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RESUME DES TRAVAUX

LE DROIT ET LES RESEAUX INTERNATIONAUX D'INFORMATION
Resume des travaux

L'cnscmble dcs travaux traitc de la relation cntrc Ie droit et les reseaux internationaux
d'information. Le premier theme dcs publications s'applique it demontrer que les rescaux
d'information posent des defis aux regles dc droit, alars que Ie second theme constate que
les regles nees des reseaux participent au developpement dcs regles de droit.
Conccrnant Ie premier theme, l'axe principal dcs travaux soulignc lcs defis poses par les
traitements des donnecs pcrsonne11es sur les reseaux transfrontieres. En particulier, les
legislations nationales divergentes en matiere de protection des donnees personnc11es sont
en con flit avec la Iibre circulation des flux de donnees sur des reseaux tnUlsnationaux et
dies creent des obstacles it cette circulation. I Au sein de l'Europe et malgre la Directive
9S/46/CE sur I'harmonisation de la protection dcs donnees personne11es, d'importantes
divcrgenccs subsistent cntre les legislations dcs Etats Membres. 2 Aux Etats-Unis, en
I'absence de principes fondamentaux similaires it ceux du droit europeen au sein du
systeme juridique americain, la protecticn de la vie privee rclevc d'un regime complexe
ct fragmentairc 3 Ces divergences impOliantes entre les systemes amcricain et curopecnqui n~sullent de diiTerences plus anciennes tenant it la philosophle politique et aux
theories constitutionne11es de chaque pays4 - font obstacle aux flux transfrontieres de
donnees sur les reseaux 5 Les travaux proposent un certain nombre de solutions tant au
niveau americain qu'europeen. 11s preconisent, nota111ment, I'adoption d'une legislation
de base aux Etats-Unis, 6 et proposent s'agissant des flux transnationaux, une solution
composite comprenant une approche contractuelle basec sur unc responsabilite solidaire
des exportateurs des donnees 7 (solution retenue rccemment par la COlllmission
europeenne), I'utilisation de moyens technologiques pour ameliorer l'harmonisation,8 et
la conclusion d'un accord international." Le second axe des publications faitune analyse
des defis que pose l'Internet it la reglementation des activites economiques. Ces travaux
tentent d'expliquer I'emergence de regimes favorables au commerce Clectronique aux
Etats-Unis, par Ie biais, notamment, d'un renforcement de la protection de la propriete
inte11ectue11e et de plusieurs rMonnes du droit c0111mercial. JO L'aspectle plus interessant
de celle protection juridique estune tcndancc it offrir une protection accrue aux llloyens
technologiques susceptibles, it te1111e, de fixer les standards et de determiner ainsi les
rcgles du commerce electronique. Celle « privatisation » des regles souleve de gran des
difficulles pour assurer un equilibre protecteur des interets des consommateurs et des
.
II
cltoyens.
Concernant Ie sccond theme, I'axe principal des travaux elabore une theorie des
nouveaux modes de reglementation des flux d'infonnation. Dans la societe de
l'information, Ie droit se trouve de plus en plus COnClllTenCe par d'autres sources
normatives. 12 En particulier, les protocoles tecJmiques et les choix technologiques sont
designes comme un impOitant systeme de « lois» de la societe de I'infollnation. 13 Dans
Ie 111eme (emps, les ac(eurs des rcseaux, tels que les grands fou111isseurs de service,
imposen( des codes de conduite agissant, en quelque sorte, comme une loi privce. 14 Ces

nouvelles sources 1l00111atives sont interdcpcndantcs. 15 Cette lex informatica est en outre
susceptible scrvir ou desservire I'interet public. I!> Par consequent, i1 indispcnsab Ie quc In
loi encadre les d6ve\oppements tcchnologiques, afin de garanlir une prise en compte de
I'interet public et des valcnrs dCl1locratiqucs clans la mise en (J;!llvre de regles n01111atives
d'ordre technique. I?
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L'Internet et ses flux d'information numerisee
bouleversent Ie droit et la stabilite juridique. Le cyberespace et
son reseau mondiaI, composes de petits reseaux et d' ordinateurs
«tisses dans une sorte de grande toile d' araignee» reposent sur
une dematerialisation et une delocalisatioll des activites
6conomiques et sociales l . Au niveau technique, I 'architecture de
l'Internet permet aujourd'hui une liberte absolue des flux
d'information. Le n"seau recherche une infrastructure OU
l'information atteindrait sa destination en ignorant tout obstacle.
Aujourd'hui, toutes les activites (dnternautes», lelles que la
transmission des messages electroniques, des images et des
sons, ou les transactions commerciales, ne constituent que de
I'information numerisee. Cette information numerisee est
decoupee en petits morceaux afin de circuler sous forme de
paquets de donnees sur les reseaux de telecommunication avant
d'elre reconstitu6c une fois sa destination atleinte. Deux paquet,
de donnees ne prendront generalemenl pas Ie meme chemin et
I' origine des informations reste parfois inconnue. Le contenu de
ehaque paquet de donnees, pris isolemenl, n' a pas de sens en
soL Il faut rassembler tous les paquets de donnees d'une
transmission pour d6chiffrer I'information.
La f1uidite de I'information pose un deft incontournable
aux regimes juridiques. Les paradigmes classiques de la
reglementation
frontieres souveraines et classification des
activites par la loi
sonl remis en cause2 • L'infonnation et ses
traitements ne respectent ni les frontilm::s territoriales ni les
classifications juridiques; I' infrastructure demande que
!'information circule partout dans le monde virtuel et ne fait pas
de distinction selon le type d' activite concernee. Bien sur, il
serai! possible de creer une infrastructure qui prenne en compte
Voir Reno c, American Civil Liberties Unioll, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (l997)j
FRANCE, Rapport de fa: missioll irttermiulsterielle ,'Our l'Internet du 16 mars
au 16 juin J996 presidee pal' Mrl!e 1, Falque~PierroJin> Pl'. 9~J8 (disponlble le

4 ju'n 1997 sur l'lnlernct ~u <hltp:llwww.tclecoU).gollv.fr/franyals/
activ/tcchno!rapfalq00.htm»; Frederic MORA, La bible Internet. Pads,
Addjs:on.-Wcs[cy France, 1995; Christian HUITEMA, El Dieu crea
l'Internei.,., Pads, Eyrolles. 1996,
2

Voir PJerre TRUDEL, Franee ABRAN, Karim BENYilKHLEF et Sophie
HEIN, Droit d" Cyberespace, Montreal, t"litions Th;!mis, 1997, PI', 5·9; Joel
R. REIDENBERG, «Governing Nelworks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace»;
(1996) 45 EmO/)' L. 1. 911, 913·916.
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les besoins specifiques de certaines activite" mais la
classification reste incommode el meme difficile. Se jouant des
frontieres, Ie cyberespace favorise l' acces universel a
l' information.
Paradoxalemenl, au moment meme ou I'Internet remet
en cause les paradigmes traditionnels de la reglementation, Ie
cyberespace necessite une regiementation stable et equitable
afin de promouvoir son developpement au service des citoyens 3 .
Les interets politiques requierenl des regie. stables afin de
proteger les droits fondamentaux des citoyens tels que la
protection de la vie priv6e, Ie droit it I'expression au Ie droit de
la propriete4 La protection des normes sociales exige aussi une
certitude reglementaire. Par exemple, une communaute doit
connaitre la definition precise des actes criminels. Au niveau
pratique, les interets economiques on! aussi besoin de regles
bien definies. De meme la concurrence et la protection de
I'inveslissement necessitenl un cadre bien defini. Le debat
portant sur les noms de domaine sur Int.ernet illustre bien ce
probH~me : Comment proteger une marque dans Ie cyberespace?
Comment d' autre part attribuer cette res source rare - les noms
de domaine?
Malgre la confusion et l' incertitude, une reglementation
existe deja dans Ie cyberespace. Cependant, I'encadrement
reglementaire de I'information doit trouver ses points de repere
dans un monde sans frontieres et sans matiere. Nous allons done
analyser la situation reglementaire dans Ie eyberespace (I) et
ensuite reehercher une coherence parmi les regles appJieables
(II),

.3

Voir Declaration JJ1il~is1f1rielle., Conference de Bonn, 6~8j\Jmol J997. Para.
20-24 «hUp://www2.echo.luibonnlfinalfr.hlml»; WHITE HOUSE. II
Framework for Global ElecJronic Commerce, July 1, 1997.
<http://www,iitLnisLgov/eleccomm/ecomm.httn> (reeommandation des
principes du secteut prive); Joe) R. REIDENBERG et Francoise GAMET~
POL, <~The Fundamental Role of Privacy and Confidence in a Network
Environmenh/, (1995) 30 Wake Forest Law Review 105.

4

VoIr Neil Weinstock NETANEL, «Copyright and it Democratic Civil
Sociely», (1996) 106 Yale L. J. 283; Paul M. SCHWARTZ. «Privacy "nd
Participation: Personal lnfonnation and Public Sector Regulation in the
Un;'ed Stale,,,, (1995) 80 Iowa L. Rev. 553; Spiros SIMlTlS, «Reviewing
Privacy in an1nfonnation Soeiety!), (1987) 135lJ. Pa, L. Rev. 707,
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Vincertitude des regles appJicables

Le cyberespace est confronte a un cadre reglemelltaire
complexe oil I'on decouvre nne mllltiplieite de regles provenant
de sources differentes et une ambigulte quant iI leur
applications. En effet, nous sommes face 11 une situation qui
n'est <mi Ie vide, ni Ie plein mais l'enfer»6. Aujourd'hui, la
reglementation du cyberespace provient de trois sources. La
plus classique est Ie droit. mais il y a aussi une serie de regJes
issues des coutumes et usages des participants aux reseaux.
Finalement, les normes et les contraintes de la technologic
creent tout un regime de regles -Ia Lex Informatica7 . AI'heme actuelle, aucune de ces sources lle nous offre un cadre
ideal presentant des regles sallS ambigulte et sans contradiction.
La juxtaposition de ees trois regimes est au contraire a la source
d'une concurrence qui ajoute 11 I'incertitude des regles du
cyberespace.

A.

La fluidite du droit

Le droit et la loi sont tres "fluides» dans Ie cyberespace.
Cette fiuidite existe sur deux niveaux et provoque des
ambigu'ites Ires importantes. Premierement, Ie classement d'une
activite dans un domaine du droit est loin d'etre clair. Le
traitement d'une merne information peut irnpliquer et faire
chevaucher plusieurs regles juridiques. Le traitement
d'informatiolls nominatives, par exemple, concerne a la fois les
lextes sur la protection des donnees, les lois sur I a propriete
intelJectuelle, er les lois concernant les telecOInmunications. En
effet, la protection des renseignements personnels accorde des
droits aux individus concernes par Ie traitement d'inforrnations
nominatives et impose des responsabilites aux acteurs de ce
5

Voir FrCdedquc OLIVIER ot Erie BARBRY. «Des rCSCIWx nux autoroutes de
l'information; R6voltnion techninue? Revolullon juddiquc? L - Dc
I'utiIisatIon des reseaux», J.c.P. 1996.1.3926; FrCderi,que OLIVIER el Eric
BARBRY, {(Des reseaux <lUX aularoHies de I'information; Revolution
technique? Revolution juridique? 2. - Du contenu infQfImltiorlilel sur ks

reseaux», J.C:P. 1996.1.3928.
6

Alain BENSOUSSAN (dir.), Internet; aspecJs juridiqucs, Paris, Henne:s,
1997, p. 11.

7

Voir Joel R. REIDENBERG. «Lex Informatica; TIle Fornwlation of
Information Policy Rules through Technology», (1998) 76 Texas L Rev, 553,

138

LES INCERTITUDES DU DROIT

UNCERTAINTY AND THE LAW

traitement 8, la protection du droit d'auteur accordc des droits
d'exploitation exclusifs aux auteurs d'illformation 9 ; cnfin, les
regles de telecommunication et les accords internationaux de
Iibre echange en matiere de telecommunication s'appliquent aux
transmissions et assurent une liberte des flux d'information IO ,
En meme temps, ce ehevauchemenl de classification permet de
ehoisir sa categoric et de manipulcr Ja loi applicable ll ,
Deuxiemement, au-dela des ambigultes de classification
juddique, Ie champ d'application des lois dans Ie cyberespace
est mal defini. Les traitements sophistiques de I'information
dans un reseau decentralise er dynamigue rendent a priori
complexe ,'application des definitions juridigues. Par ex empIe,
les lois de protection des donnees personnelles s'appliquent
typiquement aux informations concernant des personnes
«identifiees ou identifiables»12. Cette detinition ne convient
guere aux adresses IP13 Sans complement d'information, un
site web qui revoit un visiteur ne pourra pas identifier la
pcrsonnc par son adresse IF quand cc numero change d'une
seance 11 l'autre sur l'Intetnet I4 . Ce site n'aura acces qu'a un

8

VOl! Loi sur ta pro/cerioll des renseignement,'i personnels dalls Ie sectcur
prive. L.R.Q,. 1977, c, P-39.l: Directive europeenne 95146iEC (24 Oct. (995).

9

Voir Pien" TRUDEL, F. ABRAN, K. BENYEKHLEF el S. HEIN, op.
note 2, chap. 16.

10

Voir: Accord gcruira! sur let tarif,! douaniers ct fe commerce de 1994 (GATr
lie 1994), Annexe IB: Accord general sur Ie commerce des services, Annexe
sur les telecommunications, art. 5 (d) (Doc, MTNIFA II·,AIB)
<http://www •wlo .orglw(,,/lrendlliegalf11 egal f. hun>.

11

cit.,

Paul Edward GELLER, «Conflicts of Law in Cyberspace: lnte(nationaj
Copyright in a Digitally Networked World», dans P. Bernt HUOENHOLTZ
(dir.), nrc Fwu/'c of Copyright in a Digital Environment, La Huyc, Kluwer
Law International, 1996) p. 27. aux pages 30<31.

12

Voir Directive europeenne 95146/EC, art. 2(8).

13

L'adJesse IP ou lnternet Protocol est l'adresse qui identifie rQrdinaleur en
ligne IOl'-l> d'une seance sur rIntemet. L'nc:iresse peut etre <<fixe)) et done
l' ()rdinateur aura toujours 1a lu-eme adresse CPID,QlC pour un nmnero de
telephone. L'adresse peut Btre (,rlynamique». et }'ordinateur aura une adresse
differenle lars de chaque usage de I'Internet. L'arlresse dynamjque est Ie cas
le plus frequent ehez les fournisseurs d' accC!;,

14

'Joel R. REJDENBERG ct Paul M, SCHWARTZ, Oil-line Services and Dala
ProJect/on and Privacy .. Regula/ory Respol1ses. Bruxelles. Eur, Off.
Publications 1998.
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numero qui correspondra au fournisseur d' acces. Pour Ie site qui
traite r information, l'identite du visiteur est inconDue. Par
contre, Ie fournisseur d'acces, lui, saura identifier l'utilisateur.
Cette situation rend compte de la difficulte de I' application de la
loi dans ce monde nouveau.
La publicite medicale iIlustre aussi Je probleme du
champ d' application. En general, la pUblicite medicale est
soumise a une reglementation juridique tres stricte afin de
proteger les consommateurs de medicaments 1s . En meme
temps, la diffusion de I'information scientifique n'est liee a
aucune reglementatioll etatique bormis celie du droit de
propriete inlellectuelle I6 . De ce fait, la diffusion sur Ie World
Wide Web d'informations concernant les medicaments pose un
certain nombre de problemes. Est-ce qu'une information
disponible au grand public sur Ie World Wide Web a une
finalite publicitaire ou une finalit6 scientifique? La
determination reste incertaine. Deux criteres semblent
importants pour en juger: la qualite d'information et sa
diffusion. Par exemple, une information sur les avantages d'un
nouveau medicament publiee dans une revue medicale ayant
une diffusion restreinte ne pose pas de probleme quant 11 son
caractere scientifique. La mCllle information sur l'Internet
devient une diffusion au grand public au lieu d'une diffusion
restreinte dans la communaute scientifique. Cette difference de
diffusion remet en cause Ie classement de I'information
(scientifique ou publicitaire) et necessitera une analyse tres
cOlltextuelle. La certitude diminue!
De plus, le role du droit international economique est en
plein developpement dans Ie cyberespace. L'Orgallisation
Mondiale du Commerce, I'Organisatioll de la Cooperation et du

15

Aux Etals~Unis. par exemplc, fa: Food and Drug Commission veiUc a 1a
protection des consommatcurs landis gu'cn France 13 C01fHuiss:ion
Consultative- de In Publicite Medicale it comme misSion Je eontrOle des
publicites de medicaments.

16

La Hber16 d'expression protegera ces communications u'infonnation
medical!!. Voir auts! Yves BRULARD et Plerre DEMOLIN, «Lcs transactions
commereiales avec les conSolnmateurs Sur Interneb,> dans Etienne
MONTERO (oir.), Cahiers du CR.I.D. : 'ntemet Face au Droit, Namur,
Story Scienta, 1997. p. 1. aux pages 10",14 {discutant gcneratemen~ 111
communication pubHcitaire ei. non publicitaire),
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D6veloppement Economique et l'Organisation mondiale de la
Propri6te IntelIectuelIe recherchent leurs roles. L'OMC,
nouvelle institution du droit intemational economique depuis les
accords GATT 1994, se voit attribuer une mission de contrOle
des flux d'information. L'accord sur les services et son annexe
de telecommunications 17 obligent les parties conlractanles 11 ne
pas restreindre la liberte de circulation de I'information. Une
derogation existe pour la protection de la vie privee J B, mais
toute derogation doit etre con forme au principe de <da nation la
plus favorisee» (most favored nation)19. L'interpretation de la
derogation manque de clart6 et est soumise a la juridiction du
tribunal de I'OMC. En meme temps, I'OCDE commence a
elaborer les principes juridiques pour Ie cyberespace. En 1997,
I'OCDE a promulgue des lignes directrices sur la cryptographie.
ees !ignes directrices ont un caractere facultatif et ne pretendent
pas au statut de loi. Elles s'inserent cependant dans un vif debat
entre protection de la vie privee et la protection de la surete
de I'Etat; elles jouent un role normatif dans Ie sens ou
I'expression de I'OCDE merite une attention particuliere dans
ses pays membres. A I'heure actuelle, I'OCDE lance aussi un
programme d' elaboration d' autres principes sur Ie commerce
6lectronique20 . Pendant que ees deux organisations s'ouvrent au
cyberespace, rOMPI prend part aux enjeux. Depuis decembre
1996, I'OMPI a ollvert 11 la signature lin traite sur Ie droit
d'auteur dans I'economie d'information 21 . En 1997, I'OMPI
s' est aussi lancee dans Ie debat sur la reglementation des noms
de domaines sur l'InterneI22 ,

ta

17

General Agreement O.D Tariffs and Trade. Annex ID : General Agreernent on
Trade in Services (GATS) & Annexe on TelecomlnnnicatioDs, (MTN/FA lJ ..
AlB) <hitp:/lwww.wto.orglJegaJlfill.lact.blm>.

18

ItT" arL XIV (Q)(ii) & Annex on TelocOlnmuniclllions, article 5 (d).

19

[d.• art. II.

20

Par exemple. i'OCDE pr6pare Un sommet a OHawa en mltomne 1998. Ce
sommet des mlnistres va c-onsiderer les }ignes: directrices de Ia protection des
consommateurs dans Ie cyberespace,

21

OMP!. Trait. (/~ I'OMP[ sur Ie droit d'auteur, CRNRIDC/94 (a~ople pat I.
ConfercD,ce d,iplom~tique Ie 20 diScembre 1996), <http;/Iwww,wipo.org/frel
dipleonfldiSlrib/94dc.htm>.

22

Voir Oh1Pl, Processus de consullatiOJ1S sur les noms de domnincs de
I'Imemet, <http://www.wipo2.wipoJntlproccsslfre/processhmnc.htm.i>.
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C-ette diversite des sources et des regles ainsi que leur
application introduit des ambigultes dans les solutions
juridiques des problemes sociaux et economiques. D'une part, la
fluidite impose une concurrence parmi les regimes juridiques et
chaque regime cherche a trouver une solution en meme temps 23.
D'aulre part, toute solution juridique semble compromise par la
possibilite d'un chevaucbement des droits. Par ex empie,
I'application aux services en ligne du principe de la protection
de la vie privee est compromise 5i une loi sur la protection de la
propriete intellectuelle accorde un monopole d'acce5 et
d'exploitation a une banque de donnees24 .

B.

L'emergence des coutumes et usages

Les coulumes et usages de l'Internet constituent un
systeme de regulation tres important. Cette deontologie de
l'Internet est aussi en plein developpement. Les fournisseurs
d' acces ct leurs adherents, par exemple, elablissent des regles de
conduite pour leurs activites25 . Les abonnes de Wanadoo ou
d' AOL n' Ollt pas acces aux discussions USE]'I.'ET sans un
accord du fournisseur de service. En meme temps, la
<metiquette», ou principes de bonne conduite, a emerge afm de
contrOler Ie comportement des citoyens du cyberespace26 . Ces
coutUlnes et usages existent grace a un certain consensus des
acteurs du cyberespace. Les participants acceptent et contribuent
11 I'emergence de ces regles 27 .

.a cntreprendre un role dam; Ie

23

NOlls voyons eet cffct dans l'efTort de l'OMPJ
dtbat sur !es noms de domaines,

24

Joel R. REIDENBERG, Multimedia as a New CllaUellge and OppoJ'lunitl' in
Pdvacy : The Examples of SQund and lmage Processing, dans Sy~nposium ;
MuHim.cdi. and Data Protection, 22 MATERIALlEN ZOM
DATENSCHUTZ. 9·12 (Berlin Data Proleclion Commission: aout 1995),
<http://www,datensehutz..fJer)jn,dc>,

25

Pour Uhe analyse des politiquclI' des fourni:sseurs d'Roces americalns, voir
<h~tp:ltwww,cdl,orglprivacyfonlinc_services/chart,h1Jnb.

26

Voir P. TRUDEL. F. ABRAN, K. BENYEKHLEF ct S. HEIN, op. cit.• nole
2, pp. 3·41
3·.62; Arlene RINALDI. The Net: Uscr Guidelines and
Netiqucue, <bttp:/lwww,enid,orglenidsehoolslcoicnidhighllnternetITUTORI
AL/jndex.htm>.

27

Voir Ejan MACKAAY ~ «Les nouveaux environncn)cnl!> informatiqucs et Jeur
droib>, dans Jacques FREMONT et lenn·Paul DUCASSE (dir.), Les

a
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Au niveau international, l'autoregulation pose un defi
considerable a la stabiEte des rcgles. Dans un regime
d'autoregulation, Ie droit positif laisse aux participants du
reseau leurs propres moyens de faire executer leurs regles. Le
gouvernement americain insiste sou vent sur sa preference pour
des solutions autoregulatrices dans Ie cyberespace 2B . Cette
position repose sur des arguments de flexibilite et de precision
des solutions autoregulatrices par rapport aux solutions
etatiques. D'autres structures politiques telle la proposition
fran~aise d'une Charte de l'Internet29 ont aussi ete seduites par
les avantages de flexibiEte et de precision. Bien que
I' autoregulation n' ait pas force de loi, eUe a une portee juridique
dans la mesure ou toute fausse information constituera un delit
de fraude. Ces regles proven ant des coutumes et usages trouvent
egalement un support juridique dans Ie droit civil; I'autorite
publique sanctionne les ruptures de contrats et les atteintes aux
bonnes moeurs ou a I'ordre public.
C.

Le developpement de la Lex Informatica

L' aspect Ie plus original des cadres reglementaires du
cyberespace reside dans les choix techniques de son
infrastructure (par exemple, protocoie de transmissions,
commutation, pIan des logiciels, etc.). La technologie impose
ses contraintes aux flux d'information. Ces contraintes et ces
choix d' architecture ont des consequences reglementaires
fondamentales sur les activites des acteurs du cyberespace 30 • La

auloroutes de ['information: efljeux et defts, Montreal, Editions Les chemins
de la Recherche, 1996, p. 123.
28

WHITE HOUSE, op. cit., nole 3.

29

Proposition de Charle de i'Internet : Regles et usages des Acteurs de
[,Internef en France (mars, 1997) (disponible Ie 15 lJlal 1997 sur i'Internet a
<htlp:llwww.pla.nete.netlcodcw Inlernet/ccode2.htmb). Celte Charle est Ie
resultat d'une mission confiee a Antoine Beaussant par Ie ministrc Fran(;ois
Filion en oetobre 1996. Voir ,,<lnternet: la voie d~ l'auloregu1ation», Les
Eeho.f, 22 mai 1997. Son avenir est toujours contest6 par les parLicipants, Voir
Compte rendu de la reunion du 24 avril 1997 de fa Commission juridique
(disponible Ie 17 mai 1997 sur rInlernet ij <hup:llwww.planete.net/codc~
inlernetlCR240497.html».

30

Voir l.R. REIDENBERG, loco elt,. nole 7, Voir aussi Lawrence LESSIG,
«Reading the Constitution in Cyberspaee», (1996) 45 Emory L.J, 869, 896~
897 et http://www.Jaw.emory.edu/EU/volumesisum96flessig.html,
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technologie peut imposer des droits qui depassent les limites des
regles juridiques notamment dans Ie domainc du droit d'auteur.
Par exemple, la loi peut autoriser Ie «reverse engineering» par
l'utilisateur d'un logicieJ3l, landis qu'une protection technique
interdit eette utilisation par ailleurs licite32 En effet, les choix
technologiques et les regles qui en decoulent sont de fait des
droits aux flux d'information et constituent une Lex
Informatica 33 •
Par rapport aux coutnmes et usages, la Lex l'1formatica
provient d' une source differente. Tous les utilisateurs de
l'Internet participent au developpement des regles
coutumieres 34 . La netiquette, par cxell1plc, s' est developpee sur
la base d' un consensus entre des participants aux discussions sur
l'Internet. Par contre, l'elaboration de la Lex 11'!formatica ne
depend pas de la participation de tous les aeteurs de I'lnternet35 .
Ce son! les specialistes seuls qui decident des regles dans les
forums tels que l'IS0C, J'IETF, et l'IANA. Les t.echniciens
choisissent la mise en oeuvre des protocoles techniques 36 . Les
citoyens a qui ces regJes s'appliquent ne participent pas de
fu\,on directe a leur d6veioppemenl. Une des rares exceptions se
trouve dans Ie deveioppement du code de traitement des
donnees per sonne lies par I' Association Canadienne de
Normalisation 31 , Ce code qui devien! desormais une norrne

31

Par exemple, I. deci,;on Sega linterprises c. Accolade. 977 F.2nd 1510 (9th
Cir. 1992) autorJse une copie el I'nnalYRc du logiciel sans la permission de Ia
perSOlllle quj appartiennent les drofts d'auteur, Le mfune principe liC trouvc
aussi dans la Dircetlve cUl'op6enne sur 13 protection du Iogiciel. Voir Direclive
91/2501EEC, arL 6 (refus de pro1ection nux aspects d'intcroperabilile des

a

logiciels).

32

Les codages des inoyens de cryptographic sout des protections techniques
dans ce sens,

33

I.R. REIDENBERG, lac. cit., note 7.

n

34

Voir E. MACKAAY.loc. cil .• nOle

35

l.R. RBIDENBERG, loc. cit.• note 7.

36

La mise cn oeuvre representc un c1Ueu huporlant. PIes el P3P existent en lanl
que concepts teGbnolog\ques depuis 1995 el 1996; mais ni l'un nl l'autrc
n'existe cn tanl que norme bien utilisee sur "Internet.

37

Voir ASSOCIATION CANADlENNE DE NORMALISATION. Code type

,'jur la protection des renseignements persrmncfst

CAN-CSA~QS30~96.

<.http://www.csa.ca/frcncbffr_producL_serviccs/ps_copyrigbt.html>.

1996
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technique 1t I'issue du processus de l' ACN a ete elabore avec la
participation d'une echelJe de participants, comprenant des
experts non techniques.
Le developpement de cette Lex Informatica existe deja
dans I'expression des protocoles de traitement d'information. La
norme PICS (<<Platform for Internet Content Selection») et son
cousin technique P3P (<<Platform for Privacy Preferences» p8
offrent des methodes de dabeUsalion» ou etiquetage de
traitement d'infonnation. PICS propose un protocole qui permet
11 n'importe quelle personne de definir les criteres d'etiquetage
des contenus des sites web et par Ii' suite, d'attribuer un score 11
ces sites en fonction des criteres. A I' origine, l' objectif etait de
permettre I'identification des sites pornographiques afin d'en
empScher I' acces aux enfants. P3P a adapte ce concept au
traitement des donnees personnelles. L'objectif est ici
d'identifier les sites qui respectent la protection de la vie privee
afin de permettre une negociation technique de I'utilisation des
donnees personnelles. D' autres techniques, telle que
I'apposition d'une etiquette comme «TRUSTe»39 aux sites dont
les pratiques sont confonnes it la protection des donnees,
permettent aussi d'idenlifier des activites des sites. Ces
etiquetages permettent, par la suite, un filtrage d'acces 11
l'information selon des criteres preselectionnes par I'utilisateur.
En effet, l' etiquetage et Ie filtrage proposeJJt UIle regIe technique
des flux d'information qui est unique pour chaque utilisateur40.
Ces regles techniques constituent un defi important au
regime juridique. Ces regles peuvent faire avancer la politique
juridique ou peuvent )'invalider. Par exemple, I'architecture de
la transmission des donnees rend Ires difficiIe Ia localisation
d'activite sur l'Internet. Un autre choix technique aurait pu
permettre une localisatioIl plus facile. L'influellce d'un regime
technique sur un regime juridique depend neanmoins de la

38

Ces deux normes viennenl de l'organiznUon World Wide Web Consortium.
Voir <htlp://www,w3c.orgIPICS> et <hup:/fwww.w3c,orgIP3P>,

39

<http://www.trusle.org/users/abouurusle,html>.

40

I.R. RElDENBERG, lac. cit., nole 7.
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configuration et de la mise en oeuvre des regles techniques 41
Sans mise en oeuvre, la technique qui pourrai! invalider une
regIe juridique n'aura pas d'effut.

II.

L'equilibre des regimes reglementaires en
concurrence

La multiplicite des sources de regiementation et
J'instabilite introduite par chacune de ces sources sont a
I'origine d'une concurrence des regimes. Un nouvel equilibre
reglementaire doit emerger qui tiendra compte de ces regimes
concurrents. D'une part, l'importance du droit diminue. D'au!re
part, la puissance des regles technologiques s'accroit. Le nouvel
equilibre de ces regimes ne pourra pas ignorer les principcs
democratiques dans Ie developpement d'un regime
reglementaire du cyberespace.

A,

La perte de I'importance du droit

L'Internet reduit l'importance des regimes juridiques. Le
droit est en concurrence avec des conlrainles liees aux autres
sources de reglementation. Notamment, la politique de
reglementation juridique chevauche la politique de la Lex
Informatica. Ce probleme est ac.tuellement au coeur du debat
sur les noms de domaines et sur la protection des marques.
L'infrastructure de l'Internet ignore l' appellation des marques
protegees. Au niveau technique, une marque protegee n'a pas de
signification particuliere el cette marque sera traitce de la meme
fa\(on qu'une autre information. De plus en plus, les
proprietaires des marques doivent. lulter afin d'assurer Ie
contrOle d'un nom dans Ie cyberespacc42 .

41

ld.; Joel R. REID ENBERG, «Th_!; Us.e of Technology to Assure Inle!"!'!el
Pdvacy : Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection», (1997) 3 Lex
Elccmmica {<http://www .1ex.~electronica,Ofg/refdenbe,html»,

42

Ponr un cas interessant ou la marque CS[ Joscrite en France et le nom de
domaine est iupcrit aux EtatsMUnis, voir Trib, gL,inst. Bordeaux, 22 juil, 1996,
no. Role: 1366196 et 1543/96, Une soci,tte. fntn9flise a depose Itt marque
(<A~lanteLcom)J a I'IntcrNip aux Etals~Dllis afin d',eviter In loi ffan~ajse qui

protege la .marque «Atlantcl» en Fnu~ce, La justice fran9aise a ordoune que la
's'ociete fr;;m~aise retire "Ie d~p6i: 'C:lJez-lntc-rNic·~ux,Etats-Un'ls. Noos troUV(}llS
a\issi ie cas ·inverse aux.Elals-Unis. UUl} societe.america.inc tie ponrm pas "Be
servir d'un serveur ell Italie ann de stocker-une.page web qUI contrefah une
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La probl<~maliquc de la loi applicable porte atteinte 11 la
force du droit. Le cyberespace remet en cause la competence
des lois tenitoriales quant 11 la matiere43 et quant a la
localisation44 . Par exemple. les criteres en droit fran«ais du droit
international prive sont : (I) localisation fondee sur Ie sujet du
rapport de droit; (2) localisation fondee sur I'objet du rapport de
droit (lex rei sitae); (3) localisation fondee sur la source du
rapport de droit (lex loci delicti)45. Le cyberespace offre deux
possibilites de localiser une activite dans Ie cyberespace : (a)
pays du serveur ou (b) pays de I'utilisaleur. Cependant, la
technologie pennet facilement une manipulation de cette
localisation. Lors des elections !egislatives en mars 1997,
I'Internet a permis un detournement de la loi fran<,:aise
concernant la publication des sondages d' opinion publique 11 la
veille du Berutin par Ie stockage de l'information sur un serveur
hors du tenitoire franyais 46 . En m<\me temps, la jurisprudence
fran9aise semble rejeter la presence «virtuelle»47 Les memes

marque appartcnant a Ia societe ({Playboy:) aux Etats~Unil::. Voir Playbo),
Enterpris,~:;

Inc. c. Clluckleberry Pu.blishing inc., 939 p, Supp_ 1032

(S.D.N.Y.1996).
43

La uum6rlsation porte de plus en plus atteinte aune qualification neUe du fond
juridjquc. Les classifications sc chevauche-nt telles que ccUes du droit des

telecommunications, de l'audiovisllcl ct des services d'inforrnation. Voir Jane
GINSBURG ct Pierrc SIRINELLl, (,Les difficu1tcs rencontrccs lars de
l'elaboration d'une oeuvre muWmedia: Analyse des droits fran~ajs et
amcrjcain») l.c.P, 1996,1.3904,

44

Voir Paul E, GELLER. loco cil" note 1L Mals lc professc~1f Vivant soutient
qulU y a tine localisation sans difficult6 en France si l'acccs du reseau se
lrouve eu Prance. Voir Michel VIVANT, «Cybermondc: Droit et droits des
reseaux», J.C.P. 1996.1.3969.

45

Voir Yves LOUSSOUARN et Pierre BOURBL, Droit international prive, SC
Cd" Par,s_ Pallo'L, 1996, pp. 159·190.

46

Plusleurs quotidiens parisien:; ont mis un lien hypertexte enlre leurs sites webs
en France el un site web aux Etats~Unis <http://wwwigeocities,comfYose
milc/6436> pourupnner acces all): rcs,u1tats ,dtt.'ll'londagcs SOFRESffribunc de
Geneve. La,publicatlon de ees sondages a etc interdite en France par 1a loi.

47

Le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Pads a eu I'occasion de se prononcer sur
une theorie du domicile vinuel dans Ie cas q'un litige opposant les ayants
droits des cha~sons ceJ~bres de Jacques BreI et de Michel Sardou et des
6(udia.nts imerna\1tes de l'ECP Cl de l'ENST qui ont mil' ccs ch£losons sur Jeur
pagcs Web,> 'La c,our a Jejete la reconnaiss_ance ~,e -eel indice d'une
communaute'virtueHe. Trib. gL lU:"1. Paris. 14 ao(U 1996. DJ9%.490. note

Gautier.
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questions se posent aux Btats-Dnis sur la competence des
cours48 De fait, ces confJits demontrent que la justice aura des
difficultes de competence pour jugcr les problemes du
cyberespace.
En terme d'instruments juridiques, Ie cyberespace pose
aussi un defi considerable. La loi a tendance it se d6veiopper
d'une maniere lente et rUJechie tandis que Ie cyberespace
evolue tres rapidement et sou vent de fa<;,on hasardeuse. Les lois
organiques telles que les lois de protection des donnees
s'appliquent avec difficulte au cyberespace49 et les lois
sectorielles se trouvent depassees par I'Internet50 . II y a aussi
une difficulte normative 11 la reglementation juridique. Le
traitement de !'information dans Ie cyberespace est decentralise,
mais I'execution des droits est fondee sur une centralisation du
pouvoir. Celie decentralisation rend la reglementation beaucoup
plus complexe. Avee une centralisation des traitement, au sein
des grandes entreprises ou des administrations, la
reglementation peut viser les acteurs et leur traitement sans (rop
de difficulte. Par contre, dans un environnement decentralise,
une r6glementation par acteur ou par activite devient tres
compliquee.

B.

La montee de la Lex Informatica

En meme temps que I'importance du droit deerolt, on
observe une montee relative de la Lex Informatica. Dans
l'incertitudejUlidique, les regles «organiques» de la technologic
dcvienncnt une source fiable de reglementation. En effet, la
decentralisation des traitements d'infonuatiol1 favorise les
regles techniques des flux d'information. Les normes techniques
deviennent les.regles de base grace 11 leul' caractere flexible. Une
norme technique pourra avoir une valeur d' ordre public ou une
force d' ordre negociabJeSl . NOll sculement ces normes
technologiques sont bien adaptees aux frontieres du reseau, mais
48

Voir Bensusan ResfauralJl Corporation c. RiclJard B. King t 126 F.3d 25 (2mL
Cir. 1997).

49

Vpir J. R. REIDENBERG et P. SCHWARTZ, of!. c'I., nole 14.

50

P. TRUDEL, F, ABRAN, K. BENYEKHLEF el S, HElN, of!. cit., note 2,

chapA.
51

.

Voir lR. REIDBNBERG, loc. cil., nole 1,581,583.
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elles permetlent grace 11 leur flexibilite I' etablissement de
«regles» sur mesure en fonetion des differcntes situations.
La Lex Informatica presente un autre atout par rapport it
l'Incertitude juridique : la Lex Informatica permet une execution
ex ante au lieu d' ex post. Cette difference accorde 11 la Lex
Informatica un avantage et un pouvoir par rapport 11 la loi. Par
exernple, les rnecanismes technologiques tels que les agents
intelligents, I' etiquetage, Ie mtrage et les certitlcats de securite
perrnettent d'assurer a I'avance Ie respect des regles de
traitement d'information. II n'y aura plus I'incertitude des
decisions de la Justice.

C,

La reprise d'une democratie dans Ie cyberespace

Les enjeux existant entre les regles juridiques et les
regJes de la Lex Informatica mettent en relief un vieux probleme
de deficit democratique. Le cyberespace tel qu'on Ie connalt
aujourd'hui est antidemocratiquc. Le processus de normalisation
des standards techniques n' est guere ouvert aux citoyens. Les
nonnes importantes comme Ie PICS et Ie P3P sont elaborees au
sein de groupes privatifs tels que W3C52. Les decisions de ces
groupes imposent les regles de participation des citoyens au sein
de la societe d'infonnation sans qu'i1s y soient representes. Ce
processus est contraire aux principes democratiques qui
accordent Ie droit aux citoyens de participer aux decisions
d' ordre reglementaire.
Pire encore, un regime de regles technologiques pennel
aussi une croissance des «info-terroristes». Dans l'architecture
actuelle, n' importe qui a la possibilite de detourner
l'infonnation ou de provoquer I'exclusion d'activites legitimes.
Les "packet sniffers» peuvent chercher les informations en
transit pour facililer leur acquisition non autorisee; les
specialistes de «spam» (des messages en gral1des quantl!es qui
ne sont ni so1licites ni desires) onl ensuite la possibilite
"d'inondef» un serveur et d' empecher les messages legitimes de
passer.

52

participcr au,;. decisions uu groupe W3C, it faut elre une institution
mcmtire qui cotisc nile sommc Importanlc. Voir <hup:llwww,w3c,orgf
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Face a cette menace pour la democratie, rEtat a une
responsabHite envers ses citoyens. Assurer la protection des
droils de l'homme ella participation des citoy~ns it la politique
esl une obligation fondamcntale de I'Etat. L'Etal a loujours Ie
pnuvoir d'imposer des sanctions conlre !OUS ceux qui se
trouvent sur son tcrritoire. Par exemple, I'Etat peut ordonner
qu'une entreprise situee sur son territnire retire de tout I'Internet
son nom de domaine sans meme se poser de question sur la
Iiceite du nom de domaine dans d'autres pays5;'. Scion
I'expression du professeur Vivant sur l'obligation des Etats dans
ees nouveaux enjeux : «L'hesitation a utiliser I'arme penale
existante releverait tout simplement ici de la complieite»54.
Cependant, l'Etat ne peut remplir ses taches en chercham des
solutions juridiques cJassiques. 55 II faut des solutions mixtes
«technojuridique". Les decisions rcgiementaires el avis doivenl
inciter la mise en oeuvre de technologies garantissant des regles
stables. En effet, <da verite n'es! pas une»56.

*

*

*

Cetle incertitude reglementaire et la coexistence de
diffcrenls regimes posent Ie probleme des limites de chacun de
ces systemes regiementaires. Ni Ie droit, ni les coutumes et
usages, ni Ia technologie, pris isolement, ne pourront resoudre
des problemes economiques et sociaux d'une fayon Cquilibree et
satisfaisante. Pour que Ie cyberespace puisse generer Ie progres
cconomique et social que nous attendolls, il faut creer un cadre
mixte afin d'eviter l'inslabilite due a la concurrence des sources
reglcmentaires 57 . Dans ce J10UVeau monde du cybere~pace, Ia
coherence des regles devient de plus en plus importante. Sans

53

Trib. gr. lust ,liordcaux. 22 juiL 1996, precile. note 42~ Playboy Entelprises
inc. c. Chucklebeny Publishing Inc., precite note 42.

54

M, VIV AN'C ({Cybcrmonde : Droit e/ drafts des

j

reseal/X>!.

loe, cit., note 44,

406.

55

l.R. RFJDENllERG, Joe. eit, note 7.

56

Michel VIVANT, «,Internet el modes de regiementUljon>', dan,<; E. MONTERO
(diL), oJ!. cil., ,m'" 16, p.21S,a I. page 226.

57

Voir P. TRUDEL. F. ABRAN, K. BENYEKHLEFei S. HEIN, OJ!. cit., note
2, conclusions.
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cette coherence, les progres apportes par Ie cyberespaee sont
Iimites.
Le rOle des Etats, des droits et des technologies dans la
creation d'un regime mixte ou «techno-juridique» neeessite une
reflexion sur la repartition des pouvoirs reglementaires. Chacnn
des regimes doit participer au cadre reglementaire. Dans cetle
perspective, la loi doit scrvir de point de depart. Elle doh se voir
allribuer la responsabilite d'etablir un certain nombre de regles
de base. Les moyens de contrOle ctatique reposent sur Ie
principe de I'application territoriale de la loi et sur l'existence
de eertains points de repere sur un territoire donne tel qu'un
serveur ou un point d'acces au reseau. Par exemple, Ie Code
civil en France note que: '<les lois de police [ ... J obJigent tous
ceux qui habitent Ie terdtoire franl(ais»58. Neanmoins, ces
moyens ne donnent pas ala loi un pouvoir efficace de contrale.
Le tTaite recent de I' OMpj59 reconnalt I' efficacite de la
technologie par rapport 11 la loi. Ce traite recherche une
protection juridique pour soutenir la protection technique de
l'information60 , En effet, les clauses du traitc etablissent une
strategie reglementaire qui encourage les solutions
technologiques en les protegeant par I'intermediaire d'un
encadrement juridique.

Dans ce cadre !nixte. la technologie ne peut plus ignorer
les consequences sociales et politiques de sa structure ou de sa
mise en oeuvre. La technologie doh se d6velopper dans Ie cadre
des debats politiques. II faut que Ie cadre «techno-juridique»
motive eGS types de developpement. Cette motivation vient
souvenl des regles juridiques. L'impositioll d'une respollsabilite
civile est un moyen efficace de promouvoir les choix techniques
qui accroissent la stabilit6. Mais ees decisions ne sont pas
faciles. SelOlj la loi americaine, par exemple, les fournisseurs de
services ne sont pas responsables des contenus qui circulent sur

58

Code civil fra:fi!rruS, arl. 3, al. 1.

59

OMP1,op. cit" nole 21.

60

!d. L'artic1e 11 encourage les

mesu~s

techniques Pl."

l'intcrdh~tion

de 1a

neutralisation des.moyens t;;:cnnoJpg_iques qut'protege91 rinfonn~tion dans un

aus~'i souticnt refficaeite de la
les parties contractantes a prevoir une protection
jurldlque pour Ies 'tatouages des CO,lltenus infor'mationnds,

cilvironnemenJ numerique. L'-a.rticle 12

teihpique en

oblig~ilnl
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leurs systemes 61 . Cette irresponsabilite financiere nous prive
d'une importante incitation 11 tout changement portant sur
l'infrastructure62 . Par contre, la 10i fran~aise impose une
responsabilite aux fournisseurs d'acces d'offrir une
infrastructure adaptee aux preferences des citoyens. La loi exige
que: «Toute persollne dOllt l'activite est d'offrir un service de
conncxion a un ou plusieurs services de communication
audiovisuelle mentionnes au ler alinea de l'article 43 est tenue
de proposer 11 ses clients un moyen technique leur permettant de
restreindre I'acces 11 certains services OU de les selectionner»63.
Al'avenir, Ie modele d'unc responsabilite des acteurs pouvant
changer I' infrastructure semble plus avantageuse.
Afin de promouvoir Ie progres economique et social et
d'eviter des consequences antid6mocratiques, il est important
que 1a Jlolitique reglementaire prevoie la responsabilit6 de
certains acteurs et points de repere. Cette respol1sabilite devrait
etre imposee en fonction de Ia capacitc II resoudre des
prohlemes tels que les atteintes a l'intimite de la vie privee ou Ie
non-respect des droits d' auteur soit par l' accomplissement d' un
acte juridique soit par Ie developpement de I 'infrastructure
technologique.

61
62
63

E[ats·Uni,. 47U.S.c' § 230.
. J.R. REIDENIlERG, loc. cit .. note 7, 583·586.

Loi n 96·659 du 26 juJi, 1996 de regiemet)tation des telficommrmicafions,
J.O. 27 iUi!. 1996, p. 11384, D. 1996.355. art. 15.
(>
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La publication en 1997 d'lln rapport de la Maison Blanche sur Ie
commerce C1eetronique 11 l'initiative de l'Administration Clinton a
declenche aux Btats·Unis lIne prise de conscience de I'importancc de
!'internet, de son essor economique et de ses defis juridiqucs (I). Cc
rapport a n£vele les lacunes du systeme en place, sur Ie plan juridiquc,
et a aussi souligne Ie besoin impcratif de rMonnes du droit americ"in.
Ce rapport proposait la creation d'un cadre reglementJire particuilerement favorable aux innovations technologiques et a J'expansion eeo·
nomique. Les propositions visaient it renforcer la confiance tiu grand
public dans Ie commerce electronique et ,t amcliorer la fiabilite tiu
res~au. Cependant Ie rcglementalion du commerce aux ("tats-Unis sc
heurte a la philosophic libera!e du pays scion (aquelle Ic rOle de I'!':ta!
doit etre aussi restrein! que possible. En outre. Ie systeme fcdemliste
america;n repan;t strictement l'exercice des pouvoirs publics entre les
differents Etats et Ie gouvernement federal. Dans ce contexte, l'l~tat
n'est pas enelin a imposer une reglementation trop contraignante de
peur de freiner Ie developpement de I'internet. La publication du I~Jp
port a dOlle ouven Ie dcbat officiel aux Blats-Unis sur Ie role du droit
face au marcM du developpemenl de l'internet et de ses services (2).
Anjollrd'llUi Ie cadre juridique de ('intemet rcste en pleine evolution.
Neanmoins, nous Jlouvons distinguer trois axes de reflcxions : Les
efforts legislatifs et jurlsprlldentie1s visent 11 renf(lrcer la protection des
echanges d'infonnation en ligne concernant notamment la propriete
imellectllelle, les transactions dll commerce. electronique er Ie traile·
ment des dOIlIlecs persollnelles tout en favorisan! les interSts economiques des entreprises (f). La loi ct la jurisprudence tenten! de proteger les Iibeltes des citoyens notamment la libcI1e d'expression ct In vie
}, Voir Whit(~ I-Iouse-, A Fmmeworkjol" Global Elecmmic Commen:e (.Inly 1997)
hUp;!/wwy.,.ecommcrce.govjfrarnewrk.hllil
2, V(,if' Symposium: the Legal Gild PolJ(:>, Framework for Global Elecfronic Commerce •
A Progress Report. Berkeley Technology Law Journal. lome 14, n:'> 2 (1999)
hl1p :llwww.law.berkeley.cdu/joumals/bilj/nnicles/'voI14,html
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plivce sans toutcfois r6ussir a eviter certaines contradictions. notam,
ment en ce qui concerne ces deux demiers domaines (II). Enfin, les
premieres lentHlives de solutions jnridiques dcrnolllrellt la diffieulte a
trouver un equilibre entre ia protection des activiles cconomiqucs des
cntrcpriscs et In liberle des citoyens (III).

I - LA PROTECTION DES TRANSFERTS
D/INFORMATION
Les tramfcrts d'infonnation ctlc developpcmcllt des rescaux num.:'riques sont devenus deux moteurs imporlanls de l'e,conomie ameTicaine. Pendant la pc.riode 1995·1998, Ie secteur iufonnatique a comrlbue
33,4 % de la croissance du Pm (3) ce qui a represcnte 8 % dc I'economie a Ia fin de cettc periode (4). Face it cet essor, Ie, Blats-Unis ont
tres rapidement essaye de mettre en place un regime juridique de protection des echanges d'information ct de transactions en ligne. La protcetion or In promotion des interets economiqucs ont incite Ie legislateur 1\ clargir Ie champ d'application de In protection de In propr;ete
intellectuclle (A) et a creer un cadre particulicrcment favorable au
commerce clectronique notamment par )a reconnaissance et Ia protection des contrats electroniques(B).

a

AI Un regime protecteur de fa propriete inteflectuefle
La protection de In propriete intclleetuelle releve gen6ralemcnt de la
competence dl! droit fCderalnotamment en cc qui coucerne les droits
d'auteur ct les brevets. La pression des industries d'Hollywood et de la
Silicon Vallcy a fait reagir Ie lcgislateur federal face 11 I 'emergence de
I'internet. En raison du flou juridiqlle relatif a I'application dn droit
aux infonnations numeriques, Ull nouvel ensemble de lois a ete mise
en place. eet ensemble de lois rransfonne er acerolt la protection offerte aux titulaires traditionuels de droiL, de proprietc intellectuelle.

A la suite de la conference diplomatique de l'OMP! et au traite du
20 decembre 1996 sur Ie droit d'auteur face alll( (X!uvres numeliques (5),
les Etats-Unis on! adopte la loi Digital Milleniun! Copyright Act oj
1998 (DMCA) (6). Lc gouvemement federal a present" celtc loi comme
3. US Working Gronp on Electronic Commerce, Pirsf AlJlma{ RepOf1..:, 1 (novcmbre 1998)
hllp:flwww.doc.goepaswlecommcrce/E-comol.pdf
4. llS Dept of Comrncl"cc,l'he Emerging Digital Economy 11 (June 1999), hHp:!lwww.('commer~
ce..gov/cde!repol1.lltml
5. Tmite de I'O~PI SUI le droit d'aulcur dll 20 decembre 1996 hup:/fwww.wipo,org/fre/dipl"
conf/dir;trib/94dcfe\'.hlm
6.17 Usc 1201 • Pup, L, 105-304, 112 Slat. 2860 (octobre: 28, i998)
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une modernisation du droit d'auteur et line mise en ccuvre des obliga~
lions clu traite. L'originalile du D"1CA reside dans la protection des
moyens tcclmologiques de gestion des droits d'auteuL Cetle protection
a SOil origlllc dans Ie traite. Le DMCA sanctiollne IOllle neutralisation
des mesures techniques miscs en place par les auteurs afin d'assurer la
protection de leurs ccuvres (7). Le DMCA sanctionlle cgaiement la sup~
pression ou 1:\ modification des mcmions relatives 11 la propriete des
droits sur j'(£uvre (8).lvlois cette protection depasse I'objet dn lmite et
menace eLmtrcs droits nolammenl ['exception de ':r(1ir usc" (usage
equitable.) (9), La loi inlerdit encore la fabrication de certains produitfi
perl11cttalli It' uelournemenl des protecnons nUl11eriqucs. En ee sens,
cos meslIrc, legislatives participenl un glissemen! general du droit
d'auleur, de In protection de I'ccuvre, vcrs un controle de ses moyens
de diffusion; aUlremenl elit, de I' objet infonnationnel au vecteur infor~
l11ationneL A titre d'exemple, Ie titulaire des droits sur une ccuvre
numeriquc POUlTa la diffuser avec un moyen techllologique lendant
impossible loute eopic, alars meme que certaines de ees copies seraient
Hutorisecs pHI' ['exception de AI;r use. Le eonlournement de cellc pro~
teetion, OH meme 13 simple diffusion d'infonnatiolls ou de produil permelt ant un leI contoUr!lcmel1l, constitueraient des violations des dispo~
sitiol1s dn DrvlcA sur la Hneutralisation" des moyens technique..;; de protection d8$ u:uvres numeriqucs.

a

Ace titrc. Ie champ d'application des dispositions du DMCA fait l'ob~
jet de vives critiques (10) et recemment de decisions de juslice. L'unc
des premieres affaires opposait RealNctworks, Ie createur de la tech~
nologie RcalMedia penne!!ant la diffusion sur l'intemct de pro~
grammes audio et video en temps reel (II), it son concurrent, 13 societe Streambox. RealNetworks avait developpe ct mis en place sur ses
logicicls un dispositif de Seeurile particulier pemlettant la reception
des transmissions. Le logiciel de Streambox avail ete con~u de manie~
re 11 aSSlIrer la reception des memes transmissions quc les logieiels de
RealNelworks. RcalNetworks a obtenu gain de cause en premiere il\s~
lancc, car Ie tribunal a juge cette tecbnique comme une neutralisation
7, 17 Usc J20l{a) Volt Traile de rOMPI sur Ie, droit d'alilCUf du 20 oeccmbre 1996, art. 11

8. 17 Usc 120!(b). VOir Traite de I'Or.-1Pl sur Ie droit d'aurcur 01) 200eccmbre 1996. ;\11, 12
9. Pour u"e disCllliS!On InltfreSsllnte au problematique avnni l'adoplion de 13 loi, voir Julie Coben,
Some R(if/r:Cfiw)$ on CopyriShl MawJ8t'melll SY!ofems and
Berkeley Tc-cilnology Law Jmlrn;.;! 161 (1997)

LeiV!';'

Designed to Pro/eef Them. 11

http://www,!;)w,berktky.edufjoHmais/brljiM[ides} 12~ .. liCo hen/hI ml/l.exl Juml
l~. Pamela S.unlUc!son, /lIfellecfJlul pf(lpeny And The Dit:ital EconOI1fJ
Why The Ami,
(m:umvellfioll RegutCfioflS Need 10 Be Revised,
14 Berkeley Tech. 1-. ], 519 (1999),
<.bttp:/lwwW,$lffis.bcrkt',ley.edH/-pam/papcrs/Sarnuelson_JP_dig3CQ-_htm,l)ll1l ; Julie Cohen,
Ihe Righ! to Read Anonymollsly: A CJosel' wok (!/ "Cop~vrighf Manageme/l(' ill Cyberspace, 28
CONN. L REV. 98t (1996)
lL <hup:/lwww.tcaLCOJ)louhHp:llfr.real.com/
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des protections techniques de RealNetworks (12). La cour a loutefois
refuse I'argument scIon lequel un autre logiciel de Streambox, pem1eltant la conversion des fiehiers RealMedia sous un autre format, violait
13 meme dISposition de la loi.
Lc.s socteles Napster ct MP3.com se Irouvellt aussi devant les lribuacause de leurs pal1icipalions ala diffusion de fichiers l1l11sieaux
sur i'inlerncl (13). ChaclIne de ces sodetes a developp" des technologies de diffusion de musique sur I'internet au formm MP3. Le site MP]
a fonctionne comme une sorte de bibliothCque centrale de dlsques
compact. AJa condition prc;)lable d apporter]n preuve de l'achat d'un
CD, tOUI lIlilisatcur peut telccharger les chansons au ronnat MP3 a partir du Serveur \1y.MP3.com et co, depuis n'imporlc gild ordinateur
relie irl'inlernet (14)
U<lUX

1

En revanche, Napster utilise I'architecture d'echange peer.. to .. peer
(dc pair it pair) qui permet aux utilisateurs d'echanger entre eux des
[iehier, MP3 stoekes sur leurs proprcs ordinnteurs, et nOll pas a partir
du serveur central de Napste!. 5i les deux cntreprisc> font oppel i\ des
technologies differenles en matiere de diffusion de richiers rnusieaux,
elles SQulcvcnt tmiles deux Ie probleme du champ d'application tlu
D!vlCA. Lors des prod:s en premiere instance, !'exccption de fair use a
etc rejelcc et leg entrcprises om elt~ loules deux condamnces. soit pour
violation direc!e des droils d'ameur (My.MP3.com), soit pour avoir
facili!e la violation des droits d'autcur par les utiHsateurs (Napster). Le
debat rcste ouvert dans I'attcntc de l'intcl1m;tation du DMCA par les
eours d'appel ou pal' la Cour Supreme.
La ten dance des tribunaux de premiere instance est d'inte11Jr<'lcr Ie
DMcA de fa~on extensive. Des groupes de pression d'Hollywood aWl ..
quem actuellement un site web qui diffusait un logiciel "DeeSS" ainsi
que des liens hypertextes vel'S d'autres sites web penneltant de lelecharger Ie Dccss(l5). Ce logicicl pennel Ie decodage des DVD (Digilai
video discs) afin de pouvoir les lire sur plusieurs ordina!eurs et les
transmcitre sur J'internet, dCjouant ainsi les codes inseres par ies !i!ll'
laires des droits afin de re'treindre l'utilisation de ehaque DVD. Le tribunal federal de premiere inslance a declare Ie !ogicicl Dccss illegal en
vcrtu du DMCA ot est mcme alle bcaueoup plus loin en interdisant au
site web d'affieher des liens hypertextes menant a d'autrcs sites (dOllt
cenains hoI'S des ttats-Unis) proposant Ie 10gicieL
12, RcalNclworks v. Strcambox, 2000 US Disi. LSX1S t889 (WD WA. 2000)
13. A&M Rec(lrd~ et at v. NapMt'::r, 2000 U.S. Dis!. L-EXlS 11862 {ND CA. 200m: UMcRccord~
el aL v. MP3, 92 E Supp. 2d 349 {SDhY 2000)
14. hup://www.mp3.coH1
15. VnlV(;ls<ll Studios v. Rcirncrdc5, 2000 US Dist. LtXI!> 1J 696 (SONY, 2000)
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Le site web a fait appel et plusicurs "lobbies" importants sont intervenus au proces. La confirmation de ee jugemcn! en appel aurai! un
impact considerable. en ce qui concerne la question hautement controvcrsee de la lcgalitc des liens hype.rtextcs.
Parallclcl1lemil eclte evolution de droit de la propricte intellcctuelle,
Ie 16gislatcllr et les tribunaux ont cherche aCCI'oJtre Ie champ d'applicatioll de In protection des marques. En utiJisant Ies noms de domnine
commt' moyen de commutation des eChanges d' information, l' internet
oppose 1£1 proteclion des marques
l'cnrc12islrement de noms de
dOl1luinc par des tierl'cs personncs. Une premiere rcponse a cettc
opposition est donnee dans la loi AllIi-cybcrsquolling Consumer
Profeelion ACf of 1999 (16). Cette nouvelle Joi a pour objet I'interdiction de l'enregislrcmcn! de mauv.ise foi d'un nom de domaine afin de
Ie proposer en>uite la vente au titulairc de In marque. Dcpuis la liberalisation des registres des nOmS de domaine par la creation de la societe TcANN (17), leg diff6rends entre les titulaircs du droit de la marque
et les [;tul,,;rc, de J';nscr;ption du nOm de domaine se multiplienl (18).

a

a

a

Par arlleurs, une nouvelle jurisprudence inquictnnte consiste a;;Iargir
Ie champ d'applicmion dn droit concede par Ie brevet afin de proteger
Ie, methodes de commerce (19). Celte tendance provoque un tres vif
debat (20). L.'elargisscmcnt du champ dc Ii! protection des brevets a
d'importantc, cOllsequences sur Ie dcveloppemcnt des technologies de
!'internet en general. Si de simplcs methodes 80m dcsormais protegees
par Ie brevet, les I'mis de licence qui greveront Jenr utilisation devicndrOlll un frein pour benucoup de prodllits et de services. Ce problemc
,'est deja pose lors <lu devcloppemcnt de la technologie P3P pour lit
protcctioll dc la vie privce. La societe Intennind avait depose une
demande dc brevet ponr un processus de labellisation et de filtrage.
Avant un ri~glement a l'amiabJe, sa revendication risquait d'entrainer
la suppression du P3P comme outil de I'intemct.
Cctte evolution de la pl'Oprh"te intellectuelle demontrc que les I~tats
Unis chcrchent it favoriser les vendeurs d'informations et les actems
ecol1omiques trnditionnels. L' approche americaine consiste inserer
de nouvelles dispositions dans les cadres existants. II manque 11 cette

a

Hi. PUb. L. 106· t 13, I J.3 Swt, J 50 J (29 110vcmbre, 1999)
17. C{I/Icmet Cotpoftlli()J) F)r A,,'siSHCd Names and Numbers (lC(,NN) cst Ja so:::kle a but mm

lucnl\if qui ;t tIe crece pOll\" gcrcr lc.s adJ'(~sses IP e1 Ie:; servcurs de b<'1,<;C de I'ililernet. VoiT <hftpJ/
WWW.IC1\nll.or2!£cncfa1/<lbUll!icalln.111m>
18, Voir

Ems(~"lt~!iOJ1.

Inc, <ilup:I/\Vww.eresolulion.ca

OMPI

Service de fcg!emcnl des liliges

rela!ifs aux IHmos de dOinBlfl,' hllp:llarbilcLwipo.inl!<Iomains/indcx"fr.hlmJ
19. Voir State Stru~l Bank & Trust v. Sigfl!HUfC Financial Group, !49F.3d 1368 (Frd, Cir., J998}
http://www,law,emol'y.edulredcircuit/july98f96.1327, wpd,hlml
l(), Voir Roben P, Merges, As IVinny as Sf;; Impossible P,l/enfs Before Breakfasl: Property Rights
fbr Brniness COIIC"P!S dnd Patent SyStem R.form, 14 Berkeley Tech, 1,.1. 577 (J999}
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approche nne reDexioll de fond sur les changements de la societe d' in ..
f0111131;on cl Sllr la perlinence des regimes classiqucs. L'affaire Napst"r
avec son nouveau mode de diffusion pose cette question fondamentaIe. Est .. ce un cas de simple violation des droit, dassiques par un moyen
nouveau ou est-ce Ie reDe! de nouveaux modeles ccol1omiques qui
requi~rcnt une "1Ilne approche du marche 'J

BI Des dispositifs favorables

all

commerce electroniqlJe

La politiqLll' de proteClion des illlerets economiques 5e mallifeste
ciairemcnt a travers I" mise en place de dispositifs favorables au commerce 61ectroniql1c. Ainsi, plnsteurs reglcmcllIutions Ollt eu pour bUI
de promollvoir les transactions CI la conclusion de contral;; en ligne. Dc
manihe gencmle, ecs efforts relevent de l'initiative de chaque Etat
etant donne que de nOlllbreux domaines du droit commercial, tcls que
la reglementation de.' clauses contractuelles, sonl soumis aux lois Clatiqucs. II existe neanmoins une volante d'harmoniser les dmits
au niveau federal tout en etablissant LIn seuil minimal de pmicelion
l1alionale.

En premier lieu, Ie Parlement a adoptc en 1998 une Ioi ctablissant
une sone de paradis I1scal pour I'intemet : Le Internet thx Freedom Act (21).
Cctte loj prcvoil lin moraloire de trois ans au niveau fe-dcra) qunnt a
I'nnposition des f!'als d'abonnement et d'acces a J'intemet et quant a
)'imposilion des taxes discriminatoires contre le commerce 61eclronique. Pendant la memo periode, la loi federale impose aussi Ies
memes contraintes aux Elats sur l'imposition de ces taxes. Celie exoneration ues taxes sur Ie commerce electronique favorise ainsi Ies transactions en ligne par rapport aux ventes en magasin. Bien entendll,
cette politique ne sied pas aux Rtats depourvus de revenus. Du fait de
celte loi, une commission de conseil a ete creee pour proposer des
mesures permanentes. En avril 2000, Ie rappOlt final de celte commission n'a cependant pas reussi 11 proposer des mesures definitives ell rai,
son de desaccords entre ses lllembres (22). En consequence, alors que
In fin de la periode d'exoneration approche, il semble evident que les
Etats vont commencer a imposer Ies transactions en Iigne, a I 'instal' de
III Californie, qui dispose d'ores et deja d'un projet de taxe sur les transactions en ligne,
Alors que I' <,tendue du paradis fiscal est en train de retrecir, il yexiste un mouvement !res fort en Cavelli' d'ulle adaptation du droit des

21. lntemet Tax freedom A.;t, PUll" Law 105-277 (octobJ'c 21, 1998)

22. US Advisory Commission

011

Electronic Commerce Report fo Congress (20 avril, 2000)

111Ip:/!www,ccomrne(CCCOI1)I1.itSsion.orgJaccc~['eport.pdf
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contrats all developpement des transferts cOllllllcrciaux d'infonnations. Entre 1992 et 1999, la .Vallorwi Conference 011 Commissioners
of Uniform Slale Law (NCCllSL) et I 'American Law Insri/we (Au) ont
[ravaille conjointemenl sur un grand projet de rHorme du code dc commerce (Unij(ml1 Cmnmercial Code ou lice). Celle reforme visai! en
particulicr la redaction d'unc nouvelle parlie 2B du code (Uce 2B).
L'Uec 213 devait defini. les regles applicables notml1l11enl aux contrats
de licence d' information, aUA c13uses de garnnlic de vices caches (,.l
autres clauses shrinkwrap. Elle aurai! ele appliquee aux logiciels, aux
produhs mulfimcoias, ;tux hanques de donnees et £lllX services d'information cn ligne. Les deux inslltutions I'origine de cette rMonne SOI1I
reputees pour In qualik de leurs analyses C1 de leurs projets de loi. En
regie genera Ie, NCCUSL el Ali proposent ensemble leurs projel aux
Riats pour qu'ils adojltcnt des lois uniformes. mais c'est la loi de
chaquc Rtat qui ,'applique am eontralS de ventes au de licence.

a

La redaction de I'Uec 2B posait d'enonncs difficnUes en ce qui
concernc la repartition des droils cntrc Ie propriot"ire de l'inforl113tion
et I'acquereur (23). A la suite de la forte opposition dUlllilieu des <'di"

teurs de logiciel ct de servkes d'infol1nation. des associations de
COIlSOl1lmateurs et e1u lobby de l'industrie cinemalographiquc, I' ALl a
finalemelll relire son soutien ct Ie projel loi eOllunun lice 2B a etc
abandonne. La NCc\;SL a Illalgre lout propose seule Ie Uniform
Compuler Information 1hmsoclions Acl (VellA) (24). Celte proposition a ete Ires peu favorablemC111 accueillie par les Etats. Lcs procureUrS de 26 l~tats se sontmcmc opposes au texle du projet de loi (25).
On reliendra de ce texte unC clause parliculiercmenl originale (el trou·
blanie pour bcnueoup d'enlreprises) qui dOllne au [itulaire Ie droit dc
stopper Ie fonctionnemcnt du logiciel en cas de viokition clu contrat par
I'acquereur.
Contraire11lcnt au" problCmes qu'elle a rcncontr<5s pour 13 refonne
du code de commerce, 13 KCCUSL a eu beallconp de succes sur les questions de la signature electroniqlle. En 1999. NccliSI. a propose un projet de loi uniforme sur Ie signature ella preuve eleclronique. Ce projet
cilerche 11 eviler certains obstacles aux transactions en ligne. Le but de
23. Symposium: lflfdlf'C/l1(li Property alld ConfrtJc/ Law ill (he /JlfimufJfion Age ". The Impact of
Article 28 f!{ fhe U!l~r(J/'m Commercial Code 011 the Future of Trnll:mctiom. if! Information and
Electronic C(!fllmerCt', 13 Berkeley Tech. 1 J. (1998)

IlUp:/lwww.lnw.herkelt-y.edu/joumals/bllji;lrtides!voJ 13. hi m!
24, Uniform ComplIlel' !nfinl1!atiofl Tn:lIIsoc/iol/s Act (VcrrA)
hltP://WWwJllw,up8nn.cdu!bJ1/ulc!uciw/ucila600c.h[lll; Voir ollssi, NCCUSL Surnmm),
hltp:llwww.nrxu.s!.(lfgluniformacumrnmtlrics!uniformac!s-s-uci\fl.hlm
25, Voir Letlrc des procureurs all NCClJSL du 23 jnillel 1999
<hllp://www.2bguide.com/docsn99ags.ht\Hlctl.eUre des proCU(e~i(S uu 23 juille.t 1999

http://www,2bguidcA:om/dot.:s/799mags,fuml
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certe rCfonne est la reconnaissance juridique dcs signatures electro~
Iliques et des documents elccfrolliques. Ce projet de loi. iUlilule Ie
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) (26) a ete adopte dans 22
I~tats assez rapidcmcnl (27).

MOlive par I'activile des Ie.gislateurs ,'t"tique" Ie COllgres a, ason fonr,
vote one 101 fe(lSrale, afin d'hannoniser 13 reconnaissance des signatures
electroniques a travers Ie pays (28). AUllivcau [edornl, eette ioi reconnall
llne valeur juridjque aux sign(ltufcs clectroniques et aux conI rats condus
enliglle, Celle loi aUlorisc In transmission enligne des informations prca~
1ables aux contrnts 01 precise les conditions de preuve dan, J'hypothese
au (';n[onnation est stockee sous forme 6Iectronique, La loi vise en outre
il assurer fa protection des consommatcurs, Ainsi, tout consommateur a Ie
droit de ehoisir s'j] veUl recevoir ceJ1aines infonnations 01 ,'il desire
conlnlcter en Iigne ou s'j] pretere I'echange c1assiquc de papier. Malgrc
ees objeetifs, la portee de eette loi cst limitee par Ia preference areOf(It\e
dans la 10; fed<'rale ala loi etatiql1e. Si un Etat vote I'UETA. c'est done la
loi etatiqllC qui ,'applique et non pas 13 loi fCderale (29), ('eei constitue
LIne &~rogation au principe con:::titutionnel qui accordc gCnenl1c:ment ia
priorile !I la Ioi fcderale,
Le demier pilier de la protection du commerce dectrolliqlle concer·
ne le spamming ou lc "pubtipostagc ::'1111vagc 1 ' Pour Jes pn';slalaires de
rinternet~ Ie spamming fcpresente une menace a rintegritc et fl la fia~
bilit;; du reseal! (30). Pour les l1tilisateurs, Ie spmmning est une nuisance et decourage \'utilisation dl1 coulTier 6lectronique, Afin de pro·
teger ces prestataires et de minimiser les lluisances, plusicurs Etats ont
vote les lois antispamming (par ex, Califol1lia, Maryland, Nevada,
Washington) (31), Mais, certaines decisions de justice ont annule ces
lois au motif qu'clles constituaient nne atteinle 11 la liberte d'expression
de l'expediteur (32). La legalite de ces lois antispammillg reste incer26. NC('USL, Ulli/orm Electronic TrrlllS(JCfiolls Act (1999)
hll P:/lwww,1aw,upen 11, cdu/b 11111 Jeffnacl99/ I9905/ue1 a99, h! III
27. Voir NCCUSL !lllp://ww\,/.nccus!.orgjunifonnac/...faClshcels/unifonnac!$-fs"ucw,hlm
28. E{eclfVllic SigfT()lIIrt!s i/1 Global and NOliOJwl COll1l17cn:e Aer, Pub. Law 1O()·229, June 30,
2000 hup://www.ccommcrce.gov/ecomnewsiEJectronicSignalures~s761 .pdf
29. Pub, Law 106~229. Sec, 102, Voir Patricia 13rumfield Fry, A Prelimillary tlluj/ysis f<f Peden)/
wui SfMC Elec-"iI'Ql!ic COllllllUee Uf'''''' Nalional Co
lutp:/}www.nccusLorg{tipiforrnacl ..urtkleS/unlform':ICIs.-Mlic)e-ucla,hlm
30. Vojr Lorrie Faith Cranor el Brlan A. LaMacchia. ,)/)(fm.l Commlmic()fiO!1s of file AC"M Vol. 41.
N".8 (Aug. 1998), Pages 74·f;3 hHp;f/www.ltcm.orglpubs/dtations!jouma!s/I;lIcln/1998-418/p74-r,ranor!
31. Pour Ie:! re:>l!11U!S et textes des lois voir h(lP:/lwww.~pamiaws.cQm!sta(etSl.;lllmary.html
32. Ferguson v, Friendfindcr. Cal. Sup, COllft, June 7. 2000
<hllp://www.law,washingtoll,edu/LCr!filcs/Cal_spanLdccisJoll_pdf
Siale ofWashing(on v. Jason Heckel, d/b/a Naturallnstincts, N". 98-2-25480·7 SEA (WaSh.
Super. Cn" King Co" March 10,2(00)
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laine. Ncanmoins, on voit cmerger une jurisprudence qui protege Jes
fournisseurs de service en se fondant sur des regles tirees nolIllnmcnl
du droit de]a concurrence deloyale OLl de la doctrine du trespass (pmlegeanlla propriete privec) appliquee allX systemes infonnatiqucs (33).

II - LA PROTECTION DES UBERTES DES (HOYENS
La reglementation de l'inlemcl pose un deri par rapport aux libert"-s
dcs citoyeus. La prolcction des libertos esI un oujcl trcs imporlant dans
les discussions du cadre juridiquc de l'intcl11ct aux [ilals-Unis. ScIon
la philosophic politique et cOl1stitlltionnelle americaine, la libelte des
citoyens doil etrc protegee contre les atteilltes des jJouvoirs pUblics. La
mise en pratique de cette philosophie semble pourtant incoherente ir
cerlains egards. Le legislatcur pm'ait tester ses pouvoirs en votant des
lois sur la libertc d'expression que la justice ne peut pas accepter (A).
Un va·et·vient entre Ie pouvoir judiciaire et Ie legislateur s'cnsuit alors,
sans aboutir it une conclusion definitive. En memc temps, In poIitique
al11ericaine en matiere de protection de la vie privee comporte d'impOI1antes laCUDes (B).

AI La jurisprudence en faveur de fa fiberte d'expression
Un point important de la politique americaine en matiere de libene
d'expression est Ja preoccupation que pose l'intemet quan! au tmfic de
donnees pornographiqllcS. La volante du Congres america in est Il'intcrdire la propagation de la pOl11ographie sur ['internet. Vexemple Ie
plus celebre est celui du Communicatio/ls Decency Act (em,) (34).
Cette loi a tente d'interdire la transmission de "materiel obscene".
Confrol1lee pour la premiere [ois lII'internet, la Conr Supreme a annuIe cene partie de la loi dans sa decision Reno v. Aclu 11 calIse d'une
definition Imp vague du temle "maleriel obscene" et de la difficulte
qu'aurait posee son applicalion aux editcurs de l'internel (35). Selon
la Cour Supreme, une telle imprecision dans les tennes utilises n'est
pas oonforme aux regles du droit cOllstiwtionncl du Premier
Amendement (1a celebre disposition sur la libertc d'expression) car
l'interdiction concernee mlrait aJors une portee plus large qne la 1'01'nographie iUegalc. La tendance de la jurisprudence actuelle est d'accorder une liberte d'exprcssion absolue. Depuis ]'annulalion du
Communications Decency Acl, tout cssai tcndant a restreilldre 1cs flux
d'illfol'malions alIcctant 'les bonnes mceurs echoue face au Prelllier
33. VOir hnp;iiinvw.jl\iJ~,edujcybe,llcllses/spal\),IHIfII
34. hnp:l!frwcbgalc.acccss,,gpo.gov/cgi ..bjn!useflp.cgJ'lIPaddrcsso:;;wais.ac<:css.gpo.gov&filename=publl 04. pdf&d irectofl':,o:/diskcJwal s/data/l 04~..cong_p ubi i c_1 aws
35. hUp://laws,findl<i\\\\:om/us!OOOJ96.511.11tml
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AmcndemcnL Un cxcmple cst celui de la 10; Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) (36), Le but de la CPPA est de proteger
les m;neurs en in!erdisant toute transmission d'imagcs pornographiques d'cl1fants qu'elles soient r<~elles au virtucllcs, Certaines cours
d'appel fCderales souriennent cette 10i (37), mais une cour d'appel I'a
annuJee en jLlgeant que Ie droit constitutionncl exdul tOll1e interdiction
quant aux images virtuelles ou representalion fictive des mineurs (38),
Le champ de la liberle d'exprcssion est d'aillcurs tres large aux l~lats
Unis, Dans une autre M~rie de jugcments, Jcs COUl'S federales 0111 meme
alllllM des deerels cmp6chant l'exportation dc la cryptographic. Les
cours assimilenl Ia cryptographic a I 'expression poliliqnc el soutiennent sa librc application (39),

B/ Les facunes de fa protection de fa vie privee
La circulation des donnees personneUes sur l'intemet representc une
rupture du regime amcl"icain par rapport a ses racinGS. En matiere de
protection de la vie privec, Ie eadre juridique esl complexe dl! fait du
systeme federal, La Constitution federale n'accorde pas explicilemcnt
un droit a la protection de la vic privee, Mais, les "Amcndemcnts" (Bill
of Rights), notamment Ie Premier Arnendcment (libenc d'expression),
Ie Qualrieme Amendcment (recherche el perquisition) el Ie Cinguiemc
Amcndcment (auto·incrimination), protegent Ie citoycn contre l'Etal,
L'intcrpretation de ces clauses par lajurisprudence de la Cour Supreme
va dans Ie sens d'nne protection de la vie privee, surtout en ce qui
cOncerne les Iibertes individuelles (40), Mais cette protection ne
concerne que les violations resultant d'une action des pouvoirs publics,
Jusqu'it present, aucun jugementn'a cOl1saere un droit fondamental a
I'autodetennination quant aux donnees personnclles, Ell revanche, la
jurispmdellcc du Premier Amendement et la liberte d'expression qui
ell docoulc imposent ceI1aines limites Ii I 'Elat si cclui-ci tcntc de res-

36,47 uses. § 231,
37. Voir US.

1/,

<h(jp:/I{'aselaw,find13w.c-om/scrjpt$/ts~seafGh.pl?tille;;;;::47&sec=231,

Acheson, I95 E3d 645 (11Lh Cir., 1999)

hllp:Ji1<nvsJ'indlaw,comlI lIh/983559man,btm! ; US v. HjJ{on, 167 E3d 61 (lSI CiL, 1999)
http://law$,findlaw.com/l1lh/983559man,html
38. Voir Free: Sp~ceh Co,,!lt[on v, Reno, 198 F3d 1083 (9fh Cil., 1999)
hllp:f!laws,fifldlaw,cofnl9lh/9716536.ht ml
39. Uemslein v, US. DepL ofJuslice, 192 F.3d 1308 (9Lh CiT" 1999)
hnp:/Il'aws.findlaw.conJ/9ih/9716686.html ; Junger v, Daiey,
209 E3d 481 (6th Cir.. 20(0) hHp:/Jlaw5.findlaw.comI6!h/OO'JOl17p.h!ml
40. Voir Roe c;, Wade, 410 tJ.S. II3 (1973)(d6cision sllr Je droit c!'avortemelll)
htCp:!/lawsJindlaw.{'Qm/usI410/ll3.html
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trcindre la diffusion des donnees (41), Par consequent, les Elats,Unis
envisngcntla question du traitemcm des dOllnees personnelles de fa~on
seetoriclle (42), La loi ne vise pas encore speci!lqucmcnt I'internet cl
iln 'ex isle pas de loi precise dans ce domaine, En consequence, un vide
juridique laisse In protection des droits civiqllcs aux mains dl! marcile
ct ell! d6veloppement techno]ogique,
La protection des donnees pcrsonncllcs aux Etats,Unis s'appuie sur
une s&ne de lois 11 portee limitee et sur la jurisprudence en droit de 13
respons"bililc civile Clortlaw"), Lc champ d'applieation de ccs pro,
lections cst done Ires restreinL Chaque 10i seetorielle no vise qu 'uno
activit,' specifi'lue ot ne cible que certains acteurs et la jurisprudence
se limite 1\ des cas Ires precis, Par exemple, 13 101 Fair Credit Reporting
Act (43) propose une protection contre 1a diffusion de eenains rcnseignements par les agences d'infonnation un credit ot ne s'applique ni
nux autres organisations ni aux aulres donnees personnelles. Les
condilions prevues par les lois actuelles ou les regles de 13 jurisprudence I]C s'ilppliquent pas SOllven! it Ja specifici!e de l'intemet. Parce
que les Imitement, des donnees persoone\les sonl pluridisciplinaires.
l'applOche sectorielle se lrollve souvcnt obsolete, En fait, une 101 sectorielle sur I'illternet n'a guere de chance d'aboutir.
Los ,olldagcs umericains rcvclent tine fOrle inqUietude dt! puhlic ct
une demande croissantc de protection legale (44), Malgre celie opinion
publiqne, seules les solutions d'auloregulatlon sont generaiemcnt <:hOlsies. Le gouvcmement Clinton n'a demande qu'une n;;glementation
des informations sur Ies mineurs, sur la sante et sur Ies finances.
Jusqu'cn juilIer 2000 la Federal Trade Commission (Frc), agence qui
promcut line certaine deontologie dans Ie commerce, n'a propose que
des solutions d'auton'gulation, En juillct demier, la FTC a en effet
declare que I' autoregulation <"tait insu ffisante el die s' est prononcee ell
faveur d'uue protcctionlegislative (45), Mals, I'opposition des acteurs
econollliques Imditionnels et de leurs lobbies est tits puissantc dans lc
41. Lei> constitutions des cia!s soot :;imilaircs. MatS, plusicurs erals (par ex. Califomia, Arizona
el fllillois} cOmlcllllCfl! des cilluses exp!icltcs sur la prolec1ioll de la vic pnvee. En general, cc;';
clauses ck pmtecllon eLa!ique vi!>Cllt Faction des pouvoirs publics, Ncantlloins. in clause de In
con)tilHlioll de. Cnlifomic s'appliquc au scclcur prive (voir Hill c. NCAA, 865 P. 2d 633 (Cal.
1994), nl;}i~ l1'a pas enwrc fail J'objct (i'une dCcl&ion en matiere des donnees pcrsonncllcs.
42. Voir PUlil M. Sdnvt\lrz & .loci R. Reidcnoorg, Data Privacy Law ([996),
43. 15 U'IC 168.1

hI Ip://cnsela \V. findJ" w, t:om/casccodcluscodcs/15/chapters/4l/subchapl crs/i U/toc.hlml
44, VOII pM ex. The Pew il1lcme! &: American Life Pro}(fcf, Trusf and Privacy Online: Wby

Americans wallt to re·wrire the rules (Aug. 2000)
http://63.21 0.24 J5/replJrts/pdf:;/PIP~Tmsl_Pri vary~..Reportpdf
45. Ff'.{], Trade COIHIli'n, Online Prol1ling : A Reporl to Congress on Ollllne Pro}Wngc Part lJ
Recommendations (jUillC12000) hlfp:fjwww,Hc.govjos/2QOO/07/orilineprofillng.hlm
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systeme americain. Le secleur privt\ refuse les solutions juridiques. Il
semble que la FTC ne soullenne plus aussi activement l'idee d'UIlC loi
(au Ie projct de loi, sl celui·ci exisle) (46). Cependant, la salidarite des
actcurs economiques tr,?lditionne]s commence a faiblir. Ainsi, Hewlett
Packard vieill de se declarer cn favcur d 'unc protection juridique de la
vie prj v''';, ell expliqllanl que Ie futur du commerce clectl'Olliquc en
dependait (47).
L'cxemple Ie plus siguificalif sm ce dcfaut de protectionlega!c de la
vic privee est la loi de prolection de la vie privee des mineurs,
Children's Online Privacy Prol('('{ion Ikl (COPPA), J5 Usc 6501 et
suiv. (48). qui vise ales proteger contre la collectc des donnees colleclees en Iigne. Celle nouvelle loi eSI enlree en viglleur cette annee e1 son
incidence eSI encore ineannuc. Les iOdi!eurs de certains sites web ont
prefer<' supprimer leurs pages plulot que de se metlre en confomlite
avec celle 101 (49).
Au niveau des Etats, la commoll/aw tie ,'applique que rarement pour
protegeI' Ia vie privce en ligne. Les juge, ont du mal 11 integrer les lrai"
tements de donnees personnelles sur I'inteme! dans'le droit classiquc
de la responsabilitc civile (TorI law). Dans cc vide jllridique, la telldance actuelle cst d'elargir la protection conlrc la fraude des donnees
collectecs sur I' internet. Les aff"ires recentes telles que DoublcClick er
Real Networks plaidcnt en [aveur de I'application des sanclions de la
fraude, dans Ie cas d'utilisatcurs nOll averlis du trailelllent ou avcrtis de
fa~on Illcnsongere, au lieu de consacrer un veritable droit h la protection de la vie privec qui serait plus adaple ce type d'abus.

a

La vie privee cst micux protegee dans Ie secteur public que dans Ie
sccteur prive (50). Les regles d'acces ill'infol'mation et les nonnes de
Irairements llutomatiques sont applicables I'intemet. Le Privacy Act
of 1974 Crablit les conditions des tmitements des donnees personnelles.
Le Freedom of Information Act (51) accorde chaque citoyen un droit
d'acces aux donnees publiques qui Ie concerncnt 8i ces donnees font
partic d'un systemc de fichiers infonnatise. Au niveau elalique, des
lois similaires imposent Ie mCllle acces aux donnees publiques des
Etats. En ce qui concerne la commercialisation des donnees publiques,

a

a

46. Voir rapprob:dion au code du Network AdVCI1!51ng Initiative, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Online
Proliling : A t?epor! 10 C(ll1sress 011 Online Pl'ofili/1g~ Part 11 fJ (juille,! 20(0)

h! IP:1/www,ftc.gov/os/2000f07/onlineprofiliflg,hlm
47. Jennifer ,10m'..,';. Fiorilla uQWs D":.Governmenl Di:llogHe, InfoWorld, 23 nollr 2000,

htlp;//www.infoworld.com/artkles/hn!xml/OO/08/23/000823hnfiorina,xml
48. 1mp:!/ca !:.e\a w_fI ndlttw, L0I11/ca~ec;;;de!u swdesj 15/chaj)Lcn:!9 J/10(' _hi In I
49. Lynn Burke. Kids' S;les Cjle COPPA Woes, Wjn~d (14 sepfembff 2000)
h t lp :fj\\ tVW, wi red.comfnc w$/polit Ie s!O, 128338666,00. hI Illl
50. Voir Paul M. Sdnvtlfll et Jo(:1 R. Rddenbefg, Dti/a Prh'flLJ' UIW (1996),

5)' S Usc 552
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la diffusion profIte t!'nne grande liberte, La Constitution cl son
Premier Amcncicmcnt interdisent les restrictions a la communicntion
d'information, Ccpendant la Cour Supreme a rcccillment soutcnu !'interdic1ion de la diffusion des noms d'individus "yant ete arrete" par I.
police (52)_ La com a aLissi confirme la liei'ile d'lIne loi fcdcrale, Ie
f),.it'er~' Privacy Profecfiol1 Act (53») qUI permet .nux citoyens de: S'Op~
pO::'f'r a la commercialisation par les Etats de certaines donnees
publiques les concernant (54),
II faut allssi signaler qu'aux E1ats-Unis les donnees puuliq"cs reprcsentent une importanle sOllrce de renselgnemenls. Par excmple, Ie
cadastre et Ie registre des hypothc'lues sonl des donnees p"bli'lues ot
SOll! facilcmcnt accessible, en ligne, Le cn'dil a 13 consommation
clevie-lll aussi une donnee publique quand un creancier inscrit line
hypothcqne sur In marchanctisc, II y a pen de contraintes 11 la colleetc
et 11 i'utilisation de ces donnees. On pcur memc facilement se procurer
Ie l1umero de sccurite sociale et la date de naissance d 'une personne sur
Ie web I Selon Ie GClleral Accounting OJJ1ce, Ulle ageuee (raudit qui
depend dll Congrt-s, il semblemit que l'administnl1iou fcderaic no rcmplit pas to utes scs obligations quant it Ia protection dcs donnees personnelles collectccs sur les sites web de I'administration (55),
La question du controlc de In protection de la vic privee est troublante pour Ie citoyen americain, Anx Etats-Unis. iln'existe pas d'autantedc controlc camme]a CNIL_ De plus, iln'y a pas d'agcncc spedfiquement competcllic en cc qui conceme !'internet. Ccs deux detnieres annees, c'oslln Federal Trade Commission qui suit les dossiers
de I'intemet er poursuit quelques siles web 'lui l1'onl pas respecte, sur
leur sile, Ie, declarations sur la protection des donnees vis-a-vis des
utilisateurs, II faut souligncr que l'article 5 du Federal ]i-ade
Commission Act limite la competence de la FTC en la matiere, notamment du fait que cetle competcnce n 'existe qu 'en cas de pratique fraudu!cuse ou de COlleUlTence dCloyalc (56). La protection juridique etant
rarc et sp(~ciflque, Ie controle cst limite. Dans les quelques cas oil une
loi existe pour protegeI' Ie cito),en, I'instance de contrOle est tanto!
52. 1..0.,; .Angeles Police Dep;, c. United Reponing Corp.. N". 98"678 (7 dccnnore, 1999)
hllp:!fliJ.ws,lIndJaw.com!lJs!OOO/98-G78.hun!
53. )8 Usc §§272I "272S
54. Reno c. Condor;, :"J". 98-1464, 12 Jtl)lVlf:)-, 200(t,
hupJllflws.fintilaw,com/:'ts/ooOJ98- )464.1uml
55. Voir G.\o. in1erne! Pnvacy: Agencies' Effnl1s10 lillplemetll OMS'S Privacy Policy (lieptembrc
20(0) <hnp:!!www.gao.gov!new.ltems!ggOOI91.pdf CI GAO, intcmet PrIvacy: Comparison of
Federa: Agency PractIces With FTC's Fllir Jnfo11lHllion Principles (11 :;c:ptembre 200Q)
<http://www.gao.gov/new.ilemsJai(A,)296r.pdf
56. J5 Usc. 45 hltp:!/caselfM. findlaw.comlcasc{.;ooe/u;:(:odes/t 5fchaplersl2/Hlbchap\els/jlsec~
liofl~seclioll._ 45.hlml
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administrativc' tanl61 judiciaire scion la specifteite de 18 10 .. Ce contraIe est done raremenl exclllsiL Par cxemple, la nouvelle loi sur la protection de la vie privee et les services financiers, Ie Gramm-LeachBliley ACI (57) prevoi! un cOlllr61c par sept commissions fedcralcs
tclles que la Fedeml Ii'ade Commission pour certains acteurs, In
Camp/roller (,~r r/1(' Curri'ncy (aUlorite bancairc) pour d'autres c( 1\1
Federal Reserve pour d'aulres. encore ,-' a quoi il fallt ajollter les autorites judicial! cS des Etats, Lc FOIl' Credil Reporting ACI aecorde lInc
competence " In Federal hade Commission pOllr son contr61e (58), En
outre lcs vicilines d'abus peuI'L'1ll saisir Ie;; Iribllnaux (59),

ParrOtS, la rllcnace d'lme plamw all nom collectif des victimes (class
(Iction) pcut clllraIller 1I1le reguJatiOiL Cettc voie contcnticl1se cst ouvel1e
malgre Je vide' juridiquc ct ce type de litigc collectif pellt faire evoluer Ies
prillcipe~ de la col1!mon/ow, An IlIveau ctalique, c'cst souvenlle proCllreur de rEtat 'lui exerce un conlrilie d'ofticc, Par cxemplc Ie procureur de
rEtat de New York Elliot Spitzer, a pOUfsuivi la Chase Manhattan Bank
pour avoir vendu des informatiolls sur ses clients (60),
Du fail dc la portee Iimitec des lois existantes et du vide juridigue
'Juanl1l l:l proteclion de la vic privee sur I'internet, e'est au march" et
an respect des regles deontologiqlles des cnlrcprises qu'es! confiee la
plOtectioll dc's ciloyens CI1 ligne. Depuis quelques annees le Becteur
prive fatt bcaucoup d'cfforls pOllr elaborer des codes de conduite el des
programmcs d'autoregulation, Les organismcs de labellisation de sites
tels que Trusl-~(61) ou BBBOnlil1c (62) son I les vedettes de toutes les
consllllation, gOllvemementales, aJors qu'ils 5e borneOl aproposer une
politique cJ'avcrtissement dcs ulilisalcurs et line procedure de mediation des diffcrends,
Ala suile d'un appel au scetcur priv" en J996 par l'administration
Climon ella Federal Trade Commission, un projet de mise en place
(J'une nonne technologique de transparence quant aux pratiques des
sites en maliere d'infonnations persoJ1nclles a ete inilie par Ie consorlillln W3C, Malgre de grands efforts, la [JOl'me 1>3P (63) reste tMorique et aUCUIl accord final n'H encore eli; alteinL Dans l'hypothesc
meme au la nonne P3P serait approtlvee, ses difficultes de mise en
57. t5 Usc § 6801 seq., hLtp;f/tilonlasJl'c gO>'/q~i"bin/(]ucry/z?c106~S.900.ENR;
58.15 Usc 16815

59.15 U;-;c I681n. )6810,
60. Office of (he N Stale AHorney Or,nenll. Pn:s$ Release. 25 jMlvj,:r 2000,
hUp:l!www.oag.stale.n}..us!pressl2000/jan/ian25b__OO.11Iml
61, hnp:/Iwww.tfuSI('.t'.of»
6l, http://ww\\\bb!JonJine,colYl
63. W3C, The Platform for Privacy Prefcrer.ces 1.0 (P3PLO) Spcdfit::ution: W3C Working Droll,.
15 scptembre 2000. hnpJlwww,w3.orgfI'R/2000jWP·P3P·20000915/
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a:uvre lirniteront grallclemelll SOil ntJiile (64). En fail. les contraintes
economiques freillem sericllsemenl les prngres en matiere de protection de la vic privec. Les aeteurs ec(\nomiques tradilionl1els profilel1l
financierement du trafic des donne~s personnelles gdke it la n011transparence des Irailements ot nux f;riblc.; conuaissances techniques
des citoyens (65). Cec; expliquc allssi Ie caraclen? illusoire d'unc
reponse s[rictemenl technolQgiql1C aux bcsoins de protection de la vic
privee : l'Alllericain moyen nc snit pas programiller son rnagnetosco~
pc r Comment pent-on pcnser ijll 'il cnmprendra les drfferences subtiles
des caractcristiques techniques de:s differents logici('ls de navigation
sur l'internet .) Malheurcusement, tOll I cela demonlrc que la confiancc
poliliquc faite au marche 11 'est pas jW;lifiec.
Le vide americain en matiere de proiCction de In vie privec et l'absence c!'autorite independante de controle, posent des problemes avec
I 'Union europecnnc. Ll Directive 95/46/EC sur 13 protection de la vie plivee oblige les Etats mcmbrcs bloqucr les llux lransfromi('res avec les
pays qlli ,,'assmellt pas une protection adequate. En j'etal ncttlel des
ciloses, ct a d6faul (]'un accord avec rEurope, les (,tats-Unis nc peuvclll
pas satist~lire celIe condition. Ann (j'eviter ulle guerre comlllerciale,
I'Union europeenne a passe Ull accord avec Ies Rlals-Unis sur Ie principe
c1'UilC "sphere de sl'curilC"(66), par Illtjucllc I'Europc a acceptc de Ia pari
des Rlals-Unis lin degr" de protection iafericur aux nonnes europecnnes.

a

III - l'EQUllIBRE DIFFICILE ENTRE LA PROTECTION DES
INTERETS EcONOMIQUES ET LA L1BERTE DES CITOYENS
II semble que Ia volante des Etats-Unis de creer un regime juridique
favorable au commerce electroniquc oppose d'un cote la protection des
interets econollliques et, de I'autre COle, In libene des citoyens. En ren·
[or9anl Ie droit de la proprictc intellcctucllc, Ia Ioi favorise Ies aeteurs
eeonomiques traditionne]s par rapport aux utilisateurs de !'internet el
pent freiner aiasi une partie du cleveloppcment du web au les innovations. Cetle approche nl' prene! pas en comple Ie fonDidable essor 6co11064. Dan Humer. Pnm,'- pOOl" Prit·tt(\, : AI, ASWSSIH('I!! of P3P OIld ilileme/ Privacy (juiu 2000).
hllp:i!www-junkbw;!c!"!i.c(lIl'l!ln/cll/p3p.hlml; OversighL Hearing on Pr ivacy and EleClronfc
Commerce before the $ubcomm, on Courts and l1Mllec!ual Pn)peny of 'he Hou~e Conll11, on (he
Judidary, 1061h Congo. 2nd Sess< (18 mai 2000)('Jeslimony of Professor R. Joel Rcidcnherg)
h[[ p:!Jreidcnberg.home,:; pry nel, comiRe idcn berg_.Testi mOll y.11 Iml
6S. VOlT Jocl R. Rcidcnberg. Restoring Americans' Pril'(UT in Elecfmnic Commerce,
14 Berkcley Tc<::h. L t TIl (1999)
hI! P:ifwww.ln \\'. berkeley.e OIl/jO urna 1sib 11 j/an i d cs/14 ._2/Reiclcnbcrglhr ml/reade r htmt
(}6. Decision de la COl1lmission europecnnc du 26 juilk:! 2000. joCE 2000./520/EC hltp:l/cup>

Pa.cu.inI/COfnlll/inlemal.Jllarkel/en/mcdia/dataprol!ncws/decisionjr.pdf
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mique dO ill'intemct(67) el i1 eSI dilficilc de savoir si celte polilique encourage r6ellement Ie developpemenl du commerce clectJ'Onique. C'est mnsi
que Microsoft s'est un peu ironiquemenl pl\'valu de sa "Iibelte d'mtlovcr "(68) d,Uls sa dClcnse face <lUX accusations de pratiques anticonelmenticlles (69). Leg enjeux de la plOtcetion economiguc et de 1(1 protect,(}n des
libe!1cs du dloycn sont egalemcnt lies It la baisse du nivean de rcsponsabilite des inlcnnediaires techniques de I 'intel1let ct au debat sur Ie role du droit
[(1ee aux developpemenls tcchnologiques.

AI La responsabilite limitee des intermediaires
La question de la repartition des respollsabililes entre les llcteurs en
Iignc ot les intCI111ediaircs sc pose aux Htats-Unis. La loi americainc
aceorde llIlC sorte d'immunite allX intermediaires. Seton la clause 230
de la Ioi de telecommunications Telecommunications Act of 1996 (70),
Ies fOllmisseurs d'acces et de service sont exoneres de leur responsabilile et bCneficient d'ulle immllllite juridique vis-a-vis des tiers en cc
qui coueeme les activites de leurs utilisateurs (71).
L'exon6ration de responsabilHe des fournisseurs PClIt cvel1l1lelle-

meat encourager la creation d'uoe gamrne de services et de contenus
en ligne. Cependant si la loi accorde cettc immunitc, Ja jurisprudence
offre en meille temps de plus en plus de protection it la Jiberte d'expression; c'est-it-dire que les fournisseurs ont de moins en mOlns de
responsabilite elles editeurs de plus en plus de liberte. Ce regime favorise ainsi une situation dans laquelle I'idcntificalion de responsables
d'abus sur I'internet est rendue Ires difficile. Parallelement Ie;; gr,mdes
entreprises sont favorisees au detriment des citoyens en ligne par la
minimisation de la respollsabilite des intclmediaires.
En cas d' ul!eintes au droit d' auteur, un fOllIllisseur de service n' esl plus
responsable s'il ne fait qu 'assurer la transmission des contenus (72). Pour les
services d'hebergement, la responsabilite est limitee s'"gissant du contenu
des tiers dans la mesure ou Ie foumisseur de ee service :
a) ignore I'atteinte ;
b) n'a pas tire un profit financier de 1a eontrefa~on et
61, Pour 11m! ';!ude Ires inter('~;.;anlc liur Irs lmx:lelc~ rcCo:lomiques, voir Car! Shapiro et Hal V,ariao,
InfulTIltdlon Ihlles: A Strategic Guide 10 the NelW().fk f"'A.'O!lOHlY (1998) ht1Jl:IIW\\'wjnf()[ulcsJ~ollv
6S. Microsofi Freedom to Innovate Nc!wol'k,
lutp:!lwww,micros"fu:om/freedunuoinnovute/defilult.hllil
69. Uniled SMits v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Snpp.2d 30 (D.D,C, 2000)
7ft. Tc/cc()/nmul1iCQtioIlS ,4(:1 of 1996, P\lb. LA No, 104~i04, 110 Slat 56 (1996)
http://www.fcc,goY/Repol1s!tcom1996.pdf
71, 47 Usc 230. Voir Bhuoenlha! c, O:udge and Amcrica Online, 992 r: S~IPP, 44 (DDC 1998)
h II p://W\'1w.l j x.com/UX fi !cs/drudge/d rudgcded slon. htm1
72.17 t:sc 512(3)
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c) a retire du service Ie contenu contrefaisant apres avail' re<;ll un aver··
tissement de I'ayant droit (73).
La loi prevait " cet effer nne procedure complexe en vue de 1a Slippression par I'h6bergeur des canten"s cantrefaisant, permettant 11 I'auIcur du site d'assurcr S3 (kfense el de demander Ia remise en Hgne de
SOn site s'i1 peul demonlrer sa I"galile (74).
Ccs deux reginles qui accordenf rU1l unc immul11!e nux services de
l'intemel et I'autre, une responsabilite limitee en matiere de droit d'aulClIr, on! lonlcfois un point COmllllltl : chlns chaqlle cas, Ie citoyen a du
mal a defendre ses inten~ts. Les intermcdiaires qui ne font que t1'anspOlicr Ie, donnees ne sont pas 16galement responsables vis-a-vis du
citoyen el, bien que responsable, Ie veritable au leur est difficilcmenl
identifiable sans I'aide des intermediaire;;. Tout citoyen qui public UI1
site web pourra Ie vair supprimcr par son service d'hebergemem sur
simple lettre d'accusatioll d'ull tiers. Le cadre juridique america in
favorise done c1airemcnt les foumisscurs de service et les grands editcurs de eontenus numeriques et de lagicicls.
t

1

BII.e role du droit face aux dtivefoppemellts techllologiques
Le role elu droit face aux d6vcloppements technologiqllcs dcvient Ie
sujet Ie plus important de la societe d'information. Lcs lendanees
contradictoires de la protection des aCliy ites economiques et de la protection des Iibertes dcs citoyens soulcyent la question fondamentale du
r6Ie du droit et de eelni du marche, dans Ia protection des interets oconomiqllcs et des droits des citoyclls. A I'heure actuelle, la politiqlle
americaine consiste a confier les interets economiques au droit et les
libertes des citoyens all marche. Les regles de protection de In propriete intellcctuelle et du commerce electroniqne sont devenoes prioritaires
par rapp0l1 a celles assurant la proteclion de la vie privee.
La reponse ala question du role du clroit lIl11ene ala conclusion que I'arehitecture elu reSellU est one source de regulation importante. Les nOlmcs
techniques sont des codes qui regulent les flux d'infollnation (75), Cette
regIe mentation technologiqlle a une valem et une puissance equivalente !l
celtaines l-egles de droit (76).
73. t7 Usc: 512(b). Ccue procedure est RppeUle "notice and take(\own."
74, 17 Usc 512(g)
75, Voir Lawrence Lessig, Code and O(il<:r Laws of Cyberspace (999) hllp:/lcg.de.is.
luw.orgln)flin,html; Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Inforrnatic,,: 11l!~ F(lltnulafion of Information Policy
Rule;; through Technology, 76 Texat L. Rev. 553 0998) ; Joel R. Hejd~nherg, Governing
Networks and Rule-Mnking in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L. J. 911 (1996)
http;//wW\vJllw,emory.edu/EW/volumes!$um96/reidcnJmnl
7~. Voir Joel R. Reidenberg, L'inSlabili1\~ et 1<1 concurrenCe des regimes reglemenlfl.ires dans Ie
Cyhe.respace, in Incertitudes du droit, Ejan MncK&ay. ed. (E.ditions Themis: \999)
Imp:lfre idellberg.hQme,spryneLGom/il:tCcI1ilUde.hlm
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On COllstate par aiJIeurs i'importance du droit de la concurrence. Lc
monopole des moyens de diffusion de !'information dans nne societe
Otl l'infonnation est aussi importallle, constitue un pouvoir politique
considerable. Les flux d'information Nant dependants de In technologic disponible et generalcment employee, t'entreprisc qui a une position dominante en matiere technologiqllc dispose d 'un pouvoir parliculieremenl fort. Par exelllple, I 'infrastructure des t616.comlllllllications
est bien differente dcpuis la Iiberalisalion par la loi Telecommunications Act of 1996. Les autorites de contrOle de la conClIlTcnce s'inquietent toujours ql1ant aux possibilites pour les citoyens d'acceder
aux services de I'internet. Cette inquietude semble bien justifiee au
regard des projets de fusion d' AOL111me Warner (77) ou d' AT&TrreleCommunications Inc. (78). Un autre exemple est celui de l'affaire
Microsoft qui a souligne Ic fait que I'evolution des services infornmtiques et des prodl1its en ligne est menacee par une position de quasimonopole sur les systemes d'exploitatioll. Le juge Jackson a coneIu
dans cette affaire que Microsoft avait abuse de sa position dominante
sm' Ie marche avec son systcme d'exploitation Windows (19). L'cnjcu
de cette decision, actuellement en appel, cst de definir I 'application des
regles de concurrence i\ la nouvelle economie et it la SOCieH' de l'illformarion.

"'/'

De manicre generale, la politiquc juridique americainc n'a pas pOllr
vocation d'incitcr Ie developpement des technologies garanlissant des
regles equitables. L'hesitatiol1 it utiliser la loi en In matiere" re/everail tout simpiement.. , de la complicite» (80) ou d' line demission des
gouvernements. CeUe hesitation s'avere parliculi<~rement nefaste pour
l'avonir qui semble destine a metlre lOujours plus \'accent sur revolution technologique au detriment des libertes fondall1cntales. Cette hesitation va probablement tcndre a diminuer aux Etats-Ullis et Ie droit de
I'intemet devrait cibler Ie developpement de In technologie pour que
eette evolution respecte les Iibertes des citoyens.

J,R.

n. Dennis

Fisher. Aot Time Warn!.:!' merge. tlssnllcd ai Fcc Hearing. ZDNel: EWeek, July 27,
2000, hup:llwww.zdacLcom!eweek/slofies!gencral/O.1 101 l,260S67:'>'oOJarnl.: Fcc Docket CS
Dockcl 00-3H, http://www_fce,gov/tr3Ilsactivlt/aoJ-lw.!Jlrnl
78, MelOorundull1 and Opinion Order, Fcc Docket N", 98-178. 18 fevriel". ~1999,
hllp:l!www.fcc,gov/l3ureauS/Cable/Orders/1999/fcc99024,txt La Commission lederale de com"
munic:mons a assure Ie mainlient d'un acces ouvett aux services de haUl (\ebh pour l'imemct.
79. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 E SU(1),?d 30 (DDe 2000}, Ce jugernclll est en appeJ
direct a hi cour d'nppd et 11 13 Cour supreme sUlvant un processtls ex(;cplionnd. Voir Micro50h
v. Dept. Of JJJsticc, Doeke.f N°, 00·139, ht!p~lIwww;supremecour1us.go\'/dockel!OO·139,hlm
80. Michel Vivant, "Cybennoude: DlOit cr droits de.s rtf:scnux." Ja 1996 ed. G, i. 3969. p. 406
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Pro Joel Reidenberg
Plof0iseUf de droit J I'universil(~ de Fo!cJha~Yl (!~l£ll:" UI~i$)
ProbsDr of L,)IV a( rCidi)JIll Ullivc~s.i~y {Un:tcd Stiltes)

I Protection de la vie privee et I'interdependance du droit,
de la technologie et de J'autoregulation '?1
Mroductiotl
Un nouveau parCldlgme ,) emerge I)our la protection efficace des donnees personnclles d;1»S
Ilcnvirollllcrncnt (In ilgne de !'lntt.1.!'!lcl ct de 1.1 societe de 1{:~)formJtion. AlofS qLc IE's !oi~ S,H ia

protection dt:s donnees se sont (;Iendues h un grand nombre de pa)!s dClDS :C' monde au cours
ving! dernieres annees, Ics dJvC;15en(:(~s dar::; les iois n;1{lonales e! Ii! proliferation dl! lraile~
ffl21l; Ifallsfrnr:lf'l1ier dl's donnees rendcnl diffici!e I'execulion d("$ normes !egales ex;stanles. En
meme temps, iI y a ell un (h~v('loppen1(~nt des possibilifes techpiqu{'s qu; permet et e:1:fdve lOut
it!a (oi) la capadte de 13 loi agMJn{ir 13 protection des dO;in~es persol1nel!e~. En errCl, :,1 :'0gl::mentalion juridique p~lrlage son pOLvoir regula~etlr JveC les ~ormcs et pro~o(oles 10(hnologiqtiPt" POdr I,) _trilil(,'1W'It des !dor~1I(1Iio:ls pe;"onnt':le~, Id regienwntcllion la plus (Iirectedu
:ktl('l1h:P! :,v /infoil:l.I!iOIl vjC'fit P:d({)( des rc'glt») [echllologlque!> illcurpur6p:, dan:. It'S 11'11·-.15~rUC!U:05 des rcseaux P,)f les ,lClelirs 6conorniques que de 1(\ !o! elle-meI1l2, En !::'fret 1\-ln:hHcc!tire des rcse,lUX d'infonnation etabli! les rcgles impliciles ell! t;,()itcment dt' "information,
L~:S

eel article elud!e done I'i~terdependance complexe exiSlam enlre laloi, la technologic elles
pratlques de I'entreprise. En se fondanl SJr 105 experiences americ;llne" et europeennes en ma~
,iere de pcolecHo:l des donncE'S persol1nelles, eel arrieie propose ~(!e, 1'00r !'Inlernel, la ioi four,
nissc une indlalion aux avancees tt'chnoiogiqiJes qui devcioppenl des technologies de
prolection de la vie privet" l'aftide sOlltient qJeiilloi doit en oul~et creer 1('5 conditions dl?
prO!notiOIl de I'extension des it.lf.i1nologies dt' protection de la vie privee et de 1(1 creation de
S}'SI(\m(lS ;{l' IE'S en~~epriscs. Dans la mist' en \J!uvre d'ullc societ6 democratiqut', la regulation
par 12 lecllllo;ogic· doi~ eire modelec P<)f les objeclifs d'inlerei publIC el It, debat public. La 10;
cst dOlle nec('ssalre pour tSl"blir ]('s obj('Clifs d'i!11crc[ p~!blic, mai~ insuifisil!11Q pOll" gar<wlil
I'applicalion dc~s prlncipes de la protection des donn(~e:;.

Differents modeles de reglementation de la protection des donnees
:.e.1 reg:es pour la prmettion des donnee!> provk'nnenr de ~rois perspeclives diff(-ker:les : 13011rique, economiquc ellechnologiqllf, tn Europe, I,j protection des donne,'s eSI Uli dloil fO'l<L~leIj!i\lcment pollHque et s'appuie sur des ~6cani$mes !egaux pour garantir ie resp~c[ d'un oroil
tit: I'homme fondamenlal J la protection de IJ vie privee 194, Au conlraire l [lUX Etats-Unis., la
p!Dlecrinn des donnees personnelies est Idiss"e au lllareh6 0111 la preference de [roelver des solutions pour la protection du cOllsommateuJ' d,lllS le5- resultals des marches F1S, DJll'l ces de~lX

l\i:i:Pr'"ir;:~t:(" ~j~-~I';:llJCtdl1.' de ilwi! de i'{miH1}i:':> ,Je 1oni!1f;tl< lint JifL'lJlii:W H'Jsl()!i df: ((;1 :rllde a tit fl.1!);;t?{' PO,1f 1.1 (o~ie
!tI;;·~, \lt(, (t' l'OUW:!jh ;ivoluliom O;w51c umit de l'ill'cmhlliqve \ pilL{ k 7.IY iHllji\'e(3~1r~ ,::1 CI{;D iI NJlT<.If, Heg''1ue, ,wee 1;1('

gt?iltwWrOi'l!);;I$$.liltt:;:U w))'L"1) Yv[>!, f'nuli"l. qui a i1~p;l[: !tnt r!..i ipftiali~:~i cars re oomi( 1e. 1,1e vrr;I(1~ ilf)g1a'5~' ;i(' eet ".rtif~ee'l
l)JllI~ liMb 1;;; Cl!li<'l\' du CRiD {;P 10, ~ Wtla!iom S'J/ h: ciU3, :Ie Iii ~cirle t;"~ I'il'i{lr!llah}f~ " O'u),;"n1; Orv~t':lr~, 2001, pp. 127 -1311.\.

1!)1 \hl; Co(wemim: clJ L(l:Mil ot: !'f:VOP~21)P1J'1<'l P(olc~(ill!1 des ~wi!S d~ I'bomnl['f': cie; 1,1>('1',65 fond~1l11ml;df', af\idc B; d!r~niw
951iMl h Pallt'flx',1: r(lrOp6;0 ct du Q)f!sei d,IL4 o\-'loGr..; 1995 ~\if lil prOlection de. illdwifiu.\ ((I[1cern~nll(> lr~jtel)wlll de, dO-'lllee,
!~l~'\f)f)f('.. \:.\. el i~ j ~)r.:drtli:'I!i(,;l ciece. dONH'H, JOO: L 281, 2) mwellibre 1'fJ5 p. OD31·0050; ConVi'nl;OII nC leHtil! (ml~li dt
,

~:01lt'!}l:lj",wi('(10i.l1:.

lfJS Voir, P;ii cxemple, Ii framrll'OfK 1m G/olxd Ek'umnic Ccmnwln", 19"97 (d'JprL'S ,

U.' F{,l/)'('\\,Cik J.).
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modele:; de protection des donnees, les choix ~echnologiqLK~5 \1 pal dt~(au[ t dl;,iini~sent !e~ prJ.
dqUl~S inform{lt:que~ ~!H les ~05l'(hjX ill[eractif~ 1%,

En Europe: :(1 pe"SpPClivc po:ilique sur 1<1 prolCoion des donnees insistp SUI' Ie fail que irs Ct.
loyer's or:l ~m droil de I' )Omm0 (ondam0nl,)1 il :d protection de leurs donnees nominJlives, Co
droit h :1 I' Jutodetern:inalio!' en matiere d'lllrormation )) f(lil p<:Hlie inlegr(1llle de la societe dc'.
mocr,l!iquc. ~'autodelerm'_nil~ion en mJ~il\r(' d'informiltion met J'accenl sur 1(1 lib('n(~ des ctloyens ei defin;t un droit d:..! ciioyer 1: controlef :a (olleCle et Ilusage des inforrn(1tioll~
p('rson~jcl~e~ qui [eleveal' j10rdre public Le modele pol:Uque des droils delT1<1nde des rogles juridiqucs etabli par une legislation genera Ie de p"Olection des donnees. En consequence, les lois
eUlopeennes modernes de prolec{ion ~:e"~ fJonn&'s ,;np05t'lllu;l ensemble (ample! de principes
pour Ip lrilitement equitable des infor:nations pcrsonne!ies alian! de If] (imlile au droil d',l(ces
et j'executiOll Bien que k--slennes spL,ollqucs et I'inlerpretation de ces lois puissl:'llt varier, ies
principes sOlls-jaceni~ parlenl de 1\1, meme idee qld2;a pro:eclion des donnees es~ un droil de
I'homme qui doh Plre garanti ptlf j'Elat

a

a

Aux Etals-Unis, Iloppose! jl;1pproche de la prolec:ion des don:1ees perso:welles repose Sill ie
caieul economique J 1.1 place du fondement poHtiquc" ~'al)prot:hc aHH?ri(:aine consi&re I'[tal.
Bvec plus de scepticisme et prefer" lai"er les ciloyens 5e debrouiller 10llt seuls, Dans I'approche
economiquc1 I'autoregulation delermine le$ termes de 1.1 pro{ection ces donnc"es pe'som~elk"S

Les codes de conduile des acteurs (~(onomiques el It's pral;ques des fntfeprlses

1'!:'11Dorlenl S~j!

In :(:1. ta pro:;~cUon d('s donn6c,> dC'vient plus Ullt' ques-Hon de pouvoir (;conon<qlH' q~1(' d('
dro:: polilique. [:1 fait, Il' debal se d6iinH plus lyp;querr\C:fll en lermes de \ c{n;Ommalelil!> (
qt:e de c ciloycns ii. Dans ceae approche, 1<1 IOi n1intervienl que de maniere tft'S ciblee DOlir r6soudre des probl€'nws sp(>cifique~ iJl Otl Ie marche a echoue. les lols sectorielles ad hoc, pilf
consequenl, ne concernenl qu'uo ensemble ecleclique de problemes, Les consommateurs oe
stupenants, par eXE'mp:e! $oni plus proteges que les utilisaleUfS du web, et les titres des m:ns vi·

Oe05 :o,,,~s sont confidentiels, alor, que les doosiers medicallx pellveot etre oivulgues 19"
Indepelldamment de ees deux modeles de protection des donnees, 13 lex informatica ou I'apdes regles techniques intor~

proch(~ par Ie v. COce ); comlitLC:: un re?ulatl.'u; agissant dU moyen
pon~es dims :'archi!ecftHE' de:. reSC,lUX 9S,

Les normes techniques e( les protocoles, Jil'si que :es optio;]) par defauf relenues par les m\lIt'lHS de s),strmr:s, et(lbliss~:nt 16 ~egle,:, de b?se de la protection des donnE'<:'s. Cos fl'gk\5 tedl'

niques d6finissC'nt les capilcites des re-Sh)JX comme j'lnlernel ~ parler illteinle aJa vie priveeou
a la protegeI'. Par 0xemple, un lIsage anonyme de l'lntcrnct peut etre incorporc dans Ilarchilf'(lure elU reseau! tout CO!llmc un suivi de s\Jfvei!lance peLt -iU';SSJ cUe incorpore dJl1sle ;'eSeJll
Hisioriquell1elli, !esliois modeles Ipolilique, economiqlle eI tochnologique) ont chanin cher-

che aocclfper un segment de IJ reg!e<11Cntation ~ur 1~1 protection des dO·1fH~e5. La per,pec~ivc
politique prenailla 101 comille mecanisme principal pour assurer 111 pro{eclion des donnees,

tandis que la perspective c'conoll1ique prenaill" marcho comme arbitrr (1e ", protection del"
vie privec. En merne temps, Ilapproche technique a incorpon:, Ges regles di(ecl{~rj1(:,nt dans IIIJ)frastructure pour la transmission des uonnees. Ces dirferenles appmch05 sont habllueIIE'r£'n!
considerccs soit (amme alJlo5Uffis(llltes, soil comme substiluao:es. Par eXBfllplc, Ie dia!ogu?
transallanlique a pendanl de nomb,'eu;e; annees docrit I'ensemble des droil> juridiqoes 01 ~oh
Oques comrnc I"al(ernative au code de conduite <:t (lUX dl~cisions du mJrche ,9~. En meme:

~6y:lir ;{:illReiC'c lifl:rg, if:¥ i!1foflJ1a!iu : 71)[' r oIiPu/a!iOIl of in[(l;IlI,l(ioll Policy Ruli-" thf(111lh IffililOfOlJ)r, 76 Texas L ReI,', 13 1,;
1:)96 {d'?pfc, ' l.i!x )n(o:m..1(iCJ ,j,
~ ')/,

Voir Pall' Sdll'.'ilr:z ('! li)~1 R:':\icflberil. DaM i'fh'ilCY 1;;;\' (Mid,!" : 19%).

'91t Volf tllWtV.1X~ Le'i.!~ Co;;il· il'IV Oiill': iilw; of CylX'{SjJiK(, (Ba)ic BooKs : j99~j; i('x m{OIfII<llic,l. ,I(IPI,<l,
H!,), Voir .lJS i-filtl1l'lh){~ ;', :;v,?!» ",,114 \qv(-'!'~iDft );.

·l ue 16 c!.
i

d /iVC5.

[:-m;:)S, Iii communaule techniqlJt' a poufsulvi "on processus de j"ornlaH~.1!ion e! d pretendl: (1 un
xr!ain degr6 de nel,haHtc po:itiqu(:, ((h.1. Cep(;'ndan~) res difj'erents modz:les ne sont ni autosu:fi·
limb nl des alicln,lIivc, completes !'un? j'tlL:!re.

Ce

Oti0/(; dr:,
·t(l de~d.

L'inadaptation des diffCrents modele, dans la societe d'information

mn:ltio!;s

C!lacune dc~ dij(erentb formes de regult1~ioll corn porte des limites inhcrentes qUI I'ernpechen!
de )uffiw aUN:' pro:ec:ion ef~cacE' de!a vie privfe, til iJ:x infOimarfca peu! incorpO:(1( Ii! tapacile dam !'infrJstrccturc soit de prolection de In vle privee, soit de vio~iI:!oP de fa vie privee,
louteioi$, a(,Be seu!e, I'approche lE'chniqlli? !lf~ gar<lnti! pas que 1<1 I)",ise en cpuwe des terhnologips respeclera !es prindpes de pro!cctiol' 00 la vie privee. Le modele cconomiquc du mar(~ie ,;nlericain minimise ou !aisse de (Die d'impoflants J:.pects de la protection des donnees leIs
que le5 va!eurs democratique3 non cOl11merciales, fandis que Ie modele europc<:'n des lois f;e~
ncrahs esl confront6 ad'imporfants probfcmes ci'applicalion dans Jes con~c:xtes siJdcinques. Ei;
rncmc temps, ia protection de~ donnees 051 confronfee ades dimensions inlernat'onales impor!an!i;\5 que :es. modeles poli!ique, du rnctrch6 ou lc"Chniquc ne n~soudfDnt P(lS sepan§111ePL
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le modele I-PX jnformaticd souffn? de !'ilh.:;ence de debat poiiflquc sur !'!nteret public cl ,-,ur L1
pr('~sion tornme~dalE' exerc6c en vue d'une MchiieLiu!(:' :echno!ogique qUI maximise la co!leele de donnees et 12 \i dataveiJlaf)cc ~ 2()1. Piusle'J(s exemples des montrepl (eHe faiblesse a(hIP!!('. La priv;]!jqIIO~ du sYSlf'me dt2i~rihuti()n de poms d0 dornJinf:' par :e gouvernemenl
amrricain c! son ,mribution J lfltl.;,rnet Corporation lor Assigned Ntlmt;.:, and ~umb('r,; (iCAN,~l
onllargement igno;e le5 CO!1S0quer.ces sur la prott'cljOJ1 de ja vip privee inherentes d !a conc('p~
l!on du nouveau prolocoie d'enregi5trernen! <iu IlQlT' de domaine 2::/. b effei, :e proloeole l't:e
prOct'S5uS d}enrcgi5tfC'mer:l exigent la pubilcalion ell lignr uiinformaliolls nomina!ives qui met
en G!use les principcs fondamentaux de protection de) donnees. La conception du syslrme empeehe 1a possibilHe {Jiun enregistrement anonyme drun !lom dc> domainc, De meme, Ie Croupe
d't'[udes Icchniaues de ,'Interne! {lETf) slefforce de Cr~1(7r un nOuveau pmtoco!e de transmission
Internctr IPv6 2ft, Cc p:otocole preVOIl que chaque appiHcil conr,ecte ?I Illnternel Jura un idCri~
(ifiao{ unique ~ un genrt' d'ernprcinlc ciiglla!e numerique pour le5 u1ilistlleUf3 d'lnternet. D'un
point de vue t{'cnnique, !e~ emprelntes dig;talc~ nw))t>riques onl peUh?lre beau coup d'aviJl)·
lagcs, rnals du point de Vlj{' de 1£1 vic priv(ie, une teile ,)(ch:lt'ctu;(' est {rils inqui6tanlc, lies: h
!loler que ces deciSions sOn!. prlses far it' groupe de~ technlciens interesses eil: I'IHF \groupo
d'eluCli;S terhniques de j'lnternet)).·1 pl~ll6t que par uno combinalsoll de lechnidcI15 et d'(1f(curs politiquf's.

Alors que les d(~c;sjons rei(itives aI' arch:tecture tedmiqdc son! $O\.lvent priscs au sein de forums
peu (on nus, les wands pmduils 50nl aussi frequemment devc!oppcs avec L>n0 ignorance fie
leurs consequence:. st.;r les !ihenes publiquC5. Les pfes~;on5 comm(\l'ciales pOLissent les !nfor~
matidcl)s vers fie~ pl'Od~d;~ qui rz-:cueil1ef){ atllani d'jnfoflHltio!1:' qUt.> possib!e sor !es utilisateUl's.
La personPrdi~iltion dcs prod1.l1t:; du march€; et If'S impCft10fs de sccurite des donn(~es exigenl,
tOllS deux, des i\11onnation5 delai!!6es sur les indivldLis etlcurs irM~ractjons en rCsea1.l, Hahituellemcn!! ces donnees ( furlives ), sonl, soit non transparentes: pour I'LiIi!isateur, solt incomprr.-

)QJi.
~1l1e
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2OO~V;;i~. pM ~~~';Pffj-::l.biJwJiiC,~lli~~JhI"~\"\'" Il'ILDrg
Jill, RDgc" Clarkt' il inVl~tllE ]·{:xpre.nI(J1l c. (b,ilVl'l\I{t~!C~ r p:;w (\&rlrc I" Iltm;que de :.t::l'ci!!',i)U' de~ f;cmnet:'i PM Iii ,av.:1; riC'S hfor·
':;~:i?lls de $t)i~1 {'~f!rlro~lq!ie{:)j\lm? !(>'> r.~lr~6ist(Qjlll''-'IS il~lrf",I!!~ (k ,)r~lhl!On. \~ir Rogel DM,b, ~1{{jrf!l,:woq ii'c!1IijioiJ)' alld Da·
(,1',(,/11,111(1', CCJ')m;lIJ.titM 11,,111\,',111103\ 1:11)1 !!ln~1v.;)IlU l'li(I.,'!h/F'tDp'!!JJ1Df;t'1 (wrKr:ltW,v,l M!i!!.i;lml
2Ot. Vflif Mid1Jd FrOinktn : Ii (J;11(14~' ai WW()·~ ;?rc VN UIJ (14 ':tars 1~9\1;. M;lr.; [lu:, fiJ; f("P!)I,:·;4;'n pt;bEn nt' n\lti>en, Ie:. 'm·
plinli!.!\; 1i,1 WIJ>O, 01">0 grMlt!c p~rlje d!! I,] nrm;1(; aw:if Me \crrr:in('{'. Voir 3" kilPi)()ll JJli\lwl du NOt!ptc de I'M!ide 29::/e 11 dlf\lctivc
C}ffort'iCt1~B %1~,G1f.C DOL ~00661lYJ!cn!lin~1 Wi' )5, p. 59. /)j~):ilf!/1lo;)~.f1I.r~!llco'Jl'f)/J!)(c:X)I_m,vk(;!/('(j!mfriiJ/d;;(:.(omf/wlT
i1t1(")/,ypllr:!'4)j1

2q3.IJl!r:ne~ [r,gi[lCrrinr,~'Js~ f()f~e, jr.lemel P!0~UC{>j,
f)l,:Fll!w(!\'.Wf,,{jfS!il(!rfr;.4r'!I.I~f f J:dmIX:t",24t:r!

\.'2(,;,)1/ (1 (11'\'(1; StJcr:ifbj,m; Df~f! S:andml RFC24bO !rl&(~fllCrI:' 199B).

/,01. Vo!, 01'['[\"1('1",' of 1/;,' IH!~ lIe)!.' /hA'IY.i2Ii'(lfg/OI'CfI')('I'i.h:w!

hensibles lOS. En efie!, CPS decisions h:chniques C:is~irnul{:,llt d'imporlZlni5 pnhl~rnes DoliliqlJ{;,

de prOlertion des donn6cs,

P,l!'

exem;)lc, le5 servcurs ont hahitucl!cmenl des fich:ers COPlp!es

lendus tR fkhiers log x) (onten,lnl des don:lces ,:11' Ie comportement des ufilisateut"5. Ce:. firhier:.

son! uiiles pour!a !ll(linler\H1ct du ~yslbme, mai~ permeltent aussi Id surveillance " une oranGe
echelle des individds. Cepcnutln(, les CO!iSeoue:lO::S des decisions poli1iqul.~s irnpo:llnte~ selon
lesfJuelles ces tichiers scron! ou non ft1p~demenj erfac0s ~khappenl (~n ge:1eral 2. ,'attention de
publlc
De menw, Ie) rnoteurs de recherche sont pour les utilisateurs des ou!lIs iJ1I1 SSill11s
po:u irouver des infonlldtions sur 1'lnWrnet. TmHefois, lis ant aus,l d'etonoanles C:1;Joclles de
:.urveilLmce, D(~iJN('\"ls el :"1otbol onl Jp!)Mernment co~figu~(: ie motE'ur de reCht;fCht.> pour
tr~lnsmeltre le£ in(orlTl,ltions de IJ chJine de recherche J des lier!. 207, D' JulrG£ logic:els cz:'iebres
contenaien! des caracleris1iques (achee:; q:Ji perlleHaienl de lepcrer :!uU;isa!eur jusqu'a lln
pOil:~ sU~!)fen<lnL Re,llNetworks J meme i~l~Drporp~unc f~nctfon Y,ui d{:clen~h(lit un ~!~pe: 5E'trcl
vers Ie slte ue RealNe!works quand un uullsateur C'couldilla muslque sur j'ln!ernE'! ;,UG. ChJetln
de ((:'5 exenlples illuslre Ie pOL;voir ql:'ont ies entfC-'prises privees d'('wblir les ri:gles en m.1lrCfP
de vic pr:vee cile poius des interi?ts commerciaux SJr les liberlL's puiJliques,
te modele dmericain il Ull e.1scrnbie pardlie:e de ii r)1iles, le :a i [ qu'ilsc fie a !'auloregddtion
pour l,jisser Ie m,m:he d6!ermin{'lf la prolect:on de !" vic I)rivee minll1l!50 les aSlltX[S !if)lll~CO.
nomiqu('s de la protection des dO:fnees 2e9, En Pd!'!iG!liel~ 1;1 vie pdvee esllLl eh~men! central

de 1(1 demoCfdtic et ,HlP valeur humanisl(' no. Lf'S eit!!llcllIS fondJn1cnt.1Ux dr. la dtSmoCf(l!k ~,!
de b dignHc hum,lim' Sf' plclen~ pel! ,"ill !1;.l~dle l~lOll0nljql.'l:'. Meme d~Hk:i;l de (QUe limite inh(Jrenlel la capacilc d\m dtOy'CIl a;<1g1r sur Ie m,l:"che dU 110m de Id protection de sa vie privee
sefd lim:lee pdf lin importanl eHet de n?SC<iu. Toul ciloyen pelll :)ertirQ la c'lpaC~!e de pr0nd~E'
de:; decisions sur ses informaHolls persOf1llclles du fa:t des d1vuigatiolls ades tiers, Pdf eXl~n;rle,

un individu qui revele se, informations gell0tiques revele ,1USS; les ;nforl11alions genetiques de
ses pare"ls. Au fUI el J llIesnr" que plus d'informa(ions circuleronl 01 qUe les possibilites d'cra·
blir des profils en I'('(roi;;anl des informal'om $(:fonl plus etorfees/ {Oul individu perdra ii! tapa.cite de bile 10 unix de leveler Oll non dcs informations.
Un lllt1rche pour la protection de I,) vie p:ivec ne PE'Ul fonctionner dficacemenl que s'i!)' ,)
lfansparencc, Cej)Cndiinlt le tnarche es( l'i1!us:ration du probleme c!assiqut' d'echec du n~ili
ch(i, Les usages aCluds de !'ir:fofllHlioll par les enlfeprises sonl ties diss!muk~s nu pubHc En
erret ;a n::ldliol1 f'nlr(' les E'nt(epdsc'!' qui !fililcnf dt'.~ donnees el !es indjvid~ls est habill:el1ement
ba5l~) sur deS infolmfjtions flsymetriqucs : r I'entreprise a Ie grand pOllVoir df' controler qceiles
lniormallol1s son: diHusees sur elle tOUt en dlssimulant s:rnult\l:iK~ment la nature ell'elemJ,Je des
f

informalions qu' elle a obtenues sur les lndividus \ 111 _ les barrieres empechant 1('$ indiviuus de
les enlreprisC'$ tl1ilisel1l1eur~ inronnaiiol~S pcrsonnei!cs sonl souvent illslrIllonlables. En meme temps! les enlr'eprises profiienl enormemenl d'uil tonl!nerce des illforlll,l1ions personnellcs dlssimlMes au public Les v;rlill1{~s 1)lonl \ll!cun recoul $, tIt H niexist€' pas de
Iw~canisme independant qui delermine 51 les n',(;sures de protection sonf respech~0s, Dans ces
conditions, Ie marche n'offre pas el ne pCLll pas offrir aliX ~ndjvjdus 13 possi!Jillle de negociC'( dr
Inanierc slgnific<ilive la ))foteclioll de ieurs informations.
d\~ouvrir comment

1:J5. p~;r.~e;;;;c j'lJlai~1Il'tlr ntj)'~~ de !'!n{Nlltt J I'hl (I~ (il"nC0. dt Gllllpre.1!.1w 1" !iOdmo!o,2;:e!.le, t CO(lKi('" ~ nil 'wi'b !Jt;g,' tt t';"
CO!!; m01n~ d; $il.V(rir ce qr':I peut y faire.
206. Lei iJVI\ ;HO;I\",I.\ db ~':~~ \n~) ,\lr !,i W;1ik!eI;~iillt!,; ,('111~; 'i?S\IQ~ Cit·> '));':1)10: lin ulil:9\Nt hiormE a:y,;it d:''r dili:Ll'l!e~;'i 1r11~1\'l'r
:2 -CPO"',? il Clj..\ 1t'6!ioa;...
2U7. 0:1,) !\dV3 Prk,xy fjh'0ch R,li,li\\ i1<_'u flag, !nkm'rM[ion 5l'Curil)' H ljnin 1999),
10B. V;~ir Rc<\!NfllVorh fl'tl~",j CJ')~s/\cl::m, iWP:!/WII'l}',IIl!{'ff!f:'!fii'w:;,ton;!)/r(·'i!lIling·(lI.!\¥,/ililiClf'lO, 1(J/if,i:J(, 1jJS 14I,m;.j~i:!l1
209, Vol; Jtl2! ReiaellOfflJ" Rt'.llorhi8 Afllt'du!Il,;'Plil',l( l' in £Iec!fI);~\' Com;;;,1('t', 1"ll3clkelp}, Tf(h, L J. 7i 111999).
2H}, Wi! P,1!J! Schwall;:, Ffhwcy ili'd P,1iii(i(!;Jli,)I;: !h';Ofl"illlx)lI')iliion ,IIY! {'J:hii( Sti(fQ' xF{:uf,}lion it! lin: Ulliwti SrMf'3, it'} 10\\"a I
Rev" :;is] :1~95); SjlitGl $imi!h;, {\;:>'I1'will£ i'liI'xV ill In Inlofm;ajrl/i 5ociel)'. 13~ lL I'J. l. He\,. IO? (1981); l\1'i\:1 'vVc,lill, Pm:tyJ:;( J
Frt'k(ioi'!l, 2)·26 (14(;7).

21;. !!hiiip Allre, M!'oduCf;Of) ill i(>c/Jrlofogy ,)!lI/ Jllil'<1CI'; 71;e ,'I;l'l\' 1;l(lri>Cilj)f i;Jhi!ip L APII;' at 'WIre RC!lfnm1jj eds. ')9!lil, 11.

rc\ponse !racilionneHe (lUX Droblemes de !'approche a111criC(l:Qe aUloreglJatdce est Vadoprie lois ciblee', pour cc~.'nbler les 1t1(unes de protection 21:. Cependant, l'edec!i5:ne de 1;1 rereAir>mentdil'e dUX f:!dls·l;nis iIIUSlre le$ iimHes de celle rnel:jod(~, les reg!emenl;;,tions
j
soot rCaC!iVCS N incoh6renlCS, Par cxemple, les dg(:nt(~s de renseign0l11enl;; SUI' i('
fournissanl des informations sur Ie) antecooents en relation avec ies decisions d'octroi de
son1 rcglenWfllCtes 11.1, lilais les organi5a!ions ck: markeIlng diret! J"oumi9,an: des infofnla·
simllaires pour de~ fil13lilcs de marketi~g 11(1 'e $O!~! pas 21,1, Crlte methode de comb' emenl
!aCLlrl('>s legi5lmive:-. :aisse ;lUssi de cOte beaucou[J d"asp0c;s tit! trailernenl des infonn.:Hions
etva a j'enconlrc de la niltufc 1fJJ1SSector;ellc elu tra:teme!l! de aOItl:0CS 'llO{j<:BW.

Les lois generales de protection des donnees, loufefois, soot n6cessair~:lnenl IransseclorieUes
avec une grdnde porlee. J\1ais Ie rnoocle europcen ?U5S1 presente S0S propres proi)jcmes qt:i Iim:!t'n! l"aulosuHisancp de Ifapproche reglementaire generale, La vic i)riv0C cst (ontextucll{, e!
1'~lllerprelaliofl de regie) gener2.ics dans un contexte speciHque sera souven: extft!lnemenl dim·
; die el con~p!exe, En effet Ics princlpcs gener;lUx laiss0111 une la:ge ill,lrgr al!inleri)H~td!ion el
;'app\ic(ltion, En consequence, ia complexite lOujOlJr5 crOiS5(l!ltt' do IraHemcn: des donrri:s eS;
un clef: fondalTlenlal d la c!arlt~ pi a I'{~quite lant ellvt'rs Ics Individus qu'env\:'fs les re~ponsJb!ps
de !railel11cnl de donnees.
L'ambigui'te et I'appllcation des principes gE-PElilUX ant L.n impact important sur les comrnunjcalions en ligne, Souvent, les :ois gene"Jles de pro:ection des donnees prl;5cplent dr.s djvef~
genecs illlpor:,\ntc~ 11". P;;r <.'\('1I1pl::" ir;, lUI'.;' infcrmallfj,H' (I( IihN!r)' $P hlPiYJrtt':ll J de"
informaUens qu~ concerncm Wit' personne ;( idenlWable )', Milis ce (~lIC rt:'CQllVre une personnc
«jder~tifiable est inierprc10 tres di(((hemmenl scion les diverses lois generalt's. Ce!lah15 pays
(;,lIop()2ns adol)!ent ure conception plus large des criif:res ~)Our les dO!~nee5 JnOIl}'I1WS e! exj;

ci,Cllt de la protection plus de donnees que d'aulre, 216, La conseqJcrce est en Europe que

cer:ains pal) peuvent considen:[ certaines donnees comme non 5DumjSe5 flUX 10's. de protection
des donnees, landis q~e d'au[les leur appliqueront ia gdm1ne complete (les nonncs juridiques.
Le caracte!e executoire presC'fJ0 u;,e \lutre limi:e a]'efficdclte des lois genera!es de pro!ecHon
dorlPees. La cf{SdibllHe fje :3 prolecHol1 des donnees depend (i(;. son CMactere exeCliloil'C',
A;OfS que' les lois europeennes elablisS0nl des ))iecan:smes d'Jpp:ication imporlants induunl
des an:t'nGe~ el des cornmissions de p:ol0clion des dor1!lt~cs, des prob10_one, de conformhe avec
Ie;, z'xige-nc0s en !lldtiere d'lnflHnntioll des pcrsonces el des dlA.dara!ions ;:upr&s des ')uloriles de
con!roIe appararssenl nrantnoins .!iI, les poursuiles pour Infraction aux 10:5 til;' prolPcl1on des
donnees ne sont toutefois pas frequenle:; en Europe rnenw face ~ des violations flagfJlltes nil,
Ce qu; (lsI pius grilVC'1 Ie traitcment jransnationai des donneeS remel er\ qU(ls!ion le$ POUVO\:s
de~

rl'cx(!cutiOl1 ,erritoriJI(~,

7'iT\~~;sa;~~~;i~~{;; ~eiJ;~~;·!!ii_;l;Pi;;~
lB. V()~r 1S usc l(-i)J/),
;11. Voir In Ie : 'Jr~fI~ Union, role 9255 Fedtf~! kul!:' COfllrt';S$IO:;, OpiliJOIl rif Iii (Dflmis:'iu(\ 12·]3 ;1<1 mm, 20(1(1)
!J!~p-l/;yWW (/q:ov/o:J2(l!)(JJOJ/IiJllwnku;ol)lIlioMfl!;Cti.x:un(111ofl_pdi 1001,lIlt (l'fi": ]['): (llRdnb:nes nun em!}, w;nr!le "genres (I,' 1'<'1>
s~;gfle:;wn!~ wr I,) $"Ilte (If\~lld(ye !)?f.)w'nl (o:Jffih 0'\'0(> ia\ort oon reSienwl;:&" de. {ionnr(es ttl! )1m! ~fjJljI,\if('>, mill; p~~ iM~i {ph!I'S,
Gilt lee. dO'lJlNo, ~\el1wBIA,; d2$ ~gl'nt('S de wr,:;eignvj;"I?Il!$ "'-If I.. ~an!~ fl(lt!j)(ii:~"J; aifJire II,m~ U{)~1l (WI' COIl.(r2 i- it, 145 Ljd

!l09 (DC (itt.. 2{)01), hlf!jJ!i;1'\'5.rilldi~,t;mm!dC/OOI141il hll"i
11 <', Vei', IW exempk. ,reIN $wifl! ('l Kooerl LiEU), f\:o:w of Yolil iliN!W~.> : WorM l):'i,{ F/Oll'.l, {h'flwJ~,r CO/llIiV!CP ,wi ~iJi' (WOpLll;
~~~~1~:e::~~"1'~t~~'1)()~lIlg\: liJ9!l); ;oi:l Re!ibll!w(e ell,,;,11 $l;Lw,1I':z, /)dh! i'r01L'(I,Qn L,1\I' and 011,'111(' 5rlY1(f!\: K'!J;(li,w.!l), J{aj1;;,>;es
2](" VOII Rejrielliwrg.'lSrhwJrI?, >Upfll, ~p. 124·26.
217, I'ft. l>XC1llp!£ II' iaiblc 11::mlm-= de'!> dedai"Uoo, l}re,II~~!tb dar., de$ j)J;'S WilW,:> b Fr;lqik el u:l ex~;ner; anr;(t!O(iqu~· <iM siles web
ft.:iOpcem Illcn1reol dt't llrol:temes De <.:onlo.m,te aVEC Jes o\);ic,,!lorl~ di! tlilJJ>(.'iI!l?OC€ 1:11 :l'iTl'l om' fl'~!l(1fhe ne~ d&dar,,!iom ouliji.[?tfi)~ til; IV,lOm (o~lmis~;)n, de :;eivkcs fh ligne dnr~ JVtr.aiil~ UlllJ.)i'S Wropffl'. iI rtITle que de- I¥1rde:. S(l(:i~'..e" Iwl ~ fail en ('vi·
(lcrKe, nl) ~'ek,-jen! pil;. enregi)\!40 el que ceU(' non conlornlifr .flla Iv; iilait igDuW<:. Voir a<,l:.,i £xWf.'I,g ca'>r'!,;w O:l (VmpbHU; "'ill)
dill,) {J((IleClIM lali'S !Jail p(iflcip11!:o .'0 Ih(' Member 5/<11('5 of lilr tlifl)peJI! Unioll, n)lt:x( ,1\1 ri!ffX!f! ;mr.u;'i ce 1998 oe la Commission
J;, [ral';';i Ueff $~.l!on j'artidt' 13 de 1<\ dl(e(hV(' 95!46!H: n9IJS].

216, !'w t'x\'mpte. ;2 aunib:e (if dkI1r;n'GH~ dan~ ~6Iia\'~ CO!lllf\-!" ffi.')((l ijU !,:.,Ilt4gi:;'lie il\diqup Ull pro\)ti'I\12 .JeC{l'lIOfl)lile. til eifel,
!ille redwrdl:' ct':: "nrc~i,lr(:;11(~flb f:-;i~(>~ ce grands llMJli~wt1;) {If WIVIt(!~ f'IlIiS'W d,lI)~ ,HI mol'!;, un pa)"~ t<lrope(~;1 ~ (6~&je {~Je tk~

411

L.es din,ension~ intemationalGs de la protc(:tion des don nee:. meHenl J h~preu\le Ch(K~VI drs dif,
Jerenls modele:;, La croissililce spC'cttlCul?:ire des industdes offren{ des service mOfldid\lX en.
(ta!ne dc-":; conrlils el pressions ir~1por«m(es sur ]es formes poliliques, l;cor:or'l:qllt:S C\ t(4::hn:(Jucs
de 'a regulation de I'in{onnatique et de Icl libertt'. Alms que les iegis:ations nalionales et manw
les. ,l(cords prives ont des roles ajoner OilllS It, nouvel 5ge de j'intormalion globalo, iI f'xIsle un
bosoill Cl'OiSS,1nt de coordhatiofl in~er!'alionrtle sur la protCi~!ion de Irt vic privee, '-'inevhilbilit0
du cooflil entre les ;lOl'me~ ,iuriOiques ef gcne"alcs que lion trOUVe 011 Europe, 0[ les protf:.'ctlons
aci !JOc que I'on voit aux Uals-Unis, pldcenl1-J question dt: trailelTlen! equHablt, des :nfornltl.
[ioes pcrso1neHes au centre db rlux tr.msJronlaliers des donnee!i. Mellle en Europe, lC h;::':lcment Ir2.I1Snatiollnl des inkmnations cree des conflits entm des regimes gem~r'lux fancies sur Id
loi, tn elfet, all dehul des annt"t:5 quatreHvingt~d;x, I'exislc:tce de dirferentes lois nalionak'5 011
rJit de !'hll:monisJ[ion des normes de p:-olection Gb donnties une composan!e f:'sser,liellc cit!
pmjet de mar,chi: interne. La direclive europer-:nne 95/46/1:( a chC'rch& abrmoniser les lois na.
{Iondles des Et(lis l'rlernbres;l. Ul' hilul niveat: commU:l dc protec~ioll pour ~ Ie!> drolls ellt's li,
berles lOMame:llak's d{~s !)ersonnes physiques el en parltCL'iier ledr Grail d la protection dll 1J
vie priv{~f' l) 219, La slra~egle eld:t douhle : premi(~r('f'lenl, 16 directivE> Clflblissail tes pr:l'tcipCS
obliga:oil'c5 essL"nlieb pow Ie lr(litcnlent des dO:lnel's prrsonneUes, pu i:" dCl1xit:l11E'mcnc eh'!
demandah ilJ\' [lellS membres de l'Union eUfOpdem~e de faire qL.;e leurs 10:5 r·alionales soien!
pleinement conlonm's it CPS 1lonnes, TOllldois, les divergC'II((:'S cltlre norn1eS qui etJien! mrlOri·
S('CS pi1r 1(1 clargr de mJntl'tJVre a(cord':f:> par 12 directive' 0:1\ I2ls:>t~ d'impor[(i:lIS ohsidf Ie') P~)~!I
!p~ ::ervices. ell [igr-c'
ta dlferliv(' a aLSSI obligr.: jell eXJmf.!r approfondi de~ regjne) de pro(('(lion des dOI~nees e!rangers par l'inlcl'dictio:1 des lr1lf1Sft:'rls d'inronnalions l1ersonne1l0s V€'0
1

des pays :l'offrant pas de prolection (\ 2d{!qilale 22', Comme les combiT1aisons complexes dr
trtiitements d';nformatio~ls impliquenf souvenl des jurid!ctions multiples! ceHe disposition a
;ynene J un confli~ entre les differenl.es ap;xoches polHique (ll economique de l'Eu~ope et des
Etats-Unis, En meme temps, I'emergence de l'lnternet eJ de ses ca{laciles sophisliquees de Irai,
tel11ent interpaliol1ll! des donnees a montre que les reg:cs techn;qll(-"S sr. rJeveloppaienl 111l'ur
fa(on sans consi(Jeraiion des qonnes nalionaics de prolectirY1 des donnees
(eei signifiail
que les diverses technologies deployees pouvi::enl ne pas orfrir aux utilisateUfs la capacitt, de 5C
confo~lller aux nOrnK~\ localE'S de protection des don:jees,
)1

Le modele d'interdependance de la protection des dOlmees personnelles
tes probl(:mes lices it chacun d(:5 differenls modek's montrenl quc· !es trois app:uchcs nl' peu·
vent eIre isoloes, En diet, les approche, politique, economique e: lechnologique s'iniluen«'nl
l11uluellel11('11t 01 donnonl des aper~us imponants pOUI la creation d'une prolectiol) des donnee;
efficace, La veritable mise au poll'll des bons :Jsages en !nformalique exige la rcconnaissanc('
dlun modele tl ' interdependance de la protection des donl1f!cs p8fsonnciles, le diagramme ci·
deS50u, illus:,'e ce modele,

Comprendre I'inlerdependance de la prolection des donnees personnelles commpnce paf com·
prendre quels sunlles e;el11cnt5 du COlllexte politique aprendre en comple obligatoilemcn! pi
quelles 50f·t !es sources des normcs de l-eference ff.gissan! la protection des donnees qui den,
vent de chacun.des 11'015 modele;;. tes elements du contexte son! les mecanismes d'el;lbliss2men! des reg!es de pro!["Clion des donnees, le modele politique ulilise la loi, Ie modele
econo:nique u(ili~e Ie; normes <iu marche er)e modeh~ de la Lex in/oonatio utilise les techno·
219. Din:C'i;~:;93f4(,.'{f.

~.-"'-"~

220, Rei:lo:brlll ('[ $chw;;1l, ::Uplil.
211. i)h:,,,1iw 95/'ib.'[C, itrliti" 1~.

2,1f. Vnir K<;'iOmmilil(hlr?11 y~~ s~r J(·.lri.iI(,lflrt11,1~!,'i>'Ib!e ~l ;hi~()1\1~1j(1\;('~15{!(:!l1l(,(~ PCftOlllldl(', $pr .l:lll!?,ll'l iaillXl: I('~it'i~i~ 11 ~~:
~;;'\(~~ dl1 gto;Jpe til: Ifil'.W! (1~bll d ~prt'$l"ir1lt~{' t l, ,Ie 1il dlfe<:l',,,, 1.15/40/£(" tt'. nne (it; WARIO ;'09.1/% WP 17 -
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Modele de I'interdependance de la prolection des donnees personnelies
(onlextes

loi
technologie

Sources des Ilormes
/f"

loi sur la protection des donnees ~

5o
N

~ protocole technique ·-··-------usage
~-.

nmmes du marche ---.

-----~----""'"

outoregulation ----~---

logies. Les veri tables reglcs de protection des donnees 50nt el(lblics par les clifrerenles normes,
Dalls Ie modele polilique, la norme est une 101 de protection des dOllnees, (and is que dans lll'1
modele (~conorniquei la norme est I' autoregulation, Dans un modele de I.ex Informatica, la
norlllC:' cst un prolocole technique,
Camille Ie rnonlre Ie di,lgramme ci-dcsSlIS, les conlcxtes n'agisscnt pas cYune fa\:on seclorieile
sur les normes, La loi ",ffecle IE's prolocoles techniques et l'alitoregulCltioll. Des cxclllplcs los
plus cbirs de eeUe interaction entre la loi et la fechnologic 50 produiscilt ell rrl(lliere de cryplogr(lphic\ I.a loi ,1 fourni des limitf's contl"Ovrrscrs sur la disfJonihilite des produits de crypt,lge,
que co ~oit Pdl- uno reglclllt'nldlioll de cUllln:JIl' d l't)Xportdliull ou sur le1 cOl1ce~sion de lic(,llcc~
porlilill sur I'utilisation de ces produits 223, De mcmc, la loi a motive des lllecanisrnes eJ'autorcgulation. La directive 95/46/EC a ete ulle grande incitation ;\ la creation pour l'lnternet {lUX

flats-Un is d'une petite industrie de labellisation altestant des traitements de donnees personnelles effeclurs par des entreprises sur leurs sites web m.
En meme temps, la technologie afiecle les lois de prolection des donnees et I'autoregulalion.
Les dcveloppemenls technologiques infiuencenl ala fois Ie besoin et I'orientation de la loi. Par
exemple, les premieres lois de protection des donnees visaient les (( fichiers » ct les systemes de
fichiefs pMce que l'environllclllelll et(1i[ coillpose d'ordin(11eurs cenfraliscs, Aujourd'hui, la dl~~
cenlr(1lisalioll de l'inforlll(1lique et les cOJllmunications sailS fil Illodifient lil relation de lrailemenl, et IJ protection de donnees llloderlH:' est (enUre sur les notions de (( responsi1b!e dl'
!railcllll'llt )!, (I trflilernent )) et de « donnees structlln~es )', refletallt aillSi ces deveioppeillcilis
techniques, Ell outre, 1(1 globalisation des reseilux a signifie que les lois de protection des donnees ont dO decider cOllllllentlr(1lter les 1l0rllleS elrilngt~res. LTurope a opte pour Ie conlr61c des
flux transfronlaliers Sill'S norilles et!"(1llgeres etalt'nt in(1dequales 225, De meine, la lechnologic~ a
influence la capacite des rnecanisilles d'autoregulation. Les premiers {( cookies ») permettaien!
dt, reperer les ulilisawurs de l'lnternet sans leur accord. Au fur et Illesure que !es lItilisateurs se
sont alarrnes el que les logic-ie)s de navigation se son! pcrfectio!lnc-s, les options pour les ( cookies)) ,se sont develop pees pour pcnneltre aux utilis(1ieurs lin meilleur contr61e SLir un tel fe-

a

perego 22r>. CeUe inlerdependance esl aossi illuslreepar I'apparilion de lois sur la protection des
donnees qui repondent specifiquemenl ilia technologic. ~Allemagne, par exemple, a adopte
Line 10i sp6cifique ( d'alelte aux cookies

»)

pour exigcr que les ulilisaleLifs solen1 inforlll(~s de

I'emploi de la technologic des cookies 22'.
2D"~ !.es Eli\15.ih;i·s:·r~;··~;~e';;11;'f~:·~;;gT~~;~nlellll'expOrla!iol1,de produi}5 Ul) nrplJge !~I:dis que la i"r,lIlI.\' ,11:)ujOllr, demalldewH.li·

Liill,·UJliS, I~ 101 LO!llpUief k,I,;lallcl' Jor L~\v LnfOlct'IllC-lli /ki,
47USC §§ 1001·1 010, exlge q!/(' \('$ re)('~,lx Il!llnerlq!ws soicnl ~ ecoulal:Jb ".

(\'11[(' POur les protiUlis de cryplage uilhb en franc(" Oe mel11C, ,lUX

22-l 'IHIsle and IWBOniine, en parliculier, cherchilil il eire line reponse <!\lloregulalriCe au nive;lu dl~ PIOI(,(lion exige pM l'~rlicle 25 de

1,1 dlrec(ive95/,1[JEC.
225. Direclive 95f46!EC ,lrlicle 25.
n(;. I.e" uemieres versions de Nel~cape COJlll1lunkalor el d'(niemel [xpJorer perrneHenl chacune pilisiellfs choix concernant II's cookie'S
qlll n'elJien( p~s (hspl)nibll', dan~ Ie, ver~iom anlerieul'6 de ces logldds de nal'fgalion.
227. IvKDG, article 2

o
o

N

Lcs :lormes du macho O!l! auss.i un impact in1pO!ianl sur les prolocoles technique:; e( j'aulo":"l?l},G!a!ion, I.es acleors du rnarche e!~lralnent Ie d6vcloppcrnenl de nouvel;es Jrch!teclures [0ehnique" PM exen;ple, atJ f;)1" et d nwsurc qw: les dt'YcloP!JemrnlS de ia :echnologie donnaien{
aux utilisa:curs plus de con~r6le sur Ie reDerJge de leur comportement par I'('mploi des cO:1kies
les sites web et Ics (1nnonccurs commencl;;ent d deCOJVfir des moyens techniques de cOn!ou~~
ncr les contrales de:, utilis,lteurs pM des bogue:; au des images en: vjd(,s, Lt~ bogue web profit\:
de (prtahes car'lcieri::.tiq~les des cornman des HTr\A,L qui pcrmc:lenl cl un site \veb ():.1 il un a:J1l00Ket,r (Jiooliger :e n<-lvigatcur des :J(ilisaWurs d:iuge: une image de id ttiillc d'u!! soul pixel
d'un site dislanL CClte image est imoorcephble POdf !'uillisateuf ct nL' pellt pas eIre hloquee par
lui, maisj'action pennet au site web ou it !'<1nnonccur de reperer :fu!llis.(1teur

a

AI'oppose, des nOIl)1CS du nldrche reLf,tam I'impor:ann: de 1(1 plOtection de b vic: priv{'t~ pour
Ie CO!~l;llerce electroniquc ont etc JlIssi UllC motivation importante pour d6velopper un protocolo technique qui pennetlrJit .;lUX sites vl/eb de dlvulguer leurs politlques de tra;tement des
donners a'lIlle manicre lisible par ordinaleuf. Cc prolocole, P3P, ell deve:opp6 par Ie World
Wid(-, Web Consortiunl, De mcme, 1(-'s normC5 dll marchc influenceni. l'au:or6gdalion ilia lois
dans UP sens positir el dans un sens negatif. Flus I(] prolection de la vie Drivce preoccl1pe Ie:; ci·
loyen:" pilL) !<: genic: de cerl(]in5 (lcteJfS de I'inol:stric (1 adoptc Itl proteclion des dorm6es
camme une pratique profcssionfwile essenlielle, De g'andes sorielc5 financenlIr.aintenanlIe
drvc~o~JI)(~n'r.nl rl'Ola:ls ct' I'l"Ot('(';ion de 1.1 vie privcc', M3i; dan) I.) m(",~m' Oll I{':. citoY'.'Ii':; II('
con:lal5sent pas les praliqw:5 des cnlrCprisQs ct o·J les aclcu(s de i'indusirie sui\'en~ des codes de
conduile ecrits par Ie:; associaLons profcssionndlcs/ ;cs normC$ du !lltll"ch~~ consli:uen: plus In
,1:gdmenl de rel<i.lior~s pllbliques qu'une veril,lble protection des donnees,

I.'impact conjoint des different, elements du ronicxtc poliiiquc qui doivenl eIre pris en compte
sur les BanTle.; de rererences e1 les regles c:ui ell resultenC delermincnlies prJUques concre:05
de tl'aitemenl des donnees ad!):' 10 socie~e, En erfet Ie;; !)ormes dC' reference ne 50l1t PdS illGcpendan~es 229 ; chacune exerc(' une in11uencc sur 1,1 protection e! sur Ie niveall reel de protf:'ction des donl1eC)~ Comllle 1e5 e.lemen~s ne son! Ilas independdn!S, fa proteClion effie.iCe des
donnees nc peu~ veni! que du fail que klS urganis2lions .1Uleurs des nonnC'~ de releren(cslra\\lH!enl ce m(ll1ierc' conccri(~e plul6t quiLn opposiiion, Lcs n:l,;ltions de la loi, de ia lcdwologif'
et des normel, dl! m7lrch6 ,1WC 1<1 l('glslalioll de protcClior: des donnees, les protocoles techniques e: l at.toregcldtion sonl entf0croisees. ChJque orgil!ljsalion el,)!)! a I'origine de normcs
de reference peul H'?duire ou 50ulen:r les objcc-!ifs des autres, Pdr exemple qu.;md !,lloi de prolection des donnees chrrche aen1pl-'cher 1(1 coHecf"e d'informations j3er;,onnclles, des protocoies
techniques exigeJnl I'identification des utilisJfeu(s peuvenl etre crees: 0:.1 des options techmques. peuvelll elre d0veloppees pour creer l'anonY11laL De meme, Ips COIl!(tdnies d prendre en
consideraHon peaven! miner leurs obj(:'Ctifs respeclifs/ et aller J I'encontre des objeclifs de diverSes norm('s de refelenCe, Par excmpic, Ie, nO;llle~ du marc1e (endent af,)Vorisel' la ll1axlmisMion de I, (ollec(e des donnees aux fillS coml1lerciale, landis que la loi prefere que Ie;
donnee~ soient IT:inimisees e( servenl (lUX besoins sociaux et des citoyens, Dans if! mesure oll
(es preferences sont illcOI'p.')rees dans Ips protocoles techniques et les mesures d'autoregu!atiofl,
ces :1OfmeS de reference seront en eonlfadiction avec 105 ohjeclifs de 1(1 loi de protection des
donnees, En breL il y a une interoei)endanu: de b !oi de la lechr;ologie el de I'autoregulation
l

l

i

l

dll marc'le,
Dans ce contexte d'l:lterdependancf, Ja protection de la vie prlv(£ ne peu( done 6tre garantic
convenablement que p(l~ !a c3n;ilisation des elements d:.1 contexte qui do1vent elre pris en
compte et des sources des norm{'S de reference, Les elements doiven! ionclionner ensemble

d\lfl(:' rnaniere coherenle pour arrlver aune protecl:on cfficace des donnees, Cette canalisation

iiB": \l;"Jir r.;cha(:'is'lli\h,rXQ';-W(:f,I;;;II~' {'lip;'!il~~I\'\\"I',p;i\,,:<;yiQlinrfiJ:,~)r,AXl:it'(d:i[albi1t'\ly,j;J);Jg.lllm!
149, V;)i~ pM f'M::'mpk', bn"n:>(1[C ll%jg Cone mid {llll!'1 [ii!I'" '.Ii Q'!X'(;:Pif(P (1993),

Jutour de quatrc conditions cl6s, Prcmiercment, 1(1 parlicipation des citoyens a IJ
conception de 1(1 loi, des technologies el de~ Illilrches est essentielle pour une protection efficace des donnees, La [Jilrticipiltion des citoycns est neccssllire afin Clue k~) villeurs elles objeclirs publics soirnl mherenls ,bns Irs Irois spheles du droit, de la lechnologie pi du marche.
Deuxicmemcnt, I'anonymat J I';lge du numcrique clevienl une caracteristique cssenlielle des
systernes techni,ques el de,S produils dUlllilrch6. L'Jllonymat i~lCmpore d~1lS 1:5,systemcs in,for.
1l,"li~ues favorrse la coherence des approches de la prolectron de la vie prlvee pM 1,1 101, 1,1
technologie etle rn,lI'chc', Troisiememcnt, lil ll1inimisJlioll des donnees doilCtI·c la pielTe' angulaire des Ilormes de la loi, de la technologie ef du llli.HChe, insister sur I" pertinence dC."i donnees
au regard des fin,llilc;s de la technologie et du Illarche preserve la coherence du lr,litement des
informations personnelles (1vec les trois spheres. Enrin, I',lutomafisalion doH jOllel· lin role important dans 1(1 garantie de la protection des donnees. Des mecJnismes d'application autolll,ltiqlle des poliliques de protection des donnees faciliteront l'uniforl1lisalion dans les dOlllilines
de 1,1 loi el du nwche.

iOUrIler(l

I'inlerdependance signifie loul a la fois

~ue

des technologies de 1,1 proleclion de la vie privee

son! necessaires, que les nonnes du marche doivent adopter ccs technologies et que la loi doit

proleger les ciloyens. Cependant d,ln5 Ie contexte de 1,1 protection des donnees, les incitations
clu mMche ct les inforrnalicicns nc soutiennent pas regulicrementlJ protection dc~ donnees el
n'(1boutissent pas ades regles pertinentes 230. POLir que I'autoregulation et Irs regles techniques
jouen( ensemble' en f,weur d'ullr protection efficace des donnees, il (([ut qu'fi existe un el1sembk\ d'oi:Jjecliis. Dall~ une ~()ci6l6 dc'1ll0Udliqut:, 1'111161('1 publil elles \lJleurs publiqllc'> soni
traditionneilcillent fixes par les representants poliliClues all moyen du syslcme juridique. (ela signifie ~ue la loi doil <'tablir les objectifs des aUlorite's do re'gleillentation de la prolection des
donnees. En eifel, pour canaliser les regles techniques et I'auloregul"lion ot les faire cor respondre aux rogles juridiques, 1(1 101 peut et doit attribuer une responsabilit6 au march6 et aux archilectes de reseaux pour leurs choix 111. En d'autres terllles, les regles juridiqlles de
responsabilitc devienncnt un mecanisme de pour incite.r les regles techniques ell',lutorc.gul(l¥
lion as'hiHrlloniser avec J'interet public. (efte motivation necessaire enlraillera Ie developpeIllenl et I'extension de technologies de prolection de la vie privee rl d'aclions de proteclion de
la vie privee sur Ie marcile. 5i, d'(lprcs 1,1 loi, los technologies doivenl contenir des oplions de
protectioll de la vie privee ('I si 1<1 rrsponsabdite doH etre inlegree aLix regimes ,lutorcgulateurs,
alms cos aLilorMs do f(~glenwnla[ion - protocoles techniClues l!l ,lutoreguialion - Clgiront de milnicre colllplc~lTIenlaire au lieu de se deveio)Jper de Jll(1niere contradicloire.

Conclusion
Le modele juridique, Ie Illodele t('chnologi~ue, elle modele du marche des pratiques 10)"le5 en
matiere cle donnees personneJles, quoique con~us comllle des ensembles de regles distincts,
sont en fail interdependants en tant qu'instruillents d'une protection effieace des donnees, (eUe
inleldependance de la loi, de la technologie pt de I'auloregul"lion rnonlre, touterois, que les
trois sources de regles concernees doivenl etre canalisecs dans la mE-me direction ann que les
reg!es se renforcent all lieu de se contrecarrer. Trois principes directeurs peuvent Nre degages
pour cette canalisalion des autoriles de regicillenlatioll :
-Ia loi esl necess"ire pour ctalM les objectifs d'inleret public, mais insuffisante l'Our garanlir la
mise en cpuvrc de pratiques loyales en matiere de donnees pel·sonlleJl(~s;
~ dans une societe democralique, l'etablisselllonl des regles par la technologiC doH etre sournis
aI'interel public el au debat public;
230. Voit Joel R('id~nberg. Rt'storillg Arneli(wl.l'Pril',lC)' h) ElecllOllie COmmel((', \4 BNKel,,')' Tech. L). 7/1 (1999).iJlIP://\\'1V\\'.iawJ)(!I'
h4,'yedll/jOlll nal~/b(ljl'lllicle.\/ 1'UIRej£i('IJ/)['J glhlm/ilr;,ldeiJllmi
231, Voir,

IW{,~eillrk,l.f)'

informatica, ,wpia,
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- la lespunsdhiiile juridique sera un instrument essentiel pout Ie ~18veloppe'n{:'nt de prQdui~) dE'
protection de 1<1 vie prjvt~,

l es rddi~(H1~ ,cmnplex!?s en~re b h~,i, ks c1?i~ IC,{,h;ji~lUC;$ <:'{ if' 1)l~m~he dcr,TIcmdenllll1<' vigil~H1Ce
CltOYH1S qUcl'll J 1.1 co;;pc:e el d 1'~lllhsJtjQn {jrlcurs mimmatlons personnel[es, Des
ciIOj'(!o:, vigHi'J'ils e{ (lcli~;: resleron11a defense ess('!ntielk, conlrc ]'erosiOIl dr la vie pFiv6.:' ii i'5ge
de ,'!'lklfm(Jtloll
dCtrUe Of'S

D
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PIUV ACY I'ROTECTION ANI) THE INTElu)EI'ENDENCE OF

LAW, TECHNOLOGY ANn SELF-REGULATION
.loel R. REIDENIIICRG'

INTRODUCTION
A new paradigm has emerged for the effective protection of personal
information in the onHne environm~nt 1)[ the Internet and the Information
Society. While data protection laws have spread to a significant number of
countries around the world during the last twenty years, the divergence in
nalional laws and tlle prolifera!ioll of transbordcr data processing challenge
the enforcement of existing legal standards. At the same time, technical
capabilities have developed that both enable and constrain the ability of law
to assure the rajr treatment of personal information. In effect, legal
regulation shares rule-making authority with tecimologicaI standards and
protocols. For the treatment of personal informatjon, thc most direct
regulation of information processing comes from the technological rules
buill into network infrastructures by industry rather than from law itself.
Indeed, the architecture of information networks establishes default rules
for information processing.
This paper, thus, explores the complex interdependence muong law,
technology and industry practice, Drawing on the American and European
experiences in data protection, the paper proposes that, for the Internet, law
must provide an incentive for technological developments that advance
privacy-protective technologies, The paper argues that law must further
ereate the conditions that promote the deployment of privacy-protective
teChnologies and systcm designs by industry. In a democratic society, rulemaking through technology must be shaped by public policy goals and
public debate. Law is, thus, necessary to establish the public policy
objectives, but insufficient to assure the implementation of fair information
practices.

Pf(.fesSQ(' of Law and Director of Ihe Graduate Pmgmm, FonlhaJU University $ch')o\ ,-~f Law, Thl);
C;;$i1Y wit;; prepared for {he c!mfercncc "-Oil (he Brink of New Hvo!nlions Illlhc Law of IIlJornUilion
Technology" in ccle))J'I1!ioll of the 2(14 Annlvcrs1I1:Y nf jhe CRfl), Nt)\', 7~fJ, 19<j() with great
tlilprecimion lind admtrmioll to Dean Yves POULLHl fOf the inf>piralio!) he hi\~ provided w so
tHany ill the field
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l. DISTINCT REGULATORY MODELS OF DATA PROTECTION
The rules for data protection come from three dislinct perspectives:
political, economic, and technological. In Europe, data protection is an
inherently political right and focu:-;cs on legal mechanisms to guarantee
respect for a fundamental human right to privacy!, By contrasl, in the

United States, information privacy is left to the marketpl.ace and the desire
to have markel-based protections for constlmers2. Across these two policy

models of data protection, technological rules and defaults define
information practices for network interactions1 .
In Europe, the political perspective 011 data proteelion insists Ihal
citizens have a fundamental human righl (0 the fair treatment of their
personal information. This right of 'int(lfInational self-determination' is an
integral component of democratic society. Information self,determination
emphasizes the associational rights of citiz.ens and defmes a basic right of
the citizen to Gonlml the collection and lise of personal information. The
political rights model seeks comprehensive legal rules through data
protection legislation. As a result, modern Europenn data protection laws
impose a complete set of standards for the fair treatmenl of personal
information ranging from ftnality to access and enforcement. Although the
specific term,s ami interpretations of these laws may vary, the underlying
pl'jllciple~ share (he common view that data protection is a basic human
right that must be guaranteed by the state.
An opposite approach in the United Stales adopts an economic
halancing instead of the political basis for informatioll privacy. The
American approac:h views the state more skeptically and prefers to let
citizens fend for themselves_ Under the economic approach, self-regulation
largely determines information privacy_ Industry codes of conduct and
corporate practices are favored over law_ Data protection becomes "
question of economic power rather than political right. Indeed, the debate is
typically characterized in terms of « coosumers » ratller than" citizens »,
In this approach, law only intervenes on a narrowly targeted basis to solve
specifk isslles where the marketplace is perceived t.o have failed. Ad hoc
sectoral st.atutes, thUS, address only an ecleetie set of problems. Drug
ahusers, for example, have stronger protection tban web users and video
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rental lilles must be held confidential, though medical records call be
disclosed 4 ,
Independent of these Iwo models of dala privacy, Ihe Lex lnf{ml1atim
or <<: code >} approach regulates through the technit:al rules embedded in
neiwork archilccllIrc5.'1'hc lechnical standards and prolocols as well as the
default seUings chosen by system developers set threshold information
privacy rules, These teGhnieai rules define the capabilities of networks slleh
as the Internel to invade or protect privacy, For example, anollymous
Internet nse may be buill into the network structure just as surveillance
tracking may also be buill il1lo IllC nelwork,
Historically, the three models (political, economic and tcelmical) have
each sought to segnwnl Ihe reguhuion of fair information practices. Th,o
political perspective insisted on law as the principal mechanism to assnre
data protection, while the ecollomic perspective insisted Oil the market
place as the arbiter of privacy protections. At the same time, the technical
approach has built rules directly into the transmission of data. These
different approaches arc typically viewed as either self·sufficienl or as
substitutes for one another. For example, the transatlantic dialogue for
many years has described comprehensive law and political righls as the
alternative to industry code and market decisioDS!>, At the same lime, the
technical community has pursued its own standardization processes and
pU'lJOI1cd 10 embrace a ccrlain degree of poiicy·nclIlraliry7, Yet, these
different. models are neither sell~sufficientllor colllplete alternatives to olle
anoUler.

II. THE INADEQUACY OF DISTINCT REGULATION IN THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY
Each of the distinct forms of regulation embody inherent Iimillltions
that preclude adequacy for effective protection of privacy, Lex /l1Jormnlica
can build the capability either for privacy·proteetivc or privaey,invasivc
infrastructures. However, standing alone, the technical approach does not
assure lhat deployment will respect fair information practices. The U,S.
economic marketplace model minimizes or leaves aside important aspeels
of information privacy such as non-market democratic values, while the
European comprehensive legislative model tit.ees significant eontexi
specific problems, Al the same tjllle, informalion privacy faces critical
4.

See Paul SCHWARTL& JOl'!j R. RElDH>JHERG, Dar,a Priwl(.)' Lml' (Midlie: 1996).

5.
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international dimensions that the political, market and tedmical n\Odds do
not singularly resolve,
The Lex ir,formalica model suffers from the absence of a
representative public policy debate and fmm the commercial pressure
toward technical structures lhat maximize data collectioll and
dataveillanceS Several key examples reflect this CUlTent weakness . The
privafization of the domain naming system by [he US government to
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (" [CANN »)
largely ignored the privacy considerations inherent in the design of the new
domain narne registration prorocol 9, Indeed. the registration pro loco I and
process require the online publication of information about registrants that
implicate basic data protection principles. The system design precluded the
option of anonymous domain nalne registration, Similarly, the Interne!
Engineering Task Porce «< lETP ») is hard at work designing a new
Internet transmission pI'Otocol, IPv6(o . This protocol contemplates that
evcry device connected to the Internet win have a unique identifier - a
type of digital fingerprint for Internet lIscrs.. From an engineering
standpoint, therc may be important advantages to digital fingerprints, hut
hom the privacy perspective, such an architecture is deeply troubling .
Significantly, these decisions arc being made by the community of
interested engineers at the lETpll rather than by a combinatioll of
engineer~ and policy makers.
While technical architecture decisions are often made 1ll esoteTic fom,
major products are also frequently developed in a policy-myopic fashion.
Commercial pressures push developers and implementer, tow<lrd products
that collect as much information about users as is possible. One-to-one
market customizatioll and data security impcmtives each seek detailed
informatioll about individuals and their net work interactions. Typically,
these « data creep" fUllctiol1'; arc either lIoll .. transparent to the user or
illcomprehensible l2 III effect, the,;e technical decisions bide important
policy issues for privacy . For example, system servers routinely maintain
log file" containing traffic data on l).~er behavior. These files are valuable
8.

9.

10.
(1,
12,

Roger CU.RKE coined the phmse "dattlvciHancc" to dest:ribe the Jlm~tice or data sun.rdilance
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for system mailHenancc, but also enable massive (racking of individuals,
Yet, the important policy decisions about whethcr' log files will be
maintained anonYlllously or whether they will be deleted promptly are
usually hidden fl1Jlll public scrutiny", Ukewise, search engines ,Ire
powerful lools for users to find informatioll on the 11llerneL However, they
also pl1lvide striking surveillance capabilitics. DejaNews and HOlbot
apparenily configured lhe search engine to relay search string information
along to third part!cs I4 • Other popular soflwan, contained hidden features
that enabled Ilscr tracking to a surprising dcgree. RcalNetworks even buill a
'phone home' fealure into its streaming audio player". Eaeh of these
examples illustrates the power that private organizations have to establish
information privacy rules for individuals and an inevitable weighting of
commen;ial inlerests oVer general pubhc concerns,
The U.S, model has a parallel sel of limitations. The rdianee on self·
regu lation 10 let the market determine the protection of privacy minimizes
the non-economic implications of data protection l6 , Specifically, privacy is
a central element of democratic governance and is a very humanistic
value!? Basic elements of democmcy and human dignity lend themselves
poorly to an economic marketplace, Even beyond this inllerent limitation, a
citizen's ability to act in a privacy market will be limited by an imponanr
network effecL Any citizen may lose the ability to make decisions about his
or her personal infol1nation as a result of third party disclosures, For
example, an lIldividual who disdos(~s hb genetic information also discloses
the genetic infonnation of his relatives, As more information circulates and
inferential proJ1les become more robust, any particular individual will lose
the ability to make palticipation choices.
A market for privacy can only function effc.ctively if there is
transparency, Yet, the privacy marketplace illustrates a classic problem of
market failure. The actual information practices of business are largely
hidden from public view. In effect, the relationship between data
processing organil,alions and individuals is typically based on asymmetric
infol'lllatioll : « the organization [has] the greater power to control what
information about itself is released while simultaneously obscuring the
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nature and scope
(he informal ion it has ohtained about individuais ;.}!~.
The harriers for individuals to di:-;cover how husiness usc their pl:rc-;onal
information arc frequently insurmountable. AI the same lime. husinesses
profil enormously from a trade in personal informal ion hidden from puhlic
vIew. Victims have no means of recourse, and no independent mechanism
exisls to determine whether fair information practices arc followed, Under
these conditions, the market does not and cannot am)rd individuals an
opportunity to negotiate for meaningful fair information practices in the usc
of their information,
The conventional response to the problems in the U,S, self-regulatory
approach is the enactment of targeted statutes to fill rhe gap;.; in
pro",ction 19, However, the eclectic stotUl.ory response in the United States
illustrates the limitations of lhis method, Sectoral regulations mc reactive
and inconsistent. For example, credit reporting agendes providing credit
history inf(lnllHlion in connection with credit eligibility decisions are
regulmed 20, bUi direct marketing organizations providing sirllilar
information for PUff: markeling purposes are nOl 2!. This statutory gapfilling approach also leaves n)any area;.; of information processing
untouched and runs counler to the cross-sectoral nalure of modern data
processing.
Comprehensive data protection laws, however, are necessarily crosssectoral and generaL But, the European model too presents its mvn <';t~( or
problems that hmit the self,sufficiency of the comprehensive regu!.r!ol)'
appmach_ Privacy is contextual and the interpretation of general rules in
any specific context will often be extremely diffieult and complicated_ In
effect, general principles create a large margin for interpretation and
implementation, As a result, the ever-increasing complexity of inforllllllioll
processing poses a fundamental challenge to clarity and fair treatmenl of
both individuals and data Users.
The ambiguity and application of general principles have a
pronounced impact for' online communications, Often, comprehensive data
protection laws diverge in significant ways22, For example, privacy rights
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attach to information that relates to an <A identifiable l)cl'son23 , Yet, the
scope of an "idenlifiablc" individual is il1tcrp.t'led quit" differently IIllLler
the various comprehensive statutes, Some European countries take a
broader view of the crilcrla for anonymous inform(uion and exdude more
transael;on related data from the statlllory protections than others24 For
data transmissions within Europe, the consequence is that some countries
may trcat specific data as outside the jurisdiction of the data protection
laws, while otilers will apply the full range of standards.
j}

Enforceahility presents another limit on the effectiveness of
comprehensive data protection laws. The credibililY of data protection
depends IIpon its enforceable charlleter. While European laws establish
subslantial enforccmenl mechanLsms through penalties and data protection
commissions, serious compliance issues with noticc and registration
re'luiremenls arc nevertheless apparenl25 Public proseeution of data
protection offenses, however, is nol a common event in Europe even in the
face of blatant violations 26 More importantly, transnational data
processing challenges territorial enforcement [lowers.
The inlemalional dimensions of data protection test each of the
various models. The dramalie rise of global service industries generales
powerful conflicts and pressures among the polilical, economic and
technical forms of regulalion for dau. privacy. While national statutory law

and even private agrecl11t'nls h<lvc roles 10 play in the new glohal
informalion age, an increasing need exists for international coordination of
privacy protection. The inevitability of conflict between cOlTlprehensive
legal standards, as found in Europe, und ad hoc protections, as seen in Ihe
United States, place the issue of fair treatment of personal infmmation at
the cemcr of global informalion transfers. Even within Europe,
transnational ini<mnalion processing poses confliclS among comprehensive,
rights-based regimes. Indeed, during the early 1990s, the differing national
laws made the harmonization of data proleCI ion standards an essential
component of the internal markel plan. Direclive 95/46/EC sought to
harmonize the domestic law of the Member Slates at a shared, high level of
protection for « the flludamcnlal right~ and freedoms of natural persons,
23.
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and in pmtieular their right to privacy ,,27 The strategy was two fold: first
the Directive set out the mandatory, essenlial principles for persoilal dat"
pl'Clcessing and then second required Member Nations of Ihe European
Union 10 [)ling their' domestic law into full compliance with Ihese
st'mdards. However, Ihe divergences ill standards still allowed by the
Directive's permissihle " marge de man<I:uvrc " left significant o\"taclcs
for online servkcszs , The Directive also forced scrutiny of foreign data
protection regimes Ihl'Clugh the prohibition on transfers of personal
inforillation to countries lacking « adequate» protcction 29 . Since complex
informatioll processing armngemcnts often involve multiple jurisdictions,
this provisioll brought the differing political alld ecollomic approaches of
the EU and the United Slates into cont1icl. At the same timc, the emergence
of the Internet and its sophisticated international data processing
capabilities illustrated that technical rules werc being developed in their
own way without regard to national data protection standards10. This meant
that various deployed technologies might not have the capability for users
to comply with local dala protection norms.

III. THE PRIVACY INTERDEPENDENCE MODEL
The problems with each of the distinct models reflect Ihal Ihe Ih,.('e
approaches cannot he isolated. Indeed, the political, econoillic and
technical approaches influence each other and provide important insights
for the development of effective data protection. The actual achievement of
fair information practices requires the recognition of a privacy
interdependence modeL The'diagram below illustrates this llIodeL

Privacy Interdpendence Model
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Privacy interdependence hegins with an understanding of the policy
and rule aUlhorities for data protection that derive from each of
the three models. Policy constraints arc the mechanisms fiJI' emllblishillg
rules of data processing. The political model uses law, the economic model
HSeS inarkel norms and the Lex Ir{f(wma{ica model llses technologies, Tlw
aetualmles of data protcctioll are estaL,lished by rule authorities. Under the
political model, the rule authority is a data protection law, while under an
economic model the rule authority is self-regulation. Under a Lex
il1jilrmalica model, the rule authority is a technical protocol.
constraint~

As illustrated above in the diagram, the policy constraints do not
operate distinctly on rule anthorities. Law affects technical protocols and
self-regulation. Some of the clearest example" of the interaction between
law and technology arise in the context of cryptograpby. J ,aw has provided
comrovcrsial limils On lhe availahility of encryption products whether
through export conlml rcgnlation or licensing of products 3 !. Similarly, law
has motivated self,regulatory mechanisms. Directive 95/461EC was a major
impetus to the creation of a cottage industry in the United Slates for the
Internet of seal programs attesting to cOIporatc privacy standards on weh
sites 32 ,
At lhe same time, technology affects (I;Ua protection law and self.
regulalion. Technological developments influence both the need and
direction of law. Por example, early dala prolCcliou laws focuse,1 on
<, files ») and file systems because Ihe cnvironmenl consisled of mainframe
computers. Today, distributed computing and wireless communications
alter the proccssing relationship and the emphasis of modern data
proteclion is 011 « cOIHrollers ». « processing » and « t'truclured data, »
reflecting these technical development. In addition, the glohalization of
networking meanl that data protection law had to decide how it wonld (real
foreign slandards. Europe opted for restrictions on foreign data transfers if
foreign standards were too weak):> Similarly, technology influcnced the
capability of self-regulatory mechanisms. The early" cookies" technology
allowed tracking of lntel'llel users witholll (heir participalion. As users
became alarmed and browsers hecame more sophisticated, « cookie })
mauagement options developed (0 allow lIsers greater control over such
tracking 34 . Thi, interdependence is also illustrated by the emergence of
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data proteclion laws that respoud specifically to the technology, Germany"
for example, enacted a specific 'cookies alert' law to require (hal HScr~ be
inforl11ed of the use of the cookies teclmology15,
Markel norms also have an important impacl on technical protocols
and self-regulation, Market participants drive the development of new
technical architectures, For example, as technology developed to give uscrs
greater c011tl'ol Over the tracking of their behavior through the use of
cookies, web sites and advertisers began to discover technical ways to
cirCU111Vent user controls with web bugs or dear gil' images. The web bug
takes advantage of certain features in the HTML commands that enable a
web site or advertiser to force the users' browser lO load a single pixel
image from a rernolc site. This pixel is imperceptihle to the lI~er and cannot
be blocked by the user, yet the action allows the web ,ile or advertiser 10
lrack the user)6 By conlraSl, markel nornes rdlecting Ihe Importance of'
privacy (0 electronic COllunerce have also been an importan1 motivation to
the development of a technical protocol that will allow web sites to disclose
their privacy policie~ in a machine readable manner. This protocol. P3P. is
being developed by the World Wide Web Consortiulll, Similarly, lllarket
norms affect sclf··regulation in both positive and negative ways. As privacy
becomes a more salient concern for citizens. the ethos or certain industry
players lIas adopted data proteclion as a critical business I'rac[jcc,
Prominent companies now sponsor the development of privacy lools, But,
to the extent lhal dlizell0 are unaware or industry practices or that iJ)dusLry
players t()llow codes of conduci wrincn by trade associations, the market
nOl'ms provide privacy public relations rather than Ime data protection,
The collective impact of the diffel'elll policy constraints on rule
authorities and the resulting rules themselves lead to the actual data
practices in society, Indeed, rule authorities are lIot independent"; each
exerts an influence on fair informatioll practices and the actual level of data
protectioll, Since the dements are 1101 independent, effective dala
protection can only come from a combination of policy constraints alld rule
authorities working in concert rather working ill opposition to each other,
Tbe relatiollships of law, technology and markelllOl'IIIS with data prolee!ion
legislation, technical protocols and self-regulalion are intertwined, bach
rule authorily call undercut or support the goals of the other IlIle aUillorilics,
POl' example, when data protection law seeks to inhibit the collc{:tiotl of
personal infommtion, technical protocols mlly be developed to require the
identillcation of usel'~ or technical choices may be developed to create
anonymity, Similarly, the policy consrminls may undercut the goals of each
35.
36.
37
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other and work against the goals of different rule authorities. For example,
market norms tend to favor data maximization for commercial gain while
law prefers data relevance to balance citizen and social needs. To the extent
that slIch preferences are enshrined in technical protocols and sclfregulatory measures, these rule authorities will contradict the goals of dala
protection law. In short, there is an interdependence among law, technology
and market self-regulation.
In this interdependent context, the protection of privacy can, thus, only
be assured adequately through a channeling of policy constraints and rule
authorities. The clements must operate together in a consistent manner to
promote effective data protection. The channeling of policy constraints and
rule authorities will revolve around fOllr key conditions. First, citizen
participation in the design of law, technologies and markets is essential for
effeetivc data protection, Citizen participation is nceessary so that Jlublic
values and goals are consistent across the three spheres of law, technology
and market. Second, anonymity in a digital age becomes a critical feature
for technical systems and market products, Anonymity built into
information systems furthers consistency of privacy across law, technology
and the marketplace. Third, data minimization must be a cornerstone of
law, technical architecture and market norms. An insistcnce on the
relevance of data for technical and market needs preserves coherence in the
treatment or personal information across the three spheres. Lastly,
automat.ion must play an important role in the assurance of data protection.
Mechanisms that automate the implementation of data policies will
facilitate uniformity across the areas of law and marketplace,
Interdependence means that privacy technologies arc necessary, that
market norms need to adopt those technologies and that law must protect
citizens, Yet, in the context of data protection, market incentives and
technological decision-makers do not regularly support fair information
practices and result in consistent rules,38 For self-regulation and technical
rules to act coherently in furtherance of effective data protection, a
framework set of objectives l11Ust exist. In democratic society, public goals
and jlublic values arc traditionally sct by political representatives through
the legal system, This means that law must establish the goals h,r data
protection rule authorities, Indeed, to channel technical rules and sclfregulation to accord with legal rules, taw can and must allocate liability to
the market and to the network architects for their choices,39 In other words,
legal liabilily rules become a key mechanism to provide the incentive for
technical rules and self-regulation to develop in harmony with public goals,

38.

Sec Joel R, REIDENBERG, RCSIOJ'illg Americans' PriV<lcy ill Electronic COJ\l1l1erce, 14
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This necessary incentive will promote the dcvelopment and rlcployJ111'llt oj"
pri vacy-pro1ech ve technologies and pri vacy-protecti \Ie market aci j \ ",s. !C
technologies mnst by law embody privacy protecting choices: and jf
accountability mu~t be built inlO self-rcgulalory regimes, Ihen the;,,· r~llc
authorities --- technical protocols and self-regulafion - ..- will act in ways
that arc complementary to each other ralher than develop in conDie! \vith

each other.

CONCLUSION
The legal, technological and market models of fair information
practices, though conceived as distinct rule selS, arc in fact intcrdep,,"dcl1!
as tools for effective data protection. This interdependence of law,
technology and self-regulation demonstf3tes, however, that the three rule
authorities need to he channeled in the same direction so that the 1111,,8
support each other rather than frustrate each other. Three guiding principles
can be identified for this channeling of the rule authorilie;; :

Law is necessary to establish the public ]Jolicy objectives, but
insufficient to assure the implementation of fair information practices.
In a democratic society, rule-making through technOlogy Illust be shaped
by public policy goals and debatc.
Legal liability will be an essential instrumental device for the
development of privacy products.
The complex relationship among law, technical choices and market
calls for ever increasing vigilance by citizens to the collection and use of
their personal information, All alelt and acti ve citizenry will remain a
crudal defense against the erosion of privacy in the Information Age.
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presence est acluEliement neeessaire aNew York. Je sui, ires honor" de remplacer un procureur
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personnel de ses dien" lorsq'Je celle-c; depose Ie biJan "
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Je propose de deerire brievemenlla SOCiete, de traiter Ie (onllil entre la loj sur la {aillile elles
eng~gcments pris par To),smart enycrs scs clienb quant a 1(1 protection de leurs donnt)es aca~
ractere personnel! de dccrire egalement llinlelvention des procureurs des fiats et de la Comw
mission federale du commerce, de commenler 12 resolution finale de I'affaire et de lirer
quelques conclusions dUJroces.

3':,PO:l(;~ M;S·~llim11T;;i.;;:;;;;1 E!~id;lj iillHile et dt' Iii tofliid"n!ial':~, vol, \:V;lhi>fW Mil1(1,; . &.: WJl.:~et;f) A..O'l{owkr, b.llilflkllJpt~y
I,1IV\', Pm:;;ty Righ!~:.v"hk:h 1:o1ci51!1e llUlJ1)J Cille r~. 3f; H(1IJ\~(lI) L !{(4{" 13 p1'.f~iln,,).

Le prom de Toysmart.com
Toysmarl elait un (:elaillanl en lig!~e, specialise dJ!1s I,t venle sur L'llernel de jauels educalifs
pO:.Jr le5 cofanls. La soc:&tc Disney eli-lit Ie pf:ncipi11 invt's(isseur d,ms Toys!TIad pin I'inlerme
diaire d'une fi 1idl0r Ie groupe Buena Vista InlC'fnc'I,
Toysmarl collecl<lilles i'lbrmatiollS nomin,1iivE'5 de ses c:icnls sur ie s;te web de 1\1 soz.:ieIC. Ces
inform,ltions compl'enaienl Ie nnm, I'adll'sse, Je:; donf'ees de f?lClufation, Ie:; prefcr(::1Ccs
d'aCiFlt ,iinsi que des rc,1s{>:gr:emenis SJI If' profil de i,) famille f(-Is que le5 d,l:CS ci'clOnive:"saire
des enfant:; et!b interets en maCere dt' jouets.
La ChJl:e de protectio;} dC's donnees J cardctel'e personnel C0 Toysm,llt prec;sai( : (: VOllS pouvez (~ln: SLn que vas in(Olin,ltions ne sewnl ji1mdis comrnuniquees 11 un tiers "ll.

tn 1999, I,) ,,,i,m de Noel a rle un grand SU(CeS PO'll Toysrna·L tn juin 2000, Toysrl'Jrt rle11O·
sail Ie bil,,,,.

Le conflit entre la loi sur la faillite et les engagements de Toysmart a

I'egard de la protection des donnees acaractere personnel de ses clients
1.,1 ic! ,ml('I"IC,linr "\1:' k'~ !i(ltl;d,l:i:m~ d'('nrrqJ~'isl' ('5",Wl' d{' h'dH';\;:~I' res illh,'rC'l:. Lnallc;c,'" dps
CfCd,1Ciers de 1.1 soci(~le dcbi!rite. La loi sur IJ fai:!ilC: J<:corGe line grande IJ!:Hlde deln, la liqui~
dalion des biens d\;n(;' soci{~lQ e! JLlorise mel11e j'2nnU!d!!On de ceri,lins types d'obiigations
contrJctueHes afin de soJ!enir la valeur des dctifs elu debj!eul'.

(ommc C'esl i'usage en C2S de dep61 de bilan, Ie syndic de fai:lile a maye de venJH" la bClsc
de donnees des clients de Toysrrlarl comrne un aelii afin de rcunir des fonds pour ies creanciers
de In sociele La base de donnees de; clienls [ootc'Mil 'cs donnee; oominaliv('s de pillS de
250000 perSOJln0S qui 2val(~nl frequenl0 Ie s::e web,
Cepcndimc (onlrt1!remen: au cas classiqJc d'ur:e entreprise en f,IH1lte, To}'s!l1<1l'l ,,;vil.it pub lie ses
rngilgernenl5 dc:' protection des donnees?: Cdf3c(cre per:.onll('15~lf son sile web. Or 1,1 v0n(e de
C('.~ dor. n6es J unlicrs dans It' cadre' d'u;w Jiql;jdd!ioll ilurail viole fes eflg,lge ,llPnlS,
J

tn oul!',;, 12. banque de donnees de Toysmc"lf! cO.'llenait des informations SJf des enfants, S(;'lon
bIoi S:Jr la j)rOlect;on dt:'s donnees pers()nnE'lk~s des enfdnls en !igne de ·1998 {diildrwlts Oil"
H!w PrivJry Protf:r1ion A(:l, au COPPA) '!, rrce-mme:li promulgueei toulC societe dOli obtL:nir Ie
conSent0me1'i1 des parents avant de di(fuser des 1nformations nOnlinilllves concernant des e:l~
(lilts, Or TO}fsmar! n'avah pa$ obtenLl ce consen!ernent.
Ainsi, eeUe affaire aoordaitdeux nouveaux p:oblemc5: premierernent, (eiui d'un eonf;jt entre
les regles dt' Id loi sur la fa:Hlte en (0 qt:l (OnCl:fI1C ill !;qujda~lon des ac(ifs el k~5 engagements
pris par ~me ~ciet6 covers S0S clienis quant a In proleclion de lellrs donnees acaractef0 p0r~
some!; dellxiemement, eelui d'un eonfli: entre ees memes regles de la liquiuat:on e: des obligations legales concernant k~ io!onnal1ons re;alives ades enfant:;,

Interventions de l'Etat federal dans la procedure de faillite
LJ h:!l!ative de ven~e des donnees des cli9!)ls de Toysmarl s'es! transfonnee en scan dale public
aux ttals·Urois, 5i bien que In Commissioll f6clerale du Commerce (federalliade Commission)

i:;;;!p)~~;'Jlq,'ikl(;;;Wc~iiDY!wj;Z;lll pdt
9. 15USC &§ &501 ·6505.
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revise leurs rr.g;:.gcments elf proleclion des donnees ,) carac~ere pel'sonnel dans Ie sens de peflTletlre ia venle de telies basps de donnees dans 1e cadre ~:e id v~'nle de l'enlH:prise. Ccs :-evi~
sion:; des politiqUtl$ inlemes relalives J Itl protection des donnees acafdctere personnel de
clients exduent la p:J&sibilite de-louie aclion future pour pratiquE's « de!o)lales el trOnliJeuSl.>S;;
et diminuent Ie nivp.1u de protection de Ja confldentiJlite (l(cordee allX ci:ents en cas de faiBites

rie societcs.
La seconde tendance est I'effort Iclgislatif deployc pour reviser la !oi sur I, fdillite. Un cerlaln
l10mbrc de propositions visem maintecan! d protege Ie, engagements de protection des don-

nees acariKtere personnel en cas de faillile et adonner aux clients un plus gra'lo contrtJle SUr
leurs donnees nominatives devant les tribunaux contrc Ics creanciers des societes debitricl:.s en
fdililfe.

Conclusions
On pCL:i tirer plusieurs conclusions de j'afrJire Toysmart. Tout d'abprd, maigre I'absence de 1&
gisla!ion genera Ie sur IJ protection des donnees pel$Onn01les aux tt(lts~Unjs{ r{l f{aire illuslre Ie
f;j~; que, dars des circon~tances cxcep!lonncl~esl all relit avair rccaUlS iI d1autres lois de prot(~c!ion des COnSOl'71nlalevrs pour dssurer Ie ll(:jitempl1; loyal des donnees nominatives, Jel1xie-

rnC!11C"1, "affaire montre egalcment que la pression du public et la publici:e onl ele esscntielle;
donnt>('~ C:JH:("I1UC; rhm Ia l};lSt' ell' riOIl0;"('<' Ik" Toy;,m,ifl, hi(;rl qt;e 11,:n) 1(')
ncrr.breuses aFdilcs avenir, pression et publicite seror~t diHicile~ amobiliseL ,\4ais, pi ('est ce
qui C5t peL:t~f>tre Ie pLJ5 important I'affaire a montre Ie roie impor~ant des procureurs generaux
des EtJts. Sans la poursuile agresslve de Ilaffaire par la coalition (Ies f:talS1)1 comprisle" rejet du
reglement de compro!11ls de la FTC, I'is~ue "limit probablemenl etclolale'mont diiierenle. Ce:)endanl, Cf:' role (Ie des procureurs des Etats exlge une coordination complext: qui peut ne pas
e::rt~ facile amainter.ir dans de fl1iUres affnkes, Enfin! Ics drconstances exceptionncHes de Ilaffaire Toysrnart sug~efent que le5 affaire:; de fail!ite n1auront pas unc issue Jdssi satisfa:sante a
I'avenir. Toysm.1rl sJetai! engage aproleger le5 donnees persOI:nelies de 5(:'S clients en inlerdis;!n(
absolUlnc)nt tOt;1 transferl a un tieis. A!',wenfr, de nOlllbrC:.J5e;; sodetes ne prer_droo! probajle·
IPent PdS les mem{IS en~agen:ents qUI O!{:-;filk'nt (lUX consom;na!eurs ou aux procureus des
[lats I'upporllmi{e de contester 121. cession des jnfon~lillions nominatives en cas de faillile.
pour p.-r.ltt;w'r :(:':.

Toysmilll a ~ouc It' premier volet dl! conflit enlre la 1"aillife 81 ia protedion des donnc{:!~ person~
nelle~f m3is ce type dlaff~!rc va probablernent surgir dans de Ilombreux autr(~s qays ella d,llramique du prod:$ aux Hats-Un!s peut Bvoir une valeur compJrd{ive cenaine pour les
commiss!ons de protection des donn&:s dans, Ie monde.
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The Globalization of Privacy Solutions:
The Movement towards Obligatory
Standards for Fair Information Practices
JOEL R. REIDENBERG
Varying jurisdictional approaches as well as diiferent standards for the
treatment of personnl informntion will pose conflicts for the interrelated
and international data processing arrangements of the twenty-first century. The European Union's directive on data protection (the 'EU directive'); coupled with the Global h1formation Infrastructure (Gil) raise the
stakes for global solutions to the universally recognized need to maintain fair information practices in an infonnation society. Yet, at the same
time, the nature of twenty-first century infonnation-processing arrangements will be complex and ill-suited lor a single type of solution. This
essay argues that data protection norms in Europe will promote Obligatory standards for fair information practices in the United States as a
consequence of the provisions found in European law and in the EU
directive.
The European Pressure
The EU directive establishes a comprehensive legal foundation throughout Europe for the fair treatment of personal information and subjects
international data flows from Europe to restrictions if the destination
does not assure an 'adequate level of protection,::' It therefore exerts significant pressure on information rights, practices, and policies in North
Arnerica.
Over the past twenty years, u.s. law has provided sporadic legal
rights and remedies for information privacy.' Most regulatory efforts
have constrained the government, while existing private sector standards derive largely from company-specific practices 4 1n essence the
U.s. approach means that the existence and non-existence of meaningful
f
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data protection will be specific lo particular circumstances,' Tbe EU
directive and the Gll, thus, present critical challenges for U,S, policies
and practices. Against this divergent structural background, theimposition by the EU directive both of harmonized European legal requirL~
Inents for the fair treatment of personal infom1ation and of liInitations
on transborder data flows outside of Europe forces the u.s, government
to recognize that American standards will be exanlined in Europe and
forces US companies to recognize tbat they will have to respect Euro·
pean legal mandales, Although there is uncertainty regarding the long·
term application of the EU directive to particular contexts, multinational
companies and the US, government will by necessity follow closely the
implementiltion of the lOU directive,
Although the EU directive provides an impetus for introspection by
the United States as well as other countries outside Europe, the GIl is
also forcing American scmtiny of the treatment of personal information,
Public opinion polls show that Arnericans care about privacy and nre
concerned about the trc~atment of personal information. This concern is
noted particularly with respect to the development of online services,
Similarly, companies are increasingly fearful of becoming the subject of
the next data scandal and are beginning to see pro·active data protection
policies as a commercial strategy, Businesses also express a critical need
for confidence and security in the treatment of network information.
Nevertheless, the United States LS not likely to adopt a comprehensive
data protection law similar in content to the EU directive at the begin·
ning of the new millennium. The ad hoc, reactive legal approach in the
United States combined with an ingrained distmst of government are
both unlikely to change without a major shift in political culture, For the
foreseeable future, such a shift appears highly improbable, Instead, a
proliferation of legal and extra-legal mechanisms are beginning to converge in a way that will proliferate the rules for the treatment of personal information within the United States, The nascent response, thus,
to the twin pressures of the EU directive and the GII is a movement
towards obligatory standards of fair information practice within the
United States and a globalization of respect for mandatory prinCiples of
fair information practice.
Scrutiny and 'Adequacy'
The initial source for tbe extension within the United States of respect
for mandatory principles of fail' information practice will be the
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required European scrutiny 01 Us. data protection. Because the Ell
directive is now Jaw, comparisons between European data protection
principles and U.5, standards of fair information practice must be
made. 6 The EU directive requires that American standards of fair information practice be 'adequate' in order to permit transfers of personal
information to the United States? In the absence of directly comparable,
comprehensive data protection legislation in the United States and the
lack of explicit criteria for the determination of 'adequacy,' the assessment of the data flows to the United States is by necessity complex. Any
general comparison would not be meaningful, as the context of infornlalion processing must be considered. More recently, the working party,
created under the directive to advise the European Commission and
comrosed of representatives from the European data protection agencies, prepared a preliminary guidance note on the interpretation of
'adequacy' that similarly took a contextual view for future assessments'"
A study of U.s. data protection conducted for the European Commission argued that the comparison should be made on the basis of 'func'
tionally sinlilar' treatment. lO This approach matches an aggregation of
targeted \<>gal privacy rights, nOJ1-specific legal rights that have an
impact on the treatment of personal informa tion as well as the actual
practices of data coUeetors in the United States against a core set of
European standards. The result offers important points of convergence
as well as divergence.1l
In the context of the GIl, data protection authorities will have significant difficulty applying Buropean st'andards to trans-Atlantic data
flows. As a practical matter, the diversity of activities, participants, and
information-processing arrangements obscure dear analysis. The GIl
crosses sectoral and national regulatory boundaries, and crucial aspects
of the treatment of personal information depend on esoteric technical
characteristics. Even if a data protection authority wanted to investigate
all contexts in each sector, the specialized expertise and the necessary
resources are unlikely to be available,
Unless the European Union seeks to withdraw from international
information flows, data protection authorities will face unexpected legal
obstacles to export prohibitions. The relatively new world trade agreements embodied in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, also known as
the GATT 1994, include a sectoral accord on services, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Because transnational information
processing qualifies as a 'service,' the GATT 1994 provisions are likely to
be a restraining force on European data export prohibitions. Restrictions
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on data flows applied against an entire country or against a specific sector within a country may violate these accords. Consistent with internatiol1(11 trade agreerfH~ntsf GATS requires 'most-favoured nation treatn1ent' that obligates signatory members to accord other signatories
'treatment no less favourable than it accords to like services and service
suppliers of any other country.'12 Article 14 of the GATS expressly
allows signatories to adopt measures for the protection of the privacy of
individuals and the protection of confidentiality." However, any such
measures are still subject to the most-favoured nation clause. Similarly,
the GATS Annex on Telecomlnunications allows signatories to take
measures necessary to enSure 'security and confidentiality of Inessages'
provided that such n1easures are not discriminatory,14
Any European restrictions on the flow of personal information must,
thus" satisfy the tests of non-discrimination arnong third countries. For
member states in the European Union to block information flows to one
country with 'inadequate' privacy protection and not violate the principles of {most-favoured nation' and non~discrinlinationf the member
states must, at the same time, bloek information flows to all countries
with similarly lacking privacy protection. In other words, to single out
the information flows to a particular country without taking comparable
action against other countries with similar privacy deficiencies is likely
to constitute an iInpernlissible discrinililation,
By contrast, a focus on particular contexts, such as the treatment of
caller identificMion infonnation 01' the processing of particular Infornlatjon by a speCific corporation would be less likely to violate the nondiscrimination obligation. The contextual analysis significantly diminishes any claim to discriminatory action on transborder data flows or to
violations of i1TIost-favoured nation status because the narrower the
examination, the less likely it will be to find a comparable case treated in
a more favourable way. Politically, the least problematic restrictions will
thus COll1C frOll1 case-by-case analYSis and assessment.
Regardless of pressure from the EU directive, fair infonnation practices in the United States face increaSing public examination. Data protection scandals continue to attract attention. For example, within the
past few years, NYNEX, one of the major American telephone companies, was publicly exposed for failing to implement customer subscriptions for number blocking on its caller identification service. 111e direct
marketing industry has been criticized in the press for surreptitious data
gathering activit1es on the Internet and for designing web sites to collect
personal information from children. And Netscape was revealed to conj

l

The Globalization of Privacy Solutions

221

tain features that allow Internet web sites to read browsing patterns
frOll1 the user's Own hard drive.

At the same tirne, businesses are also concerned with privacy issues.
Industry wants certainty of slandards for the fair treatment of information. And, business needs confidence in the integrity of information, 15
Data protection around the world will be an essential element of 'good
business practice' because the treatment of personal infomlation is now
an issue of business competitiveness. Already in Belgiuffi r financial
institutions have fought each other over the use of bank payment
records to cross-sell products of affiliated cOlnpanies l &
Companies based in the United States have also begun to recognize
this key aspect of data protection< For example, Cilibank has developed
a data protection arrangement among affiliates for worldwide information processing that establishes a high competitive standard< Citibank
im.plcrnented among its affiliates a senes of contractual standards in the
United States for the processing of railway card data originating in Gernlany.1" Internet software providers are, likeWIse, seeking to incorporate
privacy preferences in products< Microsoft, for example, has implemented filtering software for web sites in the Explorer 3<0 browser software< In essence, the sufficiency of standards of fair information practice
within the United States is now on the political and business agenda<
The Confusing Governmental Response in the United States
The U.s. govenunentaI reaction! howe-veri to the twin pressures fron) the
lOU directive and the Gil is confusing< Despite the IOU directive and the
GIl, the American regulatory philosophy remains wedded to targeted
sectoral rules adopted in reaction to particular issues< The prospects for
a comprehensive data protection law in the United States ren1ain low.
The U$< government, particularly the federal government, has tried to
give fr'2sh thought to fair information practice issues, but the messages
frOin policy decisions are neither coherent nor consistent
In 1993, while the EU directive was still in draft form, Vice President
Gore and the Clinton Administration launched the National Information Infrastructure initiative and created the lnforxnation Infrastructure
Task Force (IlTF). As part of the initiative, the lITI' attempted an ambitious effort to defIne American standards of fair treatment of personal
information for the information infrastructure< Because of the likelihood
of increased foreign scrutiny of transborder data flows, the IlTF examined the standards from the Council of Europe convention, the OECD
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guidelines, and the drafts of the EU directive with the intent to develop
an American position consistent with global norms. By the end of 1995
the lITI' issued a series of reports, non-binding policy statements, and
guidelines that appear to compete with one another and result in the
preservation of the federal regulatory status quo. IS In 1996 and 1997 the
Federal Trade Commission even took a brief foray into privacy policy
and held Widely publicized hearings that resulted in another government rehash of the debate over the effectiveness of self-regulation. Then,
in fear of wanin influence, the NTIA issued yet another explanation of
self-regulation. I
More recently, individual states have begun to grapple with information infrastructure issues, and there is a growing rnOVClnent to increase
legal standards of fair information practice, particularly with 'respect to
marketing uses of personal information. Interestingly, the EU directive
is having an influence on the direction and drafting of proposals at the
state level, as legislative staff consult the EU directive to find ideas and
to strengthen support among representatives. In this election year, however, privacy issues are not hkdy to be a high priority.
Another more concrete response to the ED directive and the Gil may
be a centralization of privacy policy WiUlin the federal government. The
llTP presented a white paper in 1997 to address the issue of a data protection board 2o The white paper presents a set of options for the institutional structure of privacy policy making, induding the centralization of
decision making. Because of the scrutiny of US. treatment of personal
information, industry has a new incentive to seek international assistance from the U.S. government. If European regulators take the tran8border data flow provisions seriously, tile dispersion in the United
States of jurisdiction for pt'ivacy issues coupled with inter-agency rivalries will ultimately encourage businesses to push for the creation of an
executive branch data protection office. Otherwise, foreign data protection authorities will continue to have no appropriate US. COtUlterpart
with which to engage in problem solving and constructive dialogue.
However, between budget pressures and ideological beliefs, a new independent agency with full regulatory powers has little chance of adoption. Instead, a consolidation of the dispersed functions in a single
executive branch office is more likely to occur, and any powers for the
private sector are likely to be limited to an ombudsman roJe.
In the likely event that European data protection authorities begin to
block flows of persona) information to the United States, a more specific
American response can be expected. The US. government and industry
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groups will certainly raise inilial objections to the principle of actual
data transfer prohibitions. Some will strongly disagree with any foreign
judgments of U.S. law and practice. Yet the American public reaction,
and consequently the political pressure, will be much harder to anticipate. A data transfer prohibition that discloses a lack of fair treatment of
personal information within the United States could greatly assist privacy advocates seeking additional U.S. protections. In addition, such
decisions may split industry cohesion, as those companies with strong
global data protection will have a commercial incentive to see businesses with poor practices thwarted in their international activities.
Alternatively, the restraints may not be perceived within the United
States as an appropriate level of response by European regulators to any
identified problem with American data protection, and U.s. business
positions against regulatory protections for privacy 11'UlY be strengthened politically.
For the long run, bilateral negotiations between the United States and
the European Commission may assist the development of consistent
U.S. government policies. Although the U.S. government has little to
offer initially, given that domestic politics keep comprehenSive data protection legislation off the negotiating table, the discussions themselves
force the U.s. government and industry to confront the need to satisfy
international privacy standards.
Globalizing Fair Treatment in Transborder Data Flows
The ambiguous state of fair information practice policy in the United
States and the impending evaluation of U.S. processing activities, as
required by the ED directive, together force data protection regulators,
global companies, and their respective constituencies to achieve a workable consensus on satisfying fair information practice obligations for
international data flows. In the global environment, the legal requirements of the EU dir~'Ctive will set the agenda; the treatment of personal
information ill Europe must conform to its mandates, and the personal
information is not geographically constrained. As a result, two strategies may be offered to minimize conflicts over t!"ansborder data flows;
(1) a new contractual model based on t11e liability of data exporters,21
and (2) a technological approach based 011 the development and deployment of privacy conscious technical standards.
The contractual strategy offers a way to sustain European standards
on the GlI without the complexities of intensive regulatory intervention
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in a world of globally distributed information processing. Under the EU
directive, an exporter of personal information could be held to violate
the requirement of 'fair and lawful' processing if the exporter fails to
assure that adequate information practices follow the data. n This
means, lor example, that a French data exporter would be liable in
France under the standards imposed by French law for the treatment of
the exported personal information regardless of where the data are processed. Under this interpretation, if an exporter cannot show that European standards are applied to the foreign processing, the exporter does
not comply with the 'fair and lawful' processing requirements. Contractual arrangements, then, become the key for data exporters to minimize
the risk of European liability; data exporters will need to develop contracts that assure protection by data recipients. 2' This contractual strategy avoids the problems associated with enforcement of intercorporate
agreements by individuals because it shifts the focus of contracts from
protection of the individual to protection of the corporation iI5£1[24 At
the same time, the liability approach maintains corporate responsibility
and preserves local recourse for individuals against data exporters,
rather than attempting to create rights against remote processors that
wHi be hard to enforce.
This type of contractual strategy forces companies to assure lair treatment of personal information without the need for data protection regulators to make direct complex evaluations of foreign law. In the absence
of contractual arrangements, data exporters wHi be unable to show 'fair
and lawful' processing. To meet the burden of liability, companies will
impose data protection obligations privately on data recipients. In practicc, the legal strategy will require a serious commitment to supervision
of foreign processing activities by data exporters. Without supervision,
the data exporter remains widely exposed to liability at the place of
export. This suggests an important role for codes of conduct both as a
device to define contractually imposed standards for specific contexts
and as a benchmark to measure compliance." With this strategy 'information audits' become a critical self~preservation device for companies,
while simultaneously aVOiding the difficulties of extraterritorial inspection by data protection authorities and costly duplication of supervision
by multiple data protection agencies. European data protection authorities may, for example, dt.'Cide that an information audit certified by a
trusted third party is the only way fol' a company to demonstrate 'fair
and lawful' procesoing when personal data are exported. In any case,
with this COl1tractual strategy, European data protection authorities
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might accomplish the goal of assuring adequate treatn)ent of personal
information without many of the difficulties inherent to the assessment
of foreign law.
The second strategy, a technological approach based on the development and deployment 01 privacy consdous technical standards, also
offers an opportunity to embed fair information practices in the GIL26
Technological choices establish default rules. For example, Netscape
browser software allows Internet web sites to log visits on the user's
computer hard drive and access that traffic information for profile purposes. 27 The feature is not publicized by Netscapc, though technically
savvy users can disable the logging capability without impeding their
use of the Netscape browser.
The use of 'technologies of privacy' is essentially a business-driven
solution that can be used to promote data protection )ioals and impl""
ment European obligations, Standards and architecture plarming may m
effect create binding privacy rules. For example, Internet web pages
may adopt a common opt-out protocol, such as a small green box that
can be clicked to erase a visitor's traffic data and thus preclude its use
for secondary purposes. Similarly, protocols may be developed that ano"
nyrnize personal information whenever possible,
The significance of technical protocols cannot be underestimated as a
policy tool to develop binding standards of lair information practice.
Two particularly noteworthy endeavours reflect complementary technical approaches. The Canadian Standards Association has elaborated a
standard for fair information practice. The CSA model code integrates
privacy as a technical quality standard, This standard emphasizes busi"
ness policy and becomes a robust instnllnent as pressure Inounts on the
private sector to US\? the standard as a reference point in conttacts. The
eSA has sought to expand this approach by proposing a privacy quality
standard at the International Organization for Standards (ISO). From
Europe, dala protection officials have endorsed the contribution to privacy that this standards initiative can 01fer,28
In the United States, however, the private sector has been more ambivalent; any such standard would require enforcement mechanisms
against companies, mechanisms that do not presently exist within the
US. framework. American industry has, instead, invested heavily in the
promotion of architectural standards that would seek to incorporate privacy policies within Internet transmission protocols. Labelling and filtering h,dmologies along with standard f01mats for data profiles present
possibilities for the assurance of fair information practices. If imple-
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mentcd, the choices and structure of such architectural mechanisms will
offer binding rules for participants. The proper design and implementation, thus, raise critical issues for data protection 29 Nevertheless, as in
the case 01 the CSA model code, European data protection authorities do
3D
See possibilities lor the labelling and filtering approach.
The recognihan and implementation of new technical strategies can reduce the
potential regulatory conflicts for international infonnation flows.
Conclusions
As information becomes the key asset of the twenty-first century, the
treatment of personal information and the verification of compliance
with fair standards become critical for public confidence in network
activities.'! In spite of the confusing U.S. goveI11menl response to the
Gil and the EU directive, the possible solutions for intcmational information flows exert a tremendous pressure towards obligatory standards. Liability coupled with contractual arrangements and network
architecture iInpose Significant rules on information prOcesslllg. Narrow
developments in U.s. govp.rnment policy, greater corporate attention to
fair information practices. . new contractual arrangements, and network
system default rules will collectively decrease the divergent characteristics of fair information practice standards in the United States from
those of the EU directive. Yet the more seriously European data protection authorities take international data flows and the more extensively
the public debates the GIl, the greater the pressure will be towards these
obligatory standards in the United States.
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;fouvcr dans ~Ili pays, Je scrvcur dfU1S OIl
autre
cl j'achclclif dans un lrolsiemc
pays,
10rs q\:t~!lcs sonl lcs jIJridie1iOl:s
rompetCll.10S ? Les rcgle& en Fnmte el a,IX
Rlals-Unls Ile SOil! pas idenliqIJe!\ sur Ifl
repon;.e nccUe question, Aux Eta!s Un;s, III
jt:risprudcnce cxigc un minimum de liens
cn~rc Ics panics, ~a trllnsllcliOl:, el ;a
jmidielio!l pour appliquer Ie droit amcri::mlL
Par conlre, Ie drol! inlernfltiOl~al prive cn
Pmnce <lura lCndance ii vouloi!' appliquer In
10: fran~aise des lors {ju'ulle parli~ dans In
lran;-;ac!io;l C$~ franyaisc. 11 scmble que
]r:cmc ,~i Ics IJanics onl !s \'olonlc de fair,;:
leur trnnsactioJ1 en dehors de It! rnmc0, Ie
fail me me d'cssayer d'evitcr lcs lois
franyais:es peut enlffllner l'applicatio!'i de In
lui frHlIynise 1 Dc toute :1w:liefc, dans les
deux pays, Ics cours de justice ne sonl pas
obligces do: respecter unc clause C!'il1lrai>
tHellc ou les panics s'enlendent Wf une loi
applicflble dans ]'exeeution de Iellr contrHl.
Drlils lous les cns de figure, I'incertitude des
fe~le$, C! ICi;~ 2:;plic2ble~ pose un ()b~(i\ck ,HI
dcvclopp::mcr..: C'J commerce cje(trol~)(lllC,
Oll bien, lcs relations cO;l:ractuelles pour
one trilfisaClion en lignc d::vienncilt
extrcmement complexes au bien ies pi1ftic~
dOllicnl prendre Ies risques d l 1m drOlt
incontlU.

,
L'ENCADREMENT JURIDIQUE liE
CERTAINS ELEMENTS
INDISPENSABLES
Ell II::CllH.'- lemps que ies regimes
conlmctuels du commerce 6:ee!wnique soot
soumis i'i un «bol.llcvcrsemen!», renLadrcDlen! juritlique de certains elCmentt;
indislJemmbles, nolamment lcs mecanismes
d'auLlienlificalion, )a cryplologie, el Ia
protection dt hi vie Plj\'ce, sont egalemenl
dflllS une phase d'inslabilile. L'au~
IhenlificatJol1 des partics e! des lram-:aclions
eslncces.',aire pour la fiabililc du commerce
cleclroniquc, Aujourd'huij la multiplicite
des 1l0rmes e1 Ie llHl1lllUC d1nnc IUlrmOJiisatio!1 des slandards ponl' la signature
numeriqce risqucnl de eloisollncr Ie
commerce, Le project de t'American Bar
Association sur Its Hgnes dircdriees des
signatures numeriqucs, la loi de l'Uiah el ics
(lctiviles en CaEfornic et dans d'autres etals
rei1etent celie divCJsite.
La poliligue en mi1!lcre de cryplo]n-gie e~t
aussi imporlml!e pom Ie d6veloppement du

commerce cieclrnniqoe. Le toelagc e,~t Iln
01::): de :lal,S Ions !es aspecl.s du commerG;
c:eclrOlliqliC. Mais, III cryplol()gle pose un
dMi dans !'eqnillhre e!)~r(; le comme~ct (;1 ld
SLlrele de l'etaL En eHet, Ie cod age pen!
cfI<:hcr des flctiviles qui portcnl aUeill!cs till);
libcncs pu1JUques ou qlli sonl iIlcgalcs. Par
cO;lscqueilcc, les Ei'ils·Cnt:\ 01 Iii France onl
Ullt.: tradition de cor.:rolc in:p01lan!c sur la
cl'yptologie qui menace III disponibilite
lltcessaire dilJls Ie seclellf privc pour Ie
commerce tlec!ronique. Aux E!a!s·Onis, Ie
cOl~trole a'cxiste (ju'a l'expOltll110n des
mO~eDS de codage, De ce fail, Ics socic(cs
Jnu)lhl(l\:ollales or.l dcs Jiffict:.~(cS ;1 sc mUIl)f
d'nn s),slemc de co.!age (!~li pCi%e;ll
salisfaire lellr bcsoin uans Ie Ill(}ndc cnlier.
POUl' la prcmiere fo]s, le gOtiVerllC1l1Cnt
<lmcricain Ylcllt d'autorisc)' l'exportfttioll
d'C!lC cle;l 1281J:L J: s'agit d'nne !lppljC!lliOI~
dans lc sccictl! ;:'~lncaire, En France,
l'Uli!isalion Ct j'exporl:Jtion $onl 50illi1:SCS au
CQutnJle du gou\,crncmcnL
La Lui du 26 juillci 1996 de Itglemel1!alioll
des leiecommtnic:ltions pre\'oit tmc libcrfl~
Jisation des aUlorisations, :nai~ Ie deefel
d'applic<llion n'cst pas encore sOrlL
Elanl donne qne l\: commcrrc c.leC!rOll:quccnSe lout'.;!) ~orlcs des donllecs qUI POIIITOll\
idcll<:ificr des indjv~d:ls, la proteclion de la vic
privec devieHt illdispcl1Sab!e, En France, 1«
Lei de i'infOJllJa1iquc e: dC5 heerles aillsi quc
in C.NJ.L. et bicntoi la tnmsposilion de la
DireelJve europeenlle 95/46lEC, veillcn! a hi
protection del> droit:; des ciloyens, Anx Elais
Onis, iln'y a pas d'equivalent lCgislaliL La
Tcleco:llnmlliC,,'llions Ad of 19% impose des
noovelles res!riclioLl5 sur la finali!e des
donnees) mars ecHes ci nc s'appli(UClll {p'ai!X
ope.raleur.s de rcselll1X e! lie COl)l"X:rnCJlt pns
d'lIutres IJrincipes imporll111\S qUI exisle en
dwii fran9aiL

LE BESOIN OE REGlES
Afh) de progrcsscf, Ie. commerce cIeeIrnniqc.e <lura t:esoin Jc regles claire:; ct de
lois stables. Cette condition fondamentale
est reconnu aussi bicn nux BlaIS Cnis (In'en
Europe. L'Admlnislralion Clinton J'avoue
dans lion toxIc du 11 deccmbre 1996 (,A
Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce" ell'Uuiou Europccnnc I'illscril
sur ]'ordre U\I jonr an proch,1in COllscil
d'Am,leldam ell iuill19n
La difflculle sera de trouvcr une llase
.iuridiquc adaptee it ia teclmologie, {lUX
oe!;loius du commerce electroniqne lou!
en reslanl conerenlc Ii travers les
fronlien:s .•

TelECOM·· N~111 ~ PRINTEMP8 97

2

f

GAZEn£: DU PALAI$ - DIMANCHE 18 AU MARDI 20

oeroonE

1990

3

I

COMMERCE ELECTRON/QUE

•

sommalre
EDITORIAL

M. Alain BENSOUSSAN, Avocat iJ 10 Cour ................... ,..................................................." ..................."..............

4

ALLOCUTIONS D'OUVERTURE
M. Philippe LAFARGE, Avocet a ia COllr, ancien Batonnier du 8arreau de Paris ... "........................................

6:

M. Michel FRANCK, President de Ja Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris """ .. "" ......... " ... " .. " ..... "

6

M. W. Robert PEARSON, Chef de mission adjoint pres l'Ambassade des Etats·Unis a Paris """.".............. "

7

.•

EXPOSE INTRODUCTlf

C:~~~::::~::~;V"""" e.,,, ""-,,.., - - ....
,9 "M. Joel REIDENBERG, Professevr 8 Fordham Universily (New Yorkl " ............. " .... " ..""" ..............." .........." ..,,

0

IJ

LA PROBLEMATIQUE fRAN~AISE
M. Xavier LlNANT de BELLEFONDS, Frofesseur a l'UnivefSite de Paris XII ......." ......" ...."...............................

16

M. AI.in BENSOUSSAN, Avocat iJ 18 Cour ...................." .................

18

m

..............................................."

.... "...........

j

.
~'

LA DIMENSION flSCALE
M. Jean·Pierre LE GALL. Professeur Ii rUniversite de Paris II IFanrMon·Assas), Avocar ilia Cour iCabinet
Jeantet et Associesl ........................................................" ..... " ..............................................................."............... 22

ENJEUX ET DEflS DU COMMERCE ELECTRONIQUE
TABLE RONDE pres;de. par Mm. Isabelle FALQUE·PIERROnN, Makra des requiltes au ConSIlii d'Etat. 28

avec fa partictpatioo de :
M. Pierre BREESE, Consei/ en propriete industrialle
M. Bernard SAVONET, Responsabla de ia Societe MULTJSOURCES et de la Societe ISICOM
M. Thomas A. MARTEN, Secretairo de I'Ambassade des ftats-Unis, charge des TELECOMS
M. Jacques RIBS, ConseiIlsr d'Etat honora;re~ Membre de Is Commission nationa/a de l'informatique
et des Ilbertes
M. Bernard SIOUFFI, Deleguo general du Syndlcat des entreprises de vente par correspondance et iJ distance
Mm. Christiane FERAL.SCHUH!.. Avocat Ie Cour, Ancien membre du Consell de I'Ordr.
DEBAT ....................................................................................................................................... 44

a

rt
§

f

I

l
I
1
!
I

SYNTHESE
M, Yves CHAPUT. Directaur sclentifique du CREDA, Professeur a I'Universire Paris IIPantheon·Sorbonn.!.
Dlrecteur de I'UFR·Drolt des affaires ..................................................................................................................... 47

CUlTURE
M. Jacques DONDOUX, Secretaire d'Etat au Commerce ext.rieur .................................................................... 49

ECHOS ET NOUVELLES
ORDRE DES AVOCATS A LA COUR D'APPEL DE PARIS .. Elections du Dauphin (rectifieariO ........................ 53
Groupe Saint·Nicolas: Messe annuelle .........................................................................................."..................... 53
I-:--=-=------:---.-~ ..~-..- - - - - - - - . - -

------1

GAZETTE DES TECHNOLOGIES AVANCEES

I
I

.......
5f

GAlEn!.: DtJ PALAIS - DIMA.\lCHE 18 AU MARDI 20 OCTOBBf: 1998

-«--.-.---~

.....- - -..-.....- - - -

COMMERCE ELECTRON/QUE
pourquoi Ie CQmmcrcc eleccfOniquc imcrpcllc d'abon.l
I(~ droit de In consommatiOIl,

us

questions qui sc posent a cc ~ujct sont s.i nom~
breuses quc 1<1 .eunion d'atljourd'hui nc peul prctendre Ie.'; aborder lOates, Pete-mele, comment faire ponr
quc, dans ces negoelations desIHnnallise..cs, l'intcgrilc
du conscntemcnt, la eapaehe de celui qUl s'ohlige,
soicn! rcspcct6cs dans In formation ou contrat ? Comment qualifier I'operalion: vente a domicile, vente
par correspoudance, acha! sur catalogue au man:::I1t~
{ail dans un magasin virtucl? LC$ regles n'Clan( pas
lcs: ntemcs dans chaque cas, la qualification est importante. Est"ce Ie droit de 1'ecril quj doh prevaloir
IHtrce quc l'anicle 1347 du Code civil l'exige pour
les acte;; mixtes ? Ou faut-il livrcr au droit naissant
de I'audiovisud I" LOlalile de ce scctcnr, donl on rappelait lout a I'heure que l'imporlunce prevue cst gigantesquc 1 Quelles traces vont subsister des pourparJcrs immatcricls qui ant precede 1a transaction, C1
qucllc sera leur force probante? Les flux cronomi~
ques ainsi crees via les satellites vont-ils echapper .a
l'impO\ QU bien Ic fisc livrera+illa « Guerrc des 6t01-

I

les») ? Lc dwit fj"cal C!'It n la thtlfllicrc du
de I'clltrepreneur.

consom~

matCuf Ct

L'autre versant, c'e.~t prCCtSemCI1II'ell(rcprisc. L'ct:treprise qui. pur la puissance de scs moyens, va COj)¥
duirc a un droit de Ja concorrence modirie, car les
regles du jeu CCSSCllt d'cHe Ics memes. On I1C salt pas
encore vraimeni O~I sera la puissance dc dcmail),
Est"ce que l'fnte,"ne! va dC.multiplier Ja cnpacitc des
acteur" ou, au cuntraire, favoriser lcs monopoles? On
seraiL enclin aetrc pessimlste puisque la premiere en~
{reprise inrormalique du moment cst, it roa cOlillaissance. 1a premiere a pretendrc claircment a uo monopole mondiaL Lcs risques de ces competiLtOnS
implacable:; vont vous circ decries: viol du consom~
mateur par I'image el par des mcssages subHminaux,
vol des marques, menace sur les donnees pcrsonnel~
les... Lc drOit de !'cnLreprise sera lui auss! largcmcnt
affcctc par I'clcetronique et I'lmmatc.riel.
Mals fen ai deja imp dit ct les exigences de l'horaire
me coudulscn( maintenanl ceder la parole aux orateurs 5uccessifs.

a

I

L'EXPERIENCE AMERICAINE
M. Joel REIDENBERG.
ProJesseur

aFordham University School oj Law (New York)

Monsieur Ie nfitonnicr, Monsieur Ie PreSident, Mes~
dames et Messieurs. je vous remercie de l'opportunii.C
qui m'cst iei donnee de vous entrctcnir du commerce
clectrouique. D'abord, je rappel1erni un fait bicn
connu ; Ie cOmmerce eleetronique cst aux Etats-Unis
en plein essOr. On constate aujourrl'hui qu'un pel!
plus de 8 % de notre produi! national brut est dfi au
commerce clectronique (1). On estirne par ailleurs
qu'il y :1 62 millions d'utilisateurs de l'fntcmet aux
Eta[s~Unls (2), dont 12 millions rjen que chez
AOL (America online)j Ie plus important foumisscur
d'acccs (3). n reste quc, flour l'heme, 1'!ntcfIlcl cst
surtoul utilise pour Ia recherche d'jnformaliolls de
toule nature, toucbant notamment a l'actuati(c (4).
eCHe reticence a se lancer dans 1e commerce cleclronique qu'on retrouve a la fois chez les entreprises el
les consommateurs ticnt aux inquietudes r6clles que
sUscilent la fiabilite et la securit6 de l'information
divuignee sur I'Internet (5), Cecj expliqlle en partie
que Ie recours A l'lnternet sc limite aujourd'ltul es
scnliellemcnt It ia recherche d'informations. A cela
s'ajoule Ie fait que Ie statut juridiqlle de cet espace
virtuel est en cours d'ciaboralion. On He se tronve pas
u

en presence d'unc situation stable (6). Ainsi, jc vous
propose une analysc en deux parties qui retlclc eelte
instabilite. La premiere concerne tes enjeux juridi~
ques de protection des entrcpriscs : qucls sont Ics problcmes qu'e!tcs rcncontrent sur I'lntemet et quclles
reponses juridiques y sont apportees 1 La seconde
conceme les enjeux du commerce clcctroniquc pOur
les consOmmnleurs : queUes sont Ies protections des
dont ils ont besoin et comment y repond Ie syswme
juridique '1

I. Les grands enjeux juridiques de la
protection des entreprises
S'agissanl tout d'aoord des cntreprises, on aflsisle ~
l'emergence d'une the:~rje de la concurrence loyale,
perceptible A travers la jnrisprudence qui commence
A apparaitre. Ccl[c recherche d'une concurrence
loyale vise a instituer unc protection conlre le phew
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"omene du detournement de clientele ~ur "Internet et
contre la {[ominalion de I'infrastructure des aulofOUles de ritlformalion. En mcme temps. ou commence
adebaHfede Ja protection de l'information l1ecessaire
au developpemcnl du commerce cloctronique et du
champ d'applieatjoa des principes de jur/diction.

1. L 'emergence d'une jurisprudence visant il
assurer la concurrence loyale sur Ie web
Pour I'instant, lcs problcmes cconOlnigues du com~
mcrce cleelronique poses devllnt les (rilmnaux amc~
ricains Ie som surlout en [ennes de marque (7). Au
jourd'hui, line adresse Internet, 1l00allHneni Ie nom de
domaine qui perillet une recOllnaissal1ee racile d'un
site web, est altribuce a la premiere persorlne qui de~
mande I'inseription au regj~[re technique de rou
tage (8), Du reste, en une allnce, Ie nombre de noms
de domainc inscrits a doublc en passalll de 635 000
en deceIllbre 1996 A 1.5 million a la fin de l'an~
nee 1997 (9)< Plus precisemelll, des con flits naissent
entre Ia marque dCposte par une enfreprise el Ie nom
d'un site web - Ie nom de domaine - inscrit par un
tiers au tableau de routage de !'Interne!, nom de do~
maine qui rcssemble fort a Ia marque, Les enlreprises
proprictaircs des marques deposees ainsl parasltees
s'inquietem du detournement de leur cliel\tCle er des
dommages causes A. leur inlage, qUI pourraient en re~
suIter, Et I'on voir se mUltiplier les confllts de ce
genre, surtout dans Ie;; douzc derniers mois (10). Par
aiJIeurs, ces entreprises craignent gu'en raIson de ia
confusion ainsi crete, leur clienteie cprouve des dlfficullcs pour trouver Ie site de 1ll marque sur {'Internet Par exempte. si queJqu'un cherche Ie site de
Coca-Cola sans en conna'ltre L'adressc pr&ise, il fera
probablement un premier essai en (apanll' adresse Internet « www.coca-cola.comlf.Mais. sl queJqu'un
d'aulre que Coca~Cola a Ie premier inserit ce nom dedo maine, alors la firme d' Atlanta ne pourra pas uti~
tiser« www.eoea-coia,colO n emnme adresse sur 1'1n~
tcrnet. Du reste, l'hypoth~se de Coca~Cola est bien
reelle. Dans Ie cas recent, Bensusan contre King (11),
Ie proprielaire de Ia. marque « Dlue Note », attribute
A un club de jazz renolllme de la ville de New York.
a porte plainle <:ontrc un autre club du marne nom
mais silue a Columbia, dans l'Elat du Miss{)uri. Lc
club du petit village du Sud des Eltl1SNUnls avait uti"
lise Jes mots « Blue Note~} sur son site web afin de
diffuser des informations sur les spectacles ct les tarifs. Malgre un renvoi de I'affaire pour des raisons
pro<:Wurates. Ie cas reste intCressant sur Ie plan de la
protection des marques,
w

w

Ilius subtil que I'utilisation d'une marque dans un
nom de domaine, on voit aujourd'hui apparattre un
autre type de comportement qui prend de plus en pius
d'ampJeur; Ie recours aux llIela~fGgs. 11 s'agit d'ln~
formations ou de tl1ots~clcs caches - Us n'apparaissent done jamais a l' ecran - qui sont introduits dans
les donnees de transmission etabHes par leconceptcnr

d'un site web dans Ie seul but d'clre re<:llllllUS par les
moteurs de recherChe tels que « hup://www.ex~
eite,oolll» ou «www.hotboLcom :;,_ De ;;orte {lue
«!'jntcrnautc », lor$qu'illancc uue recherche a partir
d'un ll1o!~dc, Soil oriente par ces moteurs de reehcr~
ehe en priorile vcrs ccs sites. Par exemple, ;;i un internaute tape Ie terme « COlumen:;e e1ectronique », un
1ien vcrs un site web pertinent apparairra sur son Ceran
si cc site a [Iris la prCCaution d'inserer dans scs mefa~
rags I'expression «Commerce cleclronique ». Or. on
voh de plus ell !Jlus de sites utilise> dans leurs meta~
tags Ies noms ou marques d'aulres enrreprise5, qu'e!Ics soient OLl. non concurrenles, pour fausser un peu
Ie jeu, et drainer vcrs cux la clientele de ces: cnlreprises. C'est peut~ctre un peu curieux. mals souvent,lcs
victlmes de ces agissements qui portent pl!lJn~c sont
des magaz.ines comme Playboy (12). En ulilisanl ce
meta~tag, d'aulres sites parviennent a auirer,. sinon ~
dCtourner, la cfientele de Playboy. Or, on conslate de
plus en plus, a la lecture de la jurisprudencc, que.
dans ces affaires, c'esl Ie proprictaire de la marque
qui gagne. Les Cours ont done tendance a privilegier
davantage Ie droit de propriclc sur 1.0. marquc que Ie
principc, jusqu'alors en vigueur sur Ie web, du « pre~
micr arrive, premier servi ». Lcs conflits devraienl
neanmoins se dcveloppcr parce que I'on constatc cer~
taines divergences entre les Cours d'appet, surtout au
niveau fCderal.
L 'autre aspect important de I'emcrgencc de ceUe .concurrence loyale a tfait A la domination e( a J'abus de
1'infrastructure. Le cas de MicrosoJl, a travers 1a pro·
ccdute cngagce par k DCIX'rtemcnt de 1a Iustice pour
atteintc iii la concurrence. a fail IreS recemment I.. une
de" joumaux et ouvre ce debat (l3). lei, I.. question
posCe est de savoir queUe est ill. part du conlroie du
systcme d' exploitation et celie du Iogidel qui doivent
ctre ouvettes A la concurrence. Qu>est~ce que Micro~
soft peut faire ? QueUe combinaison pcut~il adopter
SanS affecter la concurrence sur le marche d'une fa·
f10n nCfaste e[ iIIegaJc ? Actueltement, on parte SUfn
lOut de la procedure au nivcau rederal, mats 11 y a
aussi une partie de la procedure qui devrait debuler
dans les prochaines semaines au niveau des £tals. Bile
sera aussi imporlanle, sinon plus, que 1a procedure
fedcrale : une vinglaine de procureurs generoux devraient poner plainte contre Microsoft. C'es{ un problcme-de qui continue it cvoluer (14).
11 y a un autre problcme qui consiste en une sone
d'abus de l'infrastructure: I' abus des sPQms. Cc sont
des messages non solHcilcs qui, par leur abondance,
peuvent detruire des siles ou r6duire a neant Ie com~
merce d'un foumlsseur de services. AOL, par exempie, a porte platnte COntre Cyber promotioll afit) d'ob~
tenir que cesse la pratique de ce dernier visanl A
inonder Ie scrveur de messages. Le cas n'a pas fail
jurisprudence parce que les entrepriscs ont regie I'af~
faire A I'amiable. Et i1 est d'autres CaS r6ccnlS dans
lesquels une sorte de ~ cyber~terrodste» auaquc lc
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SC1Vcur d'un cOllcunenl en I'inondam de messages
dans Je sell! but d'intcrdlre dans les faits Iii veritable
clientele du :>itc d'v avoir llcces. On commence a voir

a

des affaircs de ce genre arriver dcvant les tribullt'lux,

2. Le ciebat sur la protection de l'lnformation
et du paiement
S'ilgissant des clijeux de "Internet pour lcs cntrcpri~
ses. la protection de l'infocmatioll cl du paiemenl cst
au c(Cur de la [lroblcmatique du Jcvelop~emenL du

cowmen.:c clcctronlquc. II existc aux Etats-Unis,
COmme dans Ie restc du monde, d'Cll0rmes difflcultes

a dcfinir ct a appliquer les droits d'auteur face a la

llumcrisation des donnees, Quellc cst la protection appropriee (>our les CCUVrt~ digitale!> ? La tcndance qui
semble !'emponer CSt cellc defendue par les maxima·
liSlc..~,

c'est-a-dire ceux qui veulent accorder une ptO~
teetion maximalc au create-ur de 1'0!uvre. On peut ob
server une premiere application dc ccttc conception
dans une situation assez parLiculierc mals tres impor
tante en pratique ~ J'eneadrement juridique des teeh~
niques de protection OS). Ains!, cause de f'insLabiliie et de I'existenee de lacul1cs dans Ie regime
juridique de l'Inlernet, les creatcurs d'o:::uvres digitales es:sa.yent d'imposer une prolection technique pour
intcrdire aux utilisateurs d'ex6cuter des operations
non voulues par les coneepteurs. En pratique, par
cxemplc. tis peuvcnt installer une sone d'cnvcloppe
te:chflologiquc autour d'un message digiral afin que
I'on fie: pulsse que le: lire, Des lors, on fie peut ni
imprimer nl modifier Ie contcnu du message. Le:s pro~
jets actuels d'encadremem juridique pour assurer
cetle proteelion leehnique consisterait a eriger en dC~
Ht toute aetivile qui vise ~ contourner une leUe pro~
teetion teehnique, Ceue poJilique reglementaire est
l'oppose de celle sui vie au nivcau europ6en. La directive de protection des Jogiciels octroie un droil
d'aecCs ~ l'information d'« interfaces» et valide 1es
operations n6cessaircs pour avoir acces cette infor"
mali on (16). Des lors, les memes actes qui sont ac~
tueHement protegl!s par la loi de i'Union europeenne
seront consid6res comme des delits aux Etats.. Unis si
Cclte rCforme est adoptCe. C'esl un grand debat qui a
deburc devant Ie Congres amcricain et qui risque de
durer encore un certain temps.
M

M

a

a
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Par aiIleurs, iI ex.iste Apropos de la protection de l'in~
formation des interrogations liee..; au paiement et la
politique de cryptographic. Et sur ces sujets, on obServe des differences enormes entre la position dl.l
gouvemement amcrfcain, d'une pan. qui est favora~
bIe ~ une reglementatlon conCernant norammenll'ex~
portation des techniques de cryptographie, ella posi{ion de J'[ndustrie ef des avocals specialises dans la
protection de 1n vie privee, d'autre part, qui Y f;:onl
toul fail oppos6s (i 7). Pour I'heure, In reglementa ..
tion americaine interdit l'exportalion de moyens de
cryptographie tICS puissanLS. Ainsi. jI est inlerdit
d'cmporter un ordinatcur a l'etranger si la demiere

a

a
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version du [HWigatellr de NelSCf<{){' y est installee, ear
cc logicicl p(lsJiMe un algol'it!ime .a 128 bits. CeHe
restriction cree des (lbstac1es au dcveloppelnent des
services financiers, La Citiballk, par exemple, permet
a lieS clients de fdire par Ie biais de l'Internet toute
une serie d'operations bllncaires - ordre de paiemem,
achal de: vl"Ileurs mobilieres. virClnell{, etc, -, a (;Oll~
dillon d'utiliser Ie nftvigateur de Nelscape avee: un
algorithme: a 128 bits. Par consequent, c'est bien In
reglemenlation du chiffremenl e:t nOll Ie droil baneaire
qui rcstreint I'accc.~ n(;.cs services anx seul!> residents
amcl'icains sur Ie territoire des Elals-Unis, eet obstacle devient de plus en plus dil'imam pour Ies enlreprises, des lors gu 'elles sonhaitent fain: du commerce
cleelronique avec Je mondc emtec

3. Le champ d'applicat/on des prlncipes de
;uridiction
Demier point qu'it faut soule:ver a propos des entreprises, c'c.... t Ie probleme des conrtils de juridiction.
S; une diffieulte surgir, queJ Iribunal raut~il salsir?
La plupar( des litigcs apparus jusqu'a present aux
Etats-Unis 11 propos de j'(nternet tournent autour de
cenc question : est~ce que la Conr cst competente ?
Suffi[~il de propose:r un produit ou un service sur l'[ntcrnet pour que n'impor~e qucfle juridiction des Etats~
Unis soit eompetente ? A cet egard, Ie droit americai»
en matiere de proeCdure civile est assez complexe,
notammenl cn ee qui concerne la repartition entre Ie
droit federal de la ~, due proceSS» et ks droils ctaliques applicables aux Cours. Cer{aincs Cours estiment
que Ie simple fail de proposer des prodults ou des
services sur J'Intemet eonstitue une publicitc au niveau national. par cela seul que l'[nternet est susceptible de toucher toutle monde. Considcrant qu'iJetait
provisible que 1a clientele sollicitee se lrouverait dans
nTimpone lcquel des cinquante Etats, Cell: Cours en
dcduisent que Ie eonflil peut
soumis la juridic~
lion de n'importe quel Etal de {'Union OE). D'autres
Cours federales ex.igent ccpendant pour se declarer
oompelentes que soient con slates, au surplus, des ac~
tes posltifs de volonte de ia part des gestionnaires des
sires (19). En tout eta.t de cause, les sites interactifs
devraient en gencral satisfairc les critercs, roeme des
juridictions lese plus restrictivcs sur la com¢tence.
Memc si I'internautc ne fait qU'cntrer son adresse email sur un site intel'aetif pour unc lisle de malting.
iI est tres probable que la juridiction saiste se dec!ll...
rera competente (20). En rcv.anchc+ la jurisprudence
ne semble pas $>etre prononcec sur Ja question de la
loi applicable. nest vraisemblable qu'elle n'a pas encore ere soulevee. En verite, iI n'y a larjen d'ctonnanl
puisque la plupart des affaires onllrait In protection
des marques dej~ evoquee, Or, la loi sur les marques
est une loi f,sderale, Dans ce contexte, c· est toujours
la loi fMcrate qui s'applique. On ne Se pose done pas
la question de savoir dans Ie cas du club de jazz « Blue
Note)) si Ja Joi de New York OU celle de Louisiane
est applicable.

elre
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COMMERCE ELECTRON/QUE
II. Les grands enjeuxjuridiques de la
protection des consommateurs
S'agissant des. consomrnateurs, on peul cons tater trois
grands enjeux juridiques aux Elau;·Onis" Premiere·
ment, Ie mauque de protection adequate de 1a vie pd·
vee menace I'essor dll commerce eleetronique. Dans
1e meme temps, Ie commerce electroniqlle pose un
certain nombre de prob1emes d'encadremenL juddi·
que de ta vente. Sur ce point, Ie debat sur les principes
cst tres anime. EnCin. les cons.ommareurs eprouvent
un malaise quant a la 1>Ccurite de la transmission des
paiements sur ['Internet.

1. Le besoin d'une protection de la vie privee
Au regard des enjeux juri diques de la protection des
consommateurs, Ie point Ie pius impor{ant conccrnc
aujuurd'hui Ie bcsoin d'une protection de In vie pr1vee, Une loi a vocation genera)c comme la 101 franIj(aise nfl 78_17 du {} janvier 1978 relative a I'informatique,. aux fiehiers et aux libertes n'existe pas aux
Etats-Unls. Quand une protection juridique existc,
SOn champ d'application est trcs limite (21). Un son~
dage paru Ie mOls dernier aux Etats-Unis Ie confirme:
61 % des personnes n'ayant jamais eu recoun; a I'In~
ternct sc sont dcclaree;; pretes a l'miliser, pour peu
que soit assurce uue protection adequate de Ja vie privee (22). Dans Ie meme temps, seulement 51 % d'cntre cUes ont consid6re qU'un niveau de prix avantageux les inciterah a s'en servir. Ainsi Ie renforcement
de ta protection de la vie priv6e constilue+i! Ie facleur Ie plus import!lnt pour Ie d6veloppcmcnt de 1'1nlcrnct. PQUrtanl. oomme notre ambassadeur vous I'a
indiqu6 dans ce colloque. Ie gouvemement americain
privilegie l'auloItgulalion. Or, en iermes de protection de la vie priv6e des consommateurs, eeHe solution com porte de trees importantes lacunes. Par exempIe, si une personne foue une cassette video dans un
magasln aux Etats-Unis, Ie eommeavan1 ne pOll ITa en
aUcun cas divulguer Ie titre du film a un tiers ni. a
fortiori. lui vendre l'information. car la loi americaine Ie lui intcrdit sans I'aecord de la personne concernee (23), En revanche. ~orsque la personne se
trouvc sur rInternet et regarde un clip video, rien
n'jnterdit au foumisseur des images de vendre mutes
les informations concernant la naVigation et In receplion de Ja video, meme pour les videos les plus « intcrcssantes ». Les sites visircs peuvcnt, eux aussi.
commercinliset les informations rcx:ueillies sur Ie
compte des personnes qui naviguenl sur l'IntemeL n
n 'y a aucune restriclion legale quant h j'utiHsation de
ces informations,
D'ores et deja, on volt surgir d'cnormes problemes
s'agissant des sites specialises dans la collecle d'informatiOl\s sur I'iofrastructure des reHcaux d'enlrepri-

;;cs, Imaginons qu'un «internaute 1> se rendc sur Ie
site d'un quotidien new ),orkais. par exemplc; les
bannicl'cs publicitaircs qui apparaisscnt souvenl a
['ecran sonl inserees dans In plu1'a1't des cas par un
tiers - unc sociele cotnme DoubleCiick -, qui eollecte
['information sur l'ulilisateur sans que eelui~ci Ie saehc. II '!I a Itt une Mruc!ure tr¢s complcxc QU la pro~
tection de la vic privee cst souvcnt locxistanlc. Ccla
diL, commence a sc manifeslcr un mouvcment en faveur tic 13 protection technique, it ['image de la norme
" P3P)l qui facilite ['etiquetage et Ie filtrage en permeLtant de cormaitrc los pratiques d'un site el done
t1'operer un fihl'tlge (24). Il c:xiste d'autrcs solutions
pour renforcer la protection de la vic privec. AiflSi,
le .. Trust c )1., societe clllifornicnnc. propose dc delivrcr un label ailX sites qui respectcnt un certain nOffibrc de normes de protection de la vic privee (25). Ces
divers: projets sonl en cours d'elaborll~ion depuis trois
nns. mais l'on ne voil toujours pas s'csquisser la~mise
en reuvre genende d'utic telle protection aUK Etats~
Onis,

2. La debat sur les prlnelpes reglssan! la
vente sur l'lnternet
Dcuxl~mc enjcu de la protection des consommalellfS,
Ie d6bat sur les pdndpes qui doivent regir 1a venle
sur !'Internet. Et d' abord. Jes problemes de formation
du contraL Quel dcgrc d'information faut·i! foufllir
aux aehclcurs sur }'lolcmet ? 11 Y a trois jours. la Fe·
deral Trade Commission a annonce Ie: lanccment
d'une ctude: donl I'objcctif est de d6finir te conlenu
minimal des informations qu'it est necessaire de delivrer pour qu'U n~y ait pas une fausse information,
c'e$t·a~dire pour que solt dClivree une information
toyale scIon la terminologie americaine (26), n existc
toute une jurisprudence sur les praliques commercia~
les loy ales. Ul commence Ie debal : queUes sont les
informations dont Ie: consommateur a besoin ? La
meme interrogation vaut a propos du consentement
A. partir de quel moment peut~on cstimer qu'it y a
consentement? Le Simple dic suffit-iI pour que l'on
puisse considCrer que la pcrsonnc est d'accord et
qU'elle a bien enVisage les consequences juddiques
qu'implique ce geste sur Ie bouton de Ja souris '1 Com~
ment peul-on savoir que c'est bien teUe ou telIe per"
sonne qui a clique sur un petit symbole 11 I'Cctan '1
Sur taus ccs points~ un projct de rCforme de I'arti~
elc 2~n de l'Uuiform Commercial Code a vu Ie
jour (27), n a pour ambition de traiLer toutes les tran~
saclions ponant sur des Informations comme des ae~
cords de licence, aU lien de tes assimilcr It des ventes.
Les consequences de ce chub:: SOnt s~veres en tennes
de garanlie. surtout en ce qui concerne les vices ca¥
cites, car les garanties altachecs aux accords de licence sonl moins protectriees dans Ie Code commer"
cial (1' Uniform Commercial Code) que celles qui sont
(iCes a ta vente. Cela contero une certaine soupJesso
aux activitcs qui constituent Ie consentement,
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COMMERCE ELECTRON/QUE
Pour Ie consomma(cul', Ie recours ct lil determination
de la 10i un for comliwcm toujours un problemc fondamcmal (2R). Dispose-t-il ct' nn recours juridique ct,
si oui, auprcs de qncl tribunal '1 Le consom1l1atcur
souhaite cvidclnmcnl que I'affaire so'it fmi[cc dcva\11
ta jnridicliol1 de son domicile. tandis que I'entrcprisc
prCferc de SOil C{lte qu'cHe Ie SOil del/a.nt celle de SOil
siege social. Comment resou(lrc Ie dilemme ? Pour
"Instant, il n'y a pas de repon:>e dCfinJtillc,

3. La necessite de la securitil
II sc pourrait aus::l qu'i\ faille pdvilCgier Je bcsoin de
securite, Or, leli consommatcufS manqucnl de COI1fiance dans la s&:urHc c1 la nabilitc des paiements.
Si Jes 62 millions d'inlernautes n'utillsenl que trees
rarement ]'fnlcrnct pour effeclUer leurs transactions
commercia]cs, c'cst principalement, on I'a vu, en raison de la reticence qu'i1s eprouvcllL il transmeure Ie
!lUmera de leur carle bancaire (29). A ce stade, iI ne
s'agit mcme pas d'envisager d'autres possibiHtes de
paielOcliI clectronique COlnine Ie cybercash ou Ie
porte-monnaie elcctronique, mais d'une inlcrrogation
de base: commcnt peut~oll lransmettre Ie numero de
sa carle bancalrc par Internet en {oute securitc ? Certains pensent que c'est un faux probleme, car 11 Y a
beaucoup plus de risques a donner SOn numcro de
carte au commer9ani. du coin ou par telephone que
sur j'Interner. II rcste que, dans la mentaHt6 publique,
II y a une cerfainc apprehension divulguer de ielJes
informallons sans savoir preciSellletH qui est en face.
On ne peut pas ne pas tenif compte de cette donnCe.
L'ins!auration de la confiance ne se fera pas sans Itt
combinaison des mcsures privees et de mesures publiques, surtout en ce qui concerne Ie dCveloppcmcnt
Cl Ja diffusion des moyens de cryptographic dans la
societe,

a

rcgJes stables et equitables viClldra uniquemcnt du
murch6 ; In jurisprudcnce -lIctuelie cn tC!l!oigllc, ainsi
que k relard pri;; dans la protection de la vie privee,
Par ail1enrs. la phlparl des discussions concernant
l'avenir dc ] 'Internet ptcnuent comme point de depart
l'In!emct tel qu'il est aujourd'hui, c'est~il:·dirc dans
sa structurc technique actuelle. II s'agilia d'un mauvais point de de pan parce 'lue !'archilecture va changer. Par cxelnl,le. les probJemes quc I'on eprouve
pour localiser une transaction pourraient eire resolus
en modifiant ceUe arehitec!l.lfe. C'cst done une que$~
tion de volonte. La question qui reste posce esl cellc
de savoir 5i l'Industrie va dcvclopper d'elfe-mcmc ces
lnoyens tcchniques - ce n'est pas impossible
ou
s'ils ne se dcvc1oppcro}lt pas plus vile avec une in~
terven£ion limirce de !'Etal- rhypofhese cst plus rea~
liste (30), EMil}, Ie demier paim de ces conclusions
tient a 1a neceS$Jle d'une coordination internationalc.
L'lnternet se developpe dans un environnement in~
lematiol)at ; des Jors. les solutinll$ relenues au niveau
des (:itals sans prcnd!e en comprc cc qui sc passe aitw
leurs rellcontreron[ sans doule del) problenlcS niajeurs
de mise en reuvre, sinon de coherence dans Ie cadre
d'une economic mondialisec. II est nUbsi inusolrc de
penser, cornme certains Ie disenl, que Ies Eta!.s n'au~
ront aucune autorile sur Ie reseau mondial (31). Tant
que Ie.;; acteur~ de l'Inlernct auront un lien Ics raUachant a un Etat, cclui-ci pourra lrouvcr les moycus
d'cxercer un pouvoir sur ccs personnes. Pour I' avenir.
it faut priviJcgicr la diversile de.;; acteurs ct des acli"
vites sur !'Internet, toul en conservant la possibilitc
d'opercr une repartition approprice des rtsponsabilites. Voila cc surquoi il cQnvienl de dcbatire present.

a

m En avril 1998, Ie poids de I'industrie infoJ)'lllllique reprtsenlai! 8,2 %
au PN!1 des Eutts.Uni•• U.S, Dept of Commerce, The Emerging
Digital Econamy. Partie "Tht Digilat R,V()I/lrion~ (avril 199B) dis-

ponlble sur lmemel; [hup1Iwww.ecomme{eqIOY/digi~
tal.html,
(2) 63 Fed, Reg. 24991 (Ie 6 rn.ail99B) (citant ['8ude tk l'f!tlclliQuest

Conclusion

Infarmalioo Group du qualfi~me trimcme 1997,

America. Olllll'lc. Pm[ile: AOL ltlfertu:livt) Services,
[http://www.aotcom/Wrp/pror.le].
{4} US, Depr. or O:mlmcrce. Tile Emerging Digilol &cnMlI)", Partie
~Digifal Defivery of GO<tds. ami Servicd' (Avril 1998)
lhttp:t!www.ecommerce.go ... /digsum.htm].
(3)

Pour conc1ure. it faut noter qu'aux Etats~Unis, des
t'instant au Ies cntreprises cherchent it abtenir des
protections commerciales tandis que les consommaleurs manquclIl de protections, Ia preference ne va
plus forccment A I'autoregulation au detriment de la
regulation. Par suite.l·hypoth~se de Ia mise cn lXuvre
d'une regtemenlation de )'Intcmet possede nouveau
un certain credit, En effet. il est deux ehoses dom it
faullenir comple: d'abord, Ia nccessitc d'obtenir et
de preserver in confiancc des consommatcurs dans Ie
syst~me ; ensuite.la ncccssitc de garantir la confiance
des entrepriser- clles~memc~ dans In loyautc de la con~
currence. Deja, certains aspecls de J'rnlernet. leIs que
la multiplicilc de;; acteurs, la oOllwlransparence des
actlviles obligenr, ;;emblc-t~il. une intervention eta~
tique, nest Wilsoire de penser que !'cmergence de

a

a

(Sj ibid.. Pnr1ic "ReUli/ &lIes ajTlmglblt Gootll'. Lhttp:{/www.¢C.Om.

merce.gov/relll LhtmJ.
(6) V, I. Reidcnoor&. l.,'iru;labiljt,c et la corn:.urrcnce dCll regimes regiemw.alres dans Ie Cyberespace, iri us ilfCcrlilutiu du ckilt (FJan

MacKaay, red.) (Bdilion!> Themis: ~ para\'tre) disponible sur
Internet
[hnp;/lwww.droit.umontrcal.ea/crdp/fr/canfcren.
ccsJi ncertitudesldefaulttllmj.
{1} V, D. 8ud;:, Trodeawrf /fix;,nllM for Glaba! Electronic Comll!tJ-ct,
49 South Carolina L. Rev. 695 (1998).
(II) AUl( E1ms--Unis, Ja societe Nttwi'frl: Solutions, Inr. est responsable
des i1lscriptions au regislre des "ams de damaine, Ce sYSiemc
fait I'objet de projets de rtrorme au sein du gouvememcnt
am6'kaln aiJ1sf qu'au sein de !'OMt>I.
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(9) v. supra. nOlc 4. Partie ~fll!radtlCli()lI" [IIUpWwww.econJlllcrtX..gavj
daniolroJl,m/,
(10) V., pare);" Pllnavi:>ioll InCI t. TOljllx:n. 141 FJd 1316 19th Ch.,
1993); Playboy Enterprisc!' e, Calvin Dc~!gncrtabd, 985 r. SlIpp.
121l! {N.D.Ca., 1997}; H"d~1I P:odu,'l$ c, I1c£o Biological, 1997
US. Dis\, LEXIS 10565 (E.D. La., 1997) ; American Nctwofl:, lilt;,
t;, A("(:'¢,s Al1ICflcl\.i(:onr:cct Alkllla, '{l5 F. Stllll, 494 {S.D.N.Y.,
1997); Cybersell, lrw. V. Cywr;dl. Inc., 130 f.3d 414 (9th Or..
199n
(I l) [iC(l';\1&ll.1I Restaurant L King, 937 E SVllp. 295 (S.D.N.Y., 1996),
Itfrd, 126 f 3-d 25 (lod Cif" 19(7).
(12) V., par 0::., Playboy EnlCfprise, c. calvi'l Dr.1iigncr Lahcl, 985 F,
Supp, 1218 {N.D. CII., 1(97) ; Playboy E:tl!crprife~ c. Wenes, 1993
U.s. Dlstricl LEXIS 918:0 (S.D, Ca. 1'>98),
(IJ) V., j};tf CX., Microson anti-trust case e:q)C("~ed in days, FilL Times
(MIIY 9, 199&).
(14) l£ 18 lI\a1199~ Ie Thlp.artcmeOI dc la Juslke fedu;;k ~ Ics prQcurenrs de Ci'!i lilals ont iOjJ~ punt plain!e et lOUtc.~ le$ i[);!ances
Oil! clc regwup.6;s dev.\1d III Cour (~dera!e de Washington, D.C.
{(5) V, 1. Cohen, A rigld 10 rcad IInol\ymonsly; A closer look at copyrighllll<truq;elntlll ill CybcIS!lllCC. Ccl!tleclinff Lall' Rel'I,m' (1997);
P. Samuelson, Regul!l.fion ofl'cchnologics to Protect Copydghtcd Works, COIJII1!ImicotioilI oj lilt ACM. tome 39, n~ 7
(JuUle: 19%).
(\6) Directive 9ltZSll'CEE, art 6.

07) V" pllr ex., S.-li. Be<:\.:et. US Rc$lriclior" 01\ E~pOf1S of {'rypto·
graphk Equipment and Software. lOl/fIlal (l/lVvrid' Tmde Law,
wme 32, tf'" I. p. 5 (! 998),
(l&) V, American Network Inc, c. Acre,s America, 975 F,SUPJl. 494
(S,D.N.Y., 1997} ; MaOll.v. Cybergold, 947 P,Supp. IJ2S(IW,Mo.
1996).
(19) V, Cyberwll, lnc. e. CybcrseU, Inc" un F. 3d414{9th CiL, !997);
l:iadan Produm e. Beso lJiologica!, 1991 V,S, Dis!. LEX!S L0565
(E.D.lA. 1991) ~ Bensman Re5II1UfMll c. King, 937 p, Stipp. 295
{S,D.N.Y. 19%).
(20) V. lIussi Compnservc c. Pancp.)on, 89 EJ<! 1257 (6lh ('if.,. (996)
{Ill fa com¢lCnt'C jllridictionnelle emit Ctllblic par Ie romra!, pasSe
en1rc CompusCTvc Cl sun I.Iti1isalcuf PIIIlOOGJl.
{21J v. P Schwartz el ], Rcidell\)crg. Da((1 prilY/CY IoU': A slUtfy of
Uuifed SIllI!'!$ d(1ra pro(tliOfl, eel. Michie. 1996. OlarioUts-ville,

(22) BWlHarris Poll: On-Line InsecuritY". DuyiutSI Wah:. MilL 16,
1998.

(23) a; U.S,C, 27:0·2711
(24) V, 1 crt tgatd W3C, I'lalfolln (tJr PO'lIl\;)' Prcfc!ellcc~ (I>3P) Sym;n:
SIXlCifltlliIOn, {llllpJ/\/,'Ww.wlorgff.IiJWI}'-P)
(25) Trust·c se IfOU~C au {htlp:llwww.trus{e.orgj.
(26) Fedcra: T!<1dc COUlmi~"ion, [,llerprelalum "l Hula mui Oolidn Illf
f:"f«I({Juic Media.,' R.tqwsl for CommNlI, 63 fed. Reg, 24996
(May 6. lYSIS).
(27) !,I:, !C~tcs au rrojC{ $e t(f)UVCIY. ,Ilf If Si1c web
\IIUp:ffwww Jaw.tlllCnn.ecoilibDlJ'yfuldun2lucc2bj.
(28) L"OCDE rcc{ltlltait amsi ccllc dlmcuhC dill'!> son projel "Rec(!IIf'
Ilwmj{l{jOIi oj Iht COl11jd! Co/lemtiTlE Gflidtlillt! jor C0I1SlUliU
Pro/ffti('/l ill 11t~ C!nltex/ of EleClr(l,~it GlIIHllel'Cc" qui devfa1t
tt,e discutc cl V()l~ lol'S du COllseif des Ullflislrcs a OHawa
en octobrc prochain.
(29) V, supra, lIOIe 22.

(30) POUf une

discu$~jon

sur le lico emre [a tochnique cl Ja 10\, v. J, R.

Re;'&cn!A-rg, Lt~ injofhlalica , 111<, ForfflH/aliOIl oj /'l/arlJlatioJ! Policy Rules tilrough Teciuw/o8Y, 76 Tcxas L'lw Revicw 553(1998).

em IbM.
M. Ie Biitonnier Philippe LAFARGE
Trois mcrcis, Monsieur Ie Profcsseur. Lc premier
pour Ie conleou de votre inlcrvcnlion. Lc second pour
un fran~ais admirable, ou I'on cnlcnd parler du « com,»cryant du coin» et dc «la lai du for ". Objo:::tivemcnl, c'est rare chez un Amcricain. El Ie troisiemc,
ce qui eslencore plus 6vcnementicl cl rarissimc, C'CSl
d'entcndre ce franyais [aire de rinfonnatlque ou de
la tcl6matique ou de I·clcctronique. Voila qui es£ absolument admirable. Nous avoos tTOuve - ils ont
trouve un oiseau rarissime, merci bcaucoup d'ctrc
venu avec nous. Je crois mainteoant que 1'00 va .scouter- je ne vais pas dire d'autres oiseanx, mais eorin,
!ii j'ai bien camptis, i1s vOnt voler ensemble - MooM
s-icur Ie Professcur Linant de Bellefoods et Monsieur
Alain Bensoussan,

GAZETTE DES TECHNOLOGIES AVANCEES
COlLOQUE
L'insfitut Univcrsiwre Intematlonal de Luxembourg (lUlL). t'A5sociation Europeenne pour Ie Droit Banc;ljre et Fin;lrtcicr
(AEDBF) er l'AEDBF France oq;anisent II Paris, du 16 au ZO NOVEMBRE 1998,la neU\'lcme sesstoo au cours de formation
approfoodie en droit bancaire ct financier de l'Unlon europeenne.
Chaque joumee sera organtsee -autour dc plusieurs themes dOtH, notammem :
LUNDl16 NOVEMBRE 1998:· L'Unlon cconomiquc et monctaire.
MA1U>117 NOVEMBRE 1998:· I.es dirccUve..'i bancaires de base. ~. I.a llbcrt.C d'ctabli.ssement, 1a Hbre prestatio,\ de services.
directives sur Ie comrOJe bancaire pnidenlkl.
MERQ{EDI 18 NOVEMllRE 1998: •
JIiUDI19 NOVTIMBRE 1998: • Le droit communamaire des valeurs mpi.lilieres,
VENDREDr 20 NOVEMIiRE 1998; * Le droit cornmunautaire dc la concurrence dans scs .aspects specifiques au secteu.
bancaire e{ finandc •.
Lien: HOTEL MERCURE - IA DEFENSE
Droit d"inscrlption: 1 300 feus (l 200 pOUf les membres AEDBF. AEDBF France ou associations affiliees).
Ilenscignemcnts: Mmes MA), Miton e{ l. Borel, fUlL.
162, avenue dc 1a Pai"encerie, 1.-1511 Luxembourg, tel. (352) 471811, fax: (8-52) 47 1677
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SoU!; la direction de Xav(er llNANT dtlBEllEFONOS.
ChrlS!(lphe CARON, Georges OECOCQ, Gorum HAAS,
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Agalha LEPAGE, Christian LE STANe.
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JURIS CLASSEUR

LES CONTRATS ENCADRANT
LES TRANSFERTS
,
DE DONNEES PERSONNELLES
L;~ presente eJude procedc l\ unc eva1u~tion du m6camsmc d~s Chronique par J6rome HUET

clauses eon!l"dCtl.leJles utilisees pour le tHmsf"erf de donnees per~
sOllnclles, a j3 lmpiere des prufiques"exislantcs et d-e l'cvolulior.
du contcxle dans lequclclles s'Opi\renl (page 8).

Agrege des facultes d\3 droit.
Professeur a llUnlversite'de Paris II (Pantheon~Assas)
Direoteur du CEJEM (Centre d'etudes jur1dJques
et economiques du multimedia)

L'AFl'AIRE YAHOO! ET
LA DEMOCRATISATION INTERNATIONALE D'lNTERNET

L'ordonnance du 1GI de Pads Sllf i'affairq Yahpo est aIn fois

orditl<\lre, P~ p~r tMl'tp,bu!)~I_f~atwflj~._en _ aw1ica¥
tion dc,regles elassiql.)es de (!1:n~'i!;tfj@£cji)J1d!,ciJ(JrmeJle que]e
droit america!» recoimw{ ,e:galetiicnl. :~t 'Ull¢ i£i;c~@i,on ex!raofdi~
l1nire,'eJ1 ce qU'elle pose Ie plincipe d'unc ~in:ocratie i'qLemhtio·
na\o et du respect-de Ville-urN 1.1011~pJ).mJt~e(CJales dans hi Inise en
Jlluee de l'inf-rnstnlctlJoo tedmiquc d'Infeinet (pageM).

une_:~~isi()o

Chronique par Jol>IR. REIOENBE~G
ProfeSil<lurde [)roiti)tpirepleur~u'MaSl<1r at I"ilwsa la

facuita dedr6M€i FordiJ"m Un!~·N<Wi York

LA NOUVELLE DIRECTIVE DU 9 AVRIL 2001 SUR LE DROIT D'AUTEUR
ET LES DROITS VOISINS DANS" tA SOCIETE DE L'INFORMATION
OU
,
LES AMBITIONS LIMITEES DU LEGISLATEUR EUIWPEEN
La direcOve sur Ie droit d'autc~lr etlcs dmits VQ!sins daot.la
sochEte de J'illformatiol1 a cite t\dpPL~ le:9,};vril2001, II s'agit
d'Ull te-xfe tnnlii!ieux. el d6e:evai..Jt tQU[.u la' fOlk que Jes mats
membres devtom. trnnspoocr (laos leur droit lntcme dans: un delai
de dixAmjt mois it compter de '1<1 nUhlicatlo;i au. JourMI Offieiel
des CommlillautCf> Eumpeenne& (page 20).

Cn~Jllq4e par Chttsi9Roe C.,\J'~QN
Agre.ge:qes Fa'CUUes de drQit, Rrofe:s$fi)ur ~!P Facul~~de
droit de BOUIClgne';.sQr~Mer {Univeislts'du Uftn!a:l ~ Cote
d'Opale)

~--4'4ii.jiliM~~Hl
DROIT D'AUTEUR DESJOURNALISTES

Cybersurvcillauce ,des sala1 ies dans
l'en!reprisc

'
mi
Creation

TITULARITE DES DPOITS
D'AUTEUR

Accord d'en!reprise a Libemtion
RAPPORT DE LA CNIL

COMMENTAIRES

'

eL intclpn:lation
salariees : dt! l<~se lata ef de lege
ferenda (page 24)

Ir.I'jIi

RESPONSABI,LlTE DU
FOURNISSEUR
D'HEBERGEMENT
A visage decouvert (page 30)

D.IIl

II!'I:'III PARASITISME

ftIIII D~B!,TS ~LECTORAUX
III:UII TELEVISES

ImiIil
IIi.UIIiI

gardi{",ns vigilant:; de I'equitc diln.slc
tl'aitcmcnt ulJdiovlsnel dcs'candid-l:lts
,lOX eleclions I1lnniclvnles (page 31)

l!~mU!.!L ar!!iLtmg/Q,allrerif:{lIi!
Australie. LoI !luSlralicnnc !lUI' {t:. droit
moral

IiIII Coquilles comprises (page 28) Le COllsciI d'Etat et le CSA : les

Veill~!l( dI'Qi1j£~l'!l]leJl!l,
Allemagne.11iffamaiioH dans des fOl1lms
de discus$io)1

De l'enoomh~mcnl de la·bande
_passante .et ,de~ pn)mcsses non

Yei([~4'Lift:Qitfi§qg!
GCDE. Conell!sions el rec.oll)mandatiofJs
rch,Lives {f!J CPI11UlCrCe eiecll'Oniquc

tcmlt~&

CONTRAT 01" FOURNI,
TURE D'ACCES

(page 28)

III!:nI

SECRE'T MED1CAL

~ L'rut dl! se [(tlre, en tonlo!;
cirtonSUlI)CeS (page 32)

{'();-;CI,\ 'S10~ (;I~:t\};:I~A1J(

Lill!aIY3;! des poosibili1es d'apprchcnsion du ph'::l1Oll1.Cl1C de Irall~fC1l
inlelilati{)nal deconnees pCJS01UlcJJes pur voie de clauses (.;onlraClue:lJes, an
n~gard noL,lmrne:11\ dtl (lroil tic',!,) obligalions, a pennis de mOIl!rer un cz,nain
llombre de fniblesses de ce dispositiL
j)'IlI)C pnr[, 0)) observe que, meme si I~s obiigr.ll\)])s g6nemlcmenl
inscliXs drtllS le~ modeles de {;onlmLS permeUe;!L C~ dOIl:1el' !:.I~!~,J.qlJ5:::\!:IJ:>.~:I~
rarlL-:0s qumu J la :,CLUlit6 des donnees et au fC.sPCCI d'un Lertain nombre tIe:
pri~dpcs (fina:itc, uci;Cs, rect.ificalion ... }, Ie pmcooe de la stipulatioll pour
autrui. inJispengablc pour anloriser les personnes CO!lCCl1lt'ies exen;er
leurs droll:-:, P!::h~~.t~.~.;~~f~J.~l.~~~~ Cll raison du tal! que Ies system'?:- jUri-

a

diques ne I'admr-!lent ll<lS tOl.ljOUl'5 SfI),'> fCstrictions, eI qu'au cas ce recxportnt/on: des donnees V(~rs 1m SCCOlld pays ticf'>, la llecessltc de d6d(iubler la
slipulahotl pour aOlfUi rend Ie ~)'stcme pa~sab!cJJJe.flt complcxc.
D'ilUtre part, 01 surtOiJI, ()n.a pll constli1f-!" que Ie lllCcanisn)c du contrrn
eSI assez ma~ .adapte pon!' ganJntlr l'efficacilc de regle;; qui re\eVC111 avant
IOU', de 1ft cnL~gor;e des 101$ de polio;, dOtll Ie re~pect devrfiil pouvoir GIJ'C.
assure pal' de;; (lulorilCs de (;011lr6Ie sll::;ceplibles d'tl!y~.~.~.~£.~l~!~~~.~.~.:~~!l~.
!iQ~2!!2t, ({Ion; que sur Ie lerrflin du droit des obligalions, la sum.:1!0Jt des
ecarLs de condlille des deLellteurs des donnees est constituet: esseulielle,
men! par)n possibiliM pOUl' les [)CL,>onnes wncem0e!'i. au cas Oil :.>jJt~ sour·
jJ'cnl un prejudice, d'~n ,Q.l>1QnirJ1Lr.CR?l:~JiQl~ grace it l'allocation (~~ dommage.';-inlerets,
!'EC()M'IlANIlAnO~s liMIS!::S A PARTIR 1lI( li(.;TlIDIc
.. Dans Ie;; clauses cntre exponateul' et importatcm· de donllCe.<; person~
nelIe:;, prevoir que 1..') IOJ applicable OltX rappoJ.1S crmtracluels entre Ies par·
ties sera If! loi du pays de I'exportatcur (pays membre (:0 Consei! de
l'Europe, don! Ie:; wCt..:anlsHlcs de droit des conlra{s son1, en pl'incipc, en
harmonie <wet: le$ pi incipcs gencraux "'uroIJCcns).

- E1fcclllcr une clnd!:, de clmi! com;m!'c dans dHfcrent$ pays cliropii;:)J1S
pour verifier si Ie regime de In " ~tip\d;l:iQn pour aul!lIi " est en !lannonie
avec le fO:1donncmeu! de&: c;ausc" conLra<:tucllc:'> ew.::aanmt le.s 11m:. lfUB:;'
fronlieres de dt.'<:mics petsonnelle~.
- Prevoir qu'ulle d"use (I,w:; tcs rapPOl1S entre exporlaleur et impmtatcur
de- donnees pers{)mtellc~ p:cdse d:lircmcnl I'objet du tl1lnsft!!i {SOn:Hl'ill'
(allte, location, CCS;;IOll .. ,) (iillSi que In qUalification du contral ell (iceo\!lanL
- PreVOjf 1'6labontlioll, elan{ donne \a Crequcnce de rene hypothese) de
danJ-es spcr-ifiql:c<; eJlllc cxp0rlatcur \;'1 impr)rtatcur de donnees personnc:lcs dans Ie cas pru1i~'ulicr de la" sous"tnli[(mce" [I J'efnmger (ou eXler,
nalisation).
. Envisager des !Doyens plus cJ'J1caces qne le$ dOlllmagcs-illLcfcts pour
sl-)tishlirc la dcmande d'une pcrsonne victimc J'un Irailclllcnl illicite de
donnees personl1elJe.~ : par exemple, Ulle compensaJioll en !latur!') de la prill
de l'cnlrcprise cxportatriec (exernple de reference : ~Uf-fCSeryati()n dans A-S
tnl1l&ports acricns, nllocatioll d'llll ,. avoil''' sur I~) \'ob de lacompagnic}.
. In!.crdirc J'exporta(Jo::) tic dOllllCeli cUf!sidcr6:':;; CQOUl1e sensibles dans le
pays de :'export.lll~U:, sauf l'~xi;}tcnGe (j'une jusliflcation sj:i6::ialc e! iimilee
a un Iypc de tmnsfcrt (exemple : 10 religion dan;; Jes aonllCe.'>conecl'mmllc."
salmie,,> en Allemagnc,ci Ie 11«m,lert f.l fin de souiHrailaIK.e.).
- Interdire dans lcs clauses enlre CXpOllltteur et imponalcllr de donnf'.es,
1« lie.xpm1alioll de donnees pcrsoHndlc<;, h panl!' du pays de l'imporL.l!"'.ll-,
vcrs till autre pays tiers.
- f'.l:endrc les disposi(if:-<; &5 eiallses COIl!tnctuclles ad'alllfcs cnlilcs que
des enl.repJl'>e<;: pa, exemple, a des nSl:lOcialkllls, de,~ egJises ..
- Tr;:walller sur des clauses, qee des ce!reprises ou autre::; orgaJiisn1l"~
poufmienlmeltre :':U1' leur site ioleme! adestination des (.;ol1sonmialetll't.
pour les informer du (lIIilemen! des donnce;; 1cs concernant cl de leHrS
droits,

mL'affaire YahOO! et la democratisation intemationaIe
d'Intemet
par Joel R. REIDENBERG'
Pmfesseur de Droit el Directeur du Master of Laws a la faculte
de droit de Fordham University, New York

Le 20 novembre 2000, Ie Tribunal de grande instance
de Pm'is continnait une premiere ordonnance de
reiere faisanl obligation 1\ Yahoo' Inc.. societe de
droit americain. de prendre (outes meSllres de nature
Udissuader el it rendre impossible la consultation il
partir du terri(oire frangai, des pages web (hebergees
sur les servcurs californiens de Yahoo !) proposaut
des objets nal.i, aux enchere" ou presentant des messages, images, insigne.s et autres emblemes faisanl
l'apologie du nazjsme ou des theses revisionuistes.'
Dc nombreux commcmatcun: ont oons~deH§ ceHe decision COl))me- Hlle
menace pour la libetiC d'expressioll sur JmenJc!, COl1un-e lInc leJ1l.alive
m~ll;ldroite d'1mpo$e)' lIue 101 J)utlona1c 11 i'cnsemblc du reseau, \'oire
eomtne un ch-ef d'reu\'1'C de futili!e, en raison du Cl\I',lclere Iransnalionai
d'Internel·"·. DHBS le$ semaifie~ ~tdvant 1u deeisio/l, Yahoo! s'empressait

J',

2, fl.'-\lwrclc Yor"rn Elkaim, LLM '01 de F01Uholll, pour ~()n uidt.li.H£-U!s:iqueel :;on ;1;;S'!f,·
!aflce de recl\GfChe.
3. TGI F'[lriy, (lnl. riff, 20'101'.,2000,' Com. tollt 6lter!: dec, 2{J()(), COillll~ ,,~ 132, diJJh.'lJlible

/'mhr.I,w: : <hUp:f!wwwJUlisoolU.nclll)(VJuJisfr!cH!lgiparb20001l2QJtlIll:>, Cet(~ dfl,'i>joll
(l cOIlBrillc ill pl1~micl1~ O:oonnill1ze en date du 12 mru 200), er\i!>ig.flMI Yahoo 1d'emp&h<:r
!()u1 ;..:ch ad~;: comenus rop;imc,~ JX!f 1a Jui ftm~i~, CI en f,l\f1iwlicr j':<Jikk R. M5· J du
Code pCllttl, "bir TGl1'clrh. OM. MI, 12 mat 2000: COOt (;(1m. ti/a:lI. s\!f4.2000, Chmm.
11"'9Z, disjlrwibh:?::
,j

<l~11X:lI\\'i'WJ1)..rj~"om_wl!'tr\!}Urisf(ftti!JWPllri;;2,'liXiOSZ2.hlln>,
l'Ollf ,un Q>Gmpli; d·q};:1J~rc:. di'f"")jlij)ks S~!r};: &i!eY;JIG« J: AI);;11Qn~>

voir:

<hnp:JI VlwwJ~{\2ljs,\lclJjnel/Hlus'Jil!joo!y(jlW!)_mltllOllH.hilll>
II, l);veffi(:s ft.%OCimiom, de d<':Jemw. Oc-s dmilH c!WI!Jt>, 'doll! le Cetlfl'rjor Demomu:y (Ilk!

fcdlllo1t;.r;y,PHl fooenx:nlYljliqhC UUIWMlill frill1\.alsc, Iolltcofmuecertaijh_ccnUllWliatcUffi
(lml\,mH: \wnl(ilm!WIC!l! CDTl'OIJC), f'~!;'THj! 6. n".2{},21 !"'h'.2!k~,; l,ilffl'ic S!c!ai{!J(iil,
C(Jffllll(:Jlft1imde l'l!.1lili!e Y«J/(iO! ;'C(l1tl(f;J MI!Z,'drril de j'mfumm!/qlll' ~ks teSr:i!l~t:, nO!;
200fl, IIQ 13[)1'f JfAris(ml1.l1tt, '24 on 2tillQ.l)1Jj)i!\Vww.y..lriS(ou;.ne~chr/2J621J(i(Jl-D24,hUn:
£)ietlilc Uh); Yc;!J(lo! (rekrmdoll)lic_t'll h!.fr'ft',: tl jJWb{ifflll) r;0II1p}c4( .j"oiufi(Jfl iIOi1(:U,;Y: -: i)'Vi!
i!( 1\',yw?li,w1i'dJ!k4o[;it>s : AC~!I(j1iiif;._ 22 M!'. 2000 <www.cln)jH&:hl'l\I,lol;k-org>;us iit{l/.5
mel/till ell p!(l(-C-liw mdli!f'Cilift IlI{J/!d;air: .-tll tlC/. I.e Mrmtlf'. J},12jdl'l; -2{X)j, j), 2,
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d'aiileuxs de demander a une cour fiderale americalne de declarer Ie
jugemem fnm~js inexecutable',
Ceae deferial1te de critiques a I'encomre de {'onlolloaIKe cst pOUflant
largement injusliflce, Il s'agi1 er:. e-ffe-l d'ul\e decision imporLanie tendant
nu respect des valeurs dcmoeratiques Bur Internet, mals cgaJement au res~
ped de res valcurs quall1 all deveioppetllenl des tcdmologies propres au
reseau. Cel1aillS consitlereronl sam, .louIe celte opinion comme nne-heresic, (,.\ en parlien\ier les" separalistes du rcseau" C'lnterncl SeparaLlfilS "}
qui prCfcrcnl croire qu'llHemel rc!Cye d'un ordre j(~ridiquc n pari, Ull.11!iCendall{ Its fronticfe-s politiq:ues eL !'cmpri';;t~ de-.~ [tilIS-tuUi,)Il$:. Ce faisnnt, ih )'cnJent les Hens complexes qui existenL pourttl:nl enlre Ie resell\!
informutiOllnel et Je £en:itohe geographique", Us prteonisen.l plotot un
sysremc (;OnHalll am: <Ictel.lr;; du rese.au 1e pou\'oir d'6di\~le)' leurs propres
reglcs de condnite, a l'exdusioH de toutr. regiemen!ution etatique. C'..eUe
philobOl)hie est largement iui1uel1cee par !'idee d'une liberte tolale des
echangcs d'lllfomlutiolls, Alaquellc In socicle llmcriea;nc attache nne
gramle imp0l1anee ~I qui est a\lji)\ird'hll: &Ollil~jaeente dans l'archi~ec[ure
d'Inlernel, Ilotmnll10nl en raison de l'inMLermination geogmphiq\lC des
lfUllsmissions,
En ec :;ens, I" deeision Yahoo! constiLue line rcaffinualioll dc vakurs
dCulo(.;raliqu(:$ 1l0)Hllnerieaines et ill[Crvienl h un mOJl1ent charl1iere dtl
dcve]OPPf,ll1ent d'Intel'l1et. La democratic frangalse a aooplc dcs rcgJes
propres relatives alaliberte c!'expressioll- dontl'uttlelc It 645·2 du Code
pcnal- qui sonl confonnes llUX cOHvenli(}l1S inremaliollales sur le~ droils
de l'llommc, mais qui ne conespoadent pns pm)f a:ulanl au>.: proteclions
offerle~ par ie premier Jmenden]{',f)1 de 1n eonslitution amfuicuine.
Chaeunc de ces re21('me!l1l1tlons cl)n:Hitue Ie produil d'nt} syslc:me politique demoeraciqoe,.e( Internet n'a pas vocation 1t aeeorder plus de legi!i~
mite it run on ;'!'aulre, L'l,decision Yahoo! illlis!re POUr1iln( Ul) renv'CfSemem <Nluel des r61es dans 1a Iuite de POl\VOir ecouomique cl polltique StU'
Internet : hi position amcrieainc, lOllgtcmps UB slRndard, est rapiee.menl
en train de devenir un point de vue rninorJtairc. En effct,jul>qu'cn 2000,
ies Etats"Uni:rderenaient une maj[)Iitc~bsolue +;11" parts dWf11llren6 >.' tant
flulliveau du COllleJ)U qJ1C des ulilislHeurs d'lmemeL Mais dans 1c eouranl
5:~y~j;~~;!~U(;;;;al::i:;;;;,f;;I' !:'(Jo:?lJi5:;VOl1b DiswiCl o.t Odifim1ill, rJr:mm,t/c -1'01,'"
gislI:&1' II' 2J "ikcmbm zOOt?}, displlnib/e SUI' <\\'W\y,{:{!t.Ofg>

6, Pou/, unc iwtdy,j'c <Iii !-'~'.\' /i(?II.1', I'oir i.aWn'llr(' l£ssiC, Codr (lnd ()!/tu ltM~ (4
£'),/11'1',111('(1:, }9P8; J(!~I R. IkidcIID!!rf:, Goremill/; Nt'IlH,rj(.1 wrd Rulc·M'lkil/.~ jll
C-Yhrr'(f':uJ(¥!, 45 FMORY L }, 91 I, )9%
<illtp:( W\vIV.1HW.Cll)Q,:}',<:d\lfEWJ\,,}lnm(':~lstll)1%1I~id\1ILh'!)'J>
COTnPlO(Ce
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de I'ann{c 2000, Ie nombre d'ulilisatcurs en dehors des BlaIs-Vilis a augmente de ravon considerable: alors qu'a la fin elu premier scmeslre, les
utilisateurs anglophoncs ne constitnaient plus qu'une iegere majoritel, a
la fin de l'annec, 55 % C\U tratic sur Ie web provcnuit de pays autres que
les Etats-Unis\ tandis qu'en France seulement, Ie nombre c\'illlcrnautes a
3ugmente de 65 % en un an, pour atteindre 6,8 millions d'utilisatcurs 9 ,
L'ordonnance elu 20 novembre aura un impact (nonnatif) positif en ce

qu'cllc incitera les acteurs du net a reconnaltre les differences socioculturelies qui subsistent d'un pays a\'autrc. Plus concrctcment, cctte decision
oblige les elites technologiques qui fw;onnent I'architecture dunet arespecter des valeurs democratiquement choisies, et plus generalement, la
regIe de droit.
Car l'architecture actuelle du reseau, qui rcnd difficile Ie filtrage geographique des conten,us, n'a rien d'immuabk. Ironiquement, les acteurs
economiques encouragcnt depuis longtemps Ie devcloppement de techniques de IOcllliSiltion et d'identification ,1 des fins lucrativcs, notamment
dans la protection de leurs proprietes intellcctuelles, Oll dans leurs efforts
de creer des banques de donnees des comporlcments des utilisatenrs.
Meme I'Internet Society, I'un des organismes de normalisation technique
charges de definir les standards de communication sur Ie reseau, tenle
depuii:i plusieurs ,lnnees de pmlllollvoir un nouveau protocole de tmnsmission, 1''' IPv6 ", qui identifierait de fa~on unique I'emplacement de
chaque appareil connecte it Internet lO •
En ce sellS, I'ordonnance du TGI de Paris est a la fois nne decision
ordinaire prise par un tribunal fran9ais, en application de regies classiques de competence juridictionnelle que Ie droit americain reconnait
egaJement (1), et une decision extraordinaire en ce qu'eUe pose Ie principe d'nne democratie illternationaie ct du respect de valeurs nOIl-commerciales dans la mise en place de I'infrastructure techniqne d'Internet (II).
I. - L'API'LlCA'l'ION Dli J)j{(J[T FRAN<,:AIS SUR LE TERRITOIRE NAl'IONAL FRAN<,:AIS
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Si Internet pennel ases acteurs c1'alteindre un public geographiqllement eparpille, ceux-ci restenl neanmoins susceptibJes de rcponcire de
leur conduite a I'interieur de frontieres nationales. Internet ne remet en
elTet pas cn causc Ie pOll voir ., et la respo1lsabilitc - qu'o1ll des Etats dClllOcratiques de reglementer les activites exercees sur leur territoire. Ainsi, a
l'cxception des quelques" scparatistes du reseau " mentionnes plus hallt,
peu de gens pourraient serieusement contester Ie pouvoir dont dispose
i'Btat fran9ais de prescrire des regles propres aux activites entreprises sur
son territoire. Yahoo! s'est pourtant estimee all-dessus des lois nationales
des Btats au elle offre scs services, apartir de ses serveurs americains. Le
co-fondateur de Yahoo!, JetTY Yang, a ainsi resume son point de vue 10rs
d'une interview: " Ii me semble difficile pOUl' la justice fralll:;aise de
demnnder aline entreprise americaine de faire ceci au cela. "11
A s'en tenir aux faits, la decision Yahoo! est assez banaie dans son
analyse de la souverainete territoriale et son application des rcgJes de
competence juridictionllelle. En depit des denegations de Yahoo !, l'entreprise americnine a activement poursuivi line strategie d'expansion
moncli<1le, et a maintenu dans ce bUl des relations commerciales pennanentes cn France. Lcs pages wcb iitigicllses, bien que diffusees it parlir
des Btats-Unis, etaient clairement clestinces aetre consul tees autoll1' elu
monde. Dans ce contexte, il est difficile d'imaginer qU'Uil tribunal nationaine se reconnaisse pas competent, et se refuse a appliquer ses lois
nationales al'encontre d'unc entreprise exer~ant de far;;on active et continue une activite economiql1e sur son territoire. L'injonctioll faite h
Yahoo! de rendre inaccessiblcs en France ses pages illicites etai! done
previsible et jl1stiftee, et la France n'est pas la seulc a avail' reagi de [a
sorte face ace type de situation. En effet, les tribunaux americains euxmemes se sont SOllvent reconllUS competents ponrjllger des agissements
d'entreprises etrangeres, des lors quc cellcs-ci avaient enfreint la loi americaine apartir de territoires etrangers servant generalement de paradis
juridiques au fiscaux .
En tant que naUon d6mocratique souveraine, la France a choisi de
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rendre illicite Ie port ou l'exhibition de tout l1uiforme, insigne ou emblcme d\ll1e organisation ou d'une persol1nc reconlllle cOllpable de crimes
7. Voir JOIUJI1II rlu Net, I?epmtitioll de I'utillsatioll des i<lIIglle.\· .1'111' Ie lIel elljllill 2000.
Sourel! : G/o/mll?escarch, <hllp:llwww.jolirnaldlincl.eOllllcclcc.Jntcr~mdc3.shtml>
8. SOIIIW: SmlMarket, <h!l[l:lIwww.~Ifl.tmarkCl.com/SM.!e ... WcckSW>
9. SOI{I'CI! .' Journal dll Net, Le IWIII!>re d'irltC/'JI{/(lles ell France.
<http://www.jollfllllldunctJr/>
10. Voir a ('e .mjet .' II//el'llet EII8illcerilig Task FOFce. lulenld Pr(}/ocol \!('fsiol/ 6
(lPv6) .r.,·pe<"ific(I{ioll: Dmji Slllildanl. RFC2460, dte. 1998.'
<hlq~:lIwww.icILolgh.feMe2460.txt.lnllin ber;:e2460>
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12. C. pell., art. R. 645·1 : " PSi plllli... le/dil, sall/pOI'1' les be.will.'> d'lmjillll, 011 iI'wl('
oposilitm COlilpOrll/1i1 1111(; el'ocaliml lii.lloriqlle. de porter Oil d'eJ;hiber ell flub/ie 1111
IIlIi}(II'IIII;, WI illsifille Oil 1111 emblblle rappe/alit les lilli/ormes, le.~ illsiglles 011 les
elllblhlle.~ qlli 0111 elt! port6.'i 011 exhibrls soit pOl' les mem/Jres d'lIl1e orgallisatioll
dec/aree crilllilieik ell applica/hm de 1'(lrlide 9 dll stallll dll Iriblllial miliwire IIlter·
IUJliOliai wmexe (I /' accord de Lolldl'es dll 8 Iwllt 1945•.>oil par IUle penolllil! I'CCOII'
1IIIe collpab/e par IlIIe juridiclioll ji-mu;aise Oil illlernatiOlwlt d'/I11 011 pillsiellfs crillies
COllife 1'IIIIIIIt1llile prel'llS par les arlides 211·1 2/2-3 (/IIlIIelllimllles par la loi 11° 61·
1326 (/11 26 deccmbre 1964."
13. C. perl .. al'l. 113·7.' " Loloi penalejiwl('aise est applicable iitollt crillle, aillsi qu'd
10111 delit plilli d'elliprisomlemClIl, COllllllis {Jar' 1111 F'l'al1~'ais ou pal' WI etmll!!er 1101'S dl(
leniloife de la /lepllhiiqlle lorsqlle la viclillic C.II de IWliollalilliji'lllu;aise (II/II1Olllelll
de I'ilifracthill. "
14. C, pen., arl. ] 13·2 : " La loi penale frallrai.'ie e,I't applicable WIX il/Facliolls COIl1//Iise.I' SIll' Ie territoire de la Repllbliqlw. L'illfractioll est reputee comllli.1t Sill' Ie lerriloire de /(1 RrJpllbliqllc (ies 101:1' IfU'1I11 de sesfail.1 L'Olislillltif~ (j euliell.\'i/I'ce lerritoil'C "
15. COllclllSlOIlS de r(/hoo!. TGI Paris. Audiellce de l'iJere, 15/11(/1 2000. Par/ie 3.1,
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contre l'hUlnanite I1 • La jurisprudence franr;;aisc a quallt aclk qualifie ce
type d'infraction de trouble a I'ordre public internc. UIlC telJe legislation
ne serai! pas admissible aux Btats-Unis car elle vioierait Ie 'premier
amendement de la Constitution americaine, mais ce n'cst pas Ie cas des
democraties europeennes qui, h I'issue de la Seconcle guene mondiale,
ont legilimement adopte une autre position quant ala libertc d'expressioll
ei ses contours.
Bien que Yahoo! soit libre de fermer les yel1X sur les objets nazis mis
en ventes aux Btats-Unis sur son site d'encheres, la France vise aprotegeI'
ses citoyens en appliquant la theorie des" effets " pour decider de la
competence des tribunaux frall~ais. La loi penale franr;;aise s'applique en
effet a toute infraction commise en dehors du territoire fran9ais par Ull
etranger, des lors que ladite infraction a pour victime un citoyen
frm19ais.IJ Cette theorie est tOlliefois assortie d'nne limile, car les Iribunaux fran~ais ne seront competents que si I'infraction au J'un de ses Clements constitutifs a ete commis sur Ie territoire fran9ais.14
Les activites de Yahoo! n'ont guere laisse d'autre choix all tribunal de
Paris que d'affinller sa souverainete en veillant a\1 respect de la loi sm son
territoire. L'cntreprise a, en connaissance de cause, fait la promotion
d'objets nazis ell France, ou eHe maintenait une prescnce active. MaJgrc
les affirmntions de Yahoo) selon lesquelles eUe " n'a jamais .. souscril
aux idees ignobles que propagent Ie nazismc au Ie neonazisme sous
toutes leurs formes ainsi qu'aux theses revisionnistes "I~, les faits demontrcni une formidable hypocrisie et une position indCfendable Sllr Ie plan
mora1. En effet, Ie reglement du service d'encheres de Yahoo! (" Yahoo!
Auctions ") inctique de fa~on expresseque" cet1ains objel') lie peuvent en
aucun cas etre mis cn vente. Ceux -ci incluent nolamment : {. .. )tout objet
dont la vente est illicite cn vertu de toute loi applicable ( .. ) les animaux
vivants (... ) les sous~vetemcnts uses ".16
Les conditions generales de Yahoo! contiennent quan! a elles llne
clause stipulant qu'un abonne au service s'engage ane pas" transmettre
Oll rendre accessible de qllelquc maniere que ce soit, toul contenu illicite
( ... ) hailleux, ou reprehensible pour des raisons raciales, etbniqucs ou
tout autre motif ".17 Les abonnes aYahoo 1 s'eugagent au surplus ane pas
" enfreindre volontairement ou involontairement toute regie applicable
( ... ) de droit international ".I~ Malgre cela, Yahoo! a constamment refiJsc
de retirer de son service les contenus nazis. All cOlltraire, eHe a decide
d'autoriser ce type de ventes et a dcliberemenl choisi d'ignorer ses
proprcs rcgles cOllcernantles ventes illicites ou les contenus reprehensibles. II fait peu de dollte que Yahoo! a estime qu'ililli eiait economiquement avantageux de diffuser ces pages-la, compte tenu du trafK et des
revenus publicitaires qu'eHes generaient, tandis qu'eUe n'a eu aucun SCL'lIpule a bannir dl! meme service les ventes de hamsters ou de petites
culottes d'occasion. La societe a d'ailleurs recenunent supprime de sa
propre initiative les publicites pour des services de paris et autres jeux
d'argent, suite <lUX plaintcs de la ligue nationale de football amcricain (la
National Football League) qui mena9ait de cesser IOllie relation d'alfaire
avec Yahoo! .19
Yahoo! a affirme que ses actions ayant ete rcalisees aux Blals-Ullis,
eUes echappaienl nccessairement a l'applicalioll clu droit fraIl9ais.)O
Yahoo! a rattache son comportementliiigielix aux l~tats-Unis - liellX des
serveurs - afin de rejeter toule responsabilitc quant h la diffusion en
France de contenu nazis. Mais cc type d'argumcllt est denue de valeur au
regard des regles de competence de n'importe quel pays. La transmission
par Yahoo! de communications vers la France soumet necessairement Ie
comportement etranger ala loi frHl19aise. Que Yahoo! soil d'accord Oll
non nvec la loi franr;;aise, la diffusion commerciale d'objets nazis constitue une infraction en France. Le TGI a d'ailleurs precise que In simple

jl/ill

2000 .'

p.8.
16. hllp:llauclions.ynhoo.com/hlmllguidclincs.hlml (Ville 7 dec. 2000)
17. Yahoo! Terms of Service. § 6a <hltp:f/docs.yahoo.com/mfofICl'IllS>
18, Yahoo! Terms of Service. § 6k <hnp:lldocs.yahoo.comJinfoflerms>
19 ... Yahoo! dmp,I' Net gillllhiillfilld.\ ". USA Todav. 14 dfc. 2000
<11 IIp:llwww.tlsaloday.comlt i fe/cyber/tcchlcli9t4 .hlm>
20. 'J'GI Pari.\'. orrl. n[t:. 22 IIwi 2000.
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" visulllisaLio:1 " de ces objets en France $UlIisa:l AGl.J"aLleri:;er 1'I11fl:'clion,"

ee que Yahoo! sOllha:h1lt par-dc;;sus IOtll dans cene affaire, c'esl d'e!endre ia plOtoclion du premier nmcndemcnL de la constitution americaiI1C a i'ensemhle de sc-,'; ;1I'(j\'ile~ de pnr;e rnondz" ('1 en parliClllier da.ns ~s
adjvild~ sujeHes a COnlroversc:.. C',"S( dam celle oplique que Yllhao ! a
manifesteme!"H refusc d.; se t:onformcr ill'ordonnance inilinJe du LrilxmaJ
f1'an,ais t ,. En rlroil americalll, iJ ne iai! aucn)) dauLe que Yllhoo! avaiL 1e
droit d'exprimer de,,", jelees et des Lheses rcpl~,hensibles, M<lts 1X droit est
un droit territorial, que la cUllSlitULioll des Etats-Uois n'clclld pas lUl·dela
dc\:; frontier0s ameriCl1tOCS, C\ qui ne s'appJiquc certainemcm pas h la dif~
fllsion £It l)(Iges web~ fI des utilisatcurs f'rano;:ais, en France,
S'agis;::ml de lu eompclcncc d.:: Iribnnaux elnmgers ajuger les aetes de
Yahoo 1 inilics aux blalsnUnis, les circonstance.<; de l'aifaire militcnl for~
lemenl cn faveur d'uue tellc compctence pour 1m; jmidic:ions etrangcres:,
Yahoo ~ cherchait ase refugicl derri0re In localisalion gengraphique de
fies servenr&, JllillS la societe e!a!t IODlcfors pres(~Il!e de fn;;;on cOl~crete el
active dam; l'hcxagone, La s1rategie globale m61iculeuscment suivie par
Yahoo! depuis sa creation implique la recherche d'un publie monciaL A
de nombrenscs occasions, Yahoo ! ~'est ainsi presentee eOlTlmc " une
enlreprise mondialc de commUlllcalion, de COlllmen~e et tie media sur
Internel, pmposant ason enseigne un reseau comple[ de services it pIllS
de 120 millioll-S d'iHiiisaleurs par mOl<;, dans Je 1Uonde enlier »l."l. La
s;x;icle a presefllc sa slrategic ases actiollnaires en affirman1 que" Ie ser~
vice principal, www,yalmo.eom, cOflSlitue Ie modCle dc rCfc.renc(! pour
I'ensemble de notre resean dc serviccs lmel'l1eL de par Jc monde ""', Dalls
Ie, merne ordre d'idee, Yahoo! aanon;;;ail cncore dans un recent communique de presse que l'enircprise " s'attcle it l'elargisscl1lcnt de son impact
global ct amaintenil'!Ql p!')sition de leader mODdial ".z;Ceue strategie
inelnt d'import3nls profits direclement generes Cll France par ulle intense
aetlvlrc oconomique locale, Pour ('flnn&: 2000, Yahoo! a indlqne qne xes
" operation!> it l'cxiericur des }lla(s-Uni-~ ont repn?sen!e 15 % de~ revenw;
lOlan); t:uilsnlidc~, """, En pratique, Yahuo ~ be, dcti~m 70 (J{) de sa liha!c
f;anvaisc Yahoo Franee ct cxerec un conlrOlc coni in:! sur les aclivitcs de
ce[te demierc.f! Ell verlU de I'accord de licence pa!>sc entre la societcmere et sa filiale fraH>;:aise, Yahoo! Inc. dispose d'nn droil de regard sur
les liens rcalis6s apanir du service frall\.::ais, ainsi que sur une partie du
0..1ntcnu de celuiHci.~· Ceue merne licence oblige en outre Yahoo! Fnmee
amailltenirlln lien vcrs Ie servenr amerieain, L'cllsemhle de-res actions,
qioutc it Ja diffusion auprcs des utiliiKlteurs fnlll1J.aig de eonlenus illkiles,
!'n!1isaienlIargement ac{ablir Ia compe!ence du trlblmal parisien en vertu
de l'article 113-7 du Code penal.
L'argument de Yahoo ! contestant III competence des u-ibunaux
fran¥<lis <ftail d'flillan! plus maladroit que Yahoo 1 " profilail "Ie!; U!iliSli(ems fumyais aun de leur 11foposer der.. publit:iles ciblCe:O>,:N A parii!' du
momenL 0\1 Yahno ! diffuS3i1 des puhlici!e~ en frall'?li::;:1 ceil nLijjS<1ICUrS,
die pouvait diftkilclllenl prc!cmlre que son BerVlc-C d'enchcres nc
s'"drcssail (ju'a un publie americain, el nc ellert-hait pM 11 realise!' Ie
mOindn: prol~t sur 1e marche fnllii;aL~. En cffel, Yahoo! deciarait precjse~
menl dan!:> son rappott amme] glle -" Ia mi'ljenre partie de nos revetius pro"
\'iellJlent aelucUcmenl des:.ttL'Cords avec des mmonccUlS Oil (}'au[TC$ arraJ)gemcnts publicitairc;.; ",J) En sOllHnc, 1a diffusion des pages de \'entc!-i
d'objcls nazis assortics de publieHcs en fnm~ais pour un public fflw;ais,
faisalt bel ct bien parlic du modele eormncrcia[ de Yahoo!
Ufie 1'oi1> admise la compctence des lTibu1lJ:lUX fran~ais c( l'app)ication
de Ia 10i peJl('lJe frnll~aise. 11 teSlalL encore il determiner comment, en pm.
tigtlC, faire cesscr rjufraelioll en cause> Plnsicurs optioJls s'offraient nux
juges ; exigcr de Yahoo! {]U'CllCTCllrc pnremcnt et simpJcmcnt des ser~
VCUl'S a1l1r5ricnins de son sire d'cnchcrcs1e.~ pages concernanl des ot":lcts
21. TGJ furls, Nrl. ref., 2Z Ilia; 200{;.
22. TOl Pari::., Old. rC}:, 11 aniJ, 2000,
2-3. Ya//ov! "1;0" l(4ppor: 4f1!)Uc/ ;999 • Fonmdfdlv )(I·K, riff/OS! w1lm\I' ;I"

in Se(:wjlks and EXr1jj?IIKif C(!mmj!.rioll (SEC), 30 man 2Q(JO
<hnp:llwww.sc<.go.lJArchiv¢..;/edg.lr/daln! 10 II 00(1/()P{ID!l)2057·O(!..Q) 4598 ·ttl ,blml>

14. Yahoo'! 1/1e., Rapport amllwl 1999 - }~mJ/1I1(1if(: ]1J-K, dlp(wl! /luprh dc
Seem/tics a/ld ExdulIIgc Cpmmi,;siml (SI:C), 3D mars 2000
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FilJtllu;ia{ RestdlS ", ]() jmm 200/, hllp:iJdocs,y(iho'H;(l-m/~$I1wI4qOOpr.!ltntl
26. Cornmllr;iqw] de prast;: " )'ahiW! RVPf)flt Fl}urlh Qu(t11e'i Yew 1*~" 2()[J(J
Fhmncml Remlls ", JOjmm 200f. hltl,:lIdots,Y4h(lo.tol1lf!j(K,;fJprl4q00pr.h(ml
21, Yahoo,' 1m::,_ Rap/J{)lf'ilrlf1;tel 1')!N ~ FOJ~rrulaih! IV'A, ,tspns;i iJ!{P'WJ' dr hf
SCturil(¢$ ond il.'<dwllgt' (:(!mmis.~iOlt 30 mOl:; ;WOf)
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28.,YuiJoo.l/nc., /f.dppaf; fi(11lj(e/1997" n1rl!li/ib.i/f/, /(t·A. /omleXr,IQ,33 «,Ya}jq{li
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<lj{\p://www;t~-\-\twvlAr<::hll-'ef;!oogll1 {catAllOll (,'(J61(l{100912Q51·97·0I1353,(;>;!>
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t1a7.i~, ou hien ;ui demander d'en empechel' J'acd~j <lUX lnl(';m!ltllCS
flftnpis, C'est la secoudc voic, !a voie la moi)'.:> reslricl]HC!, qui a >ite
preferec par Ie 1'01 dam SOH ordOllnance tin 2l mai 20{)0. CeHe injtt,cfion n'exigcail cepcndant pas de Yahoo ~ qu'cllc melle en pJace un 5y~le
me lolalcmcnl lnfailJible, ef la justice DC ramah cCI'l-ain(';mem pas ienue
pour respuDsable dalls Ie;; cas marginaux 0:) des lllilisaleur" lluraiell!
volollfairemen~ cO:llOurne k mecanisme de flltrage :lfin d'acc&ler aux
pages illicites. Lc tribunal S'csl en e!fel bome 11 exiger un !\iveau flIiso!J"
Hable de confOfmiH! au droil fran.yills, en admeHant nntammenl daIlS:'(I
decision que Ya:lOo ! n'auraii it exdure de son service que les pages d'ohjets presCJl!ls par leurs vcndeurs cornme ctant d'originc nazie.
"Nous demander de, filtrcr lfacces anos sites en fouction de IlllHl!iollalile des internaUlcs c:;l1Jes nall ',)1 dcdarai( neanmoins Jerry Yang, j'un
des co-foudateurs de Yahoo ~, arguanl de rimp0s-l>ibilite H1'itcrielle d'a))pliqucr j'ordonnallce flu TGI. L'anogance et In mauvaise foi de eet arga"
ment n'a cependanljXlS cchappe aux jugcs frauyai!'. ayaJH comaalc que
Yahoo! n'avaiL par l:lilleurs aucun mal aimpJanler Ie meme Lype de mtres
s'agissant de pen;onnaliser la publici1C SUI' les pagcs consullie- par del)
FraJ19ais. Malgn? tm:L, en rcponsc a}'argumcn1 d'impos;>ibiIite mil) en
evanl par Ya!ma !, Ie 1ribullainomma Iwis cxperlS ann de sc prononccr
~ur les capneiles de,; h~cimiqlles de filtrage aetueHes. Ces demicr$ onl
condu a l'impossibilite de garantir un tiltrage Ii 100 % dc-s ioternautes
fnUl~ais, mais onl ('-slime qu'cnviron 10 % des intcrnautes (ranyai::; etaicnl
directement identifiables commc tels par 10 biais de lcur fOllrnisl>cur
d'acccs ct de Jeur adrcsse IniemCl Prolocol OP), tandis que Ie reste des
utihsaleurs a J'orlgine mnbigue poulTaien! faire I'obje! d'llll~_ declaration
volontaire de nalionalitc afin d'acc6ier au service, Au tOial, Ie-s experts
onl considere qoe i'applicn1ion conjointe de ces differclltes !ccbniqnes
permeHraill'identifica{ioll de 90 % des in!ernHutt~" fnu19ais. Enfi;1, k tribunal a note qo'mlcune preuve ll'avait etc rapportee de ee qU'oll lei mecanisme de filtrage cau:;craille moindre prejudice financier pO~lr Yahoo 1
Au final, lc tribunal parisien ,,'est horne Ii exif,l'r cle Yaho\) I qu'cllc t(''; ..
peele la ill] fn-tJl~luse dans "CS W:livi:es cl)l)lJ)lerciaJes {J'Hn.,.-!li;;e;;. A 1;1
suite de cellc decision de[avomble, la societe eaHfornicnne a chercM
d'au1res moyens de contestcr l'tm!orite des .luges fraot,:''li;..
En decembre 2000, cUe a saisi aeel effel un tribunal americaill J:\lin
d'obtenir tmjugement deelaratiffaisant obstacle al'execution de la decision fran~ai.sc sur Ie telTtlOire des Etats~Unis?j L'o-rdollllance do TGl
ayant ctc prise dans Ie cadre d'une infraction penaIe, cctte nouvelle
demarche judiciaire de Yahoo 1eonS{iLuait mains une dcmru'che juridique
qu'llue operation de relations publlques, Ell effel, les tribun3U); nmcri·
cains reje1tent lraditionncllemellt lcs demandcs (l'exeeu1ioll de decisions
etrangeres en matiere penale,
Acelie occasion, Y8hoo ! s'es.t mot)lftC particulicremenl evaSive
cOlleemaut]<I nHlure n~elJc des at.liv/IC~ nYflllt donne lieu au litigc, 50ilia
pllursuite rlclibCrce d'un modele eco!)omiqoc il)cllwnL la mise cn vel:1e
d'objels n~zl$ dans ie mnr.dc- cn1.lcr, y compris CJ, Fram~e, J..-es conclu~
sions dC1-1()sees par Y~\hoo ! dew)f1t Ie jugc nmericaln Will d'aillellfs
vagucs, 'loire aj)ocryphes danl; !cur description de In dCdsion dtl TGl. La
societe -a ell eifel nff1rmc qt\'c-lle ne dif:-posail d'auclll1 patrimoine ell
France et qu'en consequcnce, I'ordonnance n'etait susceptible d'elre exeentee t]u'aux Elals-Unis, YllllOO ! s'esl a10['$ bien glinJee de dire {ju'clle
ctall propJielaire de: 70 (til dl! capital de Yahoo! Prance ct tIne ceHe J'ilia]e
lui reversait Ngulicnt:ment des royalties en verLll du contra! dc licence
passe exis!ant entre .DUX ~ au(ant de sommes pouvan1 servir un j><lie.mem
en 'France dcs d01l1mages-intercls cl1Hnen~!cs eventuels~.
Enfin, Yahoo J estime que III constitution amerieainc reghl'cnsemble
de ~ activj~e..;;: mondiales landis que Je jugemenl fralV,;ais en viole Ie premier amendemcnL Pourlant, s'agissflIll d'acliviles llltemallonales, tl()Wm~
mclll sur Intcmet, meme Ies 1r;bullaux amcricaius Ollt employe de:; reglcs
de competence el d'applieation de 1a loi 'amerientHC similajres acclles
appliquCes par Ie Tal dam; ceUe affaire.

B. ·l)e,~ Mcisions amcricuIJ)(ls similaires~n maiih'c de emupetenct'
infernalionale sUI'lnterue(
En depit de l'oppositlon fureen&: de Yaboo Jit 1a competcnce des juges
1'l'anr;ais, ceUe,·d ne contredil en rien les principes l:Ipplique.-fi par Jcs cours
amer[caiues [ace it ee Iype de litiges. Du fait du earaclere federal des
'Etll!S-J]nis" ~es tdbXIl:u\l~X SQut_mu:6c:ulierem;;nl habhucs ,au regferne111Jjc
'eonflits de lois el de juridictions dans des jjliges 0ppOSlllll des partles d'e..
talS dincft}n1$, l.-a conSJit\-ltion amtl'icaine exig-e que l,'cx.ercicc par un e.tat
de'.~a.'cojfipelen~c judicJ~irc sur j.)Il ressorlissant,d'tm (tu1re Cl/ll so)c"-rai31.1lrial! 4"'13, Ow

IU'IPll(nis YII!irm:,il,DNei, lOfJ.or.! 2fJO(;.
;12, }'alW(J/ JilL 1,1.</ UgHt' rollfl(i If' md:iI>lt! 1!11'(mii~rJmil;ifIJ?"l)ockJ COO·2J2'!.f,
I>I,/), Ca', Compl. jilNt2-1 rli'fc,.2[)(Jtl

sollnable cl jl1SIC " ~ l'egard d~l de!endcuL ,l Selan iajurlsprudem;c trm.li·
liollllclle, ccl1e COlllpClcnce - (lite do; " bras.iong" e~l rais.ollnable c;
jIlS[C des tors que Ie dcfcmJcur a entrepris tine activile dclibCrce dans ;'e~

direclion de !'(~tai tlu for". La cour acceptall par-1ft la ih"':orlc dilC des
"e.ffets " lui accordant cCJ1lJ:xElence des lors que l'aCie litigieux <WHIt ell

du for. Dans In m~sure uu b dl'fendcm" clranger" n vOlonta;remenl
decide de tirer parti de:; opportunitcs offerles dans eel CUll, scs tribunaox
onl competence pour conll<il\)'c des litigcs is:;;ug de scs ac!lVltes, Cl une
delCnniulllion pnSalablc releve de leur appreciation sotlVCra!11c.
Si InLcll1l~1 He feme\ pas CIl cmlk0 cc prillcipe, [1 cn rend nC[1Hmoj~lii rapp:ication pl1.:5 dclicBte, En pal1icuJier, plusll~urs tribumHix un! ell adetcrnlincl\ ]lon sans mal, si lel site web «vnit deliberemcnt "dem.u'chc " l'clilt
du for, 01.: 5i son <leI/vile daus eel. cHIt etaiL residuclle ou farlUilc. Ainsi, dc
llombreusc;) ,lffaires rC,ccU1menl portees d(!Vanliu jUMice americainc OIl!
~opte une ppsition similairc accltedu 1'01 dans I'affaire Yahoo L
Dans llne affaire pe.nalc parl1culicrcHlcllt imcrel:isanlc, People 1'. World
ifltcractiw Gamin,;; Cm1wrafiol!, I. un tribunal new-yorkais a trace les
limiles rerritoriales a l'HpplicHtkm du droit de l'elaL de New York d,IHS
une alfllire de casinos vinuejg. LC$jugcs oul en effet ordonne 11 un casino
de I1le d'Antigui:t de ee$$Ci' d'offrir SC$ :;ervi<;C.'l, via Internet, Zt dl.~.s !ulbitunIs d.;: J'etflt de ~cw York car leI> je:m: d':1rgent, parfni(cmcnL licites fI
Antigua, SOUl pwhib6 !JHr Ie droitllcw-yorkais, Lc lribull<11, cherchant
untien enlre I'aetivilC liligicllse ct r..!lal dc New York, J'a tfOuve dansla
rela1ion elroilc,cxistam entre lccrlsiuo d'Anliguae1: Si:\ socicle~lnc!'e ayi\!i\
son siege aux ElmS~Unlg, justifianlail1si la competence du (rlbun<)} He\\'yorkais. Ce scenario est en tons points sembIable it celui d.e Yahoo! car
la societe ealifornierme, qui entrelient des mpporlS elrnil$ avec sa fiiinic
fmnyai,<:e a volontaimmcntdelnarehC les intcmaute::; fram;ais, Hi., dans les
deux affaires, Je service imcmcl eu catISC etait licite dans Ie pays abrilan!
Ie;; serveurs, rnai:; illicite dans l'elal destmalaire du service.
Un cas de figure simih,ire n doonc lieu rtumment a un luigc en
maljhe~ de <In)jls de proprletc )nlelleeluelle Dan~ J'affl1ire TIt'Fllliefh
ern/1ft)' ]:<JX v. iCrfH'eTEc()mJ~ , une societe cnnadierme rcdiffusuit stir Ie
web, S;:1:t5 Rucuue lU;!orisatiou prealllbJe. oo!laincs cmissions de teI6v15:01: dilTtbCes mIX (;;a!~,Unis par de!> chaines <um~ricllincs, mills cnptec"
de l'aul!'!: cote de kl hQnliere canadiellne p:tf lefavc'IV Au Canada, Otl lc
she web etait base, ce precede de " webcasting" cta!! scmblcwl-i! lielle,
Mal;; aux Dtats,l'nis, 00 tOtH luremame pouval1 acceder ace service, ces
rclfflllslni;;sions porlaicnl a:tcinle IIUX droits del) chaines de telcyislon
aim! pira!et:s, en "crlu du droit d'aulcur amerieain. Le tribunal ameneain
lmisi de Ja plflintc rendit une injonction Im5liminaim interdlsau! a
iCraveTV de diffuser cc:.; en:ussjoni\ ades utllisuteurs mnericains, queUe
qn'cn soH la Iieeite au regard du droit canadien, Tout conlJ:lte ie TOI dans
I'affaire Yahoo !, le tribunal amcl'lcain a HillSi estimc gue c'etai! a la!Oj du
lieu de reception de n£gir l'acti\lllc etnUlg~'e e~ que Ia simple l'ediffosiofi
vel'S les EtMs-Un;s suffiSflit adonner competence auxjuge~ all~ericains.
Tou\cfois, avail! que l'uffaire ail pu donner Ik'U nnn jugc.mcnl au fond,
iCr;lveTV n prcfcre fransiger avec 1cs phdgnanls l1mericajn~ el s'est
engage II cesser loUIe redjffu~iofi d~~ pmgrammcs. aJll(~ricajns.""
Dellx affuires en droit des marques ont cga!emem donl1elicu & des
solutions analogucs. Dans hI premierc, Playbo,V Emerprises, inc, v,
Chlu:kkben)' Pub. iI/c n, Ull tribtlnal federal de New York 11 rendu une
injoncltuu inlerdis<\111 l'utiliblllion de la mHrque " Playmeo " par une
sociele italicnne e:diuic(; d'ull Illllg!lzine IHaseulin accessible depuis
rltalie allX EllHs-Unis via Ie web, Dans cellI.! an~'lirc. Ia societe
ChuckJcbeny avaH Ie droit de publicI' le magazine Play men en Ilalic,
mai$ la,lusuee funericainc lui aVJlit interdlt dans le passe de distrihuer son
maga'Line aux Blats-Vnis en raison du risque de confusion avec Ia
mmque Playboy, ChllckJeOOI1Y:l alo!','; mis en place un sitc web base en
Italic el en a failla promotion auprcs d'utilisateufs all',criCaltls. NOll sans
rappelex Ja decision du TGI, lc tribunal new~y(H'kais a o1'dol111e a
Cfmcklebt~rry d'emp&:her I'aeces des u(ilisateurs .amerieaius ;L son silc
web. Dans la secoude affaire, Prmavlsfoulllf'l, L.P. v. Toeppen'\ une eotil'
(j';l.pl'el tCdcrale II con;;iMre que The1'J}en, un resident de l'HHnois ayall.l
curegistfe Ie 110m de domaine de la mnrque Palla.vision dans son ei:al de
resldcnce, elajt l)CamnOillS soumis a lIt eomlJ.CiCnee d'un tribuna! califOftiicu, La cour a cslhr\6: qu'eUe aUffllt competence pour c-onnallre du lilige
s'il pou\,Elit atre fait 61tH" d'an pen plus fqll'un simple site "veb passifj
pour dernO(itlCr que Ie defendear oricnlait volomalrcmenL ses cffoJ1s ell

Prise:: dans leur enscmble, ees decisions mciten1 eu evidence le principe de la protection de fa CI)Il)pctence 1t,rrl!oriale sur InterneL h Dam; la
l11CStlle 0\1 m: site sollklk delibcrClMlll des ulilisaleurs dati!:' Ul) a.t!1n
etal, eel cHIl a ll;HnreUeme[ll competencc pour eOBllail.re du iilige ct pollr,
ie eM &:hemH, decider de In !iccite du service an regard de la loi dn for. Si
b:m Hombre des affa~res precilees visait if 1a prolcc\ion de droils de pro.
pric\c inlcllC'clllclle, lC$ quclqnc;.; aulres affaire.!> de bonnes mreurs iudiqUCUl m~anmnhls que Ie mcmc principe a vocation 1"1. :;'appUqucr 0j) mali~
to d'ordl'c public. Le~ Lribunaux SI? dcclarcnt alors competent:; pour pmegcl' lcs regIe;; d'onlrc public. Dans. ee contexte, J'ordonnmK'.C fnmy:li;:e
eonslilUc uli excreice ordinaire. d1lLl pouvoir judiciairc toU( aussi COUffiLt
HUX Elats-Unis:!iO
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II. - VERS UNE [)(cMOCRlITISATlON DE L'ARUlITECTliRE
DlJ [U;SEAU
Alor.~ qu'lnLernel, longtcillps phenomene essenlie:lemeLl! amcricnin,
revel Hne veritable dimension intcrnatiollalc avec dl~sormais moi»:; d'ult
fiers d'mjlisa(eun: ' e! l110ins de la moilie des pages41 proven3nl de:;;. l~!aL$
Unis, I'affaire Yahoo! souligne forlemenl les enjeux que sont la demoCralic c{ Ie pluralislIle sur Ie reseau mondial. LOJ'squ'un pays d6moc(i:\tiqne, coltsiittltif d\lI1 mareM ccol1omiquc non-negligeable, exigc des
c))l!'epJisesdlJ Net qHidlc.~sc mcltenten COnfWOlile avec son droillocal· tm
cnsemble de rcglcs jUlidiql1cS librcmenl choisies par Ie pcuple via ses repre.
~en!ants . mais exige e.ga!emenl que 1a technologie SOll!i~jacellle rcnde
ceHe confonnitc possible, Ie developpemenl de l'infra:>trucillrc du resea\)
s"cnl.nmvera nliccssairelllcllt a!Teele. L.es EUils prouvent aillsi qu'i1s cxistent loujtmrs dalls Ie cybere.."p.ace, !l'en de.plaise aux "separalisles d\l
rtseau ".
Le monde des infol1l1aliciens a, oans nne gramJe mesure, dCfinil d'imporlan!c;; ;'cgk:; pour la ::locie!:> :l'infonrw!ion fL tr.il\·crs des dcci~j\ll\~ L~t
des choix techniques c; $;1,n5 (l.1H:Hnc inlerVcl:l.iml jJojiliqatO'''. L'aHait"
Yahoo! remet en Qtusc celie eht! de fait en resl.lt'.lallt cc pouvoir normiJ!if
;lux represenwnts politiqtlcs, Elk sonJigne egalementle risque que pI en..
!lent Ics entIeprises qUl emploient des technologies ne lemm( fA'lS compte
des droits nationaux, e1 incite par~ja au devcloppemem de IlouveflUX produits el services ell eOnf0l111ite avec ccs droit!>. Les enlJCprjses de In nouvelle economie c1 105 architectes du reseau serom ains1 comraints de
prendre en compte les differences de valeurs puhliques d'un pays
l'aulre.
La respoHsaJ:!ilisation de Yahoo! 3l11itrc dll droit Ir.myais, lout COlome
I'Hpplicalion par les trihullallx amerlcnins un droit americain a l'egard de
sHes etrangcrs. favorisenl ja democmtlsation d'In(ernet dims sa tXmflgl,lration Cl dans son [O))ClrOnnemenL CeUe d&:isloli impoSt hI IceoJ)j:t\issanec des wlleurs publlqnes adoptee:; daos differents eHds. Ene encoura ..
ge enrin Ie develuppcrncnl tic moyens techniques pClmetWnl tl ces
valeurs d'G-tre prise;; en consjderation dam, l'infmSI!lJcture dn r~ttt

a

A. ~ Lp:> "lJleut's IH1bIiqtws integl:t~t:s;j 1',tn:h){,wiw'('d'jnll'l1)(:!
L'aJfaire Yahoo! illustre bien 1e [{Ii! que eerlaines vuleurs pubJiqucs flU sens Ie plos large, c'esl-a-dire ;nclUt1!)l le-$, valeuts $ocJoc:uhurellcs,
philosoplliques, politiqm'ls, j\lridjqIlCf> cl mornle5 - Sail! implantecs daBS
l'architC'.c!ure actuelle d'In!emcl. Yahoo; it chel'chii, eJ)somme, age refllgier derriere les protocolc.-: techniques du reseal! Mn d'ech.1ppt~r it sa responsabilitedu fail de ses iletiyileS internalionales. En efiet, elle argumen~
lait devanl Ie TGl qn'cllen'etait pas en )Ucsme, leclmiquemell!, de refuser
l'aeees des intemautes fratl\l1is du fail de l'indetermination geographique

:l9:I'fesTfI nOierq\;CI;rrojCi'(lcl;(S~V;;Uirm de Lfi H;"ye rdative h Ie C01:Jp;!tenc<.·,
jurldictio!llltllc in!ernationille dlcrche b 6wbJir une \cria de jlrillciJl(.'~ Jj(tmif.llu nlv\'!ilu
intc_fIlatipnal. Tou!efois. )'o)lpositiollllcIUelk des Erlllll-UJli~ "(lmp!o:ncl f>(lrk.1)s-emen!
l'at!\DVl.IJlir;m de cc projct.
40.. G-cH"yr:!liqllc i1 (l'll111c\lfs.% o!1icicllcnt{)U\ tnt6rincc j)M!eM Elall1·Unls dal!~ b:l.
rlke))/e lui ;'i\1r 1r. pro!I.lC!1tm U(~~ dl)l\Jlecs jM,L'SOJlllcl!es dCll)ineors sur lnt~lilel- Ie ChillI
Onlinc Privscy ProlCclioll Acl· q()'1 S',IEPhque c~alcm(Jrti a\lX .site!\. c1nl.ngcfs recolLarn
des bfollnilljoll-s pCl?ollJ)c!le~ 'Iupr,.~ de wmeu!'s SUI Ie Ic,l'iloire mi)f~1calll.
VoirJ5 USc. §6502{J){A){iJ

41, CybeJ'A$los, The World's Oilline Poplf!aflon:;, :; fiyr, lOO/
11l1p:lkybuatlllsJ ntemct.c(H))lbjg_pic\tJj'l1geogrHl)hic~!lIrtjdefO, 1323599.1 1_15115 J,0
ii.lI1!l)1 (proYDyam que ,:wx lien; dc~ iut('fl1(111tC,~ serOl1\ en de!lor~ des 131ats"Un)~ ell

:2(02).
42,55% ofu!l )f(w/dwj(it web Itqirk comcs:ji(Hl! nmsidl.! lllf' {lnill'd Stn/I',I,

WcbS,'d.:SfPC\\ ·23 Jml)'. 20()}.

llttp:;l!Jvw\V,~~bfo,\dCiIOfY<Wll;fc'!J'leDJ.dm'!Pi!""3&V!{,,:I{){i0{){1OO0<}(1{}f4
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t;J ("Y/H!(,rp(lc('. 1999 !

A(1liJcw Sllflpi/tJ, nit' {,im:ml !?{11\?l!tIl(J/! ; flo!\' ff1~ fll({,)1lf!lls PJlfting Peopic ill C!w/'/it
lmd ClJan£ing H,(' mllM 1\0 Kllom, 1999 .. Nl!il WrillMor/: NJJlam:l, (.'Y/;(,(S{!{/(Y.' 2,(J, 7Y
1cx(ls L R<'1'" 447. 2(JtJO t lod t(, /?'cWen!Jo8' U\' /"IiUJlWI(t'(/ .' 'Thi' 11.'111JUIlililln d
irijol'Jlitlfioll );h/ity RuleN lilfOUgh 1tr1mo}{}s.\\'/{; Jr.m; ~L /(fL 553, 19M;,
•

des tfansferls de donnees $,;1' 11l[Crn:::L'< Cet nrgul11cnl i!lustre mieux que
loul au!re a que] poinl certainli rar!i.~ pris d'onire techniquc OlH l)loue}e
les regies de condullc slJr Ie ni;can et lcs regles dc:; flux d'infonn[ltio!ls.
I.c:' r?ogles-des d'ordre teelmoJog,ique On! totllt,fois etc fone-ment
intlllencees paf les valeurs RllI.criC:'lines e: cclh:$. des" hCptH'Ullstcs du
ffSe<!ll ". En Pfntlcl.lHcr, le premier <'lm. . ndemcill de )'1 con.)(iLution ameri::uine, invoquc par Yahol) " joue UII rOle :mp0r!iml {ialls I'al'chitecture
.(IClUeJk d'Imcmc-1 en ('e qu'il consacre Ie prillcipe fondamcntal (l'UJl~ Gil~
cul<ltionlti)ft; C\ aniOllOl1JC des informttlioJ!s. De fa)'ol1 similaire, lc~ scpa~
ratislCS dn rescan om qUllnl a eux pour ow d'ordre ,. l'infonnJlion
dC-Illandc a eln: Ubii,'; " (" lnfol"lnlllioll wanl:-; !o b0. frel.~ 'V' Ben Lm.nk,
rUll ct,,» expel Is lechniqih..'!S cOllsuli!!s par Ie TGl 00 Paris, i\ ci'ime haut et
fort (:CUe philosophic, en dedaranl par aillcl.:rs ; " Cc qui fait l'objet du
Mbal, c'eSI HttCmJemcllt ce tjl,lC pcnselH les indi','idus. Personnc llC
dcvrait cOllhtller ee :!ue je ,~ais ou !,.·C que je pen!)!.'. Ni r(~\a!' 11i la Po:icc
de la Penscc, ~i Iml famillc,!li IllCS limi:;:, Intcrne.!, C'CSI j'information ~
i'elltl pur. "l' Lauric elllcdne ainsi la libcr::e d'expression it l'americaine,
par opposition aux l'eg!e<; Juridiqncs de son proprc pays, Ie Royaullll>'
Unl. lI

L"lhcorlc an)eficniric de la lill!c circulation de i'information aPfJa!ail
enl1lignmc dans k~ modalit6s tccimiquco; de Inmsmission des donnees
:fur lmerneL L'an:hilccture actuelle du reseall ignore volontairelHen! los
consideralioll$ dC', distance ou de l(lcl1lisation goographique s't1gissalll de
t~an:"mjshi(lns d'informatlonI< Ces lfan&mi$sion~ reposenl stir um: technique de commutalion des donnees. par paquels el sur J'uiilisalion
d'.'ldrc$scs numeriqtteS C()nnucs SOliS Ie rom de" lntcruet Protocol ", ou
ad;csscs IP. Celi nmnclos, nn pcu comme un nnmcro de tt'lcphQl1e, PCI'M
mb!!cnt In commtlHUion des bits de donnees d'nn pl.)iut araulre du re&0<lU.
En vellu du protoco\c de commie des lransmissi(}n,~, ch.aque message eS1
ainsi sdnde en plusicurs pdilS !h1quels dcdoonees qui voyagent imJcpen.
t.lammenL ,~ur Ie reseal! avanl de se regrouper it I'adres!'c dc destination
aib de reco!lslilUer Ie message originaL Ce schema a pom efrct d'evller
:;)HI nb:;l;u::e .11<l1r<t11:'1l1Isc,ion d'ur ;)Cinl ;\ l"ilUI!\\ t'l a
dcw]oppc p;·8·
dsemcnt en vue de reduire all maximum Ies barricres a la libre dreula~
Lion des donnees s).;r Ie rcs~al1, ~uivanlla philo!'ophie amenclIine dc la
Eberle d..:: l'iuformlliion ella vision l>cpanl1iSle du rescal! mondiaL Mais
ees valeurs liOl1S~jacentes ne rcJ1clelll pas du tou! Ies LMorics- plus
nuaneees de lu ·}ibel1.t>. de l'iliformation presenles dans d\m!res dcmocrarics, qui comme 1e rappe:][e lit decision fnlll\;aise, 1)'Onl pdS Ill/e v;l>ion
aussi expllll::ive de 1a libcrle d'exprcssion que les Etats·Unis,
Par aiHeu!'.<:, !'architecl11re actuelle d']nlcrnet integrc des regles relatives aIn cireuliltion d'il1fonnruioll qui vom dans le sens d\lne aU[fH.'cgnhltioll e: de la librc delcrmina!ion (iu marche, par opposjJjO)1 <tux rnode"
publies de regnhILir,ln. En l'cla! <letue! des c11O"e5, les rne!hodes Jmblkitairl,\<; sur Intcl1)cl reposel)\ sur un clhlagc de.<; ulili::mc\\I"S, avec une lfCS
1ilibJe JliIrticip!llioll de I'utilisatcur lui-mcme. Cc ciblagc requierllil collecte ct Ie proJ!!;lge d'lwe impofllHllc qthHltiti5 d'infonnlHioJ15 pcrBonnelles. Les prolOcolcs de tr;t!)sT))b~ioll penr:eltcnt avec tlne j~icili1C .::mis·
s!\r.te de roc;Jltcr ees informatiolls persoJlll.el\cs ~ l'insu de j'Ulili;;aICllj', A
titred'excmplc, uc-puis que l,\ Ic-t-hnique des <, cookies" c!4! dc\'enu JllleliX
cunnllC de.~ l\!ilisateurs, denombreilX sl!e$ web les Ollll'0mp~aCc!i pur des
pixels cspions ou« web bug~ "." Aux Ei<l'.s-Unis" laloj pose lL'Cs peu de
contrainte..s jlllX nielbodes comlllerei'i1cs el ~C$ ,)utils techniques tels le-.s
cookies elIes web bugs SOil! devenlls monnHie {;OUHiIlIC. Totnefois hI
poliHqllc <lloedcfline- ell favell!, de l'autoregnlu(ioZl en malie,!'e de donnees
lX';I'bOnneUcs V<l al'eneo!l(rc de celie des lUl1re.,> pays: oc-cidenHiux qui Olll
adople des JOtS sl>6cifique5 prolegcanlla vie prlvee eli lant que dmtl fon~
damenUIl.;\< Malgrc tout, Ie:; protocoJes actuel.~ (I'lnternet favoriscnt l'''PM
proche du mar-ehe iu!)crkrun au dCtlimcnl des lcgi~lUljnns adOj)h~eS (hillS
les ;mlrcs pays.
S'agissanL de lUl)fOprJctc illtellee!uclle, Icsreg!es <Ill rcscau $Oul ega lemcnl de plus en pIu?: problcl1HIL19ues. Les titulairc.s lmdilionnc!s de droi!s
de proprietc inlell\'clUeHe aux Btats-Unis on\ reUSS) 3 fdrc ilLlcgrer de~

()ulils dc protlX:ion de c'es dTOils daoii ccrla:r:s aspecl," de J'urcl;iteclnre dll
ni-<,eau.'" Les idenllfilln;~ nlllfjnCS lets que Ie aUlD de Microsofl, par
cxem])ie, penTlc[fC:Hl d;: " lalone!' " un logidcl nlin d'cn limiler l'usllge a
Ull :.culvrdina(cuJ idcnlifi,j ()lI ptWf en sllrvci1!cl l;) J.j;-,triimtio!1. Ai in~'el"
SC, les liei):;,rati:;tc,~ du 1l:.~l:au on! dcvc!o[Jpe [e~ logicicls acode source
otlvel1 (in "open !>ource ", nnn de f,lire 6.:hec ,1llX syslemc::, J)ropriel<lII'CS
0xislan1;<;,;;;1 il cx.Jste en cc momcnlllil mmlVemcnt de contestation a rene
contl'C de nCANN . f!rgaLlisme chargi de la gcslion des l10ms de
dnmainc-;; - du fliil de sa poiltiquc d'aUribulioIl de noms de domaincs.
favorls,ml induIIlc1l1 Ic;; titu!alrc~ de marques."
Pour Yahoo J CO;l1me pour leS sepamtistcs flu rcsC<l1.l, Ie.'; y,lleUI'S
publiljues inC(}!p0Hfcs it i'inffafitI'llCItIl'C techniquc dll r-c~au garantlsse:1t
U:1C certainc preeminence de In phi!o~ophjc am~sicaine c( eu parti pm,
pl'O,m;lrchc sur Ie resc,;\l, au deLrimcn1 dc toule aUlre approclie.
Cepcndanl, il esl iIlusoil'e de croire qllC l'ilJ{ielerlll!nallOn geographique
des InlOsmissi0ns sub);islCra et qu'Imemc( esll'informa110ll it fe-WI plll'.
1J:~ efforts Icgislatlfs c! I» pression du marchc son! deJa en train de chnligel' lu face d'ln!ernel. Le~ lilulaires de dl'oil de propl'icle illtel1cCluclle
n'ont aUClln scrop\lle it nkinmer un elargisscmenl de leur::; droits quiHe 11
cxclure l'neces d'aUll'l~s personnc5 a l'infonnaliou';. Lcs modele." CCOl;Omiques du Net \'onl qUilllt II enx dans Ie sens d'ullc pluii grande lo(;alisa~
lion des u{i\isateu!'s, adc.,> fins de cihlage m:lrkeling el de pcrsomlilHsH~
tion des ~crvices. n ll'y a pm; de rcg1c;;; cJ'arehilec1H!l.: qui sont immnahlcs
sur h:lcmel; c[ de fail, ceconstat a inspire une hriHante reflexioll du l)ro~
r~;:seur Lurry Lessig ;;lU Ia Capacil!! de l'i~ta! it rcglemeuter ci sur les
moyens de retraduire )es valenrs conslilulionnelles c!assiques dHn~ Iii
reglclllentatioll dn cyberespace~-'. Lessig estimc que" l'open sonrce ", par
OPPOSilioll all codc pl'Opric~aiJ1~, rooui! 1a cap'lei!e de nilal i1 mc\ll'e des
obiigaliolls a In charge de.<; dtoycns. Ced rcnetc bien Ie eoncept separntiste d'ullc gOllvernance sui gencris du reseau. ParailelclllC'j'll, l' " 0pCll
source" constitue lIll det) i\ Ja prooominance de l'approche wJxIJatislc. Si
I'opell cortI' POUlTtlil en !heorie compiiqucr 1<1 tikhr: de ;'Etat dans le
cOlltr(\lo (b, :::yriades de progran;mcuf;, i\\I(dur (:l! 1l1Ol\dc, il f',hll'nlil
tou:efois iui facililcf III tache en Ini permcll:1nt d'imposer l'implil:ltO-liQIl
de cerlains modules logicicls dans les produi!s 01 ~!vice$ dislrihucs sur
SOil tcrritoiro. Ce.:i csl un hon Cx.cmllJe d~ Ia fai;oll doni ie." approche~
aJltl\gonistes peuvent-coexister dans nne archileC!l.lre de 11fuc.."H!.
13. - L'amrmalion du p(}U\'oir ctatique dans la protection des
valeurs ltwllks:
L'oll'nir-e Yahoo! favorhe fortemcnt Itt demoeratisaliou du de\'eIopp,,~
mCHI lecilnologiqllc, ail}sl que Ie plui1tlisme culture1 sur InlemeL Jusqu'a
prcsent, le~ scparatis[ef dn rcseflu on! ell plus 011 moins- cli!'le blanche
iJour deril:ir les fcg1cs de J'illffflstructure d'llltcmei. Les jll'incipttlcs dedsions tedmiquc.s on! e!e prise!' sekm un modele llmcfitflin. Yahoo!.1
ch.;rchC UCOIl\(.'stc-r hI leg:timhe~meJlle de In ioi elrnngcre ell argumcll"
lau!, $lifiS sue!;?':>, qu'elle devmi~ cIte uffl'ul)c])je de {(julIO rl.':~pons,tbiIlte
pour $C~ .fh.:(i\'11es Illternmionaies du fail de la relalive indclemlinll.tlon
gcogtaphiqt1e de.~ trnnsllllssLOllS sur hll~~nle1. En n::jcUlnt eel argument, 10
lri!J:.u)al parisien <tff1nnait de f:t\.(on daire- que dans tine socielc dcmocratiqtlC, les enlreprises de 1a nou\'l.'llcCcol1omie 11'()Ht pas Je pOl1\'oir de supplllmer la rcgle de dro;l choisie par les ciloYCJ)s. Ainsi, ie plurnlisme
dcmOeflt!iquc cst renforce sur Internet en ce qn\l1w tcUe M.zi~ion incite
au dcvcloppcmcnt demoyel\S Leehno!ogiqllcs permcHZllli achaque

ruM

d'l!I;pIiquer WII propl'C droit,
En resPQmmbjlisfl!1( Yahoo !, la Fm_nce -exhol'te Ics ftclent's de la nOll·
velie r.conomie $OUhllilanL dCinarcbe.r Ics in[emaute;; rran~l!is MreCOIl·
nilllre JBS \'alCllf." pubHques fnUlyaiscs, Anne epoquc ou le-s site,$ nC-o.naris (nigrcnt vcrs les Eltlts~Ll:-.is afill de bCneficier de Ia protection que
lc premier amclldcmenl accorde meme ,[lUX (Iiscoul'$ baineux'\ cettc responsabiHsalion l'uppcUe a qui vellt fentendre quc Ja Frnnce n l'in[cnLioll
de preserver SOil ordre public, dont Ies contours om ele d~finjs demoeJ'<t
HquemcnL Ceuc sanctio)) en venu d'l.I11 drnilllJtlot!ul renllC par-Iii 1e
M
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poinl d~ vue des scpnralisfes du resl'au scion icquelle monde inform<ltique est seul a mellle de definir la regie du jeu sur Intemel pour la
Soeiele de l'Informalion, Pnisque les regie:; d'ordre technique ne sonl pas
immllables, la respnllsabilis<ltioll it I'echelle locale des acleurs d'lillernel
pennel aux Etats de .iouer lin rble dans la definilion des va leurs SOU5jacentes aI'lll"chill'Clme liu resean. La decision Yahoo I incite indeniablement ala reconnaissance des lois nalionalcs democraliq\lG~.
D'un point de vue normalif. la possibilite pOllr un droit national de
sanetionner un comportement local sur Internet pousse ala mise en place
d'unc forme de scctorisation du rt\~eall afin de n~glemeJller les conlellllS
au regard des dillerents droits nalionauxY Afin de se prelllunir eonlre
unc eventuelle responsabilite, al'instar de Yahoo !, les entreprises du Net
devronl revoir leur politique et faire quclques reamenagements dans \cur
structure tant organisationnelle que tectmologique. Rejetant Ie caractere
immuabJe de I'indeterminatioll geographique du reseau, la Prance appelIe en clair a un dcterminisme geographique sur InterueL. Si Yahoo! souhaile confinuer la mise en vente d'objels nazis, l'enlreprise devra modifH~.r
son infraslructure el developper les outils infonnatiqlles neeessaires rl
assurer Ie fillrage des utilisatems, et empecher I'acces des illlernautes
fran<;ais aux pages illegales du service. A ce titre, il est illteressant de
noter que Ie TGI n'a pas exige qne ce filtrage soit fiable il. 100 %, mais
s'esl borne amettre ala charge de Yahoo! lllle obligation de moyells" raisonnables ".J'
Au lieu de cela, Yahoo! a finalemellt decide de sllpprimer pur~ment et
simplemellt les pages iltigieuses, et de refuser ai'avenir la mise en vente
d'objets nazis sur son site d'encheres. Jl Ceci a evidemmenl provoque rire
de Jlomilreux observateurs, eriliquant l'ellet devas1a1eur de celle " censure extralerritoriale d'interne1 " par la France, alors IIIcme que Itt France
n'avait pas cxige un tel zele. Dans tous les cas, Yahoo! et les architectes
du reseau Ill' disposellt d'aucun pouvoir legilime pour relllellre en cause
des valeurs publiques telles que la prohibilion de J'apoJogie dl! nazisme
en France el dans d'(llltre.) pays europt<ens." 1.:1 crainle elu ~p(~ctrc de la
ccn~ure et de son elIet destrnclcll)" sur Intcrnef, ~on\ largemenl exagl~rcs.
Le~ aetellrs d'internet ne se verron! appliquer ulle loi locale que s'ils
entretiennent avec Ie pays en question des liens suffisamment etroits pour
qu'il y ait nn reel raltachemellt, el pour qlle l'instruction, Ie proees ct
I'execution d'un eventllel jugement constituent Hne menace concrele,
Dans ce cas, 011 Ile peu! pas justifier que ces acteurs benef,cient d'une
derogation des reglcs locales oD ils font leurs affaires. Ce fut indeniablemel\! Ie eas pour Yahoo! qui a activement developpe une Hctivite com~
mereiale inlelllalionale a partir de ses sill'S americaills e( a realise d'im~
por/ants inveslissemtnts afm de M-velopper nne activitc en France via
une fili'llc dont elle a Ie contrale.
Plusiems aliI res raisons devraicllt rassurer les defellseurs de Ia liberle
d'cxpressioJ}, inquiels a I'idec que toul pays puisse imposer scs regles de
censure sur des siles e!rHllgers. Les pays s'adonnant a Ulle L'ensurc pennanCllte ct PCl! dCll10cratiquc scront marginalises sur lntemet. Lc risquc lic
all developpemcnt d'une activite ecol)omique dans ce 1ypc d'J~ta{s dissuadcra Ies cntrcprlses de soutcnir ces regimes repressifs pro' leurs aCJivites
commerciaIes, E1, encore uoe {ois, lcs prestataires de services Intcrnel ne
sauraicn! elrc tcnus pour responsahles lorsq\le certains utilisatenrs !oci\u;\
plus malins que d'auLres arriveJl[ a dejoller le mecanisme dc flltragc gcographiqllc mis en place.
JJ existc d'ores el deja des moycns bien plus inquielants permeltant
des Elats d'imposer une censurc efficaee sur Internet. Lorsqllc certains
gouverncLllents mel\cnt en place des sys(emes d'ecoulc de type
Carnivord9 OlJ Echelon(,j Ie risque dc eensurc el de contrale des eehallges
par les agenls informatiqlles n'est pas lointain et est bien plus impOitanl.

a

55, Pour IIIW (jiSClIS.\'jOIl Sl/r}fI " sec/ori.mtion ., ll'bueme! CI fa liven,} d'(I..\prr.'Ssion WIX

Etalli,Vllis, l'oir I..ml'l"(!llce l-r:,uig & Paul Resnick. Zollill/! S/leec/l on Ille ililemel : A
u'g(Ji (//ld Tee/Illittli Mode!, 98 Mich. 1. RCI'. 395, 1999.
56. 1.(' J"l1P}Jor' d'o:pi'I"IS proilliit /I, I'(ludience ilJ{liquai! qlle 70-80 % 11('.1 inll'!1wUles
jJ"lJl!("a/s CtaicJ!/ d'ores eI titfji! idemijiab/es comllll! te!, el quc 1(1 localislII/olI dr!s mllte.\"
Il/ili.f(lI('III~f pourmiliflCjlellwn1 Erl"/: a.l·slIree I/o/wilme/il par'1l11e dtd{l}"{/liOiI de resi·
!OI:~ d(t i'illsaipJioll (JII sen,icc, 011 {[I'mll d'tICCt!dlil" ({I/X pages liligfeuses. 11 J(l1I1

delJct

nola que Ya/lOo! ne'semil pas leI/II pOUI" responspblc si dl'.I" ili/(lI1WII/('S mal inlfll-

{ionne.\" d610Ilrnaiell/le.~ mes/II"(!s misOlllwbles de J!flmge mises ell place.

57. Hlil' 1I'oyWo!l'Imoll & Eric/I Lillming, Will Yahoo's /Jall (Ill fmcliollcd N(Ili ilc/l/s
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D'autres l~lats moins diplomates pourraiel1l sc livrer it des att,ll}uCS informH!iques coutre des sites web etrangers(·l ou dcvelopper dcs virus destines a saboter cerlains serVCllrs ctrangers. Ce type de pratiques cons!iluerail \lile menace bien plus grande sur la liberte d'cxpression que les
decisions judiciaires (I'Etats dcmocratiqucs vislIln simplement 11 apphquer la loi nationale sur Icur tcrritoire.
Malgrc les nvanfages sur Ie plan delll(){:ratique d'nne plus grande localisation geographique Slll" Ie rescan, la cOIl1Jl1Unanle informalique y cst
fOl1ement opposee. AIn suite de In dicision Yahoo !, Ben Lauric a publk
un articlc "d'excuse "relatif au jugemenl, clune critique acerbe de celuici.t'~ Lauric';, I'un des pionniers d'lntcrnct, est une autorite reconnLle dans
Ie domaine purelnent scienlil'iquc, mais son cliscours depasse largemen!
ceLIe sphere des lors qu'ij emet des propositions d'ordre politique dans Ie
plus grand mepris des principes juri diques et soeiaux efablis dans certaines societes democratiques.
Laurie a ete particuHerement eontrarie par l'obligation faite a Yahoo!
d'empechcr I'aeces des illternautes franc;ais a ses servellrs litigieux. II
admel qu'il existe deja des techniques de fiHrage de haut niveau.
Pourtanl, il n'hcsite pas a qualilier 1a decision du tribunal fran<;ais
d' " idiote et !lai"ve " (" half~assed and lrivially avoidable "Y.\. Ce!fe derniere remarque est revelatrice d'ulle arrogance asset cOllrante dans la
cornmllnaute infonllatique, avec en filigrane la conviction que les scienldiques sout les mieux places pour dehnir I'interet general. Si l'opinion
de Lauric sur les technologies actucllement dispollibles cst impoliante, il
fait l'impasse sur trois Clements essenticls. Prelllicrcmclll, aucune democratic Ile dispose aI'heure actuelle d'lIn systcllle iuridique garantissanl un
respect absolu de toUles ses lois, a dCfaul po~'r I'l~tat d'employer des
moyens de police. Les exces de vitesse, par exempie, sont un pilenomene
rectment. Aueun Etat democratique ne songcrait pour mllanl it placer un
pol icier a chaql1e eroisel11en1 pour enrayer a 100 % les infractiolls au
Code de la route. Un tel dispositif serait qualifie, ajuste titre, de totalitaino Lcs i'~l(\IS lh~mocratiqucs comptcnt c1avan\agc sur 1c droil pOlll" influencer les cO!llponemcn\s cl les allentcs sociales. COll1ll1C beaucoup de
" technologistes", Lanrie refuse dc voir dans la decision Yahoo! Ie
moindre impact sur Ie comportement des fournisseurs de services et des
ulilisa!elU"s. Dans Ie mecanisme de filtrage prescrit par Ie tribunal, les I1tllisatcllrs Ile pOIllTaiellt eontourner Ie contrale geographique qu'en mentant sur leur lieu de residence ou en ouvrant des comptes" off-shore"
d'acces II Internet. Deuxiememcnt, les Etals democra1iqllcs n'engagenl
generalelllent pas la responsabiJjte d'une pers(lnne pour les actes Hiicites
(['un tiers. Si un ulilisateur mel1t sur son Iku de residence ou tellle de
con1ourner Ia loi 1hUl~aise dc toute alltre fa~oll, Yahoo! pOIllI'a difficiJement ctre inquie1e. Si ce lype de comporlemenl venail II sc repiHldre,
ce[te dCsobcissance generalisCe aurail tlecessairement des consequences
poliliques sur les regles juridiques sous-jacclltes. Enfin, Lauric postule it
tort que Ja technologic est stalique et que Ie droit ~~sl sans clTet sur son
evolution.
()tIrant un remede ,H1X problCmcs d'appjiciHion de la 10i poses par
I'indetcrmination geographique sur Internet, Ie re1ablissement de !ignes
geographiqucs sur Ie reseal! pcnneltrait en outre aun Elat de gru'anlir sur
Ie lerritoire national Ie respec1 d'autres droi!s leis que les droit!'> de propriele inlelleetueUe, la prolection des COllsomma(eurs ou Ie rcspecl de Ia
vie privee sur Internct. Al'invcrse, l'incapacile d'nn Etat a proteger ces
droits sur InlCrne1 irai! direcfement al'euc()ulre des prineipes foudamen(nux de loute societe democratique, e! en particulier Ie droit des citoyens
1\ c,hoisir lcs regles qui les gOllvemenL

CONCLUSION
La decision Yahoo! cst Ie signe (j'UD mfitissement du cadre juridique
d'ln!crnel cl de I'emergcnce d'unc nouvelle approche des lribunaux
conccrnatH lcur competcnce. Comlllc I'a cedt Ie profcssellJ" Michael
Geist, " nous voyons Ies tribunaux sc dirigcr progressivement vers UJle
analyse des" effels " en matiere de competence jurldictionnelle sur
Inlernet ",f>1 Ceei n'est pas sans consequenees sur }e'developpemenl technologique, Le monde infonnulique pourra de moins en moins ignorer les
droilS llutionaux dam leur Mlermin'ation de l'architecture du reseall, tandis que Jes BlaIS se feront ~ nouveau enlendre cn lant que participants a
une democratic interJlfltionale e( pluraliste.

<l)!tjl:lIarchquo,nollvc]qlls.comlcgi/idx!isl'!a::un&aa<lammjj"'20()lO!()3&nlllll~}{)OO()

il074&mJ,,!yahoo&m2==&In3'C'&!lOsl::Jlttp;(!quolidjcn.1l(JuY~Jobs.ci)ju/;>

:S8.

Hlir 1WI(1/11Illenl ('.g. Lc (hVi{ (1I!el/l(l{)do]Jpo,mMe

siblc deplI(.,' I'AlJelll(J8ne, Ni!{-lris 20 dlic.

zoao.

i! 10Jl/ COIl/filII d'llllerne/

(/("{"(~.I"

hllp:l!www.nel-iris.com/Wittcl)/pressl?datc::;20-12-20001/474

llt!p;IIWv."w.CCli,orgflldv,isorie~!C/\-2000-01.:11tml

62. Bm l...aurie, All experl'x Apology, 211101'.'ZOOO
<llllp:l!wIVW.<lp!lchc-ssl:org/apology.lltlll>

59. \-hir Ci!!!Su//(Ilioll SJ//" h!s mO,w!IIs,{/'i/Jlelt'ePliOil dt'S dO/llli!es sur 11l11'/"flCl d,}I'«·
(oppl!.~ PM Ii> fIJi, COlllmissioJ) judicial I¥.' de '(1 cflwubrl! lieS I"qmf.\·cIIW/lIS, SOJls-r'm/l-

63. Bell Lal/ric, All I:-)ywrl:s Apology, 2{11(1)'. 2000

24 irdll. 2000.
60. It)i (" 'h'IIP://W\vw.ec!lc!oIIW;llch.oYg!

64. Mid!(I('/ GdS!, 1111.' Icga! implicalionsl(rrh~,'l'(lhiiO lIne. N(lzi M<'1I101"(1}Jili(l DiSf!lIll',
Jwis('qm.lw I, -jolly.(!il)'» 200 J : <:htlp:llwww.juriscolll.))c!/cnfuni/docfYllhoo/geist.hlm>

missiOn (/('s ljill'SliollS c(ln~'lilU!iOIJIICllcs,

Ii

6J" POUt" n1 S(1I'Olf 1'111,\ StU" 1£1 flratiql/e ilile rill .. dr'llial of St(l'ir(' att(wk ". Wlir (TRT®
CA··'}OOO"Ol: Dcnial-oj·Service Pl'I'i!lOPlllfllls, 3 jm!i', 2000

AdvisOl:Y

COIIS/illi/ion, 106' CongreJ, Z, se,\'siOIl,

<11!tj);!/WW\\':llJlilCll~,-fis!.Qrg/apo\ogy.hlJn>

_~-:CemmunjcaLion - Commerce E!eGlrO(1lque ,~,~.~ ..

4

Harvard Journal of
law & Technology
Volume 6
Copyright

©

Spring, 1993

1993 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

SYMPOSIt.lM: ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS AND LEGAL CHANGE
ELECTRONIC CONFERENCES:
THE REPORT OF AN EXPERIMENT
I. Trotter Hardy ....... " ........................ " ...... "...... ...... 213

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
FOR DIGITAL LIBRARY AND
HYPERTEXT PUBLISHING SYSTEMS
Pamela Samuelson, Robert J. Glushko ............................ 237

INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE NEED
FOR HARMONIZED NATIONAL REFORMS
Jeffrey B. Ritter, Judith Y. Gliniecki ............................... 263

RULF<S OF THE ROAD FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC HIGHWAYS: MERGING THE
TRADE AND TECHNICAL PARADIGMS
Joel R. Reidenberg .......... " .......... ", .... " ........ , ............ 287

COMPUTER NETWORK ABUSE
Michael p, Dierks """""""""""'"'''''''''''''''''''''''''''' 307

VIDEO DIALTONE:
REFLECTIONS ON CHANGING PERSPECTIVES
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
Robert L. Pettit, Christopher J. McGuire ...... "., ... .,,, .... ,,. 343

Volume 6,
6, Spring
Spring Issue, 1993

RULES
GLOBAL
RULES OF THE ROAD FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC HIGHWAYS:
MERGING
IDGHWAYS: :MERGING THE
TRADE
AND TECHNICAL PARADIGMS
TRADE AND
PARADIGMS
Joel
Joel R. Reidenberg*
Reidenberg*

INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
This symposium on the legal problems and implications of new
communications
communications technologies
technologies comes at a particularly
particularly timely juncture.
juncture.
Instant access to data in remote locations has become a central factor in
the growth of transnational business.11 Telecommunications
Telecommunications gateways
gateways
connection of information
information networks and information sources
allow the connection
across both national
national and sectoral
sectoral borders.
borders.22
Against
Against the background
background of seamless global networks, North America
continent-wide zone for information
information exchange,
is pushing toward a continent-wide
exchange, the
European Community is striving to manage
cross-border
information
manage cross-border information
flows, and leaders
leaders in the United States are beginning to debate a highEastern European
European nations are
speed, national data network. 33 Even Eastern
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1. See, e.g., KARL
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
IN SERVICES: THE
KARL SAUVANT,
SAUVANT, INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS IN
THE
POLITICS
TRANSBORDER DATA
FLoWS (1986);
TRANSBORDER DATA
FLOWS (Hans-Peter
(Hans-Peter
POLmcs OF TRANSBORDER
DATA FLows
(1986); TRANSBORDER
DATA FLows
ed., 1983)
1983) (proceedings
(proceedings of OECD conference
Gassmann ed.,
conference held in December
December 1983); Joel R.
Reidenberg,
Privacy Obstacle
Course: Hurdling
Barriersto Transnational
Reidenberg, The Privacy
Obstacle Course:
Hurdling Barriers
Transnational Financial
Financial
Services, 60 FORDHAM
REVIEw S137 (1992); Ren6
Transborder
FORDHAM L. REVIEW
Rene Laperri~re
Laperriere et al., The Transborder
Flow of Personal
International and
and Comparative
Comparative Law Issues,
Issues, 32
Personal Data
Data from Canada:
Canada: International
JuRIrrmics
(1992).
JURIMETRICS J. 547 (1992).
Technologies: Current
CurrentIssues Facing
2. See, e.g., Patrick J. Leahy,
Lealiy, New Laws for New Technologies:
Facing
the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, 5 HARV.
& TECH.,
1992, at 11
HARV. J.L. &
TECH., Spring 1992,
(describing the Internet and its linkage of a multitude
multitude of local networks
networks and information
information
sources).
sources).
Building the Electronic
1993,
3. See John Markoff, Building
Electronic Superhighway,
Superhighway, N.Y. TIMES,
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1993,
§3, at 11 (describing
(describing the
the debate over
over the
the creation
creation of aa national
national fiber
fiber optic
optic network);
§3,
Preamble,
Preamble, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection
Protection of Individuals with
Regard
to the Processing
Regard to
Processing of Personal
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data,
Data,
COM(92)422
[hereinafter Amended
COM(92)422 final-SYN 287 [hereinafter
Amended Proposal]
Proposal] (noting the need
need for intraEuropean
American Free Trade Agreement § 1302(5)
1302(5)
European information
information flows); Proposed
Proposed North American
(1992) (exempting
(exempting security
security and privacy laws from prohibitions on regulatory
regulatory barriers to
information
information flows within North America).
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"informatization." 4 Already, global information networks
grappling with "informatization."4
have changed both the way business is done and have altered the nature
markets.'s
of national markets.
As we create new electronic "highway"
"highway" systems,
systems, flows of information
information
and access to global information networks depend increasingly on
emerging fair information practice rules and, specifically, the treatment
Regulation of
of
of personal information or information
information about individuals. Regulation
information practices will determine the availability
availability of data and the
networks. Standards of fair inforinainformapossibilities for interconnection
interconnection of networks.
tion practice around the world are as critical to electronic highways as
traffic lights and speed limits are to asphalt roadways. They establish the
new rules of the road for information systems.
International efforts to define fair information practices66 for global
networks derive from two distinct paradigms.
paradigms. Traditionally,
Traditionally, regulatory
standards have been cast in trade terms. The trade perspective
perspective seeks to
information and define standards that balance
promote free flows of information
balance free
information practices
flows against human rights values.
values. Fair information
practices also draw
approach seeks
on another rarely emphasized
emphasized technical paradigm.
paradigm. This approach
to eliminate
technological obstacles
eliminate any technological
obstacles to free flows of information by
defining
standards
for
system
integrity
and interoperability.
Nevertheless,
defining standards
interoperability. Nevertheless,
these technical standards are set in ways that also define fair information
information
practices.
practices.
While each paradigm provides a basis to establish rules for global
electronic
self-contained and tend not
electronic highways,
highways, the two are
are surprisingly
surprisingly self-contained
not
to fit within the broader trends in global information networks
networks and
practices. Instead of facilitating the definition of fair information
practices.
information practice
practice
standards,
standards, the distinct
distinct trade and technical
technical perspectives
perspectives obscure the
tendency of global networks
networks to shift norms for the regulation of private
private
sector actors into a combined
combined arena of both
both national
national and network
network
jurisdiction. Global
Global information
information networks challenge regulatory and

4. See, e.g.,
& Bus.,
e.g., Data
Data Protection
Protection Round-up, PRIVACY
PRIVACY L. &
BUS., Oct. 1992,
1992, at
at 25-28
(Hungary,
fair
(Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland
Poland have
have each
each become
become concerned
concerned with fair
information
INITIATIVE, ANALYSIS
information practices);
practices); ABA
ABA CENTRAL
CENTRAL AND
AND EAsT
EAST EUROPEAN
EUROPEAN LAW
LAW INITIATIVE,
ANALYSIS
OF
BULGARIA'S DRAFr
OF BULGARIA'S
DRAFf INFORMATION
INFORMATION LAw
LAW (1992)
(1992) (Bulgaria
(Bulgaria is contemplating
contemplating legislation
legislation on
on
information
information practices).
practices).
5.
MARRIAGE OF
5. See
See PROJECT
PROJECf PROMMHE,
PROMETIIEE, NETWORKS
NETWORKS & MARKETS:
MARKETs: MORE
MORE THAN
THAN A
A MARRIAGE
OF
CONVENIENCE
CONVENIENCE (1992).
(1992).
6. This
This Article
Article focuses only
only on personal
personal information
information and fair information
information practices
practices in the
context
the private
private sector.
context of the
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information
political assumptions and defy simple regulation
regulation of fair information
independent approaches to the establishment
practice. These independent
establishment of fair
information
practice
rules
suggest
that
international
information
international data flows require
complex standards,
standards, including overlapping
overlapping regulation, rather than isolated
one-dimensional rules.
one-dimensional
rules.

I. THE TRADE PARADIGM:
1.
PARADIGM:
BALANCING FREE FLOWS OF INFORMATION
INFORMATION
BALANCING
HUMAN RIGHTS
AND HUMAN
The conventional view of fair information
information practice standards
standards uses a
trade paradigm. Ru1es
Rules for data processing must resolve an inherent
inherent
tension between the desire for free flows of information and the concern
concern
over human rights. Under the trade theory,
theory, economic
economic progress and trade
competitiveness
borders.'7
competitiveness depend on free flows of information
information across borders.
However, Rolv Ryssdal,
Human
Ryssdal, President of the European Court of Human
Rights,
"activities in the field of data protection
Rights, recently
recently noted that "activities
protection are
firmly rooted in fundamental rights and freedoms.
freedoms."s
The rights of
of
"8
9
privacy
self-determination" conflict
conflict with the trade value
privacy and "information
"information self-determination"9
of free flow. Information
self-determination gives control over the flow
Information self-determination
of personal information to individuals and thereby limits free flows. Free
flow gives control of information
information to private actors and thus limits an
individual's power
information practices in
power of decision. By viewing fair information
trade terms, regulatory
efforts
attempt
to
create
a balance between the
regulatory
attempt

Recommendationof the
7. See Organization
Organization for Economic Cooperation
Cooperation and Development,
Development, Recommendation
Council Concerning
ConcerningGuidelines
Guidelines Governing
Governing the Protection
Privacyand TransborderFlows
Protection ofPrivacy
Transborder Flows
of Personal
PersonalData,
[hereinafter
Data, OECD Doc. C(80)58 final, reprinted
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 [hereinafter
OECD Guidelines];
of Europe,
Europe, Convention
for the
the Protection
of Individuals
Individuals with
with
Guidelines]; Council of
Convention for
Protection of
1981, Europ.
Europ. T.S. No. 108,
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981,
reprinted
Proposal, supra
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 317
317 [hereinafter European Convention]; Amended
Amended Proposal,
supra
note 3,
3, Preamble
Preamble " 1-6.
1-6.
note
8. Rolv Ryssdal,
Ryssdal, Data
Data Protection
and the
the European Convention
Convention on Human
Human Rights,
XIII
Rights, xm
Protection and
CONF. DATA
PROTECTION COMM'Rs
DATA PROTECTION
COMM'RS 39 (1991)
(1991) (transcript available
available from the Council of
of
Europe) [hereinafter Proceedings].
Proceedings].
9.
"information self-determination"
self-determination" was coined by a German constitutional
court
9. The term "information
constitutional court
in a suit challenging
challenging attempts
attempts by the state to gather personal information
information for the census.
census. See
Senate (Karlsnihe,
1983), translated
HuM. RTS. L.J.
Judgment of the First Senate
(Karlsruhe, Dec.
Dec. 15, 1983),
translated in 5 HUM.
L.J.
(1984). For a comparative
The
94 (1984).
comparative analysis of this important
important decision, see Paul Schwartz, The
Computer in German
German and American Constitutional
Towards an
an American Right of
of
Constitutional Law: Towards
InformationalSelf-Determination,
Self-Determination, 37 AM.
AM. J.
J. COMP.
L. 675 (1989).
Informational
COMPo L.
(1989).
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two competing sets of values. This perspective
perspective presents
presents an inherently
inherently
unstable balance. Global information networks and markets change
change the
context of information
information practices
practices on a continual basis. These dynamic
dynamic
of
circumstances for international data flows defy a satisfactory
circumstances
satisfactory definition of
Generic
fair information
information practices on a generic
generic or momentary basis. Generic
circumstances and
omnibus rights will be difficult to apply in specific circumstances
contextual
willbecome
anachronistic with technical advances.
contextual applications will
become anachronistic
advances.
Toward a Broad
Broad Balancing
A. Toward
Balancing
1970s, European countries
During the 1970s,
countries began to enact broad data
data
protection laws to formulate the balance
balance for the early
early phase of computinformation
erization. These laws specified
erization.
specified general
general principles
principles of fair information
export of
practice
of
practice and authorized national
national regulators
regulators to prohibit the export
personal information
information to countries
countries that lacked sufficient privacy
privacy protecprotection.lO
tion.'o
Because fair information
Because
information practice
practice standards
standards existed only through
narrowly-targeted regulation
American business
narrowly-targeted
regulation in the United States, 11' the American
were
protectionist
community warned
warned that these European
European rules
protectionist and
2
emphasized that any
would threaten trade relations.'
relations. 12 The complaints emphasized
balance should be more tilted toward free flows of information. The
international data
short-circuit began to loom for international
specter of an electronic short-circuit
countries. In fact, during the
flows to the United
United States as well as other countries.
late 1980s,
1980s, some restrictions on international
international data transfers were imposed
national authorities.
authorities. France, for example,
by European
European national
example, restricted
restricted data
flows to Italy and Belgium, and the United Kingdom
Kingdom banned
banned the transfer
transfer
3
States.'13 More recently,
of direct marketing lists to the United States.
recently, the

10.
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 1, at S160-65.
10. See Reidenberg,
Frontier
11.
Reidenberg, Privacy
Privacy in the Information
11. See Joel R. Reidenberg,
Information Economy: A Fortress
Fortress or Frontier
for
(1992).
for Individual
Individual Rights?, 44 FED.
FED. COMM. L.J. 195 (1992).
TransnationalData
12.
Restrictions on Transnational
12. See John M. Eger, Emerging
Emerging Restrictions
Data Flow: Privacy
Privacy
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1055 (1978);
(1978);
Non-Tariff Trade
Barriers?, 10
& POL'y
Protection
Trade Barriers?,
10 LAW
LAW &
Protection or Non-Tariff
(1979); InternaFlow Barriers,
Barriers, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 8 (1979);
Robert
InternaRobert Bigelow,
Bigelow, Transborder
Transborder Data
Data Flow
Flow: Hearings
HearingsBefore Subcomm. on Gov't Information
tional
tional Data
Data Flow:
Information of the House Comm.
Operations,96th Cong.,
on Gov't
Gov't Operations,
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980).
(1980).
juillet 1989,
1989, reprinted
reprintedin Commission
13.
13. See D6lib~ration
Deliberation No. 89-78 du 11 juiIIet
Commission nationale de
l'informatique
[C.N.I.L.],
l0e Rapport, at 32-34 (1989)
I'informatique [C.N
.I.L.], 10e
(1989) (restriction on electronic
electronic
transmission
transmission of personnel
personnel records from France to Italy);
Italy); D6lib6ration
Deliberation No. 89-98 du 26 sept.
C.N.I.L.,
(1989) (restriction
1989, reprinted
1989,
reprinted in C.N
.I.L., 10e
IDe Rapport d'activit6,
d'activire, at 35-37
35-37 (1989)
(restriction on the
the
THE DATA PROTECtransfer
transfer of health records from France
France to Belgium); U.K. OFFICE OF TIIE
PROTEC-
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European Community has shown
shown interest in scrutinizing
scrutinizing transborder
transborder data

14
flows.
flows. 14

Community, there was growing concern
Even within the European Community,
concern
Businessmen worried
about balancing values for cross-border data flows. Businessmen
worried
that differences
differences in standards
standards for fair information
information practice
practice would be
harmful to economic relations between the member states,
states, and human
rights activists were concerned that some countries lacked
lacked any standards.
Countries
with
data
protection
legislation,
such
as
France, were
were critical
Countries
of potential
potential "data havens" where privacy
privacy laws were seen as lax or non5
ls
existent."
By
1984,
the
United
Kingdom
feared that it would become
existent.
isolated
isolated from its European information partners and adopted
adopted a data
data
16
16
protection law despite years of seemingly
endless
discussion.
seemingly
Even nonmember countries such as Switzerland were motivated to enact data
data
protection legislation. 177 By 1990,
1990, the concerns
concerns in the European
European Commustandards for fair
nity over the trade distorting effects
effects of divergent standards
information practices
information
practices reached
reached a critical stage. The Commission began
began the
rules."8IS
formal process
process of developing common rules.
1970s, the predominant multilateral efforts to
Also beginning
beginning in the 1970s,
define fair information
practices
information practices centered
centered on the trade terms. The
Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
Development ("OECD")
("OECD") and
Organization
Economic Cooperation
the Council of Europe each
each worked to establish
establish a set of principles that
balanced
interests: free flows of information and human
balanced the two sets of interests:
19
rights. 19
With the enactment of various national
national laws in Europe,
Europe, the
American computer sector became alarmed at the prospect of government-imposed
ment-imposed restrictions on the flow of data from Europe to the United

TION REGISrRAR,
(1990) (ban on the transfer of mailing
TlON
REGISTRAR, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 33-34
33-34 (1990)
lists from the United Kingdom to the United States).
States).
14.
In 1990,
1990, the
the Commission
Commission proposed
proposed a directive
directive for
for fair
fair information
information practice standards
14. In
that contained a restrictive
European
restrictive provision on international data flows outside the European
Community.
Individuals
Proposal for a Council Directive
Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals
Community. See Proposal
in Relation to
to the Processing of Personal Data, COM(90}314
COM(90)314 final-SYN 287 [hereinafter
[hereinafter
Proposed
Directive]. The revised draft continues the scrutiny of international data flows.
Proposed Directive].
See Amended
supranote 3, art. 26; see also infra
infra notes
Amended Proposal,
Proposal, supra
notes 23-28 and accompanying
text.
text.
15.
ANDRI LucAs,
(1987).
15. See ANDRE
LUCAS, LE DROIT DE L'INFORMATIQUE
L'INFORMATlQUE 66-67 (1987).
COLIN J. BENNEIT,
BENNETr, REGULATING
REGULATING PRIVACY
(1992).
16. See COLIN
PRIVACY 91-93 (1992).
17.
17. See Loi f~d6rale
federale sur Ia
la protection des donnes
donnees du 19 juin 1992 [Federal Law on the
the
Protection
Data, June
June 19,
19, 1992]
1992] (Switz.).
(Switz.).
Protection of Data,
18. See infra
infra notes 23-28 and accompanying
18.
accompanying text.
19. For an excellent
excellent concise history of these efforts, see BENNETT,
supranote 16, at 130BENNEIT, supra
19.
39.
39.
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States. At the same time, Europeans argued
argued for increased
increased attention
attention to
privacy
privacy concerns.
concerns. While the principles adopted by the OECD and the
emphasized the free flow
Council of Europe are quite similar, the OECD emphasized
of information in contrast to the Council of Europe,
Europe, which stressed the
human rights concerns.
recommended a voluntary
of
concerns. The OECD recommended
voluntary set of
guidelines
guidelines rather than a binding set of rules like those in the international
international
treaty proposed
proposed by the Council of Europe.
Europe. Other
Other international
international organizations such as the International Bureau
Informatics, the U.N. Center on
on
Bureau of Informatics,
Transnational
Transnational Corporations,
Corporations, and
aild the International
International Telecommunications
Telecommunications
Union have also addressed
addressed fair information practices, but with considerably less recognition of their work in the international
international community.20
community.'

B. Toward
Narrower Balancing
Balancing
Toward Narrower
The dynamic environment for global information networks makes the
ever-elusive goal. The
broad balance
balance sought in the trade dimension an ever-elusive
increased computing
computing power of sophisticated
sophisticated communications
communications networks in
increased
the 1980s created
created specialized networks
networks and customized information use.
developments moved the search
Inevitably, these technological
technological and market developments
search
for fair information
information practice standards from general
principles
general principles to particularized
larized contextual
contextual definitions. The Council of Europe, for example,
example,
recognized
the
need
to
define
information practices
recognized
define fair information
practices under specific
circumstances
circumstances and issued
issued recommendations
recommendations for areas such as direct
marketing,
of payment."21 Nationallaws
National laws
marketing, employment records, and means ofpayment.
context-specific rules.
rules.'22
also moved in the direction of context-specific
harmonization efforts demonstrate the
The European Community's harmonization
same elusive quality in its search for the trade-dimension
trade-dimension balance between
free flow and human
1990, when the Commission of the
human rights. In 1990,
European
Community
proposed
a
directive to harmonize
European
proposed
harmonize the legal

132-33.
20. Id.
[d. at 132-33.

21.
MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION
21. See COUNCIL
COUNCIL OF EUROPE
EUROPE COMMITTEE
COMMITIEE OF MlNISfERS,
RECOMMENDATION R(85)(20)
R(85)(20)
ON
THE PROTECTION
PROTECTION OF
FOR PURPOSES
(1985);
ON THE
OF PERSONAL
PERSONAL DATA
DATA FOR
PuRPosEs OF
OF DIRECT
DlREcr MARKETING
MARKETING (1985);

COUNCIL
OF EUROPE
EUROPE COMMITrEE
OF MlNISfERS,
MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION
RECOMMENDATION R(89)(2)
ON THE
COUNCIL OF
COMMITIEE OF
R(89)(2) ON
THE
PROTECTION OF
OF PERSONAL
(1989); COUNCIL OF
OF
PROTECTION
PERSONAL DATA USED FOR EMPLOYMENT PURPOSES (1989);
EUROPE COMMITIEE
COMMITTEE OF
OF MlNISfERS,
MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION
RECOMMENDATION R(90)(19)
PROTECTION OF
EUROPE
R(90)(19) ON THE PROTECTION
OF
PERSONAL DATA
PAYMENT AND OTHER RELATED OPERATIONS
(1990).
PERSONAL
DATA USED
USED FOR
FOR PAYMENT
OPERATIONS (1990).
(1988) (Neth.)
(Neth.) (providing rules for the
22. See, e.g.,
e.g., Data Protection Act §§ 15-16 (1988)
translatedin Council of Europe
protection of privacy in connection with personal data files),
files), translated
Europe
Doe. Cl-PD
(Jan. 27,
1989).
Doc.
CJ-PD (89) 4 (Jan.
27, 1989).
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information practice in each of the member states, the
standards of fair information
23
proposal
debate.23
The spirit of the
proposal was a classic example of the trade debate.
1992 program
logically extended concepts
concepts of free movement from goods
1992
program logically
and services to personal information. Consequently,
Consequently, the draft linked
Communiinternal European
European Communiinformation flows to the development
development of the internal
ty market and sought to protect
protect individual
individual rights against data processing
through a set of regulatory
principles. Again, U.S.
regulatory principles.
U.S. industries and their
European
European trading partners urged the Commission to include a commitment to the principle of free exchange
exchange of data. In fact, the revised
revised draft
24
24
specifically
This trade
specifically sought this clarification
clarification in a title change.
change.
approach
has
fueled
persistent
debate
over
the
effect
of
the
directive.
If
If
approach
persistent
the directive
directive sets minimum
minimum standards for fair information practices,
practices, then
then
further distortions on the free flow of information
information may still be encouraged
encouraged
protection. However,
However, if the directive
directive sets
by divergent actual levels of protection.
mandatory standards,
standards, then additional
mandatory
additional limitations on free flows may be
avoided.
efforts, the Commission has had some difficulty
avoided. In its efforts,
establishing general regulations. The draft directive
directive contained a provision
provision
Commission
for business
business groups to develop codes of conduct, and the Commission
simultaneously a companion
offered simultaneously
companion proposal explicitly directed to fair
information practices in the telecommunications
sector."2S This approach
information
telecommunications sector.
states, such as Germany and
in the member
member states,
flows from experiences in
France, where sectorial implementation
implementation was critical.
The treatment of data flows to destinations outside the European
Community posed a similar dilemma for the trade perspective. Taking
exchange
data privacy
privacy seriously
seriously would have a limiting effect on the free exchange
of information with nations outside the Community. Under the initial
non-European Community
personal information
information to non-European
Community
draft, the export of personal
member
member countries was to be prohibited
prohibited unless the destination
destination assured a
protection.'26 "Data
"Data havens"
havens" would be blacklisted,
sufficient degree of protection.
United States were assumed
assumed to be targets for a
and countries
countries such as the United
blanket
blanket export prohibition,
prohibition, though individual exemptions
exemptions might have been
27 Because
possible.
countries approach
Because few non-European
non-European countries
approach fair informapossible.27

23. See Proposed Directive, supra
supra note 14.
supra note 3, Explanatory
Explanatory Memorandum,
24. See Amended Proposal,
Proposal, supra
Memorandum, at 8.
of
25. See Proposed Directive,
Directive, supra
supra note 14,
14, § 20 (provision relating to sectoral
sectoral codes of

conduct).
conduct).
26. See id., art. 24.
27. See id., art. 25.
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tion
tion practice
practice standards
standards with
with the
the same
same rigor,
rigor, the
the proposed
proposed directive
directive risked
risked
isolating
isolating Europe
Europe from global information
information networks.
networks.
The
The revised
revised version
version of
of the directive created
created a more
more nuanced
nuanced balance
balance
28
between
information and
and human
human rights.'
rights. Data
Data exports
exports are
between free
free flows of information
still
subject
to
restriction
if
the
foreign
destination
lacks
the foreign destination lacks adequate
adequate
still subject
restriction
protection
protection for individuals.
individuals. The
The generic
generic approach
approach was
was tailored
tailored to
to a more
more
narrow
narrow balancing
balancing of the free flow and
and human
human rights
rights interests.
interests. Under
Under the
revised
revised draft,
draft, national
national authorities
authorities may
may consider
consider the specific
specific circumstances
circumstances
of each
case-by-case basis, rather
each data transfer on
on a case-by-case
rather than
than an
an overall
overall
country
country assessment,
assessment, to determine
determine the sufficiency
sufficiency of the destination's
destination's fair
fair
information
information practice
practice standards.
standards.
Although
Although the revised
revised version
version appears more flexible, it causes
causes greater
greater
complexity
complexity in the regulation
regulation of
of data flows.
flows. The
The second
second draft
draft no longer
longer
gives foreign
companies
the
same
ability
to
lobby
as
a
group
with
foreign companies
lobby as
European partners against a blanket restriction on data flows. Moreover,
European
Moreover,
companies
will
now
have
to
argue
separately
before
each
of
the twelve
companies
have
separately before
future national authorities.
authorities. With or without the revised directive,
directive, national
authorities
authorities under existing
existing European
European laws are likely to scrutinize
scrutinize data
exports
exports to the United
United States more
more thoroughly
thoroughly because some American
American
industries,
industries, such
such as direct marketing,
marketing, have achieved notoriety
notoriety for their
their
limited standards
standards of fair information
information practice. In
In short, the rules of the
the
road for global "electronic
highways" are
"electronic highways"
are becoming
becoming a higher priority
issue
issue for governments
governments and transnational
transnational businesses.
businesses.
C.
Customized Balancing
C. Toward Customized
Balancing
Traditional multilateral trade negotiations
negotiations have not ignored the
significance of fair information
information practices for the emerging electronic
electronic
significance
highway system. The endless search to define
fair
information
defme
practice
standards for international
international data exchange in itself poses barriers to global
information
information networking.
networking. When
When services appeared on the agenda for the
GATT
negotiations, negotiators
concerned that
Uruguay Round
Round of
ofGA
TTnegotiations,
negotiators became concerned
standards for transborder data flows might be used as protectionist trade
impediments. Following the trend away from general principles,
principles, the
circumstancservices sector negotiating group reviewed proposals for the circumstanc-

supra note 3, art. 26.
28. See Amended Proposal, supra
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Similarly, the
es permitting restrictions on transborder data flows. 299 Similarly,
Agreement
negotiators for the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement
contemplated fair information
delegation sought
contemplated
information practices.
practices. The American delegation
30
to ensure "fair
"fair access to and use of public networks"
for information
information
networks"30
security,
services, and the proposed
proposed text defines conditions for privacy, security,
31
31
confidentiality legislation.
and confidentiality
Both sets of trade negotiations strongly tilt the balance
balance toward free
flows of information. The proposed trade treaties establish
establish the standard
that restrictions on information flows may not be discriminatory
discriminatory and most
favored nation treatment would apply.32
apply.32 Signatory countries,
countries, for
example,
generically restrict data flows to the United States
example, could
could not generically
without also scrutinizing other countries
countries and blacklisting
blacklisting those similar to
the United States. In an age of global networks,
networks, non-discrimination
non-discrimination
forces rules of fair information
information practice to be narrowly defined for
specific
types
of
data
flows and uses.
specific
For international
international information exchanges,
exchanges, the trade paradigm
paradigm moves
toward definitions increasingly customized
to
specific
circumstances.
customized
circumstances. The
French, for example, have used a contractual
contractual approach
approach for data protection. When
When the destination
destination of an information
information export does not have any
of
omnibus law, the French government authority has required
required execution of
a contract between the French data exporter
exporter and foreign importer to
assure that the protections for individuals
individuals apply to the foreign data
33 The International
processing.
Commerce in conjunction
conjunction
processing. 33
International Chamber of Commerce
with the Council of Europe and the European
European Commission have prepared
prepared
a model contract
contract for international data transfers to promote
promote this type of
of
4
34
regulatory customization.
Despite
the
attempt
to
customize
standards,
customization.
customize standards,

29. GATT
GATT Doc.
Doc. MTN.TNSIW/FA,
MTN.TNS/wIFA, at 18
18 (1990)
(1990) (measures necessary
necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations for the protection of privacy of individuals in relation
compliance
relation
dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality
confidentiality are
to the processing
processing and dissemination
permissible provided they are not applied in a discriminatory manner
manner or as a disguised
restriction on international trade in services).
services).
SERVICES POLICY ADVISORY COMMITIEE,
COMMITrEE, REPORT ON THE NORTH
30. See SERVICES
NORTH AMERICAN
AGREEMENT 12-13 (1992)
FREE TRADE
TRADE AGREEMENT
(1992) (prepared in
in compliance with the Omnibus
Omnibus Trade
Trade
and Competitiveness
Competitiveness Act of 1988).
1988).
31. See Proposed North American
(1992).
31.
American Free
Free Trade Agreement, art. 1302(5) (1992).
32. "Most favored nation treatment"
treatment" means that a signatory to a treaty must grant another
another
signatory the same treatment as the most favorable treatment accorded to any other nation.
D6liberation No. 89-78 du juillet 1989,
1989, reprinted
C.N.I.L., 10e Rapport
33. See Deliberation
reprinted in C.N.I.L.,
(1989).
(1989).
Contract, PRIVACY
PRivACY L. & Bus.,
34. See Model Clauses
Clauses for
for Inclusion
Inclusion in aa Model TBDF Contract,
BUs.,
Dec.
1992, at 17-18; MODEL
CONTRACT To
ENSURE EQUIVALENT
EQUIvALENT DATA PROTECTION
PROTECTION IN
Dec. 1992,
MODEL CONTRACT
To ENSURE
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this contractual
contractual approach
approach may not satisfy the proper balancing. Problems
remain.3355
of scope and enforcement may remain.
The trend in the trade dimension
dimension toward
toward micro-level balancing
suggests that fair information practice standards
standards may become
become part of the
36
technological
networks.36
Network configuration
configuration
technological architecture of global networks.
and the choice of technologies may be used to assure fair information
information
international circumstances.
practices for specific international
circumstances. This evolution leads to
narrowly drawn
drawn standards for international
international data flows and a growing
Technical choices
importance for the technical
technical dimension. Technical
choices become
become
circumstances, and the
critical to implement
implement standards in particular circumstances,
technical
decisions
themselves
may
determine
standards.
technical
themselves
determine standards.

II. THE TECHNICAL
TECHNICAL PARADIGM:
STANDARDIZATION
STANDARDIZATION OF SYSTEM
ARCHITECTURE
ARCHITECTURE
While the trade dimension receives most of the internation.al
international attention,
fair information practice
practice standards have also emerged using a distinctly
technical
paradigm.
interoperability of information
information networks
technical paradigm. Integrity and interoperability
37
are usually defined
technical criteria.37
Unlike the trade
defmed in terms of technical
context-specific definitions
information
dimension trend toward context-specific
defmitions of fair information
practice, the technical
technical perspective
perspective is moving toward defining
defining broader,
architecture of global networks.
networks. The
normative standards within the architecture
paramount
technological obstacles
obstacles to system
system
paramount value is the elimination
elimination of technological
interconnection.

A. Integrity
Integrity
A.
The integrity of information
information flows depends
depends on system reliability
reliability and
confidentiality.
Fair information
confidentiality.
information practice rules typically mandate

THE
TRANSBORDER DATA
DATA FLows
FLOWS wrrn
WITH EXPLANATORY
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM (Nov.
TIlE CONTEXT
CONTEXT OF TRANSBORDER
2, 1992) (available from Council of Europe T-PD
revised).
T-PD 7 revised).

35. See Ulrich Lepper, Experience
Experience with Contracts
TransborderData
Data Flows in the
Contracts on Transborder
Credit Sector,
Sector, in Proceedings,
Proceedings, supra
50-51.
supra note
note 8,
8, at 50-51.
Credit
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 1, at S175-76.
36. See Reidenberg,
excellent overview
overview of the standards
standards process in the European Community and
37. For an excellent
WOOLCOCK, MARKEr
MARKET AccESS
the United States, see STEPHEN
STEPHEN WOOLCOCK,
ACCESS IssUEs
ISSUES IN
IN EC-US
RELATIONS:
(1991).
RELATIONS: TRADING PARTNERS OR TRADING
TRADING BLOWS? 92-110 (1991).
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adequate security
security to preserve integrity.
integrity. 388 Provisions
Provisions in the multilateral
instruments
instruments on transborder
transborder data flow stipulate a requirement of security.39
39
Omnibus data protection
protection laws require data processors to take measures to
Industry-specific or
assure the integrity of personal information.
information.n'4O Industry-specific
sectoral laws similarly require security measures.4141 In addition, private
contracts will also customarily obligate
contracts
obligate system operators to assure
42
security.42
security.
Security
infrastructure of global
Security measures
measures are usually part of the infrastructure
Technological
against
information networks.
networks.
Technological safeguards protect against
unauthorized
unauthorized manipulation
manipulation of computer systems
systems and are an integral part
solutions such as
of fair information practice standards. "Soft"
"Soft" policy solutions
password
unauthorized manipulation.
password access or restricted sites may limit unauthorized
manipulation.
"Hard" physical solutions such as semi-conductor chips on credit cards
may also be used to assure security by imposing barriers to the access and
combined
manipulation of data.4433 These
These two technical methods may be combined
when particular circumstances
or
types
of
information
flows
require
circumstances
higher level security.
security. For example,
example, in Sweden,
Sweden, subscribers to the
TeleGuide electronic shopping network
Swedish TeleGuide
network receive
receive a magnetic
magnetic card
44
containing
data.41
containing name,
name, address, and bank account
account data.
With a PIN, the
TeleGuide terminal. Other
subscriber may access the network from any TeleGuide
payment networks
networks in Europe are increasingly using more sophisticated
sophisticated
chip card technology to offer transaction
transaction authorization
authorization at the local level
centralized
(i.e., purchase site) as well as at the system level (i.e.,
(i.e., centralized

38.
supra note 14, Preamble 121.
1 21.
38. See, e.g.,
e.g., Proposed Directive,
Directive, supra
Convention, supra
supranote 7, art.
European Convention,
39. See European
supra note 7, art. 7; OECD
OECD Guidelines, supra
11.
11.
40. See, e.g.,
l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux
e.g., Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier
janvier relative
relative A
a l'inforrnatique,
liberts,
Jibertes, art. 29,
29, 1978
1978 J.O. 227, 229 [Law
[Law No.
No. 78-17 of Jan. 6 relating
relating to data processing,
processing,
files, and freedoms]
(1988) (Neth.) (providing
(providing rules for the
freedoms] (Fr.); Data Protection Act § 8 (1988)
translatedin Council of Europe
protection of privacy in connection with personal data files), translated
Doc. CJ-PD (89) 4 (Jan. 27,
3, art. 17.
17.
27, 1989); Amended
Amended Proposal, supra
supra note
note 3,
41.
See, e.g.,
41. Banking rules, for example,
example, typically require a high degree of security. See,
U.S.
OF
U.S. GENERAL
GENERAL ACCOUNTING
ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
OFFICE, ELECTRONIC
ELECfRONIC FUNDS
FUNDs TRANSFER OVERSIGHT OF
CRrrICAL
IMTEC-90-14
CRITICAL BANKING
BANKING SYSTEMS SHOULD
SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED,
STRENGTHENED, GAO Doc.
Doc. IMTEC-90-14
(1990).
(1990).
42. See GEORGE BRANDON
BRANDON &
& JOHN K. HALVEY,
HALVEY, DATA PROCESSING
PROCESSING CONTRACTS
CONTRACTS 165-67,
165-67,
357 (3d ed. 1990).
1990).
43.
43. Chip cards may be used only with
with a machine programmed
programmed to read the code on the
chip.
44. See Matthew Rose, French
FrenchMinitel
Minitel Idea
Idea Slumps in Sweden, DM
1993,
DM NEWS, Feb. 1, 1993,
at 1.
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45
authorization
Various
authorization centers).
centers).4S
Various network
network transactions
transactions may
may demand
demand
higher
higher security
security than others.
others. For
For example,
example, the computerization
computerization of
of health
health
records
records for remote
remote access
access might require
require greater
greater confidentiality
confidentiality measures
measures
than
than home shopping
shopping networks.
networks.
Because
Because technical
technical security
security safeguards
safeguards are
are implemented
implemented through
through
network
network architecture,
architecture, national
national and
and international
international standards
standards organizations
organizations
are struggling to develop
policies
and
measures
for
different
develop policies and
different levels
levels of
of
security.
The European
Standardization/European
security.
European Committee
Committee for Standardization/European
Committee
("CEN/CENELEC") and
and
Committee forElectrotechnical
forElectrotechnical Standardization
Standardization ("CEN/CENELEC")
its national
national members,
members, for example,
example, have considered
considered security needs
needs for
for
European payment
Consultative Committee
European
payment systems. The Consultative
Committee for InternationInternational Telegraph
Telegraph and
and Telephony
Telephony ("CCITT")
("CCITT") has addressed
addressed security
security issues
issues for
global telecommunications,
telecommunications, and
and the United
United Nations
Nations effort to develop
develop an
an
electronic data interchange
interchange standard,
standard, EDIFACT, has also
also worked
worked on
on
security
electronic-based transactions.
Coordinated efforts are
security for electronic-based
transactions. Coordinated
essential
essential to avoid
avoid incompatible
incompatible security standards
standards that would
would establish
establish
technological
technological barriers
barriers to global
global network
network interconnection.
interconnection. Standards
Standards also
offer
a
variety
of
choices
for
the
level
of
security
measures.
offer
variety
security measures. For
For
example,
example, standard
standard encryption techniques
techniques are available to secure confidentiality, while standard
"firewalls" can be used
standard techniques
techniques to build system "firewalls"
to protect against
against intrusions. Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, standards
standards for authorization
authorization
protocols can be found to verify legitimate
legitimate users,
users, and standards
standards to
segment
segment chip memory
memory can
can offer
offer multi-user
multi-user validation and access
limitations. These
limitations.
These standardizations
standardizations all facilitate the connection
connection of global
information networks.
The choices
choices for technical
technical standards
standards also define
define fair information
information
practice. For example, the widely
used
encryption
standard
DES is not
widely
46
46
encryption standard available.
adopt
To define and adopt
the most secure encryption
DES for a network
rather
than
the
more
secure
RSA
encryption
standard
network

example, now embeds
45. Visa, for example,
embeds microprocessors
microprocessors on cards
cards issued in France.
France. See
Can Charge
ChargeEverything, L.A. TIMES,
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1985,
1985, §6,
§6, at 4;
Penny Pagano,
Pagano, Consumers Can
Card Planned
Plannedby
by Codercard,
Codercard,L.A.
TIMES,
David Olmos, Deal
Deal with AT&T; High-Security
High-Security Card
L.A. TIMES,
July 13,1988,
13, 1988, §6,
§6, at6;
at 6; William Gruber, Automated Tellers
to Meet
MeetBank
Card,CHI. TRIB.,
TRiB.,
Teilersto
Bank Card,
10, 1987,
1987, at C5.
Aug. 10,
U.S. federal government standard that must be incorporated in
46. DES is a widely used U.S.
government contracts that require encryption security.
security. DES is subject
hardware used for government
U.S. export controls.
to stringent U.S.
controls. RSA is a proprietary standard that is a more sophisticated, more secure encryption algorithm. Companies seeking higher levels of security prefer
prefer
to use RSA.
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satisfactory level of security at a lower point. In addition, the
sets the satisfactory
technical decisions that locate safeguards
safeguards at particular
particular places
places in global
responsibility for fair information
information
information networks also define responsibility
47
47
practices.
The choice of authorizing
authorizing access
access by a network central
practices.
processor
processor rather than a chip card processor assigns responsibility
responsibility in
standardization efforts, thus, have a
different ways.
ways. These technical standardization
broader
broader significance for fair information practices.
practices.
perspective emphasizes technological
While the technical
technical perspective
technological solutions to
maintain
"soft" solutions
maintain the integrity of global networks,
networks, "hard" and "soft"
solutions do
not settle security issues. Computer
Computer crime statutes around the world seek
seek
also to protect integrity through prohibitions on computer tampering and
48
The criminalization
criminalization of these security
security breaches
unauthorized use. 48
suggests that the purely technical
answers
to
system
technical
integrity do not set
a complete
Paradoxically, computer
computer
complete standard of fair information practice. Paradoxically,
effective instrument to establish a higher
crime laws are not always
always an effective
standard. Victims frequently have an incentive not to acknowledge
standard.
recognizing illegal access
access or use,
unauthorized access or use. By publicly recognizing
announces that its information
the victim announces
information system may not be adequately
secure, and that the integrity
integrity of the system is not assured.
B. Interoperability
Interoperability

Beyond the integrity
integrity of global information
information networks,
networks, the technical
technical
communications systems.
systems. Interopdimension seeks interoperability of communications
erability
communications protocols
compatible
erability requires
requires that communications
protocols be technically compatible
interconnect. Common standards,
standards, such as the
for diverse technologies to interconnect.
International
ISDN protocols, are necessary
necessary to achieve
achieve interoperability.
interoperability.4499 International
0
50
technical
organizations seek to define these standards.
standards." The results have
technical organizations

47.
DES, for example, is usually implemented
47. DES,
implemented at the hardware level, while other
other
encryption
software.
are implemented
implemented at any level,
level, hardware or software.
encryption techniques are
48.
See, e.g.,
RECOM48. See,
e.g., N.Y. PENAL
PENAL LAW
LAW § 156 (McKinney 1991);
1991); COUNCIL OF EUROPE
EUROPERECOMMENDATION
(1989); JEROME
JtROME HUET &
& HERBERT
MENDATION R(89)(9) ON COMPUTER-RELATED
COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME
CRIME (1989);
MAISL,
L'INFORMATIQUE ET DES
DES TPLtCOMMUNICATIONS
(1989).
MAISL, DROIT DE L'!NFORMATIQUE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 833-57
833-57 (1989).
49. See Joachim
Scherer, European
European Telecommunications
Telecommunications Law: The Framework
Joachim Scherer,
Framework of the
Treaty, 12 EUR.
(1987).
Treaty,
EUR. L. REv. 354, 355 (1987).
50.
example, by the International
Organization
50. Standards
Standards are
are defined,
defined, for example,
International Standards
Standards Organization
("ISO-),
("ISO"), CEN/CENELEC,
CEN/CENELEC, and national or regional groups such as the European
Telecommunications
Standards Institute ("ETSI").
standardization process
process can be
be
Telecommunications Standards
("ETSI"). The standardization
controversial.
Roger Tuckett,
Standards:Interoperability
Revisited,
controversial. See Roger
Tuckett, Access to Public
Public Standards:
Interoperability Revisited,
PROP. REv. 423 (1992);
(1992); Diana Good,
Good, How
FarShould IP Rights
Rights Have To
To
14 EUR.
EUR. INTELL.
INTELL. PROP.
HowFarShouldIP

HeinOnline -- 6 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 299 1992-1993

300

Harvard
Harvard Journal
Journal ofLaw & Technology

[Vol.
[Vol. 6

significant implications
implications for information use. For example, the X.400
XAOO and
X.500 e-mail transmission standards defined by CCITT allow "functional"functionality and communications"
communications" within network architecture. 551 This means that
the network can do much more
more than merely transmit
transmit messages
messages from point
to point. The network
network can
can translate different transmission protocols to
technologies. It can provide
connect previously
previously incompatible information technologies.
network-based directory
of
network-based
directory assistance, and it can package a wealth of
transaction data with messages.
messages.
The technical
technical choices made for interoperability
interoperability set the parameters
interoperability standards
directly in global network architecture.
architecture. The interoperability
cannot be isolated
from
broader
definitions
of
fair information practice.
practice.
isolated
broader
Caller identification and call blocking
blocking show the illusion
illusion of such a
separation.52
The service raises important questions of fair practice.
52
"Caller identification" displays the telephone number of the calling
calling party
"Caller
to the recipient.
recipient. "Call
"Call blocking"
blocking" enables the calling party to block his
identification
Yet,
identification to the recipient on either a per line or per call basis. Yet,
communications
define if and how the services can be offered
communications protocols
protocols defme
between regional or national networks.
networks. For example,
example, if a common
common
identification, but not call blocking, the technical
protocol enables caller identification,
technical
choice defines an important
fair
information
practice
standard.
Even
important
practice
Even the
choice of the technology
standards. Only
technology sets fair information
information practice
practice standards.
one of the two presently available technologies
"call
technologies can accommodate
accommodate "call
53
blocking.",,53
Similarly, if a common
blocking.
Similarly,
common protocol cannot support particular
particular
security technology,
technology, then the level of security
security may be limited by the
interoperabiity standard.
interoperability
technical dimension is increasingly
The technic3I
increasingly linked to more expansive
expansive
information practice
standards. Varying
practice standards.
Varying rules of
definitions of fair information
information systems can hinder the interoperability
interoperability of global
conduct for information

Policy Positions
ETSI and
and the
the EC,
EC, 14 EUR. INTELL.
Give Way to Standardization:
Standardization: The Policy
Positions of EI'SI
INI'ELL.
PROP.
PROP. REv. 295 (1992).
(1992).
51. See Mitzi
Gatewaysfor Cross-Platform
E-mail, MACWEEK, Dec.
Dec.
51.
Mitzi Waltz, Opening
Opening the Gatewaysfor
Cross-Platform E-mail,
14, 1992, at 107.
14,
Glenn C. Smith, We've Got Your Number!
Number! (Is
(Is it Constitutional
Constitutionalto Give It
52. See Glenn
It Out?):
CallerIdentification
Privacy, 37 UCLA
REV.
Informational Privacy,
UCLA L. REv.
Caller
Identification Technology and the Right to Informational
(1989).
145 (1989).
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY
TASK FORCE 10
53. See FINAL REPORT OF THE
THE PRIVACY
TECHNOLOGY TASK
10 (1991)
(1991)
(submitted
Leahy). The
The Automatic Number Information ("ANI")
(submitted to Senator Patrick J. Leahy).
technology
identification choices
choices
technology cannot accommodate
accommodate call blocking, unlike the other caller identification
technology.
using Common Channel System
System Signaling 7 technology.
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networks.
networks. The Canadian
Canadian Standards
Standards Association
Association ("CSA"),
("CSA"), for example,
example,
feared
feared that the
the proposed
proposed European
European directive
directive on
on data
data protection
protection would limit
limit
and
European
the
the connections
connections between
between Canadian
Canadian information
information networks
networks and European
information
As a result,
result, CSA
CSA began
began work on
on a privacy
privacy code.-,
code.55
information sources.'
sources. 54 As
Yet,
Yet, in keeping
keeping with the technical
technical perspective,
perspective, CSA
CSA contemplates
contemplates the
eventual
privacy code
code by its members
members and others
others
eventual implementation
implementation of the privacy
6
56
through
There is also
also speculation
speculation that
that the Internathrough technical
technical solutions.
solutions. There
tional
tional Standards
Standards Organization
Organization ("ISO")
("ISO") might similarly
similarly address
address broader
broader
57
issues.'
fair information
information practice
practice issues.
In contrast
contrast to the trend in
in the trade
trade dimension,
dimension, these technically
technically
defined
defined standards
standards are moving toward an expansive
expansive vision
vision of fair
information
information practice.
practice. Technical
Technical choices
choices lead to normative decisions
decisions about
fair information practice
practice standards.
standards. Yet,
Yet, the technical
technical dimension
dimension subtly
subtly
introduces
standards through
introduces these standards
through the network
network architecture
architecture itself, rather
rather
than through
through a broader
broader debate on the norms.

GLOBAL
III.
ill. THE GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL
INFORMATION NETWORKS
INFORMATION
between fair
The
The trade and technical paradigms each
each obscure the link
link between
fair
information
information practice
practice standards
standards and governance.
governance. Choices
Choices under
under each
each
governance decisions.
perspective
perspective are
are essentially governance
decisions. They determine
determine who
sets rules of the road for global networking
networking and how standards
standards are
whether through trade
defined. This establishment
establishment of rules of conduct, whether
is
based
on
particular visions of
standardization,
balancing or technical
technical standardization,
of
social relations, the role of the state, and the relationship
relationship between
between nations.
assumptions. Global
Global
Each perspective raises different
different sets of values and assumptions.
information networks juxtapose these different visions.
and
In searching for a balance between free flows of information and
human rights, the trade perspective sets norms for relationships
relationships among

PRIVACY CODE
A MODEL PRIVACY
CANADIAN STANDARDS
STANDARDS ASSOCIATION,
54. CANADIAN
AssOCIATION, PROPOSAL FOR A
Er DES TELECOMS
T1L-COMS 88.
88.
L'INFORMATIQUE Ef
(1992), reprinted
reprintedin 1992/2 REVUE DE DROT
(1992),
DROIT DE L'lNFORMATIQUE
the code has not yet been completed.
Work on the
Id.
55. ld.
at 90.
56. Id.
ld. at
la vie privee
privge dans
dans Ie
le secteur
secteur prive:
privi: le
57. See Charlotte-Marie
Charlotte-Marie Pitrat, Protection
Protection de fa
Ie
DE DROIT
DROIr DE
DE L'lNFORMATIQUE
L'INFORMATIQUE Ef
ET DES
DES
bougent, 1992/2 REVUE DE
Canada et le
Canada
Ie Quebec bougen!,
T]hCOMS 86, 87.
TELECOMS

HeinOnline -- 6 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 301 1992-1993

302

Harvard
JournalofLaw &
Harvard Journal
& Technology

[Vol. 6

citizens. European
European democracies
democracies tend to assume that the state is needed
citizens.
needed
to develop the social community
develop.5" As
community within which individuals
individuals develop.58
a result, European
European countries
countries view data protection
protection regulation
regulation as the realm
realm
of "public
law"59 and define substantive rights and obligations in a way
"public law"59
example, computer
governance. For example,
computer
that reflects
reflects a statist
statist vision of governance.
databases
must
often
be
registered
with
the
government.'
Registration
databases
government. 60 Registration
of
frequently involves the disclosure to the data protection
protection authority of
detailed information
computer
information concerning
concerning the registrant's
registrant's data base and computer
operations.661" Europeans also tend to give more weight to human rights
operations.
concerns. This higher value may be seen in the special provisions
concerns.
provisions for
"sensitive"
data such
such as
as information
information pertaining
pertaining to race, health, sexual
"sensitive" data
preferences,
preferences, and political opinions as well as with the careful administration and judicial evaluation
evaluation of context to determine
determine if other
other data may be
be
62
62
sensitive.
American approach, in contrast, is founded
founded on principles
sensitive. The American
of private rights and libertarian governance.
governance.63
Americans
63
Americans are more
suspicious of the state,64
state,' and, consequently,
consequently, fair information
information practice
practice
standards
usually
weigh
free flows of information more heavily.
heavily.
standards
With the dramatic
of
dramatic political
political changes
changes in Eastern
Eastern Europe and the fall of
the Berlin Wall,
Wall, many formerly communist
communist countries are also trying to
information practice
practice to match their emerging
emerging
develop concepts
concepts of fair information
democracies. Hungary's
democracies.
Hungary's constitutional
constitutional court declared
declared the existence offair
offair

Protection Between Property
Liberties: A Civil Law
58. See Yves Poullet, Data
Data Protection
Property and Liberties:
Approach, in AMONGST
COMPUTERS AND LAW 161,
AMONGSf FRIENDS IN COMPUTERS
161, 175 (H.W.K. Kasperson
Kasperson
& A. Oskamp eds.,
eds., 1991).
1991).
&
Laws&
European
59. See Peter Blume, Remarks
Remarks at Privacy Laws
& Business Conference
Conference on New European
Community Data Protection Law, St. John's College,
1992), in Peter
Community
College, Cambridge
Cambridge (July 1992),
Culture and
and the Possibilities
Control, 3 LECTURES
PROTECTION
Possibilities of Control,
LECTURES ON DATA
DATA PROTECI10N
Blume, Legal Culture
(1992).
(1992).
Loi No. 78-17
60. See, e.g.,
e.g., 1984
1984 Data Protection
Protection Act, ch. 35 (U.K.); LoiNo.
78-17 du 66janvier
janvier 1978
relative it1 I'informatique,
l'informatique, aux fichiers etaux libert6s,
Iiberres, art. 16, 1978
1978 J.O. 227, 228 [Law No.
No.
78-17
files, and freedoms] (Fr.).
Jan. 6 relating to data processing,
processing, fIles,
78-17 of Jan.
See, e.g.,
U.K. Data Protection Registrar, Form DPR1 Application for Registration,
61. See,
e.g., U.K.
Registration,
Part
Part B (1984) (U.K.); D61ib6ration
Deliberation No. 79-03 du 23 octobre
octobre 1979
1979 portant adoption
adoption d'un
module de declaration
d6claration et de demande
calendrier d'appel
d'appel et d'un modele
demande d'avis n~cessaires
necessaires itAla mise
automatis6s d'informations
C.N.I.L.,
en oeuvre des traitements automatises
d'informations nominatives, reprinted
reprinted in C.N.I.L.,
1473, at 113,
113, 119 (1991).
(1991).
J.O. Informatiques
Informatiques et libert6s
Iiberres No. 1473,
European Convention,
supra note 7, § 6; Schwartz,
Schwartz, supra
supra note 9.
62. See, e.g., European
Convention, supra
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 11,
11, at208-09;
63. See Reidenberg,
at 208-09; David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's
Place
Tort Law, 41 CAsE
Place in the Intellectual
Intellectual History of Tort
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 769, 785-88
(1991); Paul Schwartz,
Schwartz, Data
DataProcessing
and Government
GovernmentAdministration:
Processing and
Administration: The Failure
Failure of the
(1991);
American Legal
Legal Response to the Computer,
Computer, 43 HASflNGS
HASTNGS L.J. 1321,
1321, 1350-51 (1992).
(1992).
American
64. See Herbert
ComparativePerspective,
122
64.
Herbert J. Spiro, Privacy
Privacy in Comparative
Perspective, in XIII NOMOS
NOMOS 121,
121, 122
(J. Roland Pennock
1971).
Pennock &
& John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
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information practice
practice rights just as the nation sought to distance itself from
the Soviet political system.6
system. 65 Czechoslovakia, between its freedom and
enacted a fair information
law.'66 Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, Poland
demise, enacted
information practices
practices law.
Poland
standards,' and Bulgaria
Bulgaria
also saw the need for fair information practice standards,67
began to consider statutory rights and obligations.
obligations.668
began
"
As global information
information networks
networks took shape, the trade perspective
of fair information
accommodate
adopted narrower
narrower evaluations offair
information practice to accommodate
the complexity of information-sharing
narrower
information-sharing arrangements.
arrangements. These narrower
evaluations
information. Global
Global
evaluations set norms in favor of free flows of information.
information
information networks
networks enable information to be available instantaneously
instantaneously
in virtually any part of the world. This availability and control of
of
69
information affects an individual's ability to participate
information
participate in society. 69 Yet,
examination ofparticular
ofparticular international
international data flow circumstances
circumstances
the narrow examination
concentration of control over a tremendous
tremendous
will not address the overall concentration
of
information in the private sector. While the effect of
amount of personal information
7
' the overall
this concentration
concentration can be either positive or negative,
negative,70
overall shift
challenges traditional norms of relations between individuals and industry
challenges
as well as the role of the state as an arbiter of fair information
information practices.
The choice between the trade and technical perspectives also involves
norms of governance.
of
governance. The technical paradigm locates control
control of
information practices in the network infrastructure.
infrastructure. Technical
Technical organizaorganizadefine the norms for integrity and
tions rather than governments
governments defme
interoperability. As the trend in standards organizations
demonstrates,
interoperability.
organizations demonstrates,
these standards of fair information practice are expanding
expanding to cover all
71
National
National boundaries become
become secondary
secondary to
aspects of network use. 71
network
obligates national
network borders. In contrast, the trade paradigm obligates

Ldszl6 Majtenyi, Central
Central and
and East European
Countries:Progress
65. See Laszlo
European Countries:
Progress Towards the
Elaboration
DataProtection
Elaboration of Data
Protection Laws-Hungary,
Laws-Hungary, in Proceedings,
Proceedings, supra
supra note 8,
8, at 80.
CzechoslovakiaEnacts
ProtectionLaw, PRIVACY
66. See Czechoslovakia
Enacts Data
Data Protection
PRIVACY L. & Bus., Oct. 1992,
1992, at
8; lin
Jiri Fronek,
andEast
EastEuropean
Elaborationof
Fronek, Central
Central and
European Countries:
Countries: Progress
Progress Towards the Elaboration
of
Data Protection
Laws-Czechoslovakia, in Proceedings,
Proceedings, supra
supra note 8, at 77.
Data
Protection Laws-Czechoslovakia,
Central and East Europe
Countries: Progress
Progress Towards
Towards the
67. See Ewa Letowska,
LelOwska, Central
Europe Countries:
Elaboration
DataProtection
Proceedings, supra
supra note 8, at 83.
Elaboration ofData
Protection Laws-Poland,
Laws-Poland, in Proceedings,
83.
See ABA CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW IN1TATIvE, ANALYSIS OF BULGARIA'S
68. SeeABACENTRALANoEAsrEUROPEANLAwINmATIVE,ANALYSISOFBULGARIA'S
DRAFT
INFORMATION LAW
(1992).
DRAFf INFORMATION
LAW (1992).

Privacyin an Information
InformationSociety, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
REV.
69. See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy
707,
732-34 (1987).
(1987).
707,732-34
70.
information are cuslOmcustom70. Some of the positive aspects of widely available personal infonnation
ization of consumer products
products and better
better targeting
targeting of consumers. Some of the negative
negative
aspects
"information profiles."
aspects are loss of privacy and isolation
isolation for those outside "infonnation
profiles. »
71. See supra
supra notes 54-57 and accompanying
accompanying text.
71.
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authorities and multilateral instruments to define standards of fair
information practice and assumes that regulatory jurisdiction
jurisdiction will be based
on national borders.
borders.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
Global information networks do not conform neatly to any clear choice
choice
governance. Networks
operate
Networks operate
between technical and trade norms of governance.
within and across national
controlled
national borders and link separately controlled
information
systems.
For
example,
a
simple
transaction-processing
information
transaction-processing
network may involve
involve data capture
capture in one country, a transaction authorizacomputer site located
located in a second
second country,
country, and
tion system
system at a remote computer
settlement processing in a third country on another computer system.
settlement
Thus, setting standards for fair information
information practices
practices will depend on both
governance principles
the trade and technical sides.
sides. National
National governance
principles will guide
governance principles
trade-based standards,
standards, and network
network governance
principles will inform
technical
technical standards.
standards.
If global information networks
networks are to be free of unnecessary
unnecessary roadblocks,
policymakers
must
develop
complex
interactions
to accommodate
accommodate
blocks, policymakers
develop
the variety of normative
normative choices and standards
standards that confront each other
other
on the networks. Standards
Standards of fair information practices will not come
from a single source or a single view.'
view. 72 The inextricable
inextricable link between
between
standards
information practice
practice and governance
governance suggests
suggests that a
standards of fair information
complex
complex system of overlapping
overlapping regulation or co-regulation will be needed
needed
information flows on global networks. Co-regulation
to set the terms for information
Co-regulation
permits national and network
practice to
network definitions
definitions of fair information practice
mesh. Global
accommodate different norms of
of
Global networks
networks must be able to accommodate
governance.
governance. Trade-based
Trade-based standards in one part of a global network may
overlap with technical standards
standards in other parts of the global network.
Without co-regulation,
transborder
data flow prohibitions would seek to
co-regulation,
export
of
export normative values rather than to restrict the transmission
transmission of
personal information.
To prevent global electronic gridlock,
gridlock, we must understand
understand and
and
appreciate
more
thoroughly
the
evolving
governance norms for global
appreciate
evolving governance
global

72. See Spiros Simitis,
Simitis, New Trends in
in National
National and International
International Data
Data Protection,
Protection, in
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DEVELOPMENTS IN
IN DATA
DATA PRIvACY
DATA PROTECTION BILL
RECENT
PRIVACY LAWS: BELGIUM'S DATA
AND THE
DREcrrvE 22-23
1992).
AND
THE EUROPEAN
EUROPEAN DRAFt
DRAFT DIRECTIVE
22-23 (J. Dumothier ed.,
ed., 1992).

HeinOnline -- 6 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 304 1992-1993

Spring,
Spring, 1993]
1993]

Global
Global Electronic
Electronic Highways
Highways

305

information
'
information networks.
networks. The movement
movement toward
toward contextual
contextual evaluations
evaluations73
marks
marks the
the beginning
beginning of more
more sophisticated
sophisticated and appropriate
appropriate global
global network
network
regulation.
regulation.

73. See,
See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra
supranote 1, atS171-76.
CompareProposed Directive,
supra
at S171-76. Compare
Directive, supra
14, art. 24 with Amended Proposal,
supra note 3,
3, art. 26.
note 14,
Proposal, supra
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

The Information Superhighway
Superhighway in the United States and the emerging
emerging
Infrastructure place standards
of
Global Information
Information Infrastructure
standards for the treatment
treatment of
personal
personal information
information at the forefront
forefront of policy discussions
discussions among
businesses, governments,
governments, and citizens.
citizens.1l Because
Because the control
control of information
information
means power, standards for the treatment
personal information
information have
treatment of personal
significant societal
significant
societal implications. Legal rules, industry norms, and business
practices collectively form these standards.2 Financially, the standards for
the control of flows of personal
economic impact
impact
personal information have a large economic
Businesses
Businesses rely on personal information for activities ranging from backoffice
Standards allocate
office personnel
personnel management
management to product sales. Standards
allocate both
economic
adequate standards for the
economic benefits and burdens. Politically, adequate
treatment
citizen
treatment of personal
personal information
information are a necessary condition
condition for citizen
participation in a democracy!
to
democracy.s Since ancient Greece, a citizen's right to
participation

*
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Infrastructure Task Force,
1. Se,
See, e.g.,
e.g., Infonnation
Force, National Information
Infonnation Infrastructure:
Infrastructure:
Agenda
Society:.
Agenda for Action 9-10 (Sept. 1993);
1993); Europe
Europe and the Global Information
Infonnation Society:
Recommendations to the European
1994), available on Internet World
Recommendations
European Council 18 (May 26, 1994),
Wide Web at http:://www.earn.net
http:://www.eam.net (also known widely as the Bangemann
Bangemann Report).
2. "Legal
"Legal rules" consist of statutory mandates, regulatory obligations, and court
decisions. "Industry norms" come from business sector
"Businems
sector aspirations and expectations.
expectations. "Busint'll.~
contexts rather than
practice" describes the actual treatment
treatment of information
infonnation in commercial
commercial contexts
than a
legally mandated treatment or an aspiration
aspiration goal.
Spiros Simitis, Reviewing
3. See
SeeSpiros
Reviewing Privacy
Privacy in an Information
Infonnation Society, 135 U. Pa. L.
1.. Rev. 707.
732-37 (1987).
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732-37
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participate in society has depended
depended on the ability to control the disclosure
of personal information.44 Without appropriate standards, citizens may be
unduly constrained
constrained in their interactions with society. Socially,
Socially, the
treatment of
of personal
information is an element of basic human dignity.
dignity.
personal information
Fair treatment of personal information
information accords respect to an individual's
individual's
relationships.
personality. Standards, thus, structure social relationships.
The terminology
fair information
been
terminology for standards of fuir
information practice has been
"privacy" is often used to
to
poorly defined in the United States. The term "privacy"
allocation of rights to personal
describe the allocation
personal information.5s This rhetoric is
"Privacy" selVes
serves as a catch-all term, protecting
protecting a variety of
of
confusing. "Privacy"
government intrusion into the bedroom6
bedrooms to the
interests ranging from government
communications! Although fuir
fair information
information
telephone communications.'
inviolability of telephone
subsumed under the broad "privacy" label, the standards
practices may be subsumed
represent
interest maintaining
of
represent a narrower and distinct interest:
maintaining the integrity of
personal
personal information and fairness to the individuals about whom the data
relates. Specifically, such standards apply to the collection, storage, use,
and disclosure of personal information.
of
For the business community, the U.S. standards for the treatment of
personal
twenty
personal information have never been more important.
important For almost twenty
years, industry has avoided
avoided the imposition
imposition of legal rules through the
promotion
promotion of self-regulatory
self-regulatory policies!
policies.s Yet, in the last few years, both
both the
implementation of appropriate
development of industry norms and the implementation
business practices
on a selfselfpractices for self-regulation,
self-regulation, as well as the consensus on'
regulatory
regulatory model, have broken
broken down. Public
Public opinion no longer views
6f personal
industry treatment of
personal information
information as benign, and Congress is
exerting
waking up from years of dormancy. At the same time, Europe is exerting
an
opinion because
they had no
an opinion
because they
no control over access
access to property and consequently
consequently no control
control
over
space. See Blaise Lemper, Informatique
Informatique et Democratie
Democratie
over the flow of information from that space.
19 (1987) (stating that
droita
19
that the droit
a laparol--the
la parole-the right to participate
participate in public debate-was
debate-was only
accorded
exclude others from access
access to property
property or
or a private space).
space). In
accorded to those with rights to exclude
essence,
essence, the rules for access to
to and
and use of personal information determine
determine the extent
extent and
quality
citizen's participation
quality of
of aa citizen's
participation in democracy.
4. See Lemper, supra note 3, at 19
19 (noting that a Greek citizen needed to control
control a
'private"
space in
in order
order to
participate in
in public
life). In
is a precondition
"private" space
to participate
public life).
In essence,
essence, privacy
privacy is
precondition for
for
democracy. Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy.
Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe
and the
the United States 32 (1992).
(1992).
5. See, e.g., Alan
Alan F. Westin,
Westin, Privacy
Privacy and Freedom (1967).
(1967).
6.
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
381 U.S.
U.S. 479,
479, 485-86
485436 (1965).
(1965).
7. See, ag.,
e.g., Telecommunications
Telecommunications Network
Network SecuritySecurity: Hearings
Hearings Before
Before the Subcomm. on
on
Telecommunications
Telecommunications and Finance
Finance of
of the House
House Comm.
Comm on Energy
Energy and
and Commerce,
Commerce, 103d
10M
Cong.,
[hereinafter Hearings]
Cong., Ist
1st Sess. 31-41
31-41 (1993)
(1993) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement
(statement of
of Raymond
Raymond G.
G. Kammer,
Acting Director, National
of Standards
Standards and Technology, Dept. of Commerce)
Commerce)
National Institute
Institute of
(discussing
the use of the Clipper
Clipper Chip to assure that
that the
the nation's
nation's telecommunications
telecommunications
(discussing the
infrastructure
compatible with wiretaps);
wiretaps); see
see alsoJaleen
Jaleen Nelson, Note, Sledge
Sledge Hammers
Infrastructure was compatible
and Scalpels:
Scalpels: The
The FBI
FBI Digital Wiretap
Wiretap Bill
Bill and its Effect on
on Free Flow
Flow of Information
Information and
and
Privacy, 41
1147-55 (1994).
(1994).
41 UCLAL
UClA L. Rev. 1139,
1139, 1147-55
8. See,
See, eg.,
e.g., U.S.
U.S. Privacy
Privacy Protection
Protection Study
Study Comm'n, Personal
Personal Privacy
Privacy in an
an Information
Information
Society
Society (1977)
(1977) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Privacy
Privacy Comm'n].
Comm'n].
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greater
greater pressure on companies
companies with global information
infonnation needs. After
Mter a
restrict
decade of little activity, foreign countries have begun to restrict
information flows to destinations
infonnation
destinations perceived as lacking sufficient
sufficient standards.
Directive on the Protection
of
The European Union's proposed
proposed Council
Council Directive
Protection of
Free
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement
Movement of Such Data has further renewed international
international debate on the
information by U.S. businesses.9
treatment of personal infonnation
The confluence
confluence of plans for an Information
Infonnation Superhighway, actual
actual
industry se1f:.regulatory
self-regulatory practices, and international
industIy
international pressure
pressure dictate
renewed
renewed consideration of standard setting for fair information
infonnation practices
practices in
in
the U.S. private sector. The legal rules, industry
industIy norms, and business
practices
United
practices that regulate
regulate the treatment of personal information in the United
States are organized in a wide and dispersed manner. This Article analyzes
how these standards are established
established in the U.S. private sector.
Part I argues that the U.S. standards derive from the influence
influence of
of
for
American political philosophy on legal rule making and a preference
preference for
dispersed
infonnation standards. American
American standards are
dispersed sources of information
characteristically ad hoc and narrowly targeted. The driving force behind
characteristically
such narrow
narrow fair information
information practice
practice standards is the philosophy that
that
government should be limited and that a "marketplace of ideas" allows
government
only minimal restrictions
information, including
restrictions on flows of infonnation,
including personal
information. As a corollary, this philosophy encourages
encourages dispersion
dispersion in
in
infonnation.
standard-setting authority. Part I consequently sets out the variety of
of
standard-setting
sources for standards
in
the
absence
of
general
legal
rules
for
fair
standards
fair
information practice.
infonnation
Part II examines
aggregation of legal
legal rules, industry
industIy norms, and
examines the aggregation
business practice from these various decentralized
decentralized sources. This Article
Article
proposes that standards must be considered in the context of particular
particular
situations. This section
section draws on a checklist of commonly accepted,
international
principles
of fair infonnation
information practices and analyzes several
international
several
contexts
in
key
industrial
sectors
to understand
contexts
understand the sufficiency
sufficiency of U.S.
practices. This Part concludes
concludes that important deficiencies
deficiencies
rules, norms, and practices.
exist in the U.S. treatment
treatment of personal
personal information.
infonnation. Moreover, these
significant in light of foreign scrutiny
deficiencies
international data
deficiencies are significant
scrutiny of international
flows.
flows.
Part III ties the deficiencies
deficiencies back
back to the underlying
underlying U.S. philosophy
and argues that the adherence to targeted st:aD.dards
stahdards has frustrated the very
purposes of the narrow, ad hoc regulatory
regulatory approach
approach to setting private
sector standards.
standards. This section argues that instead
instead of minimizing
minimizing the
manipulation of citizens and their thinking through unfettered flows of
manipulation of citizens and their thinking through unfettered
of
information, the private sector has established
established a "smoke screen" that in
infonnation,
in
through
effect enables subtle, yet significant, manipulation of citizens
citizens through
9. See Spiros Simitis, From
Directive on the Protection
Protection
From the Market
Market to the Polis: The EU Directive
of Personal
restrictions of
of
Personal Data, 80 Iowa
Iowa L
1.. Rev. 445 (1995).
(1995). The proposed
proposed directive calls for restrictions
suffident level of data
data flows to nonmember
nonmember countries that lack a sufficient
data protection.
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information.
personal infonnation.
hidden control of personal
Part IV addresses the irony that European
European pressure should force the
United States to revisit the setting of standards for the private sector. This
section argues that this pressure
pressure should instigate
instigate a return to the basic goals
of American
American political
political values regarding
regarding the use and flow of information and
comprehensive, yet flexible, legal
should result in more comprehensive,
legal rules. This Part
concludes with a theory for global data flows on the basis of the use of
concludes
of
decentralized
U.S. standards
standards despite
d~spite differing national
nation.'ll legal
legal rules and
decentralized U.S.
European scrutiny.
European
I.

PuRsUIT OF TARGETED STANDARDS
THE ZEALOUS
ZEALOUS ADHERENCE
ADHERENCE TO THE
THE PURSUIT

Despite the growth of the Information
Information Society, the United States has
comprehensive legal rules for fair
resisted all calls for omnibus or comprehensive
on
information practice in the private
private sector. IO Legal rules have developed on
an ad hoc, targeted basis,"
basis,II while industry has elaborated
elaborated voluntary norms
and practices
practices for particular problems.212 Over the years, there has been an
almost zealous adherence
adherence to this ideal of narrowly targeted
targeted standards.
s1landards. In
other countries, the response
response to the Information
Infonnation Age has been quite
different
Foreign nations have enacted broad, sweeping "data protection"
different. Foreign
both public and private
infonnation practices in 'both
laws to establish fair information
3IS
sectors.
information standards
In democratic
democratic society, information
standards reflect specific
specific
14
4
govemance. An individual's desire for seclusion from the
conceptions of governance.
conceptions
information for
public realm opposes the societal value in a free flow of infonnation
set
information set
economic or political gain. Legal rules for the treatment
treatment of infonnation
economic
(1974), reprinted
repinted in 1974
10. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong.,
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974),
(explaining the decision not to extend the Privacy Act
Act of
of
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6929, 6932-34
6932-34 (explaining
U.S.C.CA.N.
Gelman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and
1974 to cover the private sector);
sector); Robert M. Gellman,
Discontinuous: The Failure
Failure of Federal
Federal Privacy Regulatory
Regulatory Proposals
Proposals and Institutions, 6
Discontinuous:
Personal Privacy
Privacy in the Computer Age: The
Software
(1993); Arthur R. Miller, Personal
Software LJ. 199 (1993);
Challenge of a New Technology
Technology in an Information-Oriented
Information-Oriented Society, 67 Mich. L Rev. 1089
(1969).
(1969).
SeeJoel
11.
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy
Privacy in an Information
Information Economy:
Economy: A Fortress or Frontier
Frontier for
11. See
(1992).
Individual Rights?,
Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. LJ. 195
195 (1992).
12. See, e.g., Privacy Comm'n, supra note 8, at 34 ("In the private sector, the Commission
Commission
is not
change Is
not
specifies voluntary compliance
compliance when the present need for the recommended
recommended change
specifies
.... .");
acute enough to justify mandatory
mandatory legislation
legislation ....
"); Direct Marketing
Marketing Ass'n, Mail Preference
Service
Service (describing a DMA program for consumers
consumers to have their names and addresses
solicitations).
suppressed
suppressed from mailing lists for junk mail solicitations).
13. See,
Private Registers Etc. Act, No. 293, 1978
1978 (Den.),
(Den.), amended ly
by Act No. 383,
Se, e.g.,
eg., Private
janvier
translated in Danish Ministry
Ministry of Justice, Pub. No. 622 (Oct. 2, 1987); Loi du 6 janvier
1987, translated
ierinted in
libertes (Fr.), reprinted
in A.C.M.
AC.M. Nugter,
1978
1978 relative Ia l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libert6s
Data Within the EC 353-63
353-63 (1990);
(1990); Wet Persoonsregistraties,
Transborder Flow of Personal Data
connection
1988
1988 (Neth.) (Act of Dec. 27, 1988 providing rules for the protection of privacy in connection
(U.K.),
reprinted in Nugter, supra, at 397;
397; Data Protection Act, 1984 (U.K.),
with personal data files),
files), reprinted
& Bus., Oct.
reprinted in Nugter, supra, at 365; see aio
also Data
Data Protection
Protection Roundup, Privacy Laws &
replinted
countries).
1994, at 2-8 (summarizing the status of data protection
protection legislation in 35 countries).
14. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 32.
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boundaries for
for state
state intrusion
intrusion into
into aa citizen's
citizen's life
life and
and for
for state
state control
control of
of aa
boundaries
citizen's conduct.
conduct. For
For private
private interactions
interactions and
and the
the relationships
relationships between
between
citizen's
both law
law and
and practice
practice set
set the
the balance
balance between
between dignity
dignity and
and free
free
citizens, both
citizens,
flows of
of information.
information. In
In American
American society,
society, two
two powerful
powerful political
political values
values
flows
of narrowly
narrowly targeted
targeted standards:
standards: (1)
(1) the
the desire
desire to
have driven
driven the
the pursuit
pursuit of
have
minimize restrictions
restrictions on
on information
information flows
flows and
and (2)
(2) the
the desire
desire to
to disperse
disperse
minimize
standards setting.
setting.
standards

A. The Desire
Desire to Minimize Restrictions
Restrictions on
on Information
Information Flows
A.
its founding, the
the American
American democracy
democracy faced
faced two
two broad
broad ideological
ideological
At its
commitments: one
one republican
republican and
and the other
other (since
(since termed) liberal. The
The
commitments:
republican commitment
commitment emphasized
emphasized self-government,
self-government, while the
the liberal
liberal
republican
commitment focused on
on individual
individual rights. The Constitution
Constitution of the
the United
United
commitment
States reflected
reflected a synthesis
synthesis of these
these two
two commitments.'
commitments.!!;5 In the
the course
course of
of
its
development,
American
politics
enshrined
belief
in
limited
in
limited
a
belief
enshrined
politics
American
its development,
government
distinct from foreign
foreign models of democracy. While both state
government distinct
and
national
governments
intervened
in the economy
economy from the
the birth of the
intervened
governments
and national
republic,
American
political
has
consistently
strong
had a strong
has
consistently
thought
political
American
republic,
society
through
of
government
society
through
antistatist
element.
as
role
in
government
as
the
role
Even
antistatist element
of social
social welfare increased
increased during
during both
both the Progressive
Progressive Era and
and
regulation of
the New Deal Era, American
political
philosophy
still
reflected
a
substantial
substantial
reflected
American political
degree of hostility
hostility toward
toward the regulation
regulation of private relations. I66 Elsewhere,
continental Europe, prevailing
prevailing politics
politics viewed
viewed the government
government
namely in continental
more benevolently.
benevolently. Professor
Professor Glendon
Glendon has aptly observed that the
discourse of American politics
politics is now cast in terms of "rights talk."'
talk."177 This
discourse
power
government
on
rhetoric of rights emphasizes
government power over the
emphasizes limitations
American welfare state during the
citizen. While the emergence of an American
twentieth century
century may have signaled
signaled a greater role for government
government in the
intervene in the
government should not intervene
marketplace, the idea that the government
marketplace,
marketplace of ideas in the absence of compelling
compelling needs remains
remains
marketplace
relationships or private
dominant.
dominant Rather than government action, private relationships
information
contracts, thus, become
become a principal source of regulation for information
flows.
Restraining Government
1. The Constitutional
Emphasis on Restraining
ConstitutionalEmphasis
American
These liberal and republican influences commit the American
Constitution to insuring citizens access to government, while also
emphasizing the protection of citizens from government.
government The principal

15.
American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum.
in Modern
Modem American
History "Lite"
"lite"in
See Martin Flaherty, History
15. Su
L.
523 (1995).
(1995).
L Rev.
Rev. 523
L.
180 U. Pa.
Pa. L.
of the Public/private
Public/Private Distinction, 130
History of
16.
J. Horwitz,
Horwitz, The History
Morton J.
16. See Morton
1426 (1982).
(1982).
Rev.
Rev. 1423,
1423, 1426
1-17, 47Discourse 1-17,
of Political Discourse
The Impoverishment
Impoverishment ofPolitica1
Rights Talk:
Talk The
Glendon, Rights
17. Su
SeeMaryA.
Mary A. Glendon,
17.
75 (1991).
(1991).
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of authority between the states and
focus of the Constitution is the division of
the federal government and the allocation of power across the branches of
government1 18 At
At the federal level, the Constitution enumerates
enumerates
federal government
government powers, and the Bill of Rights sets out due process
searches and seizures, and guarantees
requirements, prohibits random searches
and freedom of the press!9
press. 9 While no explicit
explicit
freedom of assembly and
protection for fair information practices appears in the Federal
Constitution, the Supreme Court has found implicit constitutional
privacy. 20 The privacy cases establish the individual as the
protection for privacy.20
governmentl21 In
In
"lone-bearer" of powerful
powerful rights of autonomy against the government
essence, the Supreme Court's "rights" jurisprudence,
jurisprudence, especially in the
privacy area, emphasizes
emphasizes protections of the citizen against the government,
other.n The Court
rather than direct protection of citizens against each other.22
constitutional
has required that state action
action be present to apply constitutional
protections;
sufficient. As Professor Tribe wrote:
protections; private conduct is not sufficient
"Nearly all of the Constitution's self-executing, and
"Nearly
all of the Constitution's self-executing, and therefore judicially
guarantees of individual rights shield individuals only from
enforceable, guarantees
government
of
government action. Accordingly, when litigants claim the protection of
such guarantees, courts must first determine
it is indeed
determine whether
whether it
government
government action-state or federal-that the litigants are challenging."2
challenging.,,25
government
Similarly, state constitutions focus on the role of the state government
contain explicit
with respect to citizens. While several state constitutions
constitutions do contain
explicit
rights to privacy, most restrain
government from intruding
citizens'
restrain the govemment
intruding on citizens'
privacy, rather than protect citizens directly from each other.
other.244 The
25
California
exception.25 Although
California
California Constitution is the rare exception.
Although the California

18. See
See id. at
at 4.
19.
19. U.S.
U.S. Const., amends.
amends. I, IV-V, XIV, § 1.
U.S. 113, 152 (1973)
20. See,
See, eg.,
e.g., Roe v. Wade,
Wade, 410
410 U.S.
(1973) (stating that although
although "[t]he
Constitution
privacy...
the Court has recognized
Constitution does
does not explicitly
explicitly mention any
any right of privacy,
.•• the.
recognized
that
personal privacy,
certain areas
or zones
exist
that aa right
right of
of personal
privacy, or
or aa guarantee
guarantee of
of certain
areas or
zones of privacy, does
does exist
under the Constitution") (citations
(citations omitted); Griswold
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85
(1964) (stating that
that the
the right of privacy is created
created by
by several
seve.ra1 fundamental constitutional
constitutional
(1964)
guarantees).
guarantees) •
21. Professors
and Sandel
Sandel have
have criticized
criticized the right to privacy as evolving toward
toward
21.
Professors Glendon
Glendon and
SewGlendon,
an Individual's
Individual's right
right to
to make choices free of
of government
government interference. See
Glendon, supra
supra

note
17, at
(arguing that
privacy has
redefined as the
the right to
to make
note 17,
at 57
57 (arguing
that privacy
has been
been redefined
make decisions
decisions without
without
governmental
governmental intrusion);
intrusion); MichaelJ.
MichaelJ. Sandel,
Sandel, Moral
Moral Argument and Liberal
Liberal Toleration:
Toleration: Abortion
Abortion
and
L. Rev.
For aa critique
and Homosexuality,
Homosexuality, 77
77 Cal.
Cal. 1..
Rev. 521,
521, 527-28
527-28 (1989).
(1989). For
critique of
of this
this view,
view, see
see

generally
Linda McClain,
McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility,
UJ. 989
Irresponsibility, 43 Duke 1..J.
989 (1994).
(1994).
generally Linda
The Right
Right of Privacy, 102
102 Harv.
Halv. L
1.. Rev. 737 (1989)
(1989) (arguing
(arguing that
that
22. SeeJed
SeeJed Rubenfeld, The

the
the privacy
privacy cases
cases are
are about
about protecting
protecting citizens
citizens against the
the government's
government's ability to
to dictate
dictate
choices
to human
human individuality);
individuality); Sandel, supra
supra note 21,
21, at 525 (arguing
(arguing
choices that are fundamental to

that
"old privacy"
cases emphasize
surveillance and
that "old
privacy" cases
emphasize protection
protection against
against state
state sUlVeillance
and "new
"new privacy"
privacy" cases
cases
emphasize
of individual decisions
decisions or autonomy
autonomy against
against government restrictions
restrictions on
on
emphasize protection
protection of

particular
conduct).
particular forms
forms of
of conduct).
23. Lawrence
18-1, at
American Constitutional
Constitutional Law
Law § 18-1,
at 1688
1688 (2d ed. 1988)
1988)
Lawrence H. Tribe, American
(footnotes omitted).
omitted).
24. See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., Ariz. Const. art. II,
II, §§ 8; Ill. Const. art. I, § 6.
25. See
See Cal.
Cal. Const. art. I, § 1.
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Privacy Clause affords restraints
restraints on individual
individual action, in practice, Privacy
Clause cases emphasize
emphasize protection against the state.266
U.S.
In developing
developing the state
state and federal constitutional emphasis, the U.S.
Supreme
eventually supported the growth of economic and social
Supreme Court eventually
during, the Progressive
Progressive and post-New Deal eras against
against
regulation during.
challenges
acceptance
challenges of intrusive government.:a This constitutional acceptance
reflected an emerging belief in the use of law as an instrument
instrument for the
enhancement
of
personal
through
social
welfare
freedom
Supreme
enhancement
personal
through social welfure.!28' The Supreme
Court, however, preserved scrutiny of regulation to assure that government
government
secured, rather than intruded upon, the participation of citizens
in
citizens in
society.29
society.29
The constitutional
constitutional emphasis
emphasis on protection
protection against the government
government
enshrines free flows of information
information
formed the basis of a legal canon that enshrines
and minimal
minimal restrictions on the treatment of information. As Justice
Brandeis once wrote, the First Amendment secures the "freedom to think
think."so° To have this liberty of thought,
as you will and to speak as you think.""
information must be freely available. The prevailing U.S. doctrine
doctrine for the
treatment
treatment of personal
personal information does not look to the positive use of
regulation to secure
freedom' sl To ensure information
secure such
such freedom.
information is freely
committed to the "marketplace
"marketplace
available, American
American courts have long been committed
of ideas."
ideas."s22 Under
Under this canon, democracy functions best when ideas, no
no
acceptance in
in
matter how well founded
founded or repugnant, vie openly
openly for acceptance
of ideas means that
society. For political
political discourse,
discourse, the free expression or"
that
government-imposed restrictions on information are disfavored. Beyond
Beyond
government-imposed
the political
political realm, the Supreme
Supreme Court extends, at least to some extent,
this principle of minimally restrained 'information
information flows to the communica-

26. SeeJ. Clark Kelso, California's
California's Constitutional
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 327,
(discussing the impetus for the constitutional amendment
amendment that added the privacy
418 (1992)
(1992) (discussing
clause).
surrounding the amendment
amendment to the California
Constitution
clause). While the political debate surrounding
California Constitution
adding this right to privacy
privacy suggested
suggested that regulation of the private sector was one of the
objectives,
ERg.,
objectives, the cases interpreting
interpreting the provision generally
generally have a nexus with state
state action.
action. E.g.,
Porten v. University
University of San Francisco,
Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal.
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (involving
information disclosed to a state agency
agency in connection
connection with a student
student loan
personal information
application). The California
Supreme Court recently held that the Privacy
application).
California :,!upreme
Privacy Clause
Clause applies
applies to
purely private conduct. Hill v. NCAA,
NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
1994).
27. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding wage regulation
regulation
against constitutional attack).
attack).
28. See, e.g.,
eg., Occupational
Occupational Health
Health and Safety
Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
651-678 (1988 &
& Supp. V
1993). Congress intended
intended OHSA
OHSA health
health and safety regulations to foster citizens' ability to
work. Id. § 651.
651.
29. See United
v. Carolene
Carolene Prods., 304
(1938).
United States v.
304 U.S.
U.S. 144, 152-53
152-53 n.4 (1938).
'Whitney v. California, 274 u.s.
US. 357,
375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
30. Whitneyv.
357,375
(1927) (Brandeis,J.,
concurring).
31. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution
although
31.
Constitution 197-257 (1993)
(1993) (arguing that, although
prevailing
interpretations exalt wholly unregulated
unregulated speech, government
prevailing constitutional
constitutional interpretations
government
intervention
inteIVention in the "marketplace of speech" can be understood
understood as consistent
consistent with the
Constitution).
Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 113 S. Ct. 1806, 1808 (1993);
(1993); Virginia State
32. See, e.g.,
e.g., Turner
Turner Broadcasting
Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia
U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
(1976).
ofPharmacyv.
Vrrginia Citizen Consumer Council, 425 U.s.
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discourse-- "commercial speech."33
55
tion of ideas unrelated to political discourse-

2. The "Right
"Right to Privacy"
Privacy" Between Citizens
For the treatment of personal information between
between citizens, "the right
to privacy"
privacy" first
first emerged as a narrow tort claim against yellow journalism.
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis launched the tort based on "the right
privacy" in a law review article that sought to justify restricting the
to privacy"
behavior of the tabloid press in Boston.M54 In the ensuing century, the
misappropriacommon-law tort developed four distinct branches: (1) the lllisappropriacommercial purposes, (2)
(2) the public
tion of name or likeness for commercial
disclosure
(3) intrusion upon seclusion, and (4) false light
disclosure of private facts, (3)
publicity.s5
publicity.55
Scholars have debated
debated theories of privacy ever since Warren and
m
Each
Brandeis immortalized the phrase "the right to be let alone."
alone."M
Each
tort, however, focuses precisely on narrow
branch of the common-law tort,
information
restraints of private conduct and minimizes restrictions on information
flows."57
flows.
The misappropriation
misappropriation tort is a right only against
against the unauthorized
unauthorized use
of a person's name
name or likeness
likeness for commercial purposes.ssss The tort seeks
9
to protect the commercial value of an individual's identity.
identity.59
This original
original
emphasized protection
unauthorized
protection from unauthorized
purpose of this action emphasized

33. Vi7ginia
IrginiaSlate
State Bd.
Bd. of PhaTTlUWj,
Phannacy, 425 U.S.
U.S. at 770-73.
770-73.
34. Samuel D.
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.
L Rev. 193
M.
D. Warren Be
(1890).
(1890).
35. See Restatement
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 (1977)
(categorizing the various privacy
(1977) (categorizing
privacy tort
actions); William
L Rev. 383, 389 (1960)
William Prosser, The Right
Right to Privacy, 48
48 Cal. L.
(1960) (arguing
(arguing that
that
"the law
law of privacy
privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasions
invasions of four different
different interests
interests of the
plaintiff").
plalntiff'). The false light branch of
of the privacy tort is similar to defamation. However, unlike
unlike
actions for defamation,
defumation, the false light privacy
privacy tort does not
not seek to
to protect
protect an individual's
individual's
reputation and
predicated on malice.
reputation
and is not
not predicated
36.
36. Although
Although the phrase "the right to be let alone" is often
often attributed
attributed to Warren
Warren and
Brandeis, they
they were
were actually
actually quoting the leading
leading torts treatise
treatise of the
the day.
day: Cooley
Cooley on Torts.
Scholarly
ag., Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an
privacy theories
theories has
has flourished. S,
S~ e.g.,
an
Scholarly debate on privacy
Aspect
(1964);
Aspect of Human
Human Dignity:
Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 963 (1964);
Charles
UJ. 475, 475 (1975);
Privacy. Its Origin,
Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy:
Charles Fried,
Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale
Yale L.J.
(1975); Jack
Function, and Future, 99J.
Rereading Warren
J. Legal
Legal Stud. 649,
6~9, 649 (1980);
(1980); Robert
Robert C. Post, Rereading
Warren and
and
L Rev. 647, 647 (1991)
(1991)
Brandeis: Privacy, Property and
and Appropriation,
Appropriation, 41 Case
Case W. Res. L.
[hereinafter Post, Rereading];
Social Foundations
[hereinafter
Rereading]; Robert
Robert C. Post, The
The Social
Foundations of Privacy.
Privacy: Community
and Self
Self in
in the
the Common Law
Law Tort, 77 Cal.
Cal. L.
L. Rev. 957
957 (1989);
(1989); Westin,
Westin, supra
supra note 5,
5, at
at 34634649.
37. Professor
Glendon argued
argued that
that the
the Warren
Warren and
and Brandeis
Brandeis formulation
formulation of the right
right to
to
Professor Glendon
privacy
Stuart Mill
privacy is
Is consistent
consistent with
with the John
John Stuart
Mill tradition of protecting
protecting individuals.
individuals. Glendon,
Glendon,
supra note 17, at
at 54.
38. See Restatement
Restatement (Second) of
of Torts § 652C
652C (1977)
(1977) (describing
(describing the
the tort of
of appropriation
tion of
of name or
or likeness).
likeness).
39. Se;
S~ eg.,
e.g., Goodyear
Goodyear Tire &Be Rubber
Rubber Co.
Co. v. Vandergriff, 184 S.E. 452, 454 (Ga. 1936)
1936)
(discussing
the tort);
tort); Freihofer
Freihofer v. Hearst
Hearst Corp., 480
480 N.E.2d
N.E.2d 349,
349, 353
353
(discussing Georgia's
Georgia's codification
codification of the
(N.Y. 1985)
(interpreting the
codification by NewYork
v. Workman,
1985)(interpreting
the tort's codification
NewYorl_ State);
State); Bartholomew
Bartholomewv.
Workman,
the tort
tort at common
common law).
169 P.2d
P.2d 1012,
1012, 1014
1014 (Okla.
(Okla. 1946) (discussing
(discussing the
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endorsements in advertisements
unauthorized commercial uses of
of
endorsements
advertisements and unauthorized
photographs of individuals.
commercial
photographs
individuals.40° Individuals have a right to the commercial
value in their
their name and image. As such, the tort imposes only narrow
circulation of names and images.
restrictions on the circulation
The action for public disclosure of private
private facts limits the circulation
circulation
to the general public of information
information that is shockingly offensive and not
not
otheIWise publicly available.441' The protection
protection is designed to prevent
prevent the
otherwise
42
wide dissemination
dissemination of embarrassing facts42
and, thus, imposes a specific
specific
narrow restraint on information
information flows.
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion focuses on the gathering
gathering of
of
information rather than on the circulation of that information. This tort
information
gathering
protects individuals from highly offensive
offensive methods of gathering
areas;4 the action only sanctions
conduct that
information in private
private areas;43
sanctions conduct
that
offends
offends the sensibilities. As such, this tort too has a limited
limited scope in the
information flows.
scheme of restraints on information
Finally, the tort protecting
protecting individuals against
against publicity that places a
dissemination
person in a false light only offers protection against the wide dissemination
of information that is misleading
erroneous. 44 The tort relaxes the
misleading or erroneous.
scienter requirements of actions for defamation,
defamation, yet still preserves a narrow
scope.
on
In isolation, each of these torts does not provide broad restriction on
the circulation and treatment of personal
personal information.4
information.4!l Together,
regulating
however, they do suggest a somewhat more active role of law in regulating
conduct
traditional constitutional
conduct between citizens
citizens in comparison to the traditional
constitutional
preferences regulating
preferences
regulating conduct
conduct between the state and its citizens. The
combination
small set of
combination of narrow rights still does not offer more than a small
of
targeted
targeted restrictions on information flows.4
flows.46
This philosophical
sentiment and doctrinal restraint
philosophical antigovernment
antigovernment sentiment
restraint
on government
government continues to translate
translate into specific
specific hostility for
for
comprehensive
comprehensive rules on the treatment of personal information.
information. SelfSee Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50
1905).
40. &ePavesich
50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
41. See Restatement
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652D (1977) (describing the tort of public
public
disclosure
information).
disclosure of private information).
occur
42. Wide dissemination
dissemination may not be necessary
necessary if sufficient embarrassment would
would occur
within the individual's
individual's local community. See Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (IlL 1990)
1990)
(holding that disclosure by employer of employee's
co-workers satisfied
employee's mastectomy
mastectomy to several co-workers
satisfied
the requirement for public disclosure of the private fact).
claim
43. See Ault
Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting ,claim
photographed), cerl.
cert denied, 489 U.S. lOBO
1080
of intrusion because the plaintiff agreed
agreed to be photographed),
(1989).
(1989).
See, e.g.,
& Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204 (lOth
(10th Cir.
Cir. 1985)
44. See,
e.g., Polin v. Dun
Dun &
1985) (denying
intrusion where the plaintiff's
plaintiffs credit report was disseminated to 17
claim for false light intrusion
people);
actionable false light
652E (1977) (describing actionable
light
people); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E
publicity).
45. See Reidenberg, supra note 11,
11, at 221-27 (discussing tort actions for dissemination
of
dissemination of
personal
personal information).
46. See
Seeid.
id. at 234.
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regulation, or
or the
the voluntary
voluntary adherence
adherence to
to fair
fair practices, by
by the
the private
regulation,
sector
is
the
preferred
mechanism
to
assure
fair
treatment
of
personal
mechanism
treatment
sector is the
information
in
American
society.
Following
the
principle
of
free
flow of
of
society.
the
of free flow
information
4
information,
legislatures
respond
only
to
specific
issues;
7
legal
if
information, legislatures respond
specific issues;47
rules, if
any, are
are justified only when they narrowly target particular problems.
problems. These
any,
legal rules
rules tend
tend to
to develop
develop as
as an
an ad
ad hoc
hoc response to
to public
public scandal.
scandal.4S
legal
Consequently,
such
rules
are
sectoral
in
nature.
Consequently, such rules are sectoral in nature.

The Underlying
Underlying Purposes
Purposesfor
for Minimal
Minimal Restrictions
Restrictions on Information
Info7mation
3. The
corresponding
The adherence to free flows of information and the corresponding
preference for targeted standards
standards of
of fair information practice pursue two
preference
underlying objectives: the avoidance of a manipulated citizenry and the
prevention of the abuse of power. Because information is power in the
prevention
Information Society, the control of information empowers the manipulaunfettered information flows enhance citizens'
tion of citizens. In contrast, unfettered
capacity to make free and informed decisions. If information is available
and citizens have fair access, then information may not be censored or
structured by the government
government to control citizen thinking or decision
decision
structured
49
making. 49
Privacy torts suggest a similar concern about deceptive information. As
a right, privacy torts may offer rules of civility reflecting
reflecting community
judgments.'
judgments.!:O The justification for minimizing
minimizing tort restrictions
restrictions on
on
information flows
the treatment of
information
flows and allowing only targeted rules for fue
of
personal information
is to
personal
information is
to prevent
prevent thought
thought control. Targeted
Targeted legal rules
47.
See, e.g.,
e.g., Fair
47. See,
Fair Credit
Credit Reporting
Reporting Act,
Act, 15
15 US.C.
u.s.c. §§
§§ 1681-1681t
1681-168lt (1988);
(1988); Electronic
Electronic
Communications
Privacy Act,
Act, 18
§§ 2510-2520,
& Supp. V 1993),
1993),
Communications Privacy
18 U.S.C.
U.S.C. §§
251().2520, 2701-2709
2701-2709 (1988 &
amended
103-414, 1994
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
Stat.) 4279;
amended by
by Pub.
Pub. L
L. No.
No. 103-414,
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108
(108 Stat.)
4279; Video Privacy
Privacy Protection
Protection
Act,
18 U.S.C.
2710-2711 (1988);
551(a)
Act, 18
U.S.C. §§
§§ 2710-2711
(1988); Cable
Cable Communications
Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C.
u.s.C. § 551
(a)
(1988);
Privacy Comm'n,
supra note 8, at M
34 ("In the private sector, the Commission
(1988); see
see also
also Privacy
Comm'n, supra
Commission
specifies
voluntary compliance
when the
present need
the present
need for the recommended
recommended change
change is not
not
specifies voluntary
compliance when
acute
acute enough
enough to
to justify
justify mandatory
mandatory legislation.");
legislation."); Gellman,
Gellman, supra
supra note
note 10, at 203-08
203-08
(explaining
legislative attempts
(explaining the
the weak
weak results of
of legislative
attempts to
to codify
codify standards
standards of
of fair information
information
practices);
Reidenberg, supra
11, at
supra note
note 11,
at 220-29
22().29 (arguing
(arguing that state
state legislation
legislation is narrowly
narrowly
practices); Reidenberg,
focused).
focused). In
In the
the public
public sector, legislatures
legislatures have
have sought
sought broader
broader regulation.
regulation. See, eg.,
e.g., PrivacyAct
Privacy Act
of
1974, 55 U.S.C.
of 1974,
U.S.c. §§ 552a
552a (1988);
(1988); California
California Information
Information Practices
Practices Act
Act of 1977,
1977, Cal.
Cal. Civ. Code
Code
§§
§§ 1798-1798.78
1798-1798.78 (West
(West 1985
1985 &
& Supp.
Supp. 1995);
1995); New
New York
York Personal
Personal Privacy
Privacy Protection
Protection Law, N.Y.
N.Y.
Pub.
1995); Wisconsin
Pub. Off.
Off. §§
§§ 91-99
91-99 (Mcxinney
(McKinney 1988
1988 &
& Supp.
Supp. 1995);
WISCOnsin Personal
Personal Information
Information Practices
Practices
Act,
Act, Wis..
Wis., Stat.
Stat. §§
§§ 19.35-19.36,
19.35-19.36, 19.62-19.80
19.62-19.80 (1993-94);
(1993-94); see
see also
also Paul
Paul M.
M. Schwartz,
Schwartz, Privacy
Privacy and
and
Participation:
Participation: Personal
Personal Information
Information and Public
Public Sector
Sector Regulation
Regulation in
in the
the United
United States, 80
80
Iowa
Iowa L.
L. Rev.
Rev. 553
553 (1995)
(1995) (criticizing
(criticizing public
public sector
sector information
information practices).
practices).
48.
The Video
Video Privacy
Privacy Protection
Protection Act
Act of
of 1988,
1988, for
for example,
example. responded
responded to
to public
public outrage
outrage
48. The
when
the video
video rental
rental records
records of
of aa nominee
nominee to the
the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court were
were publicized.
publicized. 18
18 U.S.C.
U.s.c.
when the
§§ 2710
2'110 (1988).
(1988). likewise,
Likewise, the
the Fair
Fair Credit
Credit Reporting
Reporting Act
Act responded
responded to
to consumer
consumer horror
horror stories
of
of dealings
dealings with
with credit
credit reporting
reporting agencies.
agencies. See
See 15
15 U.S.C.
U.s.C. §§
§§ 1681a-1681t
1681a-168lt (1988
(1988 &
& Supp. V
1993).
1993).
49.
49. Implicit
Implicit in
in fair
fair access
access to
to information
information isis the
the assumption
assumption that
that transaction
transaction costs
costs related
related
to
the circulation
circulation of
of information
information will
will be
be either
either trivial
trivial or
or of
of equal
equal significance
significance to
to all citizens.
citizens.
to the
This
This isis not
not the
the case.
case. See
See infra
infra text
text accompanying
accompanying notes
notes 196-98.
196-98.
50.
50. See
See Post,
Post, Rereading,
Rereading, supra
supra note
note 36, at
at 651-52.
651-52.

HeinOnline -- 80 Iowa L. Rev. 506 1994-95

SE1TING
STANDARDS
SETTING STANDARDS

507

showing
attempts to restrain manipulations of
of
showing the community ethos reflect attempts
citizens. The minimalist
restraint
personal
minimalist restraint on misappropriation
misappropriation of personal
information
information and the narrow "false light" protection strive to harness the
circulation of deceptive information
information that may manipulate
manipulate citizens'
citizens'
5
perceptions
perceptions of each other.51'
Scrutiny of government actions and targeted
targeted standards
standards for fair
information practices assuage the public fear of the abuse of power.
Restraints
against
Restraints reserve to citizens the power to control information
information flows against
government
government manipulation. Even beyond the issue of government rule
making, the fear of concentrations
concentrations of information
information and "Big Brother" led to
protections
surveillance and public sector information
information
protections against government surveillance
processing
on
Constraints protect citizens against intrusions on
processing activities.5522 Constraints
personal
personal privacy by the powerful
powerful institutions of government.
preventing abuse of power is also at the heart of the
The goal of preventing
privacy torts. Warren and Brandeis sought
perceived to
to
sought to rein in what they perceived
be an abuse of journalistic
fault, the
journalistic power. Unlike typical torts based on fault,
resulting
prohibitions.553 The
resulting "privacy" torts emphasize rights based on prohibitions.
approach rather than "fault"
"rights" approach
"fault" approach
approach blurs the historical
historical division
division
between
law.r 4 The "rights"
"rights" orientation
orientation supports the
between public and private laW.54
political significance
significance of information standards as protection
protection against abuses
of power. Privacy rights become part of the rhetoric of coercive power akin
akin
citizens to block
empower citizens
to government power. As a right, the torts empower
to
specific manipulative
manipulative actions or abuses by others. The torts reserve to
citizens
prevent private
private power from intruding on personal
personal
citizens the ability to prevent
privacy
personal
privacy and to secure against the misappropriation of personal
information.
Dispersionof Standards
Standards of Fair
Practice
B. The Dispersion
Fair Information
Information Practice
As a corollary
corollary to minimal
minimal state
state regulation of information flows, the
American
standards for fair information
information
American system values a dispersion of standards
such
practice. There are no universal rules and there is no discrete source, such

accompanying notes 30-33 (American legal policy has supported
supported free
51. See supra text accompanying
information to promote free thinking).
52. See, e.g.,
Privacy Act of 1974,
1974,5
U.S.c. § 552a (1988)
(1988) (structuring federal
federal government
eg., Privacy
5 U.S.C.
government
information
Financial Privacy, 12 U.S.C.
information practices);
practices); Right to Fmancial
u.s.c. §§ 3401-3422
3401-3422 (1988
(1988 &
& Supp. V
Electronic
1993) (protecting citizens
citizens from government
government access to bank account records); Electronic
Communications
U.S.C. §§
2510-2521, 2701-2711
& Supp. V 1993)
Communications Privacy Act, 18 u.s.c.
§§ 2510-2521,
2701-2711 (1988
(1988 &
1993)
(protecting the confidentiality
confidentiality of communications
communications from the government);
government); David
David Flaherty,
(protecting
Protecting
protection
Protecting Privacy
Privacy in Surveillance Societies
Societies 321,
321, 367-70 (1989)
(1989) (arguing that U.S. protection
against
inadequate); Paul M. Schwartz, Data Processing and
and
against government
government surveillance is inadequate);
Government Administration:
Government
Administration: The Failure of the American
American Response
Response to the Computer, 43
Hastings
L.J. 1321
1321 (1992)
(1992) (arguing that protections
of
protections are inadequate, particularly in light of
Hastings LJ.
social
social welfare
welfare program).
program).
53. See David
W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place
David W.
Place in the Intellectual
Intellectual History
History of Tort
Law, 41 Case W.
W. Res. L.
L Rev.
Rev. 769 (1991).
(1991).
54. See general!Y
generally Horwitz, supra
supra note 16 (noting that American
American legal
legal thought generally
generally
sought
constitutional or public law issues).
sought to distinguish tort issues from constitutional
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as one sectoral rule or one industry norm or practice,
practice, to provide all the
context. Fair treatment
information
standards for a particular
particular context
treatment of personal
personal information
sOUJrces. This diversity
relies on the aggregation of standards from various sources.
government
promotes the goal that no single actor, whether it be the government
through
market
private firm through market
through its power to make legal rules or a private
power and contractual relationships, should control information
information flows.
In theory, the decentralization
decentralization of fuir
fair information practice
practice standards
through
business practice
practice offers
offers flexibility
fleability
through legal rules, industry
industry norms, and business
to tailor the standards
of
standards for specific conditions.
conditions. The different forms of
standards coupled with the variety of standard makers-namely
companies--can target
target
government, industry groups, and individual
individual companies-can
federalist
problem issues. This theory draws on the same thinking as the federalist
of
goal of making the states "laboratories" for appropriate kinds of
regulation.5 Within this paradigm, standards for information
regulation.~5
information practices
private sector
sector level
level to best meet
may arise at the federal, state, and even private
particular issues.
As a matter
standards implies
matter of legal policy, the decentralization
decentralization of standards
that fair treatment
overlapping
treatment of personal
personal information will
will emerge
emerge from overlapping
and substitutable sources. Legal rules may overlap business
business practice, and
standards may substitute for the other type of standard. For
either set of standards
For
example, either legal rights or the technical
technical characteristics
characteristics of an
information
fair treatment
information system may achieve the result of :fuir
treatment of personal
personal
information.6
Decentralization also means that the mechanism
mechanism to achieve
information.56 Decentralization
fair information
This policy is
information practices
practices is secondary to the actual results. 11ns
combination of varied sources of standards provides a
justified only if the combination
full set of fair information practices.
In specific cases, the actual contours
contours of fair information practice
practice
(2) industry norms and
evolve from two sources: (1) legal rules and (2)
business
different characteristics
characteristics and values. Only
business practice. Each
Each source has different
treatment under the standards
standards from each
each of these
the combination
combination of treatment
sources can completely
completely develop fair information practices in the private
private
sector.
sector.
1. Legal Rules
The most powerful standards for the treatment
treatment of personal
personal
information
established through
such
information are established
through direct
direct legislation. Specific
Specific laws, such
as the Fair Credit Reporting Act
Ac 577 or the Video Privacy Protection
Protection Act,
Act,58

55. This famous
fumous description of the goals for federalism comes from a Brandeis dissent in
in
New
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
u.S. 262, 311 (1932).
(1932). For purposes of fair information
information
practices regulation, only the basic concept is significant for U.S. standards
standards setting in the
private
private sector. The actual nuances and evolution
evolution of federalism are beyond the scope of this
Article.
56. See generally
R.Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways:
generally Joel R.
Merging
J.Lh &:
& Tech. 287 (1993).
Merging the Trade and Technical
Technical Paradigms, 6 Harv.
Harv.J.L.
(1993).
57. 15 u.s.c.
U.S.C §§ 1681-1681t (1988).
(1988).
58. 18 U.S.c.
U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1988).
(1988).
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set targeted rules for the treatment of information.
information. Other legal doctrines
may also indirectly
indirectly have an impact on the treatment
treatment of personal
personal
information
information and, thus, establish additional
additional legal rules. For example, the
59
Equal Employment Opportunity
Acteg
Opport.ui:lity Act
establishes, to some degree,
pertaining to racial or ethnic origin.
standards for the treatment of data pertaining
Similarly, tort rules such as defamation can have a dramatic
on
dramatic impact on
business treatment
treatment of personnel
personnel records.
records. Employers' fear of liability
information
constrains the retention and dissemination of personal information
relating to employees.
2. Industry
Industry Norms and
and Business Practice
Practice
Business
management decisions set standards.
Business and management
standards. While commercial
commercial
policies are the driving force behind
of
behind the existence or lack of existence
existence of
6°
business
several
of
b~iness practices,
practices,60
several different forces mold business treatment
treatment of
Standards may emerge
personal information. Standards
emerge from: (a) the technical
network structure, (b) industry codes of conduct, (c) company policies, (d)
contractual
arrangements, and (e)
(e) pressures
pressures for good corporate
contractual arrangements,
citizenship.
citizenship. Because business
business decisions are flexible and can easily change,
business practice depends
depends upon
the establishment of standards through business
implemented by specific
the extent to which such standards are actually
actually implemented
companies. In any specific
specific situation, however, the effectiveness
effectiveness of business
practice
practice to achieve
achieve fair information practice will depend upon the
harmonization
commercial interests with individual
harmonization of commercial
individual interests.
a. Technical
Technical netwo'1k
network structure
structure
Technology
structure the treatment
Technology itself may structure
treatment of personal
personal
frequency of data purges, or
or
information. Technical
Technical decisions such as the frequency
back-up storage, "hard wires" rules for the treatment
treatment of personal
personal
gather
information directly in the network
network. An information
information network may gather
and store significant
significant amounts of personal information and make the
information accessible
computer
information
accessible to anyone with network privileges, or the computer
certain
system may keep only limited information
information and restrict access to certain
corporate officers. These
structure and
authorized corporate
These choices in network structure
and
technology embed default rules or practices
into
the
architecture
of
an
practices
architecture
61
information network.61
Although technology
can
be
modified,
these
technology
business practices
provide a robust means of establishing
for
practices do proviae
establishing standards for
fair information
practice.
information practice.

59. 42 U.S.C.
u.S.G. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
2000e-17 (1988
(1988 &
Be Supp. V 1993).
60. See generally
geerally H. Jeff
Privacy. Information
Jeff Smith, Managing
Managing Privacy:
Information Technology
Technology and Corporate
America 85-86
short-term profit incentives
incentives impede
corporate information
impede corporate
information
85-86 (1994) (noting that short-term
privacy
privacy policy making).
61.
296-301.
61. See Reidenberg, supra note 56, at 296-301.
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b. Industry
b.
Industry codes of conduct
52
Industry codes of conduct
conduct set voluntary benchmarks
benchmarks for companies. 62
actual
At best, they establish
establish an ethos for an industrial sector. The actual
information by companies in the industry is not
treatment of personal
personal information
not
reflected
reflected by the existence or nonexistence
nonexistence of a sectoral
sectoral code. To the extent
extent
important
that a code reflects customary industry practice, it may have an important
influence
influence on specific companies. However, an industry code itself is a weak
weak
lack
source for standards because such codes are voluntary
voluntary and lack.
self-regulation remains at the level of
of
enforcement; the only true site of self-regulation
company activity.

Company policies
c. Company
policies
implementation offer
offer
Actual company policies and their specific
specific implementation
important
important standards
standards of fair information
information practices.
practices.55s Company policies
purposes are relevant sources for fair information
information
designed for a variety of purposes
practices.
If the implementation
implementation of a company data
practices. lf
data security
security policy means
personal information, the result
that strict limits are placed upon access to personal
is an important standard
standard for fair information
information practices
practices with respect to that
that
implementation offer
offer
company. Nonetheless,
Nonetheless, company policies and their implementation
"soft" standards;
are neither
neither legally
legally binding nor industry-wide.
"soft"
standards; they
they are
industry-wide.
d. Contractual
Contractualarrangements
d.
arrangements
Contractual arrangements
arrangements may arise from two sets of relationships.
Contractual
relationships.
such
Companies may contract directly with individuals
individuals and may stipulate in such
personal information
information will be treated.
a contract
contract how an individual's personal
Companies may also contract
contract with business
business customers and similarly provide
for the treatment
treatment of personal information
information by the business
business customer. In this
of
case, protection
protection of an individual's personal
personal information is an incident
incident of
of
the contract between the company
company and its business
business customer. Each set of
arrangements
arrangements may establish legally
legally binding standards because
bec.:'1use of the
contracts."64
enforceability of contracts.

Information Protection
Protection
62. See,
See e.g.,
eg., Direct Marketing Ass'n, Guidelines for Personal
Personal Infonnation
[hereinafter DMA Guidelines];
Information Industry Ass'n, Fair Infonnation
Information Practices
[hereinafter
Guidelines]; Infonnation
Guidelines (1994).
(1994).
Concerning
63. See,
See, e.g., American
American Express, An Important Notice to Our
Our Cardmembers
Cardmembers Concerning
Visa,
Cardmember Privacy, Mailing
Options (1993);
(1993); Citibank Mastercard
Mastercard &
&: VISa,
Cardmember
Mailing and Telemarketing Options
(1993).
Privacy Policy (1993).
terms in the
64. In the case of contracts
contracts between
between businesses, the individuals protected
protected by tenns
beneficiaries. SeeJohn
&Joseph
of
agreement are third party beneficiaries.
agreement
SeeJohn D. Calamari &:
Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of
1987). Because
enforcement rights of third party
Contracts 691-702 (3d ed. 1987).
Contracts
Because courts limit the enforcement
beneficiaries,
beneficiaries, those individuals
individuals vill
will only be able to recover
recover under specific circumstances. Id.
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e.e. Good corporate
corporate citizenship
Finally, pressures from public
public opinion, academia, advocacy
advocacy groups,
for
business
practice. These
government
officials
may
also
set
the
tone
and government
treatment
name and image of companies
companies at risk if treatment
pressures place the good name
of personal
information is unfair. To promote
personal information
promote good corporate citizenship,
implemented new practices. Companies
some companies have implemented
Companies such as
& Bradstreet have recently
Equifax and Dun &
recently even included commitments
to privacy in their annual reports
reports. 655 American
American Express now provides a
detailed privacy notice to cardholders
cardholders on an annual basis.6
basis.66 These
incentives form moderately
moderately strong standards because
because
pressures and incentives
poor
sanction to result from poor
companies expect some form of public sanction
companies
practices
constraining government
practices such as lost business, lost goodwill, or constraining
government
citizenship pressures is
corporate citizenship
regulation. Nevertheless, nothing about corporate
legally binding.
The dispersion
dispersion of standards for fair information
information practice
practice across legal
legal
rules, and industry norms and business practices,
practices, reinforces narrowly
targeted treatment of personal information. Each type of standard takes a
particular perspective
information practice and addresses particular
particular
particular
perspective on fair information
Under
characteristics of the treatment
treatment of personal information. Under
contexts or characteristics
law
the U.S. scheme, no single standard seeks to cut across boundaries of law
and industry practice.
AGGREGATION OF DISPERSED
STANDARDS
II.
THE DISAPPOINTING
II. THE
DISAPPOINTING AGGREGATION
DISPERSED STANDARDS

The pursuit of targeted standards at a time of explosive growth
growth in
in
determination
information processing
processing activity makes the actual determination
wide-scale information
of rights, responsibilities, and practices in American society complex. The
varied standards for fair information practice offer overlapping, yet
combination of legal
distinct, treatment of personal information. Only the combination
rules, industry norms, and business practices can properly define the scope
information in the private
of standards
standards for the treatment of personal
personal information
sector.
comparison with a
The assessment of U.S. standards requires a cOIpparison
information practice. A variety of
benchmark
benchmark for principles of fair information
American, international, and foreign legal instruments
instruments have articulated
articulated

& Bradstreet
Bradstreet Corp., Annual Report
65. See Dun
Dun Be
Report to Stockholders
Stockholders (1993),
(1993), available
available in
in
(1992),
Equifax Inc., Annual Report to Stockholders
LEXIS,
LEXlS, COMPNY
COMPNY library, SECOL File; Equifux:
Stockholders (1992),
to
Equifax Inc., Annual
available in LEXIS, COMPNY
available
COMPNY Library,
library, SECOL
SECOL File; Equifux:
Annual Report to
availabl in LEXIS,
ibrary,
(1991) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Equifax
Stockholders (1991)
Equifux: 1991 Report],
Report], available
LEXIS, COMPNY library,
SECOL File.
66. The exact wording of this notice
notice is contained
contained in an assurance made by American
American
Consumer Frauds and Protection
Protection of the New York
York Attorney
Express to the Bureau of Consumer
of
General's Office. See In ure American Express Travel Related Servs.,
Servs., Inc., Agreement of
College of UW
Law
Voluntary
Assurances (May 8, 1992) (on file with the University of Iowa College
Voluntary Assurances
library).
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67
commonly accepted
accepted standards.
standards.67
These commonly
commonly accepted
accepted standards
standards
These
commonly
of criteria
criteria to
to evaluate
evaluate the
the development
development of
of U.S.
U.S.
provide aa thorough
thorough set
set of
provide
standards. While
While the
the legal
legal instruments
instruments approach
approach standards
standards for
for the
the
standards.
treatment of
of personal
personal information
information comprehensively,
comprehensively, the
the existence
existence of
of a
treatment
comprehensive set
set of standards
standards still
still comports
comports with
with the
the ad
ad hoc
hoc and
and targeted
targeted
comprehensive
approach. Standards
Standards themselves
themselves do
do not
not offend
offend the
the value
value of
of minimal
minimal
U.S. approach.
restrictions on
on information
information flows. Standards
Standards are necessary
necessary for
for a fair
fair
restrictions
"marketplace"
"marketplace" of
of personal
personal information.
information. Moreover,
Moreover, the
Ihe entire
entire set
set of
of
commonly accepted
accepted standards
standards need
need not
not appear
appear in any single
single U.S.
U.S. source;
source;
commonly
the collection
collection of
of American
American standards
standards from all
all U.S.
U.S. sources
sources can
can treat
treat
the
personal information
information according
according to the
the commonly
commonly accepted
aecepted standards.
standards.
personal
appropriate analytic
analytic method
method to assess
assess American
American standards
standards is to
The appropriate
particular contexts
contexts for information
information processing.
processing. An accurate
focus on particular
precluded by
by diverse
diverse needs
needs for personal
personal information
information
general assessment
assessment is precluded
general
in the private
private sector
sector and targeted
targeted standards
standards from dispersed
dispersed sources;
sources; the
the
applicable
universally
def,
standards
multitude
of
practices
narrow
standards
def)'
universally
applicable
narrow
and
practices
multitude
conclusions. The measure
measure of fair
fair treatment
treatment of personal
personal information,
information, thus,
conclusions.
becomes
the
extent
to
which
the
benchmark
principles
are satisfied in
principles
benchmark
the
extent
becomes
standards.
the
dispersed
of
aggregation
particular
contexts
aggregation
of
the
dispersed
standards. For
For
the
through
contexts
particular
the analysis
analysis to be
be meaningful, the contexts
contexts must be drawn
drawn from key
industrial sectors that represent
represent major
major information
information processing
processing activities
industrial
with a significant
significant impact on society.

Benchmark: Commonly Accepted Standards
A.
A. The Benchmark:
Standards
and abroad, there is a consensus
consensus on the general
general
In the United States and
treatment of personal
personal information
information in the
principles necessary
necessary for the fair treatment
principles
Department of Health, Education
Education and Welfare
private sector. The U.S. Department
treatment of personal
wrote one of the first sets of guidelines for the treatment
information.
government supported similar voluntary
information."688 The U.S. government
Organization for Economic
guidelines adopted several years later by the Organization
Cooperation
American
(OECD). 9 Many major American
Development (OECD).£9
Cooperation and Development
companies publicly declared their acceptance
acceptance and support of these OEGD
OECD
principles.7070 These core principles are also embodied in a number of U.S.
legislation
Qu6bec has adopted legislation
laws.71 Elsewhere
Elsewherd in North America, Quebec
67.
accompanying notes 68-78.
67. See infra text accompanying
15 n.7.
n.7.
note 8, at 15
68.
68. See Flaherty, supra note 52, at 306; Privacy Comm'n, supra note
Protection
Governing the Protection
69. See
Council Concerning Guidelines Governing
See Recommendation of the Council
1980),
(Oct. 1,
1, 1980),
(0 58 final) (Oct.
OECD Doc. (C
Data, OEeD
Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
of
of Privacy
Privacy and Transborder

government
reprinted
The U.S. government
Guidelines]. The
OECD Guidelines].
[hereinafter OEeD
(1981) [hereinafter.
20 I.L.M. 422 (1981)
repinted in 20
Obstade Course:
Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle
ahso Joel RR. Reidenberg,
the negotiations.
negotiations. See also
participated
in the
participated in
S167 (1992)
Rev. 5137,
S137, 5167
Hurdling
60 Fordham
Fordham L. Rev.
Financial Services, 60
to Transnational Financial
Barriers to
Hurdling Barriers
(comparing the OEeD
the European
European Convention).
Guidelines with the
OECD Guidelines
70. &e
the National TelecommuniPolicy Activities of the
Privacy Policy
Accounting Office, Privacy
General Accounting
See General
10, at
supra note 10,
in Gellman, supra
1984), cited
cited in
cations and
(Aug. 31,
31, 1984),
Administration (Aug.
and Information Administration
the OECD
OECD
227 n.60; u.s.
of U.S. Corporations Supporting the
List of
Business, List
for Int'l Business,
Council for
U.S. Council
Privacy
(1983).
Privacy Guidelines (1983).
for
core principles
principles fiJI'
(establishing core
552a (1988) (establishing
1974, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a
71.
See, e.g.,
e.g., Privacy Act of 1974,5
71. See,
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comparable basic principles.'2
principles. 7 2 Across the Atlantic, the
recently mandating comparable
7
protection contains
European
European treaty on data protection's
contains a set of basic principles
74
similar to the OECD Guidelines.
Guidelines.'4
Although the United States is not a
party to the treaty, the treaty mandates
enactment in signatory
mandates the enactment
countries
countries of laws containing
containing the core principles. More recently, the
European
European Union's proposed
proposed directive
directive on data protection models its
standards for the fair treatment of personal
personal information around the same
set of basic principles that exist in various
various European
European national laws.!laws.'s
Likewise, in Asia, data protection
protection policies look to7 6the basic principles
OEGD Guidelines
found in the OECD
Guidelines and
and European
European treaty.
treaty.'6
of
The basic principles
principles of this global consensus
consensus form four sets of
standards:
or
(2) standards for transparency
transparency or
standards: (1)
(1) standards for data quality, (2)
openness of processing, (3) standards for the treatment
treatment of particularly
sensitive information, and (4) standards for the enforcement
enforcement of fair
information practices."
practices.7 7 While the precise requirements
information
requirements and interpretaenforcement
tions for data quality, transparency, sensitive information, and enforcement
vary, 5 the core elements
vary/a
elements are commonly accepted
accepted by the global
global
community.

U.S.C. § 2710 (1988)
(establishing core
the public sector);
sector); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
(1988) (establishing
U.S.C. § 551
principles
records); Cable
Cable Communications
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 u.s.C.
principles for video records);
(1988) (establishing core principles
communications sector).
sector).
(1988)
principles for the cable communications
information in the private
72. See An Act respecting
respecting the protection of personal
personal information
private sector,
S.Q. 503 (Can.)
(Can.) (to be codified atR.S.Q.
RS.Q. ch. P-39.1).
P-39.1).
1993 s.Q.
to
73. Council of Europe, Convention
Convention for the Protection
Protection of Individuals
Individuals with Regard to
reprintedin 20 1.LM.
Processing of Personal
1981), Teprinted
Automatic Processing
Personal Data, Eur. T.S. No. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981),
I.L.M.
317
Convention].
317 [hereinafter
(hereinafter European Convention].
74. SeeJon Bing, The Council of Europe Convention and the OECD Guidelines
Guidelines on Data
Transnational Communications,
Protection, in
in Regulation of Transnational
Communications, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal
Legal Stud.
A Comparison of
of
Transnational Data
Data Flows: A
271; P. Howard Patrick, Privacy Restrictions
Restrictions on Transnational
the Council of Europe Draft Convention
Convention and the OECD Guidelines, 21 Jurimetrics J. 405
(1981);
(1981); Reidenberg, supra note 69, at S143-46.
Individuals in Relation
to
75. See Proposal for a Council
Council Directive
Directive on the Protection
Protection of Individuals
Relation to
17, 1990)
the Processing
Processing of Personal Data, Eur. Comm. Doc. COM(90)314 final-SYN
final-SYN 287 (July
Guly 17,1990)
Protection
[hereinafter
Council Directive on the Protection
[hereinafter Original Proposal];
Proposal]; Amended
Amended Proposal
Proposal for aa Council
of
Processing of Personal
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
Personal Data and on the Free Movement
Movement of
(Oct. 15,
1992) [hereinafter
[hereinafter
Such Data, Eur. Comm.
Comm Doc. COM(92)422
COM(92)422 final-SYN 287 (Oct.
15, 1992)
Adopted by the Council with
Amended Proposal];
Proposal]; Common Position
Position Adopted
with a View
View to Adopting
Adopting
Directive
Directive on the Protection
Protection of Individuals with Regard
Regard to the Processing
Processing of Personal Data and
[hereinafter Common Position];
on the Free Movement
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J.
OJ. (C 93) 1 [hereinafter
Position];
Simitis, supra note 9.
S151-52.
76. See Reidenberg, supra note
note 69, at SI51-52.
international law.
77. Some scholars
scholars have even argued
argued that these norms form customary intemationallaw.
International Law, 16
See Olga Estadella-Yuste,
Estadel1a.:yuste, Transborder
Transborder Data
Data Flows
Flows and Sources
Sources of Public International
& Comm. Reg. 379 (1991).
(1991).
N.C.J. Int'l &
78. See generalty
generally Reidenberg, supra note
note 69.
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1. Data
Data Quality Standards
Standards
The benchmark
benchmark of
of data
data quality
quality consists
consists of
of commonly
commonly accepted
accepted
The
standards to assure
assure that
that personal
personal information
information is
is acquired
acquired legitimately
legitimately and
and
standards
in a manner
manner that treats
treats fairly the
the interests
interests of
of individuals,
individuals, industry,
is used in
These standards
standards provide
provide value
value to
to personal
personal information.
information. A key
and society. These
commonly accepted
accepted standard
standard requires
requires that
that personal
personal information
information only be
be
commonly
collected lawfully
lawfully for specific
specific purposes.!
purposes.79 This basic standard
standard imposes an
collected
obligation on data
data collectors
collectors to determine
determine the uses of each
each piece
piece of
of
obligation
personal information
information prior to its collection
collection and an
an obligation
obligation to obtain
obtain
personal
such information
solely through
through lawful
lawful means.
means. Another
Another core
core element
element
information solely
stipulates that
that personal
personal information
information be used by
by the collector
collector only in a
manner compatible
compatible with
with the purpose
purpose for collection
collection and that unrestrained
unrestrained
manner
secondary
inappropriate.08D This critical
critical standard
standard binds
binds the
secondary use is inappropriate.
treatment of personal
personal information
information to the uses for which
which the information
information
treatment
was collected.
collected.
was
The commonly
accepted data quality standards
standards also concur that
commonly accepted
information musf
must be relevant
relevant for the purpose intended
intended by the
personal information
collection of the information. This core element
element proscribes
proscribes the collection
collection
collection
extraneous personal
personal information.881' While this principle
principle of
of data quality
of extraneous
determine whether particular
provides no clear guidance
guidance to determine
particular information
information is
provides
accepted
necessary
identified collection purpose, the commonly accepted
necessary for an identified
to
standard
collectors of personal information
information an obligation
obligation to
standard imposes on collectors
information as possible.
acquire as much information
possible.
resist the desire to acquire
of
important core
core element
element of
information is also an important
The timeliness of information
standard that
data quality standards.
standards. There is, thus, a commonly accepted
accepted standard
that
data
collectors should not store personal
personal information
any longer than necessary
necessary
information any
collectors
collection.n This is designed to assure the
accomplish the purposes for collection.52
to accomplish
validity of personal
personal information
information in circulation.
Data quality
quality further demands accuracy
accuracy of personal information.
Commonly accepted standards assure this aspect by providing individuals
Commonly
with access to their personal
personal information
information and the ability to require
3
correction of inaccurate
inaccurate data.83
Finally, data quality also requires measures
measures
correction
common
to assure the integrity of personal
personal information. There is a common
standard that security
security measures
measures are necessary to protect
protect personal
personal
standard
84
unauthorized alteration.'
information against
against destruction or unauthorized
alteration.
information
79. See Common Position, supra note 75, art. 6(I)(b);
supra note
6(1)(b); European Convention, supra
art 9.
73, art. 5; OECD
OECO Guidelines, supra note 69, art.
80. See Common
Common Position, supra note 75, art.
6(1)(b); European Convention, supra note
art. 6(I)(b);
73, art.
art. 5b; OECO
OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, arts. 9-10.
art. 6(I)(c);
6(1)(c); European
81. See Common Position, supra note 75, art.
European Convention, supra note
81.
art. 8.
art. 5c; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art.
73, art.
art. 6(e); European Convention, supra note 73,
82. See Common Position, supra note 75, art.
art. 8.
art.
art. 5e; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art.
83. See Common Position, supra note 75, art. 12; European Convention, supra note 73,
art. 8c; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, arts. 12-13.
73,
84. See Common Position, supra note 75, art. 17; European Convention, supra note 73,
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Transparency of Information
Processing
2. Standards
Standards for Transparency
Information Processing
benchmark of transparency consists'
consists of commonly accepted
The benchmark
accepted
standards
Global
assure the openness
openness of information processing.s"
processing.8S Global
standards that assure
consensus dictates that the circulation of personal information be open to
scrutiny
scrutiny by individuals and not obscured from view.
information processing
The core elements
elements for the transparency
transparency of information
processing
assure the participation
participation of individuals in the treatment
treatment of their personal
information. The first commonly
commonly accepted standard
standard is that the very
information processing activities must be transparent to
existence of information
standard requires that collectors of personal
personal
citizens.886 The core standard
information
personal
information give individuals
individuals notice for the collection of personal
information. In some cases, the commonly accepted
accepted transparency
transparency standards
go further and require that collectors obtain the affirmative consent from
personal information.0
information.g;
individuals for certain processing
processing and use of personal
individuals

3. Special
Data
SPecial Protection
Protection for Sensitive Data
information practices
fair, benchmark
For information
practices to be fair,
benchmark standards
standards recognize
other
that certain
certain personal information is inherently more sensitive than other
accepted standard establishes that the treatment
of
data. A commonly accepted
treatment of
sensitive
sensitive information warrants
warrants greater
greater scrutiny and protection."
protection.ss
characteristics such as race, religion, health,
Specifically, data pertaining
pertaining to characteristics
accorded a higher level of protection.
or political
political beliefs must be accorded

4. Enforcement of Fair
Fair Information
Information Practices
Practices
The benchmark
enforceability includes
benchmark of enforceability
includes commonly accepted
accepted
standards
implementation of fair information
information practices.89
practices.89
standards to assure the implementation
The core elements
elements of this consensus on enforceability
enforceability has two components.
First, there must be supeIVision
supervision and oversight of the treatment of personal
personal
information. Second, there must be a remedy for aggrieved
aggrieved individuals.O
individuals.90
art
art. 7; OECD Guidelines,
Guidelines, supra
supra note 69, art. 11; see also Office of Technology
Technology Assessment, U.S.
U.S.
Congress, Infonnation
Information Security and
and Privacy in Network
Network Environments (1994)
(1994) (discussing
(discussing the
importance of security for network infonnation).
information).
critical importance
85. This use of the term
term "transparency"
"transparency" comes from the trade meaning
meaning rather than
than
certain business
business meanings that refer to hidden, back-office
back-ofIice activities. In the trade sense,
sense,
transparency
practices should
should be open to scrutiny. Certain
Certain
transparency means
means that rules, regulations, and practices
business usages of "transparency" mean that intermediary business
business functions are hidden from
customers.
86. See Common
10(1), 11
11(1);
European Convention,
Common Position, supra note 75, arts. 7(a), 10(1),
(1); European
supra
art 13a.
1Sa.
supra note
note 73, art. 8a; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art.
87. See Common
art 7(a);
Common Position, supra note
note 75, art.
7(a); European Convention, supra note 73,
art. 5b; OECD Guidelines, supra
art.
supra note 69, arts. 9-10.
88. See
See Common
Common Position, supra note
note 75, art. 8; European Convention,
Convention, supra note 73, art.
6; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69,
art 3(a).
69, art
89. See Common Position, supra
supra note 75, arts. 28, 30; European Convention, supra
supra note
73, art. 13; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art. 19.
90. From a U.S.
U.S. perspective,
remedies as aa commonly
perspective, the acceptance
acceptance of private
private remedies
commonly accepted
acceptt·"

HeinOnline -- 80 Iowa L. Rev. 515 1994-95

516

80
80

IOWA
IOWA LAW
LAWREVILEW
REVIEW

[1995]
[1995]

The common
common acceptance
acceptance of
of these
these two
two core
core standards
standards provides
provides significant
significant
The
strength to
to the
the benchmarks.
benchmarks.
strength

B. The
The Search
Search for
for Benchmark
Benchmam Standards
Standards in
in Key
Key Contexts
Contexts
B.
The multitude
multitude of
of data
data processing
processing situations,
situations, the
the targeted
targeted nature
nature of
of
The
U.S. standards,
standards, and
and the
the multilayered
multilayered regulatory
regulatOly framework
framework in
in the
the United
United
U.S.
States necessitate
necessitate aa context-specific
context-specific methodology
methodology to
to analyze
analyze the
the
States
implementation of
of benchmark
benchmark standards.
standards.991' Narrowly
Narrowly targeted
targeted standards
standards
implementation
of their
their intended
intended applications.
applications.
can only
only make
make sense
sense against
against the
the badcdrop
backdrop of
can
For the
the analysis
analysis to
to be
be meaningful,
meaningful, the
the identification
identification and
and selection
selection of
of
For
information processing
processing contexts
contexts must
must be
be appropriate.
appropriate. The
The contexts
contexts should
should
information
reflect key
key industries
industries or
or sectors
sectors in
in American
American life
life that
that have
have a.
a.significant
significant
reflect
impact on
on society. While
While many
many activities
activities satisfy
satisfy this criteria, two
two major
major areas
areas
impact
and employment.
employment. Within
Within each
each of
of these
these
clearly qualify:
qualify: direct
direct marketing
marketing and
dearly
of personal
personal information
information is diversified
diversified in
in all
all senses.
senses. The
the treatment
treatment of
areas, the
provision of
of information
information is
is diversified,
diversified, the providers
providers of information
information are
provision
diversified, and the
the uses
uses of
of information
information are diversified.
diversified. The complexity
complexity of
of
diversified,
contextual analysis
analysis calls
calls for even
even greater
greater selectivity. Narrower
Narrower contexts
contextual
each area
area should
should reflect
reflect representative
representative treatment
treatment of personal
personal
within each
within
example, in
in the employment
employment
information within the industry
industry or sector. For example,
information
critical
the treatment
treatment of personnel
personnel records
records by employers
employers represents
represents a critical
field, the
The treatment
treatment of personal
personal information in
information processing
processing context. The
information
personnel records
records is vital to labor markets
markets and has a significant
significant impact
impact on
on .
personnel
careful selection
analysis and
employees and society. By careful
selection of contexts, the analysis
comparison of U.S. standards
standards against
against the commonly
commonly accepted
accepted benchmark
benchmark
in
practices
standards
offers
concrete
assessment
of
information
practices
in
fair
key
concrete
a
offers
standards
the U.S. private sector.
1. Direct
Direct Marketing
Marketing
major force in the
The direct marketing
marketing industry has become
become a m~or
American
economy.92
In
offering
valuable
shopping
services
to consumers,
American economy."'
personal
of
massive
quantities
of personal
direct marketing relies on the gathering
gathering
how
information. Fair information practices for direct marketing focus on how
are
names
how
and
particular individuals are identified for solicitations
of
receipt
The
exchanged among collectors of personal information.
and
mail
unwanted commercial solicitations may be aa nuisance, but junk
junk calls are not in
in themselves an issue of fair information practice.
objected
has often objected
States has
standard
At the international level, the United States
dear. At
standard is not entirely clear.
for
provide for
rules provide
U.S. legal rules
to
where U.S.
remedies. Yet, where
private remedies.
have private
that have
mandatory rules that
to mandatory
are included.
included.
remedies are
standards
practice, private remedies
standards of fair information practice,
to
seeking to
principles seeking
general principles
91.
(arguing that general
296 (arguing
56, at 296
note 56,
supra note
91. See Reidenberg, supra
require contextual
necessarily require
will necessarily
balance
rights will
human rights
information with human
of information
free flows of
balance free
interpretations).
interpretations).
the
to the
billion to
$350 billion
92.
contribute $350
to contribute
claims to
whole claims
as aa whole
industry as
marketing industry
direct mari<eting
The direct
92. The
WEFA
billion: WEFA
$51.5 billion:
gross
1992 Reached $51.5
in 1992
Revenue in
Catalog Revenue
Jaffee, Catalog
Larry Jaffee,
national product. Larry
gross national
4.
at 4.
5, 1993,
1993, at
July 5,
Group
DM News,
News, July
Study, DM
Group Study,

HeinOnline -- 80 Iowa L. Rev. 516 1994-95

517

SETTING STANDARDS
STANDARDS

One of the most important
the treatment of personal
important contexts for the,
information
profiling of information.9393 By crossinformation in direct marketing is the profiling
individual profiles
referencing numerous items of personal information, individual
are developed. These profiles may
may consist of a single characteristic,
characteristic, such as
95 They may also
Penthouse 94 or denture
denture adhesive buyers.95
subscribers to Penthouse
consist of a more complete set of characteristics such as married, middleaged, "large size" women with children
moderate incomes who
children and moderate
9966
purchase
particular
types
of
underwear.
A
list
of
individuals who meet
purchase particular
undelWear.
specified characteristics
characteristics conveys far more than innocuous name
name and
address data and implicates
implicates the benchmark standards for the treatment of
of
personal
personal information.
This industry obtains discrete bits of personal information
information from many
sources. Interactive communications
communications now leave significant amounts
amounts of
of
personal
of
personal information behind, such as the details of an individual's use of
identifiable
services. Transaction data, typically derived from calls
identifiable network
network seIVices.
to toll'
toll- free numbers and mail order purchases, offer a wealth of
of
97
information
information about
about individuals.97
For example, calls to a touch tone health
information
and. on that
infonnation center generate
generate data on the phone subscriber
subscriber and,
household's
Subscription
household's interest
interest in particular diseases
diseases or health
health products.
products. Subscription
lists from publications
similar
publications and purchasing patterns at stores all leave similar
98
traces of individual
individual behavior.
Public records also provide personal
behavior.98
information to this industry. Property records, for example, indicate the
value or purchase
purchase price
price of an individual's
individual's home
home as well as any outstanding
outstanding
mortgage
mortgage amounts. 99
Direct marketers'
information for profiling
marketers' treatment of personal
personal information
demonstrates a surprising absence
benchmark standards. In
demonstrates
absence of many benchmark
contrast to other U.S. industries, no identifiable sectoral
sectoral law targets direct
marketing.W
Sectoral laws in other fields, such as home entertainment,
entertainment,
marketing. loo Sectoral

93. Profiling must be distinguished
distinguished from the commercialization
commercialization of personal
personal information
information
in the form of list sales
sales or rentals. The exercise
exercise of fair information
information practices to create the
commercialize the personal
profile does not imply that fair practices are employed to commercialize
personal
commercialization of lists do
information. The
The opposite is also true. High standards for the commercialization
not necessarily
necessarily reflect on the standards implemented
implemented for the creation of the underlying
profiles.
94. See General
94.
General Media
Media Handles Newly Merged Database, DM News, Dec. 5, 1994, at 31
(including the list of Penthouse subscribers).
subscribers).
95. See LH Management
Management Advertisement,
Sea-Bond
Advertisement, DM News, June 20, 1994, at 33;
33; Sea-Bond
1995, at 52.
Denture Names Requestors, DM News, Mar. 27, 1995,
96. SeeVenture
Communications Advertisement, DM News, Dec. 26, 1994, at 27.
See Venture Communications
97. SeeJonathan
Marketing- A Potent New Tool for Selling, Bus.
97.
See Jonathan Berry et al., Database Marketing:
Wk., Sept. 5,
5, 1994, at 56, 56-62.
98. Catalogs containing thousands of such lists are already in existence. See Standard Rate
&
Be Data Serv., The Bullet:
Bullet Direct
Direct Mail List Rates and Data, Sept. 1993.
LEXIS and
and Westlaw have searchable
searchable files containing such
such information.
information.
99. Both LEXJS
100. Legislation
Legislation limiting junk
information practices
junk phone calls is not designed as aa fair information
47 U.S.C.
law. See Telephone Consumer Protection
Protection Act of 1991,
1991,47
U.s.c. § 227 (Supp. IV 1992).
1992). Only
provisions
maintenance of "do not call" databases
databases impact on the treatment of
provisiOns related to the maintenance
of
personal
personal information.
information.
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information.' lOl Thus, industry
address some marketing
marketing uses of personal information.
norms and business practices
of
practices largely set the standards for the treatment of
personal
in this sector. The industry trade association,
personal information fu
association, the
Direct
Direct Marketing Association (DMA),
(DMA), has developed a code of conduc
condudo22
and has a Privacy Task Force
Force to promote
promote voluntary, self-regulatory
se1f.regulatory
major
standards within the sector.IOSs In fact, the DMA has engaged in a major
effort to promote the implementation of information
information practice stan04
Nevertheless, company
company practices
dards. lo4
practices for profiling remain the
principal
principal source of actual standards.
Profilingand
and data
data quality
quality standards
standards
a. Profiling

Compared to the benchmark of commonly
commonly accepted
accepted standards for
for
data quality, direct
direct marketing standards in connection with profiling are
05
disappointing. The legal rules are exceedingly
exceedingly sparse. I05
Profiles
collection
themselves are only rarely subject
subject to legal restraints for collection
purposes,'"
of
purposes,I06 and virtually no legal rules restrict
restrict secondary use of
information for profiling, the collection of unnecessary information,
information
information, or the
duration of storage.
storage. Because
Because of public outrage to particular
particular abuses, rare
exceptions
exceptions are found in the home entertainment
entertainment and credit reporting
fields.'
fields.0lo77
Technical
direct
Technical arrangements
arrangements for the computer systems that process direct
marketing profiles
do
not
routinely
provide
standards
for
the
core
profiles
standards
elements
of
the
data
quality
benchmark.
For
example,
the
information
elements
information
system at Metromail, one of the nation's largest list brokers, is not even
even
configured
accommodate requests for access
configured to accommodate
access to personal information
information
101. See 18 u.s.c.
U.S.C. § 2710(b)
(2) (1988)
U.S.C. § 551
551(c)
(2) (C) (1988)
101.
2710(b)(2)
(1988) (video records); 47 u.s.c.
(c)(2)(C)
communications records).
(cable communications
records).
102. DMA Guidelines, supra note 62.
Marketing Association released a Fair Information Practices
Practices
103. Recently, the Direct Marketing
Marketing
Manual to elaborate standards for the treatment of personal information. Direct Marketing
[hereinafter DMAManual].
DMA Manual].
Ass'n, Fair Information Practices
Practices Manual
Manual (1994) [hereinafter
104. Id.
105. Only a few laws limit marketing uses of personal information gathered from specific
specific
105.
personal
sources. See,
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
U.S.c. §§ 2710 (1988) (providing
(providing that video stores may keep personal
information
551(a)(1)
(a)(l) (1988) (providing that
that
Information to fulfill the purpose of collection); 47 U.S.C. §§ 551
cable
c.'lble company may collect personal information from subscribers only if it specifies the
reason
telephone
reason and informs subscribers).
subscribers). Other
Other key sources of profile
profile information,
information, such
such as telephone
and purchase
purchase transaction records, are unrestricted. Another
Another prime source, state
state driver's
driver's
license
license records, however, soon will be subject to restrictions. See Omnibus Crime Act of 1994,
§§ 2510-2515 (1994).
(1994). California
Borer's amendment to the crime
California Senator Barbara BOl(er's
18 U.S.C. §§
bill (Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1994 U.S.C.c.A.N.
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108
(108
§§ 2721-2725)
Stat.) 2099-2102, to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
2721-2725) required that state departments of
of
Stat.)
motor vehicles
such as
vehicles offer drivers the ability to opt out of the now public disclosures of data such
height, weight, hair color, eye color, and corrected vision. Imposition
Imposition of the restrictions
restrictions were
motivated
murderer found the victim by accessing
accessing
motivated by aa stalking case in California in which a murderer
state motor vehicle records.
See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 1751 (1992).
(1992).
106. SeeMass.
11, at 219-20, 234-36.
107. See Reidenberg, supra note 11,
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08
profiles.los
Even having protections against the misuse of profiles through
lists'lO99 does not deal with underlying secondary
secondary use of infonnainformaseeding lists
the creation of the profile.
tion in the
address other aspects of the
To some extent, technical structures do address
which
data quality benchmark. System planning can limit the duration for which
information for profiling. While the capacity for
for
companies store personal infonnation
retaining massive volumes of information has increased, and the associated
associated
costs have decreased, capacity and cost are not unlimited for most
most
n°
schedule data purging for
companies. 110
Consequently, companies will schedule
their systems. Similarly, security choices are often built into profiling
profiling
systems; computer system access is likely to be restricted.
In terms of industry norms, the trade association guidelines attempt to
standards for data quality. The guidelines
guidelines state that "[p]ersonal
"[p]ersonal
set out standards
marketing
data should be collected by fair and lawful means for aa direct marketing
lll
purpose" and should only be used for marketing purposes.
purposes."'
However,
association
little credence
credence can be given to this pronouncement. The trade association
12
itself opposes limitations on secondary use,
use,112
and the broadness of the
purpose
specification frustrates any meaningful
purpose specification
meaningful standard. All personal
personal
information can be used for a marketing purpose.
infonnation
As for business practice,
practice, companies
companies are often not very responsible
responsible in
catalog
setting data quality standards. For example,
example, Fingerhut, a large catalog
marketing
"informamarketing company, has a privacy
privacy policy
policy that says any relevant "infonnation will be used and maintained for marketing purposes."IlS
purposes." s Fingerhut's
Fingerhut's
managers to articulate any specific
specific
policy does not require the company's managers
purpose for data collection.
Secondary
infonnation for profiling
profiling is widespread in
Secondary use of personal information
the direct marketing
marketing sector. A review
review of any list catalog, such
such as the
Standard
Services catalog, or the trade
Data Services
trade paper
paper DM News,
Standard Rate & Data
demonstrates
demonstrates the
the extent
extent of secondary
secondary uses. Profiles of political
4
5
conservatives,1
liberals,"
women
wigs, 116 impotent
117
conseIVatives,114
liberals,115
women
who buy
wigs,116
impotent middle18
9
aged men,
gamblers,
male buyers
of fashion
underwear,"
and
aged men,117 gamblers,l1s male buyers of fashion underwear, ll9 and

108. Telephone
confirmed in
in
Telephone interview
intexview with Mary
Mary E. Doher, Metromail
Metromail (July 26,
26, 1994),
1994), confirmed
16, 1994) (on file with the University
Letter fromJoel K.
R Reidenberg
Reidenberg to Mary
Mary E. Doher (Aug.
(Aug. 16,
of Iowa College
College of Law library).
library).
109. This
is aa process
used to
to determine
if aa profile
are used
determine if
profile is being
being
109.
This is
process whereby
whereby decoy
decoy names
names are
used
or sale
in accordance
accordance with
with the
the list
list rental
rental or
sale agreement.
agreement.
used in
110. Seejohn
See John Verity, Silicon
Silicon and Software
Software that
that Mine for
for Gold,
Gold, Bus.
Bus. Wk., Sept. 5, 1994,
1994, at
at
110.
62.
62.
111. DMA
supra note
note 62,
62, arts. 1, 5.
111.
DMA Guidelines,
Guidelines, supra
112. Se
~ e.g.,
e.g., Direct Marketing
Marketing Ass'n, Grassroots
Grassroots Advocacy
Advocacy Guide
Guide for Direct
Direct Marketers
Marketers 50
50
(1993) (suggesting
(1993)
(suggesting ways for
for direct
direct marketers
marketers to oppose
oppose legislative
legislative proposals that would
would
prohibit
prohibit secondary
secondary uses
uses of credit
credit information
information for marketing
marketing purposes).
purposes).
113. Fingerhut
art. 1.
1.
. 113.
Fingerhut Companies,
Companies, Inc.,
Inc., Consumer
Consumer Privacy
Privacy Guidelines,
Guidelines, art.
114. See
See Conservative
Conservative Business
Business File
File Names
Names Community
Community Leaders,
Leaders, DM News,
News, May
May 23,
23, 1994, at
at
44.
115. SeeAmerican
11.
115.
SeeAmeri.can List Counsel,
Counsel, Inc.
Inc. Advertisement,
Advertisement, DM News,
News, Dec. 26, 1994, at 11.
116. RMI
116.
RMI Direct
Direct Marketing,
Marketing, Inc. Advertisement, DM
DM News,
News, Mar. 20, 1995, at
at 17.
117. SeeJust
Lists Offers
SeeJustLists
Offers "Male
"Male Potency" File,
Fue, DM News,
News, Apr. 19, 1993,
1993, at
at 37.
37.
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of "skimpy
"skimpy swimwear
swimwear and
and related
related items
items such
such as
as clingy
clingy short
short dresses
dresses
buyers of
buyers
and skirts,"
skirts,n 1l220 are
are just
just aa few
few examples
examples of
of the
the profiles
profiles being
being developed.
developed.
and
companies do
do not
not seem
seem to
to pay
pay attention
attention to
to the
the other
other
Similarly, companies
benchmarks of
of data
data quality. The
The relevance
relevance standard
standard poses
poses problems
problems for the
the
benchmarks
direct marketing
marketing industry.
industIy. Any
Any information
information can
can be
be included
included in
in some
some form
form
direct
of profile
profile at
at aa later
later date,
date, and
and companies,
companies, such
such as
as Reader's
Reader's Digest,
Digest, even
even
of
about nonresponses
nonresponses to
to solicitations.
solicitations. Major
Major industry
industIy
collect information
information about
collect
players ignore
ignore the benchmarks
benchmarks offering
offering individuals
individuals access
access to personal
personal
players
held by
by companies.
companies. For
For example,
example, Metromail
Metromail does
does not
not provide
provide
information held
information
2
' despite
despite its
access to personal
personal information
information to
to the concerned
concerned individuals'
individuals121
access
of membership
membership on the DMA
DMA Privacy
Privacy Task
Task Force,
Force, a group dedicated
dedicated
history of
history
promoting fair information
information practices
practices within
within the trade
trade association,
association, and
to promoting
the company's
company's purported
purported adherence
adherence to
to the DMA
DMA Guidelines.
Guidelines. Typical
Typical
the
to
profile
access
when faced with
with a request
request 1for
access
profile
responses from companies
companies when
responses
2
or "we
"we won't
won't tell
tell you."
yoU. nl22
information is "it's proprietary"
proprietary" or
information
In contrast,
contrast, there
there are instances
instances when
when company
company policies
policies include
include
In
case
practices covered
covered by the core elements of data quality. This rare case
practices
occurs most often for security. Direct
Direct marketing
marketing companies
companies typically
occurs
protect their commercial
commercial
include standards
standards for security practices
practices to protect
include
interests.
interests.123

48; National
118. Dunhill
Dunhill Unveils Casino
Casino Gamblers, DM News, May 23, 1994, at .48;
National List
List
118.
Exchange Advertisement,
Advertisement, id. at 40.
Exchange
5, 1993, at 34.
California Offers Three Lists, DM News, Apr. 5,1993,
119. Brawn of California
119.
1993, at
120. Sunup Sundown
Sundown Available
Available from TC1
TCI List Management,
Management, DM News, Dec. 20, 1993,
120.
27.
121. The DMA Guidelines call for access to personal
personal information held by direct
direct marketers.
121.
Metromail, to Joel
5. Cbmpar8
DMA Guidelines,
Guidelines, supra note 62, art. 5.
Compare Letter from Mary E. Doher, Metrornail,
DMA
(Aug.
R. Reidenberg
Reldenberg (Aug.
with Letter fromJoei
Reidenberg to Mary E. Doher (Aug.
from Joel R. Reidenberg
(Aug. 10, 1994) tith
Iowa College of Law library).
library). Initially, Metromail
16, 1994) (both on file with the University of Iowa
accurate disclosure of the personal
personal
Ignored the follow-up request for adequate and accurate
Information. Subsequent
Subsequent to mention of this practice at the Annenberg Conference, Metromail
Metromail,
Huller, Vice President, Metrornail,
offered a dubious explanation. See Letter from Thomas E. Hiller,
record
to Joel R. Reidenberg (Oct. 17, 1994) (explaining
Metromail sold public record
(explaining that Metromail
Metromail did not provide the Information
individual
Information, but that Metromal
information on request to the individual
concerned
Iowa
concerned in order to protect the person's privacy) (on file with the University of Iowa
consumer lists, marked to show the
College of Law library).
library). Metromail provided aa catalog of consumer
does
catalog does
lists containing the requestor's personal information,
information, as aa full disclosure. Id. The catalog
not Include
Metromail sells, however, and thus cannot be an
include all the consumer lists that Metromail
accurate response to
for access.
access.
request for
to the request
to Joel R..
Card, to
122. See, e.g.,
First c.-ud,
Vice President, FIrSt
from Susan Coe Heltsch, Vice
ag., Letter
Letter from
which
lists which
Reldenberg
("[M our name was obtained from one of the mailing lists
10, 1993) ("[Y]our
Reidenberg (May 10,
you...
qualified you
we
••. are
of this
this list and the credit criteria which qualified
we purchased. Both the source of
(on
this information.") (on
proprietary
to disclose
disclose this
am unwilling
unwilling to
reason, II am
proprietary in nature, and for this reason,
file
Law library).
of Iowa College of Law
file with the University of
needed to carry
123.
those employees needed
that "[o]nly those
notes dlllt
For example, Fingerhut's policy notes
123. For
any...
about any
have access to information about
may have
out the
..• customer."
the business functions involved may
4.
art. 4.
supra note 113, art.
Fingerhut,
ingerhut, supra
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b.
Profilingand
and transparency
transparencystandards
h. Profiling
standards
Standards covering
benchmark are similarly weak
covering the transparency
transparency benchmark
weak for
for
information profiling in the direct marketing industry. Legal rules are
24
virtually nonexistent.
Technical arrangements
nonexistene24
Technical
arrangements do not deal with notice
or consent issues.
The DMA tried' 5to address transparency
creating an industry-wide
transparency by creating
industry-wide
"opt-out"
These mail
mail and
and telephone preference
"opt-out" program.
program.l25 These
preference services
services
offered
solicitations to
suppress mail or telephone solicitations
offered by the DMA strive to suppress
individuals who have requested
requested not to receive
receive junk mail and junk calls.
Because these programs
Because
programs operate after the profiling has taken place, they
are not standards for transparency
transparency of profiling. Rather they reflect
reflect
transparency of list exchanges."
In any event, the
standards for transparency
exchanges.126 In
programs are not yery successful; individuals are unaware of their
existence,"5
corporate compliance
compliance cannot be measured.
existence/2'7 and corporate
measured.
of
In practice, companies frequently fail to provide meaningful
meaningful notice of
information practices. Typical
Typical statements on consumer
consumer catalogs sent to
language like "[f]rom
"[f]rom time to time, companies and
individuals use language
organizations
organizations ask to send their catalogs
catalogs and brochures
brochures to our customers....
it.""1288 Other companies, such as American
American Express, offer
ers.... we allow it"
offer
"better disclosure."
disdosure.""5
129 Commonly, companies
companies ask individuals to fill out
surveys with the promise
promise of "free savings" or "valuable coupons." These
surveys rarely identify
identify the survey organization, the beneficiary, or the
responses."ISO0 Metromail, in one recent example, even
even
intended uses of responses.
affirmatively misled individuals as to the nature and purpose of its
affirmatively
information gathering.'
gathering.5lSI' In fairness, however, companies are increasingly
124. Only
communications and video privacy
appear
Only the laws governing
governing cable communications
privacy protection appear
U.S.C.
to require any sort of notice for the collection and use of personal
personal information. See
See 18 u.s.c.
§§ 2710 (1988);
(1988); 47 U.S.C. §§ 551 (1988).
(1988).
125. See Data Protection,
Protection, Computers, and Changing
Changing Information
Information Practices:
Practices: Hearings
Government Information,
Before the Subcomm. on Government
Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House
House
Comm. on Government Operations, 10Ist
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1990)
(1990) (statement of Richard
Richard A
A.
Marketing Ass'n); DMA
DMA Manual, supra note 103.
Barton, Senior Vice President, Direct Marketing
others and provide a means
means for
for
126. They offer notice that profiles will be sold to others
individuals to prevent such
such sales. The opt-out
opt-out programs by their very
very nature do not address
notice for the profiling activities themselves.
themselves.
MaryJ.
Culnan, Consumer Attitudes Toward Secondary Information
127. Mary
J. Guinan,
Information Use, Privacy, and
and
presented at Symposium on
on
Name Removal:
Removal: Implications for Direct Marketing, Paper presented
Consumer
Chicago/Midwest Direct Marketing
(Jan. 20, 1993)
1993) (revised
(revised
Consumer Privacy, ChicagolMidwest
Marketing Days aan.
manuscript on file with the University
University of Iowa College of Law library).
manUScript
Fingerhut Corp.,
Corp., Catalog
Catalog Payment
Payment Chart (on file with the University of Iowa College
128. Fmgerhut
of Law library).
library,.
annually- "[W]e develop mailing lists based on
on
129. American Express
Express discloses annually:
derived
information you provided
provided to us on your initial application and in surveys, information
information derived
from how you use the Card that may indicate purchasing preferences
preferences and lifestyle, as well as
information available
available from external
external sources." American
American Express, supra
supra note 63.
130. See,
130.
See, e.g., Survey Savings Form (on file with the University of Iowa School of
of Law
library).
131. SeeR
Donnelley Unit Faces FTC Scrutiny
St J., Dec. 29,
See R R Donnelley
Scrutiny over Phone Survey, Wall St.
131.
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offering individuals
individuals the ability to opt
opt out of future
future use of personal
personal
offering
profiles.
for
marketing
infonnation
marketing
information

c. Profiling
Profiling and sensitive information
The commonly
commonly accepted
accepted benchmark
benchmark standards
standards for the
the treatment
treatment of
of
The
sensitive personal information
information are virtually nonexistent
nonexistent in the context
context of
of
proflling. Health information, for example,
example, has few applicable
applicable legal
legal
profiling.
protections."
Aside from rare
rare state
state statutes
statutes limiting insurance
insurance informainfonnaprotections.51522 Aside
marketing profiles,"'
profiles, ISSs state
state tort law, in theory, imposes
imposes legal
tion and marketing
tion
rules for profiling
profiling sensitive
sensitive information.
infonnation. The tort protecting
protecting against the
treatment
covers
the
public disclosure
of
private
ostensibly
covers
the
treatment of sensitive
sensitive
facts
ostensibly
private
disclosure
dissemination
the
wide
tort
is
of the
the tort
wide dissemination
infonnation. However, a basic
basic element
element of
information.
for
infonnation. l54 This makes tort claims
claims hard
bard to sustain for
of personal information.'34
disclosures are often
typical
typical disclosures
disclosures in the marketing
marketing context;
context; the
the disclosures
often
5 Additionally, few technical
between two companies. ISS
technical protections
protections in
in the
* Additionally,
between
for
sensitive
proflling systems would appear
appear to offer special
special safeguards
safeguards
sensitive
profiling
4
information.
information."lS6
Industry norms and business
business practice
practice similarly
similarly ignore
ignore standards
standards for
Industry
sensitive data. For example,
example, the DMA.
Guidelines
do
not
even
mention
even mention
DMA Guidelines
7 In fact, the DMA Guidelines can even be read to
sensitive data.1S7
DMA
data."
weaker standards
standards for sensitive
sensitive information
infonnation than for ordinary
approve of weaker
personal information. The guidelines define
define personal
personal data as
personal
individual..,
"[i]nfonnation which
which is linked
linked to an individual
... and which is not
"[i]nformation
"public" informapublicly available or observable"""'
observable" IS8 and, thus, exclude
exclude "public"
infonnaphysical handicaps
handicaps
tion from any protection. Since data such as race and physical
are readily observable,
observable, they would not qualify for the narrow protections
protections of
of
1994, at ClO.
CIO.
132. See
SeeThe
4077 Before
Before
Health Information Practices Act of 1994: Hearings on H.R. 4077
The Fair Health
Agriculture of the House
Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture
the House Subcomm. on Government
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 358 (1994)
Comm. on Government
Operations, 103<1
(1994) (statement of Paul
Government Operations,
Arkansas-Fayetteville Law Center);
Center); Office
Office of
of
Schwartz, Associate Professor, University
University of Arkansas-Fayetteville
Computerized Medical
Technology Assessment, U.S.
Congress, Protecting Privacy in Computerized
Medical
U.S. Congress,
Technology
Prescribing Privacy:
Physician
Information (1993);
(1993); Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing
Privacy. The Uncertain Role of Physician
Information
N.C. 1..
existing ethical and
In the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C.
L Rev. 255 (1984) (arguing existing
in
confidentiality); Paul M.
legal standards
standards inadequately aid physicians protecting patient
patient confidentiality);
legal
(1995).
L Rev. 295 (1995).
Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 Vand. 1..
133.
collection of information for
1751 (1992)
(1992) (regulating the collection
L ch. 1751
See e.g., Mass. Gen. 1..
133. See,
insurance purposes).
Insurance
1204, 1206-07 (10th Cir.
134. See Polin v. Dun &
& Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204,1206-07
ar. 1985) (holding
that distribution
distribution to small group of recipients
recipients does not qualify for the tort).
135. Recently,
special protection for the disclosure of HIV
Recently, courts have found, however, special
CL
(N.J. Super. Ct.
Ctc. at Princeton, 592 A.2d
A.2d 1251 (NJ.
diagnoses. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr.
[hereinafter
11, 1994,
1994, at A23 [hereinafter
N.Y. Times, May 11,
Law Div.
Div. 1991); Award in HIV Disclosure, N.Y.
v. Delta Airlines].
Airlines).
Sullivan v.
60 (describing database marketing systems).
al., supra note 97, at 56-57, 60
136. See Berry et aI.,
137. SeeDMA
See DMA Guidelines, supra note 62.
138. Id. at 2.
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DMA Guidelines.
the DMA
Companies themselves seem to reject
reject higher standards
standards and
and treat
Companies
sensitive data
data as the key to valuable profiles. TRW,
TRW, for example,
example, sells ethnic
ethnic
sensitive
lists that
that can be segmented with
with detailed demographic
demographic information (e.g.,
lists
age, income, and
and marital
marital status).lS9
status).' Claritas
Claritas offers aa profiling
profiling product
product that
that
age,
"makes it
it easy
easy to
to keep
keep up with
with theJoneses
the Joneses...
as well as
as theJohnsons,
the Johnsons, the
the
"makes
... as
Francos, the Garcias, the
the Wongs and
and all the
the others,nl40
others,"'4 and
and Metaxa found
Francos,
liquor. 4' ProfIles
Profiles of political
its niche profiling Greeks who drink liquor.l41
opinions and
and sexual orientation are also
also readily available. One company
opinions
and lesbians
lesbians ....
.... we've got the lists ....
.... [s]electable
[s] electable
boasts: "Gay men and
by...
sex,
gift
amount
to
gay
causes]
....
by
.. , 14zip,
sex,
gift
amount
[donors
to
gay
causes]....
They're
2
yours."n142
yours.
Health information
information is similarly exempt from special consideration in
in
Health
the context of profiling. Johnson &Johnson profiled 5 million incontinent,
the
elderly women and
and said the activity was "consistent with current direct
elderly
43
practices."n 145
marketing industry practices.
Metromail, a one-time member of the
DMA Privacy
DMA
Privacy Task Force, profiled millions of Americans
Americans with specific
health conditions
conditions (i.e., allergies, bleeding gums, and epilepsy) and said,
health
nl44
"We feel
this data
data is less suspect in terms of privacy than other data.
data."'"
"We
feel this
d. Profiling
Profilingand
and standards
d.
standards enforcement.
In
the context
of direct
direct marketing
In the
context of
marketing and profiling, the enforceability
enforceability of
of
information practices
fair information
practices for profiling is limited. The absence of legal
rules translates into an absence of legal recourse
recourse for individuals facing
rules
unfair information
information practices. Contractual
Contractual remedies
remedies are only available
available to
businesses
party to a profiling contract and could only
only rarely be
businesses that are party
available
Industry norms and
available to individuals.'"
individuals. l45 Industry
and business
business practice
practice are also
also
extremely weak
extremely
weak on remedies
remedies for individuals. The DMA and its Ethics
Committee offer very
very limited industry
industry oversight. Unfortunately, the Ethics
Committee is not an independent
independent oversight authority charged
charged with
properly
properly balancing
balancing standards
standards for
for information
information practice.
practice. It has rarely
sanctioned
sanctioned members
members for unfair
unfair information
information practices,
practices, and
and it can have
have little
little
credibility when
credibility
when members
members of
of the DMA
DMA Privacy
Privacy Task Force
Force itself
itself ignore the
DMA
DMA Guidelines.'"
Guidelines.l46

139.
139. TRW
TRW Target
Target Marketing
Marketing Servs.,
Servs., Ethnic
Ethnic Markets
Markets Consumer
Consumer Database
Database (Fall
(Fall 1992).
1992).
140.
140. Claritas
Claritas Advertisement,
Advertisement, DM
DM News,
News, May
May 23, 1994,
1994, at 26.
26.
141.
jerrold Ballinger,
Ballinger, Metaxa
Metaxa to
to Roll
Roll Out
Out Mailing
Mailing Effort to Greek-Americans
Greek-Americans by
by End
End of
of
141. Jerrold
Year,
Year, DM
DM News, Mar. 1, 1993,
1993, at 2.
2.
142.
142. Letter
Letter from Strubb
Strubb Media
Media Group,
Group, Inc.
Inc.. to
to Direct
Direct Marketers
Marketers (on
(on file
file with
with the University
of
of Iowa
Iowa College
College of Law
Law library).
library).
143.
Larry Tye, List-Makers
List-Makers Draw
Draw aa Bead
Bead on
on Many,
Many, Boston
Boston Globe,
Globe, Sept.
Sept. 6,
6, 1993,
1993, at
at 12.
12.
143. Larry
144.
Schultz, Carlson,
June 21,
News,june
21, 1993,
1993, at
at 1.
144. Ray
RaySchultt,
Carlson, Metromail
Metromail Offer
Offer Medical
Medical Data, DM
DM News,
145.
remedies only
145. Individuals
Individuals can
can assert
assert contract
contract -remedies
only if
if the
the agreement
agreement between
between the
the
contracting
contracting businesses
businesses specifically
specifically provides
provides for individual
individual recourse
recourse or
or if
if the
the individuals
individuals are
are
third
third party
party beneficiaries.
beneficiaries.
146. See
July 19,
'146.
See Paul
Paul M.
M. Alberta,
Alberta, DMA
DMA Suspends
Suspends Direct
Direct American,
American, DM
DM News,
News,july
19, 1993,
1993, at
at 1.
1.
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2. Employment
significant amounts
critical to a healthy economy, and significant
Employment
Employment is critical
relationships.
employment
to
support
are
critical
of personal information
information
has
undergone
workplace
the
American
twenty
years,
the
last
During
undergone a
impact
of
information
The
substantive information
information revolution.
information technology
and state governmental
federal
and
increasing
making
on business decision
governmental
regulation of employment require employers
employers to obtain and maintain more
regulation
47
employee personal information. 147
Personnel
Personnel record keeping is a vital activity in the labor market.
Employers
Employers must use personal information
information for basic management
management activities
including hiring, payroll processing, performance
performance evaluations, and
including
information
for
the
treatment
Standards
decisions.
promotion
promotion
treatment of personal information
for
a
productive
needs
employer
between
must strike a difficult balance
balance between
productive
to
privacy.""
and safe work environment
environment and employee rights
privacy.143
The treatment of personnel
personnel records generally addresses the commonly
accepted
benchmark standards. Legal
Legal rules, industry norms, business
accepted benchmark
architecture all exist to protect the
practice, and computer
computer system architecture
information in the employment context. There are
treatment of personal
personal information
direct state laws governing
information. practices
practices in the workplace and
governing information,
indirect rules arising as a result of other labor laws, such as the Labor
Labor
Management
Management Standards Act, the Employee Retirement
Retirement Income Security
establish
Act, and the antidiscrimination
Information systems establish
antidiscrimination laws. Information
other
department and other
separations between
structural
between the personnel department
structural separations
divisions of companies, and corporate policies also exist to go beyond the
other norms.
standards
and data
data quality standards
records and
a. Personnel
a.
Personnel records
to a certain degree
The benchmark standards
standards for data quality
quality are met ((0
Legal
rules require
in the context of the treatment
treatment of personnel
personnel records.
49
purpose
purpose specifications
specifications for the collection
collection of some personal
personal information. 149
several
Is the only case publicly reported in the trade industry
industry newspaper
newspaper over the last several
This Is
Privacy Task force do not seem to
years. Significantly, even founding members of the DMA Privacy
association's commitment to fair information practices seriously. See Robin
Robin
take the trade association's
36
Smith, DMA Privacy Task Force
Force Works for Self-Regulation, DM News,
News, Feb. 1, 1993,
1993, at 36
(responding in a letter to the editor to an article
article written by Rob Jackson of Donnelley
Jackson
databases: "[W]hat
Marketing
marketing databases:
"[W]hat distresses me is
Is that Mr. Jackson
Marketing on privacy and marketing
appears to be totally unaware of the work of the Direct Marketing Association's
Association's privacy task
president
industry leaders including, as a founding member, John
John Cleary, president
force, made up of Industry
of Donnelley
Donnelley Marketing.").
Marketing.").
(1989) (arguing that personal privacy
America 24 (1989)
147. See David Linowes, Privacy
Privacy in America
privacy is
being Invaded by employers who are required by law to obtain
obtain personal information).
information).
Cavlco, Invasion of Privacy
Privacy in the Private Employment
Employment Sector:
Sector: Tortious
148. See Frank J. Cavico,
L Rev. 1263, 1266 (1993).
and Ethical Aspects, 30 Hous. L.
(1993).
must
U.S.C. § 211(c) (1988) (prescribing
(prescribing the information that employers must
149. See e.g., 29 U.S.c.
34:11-56a20 (West Supp. 1994);
Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56a20
collect and maintain for payroll purposes); N.J.
NJ. Stat
1994);

HeinOnline -- 80 Iowa L. Rev. 524 1994-95

SETTING STANDARDS
SETI'ING

525

Legal rules, in aa few states, indirectly limit secondary
secondary uses of personal
information through the imposition
imposition of restraints on the disclosure of
of
50
on the
personnel records. lso
They also impose relevancy with limitations on
collection of certain types of unnecessary information for personnel
collection
records.""
Finally, legal rules in a number of states assure accuracy by
lSI Finally,
records.
providing employees with statutory rights of access to their records and
statutory rights of correction for inaccurate information,
information, in addition to
common-law duties.'
common-law
duties. ls22
Additional
computer
Additional benchmark
benchmark standards for data quality are set in computer
system structure. Technical decisions often set company standards for
information retention. Large cOIporations,
corporations, for example, establish record
infonnation
archival
system retention policies in order to limit the sheer size of archival
53
records.'ISS
As an illustration, ffiM
IBM updates its files regularly
regularly and deletes
records.
schedule.'5
stale data on an identified schedule.
1M
practice can similarly offer important
Industry norms and business
business practice
important
secondary use through data
purpose specifications and limitations on secondary
security
discrimination lawsuits and "smoking guns"
programs.15S Fears of discrimination
security programs.'
constrain employers
employers from seeking overly
overly extensive or sensitive personal
ISS Company policies
information
reasons"6
infonnation without strong reasons.
policies routinely
routinely give
give
employees access to their personnel files. 1577 In addition, business
business practice
employees
often includes
includes security for employment records
records to prevent
prevent unauthorized
unauthorized

N.Y. Lab. Law § 679 (McKinney
(McKinney 1988).
1988).
Supp. 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-128f (1993); Ill.
In.
150. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1198.5 (West
(WestSupp.1995);
Comp.Stat.
Stat. ch. 820, §§
§§ 40/1-40/13
L ch. 149:52C {l992}.
(1992).
Compo
40/1-40/13 (1992); Mass. Gen. L.
U.S.C. §§ 12112(d}
12112(d) (Supp. II 1991)
1991) (prohibiting
151. See 42 u.s.c.
(prohibiting collection
collection of job applicant's
applicant's
medical
information if not specifically
specifically related to job
job performance);
performance); Conn.
Conp. Gen.
Gen. Stat. Ann.
medical information
about arrest
arrest record
record of
of job
§ 31-51i
31-5li (West
(West 1994) (imposing
(imposing restrictions
restrictions on use of information about
applicant
applicant obtained from application
application form); Ill. Comp.
Comp. Stat. ch. 820, § 40/9
40/9 (1992)
(1992)
(prohibiting
employees' nonemployment
(prohibiting collection of certain
certain information
information of employees'
nonemployment activities);
activities); Md.
Code Ann.
Lab. & Empl.
Empl. §§
§§ 3-701,
-702 (Michie
3-701, 3-702
(Michie 1991
1991 & Supp. 1994)
1994) (prohibiting collection
collection
Code
Ann. Lab.
of certain
certain psychological
of
psychological information);
information); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(d)
296(I}(d} (McKinney
(McKinney 1993)
(restricting
employers from requesting certain information
(restricting employers
information from job applicants);
applicants); see also
also
Soroka
Hudson Corp.,
Soroka v.
v. Dayton
Dayton Hudson
Corp., 1 Cal.
Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal.
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
1991) (holding that
that
employer may not
employee's religious
not collect
collect information related to employee's
religious beliefs
beliefs or sexual
sexual
orientation),
dismissed 862 P.2d 148 (Cal.
1993).
(Cal. 1993).
orientation), rev. dismissed,
152.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19,
152. See ag.,
e.g., Cal. Lab. Code
Code § 1198.5
1198.5 (West Supp. 1995); Del.
19, § 732
(Supp. 1994);
1994); Me.
Me. Rev. Stat.
Stat. Ann. tit
tit. 26, § 631
631 (West Supp. 1994); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 275:56
275:56 (1987);
(1987); Bulkin v. Western
Western Kraft
Kraft E.,
E., Inc.,
Inc., 422 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. 437, 442-45
442-45 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
1976)
(imposing
(imposing common-law
common-law duty
dUty for employer
employer to
to keep accurate
accurate personnel
personnel records).
153.
153. SeeRichard
See Richard D. Williams,
WilIiams, Corporate
Corporate Policies
Policies for Creation
Creation and Retention
Retention of
of Documents
Documents
(PLI Litig. &
1987).
& Admin.
Admin. Practice
Practice Course
Course Handbook
Handbook Series
Series No. 332,
332, 1987).
154.
& Ray
Ray C. Spencer, PrivacyPrivacy: The Workplace
Workplace Issue of the
the '90s,
'90s, 23
23 J.
J.
154. David
David F. Linowes &
Marshall
Marshall L
L. Rev. 591,
591, 619
619 (1990).
(1990).
155.
155. See Linowes,
Linowes, supra
supra note
note 147,
147, at
at 30
30 (noting that IBM,
ffiM, for example,
example, restricts access
access to
to
personal
personal information
information on
on aa need-to-know
need-ta-know basis
basis for employment
employment purposes, thus
thus minimizing
minimizing
secondary
secondary use
use possibilities)..
possibilities) •.
156.
al.,
Personnel
156. See Steven
Steven C.
C. Kahn
Kahn et
et al.,
Personnel Director's
Director's Legal
Legal Guide
Guide 'It 2.04[3],
2.04[3], 9.01 (2d ed.
ed.
1990).
1990).
157.
&
157. Eighty-seven
Eighty-seven percent
percent of
of U.S. companies
companies were
were reported to
to provide
provide access.
access. Linowes
Linowes &
Spencer,
Spencer, supra
supra note
note 154,
154, at
at 594.
594.
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access or
or tampering."
tampering.158s
access

b.
b. Personnel
Personnel records
records and
and transparency
transparency standards
standards
The benchmarks
benchmarks for
for transparency
transparency are
are not emphasized
emphasized in
in the
the context
context
The
of personnel
personnel record
record keeping. Legal
Legal rules
rules create
create few
few obligations
obligations for
for
of
companies to provide
provide employees
employees with
with notice
notice and
and consent
consent for the
the treatment
treatment
companies
9 Indirect
personal information.
information.159
Indirect standards
standards from
from tort
tort law,
law, however,
however, offer
offer
of personal
transparency.lI;O Defamation
Defamation cases
cases provided
provided companies
companies with an
an
some transparency."'
some
incentive to
to obtain
obtain employee
employee consent
consent before
before disseminating
disseminating personnel
personnel
incentive
records. t61 Yet, technical
technical systems
systems for personnel
personnel records
records are
are not
not configrecords.'
ured to emphasize
emphasize notice
notice or consent.
ured
Industry norms
norms and business
business practice
practice have
have not implemented
implemented the
Industry
benchmark transparency
transparency standards. The
The majority of U.S. companies
companies do not
not
benchmark
infonn employees
employees of the types of personal
personal information
infonnation that is
is collected,
inform
the purposes
purposes for the data collection,
collection, or
or the
the intended
intended disclosures
disclosures of
of
the
information.61622 A significant
significant minority
minority of companies
companies do, however,
personal information.
l65
These
policies to inform
infonn employees
personnel record
record practices.'
practices.63
These
employees of personnel
have policies
companies usually infonn
employees through
through general
general purpose
inform employees
larger companies
employee handbooks
handbooks that are part
part of a personnel
personnel department's
department's new
employee
employee orientation
orientation program. Typically, companies
will also request
request
companies will
employee
authorization from employees
employees prior to disclosing personnel
personnel information
information to
authorization
164
third parties.6 4

and standards
records and
standards for sensitive information
Personnelrecords
c. Personnel
standards for personnel records offer some
Like the benchmark, standards
laws and employment
special treatment
treatment for sensitive data. Labor L1.ws
employment
discrimination rules limit the types of sensitive information
information that employers
discrimination
165
against public disclosure of private facts, available
available
may collect. 6" A tort against
Privacy and Data
158. U.S. Council for Int'l Business, Statement on Examples of Pm-acy
US. Council].
[hereinafter u.s.
Council].
Protection Codes of Conduct in Use in the United States '77 (1991)
(1991) [hereinafter
consumer report" on an employee or
159. If
"investigative consumer
If an employer wishes to make an "investigative
law, may be
prospective employee, the person must be notified and,
and, in the case of state law,
prospective
reqUired
N;Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 380U.S.C. § 1681 (1988) (requiring notice); N.Y.
Se- 15 U.S.c.
required to consent. See
c (McKinney
(requiring employee consent).
1984 &&Supp. 1995) (requiring
(McKtnney 1984
A.2d
160.
Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d
Sigal Constr. Corp.
those awarded in Sigal
Tort damages such as those
160. Tort
1986),
780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986),
1204 (D.C.
Inc., '780
Papa Gino's of Am., Inc.,
1991), and O'Brien v. Papa
(D.C. 1991),

have led to corporate
corporate fears of liability for the disclosure of personal information without
Just
consent. SCQ
Giving a Reference: Just
Cc]; David Grant, Giving
7.03[4] [c];
156, 1: '7.03[·1]
Sce Kahn
Kahn et al., supra note 156,
16.
Name, Rank, and
30, 1987, at 16.
Legal Times, Nov. 30,1987,
and Salary History?, Legal
161.
C. Reuben, Employment Lawyers
fading. See Richard C.
protection isis fading.
even this protection
161. Yet, even
32.
at 321994, at
A.BA J., June 1994,
Rethink
Rethink Advice, A.BA.
at594.
note 154,
154, at
162. Linowes &&Spencer,
594.
Spencer, supra note
the
on the
of a nationwide survey on
163. See
41 (introducing results ofa
147, at
at 41
note 147,
supra note
See Linowes,
LUnowes, supra
500 companies).
privacy policies of Fortune 500
164. Id.
42.
Id. at
at 42.
data
of health data
collection of
165. See
(prohibiting the collection
I11991)
1991) (prohibiting
(Supp. II
12112(d) (S~pp.
U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)
See 42 U.S.c.
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under state common law, also affords special protection
protection to sensitive data
and has particular
particular application
application in the workplace. Usually, the tort requires
requires a
16 however, courts
wide dissemination of sensitive
sensitive information;
information;I66
courts have
requirement of broad public dissemination
dissemination for disclosures in
relaxed the re~uirement
the workplace.
workplace."I6
Company practices frequently make secondary use of sensitive
information for decisions related
related to an employee, and few companies
companies
1' Health information
inform employees of the practice. I68
Health information is particularly
problematic. Corporate "wellness" programs
programs often collect sensitive
information about employees, ostensibly for the purpose of promoting
promoting
company insurance costs, and then make
good health and reducing company
secondary use of such information for decisions about the employees.l'
secondary
employees.I699
Some companies do set up contractual
contractual arrangements
arrangements that better protect
mM arranges
arranges claim submission
submission to
sensitive employee
employee data. For example, IBM
greater
bypass corporate information systems
systems in order
order to secure greater
confidentiality.'" Other companies,
confidentiality.I70
companies, such as se1finsured
self-insured businesses, may
not seek such
such special
data.l7I
special protection.for
protection for employee
employee health data."'

records and
and enforcement standards
standards
d. Personnel
Personnel records
Standards for the enforceability
Standards
enforceability of fair information
information practices do exist,
to some extent, for personnel records. Remedies
Remedies are available for breaches
of statutory
statutory rights. Tort law also offers some possibility
possibility for remedies
afford
benefiting aggrieved individuals. Business
Business practices
practices do not, however, afford
individuals direct redress, though violations of company policies may result
agent
in the company sanctioning an offending
offending agent.
Standards for supervision
supervision are more widespread. Federal and state
Standards
unrelated to job functions); Hanlon &:
&Wilson,
Wilson, Co. v. NLRB,
NLRB, 738 F.2d 606, 613 (3d Cir. 1984)
to prohibit employers from collecting information
(interpreting 29 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 150(8)
150(8) (a) (1) to
infonnation
of
about the union activities of employees); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (1994)
(1994) (restricting use of
medical infonnation
information obtained as part of an entry physical).
physical). Compliance
Compliance with affinnative
affirmative
medical
action programs requires
information about sex, race, ethnic
requires the collection of personal
personal infonnation
classification, and
and handicaps;
C.F.R.
classification,
handicaps; however, the use of such information
infonnation is restricted. See
See 29 c.F.R.
§ 1602.7
1602.7 (1994) (requiring reporting on Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Standard
Standard
100).
Form 100).
166.
166. See Restatement
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D
6520 cmt. aa (1977);
(1977); Prosser, supra note 35, at
393.
167. See,
Se e.g.,
v. United Airlines, 500 N.E.2d
370, 373 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)
e.g., Levias v.
N.E.2d 370,373
1985) (holding
(holding
employer was not allowed to disclose medical
employer
medical information
infonnation without employee's
employee's consent);
Sullivan v. Delta Airlines, supra note 135 (finding that employer
employee's privacy
employer invaded employee'S
privacy
employees suspected of HIV infection).
by placing
placing his name
name on list of employees
168. Linowes &:
& Spencer, supra
supra note 154, at 594 (stating that the majority of corporations
do not inform employees of the types of personal
personal records
records that are maintained, how they are
used, and corporate
corporate disclosure practices).
practices).
169. S&e
See Ellen E. Schultz, Open Secrets: Medical
Medical Data Gathered by Firms
Frrms Can
Can Prove Less
Than Confidential, Wall St.
J., May 18,1994,
18, 1994, at
Al.
St.].,
atAl.
& Spencer, supra note 154, at 612612.
170. See
See Linowes &:
171. SeeWho's
171.
See Who's Reading Your
Your Medical
Medical Records?
Records? Consumer Rep., Oct. 1994, at 628, 632.
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jurisdiction to consider the
agencies have oversight for labor practices and jurisdiction
treatment of personnel records.172 Industry norms and business practice
impose standards for periodic company review of employment record
7
systems 17S
systems.
Additionally, corporate policies may have aa grievance
complain about the treatment of personnel
procedure for employees to complain
74
records. m

C. The Assessment of Standards
Standardsin Key Contexts
Contexts
C.
The search for standards in the United States that enshrine the
commonly accepted benchmarks for treatment
treatment of perJonal
personal information
information
commonly
yields aa surprising, and disappointing, result. Dispersed sources in aa robust
complete and
marketplace should, in theory, lead to the development of aa complete
sheer
tailored set of standards
standards for particular contexts. Instead, the sheer
dear understanding
understanding of
of
complexity of finding standards hinders both a clear
implementation of benchmarks. Citizens are
private sector practice and the implementation
of
at a loss to understand
understand the treatment
treatment of personal information because of
the multilayered approach
to" standards, and most corporate
approach to'
corporate managers
managers
information practice
innovators on fair information
generally do not want to be innovators
75
standards
standards.175
The private
private sector reception of the benchmarks
benchmarks has been mixed. Data
standards of access and correction
correction are stronger than standards
standards -of
'of
quality standards
data collection
collection and secondary use. At the same time, transparency
standards, sensitive data standards, and enforcement
enforcement standards are weak.
The greater
greater focus on access and correction
correction underlies
underlies a bias in American
American
regulation
of
regulation to focus principally
principally on the market process and to lose sight of
inherent substance or quality of the "marketplace of ideas."
the inherent
The U.S. standards-setting
standards-setting approach
approach also defies current
current industry
practices.
The
narrow,
dispersed
approach
assumes
that
the
processing
of
approach
processing of
practices.
personal
information
will
be
limited
to
one
context
within
a
particular
personal ~formation
one context
particular
industry
companies' information practices challenge
challenge
industry or company. Today, companies'
this sectoral
cross-sectoral use of
of
sectoral thinking because
because there
there is widespread, cross-sectoral
personal
information.1176 For example, data collected
personal information.
collected to execute
execute a
172. For example,
example, the federal Department
Department of Labor, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission,
Health Administration, and their respective
respective state
state
Commission, Occupational
Occupational Safety
Safety and Health
counterparts
personnel record
counterparts each
each have
have supervisory
supervisory roles
roles with respect to specific aspects of personnel
keeping.
keeping.
173.
173. See
See Linowes
Linowes &
&: Spencer,
Spencer, supra
supra note
note 154,
154, at
at 596
596 (discussing
(discussing corporate
corporate policies).
policies).
174.
be available
available under grievance
grievance procedures
procedures to punish
punish the offender
offender within
within
174. Sanctions
Sanctions may
may be
the
the corporate
corporate structure, but
but are generally
generally not available
available to afford
afford direct redress
redress to the
aggrieved
aggrieved employee.
employee.
175.
Louis Harris
Harris &
&: Assocs.,
Assocs., Inc.,
Inc., Privacy
Privacy &
&: American
American Business
Business Survey
Survey of Interactive
Interactive
175. See Louis
Services,
and Privacy,
Privacy, at xii
xii (1994)
(1994) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Privacy &
&: American
American Business
Services, Consumers,
Consumers, and
Survey]
Americans believe
believe they have
have lost control
control of how personal
personal
Survey) (reporting
(reporting that 78% of Americans
Information
circulated and
and used
used by
by companies);
companies); Louis Harris &
&: Assocs.,
Assocs., Inc. &
&: Alan
Alan F.
Information is circulated
Westin,
Westin, The Equifax
Equifax Report
Report on Consumers
Consumers in the Information
Information Age 98
98 (1990)
(1990) (reporting
(reporting that
that
few
few companies
companies initiate
initiate privacy
privacy reviews);
reviews); Smith, supra
supra note
note 60, at
at 90-93.
90-93.
176.
Joel R.. Reidenberg, Information
Information Flows
Flows on
on the
the Global Infobahn,
Infobahn, in The
The New
176. See Joel
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payment transaction
transaction now
now has
has utility
utility for marketing
marketing profiles
profiles and
and may be used
used
payment
by third
third parties
parties outside
outside the
the financial
financial sector.
sector.
by
The search
search for
for U.S.
U.S. standards
standards ultimately
ultimately reveals
reveals important
important
shortcomings in
in the
the treatment
treatment of personal
personal information
information in
in the American
American
shortcomings
private sector. Specifically,
Specifically, there
there is a lack
lack of
of transparency
transparency for the treatment
treatment
private
personal information, abundant
abundant secondary
secondary use of
of personal
personal information,
information,
of personal
weak enforcement
information practice
practice standards,
standards, and
and a
enforcement of fair information
weak
responsibilities.
misallocation of standard-setting
standard-setting responsibilities.
misallocation

1. opaque
Transparency
Opaque Transparency
1.
hal1mark of
of fair information
information practices
practices is the ability
ability of individuals
individuals
The hallmark
society's information
information flows. The existence
existence
participate meaningfully
meaningfully in society's
to participate
and extent
extent of
of information
information processing
processing must be public
public for individuals to
have these
these opportunities. In
In key
key private
private sector contexts,
contexts, notice to
and* consent, if
individuals and·
if necessary, for the treatment
treatment of
of personal
personal
77
information
deficient.111
information are deficient.'
Private
Private sector
sector companies
companies often
often display an unusual
unusual degree
degree of hubris in
justifying
the
to
provide
transparency.
Companies
believe that
that
failure
justifying
the
but
that
be
open
company,
personal
information
should
to
the
open
personal information
concerned
individuals
have
no
right
to
know
what
the
company
company is
concerned individuals
178
78 The
of
the use of
private sector also takes the position that the
doing.
interests of consumers, yet companies
personal
information is in
personal information
in the best
best interests
judge this for
for
simultaneously
deny consumers
consumers the opportunity
opportunity to judge
simultaneously deny
themselves.
themselves.
significance on
The lack
lack of transparency
transparency has an even
even greater negative
negative significance
on
practice.
through
business
standards
of
other
the
the development
development
standards through
practice.
Nontransparency
Transparency
Nontransparency blocks the evolution
evolution of dispersed standards. Transparency
forces companies to review
review their data quality
quality and sensitive data practices.
necessitates broader, internal
Similarly, transparency
transparency necessitates
internal company polices in
order to inform individuals
individuals of the company
company practices. Transparency
Transparency brings
quality. Without the
public pressure
pressure to promote better standards
standards of data qUality.
public scrutiny that transparency
compelled
transparency allows, companies do not feel compelled
to justify
justity their information practices.
practices. When unjustifiable
unjustifiable information
information
practices
prompt and
practices are transparent, public
public outrage
outrage can lead to prompt
1 79
appropriate
appropriate legislative
legislative action.
action.l19
challenge to
The lack of transparency
transparency further poses a fundamental challenge
interactive technologies. On an information highway, "lurkers," "slurpers,"
interactive
and "snoopers" abound. Lurkers monitor information flows over the
ed., forthcoming
forthcoming
J. Drake ed,
Strategies for U.S. Policy (William J.
Infonnation
Information Infrastructure:
Infrastructure: Strategies
1995).
1995).
text.
124-31, 159-64 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 124-31,
178. See
SeeLetter
Letter from Susan Coe Heitsch, supra note 122 (stating that treatment
treatment of personal
information is proprietary to the company).
infonnation
18 U.S.C.
Se, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act, 18
u.s.c. §§ 2710 (1988) (protection accorded
179. See,
ill-fated
to video rental records resulted
resulted from release ofJudge
ofJudge Bork's viewing habits during his ill-fated
Court).
nomination to the Supreme Court)_
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public view. Slurpers
Slurpers assemble
assemble and collate
network hidden from public
information
infonnation from
from
infonnation from multiple sources. Snoopers obtain information
unsuspecting sources. Transparency
Transparency is necessary
necessary to make these players
unsuspecting
distinguishable so that individuals
individuals or other suppliers of personal
personal
visible and distinguishable
participation in all aspects
information
aspects of network
network
infonnation can have effective participation
information
infonnation flows.
2. Secondary
Secondary Use
Use

The benchmark
benchmark standards for fair information practices place
"finality." This is the principle that information
considerable
infonnation
considerable value
value on "ftnality."
obtained for one purpose should not be used for other purposes
purposes without
without
obtained
marketing
consent
consent from the individual concerned. As seen in the direct marketing
and employment
employment contexts, secondary
secondary use is a problem in the U.S. private
sector, particularly
particularly with respect to marketing
marketing applications.'
applications. ISO°
accentuated for sensitive
The problem of secondary
secondary use is accentuated
8
commercial market
information.
' An enormous commercial
market exists, for example, in
in
infonnation. l81
information.8lS22 Interactive
Interactive technology
secondary use of health infonnation.
secondary
technology now also
also
to
allows isolated
personal information
infonnation to be amassed and profiled
profIled to
isolated bits of personal
of
create
create "new" sensitive data. For example, it is easy to construct a list of
83
married
married Catholics with small families who support abortion. lss
of
American standards for the treatment
The fragmented sources
sources for American
treatment of
for secondary
personal
information invite a permanent
personal infonnation
permanent problem fOll"
secondary use.
Personal
Personal information gathered in one context has value for other uses.
There
There will be unrelenting
unrelenting pressure for companies
companies to re-use personal
personal
fashion. 1844 Without effective
information
secondary fashion.
effective transparency,
infonnation in a secondary
companies
companies have unfettered discretion
discretion to determine the uses for personal
information.
infonnation. This inexorably
inexorably leads to myopia
myopia in how companies
characterize information
infonnation use and how they use data in deviation from the
characterize
8S
original purposes.1
original
purposes.' s5

180. See supra
supra notes 105-07,
105-07, 112-20, 150, 168-71 and accompanying
accompanying text.
112-20, 168-71 and accompanying
accompanying text.
181.
Seesupra
181. See
supra notes 112-20,

offered for
for the merger
Merck,
182. For example, one of the principal
principal rationales offered
merger between Merck,
the large pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical company, and Medco, one of the nation's largest mail order
prescription records and purchasing
pharmacies,
pharmacies, was to utilize the individual prescription
purchasing histories
&Rochelle
contained in Medco's database. See
SeJoseph
Joseph Weber &:
Rochelle Shoretz, Is
Is This Rx Too Costly
Bus. Wk,
Aug. 9,1993,
9, 1993, at
at 28.
for Merck?,
Merck?, Bus.
WI" Aug.
28.
183. Planned Parenthood sells its list of donors, and demographic information is
is widely
Se Craver,
Craver,
marital status. See
available
available to match the list by religion, age, family size, income, and marital
Mathews,
News, Sept. 13, 1993, at 37 (including list of
Mathews, Smith
Smith Awards 16 Files to ALC, DM News,
Claritas Advertisement, DM News, May 23, 1994,
Planned Parenthood members and donors); C1aritas
demographics); TRW Target
at 26 (the PRlZM
PRIZM 4 offers matching according to family demographics);
Target
Marketing
Marketlng Servs., supra note 139 (offering ethnic
ethnic selections).
selections).
(describing large databases of consumer
184. Se
See Smith, supra note 60, at 74-80 (describing
consumer
psychographic marketing).
Information currently used for psychographic
marketing).
'
185. See
See id. at 86-90 (discussing cognitive dissonance
185.
dissonance even among corporate
corporate information
information
system managers).
managers).
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3. Lightweight Enforcement
Fair information practices
practices must be enforceable
enforceable in an Information
Information
Society. Under
Under the system of targeted
targeted standards in the United States,
government sanction. Narrow, targeted
targeted
private enforcement
enforcement is preferred to government
standards and the corresponding
reliance on se1f.regulation
self-regulation depend on the
corresponding reliance
market
enforcement of fair information practices."'e
practices.ISS The scarcity of
of
market for enforcement
legal rules limits the option of private enforcement. Remedies for citizens
87
contexts.'l87
and supervision of companies
companies are lacking in key contexts.
In the absence
absence of legal rules, the emphasis on self-regulation
se1f.regulation poses a
enforcement companies have little incentive
threshold obstacle to effective enforcement:
through
to police themselves.
themselves. Bad practices can easily be hidden through
nontransparency, and organized industry efforts are not serious about
nontransparency,
about
enforcement. 'ISS" In addition, there are other
other formidable obstacles to
private
private enforcement. The cost for an individual
individual to pursue a claim for
unfair information
information practices is prohibitive, and the real harm from unfair
unfair
information
information practice is not monetary, but rather dignitary and societal
societal.1l899
These are often not covered
covered by the liability provisions of relevant
relevant statutes
statutes
or industry policies.
4. Misallocated
Responsibility
4.
Misallocated Responsibility
The reliance
reliance on targeted standards in the U.S. private sector places a
preponderant emphasis on voluntary industry norms and business
preponderant
business practice.
practice.
responsibility for standards
This allocates complete responsibility
standards to the business
participants in private sector information exchanges. However, since
transparency
transparency is missing in key contexts, individuals and society as a whole
ill-equipped to exercise any influence on standards setting.
are ill-equipped
Responsibility for the existence and creation of standards, thus, rests fully
Responsibility
on corporations. Yet, the business
business world shoulders
shoulders this responsibility
responsibility for
information practice
without
-accountability
precisely
because
practice
·accountability
because so many
aspects of business practices are obscured
obscured from public
view
and there are
public
few means of either public or private enforcement.
The haphazard
haphazard and incomplete
incomplete character
character of the existing standards in
key contexts demonstrates
that
the
allocation
of responsibility
responsibility to establish
establish
demonstrates
fair information practice from dispersed sources has not worked. The
objective
objective of tailored standards through an aggregation
aggregation of dispersed sources
cannot
realistically
be
achieved.
cannot
186. For example.
example, the United States has rejected until now
186.
now the creation
creation of any
any regulatory
regulatory
commission
commission to enforce
enforce fair information
information practices.
145-46, 172-74
187. See
s~ supra
supra notes
notes 145-46,
172-74 and accompanying
accompanying text.
188. The significance of the DMA Ethics Committee
Committee is a good example of this. Despite the
skewed
skewed treatment of personal
personal information
information in the direct marketing industry, the Ethics
Committee focuses
focuses on
deceptive advertising and not on fair information
Committee
on deceptive
information practices.
practices.
189.
See Judy
Judy
189. An individual must budget at least $150-250 per hour for legal fees. S~
Sarasohn, In Search
Alternatives: Client Pressure Holds Down Fees, Legal Times, Nov. 22,
Search of Alternatives:
1993, at 13.
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THE SUBVERSIVE
SUBVERSIVE EFFECT
EFFECT OF
OF TARGETED
TARGETED LEGAL
LEGAL STANDARDS
STANDARDS
III. THE
information practices in the private
The evolution of standards for infonnation
sector poses a paradox for the goals embodied in the pursuit of targeted
noncomprehensive approach to standards seeks to preserve
standards. The noncomprehensive
democracy.'9 ° The weak development
development of
of
identity and liberty in American democracy.19o
benchmark
approach has instead
benchmark standards in key contexts means that the approach
fostered a concentration
concentration of economic and political
American
political power in American
society and has diminished that very identity and liberty cherished by
IOI
citizens."'
citizens.
More
More than fifteen years ago, the U.S. Privacy Protection Study
Commission identified a number of key sectors that had tremendous
impact on the lives of citizens.
citizens.'192 The Commission
Commission worried that treatment
treatment
information in these sectors corresponded
corresponded to an obvious
of personal infonnation
93
potential for the improper coercion
coercion of citizens
citizens by private sector actors. 193
potential
Even in the most closely
financial
closely regulated of these sectors, namely financial
legal protections
services and telecommunications,
telecommunications, the targeted
targeted Regal
emphasized
emphasized minimal
minimal restraint
restraint on information
infonnation flows; accuracy
accuracy protections
94
predominant.1l94
limitations were
purpose limitations
rather than collection
collection and
and purpose
were predominant.
Over
information
Over the last decade, there has been
been a concentration
concentration of infonnation
accepted benchmarks for
power under
under private control.'
control. l95 The commonly
commonly accepted
fair information
infonnation practice to preserve
preserve citizen participation
participation in the flows of
of
information have not emerged through targeted stkndards.
personal information
standards.
Contrary
Contrary to the purposes
purposes of targeted standards, individuals
individuals have lost
lost
identity to computer profiles and models and have lost power in society.
Targeted
created infonnation
information flows that suffer from
Targeted standards have created
intractable inequities
inequities and frustrate the very
very objectives
objectives of the narrow and
and
dispersed approach to standards
standards setting in the United States.
InformationMarket
A. Failures
Failures in
in the Information
The
The reliance
reliance on the marketplace
marketplace to define standards
standardls faces formidable
problems.
problems. The marketplace
marketplace does not have a level playing field and contains
destructive internal inconsistencies. In this "marketplace" of personal
personal
information,
standards fails to assure
assure citizens
citizens fair
fair
information, the system
system of targeted standards
190.
190. Identity and
and liberty
liberty are intrinsically
intrinsically linked
linked to the private
private sector treatment
treatment of personal
personal
information.
See generally Fried, supra note 36
infonnation. See
36 (arguing that the
the right to control
control the
the disdosure
disclosure
of personal
personal information
information to others is part
part of
of political
political and social
social interchange);
interchange); Herbert
Herbert Maisl,
]2tat
i la protection
legislation frangaise
fran~e et tendences
tendences de la jurisprudence
jurisprudence relatives a
protection des
Btat de la legislation
donndes
(1987).
droit compar6
compare 559 (1987).
donnees personnelles, 39
39 Revue
Revue internationale
internationale de droit
191.
accompanying notes
notes 212-35.
212-35.
191. See infra text accompanying
192.
192. See Privacy
Privacy Comm'n, supra note
note 8, at
at 37-39
37-39 (identifying,
(identifYing, inter alia,
alia, the following as
as key
sectors:
sectors: financial
financial services,
services, direct
direct marketing, employment, health
health care,
care, government,
government, and
and
education).
education).
193.
194.
194.
195.
195.

See generaly
generally id.
Id.

See
11, at 210-16.
See Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 11,
See Reidenberg,
176.
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 176.
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and treats
treats citizens
citizens inequitably.
inequitably.
participation and
participation
1.
1. The Skewed
Skewed "Marketplace"
"Marketplace"
In the
the absence
absence of
of the
the benchmark
benchmark standards,
standards, political
political weight
weight is greatly
In
favor of
of the
the collectors
collectors and
and manipulators
manipulators of
of personal
personal
skewed in favor
skewed
on targeted
targeted standards
standards allocates
allocates
information. At
At the
the same
same time,
time, the
the reliance
reliance on
information.
the role
role of
of developing
developing industry
industry norms
norms and
an!;! business
business
to these
these actors
actors the
to
that require
require shared
shared decision
decision making
making with
with citizens.
citizens. This
This presents
practices that
practices
an inherent
inherent conflict
conflict of
of interest.
interest. The
The only
only way
way to
to preserve
preserve some
some semblance
semblance
an
of control
control over
over the
the disclosure
disclosure of
of personal
personal information
information in American
American society
of

and live
live aa hermit's
hermit's life.
life.
withdraw entirely
entirely and
is to withdraw
The development
development of fair information
information practices
practices through the
the
The
has argued
argued that
that
marketplace faces
faces profound
profound structural
structural problems.
problems. Posner
Posner has
marketplace
absent any
any legal
legal protections,
protections, the
the market
market will
will efficiently
efficiently create
create fair
fair "privacy"
absent
information practice
practice results.1l96
argument depends
depends on the triviality
9 This argument
or information
transaction costs,
costs, externalities,
externalities, and imperfect
imperfect information.'9
information.l97 The
The
of transaction
absence of benchmark
benchmark standards
standards results, however, in precisely
precisely the reverse
reverse
absence
important
situation: a marketplace
marketplace with
with high transaction
transaction costs,
costs, important
situation:
externalities, and
and a significant
significant level
level of imperfect information.
externalities,
information practices
practices to be
be
Dispersed standards
standards allow
allow transparency
transparency of information
Dispersed
obscured. With
With obscured
obscured transparency,
transparency, citizens
citizens face an extraordinary
extraordinary and
and
obscured.
insurmountable burden
burden if they even attempt
attempt to learn about
about
often insurmountable
information practices. Companies
Companies control the disclosure
disclosure of their practices
practices
information
and suffer
suffer no penalties
penalties for refusing
refusing to disclose. In fact, companies may
disclose their inappropriate
inappropriate practices
practices as a result
result of
of
suffer harm if they do disclose
suffer
lg8
negative backlashes"
backlashes. 9 Industry
Industry norms
norms and practice preclude
preclude citizen
citizen
personal information. Without notice,
involvement
involvement in the circulation of personal
individual even to discover how,
consent, and access, it is impossible for an individual
personal information
information is circulating. In economic
economic
where, when, and why personal
transaction costs and allocates
transparency raises transaction
terms, this obscured transparency
.
them to citizens.
personal
There is also an external
external effect from the circulation of personal
information without direct citizen participation. The failure to include
decision-making process affects political and
citizens in the information decision-making
IL Rev.
Rev. 393 (1978)
Ga. L.
196. See
Right of Privacy, 12 Ga.
A. Posner, The Right
Richard A
See generally
generally Richard
such
because such
protection for personal information because
(arguing that individuals should
should not have protection
protection
protection would distort efficient market functions).
(1975)
104-07 (1975)
on Regulation 10407
and the State: Essays on
The Citizen and
197. See GeorgeJ.
George J. Stigler, The
Posner
effectively). Posner
minimal for the market to function effectively).
(arguing that these points must be mininIal
state.
rights by the state.
assigned no rights
low when individuals are assigned
assumed transaction costs would be low
of limited
limited
externalities, or social cost, of
the externalities,
Posner, supra
398. He
He minimized the
196, at
at 398.
supra note 196,
Id.
information. Id.
of perfect or imperfect information.
protection for individuals
question of
bypassed the question
individuals and bypassed
against eavesdropping
eavesdropping and
at
for protection against
also argued for
Interestingly, Posner also
at 412-13.
412-13. Interestingly,
individual
if the individual
would be greater if
eavesdropping would
transaction costs for eavesdropping
because the transaction
sUIveillance
surveillance because
provide exactly
exactly that:
seek to
to provide
practice standards seek
401. Fair information practice
Id. at
at 401.
has
has no protection. Id.
protection against surveillance.
at 85-93.
supra note 60, at
198.
198. See Smith, supra
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l99
interchange.'"
of
Society as a whole is altered by the treatment of
social interchange.
information without fair infonnation
information practice standards.
personal infonnation
Distinctions between public and private activity disintegrate and social
informational power shifts.
dynamics change as infonnational
for the accuracy
accuracy of circulating personal
The weak standards for
information create a two-way condition of "imperfect information."
information." The
infonnation
participation by individuals in the market of circulating
information
lack of participation
circulating information
information for decision
decision
prevents business from obtaining the best infonnation
making.2 Business is often unable to COITect
correct errors in circulating
circulating
making.200
personal infonnation
information because the problems may only be discovered by the
concerned individuals.02011 Citizens also face imperfect infonnation.
information.
concerned
customized products, services, and advertising are developed based
based
Because customized
upon information
information profiles,
proftles, a citizen's vision of society is increasingly
narrowed.
interactive services for
for
narrowed. The greater reliance citizens place on interactive
daily life, including news, shopping, and household
household finance, the more
Information Society.202
Society.2 2
citizens lose a broad view of the Information

2. Self-Destructing
Self-Destructing Targets
Targets
The system of targeted standards has become self-destructive
self-destructive for the
U.S. private sector. The lack of fair information
practices
produces
infonnation
produces costly
03
203
embarrassment
to
companies.
In
rare
instances
of
transparency,
public
embarrassment
companies.
pressure
and
congressional
interest
have
forced
companies
to
abandon
or
congressional
or
pressure
2M
modify
products
after
development.m
modify
development.
The narrow focus of targeted
targeted standards
standards and the absence of
of
benchmarks
for
fair
information
internal conflicts
for
benchmarks
infonnation practice
practice intensify internal
conflicts for
205
information.20
treatment of
many large companies
companies in their treatment
of personal
personal infonnation.

199. See
&e genffalj
general~ Westin,
Westin, supra note 5; Fried, supra
supra note 36.
200.
200. One
One recent
recent audit of consumer
consumer profile
profile lists in the direct marketing industry
industry found
found
surprising
surprising levels
levels of inaccuracy. Ray Schultz, List Accuracy
Accuracy Rated
Rated in Leo
Leo Burnett
Burnett Audit, DM
DM
News,
News, Sept. 19,
19, 1994, at 1 (noting that list accuracy
accuracy ranged from 21%
21 % when
when profiling income
income
home ownership).
ownership).
to 95% when profiling home
201.
201. Id.
202. To
To regain the broad
broad view of
of society, citizens
citizens must deviate
deviate from the norm.
norm. Such
Such
substantial effort and cost.
are likely to involve substantial
cost
deviations are
203.
203. See Reidenberg, supra
supra note 176.
176.
204. See
&e Domestic and International Data
Data Protection Issues: Hearinga
Hearing.; Before
Before the
Subcomm.
on
Subcomm. on
on Government
Government Information,
Information, Justice,
Justice, and
and Agriculture of the House
House Comm. on
Government
Government Operations, 102d Cong., 1st
1st Sess. 66 (1991)
(1991) (statement
(statement ofJohn
ofJohn Baker, Senior
Senior Vice
Vice
President, Equifax, discussing
discussing the
the abandoned
abandoned Lotus-Equifax
Lotus-Equifax consumer
consumer database);
database); Markey
Widens
Inquiry. AOL
11, 1994,
on Mail
Mail Lists,
lists, Comm.
ComllL Daily, Oct.
Oct 11,
1994, at
at
Widens Inquiry:
AOL Defends
Defends its Privacy
Privacy Policy on
1 (referring
(referring to America
America Online's
Online's new
new notice
notice policy following
folIo\\ing embarrassing
embarrassing publicity);
pUblicity); Terry
Brennan,
CADM Releases
Releases Its Unanimous
Unanimous Objection
Objection to
to AT&T
AT&T 800 Directory,
Directory; Joins Other
Other
Brennan, CADM
Industry
Industry Leaders,
Leaders, DM News,
News, Oct.
Oct. 7, 1991,
1991, at 1 (discussing
(discussing the
the objections
objections to distribution
distribution of an
an
AT&T
AT&T directory
directory of 800 numbers).
numbers).
205.
205. Various
Various departments
departments within
within a single
single organization
organization will
will have
have drastically
drastically different
different views
views
on fair Information
specific personal
information practices
practices for specific
personal information. For
For example,
example, in
in a financial
Institution,
marketing group
group will
will seek
seek secondary
secondary use
use of account
account information,
information, while
while th
Ihl'
institution, the marketing
customer
for billing
billing purposes
purpnsl's
customer relations
relations group
group may view
view transaction
transaction records as
as confidential
confidenti.-.I for
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Products and product quality
quality in an information
information economy
economy depend
depend
increasingly on a complete set of standards
standards for fair information
information practice.
of
Incomplete standards
standards and poor standards threaten the future of
information-based
long-term vitality of their
information-based businesses
businesses by jeopardizing
jeopardizing the long-term
products and services.
For the long-term, business is beginning
beginning to grasp that better standards
for fair information
information practice can be a competitive
competitive advantage
advantage and will be
companies are generally myopic
necessary for business
business survival
Survival..206 Yet, companies
07
and only see immediate
immediate revenue from the sale of personal
personal information.2207
developing
In the short-run, most companies
comp"anies still affirmatively resist developing
208
Business
standards.208
Business reluctance
reluctance to embrace setting standards
standards preserves
preseIVes a
destructive process for the development
development of the Information Society.209
Society.M

Justificationfor
Targeted Standards
Standards
B. Frustrating
Frustrating the Justification
jor Targeted
information practices
The targeted
targeted standards
standards approach
approach to fair information
circulation of personal
personal information.
enshrines inequities
inequities for citizens in the circulation
overcome
The approach
approach also imposes
imposes structural hurdles
hurdles that business
business must overcome
collectively challenge the underlying
to improve standards. Those
Those results collectively
underlying
justification
justification for the targeted
targeted standards
standards approach.
To restrain abuses
abuses of power and attempts at thought control, the
interference with personal
United States
States has long resisted government interference

only.
1991 Report, supra note 65; Privacy Be
&
206. See Dun Be
& Bradstreet, supra note 65; Equifax 1991
Am. Bus.,
Sept./Oct. 1993, at 15 (setting forth Pacific
Bus., Sept./Oet.
Pacific Bell commitment to fair information
information
practices).
instances of public
practices). Two of these prominent
prominent examples
examples stem
stem from earlier instances
embarrassment. Equifax
developed'a
information practices
"a deep commitment to stronger fair information
Equifux developed
following the abandonment
abandonment of the Lotus-Equifax consumer
consumer database. Pacific Bell similarly
adopted
adopted a fair information
information practices
practices cbde
code following
following a controversy
controversy over its plan to sell
subscriber
subscriber information.
information.
207. Trans
Trans Union, for example, sells marketing
marketing profiles based upon information contained
contained
in its credit reporting databases. While credit reporting
reporting is regulated
regulated by the Fair Credit
Reporting
U.S.C. § 1681
(1988), Ti-ans
Trans Union's secondary use of the information is
Reporting Act, 12 U.S.c.
1681 (1988),
inconsistent
information practice. Trans
Trans Union's
Union's
inconsistent with
with benchmark standards
standards of fair information
competitors, TRW and Equifax,
Equifux, no longer engage in the same practice. Trans Union, thus,
has information products that face no competition. The
The Federal Trade
Trade Commission
Commission objects to
to
Trans Union's practice under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
Act and Trans Union
Union is aggressively
aggressively
Fed. Reg. 55,669 (FTC 1994);
challenging an FTC order. See Trans Union Corp., 59 Fed
Washington Regulatory
(Jan. 16,
Regulatory Reporting
Reporting Assocs.,
Assocs., FrC:
FTC: Watch, No. 426-Credit
426-Credit Reporting
Reporting Gan.
1995), available
available in LEXIS, Trade Library, FTCWAT
of
1995),
FTCWAT File
Fue (stating that United
United States Court of
Appeals
Appeals for the District of Columbia "stayed an FTC order requiring Trans Union to halt its
direct-marketing lists business").
business"). In the event that Trans
challenge, Congress
direct-marketing
Trans Union
Union wins its challenge,
has expressed interest
H.R. 5178, 103d
2d
103d Cong., 2d
interest in prohibiting Trans Union's practice. See H.R.
(1994); H.R. 1015, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.
Sess. (1994);
S. 783, 103d Cong.,
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
(1993).
Despite such opposition, Trans Union makes money in the short
short run.
208. See Smith, supra note 60, at 85-86, 90.
209. E.g.,
Eg., Privacy Be
& American
American Business Survey, supra
supra note 175 (finding that refusing to
develop fair information
information standards will dissuade potential users of interactive
interactive services
services from
participating in network
network transactions).
transactions).
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rights.
rights.22100 Freedom in the circulation of personal information, however,
citizen
supported citizen
has neither prevented
prevented the manipulation of citizens
citizens nor supported
liberty and the accepted role of the state in economic
economic affairs. 211
1. Manipulation
Manipulation of Citizens
One of the earliest government
government studies of computers
computers and society
information
made the profound
profound insight that the concentration
concentration of information
power.212 The ubiquitous
techniques leads to an imbalance
imbalance of political
political power.212
extensive information
information risks the manipulation, molding, and
availability of extensive
acljustment of individual
individual conduct. The citizen loses power to other actors
adjustment
when
in society
society when computer
computer models define individual conduct
conduct and when
deviations
deviations from predicted
predicted behavior are questioned.121s Information
Information traces
of individual
individual conduct, such as transaction records from interactive
communications,
communications, lead to the manipulation of social engagement. Services
Services
and products will be offered to the individual
individual based on predictions from
these interactive
interactive patterns. This has the positive effect of offering consumers
interesting
they are li1<ely
likely to find interesting
information
information about goods and services that they.are
or appealing. At the same time, these selective offerings
offerings have the more
nefarious consequence
consequence of limiting an individual's
individual's "information horizon"
and stereotyping
stereotyping citizens.
The private sector has precisely
precisely the type of dossiers that the public
214
has long feared government would abuse.214
In many
many ways, private data
215 It is particularly
files
fIles substitute for the lack of state data bases.215
particularly telling
direct
that the FBI, with all its surveillance
surveillance resources, still went
Vlent to the direct
marketing
marketing industry
industry to obtain personal
personal information. 2166
of
At the present time, one important result of the existing limited set of
standards is that large corporate interests structure
structure decision making
making
through their hidden control of information
information flows. Companies
Companies both create
and enforce information standards without public scrutiny. The effect is
subtle, but significant. As interactive
interactive communications
communications become
become ever more
crucial to everyday life, goods and services will be offered
offered primarily on the
subscriber has done in the past
basis of transaction
transaction data profiles.
profIles. What a subscriber
past
will dictate what is offered in the future. Such behavioral
behavioral stereotyping
stereotyping
17
citizen 217
In
censors
J[n addition, the
censors the information delivered to the citizen.

accompanying text.
210. &esupra
See supra note 18-54 and accompanying
197-256.
point. Sunstein, supra note 31,
211.
211. Professor
Professor Sunstein has argued
argued a similar point
31, at 197-256.
Rapport de la Commission
Commission Informatique et Libert6s
Libertes 77 (1975)
(1975) (report of a French
French
212. Rapport
government
government commission established to consider the impact of computers on freedom and
action).
society
society and to make
make recommendations'for
recommendations'for government
government action).
61, 69
See Simitis, supra note 3, at 710-12, 720-24; Hearings, supra note 7, at 61,
213. Sec
(statement
(statement ofJoel
ofJoel R.
R. Reidenberg, Associate Professor, Fordham
Fordham Univ. School
School of Law).
Law).
214. Sec
See Linowes, supra note 147, at 156-67.
Simitis, supra note 3, at 725.
215. See Simitis,
Ray Schultz, FBI Said to Seek Compiled Lists for Use in Its Field Investigations, DM
DM
216. Ray
1.Ironically, the marketing industry
News, Apr. 20, 1992, at 1.
industry declined
declined to provide information
information
FBL Ray
to the FBI.
Ray Schultz, Big Compilers
Compilers Say No to the FBI, DM News, May 4, 1992, at 1.
subscriber
217. For example, on the Prodigy network, interactions
interactions are profiled and each subscriber
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control of these
these information
information resources
resources without
without citizen
citizen knowledge
knowledge
control
thought control.
control. Without
Without knowledge
knowledge
empowers corporations
corporations to
to engage
engage in thought
empowers
of the 'specific
commercial sources
sources of personal
personal information
information or
or the basis
basis for
for
of
specific commercial
cannot effectively
effectively evaluate
evaluate alternatives.
alternatives.1218
particular profiles,
profiles, citizens
citizens cannot
particular
Critiques of recent
recent Supreme
Supreme Court
Court privacyjurisprudence
privacy jurisprudence highlight
highlight an
an
Critiques
important shift and a growing
growing concern
concern for protection
protection against
against the
important
manipulation of citizens.
The "old privacy" doctrine
doctrine sought to
to protect
protect
citizens 2199 The
manipulation
such as
as the
the intrusion
intrusion of the
against government
government surveillance
sUlveillance of citizens such
against
use of contraceppolice into "marital bedrooms
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
police
tm The
tives."220
seeks to
to protect
protect citizens
citizens from
from
The "new privacy" doctrine seeks
tives."
how to live their
their lives, such as a state ban
ban on
on a
coercive
choices about how
coercive choices
evolution shifts the conception
conception of abuse
abuse
right to choose.nl
choose.221 This evolution
woman's right
power from fear of surveillance
sUIVeillance to fear of control
control of
of thought and social
social
of power
of
interaction. A similar potential
potential abuse now emanates
emanates from
from private use of
interaction.
personal information.
personal
The concept
concept that private
private control of information
information flows
flows risks significant
significant
There is a unique
unique strand
strand in
in
potential for citizen manipulation
manipulation is not new. There
potential
U.S. telecommunications
policy that seeks to harness private sector
sector control
telecommunications policy
as a means to manipulate citizens. For example, the
of information flows as
fairness doctrine requires
requires private broadcast
broadcast stations to air opposing points
carry" doctrine requires private cable television
and the "must carry"
television
of view,222
view,an and
Broadcasting v.
v.
companies to offer
offer public service channels.!2
channels.m In Red Lion Broadcasting
companies
FCc,224
Court upheld
upheld the fairness rule in order
order to protect
protect
Supreme Court
FCC, 4 the Supreme
public's right of access
access to free thought. The Court
Court said: "It is the
the public's
marketplace
Amendment to preserve
preserve an uninhibited
uninhibited marketplace
purpose of the First Amendment
ideas in which
which truth
truth will ultimately
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
countenance
of ideas
Government itself or a
whether it
it be by the Government
monopolization
monopolization of that market, whether
private licensee
Broadcasting v.
v. FCC,m
FCc,226 the
Turner Broadcasting
22 More recently, in Turner
licensee..".,225
because the "basic
"must carry" rule because
Supreme
upheld the "must
Supreme Court similarly upheld
communications policy that 'the
'the widest possible
tenet of national communications
subscriber is thus
advertisements based on the profile. The subscriber
sees a customized
customized set of product advertisements
cut off from other
other product information.
L Rev. 2097
218. See genera19
c. Edwin Baker, Advertising a Democratic Press, 140
140 U. Pa. 1..
generally C.
(1992) (discussing manipulative effects of advertising).
(1992)
advertising).
emphasizes
219. See Sandel, supra note 21,
21, at 525 (arguing that "old~
rhetoric emphasizes
"old" privacy rhetoric
protection
particular forms of
protection from surveillance and "new" privacy rests on protection for particular
generally Rubenfeld, supra note 22 (arguing that privacy rights must restrain the
conduct). See genera19
conduct).
fundamental to
government from dictating choices about citizen conduct
conduct that are fundamental
government
individuality).
individuality).
220. Griswold v.
(1965).
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
221. Roe v.
113 (1973).
(1973).
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
1993).
& Supp. V 1993).
222. Communications
§§ 151-613
151-613 (1988 &:
1934, 47 U.S.C. §§
Communications Act of 1934,
(1988 &
U.S.c. §§ 521-559 (1988
&: Supp. V
1984, 47 U.S.C.
223. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,
1993).
1993).
(1969).
224. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
390..
225. Id. at 390
(1994).
. 226. 114
S. Ct.
Ct. 2445 (1994).
114S.
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information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
dissemination of information
'"
' Under
jurisprudence,
public.'"w
Under this jurisprudence.
essential to the welfare of the public.
standards for public participation
participation in information
to
information flows are critical
critical to
standards
information
avoiding citizen manipulation. The lack of standards for fair information
practice
participation
sector prevents precisely
precisely the type of participation
practice in the private sector
that the Court deems essential to the welfare of the public.

2. The Reversal of Liberty
Liberty
The market failure and the shift in information power reverses the
evolution of the concept of liberty and the role of the state that took place
in the United States between
between the nineteenth
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Modem
of
Modem liberty
liberty for citizens requires an ability to participate
participate in flows of
personal
information, if not the ability to exercise control over those
personal information.
flows.sss
flows. 228 Early America
America viewed personal information
information as private,
private. and
significant efforts were made to limit the amount of personal
information
significant
personal information
in the public
public realm.ns
realm.229 The more colonialists
coloniaIists adapted to New World
conditions
space. the more protective they became of
of
conditions and found open space,
solitude and isolation from others. 230 In the congested urban centers of
of
age, the same sense of isolation
the industrial
industriaI age.
isolation or solitude could be found
211 An individual
in "protective anonymity."
anonymity.,,2S1
public place.
yet
individual could be in a public
place, yet
still seek or assume freedom from personal identification.22s22
The search for solitude and protective anonymity meant that citizens
participatory power
had full participatory
power in the circulation of personal
personal information.
Citizens acquired an important
important liberty through
through the exercise of control over
over
flows of personal information. Nineteenth century U.S. courts gradually
gradually
enshrined
physical and mental
mental spaces"
space.2SS The
enshrined the notion of inviolable physical
state, through the increase of citizen rights.
rights, promoted such liberty. The
state.
First Amendment grew to secure information
information flows in support
support of the
for polity.2
respect for
the respect
and the
judgments and
political judgments
process for democratic political
polity.2S4
The First Amendment
promoted
liberty
for
individuals
as
participants
Amendment
individuals participants in a

227. Id. at 2470 (citations
(citations omitted).
omitted).
American development
228. See Glendon, supra
supra note 17, at 52-54 (noting the American
development of privacy
privacy as
an extension
extension of liberty); Westin, supra note 5,
5, at 7 (stating that privacy
privacy is the complete
complete
control
to others);
control by individuals in determining
determining the disclosure of personal information
information to
others); Fried,
supra note 36, at 493 (stating that privacy consists of the right of individuals to define
define
themselves
control
themselves for others);
others); Miller, supra
supra note 10, at 1107 (stating that privacy entails the control
of the flow of Information
information about individuals);
individuals); Simitis, supra note
note 3, at 232-37
232-37 (arguing that
that
data protection is necessary for citizens
citizens to participate in democracy).
Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century
Century America, 9'1
L. Rev. 1892,
94 Harv.
Harv.L
229. See
SeeNote,
(1981) (discussing
(discussing emergence
emergence of right to exclude others from private
1895-96, 1900-01 (1981)
property
communications).
property and the right to control the disclosure of private communications).
(1972).
230. See David F1aherty,
Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England, 26 (1972).
Richard F.
Public Society 9 (1987).
(1987).
231.
231, Richard
F. Hixson, Privacy in a Public
232. See
SeeWestin,
31-32.
Westin, supra
supra note 5, at 31-32.
233. See Note, supra note 229, at 1895-96,
1895-96, 1900-01.
1900-01.
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex.
234.
31, at 220; see also Mark
234, SeeSunstein,
See Sunstein, supra note 31,
(1984).
L. Rev. 1387
1387 (1984).

HeinOnline -- 80 Iowa L. Rev. 538 1994-95

SETTING STANDARDS
STANDARDS

539

democratic society
society as
as distinct
distinct from
from the
the notion
notion of
of liberty
liberty for
for individuals
individuals to
democratic
make
private
consumption
choices.235
choices.2
consumption
private
make
Today, with
with targeted
targeted standards
standards and
and the
the corresponding
corresponding treatment
treatment of
of
Today,
colonial
the
early
personal
informatiop,
citizen
liberty
resembles
the
early
colonial
resembles
liberty
citizen
personal informatiqn,
of the
the developments
developments over
over the
the centuries.
centuries. The
The
experience without
without any
any of
experience
erode
combination
of
current
technology
and
existing
targeted
standards
erode
standards
targeted
combination of current technology and existing
protective anonymity. "Information
"Information traces"
traces" destroy
destroy anonymity. Individuals
Individuals
protective
at
groceries
of
purchase
in
public
places,
such
as
the
the
purchase
of
groceries
at
perceive
transactions
such as
public
perceive transactions
yet
the
supermarket
or
books
at
the
bookstore,
as
anonymous
activities,
activities,
yet
the bookstore, as anonymous
the supermarket or books
information records
records collected
collected and
and maintained
maintained by store
store computer
computer systems
systems
information
personalized. Stores
Stores and other
other third
third parties
parties
enable these
these activities
activities to be personalized.
enable
can link
link specific
specific transactions
transactions to
to individuals.
individuals. Citizens
Citizens no longer
longer have the
can
choose the
the terms of
of personal
personal information
information disclosure
disclosure and
and
freedom to choose
consequently have
have lost
lost the capacity
capacity to participate
participate in
in decisions
decisions about
about
consequently
societal information
information flows.
flows. This denial of
of participation
participation inherently
societal
manipulates
citizens; liberty for the control
control of
of personal
personal information
information reverts
manipulates citizens;
back in time.

3. Usurping
Usurping the State
State
3.
The transfer
transfer to
to business
business of
of control
control of personal
personal information
information flows,
The
coupled with
with continued
continued dispersion
dispersion of standards for fair information
information
coupled
American state. After
Mter the New
modern American
practice, usurps the role of the modem
state became
became a more
more active participant
participant in economic
economic affairs,
affairs, and
and
Deal, the state
the courts sought to give greater
greater protection
protection to personal
personal liberties. Following
Following
the
Products,27 the
Coast Hotel v. Parrish2
Parrish 236 and United
the
Carolene Products,2S7
United States v. Carolene
West Coast
Supreme Court upheld economic
economic regulation more readily than restrictions
Supreme
of
on certain
certain fundamental
fundamental personal freedoms, such
such as freedom of
standards is
communication.236 Ironically, the underpinning
underpinning of dispersed
dispersed standards
of
rights--the freedom from manipulation
to presenre
personal rights-the
manipulation and abuse of
preserve personal
minimal restraints to protect
protect personal
personal
power. Yet, the combination of minimal
information and of dispersed standards creates broader
broader protection for
information
commercial interests than for individual interests. Business has unchecked
unchecked
vast
circulation of vast
discretion to determine
determine the terms and conditions of the circulation
personal information.
amounts of personal
between
The treatment of personal information
information is actually confused between
the two ideologies of economic and personal freedoms. Flows of personal
information raise significant commercial stakes while at the same time
implicating personal freedoms. Personal information is an economic asset.
like other economic assets, the Supreme Court's jurispruAccordingly, like
235.
31, at
at 220.
220.
supra note 31,
235. Sunstein, supra
236.
wage law).
state minimum wage
236. 300 U.S. 379, 393-94 (1937) (upholding aa state
on personal
237.
impinging on
152 n.
n. 44 (1938) (suggesting that legislation impinging
144, 152
U.S. 144,
237. 304 U.S.
than economic
economic regulations).
scrutiny than
subject to more exacting scrutiny
liberties may
.
may be subject
the
and the
Liberty and
238. See
Scheiber, Economic liberty
N. Scheiber,
4-5; Harry N.
17, at 4-5;
note 17,
supra note
See Glendon, supra
Huntington
at the Huntington
Lectures at
Institute Lectures
of liberty.
Liberty. Seaver Institute
Constitution,
the History of
in Essays in the
Constitution, in
library
(1988).
Library 75,84-86
75, 84-86 (1988).

HeinOnline -- 80 Iowa L. Rev. 539 1994-95

540

80

IOWA
IOWA LAW
LAW REVIEW
REVIEW

[1995]

dence
dence on economic regulation should apply. However, because personal
information implicates
infonnation
implicates individual
individual rights, courts and society tend to
information
scrutinize regulation and restrictions on the flow of personal
personal infonnation
239
freedoms.ns
as a limitation on cherished First Amendment freedoms.
While the
courts give less protection
commercial speech, advertising and
protection to commercial
240
commercial
commercial messages do enjoy some protection.240
The circulation
circulation of personal
personal infonnation,
information, however, is not like the
traditional
traditional commercial speech cases involving advertising
advertising or the
communication
commercial message. Restraints on the circulation
communication of a commercial
circulation of
of
communication of a message.
personal information
infonnation would not damage the communication
Rather, the regulation of the treatment of personal infonnation
information would
participation by citizens in the communications
secure participation
communications process. Moreover,
in commercial
commercial speech
speech cases, courts are ·willing
willing to uphold regulations
if the
if
241
economic activity.
the underlying
activity.241
government can regulate the
underlying economic
market
The continued
continued pursuit of target standards
standards in the face of market
failure and frustrated goals abdicates
abdicates the proper
proper role of the post-New
post-New Deal
242 The Constitution
government
state.242
Constitution is not inconsistent
inconsistent with the government
2455 At the same
securing a more balanced
balanced market
market in information.
infonnation.24
same time, the
standards present
targeted standards
present a classic
classic case for justified economic regulation.
self-regulate when the shortshortSociety cannot expect the private sector to self:.regulate
term costs of setting high standards is considerable
considerable and the significant
significant
countervailing pressure
transaction costs for citizens limits countervailing
pressure on companies.
Furthermore,
Furthermore, citizen manipulation and reductions
reductions of liberty cry
cry out for
intervention.
A REvIvAL
REvivAL OF
OF DEMOCRATic
VALUES
IV. THE FOREiGN
FOREIGN AID TO A
DEMOCRATIC VALUES
rebalance
The U.S. private sector faces serious pressure
pressure to rebalance
targeted
information practices and to restore the values underlying
underlying the targeted
standards approach.
approach. In addition
addition to growing
growing discord within
viithin the United
United

239. See, e.g.,
e.g., Lovgren
Lovgren v. Citizens
Citizens First Nat'l
Nat'l Bank, 534 N.E.2d 937,
988-91 (TIL
987, 988-91
(ilL 1989)
1989)
defamation and First
concerns to de£unation
First Amendment);
(suggesting that privacy tort has similar concerns
Arrington
1982) (interpreting New York
Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1982)
misappropriation tort
newspaper publication from
statute codifying
codifying the privacy
privacy misappropriation
tOlt to exclude newspaper
from
commercial
commercial use under First Amendment reasoning).
240. See SEC v.
St Publishing Inst.,
lnst, Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
v. Wall St.
(explaining that injunction
injunction against publication
not
(explaining
publication of monthly stock market magazine
magazine not
prohibited
& Bradstreet,
prohibited by First Amendment); Towers Fin. Corp. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 803
803 F. Supp.
820, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (allowing aa restraining order
commercial
order against
against the publication of commercial
speech);
1099 (Ohio 1976) (rejecting
speech); Ohio State
State Bar
Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 357 N.E.2d 1097, 1099
(rejecting First
FIrSt
Amendment defense by defendant attorney suspended
suspended from practice
practice for improper client
client
Amendment
solicitation).
solicitation).
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S.
U.s. 328 (1986)
(1986) (holding that
that
241. Posadas
Posadas de P.R. Assocs.
241.
advertising
advertising for gambling could
could be regulated
regulated because
because the government
government had the power to
regulate
regulate gambling itself).
31, at 230 (arguing that the New Deal for speech means
242. See Sunsteln,
Sunstein, supra
supra note
note 31,
regulation to further democratic deliberation
deliberation and diversity
diversity of participation).
participation).
243. See id. at 256.
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States, foreign interest
interest in and concern
concern over U.S.
U.S. standards
standards is
is an unusual,
States,
driving a return
return to the democratic
democratic value
value of protecting
protecting
but important, force driving
citizens against
against thought
thought manipulation
manipulation and
and abuses
abuses of power. Unlike
Unlike the
the ad
citizens
hoc, narrowly
narrowly tailored standards
standards of
of the United
United States,
States, foreign standards
standards
personal
often offer
offer comprehensive
comprehensive legal norms
norms for the
the treatment
treattnent of personal
often
Divergent norms
norms among
among various countries
countries in
in a global
global
information. Divergent
Global information
pr<;>blematic. Global
information processing,
information economy
economy are problematic.
information
thus, requires
requires the
the U.S.
U.S. private sector to consider
consider trends in foreign
foreign
information practice.
practice.
standards of fair information
standards
" has
The
The original
original European
European data protection
protection proposal
proposal2244
has served
seIVed as a
wake-up call
call for information
information practice
practice standards
standards in the U.S. private sector.
wake-up
The initial
initial business
business reaction to the proposed
proposed directive was loud and
The
negative, but
but the need
need to respond
respond galvanized
galvanized American
American companies
companies to
negative,
evaluate their
their information
practice policies.
policies.2245" Trade
Trade associations
associations began
began
information practice
evaluate
reinvigorated the process of drafting codes
codes of conduct.
conduct2246
" Similarly,
or reinvigorated
policy-making circles
circles of fair
fair
European interest stimulated
stimulated scrutiny in U.S. policy-making
European
information
information practice norms. Both
Both legislative
legislative and executive
executive branch officials
officials
began to evaluate
evaluate U.S. standards in light of the more comprehensive
began
7
European
European principles.24241
Existing and emerging
emerging foreign standards lead to scrutiny of industry
offihore data processing may
4
Because offshore
business practice.2248
norms and business
personal information,
information, the evaluation of
of
compromise the treatment
treattnent of personal
regulatory problem. Foreign regulators
nonlocal standards
standards becomes
becomes a regulatory
regulators have
nonlocal
private sector standards. The
expressed specific interest in U.S. private
expressed
Communities has, for example, sponsored a
European Communities
Commission of the European
249
European data protection.249
Foreign
comparative-law study of U.S. and European
comparative-law
standards.2250°
commissioners have voiced concerns about American standards.
privacy
privacy commissioners
Other commissions
commissions have prohibited
prohibited data flows to the United
United States on the
States.2"
ground of unfair information practices in the United States.2!:l
244. See Original
Original Proposal, supra note 75.
See, e.g., U.S.
U.S. Council, supra note 158.
245. Seguidelines were
were
246. See, e.g., Information Industry 'Ass'n, supra note 62 (stating that guidelines
following
developed "to assist companies
companies in their development of policies and practices" following
1990 policy statement
adoption of a 1990
statement on privacy).
See, ag.,
e.g., Working
Working Group on
on Privacy, Information
Information Infrastructure
247. Se4
Infrastructure Task Force, Draft
(1994), revised
revised by
Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 27,206 (1994),
Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information,
o Working Group on Privacy, Information Infrastructure
Infrastructure Task Force, National Information
Information
Providing and Using Personal Information and
Principles for PrOviding
Infrastructure-Draft
and
Infrastructure-Draft Principles
(1995) (containing
Commentary, 60 Fed. Reg. 4362 (1995)
(containing an executive branch review of fair
satisfy international standards);
information practices
practices and attempt to articulate norms that satisfy
telecommunications transmissions and
integrity of telecommunications
Hearings, supra note 7 (discussing the integrity
telecommunications network security).
networks and encryption and telecommunications
248. See Reidenberg, supra note 56, at 294-96.
Paul M. Schwartz &
Joel R
249. See
American Data Protection Law
R. Reidenberg, A Study of American
&Joel
SeePaul
&
& Practice: Report
Report to the Commission of the European
European Communities (forthcoming).
250. Private discussions with data protection officials at international meetings, such as the
University, reveal this concern.
conference at Cambridge University,
Laws &
& Business conference
annual Privacy Laws
251. See
U.K Office of the Data Protection Registrar, Seventh Annual Report
Report 33-34 (1990)
See U.K.
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of standards
standards under
under the U.S.
u.s.
With the disappointing
disappointing aggregation
aggregation of
With
targeted approach,
approach, this
this scrutiny
scrutiny raises
raises challenges
challenges for global
global information
information
targeted
In particular,
particular, foreign data protection
protection commissioners
commissioners can
can and
and do
do seek
seek
flows. In
exported personal
personal information.
information. The weakness
weakness in
in
assure fair treatment
treatment of exported
to assure
targeted standards
standards poses
poses an important
important obstacle
obstacle for global
global private
U.S. targeted
and undermines
undermines the
the U.S.
U.S. approach
approach to information
information practice
practice
sector activities
activities and
sector
search to accommodate
accommodate global
global information
information flows
standards. The very search
standards.
United States
States to restore the underlying
underlying objectives
olbjectives subverted
subverted
pressures the United
pressures
and unsuccessful
unsuccessful targeted standards.
standards. American
American
disappointing and
by the disappointing
standards through
can be
be connected
connected to foreign
foreign standards
through
information practices
practices can
information
narrow comparisons
comparisons and a reallocation
reallocation of responsibility
international
responsibility for international
narrow
flows. A key consequence
consequence of any
any such
such solution to the problem
problem of
of
data flows.
international data flows is an
an increase
increase in citizen
citizen participation
participation in the
international
treatment of personal
personal information
information through
through reallocation
reallocation of responsibility
responsibility
treatment
the creation
creation of corporate
corporate incentives
incentives to support
support general, rather
rather than
than
and the
targeted, standards.
standards. This international
international influence
influence pushes
pushes a
targeted,
information
reconceptualization of the philosophy of minimal restraints on information
reconceptualization
flows.

A. Foreign
Pressure on U.S Targeted
Targeted Standards
Standards
A.
ForeignPressure
The foreign pressure to reform
reform U.S.
U.S. standards
standards has two distinct
distinct
features. First, foreign legal
legal rules authorize
agencies to
authorize data protection agencies
perceived as having
prohibit the flow of personal
personal information
information to countries
countries perceived
of
fair
information
practice.~2
Second, these
these
insufficient
standards
s Second,
practice.
information
insufficient standards
transborder data flows undermine
undermine the U.S. targeted
targeted
foreign restraints
restraints on transborder
selfapproach by raising the stakes for U.S. businesses
businesses of unsuccessful
unsuccessful selfapproach
regulation.
FRows
Data Flows
Restraints on Transborder
1. Precise
Transborder Data
PreciseRestraints

National laws in many countries
countries already authorize government data
National
if the
protection
personal information
information if
protection agencies to prohibit
prohibit the transfer of personal
destination has insufficient
existing
standards255 In light of these existing
insufficient privacy standards.253
proposed European
European directive on data protection was a
provisions, the proposed
international data flows.
catalyst for renewed
renewed fear regarding
regarding restrictions
restrictions on international
contemplated a blacldist of countries with
proposAl contemplated
The first version of the proposal
information.254
inadequate standards
treatment of personal information.2
standards for the fair treatment
inadequate
With the targeted standards in the United States, American business
[hereinafter
[hereinafter Data Protection Registrar] (prohibiting data export to the United States); see also
Reldenberg, supra
supra note 69, at S162-65 (discussing data export prohibitions).
prohibitions).
252. See Reidenberg, supra note 69, at SI6().65.
S160-65.
1984,
253. See generally Loi no. '78-17
janvier 19'78,
art. 24 (Fr.); Data Protection Act, 1984,
1978, art.
25janvier
78-17 du 25
of
§ 12(2) (U.K.);
(U.K.); Martine Briat, Personal
Personal Data and the Free Flow of Information, in Freedom of
Data Flows and EEC Law (1988);
Data
(1988); Nugter, supra note 13; Peter Blume, An EEC Policy for Data
Transborder Data
Protection, 11
Kirby, Legal Aspects of Transborder
L.J. 399 (1992); Michael Kirby,
11 Computer LJ.
S160-65 (1992).
(1992).
S137, S160-65
Flow, 11 Computer
Computer LJ. 233 (1991); Reidenberg, supra note 69, at S13'7,
254. Original Proposal, supra note '75,
75, art. 24.
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thought
thought the European
European Commission would be obliged to blacklist the
general
inappropriate nature of a general
United States. The high stakes and inappropriate
non-European standards led to a more permissive
assessment of non-European
permissive provision
provision
in a revision of the proposal.2proposal.2!lS Following the revised proposal, the
Council
Ministers adopted
adopted a common position on a new text that
Council of Ministers
compromises
second
compromises between
between the European Commission's first and second
clause that requires
versions. The Council's draft contains an important clause
European Union and
the examination
examination of data transfers outside the European
and
mandates that member
member states block data flows to countries that the
mandates
European Commission
European
Commission identifies
identifies as "inadequate," yet permits transfers to
case-by-case review can demonstrate
blacklisted
demonstrate that
that
blacklisted destinations
destinations if a case-by-case
particular case.2
satisfactory standards will be applied in the particular
satisfactory
case.256
Outside Europe, the proposal
proposal has also had a spill-over effect
effect on
of
precise restraints. For example, in Canada, the provincial legislature of
Qu6bec
Quebec enacted
enacted a provision
provision that enables the Quebec privacy
privacy commission to
transfers.27 Similarly, Hong Kong undertook
scrutinize private
scrutinize
private sector data transfers.2!l7
Reform
information practices standards through the Law Reform
a review of its fair information
Commission.258
Commission.
In many ways, the proposal masks the real action likely to occur
occur at the
national level in Europe. The debate over the course of the proposal seems
to have harnessed national authorities. Shortly before
before the release
release of the
first draft of the proposal, both France
France and the United Kingdom
Kingdom issued
issued
information.2!l99 Since then,
public prohibitions
prohibitions of the export of personal information2
concerns about international
international
data protection
protection authorities have voiced grave concerns
260
Once
data transfers, but have refrained from taking
actions.ee
taking public actions.
Once the
international data
proposal is finalized, the push toward greater
greater scrutiny of international
national data protection agencies with a new
transfers is likely to stimulate national
European-wide
consider international
international data flows.
European-wide mandate to consider

255. See Amended Proposal, supra note 75,
75, art. 26; Reidenberg, supra note 56, at 293
(arguing that the Original Proposal was actually
actually less likely to result in transfer prohibitions
than the Amended
Amended Proposal).
256. See Common Position, supra note 75, arts. 25-26.
257. SeeAn
SeeAn Act respecting the protection of personal
personal information in the private sector, ch.
R.S.Q. ch. P-39.1)
S.Q. 503
17, 1993 S.Q.
503 (Can.) (to be codified at RS.Q.
P-39.1) (requiring that the collection,
must
communication of personal
personal information
information on behalf of another party must
storage, use, or communication
Paul-Andr6 Comeau
Comeau &
Andr6 Ouimet,
conform
law); Paul-Andre
&: Andre
conform to the standards established in the law);
Information and Privacy.
Freedom of Information
Privacy: Quebec's
Quebec's Innovative Role in North America, 80 Iowa L.
Rev. 651 (1995).
(1995).
fair information practices fouod
found
The
Qu6bec law a1sp
also reflects aa new commitment to fuir
The Quebec
growing
growing around the world. The Quebec legislature
legislature enacted
enacted this most recent
recent data protection
protection
law unanimously.
Law Reform Comm'n of H.K, Report on Reform of the Law Relating to the
258. Law
(1994).
Protection
Protection of Personal
Personal Data (1994).
reprinted in Commission nationae
259. D6liberation
Deliberation no. 89-78 du 11 juillet
juillet 1989, reprinted
nationale de
Rlpublique et au Parlement
Parlement
l'informatique
l'informatique et des libertas,
liberres, 10e Rapport au president de la Republique
3334.
[hereinafter CNIL]; Data Protection Registrar, supra note
1989, at 32-34
32-34 (1990)
(1990) [hereinafter
note 251,
251, at 33-34.
260. Paul
Paul Waterschoot,
Waterschoot, EC Directive Update, in Proceedings
Proceedings of the XVth International
International
Commissioners 160 (1993).
Conference of Data Protection
& Privacy Commissioners
Conference
Protection &:
(1993).
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2. Raising
Raising the
the Stakes
Stakesfqr
fqr Global
Global Business
Business
2.
Foreign rules
rules that
that allow
allow data
data protection
protection agencies
agencies to
to block
block transfers
transfers of
of
Foreign
personal information
information to
to the
the United
United States
States and
and the
the growing
growing concern
concern over
over
personal
flows raise
raise the
the stakes
stakes for
for American
American business
business and
and
international data
data flows
international
undermine the
the targeted
targeted approach.
approach. Foreign
Foreign data
data protection
protection regulators
regulators will
will
undermine
search to
to make
make determinations
determinations about
about the
the sufficiency
sufficiency of
ofU.S.
U.S. standards.
standards. Just
Just
search
as the
the U.S.
U.S. standards
standards derive
derive from accepted
accepted American
American beliefs
beliefs in
in certain
certain
as
political principles,
principles, foreign
foreign standards
standards embody
embody the
the particular
particular democratic
democratic
political
1 The
foreign societies.
societies.26261
The scrutiny
scrutiny of
of U.S.
U.S. targeted
targeted standards
standards
values of foreign
values
way to compare
compare divergent
divergent legal
legal rules
rules and
and to
to accommodate
accommodate
requires a way
requires
2
flows without
without diminishing
diminishing fair
fair information
information practices.
practices.262
global information
information flows
global
Without a full
full set
set of
of legal
legal rules
rules to
to establish
establish the
the benchmark
benchmark standards
standards
Without
to determine
determine the
the actual
actual
fair information
information practice,
practice, context
context becomes
becomes vital to
for fair
of practice
practice applied
applied to
to the
the treatment
treatment of
of personal
personal information.
information.
standards of
standards
the United
United States, the
the
Because standards
standards arise from dispersed
dispersed sources
sources in the
Because
information practices
practices offers
offers the only
actual implementation
implementation of fair information
actual
appropriate basis to compare
compare U.S.
U.S. standards
standards to foreign standards.
standards. For the
appropriate
examination of standards
standards must
must search
search
comparison to be meaningful, the examination
comparison
totality of standards
specific contexts. If the totality
for "functional similarity" in specific
United States
States is functionally similar
similar
resulting from divergent sources in the United
particular situation, then
then any restraint
restraint on
on
standards for a particular
to the foreign standards
information
would be entirely unwarranted. This inquiry focuses on
on
information flows would
personal
aggregate, substantive
substantive standards
standards that are applied
applied to personal
the aggregate,
Functional
information, rather than on the means or sources of norms. Functional
information
approaches to fair information
similarity allows a comparison
comparison of divergent approaches
practice without imposing values from either legal
legal system
system on the other.2626S
Although narrow comparisons support freer flows of information, the
identification of the
contextual analysis offers precision for the identification
contextual
American
inconsistencies
inconsistencies between actual U.S. standards and the underlying American
high
policy goals. While there are major U.S. businesses that adhere to higlr
an
U.S. private sector bears an
standards of fair information practice, the U.S.
an
important and significant burden. Particular companies must define an
appropriate evaluation context for foreign regulators and demonstrate that
the aggregation of targeted standards in the relevant context is satisfactory.
The
between American standards and underlying values
The inconsistency between
foreshadows significant difficulties for the U.S. private sector in meeting
this burden.
The proposal for a European data protection
protection directive reiterates the
draft of
original draft
increased stakes for
to the
the original
As compared to
for global businesses. As
differences
for differences
261.
grounding for
political grounding
the political
(discussing the
at 217-19
217-19 (discussing
4, at
note 4,
supra note
Bennett, supra
See Bennett,
261. Sec
In
regulation).
in privacy regulation).
262.
at S142.
S142.
69, at
note 69,
supra note
See Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
262. Sec
(Tony
30-31 (Tony
Law 30-31
Comparative L'lw
263. Sec
to Comparative
Kotz, 11 Introduction to
Hein Kotz,
& Hein
Zweigert &.
Konrad Zweigert
See Konrad
Wels
1987).
ed. 1987).
2d rev.
rev. ed.
trans., 2d
Weis trans.,

HeinOnline -- 80 Iowa L. Rev. 544 1994-95

SETTING STANDARDS
STANDARDS

545

the proposal, the revised
emphasizes context evaluations, rather
revised version
version emphasizes
rather
2264
than overall country assessments.
By doing this, the revised draft
assessments.
decreases
decreases the political
political power of lobby groups
groups and reduces political
political
pressure
unrestricted information flows despite
pressure that might have promoted unrestricted
65
a lack of relevant standards.
standards!265
As a result, scrutiny of data flows to the
United States will need
need to take place on an ever-increasing
in
ever-increasing micro-level in
each of the European
European member states by the separate national data
data
protection
protection authorities. Because key standards
standards of transparency, finality, and
enforcement
are
often
ignored
by
targeted
enforcement
ignored
targeted standards
standards in the United States,
the scrutiny
on
a
micro-level
of
international
scrutiny
international data processing increases
increases the
prospect
if the U.S.
prospect that European regulators
regulators will restrict more data flows if
U.S.
private sector does not augment
augment existing standards.
With the lack of key standards in many contexts, U.S.
U.S. businesses
become forced to justify the legitimacy
of
data
flows
to
the
United States.
legitimacy
The lack
of
observable
benchmark
standards
creates
a
presumption
lack
obsenrable benchmark
creates presumption of
of
insufficient
privacy.
Foreign
regulators
must
insist
that all U.S. companies
insufficient
Foreign
companies
fQr personal
personal information. American companies
companies
show adequate protection
protection for
that implement
implement serious
serious standards of fair information
information practice are, in
in effect,
general legal rules. For these companies,
. penalized by the absence
absence of general
companies, the
targeted
targeted standards may supply adequate
adequate levels of fair information practice,
but because of the disappointing
disappointing aggregation
aggregation under the U.S. approach,
approach,
these companies
companies mustjustify
justify their practices to a variety of separate
separate national
companies that have actually implemented
set
regulators. In effect, the companies
implemented the set
of benchmark
benchmark standards
standards for fair information practices lose under the
targeted approach
implement fair practices will
will be
approach and those that do not implement
prevented from doing global
global business
business until they develop
develop appropriate
standards.
B.
Connecting U.S.
U.S. Standards to the Global
Information Infrastructure
Infrastructure
B. Connecting
Global Information
European data protection officials
Since few, if any, European
officials seek to "pull the
plug" on global
global networks, regulators
regulators and companies
companies have engaged in an
active search to customize
customize standards for transborder
transborder data flows. The
customization
customization solution ironically
ironically reinvigorates the desire to minimize
restrictions
information flows and reliance
reliance on dispersed
dispersed standards. A
restrictions on information
reconceived contractual approach
reqmceived
approach to bridging
bridging divergent
divergent standards of fair
on
information practices injects citizen participation
participation and societal restraint on
the abuses of information power back
back into U.S. standards
standards setting through
through a
industry norms and business practices.
practices.
new mix of both legal rules and industry
New Approach to the Contractual
ContractualSolution
1. A
A Nw
government
Academics, international
international organizations, and European government
contractual solutions as a potential
agencies have proposed contractual
potential aid to the
transborder data-flow problem!se
problem.266 Under this model, a company that
that

264.
265.
266.

See
See Reidenberg, supra note 56, at 294.

Id.
Michael Epperson, Note, Contracts for Transnational
See G. Michael
Transnational Information SeIVices:
Services:
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information to a country without an omnibus
wishes to transfer personal
personal infonnation
data protection law, like the United States, must first enter into a contract
contract
with the recipient
recipient to protect the data protection
protection rights of the individuals
67
concerned once the data is at the destination.!
destination.267
The contractual
contractual model, as presently
presently conceived, however, suffers a
of
number of weaknesses.
weaknesses. Because
Because of the traditional contract doctrine of
privity in some European
European common- and civil-law jurisdictions, individuals
to
may not have any right against the recipient
recipient of personal
personal information
infonnation to
enforce
information practices.
contract is governed by
enforce fair infonnation
practices.2268's If the contract
269
American law, the individuals
individuals may have a third party beneficiary claim.269
The model, though, also contemplates
contemplates discrete information
infonnation transfers,
information processing arrangements
rather than the complex
complex network infonnation
arrangements
contractual
that may be the primary source of concern. Additionally, this contractual
managerial policy
model is not an adequate substitute for an effective managerial
toward personal
personal infonnation
implements fair information
infonnation practices in
information that implements
toward
transnational
transnational contexts.2
contexts.270°
contractual solution seeks to give the individual
The existing contractual
"primary"
rights with
with respect
to the
data recipient.
recipient. The contract itself is the
"primary" rights
respect to
the data
source of protection
protection for individuals against the data recipient. This
situation suffers
suffers important
important substantive
substantive and instrumental
instrumental weaknesses.
weaknesses.
Individuals
Individuals may be unable to enforce effectively
effectively their protections
protections for the
treatment
infonnation due to a lack
lack of privity, the
fue need to
treatment of personal information
establishing
obtain jurisdiction in a foreign country, or the difficulty
difficulty establishing
foreign law in the local forum. In addition, the terms of the contract
contract are
171-75 (1981);
Equivalency of Data Protection,
Securing EqUivalency
Protection, 22 Harv. Int'l L.J.
LJ. 157, 171-75
(l981); B.W. Napier,
Contractual
Equivalent Data Protection
Contractual Solutions
Solutions to the Problem of Equivalent
Protection in Transborder
Transborder Data
Data
Challenges and
Flows (paper presented at conference
conference on "Legal Challenges
and Opportunities
Opportunities Created
Created by the
of
Prolific Grovth
Growth of Electronic Information Services,"
Senices," organized
organized jointly by the Council of
Commission of the European
Europe and
and the Commission
European Communities, Luxembourg, March 27-28,
Contract to Ensure
1990)
1990) (on file with the University of Iowa
Iowa College of Law library);
library); Model Contract
EnsUre
Transborder Data Flows with Explanatory
Explanatory
Equivalent Data Protection in the Context
Context of Transborder
Eur. Doc. T-PD (92) 7 revised
Memorandum, Council of Eur.
revised (Nov. 2, 1992) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Council
Model Contract] (on file with the University
University of Iowa College
College of Law library).
library).
reprinted in CNlL.,
CNIL., supra note
267. See Deliberation
note 259; Council Model
Model
D6liberation No. 89-78, reprinted
Contract, supra note 266.
(discussing the problem
problem of privity in English law).
law).
268. See
&e Napier, supra note 266, at 24 (discussing
conflict of law principles
Other jurisdictions may not have the same privity problem, but conflict
principles may
solution
present
present an issue if
if parties
parties go forum shopping. Furthermore, the typical contractual
contractual solution
&z
contemplates
contemplates very
very discrete transfers
transfers that are often atypical for information
information systems. See
issues remain.
See
at S175.
addition, scope
scope and
and enforceability
enforceability issues
note 69,
..Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
supra note
69, at
S175. In
In addition,
remain. See
(paper
Commissioners 50-51
Ulrich Lepper, XIII Conference
Conference of Data Protection
Protection Commissioners
50-51 (1991)
(1991) (paper
available
available from the Council of Europe).
269. SeeJoel
See Joel R. Reidenberg, An American
American Solution to TBDF Personal Data
Data Contractual
Contractual
& Bus., Dec. 1991,
1991, at 12-14.
Problems, Privacy L. Be
12-14.
270. See William
William R. Whitehurst, Director of Data Security
Security Programs, mM,
Remarks at the
IBM, Remarks
Symposium
Symposium on Model
Model Contract Clauses and Their Use
Use in Transborder
Transborder Data Flows (May 6,
organized by the International Chamber of Commerce, the Council of
1993) (symposium organized
of
file with tlle
tie University of
European Communities)
Communities) (on fue
Europe, and the Commission of the European
Iowa
Iowa College of Law library).
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protection
negotiated by the companies themselves
themselves with the input of data protection
authorities!" The exporting
authorities.2'l1
exporting company
company acts, in effect, as the agent for the
representation during the
individual, though the individuals have no direct representation
contract negotiations.
inherent
The reconception
reconception of the contractual model can avoid these inherent
reconceived model looks to contract
problems. The reconceived
contract as a by-product of
of
protection
protection for individuals
individuals rather
rather than a source of protection itself.
itself. This
exporter's direct obligation
obligation to the individual to
reconception starts
starts with an exporter's
standards 2 of fair information practice
matter
adhere to the local
local standards2'l2
practice no matter
exporter remains responsiinformation goes.2'lS
goes. 5 The exporter
where the personal information
information
ble to the individual
individual for the foreign treatment
treatment of any personal information
the company transfers. The foreign recipient becomes, in effect, the agent
agent
exporter.24 This places the burden on exporters to demonstrate to
of the exporter.2'l4
individuals, and to the local data protection authority, that the standards
actually being applied by the foreign recipient conform to the requirestrict
ments of the exporting jurisdiction.
jurisdiction. The exporter has a form of strict
liability for the foreign treatment of any exported
exported personal information.
information.
Under this reconceived model, individuals can seek redress in their local
nonconformrecipient's nonconformjurisdiction against the exporting company for the recipient'S
based
ing treatment of personal information. The individual's claim is based
protection law and the export authority.
directly on existing local data protection
implementation of standards for
Under this reconceptualization,
reconceptualization, the implementation
contractual
personal information
information becomes
becomes a private contractual
foreign treatment of personal
between the exporter
exporter's
matter between
exporter and the recipient. Yet, because the exporter's
obligations depend upon the standards at the place of exporting, the
obligations
recipient
recipient must disclose its foreign practices and must commit to adhere to
appropriate practices. Unless the exporter
exporter knows what standards the
apply, and knows that the standards meet local requirements,
recipient will apply,
the exporter cannot meet its local obligations.
Once
exporter
Once the recipient commits to appropriate
appropriate standards, the exporter
needs
will still need to supervise
compliance.
To
this
end,
an
exporter
supervise
in
the
contract
some form of regular certification
certification mechanism
included
mechanism
contract to
the
recipient's
processing
conforms
to
the
contractual
assure that
recipient'S processing conforms
contractual
exporter would fail to
standards. Without some form of periodic audit, the exporter
conform to its own local obligations. Since the foreign recipient is not

not
information transfers
271. Since the data protection authorities
authorities may block information"
transfers if they are not
271.
any contractual
arrangements, companies
satisfied with the arrangements,
companies must consult
consult with them on any
contractual
arrangements.
272. Throughout
Throughout this discussion, "local" refers to the jurisdiction where the data export
export
originates.
originates.
exporters to take reasonable
273. This parallels the new Quebec law that requires exporters
fair treatment abroad of any transferred data. An Act respecting the
measures to assure the fuir
ch. 17, 1993 S.Q. 503 (Can.)
(Can.) (to be
be
protection of personal information in the private sector, ch.
R-S.Q. ch.
ch.P-39.1).
codified at RS.Q.
P-39.1).
assumption under the present view of contractual solutions that the
274. This reverses
reverses the assumption
transferor is acting as an agent of the ilidividual concerned.
concerned. SeNapier,
See Napier, supra
sU'pra note 266.
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subject
subject to similar legal standards
standards where
where it
it operates, the presumption
presumption is that
that
recipient's practices
the recipient'S
practices do not conform
confoxm to the exporter's local obligations.
Audit and certification
certification is the only way for the exporter to show the
Certification by an
recipient's
recipient's compliance
compliance with proper
proper standards. Certification
an
independent outside audit could confirm compliance with the appropriate
independent
data protection
standards to individuals and data
authorities,25 though for
protection authorities,2'15
standards
particular
particular cases, the exporter would need to show that the standards
standards were
followed in the specific instance.
There
domestic practice
practice that show
There are precedents
precedents emerging in U.S. domestic
companies have recently
the viability
viability of this approach. Several companies
recently established
established
transparency of
improving transparency
audie' mechanisms.
mechanisms.2'16 Others are improving
"privacy audit"

privacy advisory
boards.2'177
advisor), boards.
their business practices through corporate privacy
arrangements are now starting to include greater
Intercorporate arrangements
Intercorporate
greater
disclosure.2'18
disclosure. 8
Under this new contractual approach,
approach, the local
locall data protection
protection
authority
authority preserves
preserves its ability to protect the treatment
treatment of personal
decreasing disruption of international
information
information while decreasing
international data flows. The
supervisory power
data protection
protection authority retains supervisory
power over the exporter
exporter and
and
standards to the private
leaves
leaves the question of the adequacy of foreign standrurds
sector
sector itself. Data protection authorities could also develop a useful role
serving as a consultative
consultative agency to determine foreign disclosure needs
needs and
auditor2 9
validate the quality of any outside auditor.2'19

---------------------------------------------------------275. In Canada, the Canadian Standards Association is developing
developing a mechanism
mechanism for privacy
accounting firm has conducted a company privacy
privacy audit and other
auditing. At least one large accounting
companies.
perfonned privacy audits for large companies.
experts have performed
276. For example,
example, ruM
IBM has had a long-standing audit policy for personnel records. Within
the last five years, Equifax has hired an outside consultant
consultant to assess the privacy implications of
various company activities. TRW has instituted a rating mechanism to determine
determine the privacy
TRW/REDI, likewise, engages in regular privacy audits and
sensitivity
sensitivity of new information uses. TRW/REDI,likewise,
LEUS/NEXIS have more
internal officers to the task. Other companies, such as LEXIS/NEXIS
assigns Internal
or
informal privacy
Infonnal
privacy vetting procedures, usually centered on reviews
reviews of information
infonnation products or
systems
systems by key personnel.
277. These have three varieties. External boards involve
involve outside
outside consultants
consultants to advise on
on
fair Information
Information practices. TRW and Equifax have followed this model
model Internal boards consist
consist
considering privacy policy.
of formal management committees of key personnel
personnel charged
charged with considering
consultations consist of aa group of key
Finally, informal consultations
AT&T is an example
example of this approach.
approach. Fmally,
personnel
particular new problem or product
product on an ad hoc basis. U.S. West
'Vest
personnel that considers a particular
LEXIS/NEXIS have followed this process.
and LEXIS/NEXIS
insurance
278. Aetna Insurance
Insurance Company, for example,
example, processes
processes claims for many private insurance
plans. When Aetna acts as aa third party claims
specify the
claims processor, it requests that the client specify
information in writing, and the purpose must be related to the
purposes for the claims information
se-171, at 628; $M
relevant insurance plan.
plan. See Who's Reading
Reading Your Medical Records?, supra note 171,
Computerized
U.S. Congress, Office
e.g., u.s.
Office of Technology
Technology Assessment, Protecting
Protecting Privacy in Computerized
33-35 (Sept.
1993).
Medical Information, 33-35
(Sept 1993).
Standards Association
AssoCiation is presently studying models of fair information
information
279. The Canadian Standards
practice
practice auditing.
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2. Restoring
Participationin the U.S.
U.S. Private
PrivateSector with Limited
2.
Restaring Citizen Participation
Government
The reconception
citizen
reconception of the contractual
contractual model ensures
ensures greater
greater citizen
participation in foreign data processing. Individuals
participation
Individuals could
could directly
treatment
challenge an exporter in
in the individual's home country over the treatment
of personal
personal information by foreign recipients. Because of the absence of
of
comparable
comparable legal rules at the information destination, foreign treatment
treatment of
information without clearly
dearly articulated standards
satisfy
personal information
standards cannot satisfy
noncompliance with
with
the local requirements. The individual
individual need not show noncompliance
local standards; rather, the exporter must show that it has taken steps to
implemented those steps. A
assure protection
protection and that the recipient
recipient has implemented
data protection authority could, likewise, require the exporter to
demonstrate that the standards
standards of the exporting country are respected
respected by
fulls on the exporter to
the foreign recipient. 22800 In each case, the burden falls
justify that foreign data processing
processing meets the local standards. Absent
Absent
sufficient proof, the exporter
exporter fails to meet the local standards. Under
Under this
with
structure, only a foolish exporter
exporter would
would fail to enter into a contract with
processing
the recipient that allows the exporter
exporter to audit and control the processing
of the transferred personal
personal information.
An important
important aspect
aspect to this reconceptualization
reconceptualization is that the contract
contract
remains a decision between the exporting
"remains
exporting and importing companies.
companies. The
implementation of data protection
protection requirements
requirements at the destination is a
implementation
business deal. This is consistent
consistent with the American
American desire for minimal
minjma]
government involvement. Self-interest
exporter to take data
government
Se1f.interest forces the exporter
protection
protection provisions seriously. Similarly, the solution injects
injects a data
protection
protection authority
authority into the calculus;
calculus; any cautious
cautious exporter
exporter will necessarily
engage
protection authority. Even
engage in consultations
consultations with the relevant data protection
Even
requirement for foreign data
exporter
absent a notification requirement
data transfers, an exporter
has much to gain by seeking
seeking assurances that the measures it envisions are
satisfactory. Few exporters
exporters would want the risk of liability
liability in the exporting
exporting
jurisdiction.
The reconceived
contractual model has an important transparency
reconceived contractual
effect
effect in the United- States. Foreign
Foreign companies
companies will require that U.S.
trading
trading partners disclose their U.S. information
information practices. Under
Under the
disclosure would
concerned
foreign standards, the disclosure
would be available to the concerned
individuals in the exporting jurisdiction. This reduces the possibility
possibility for
hidden manipulation
manipulation of citizens. Although the direct beneficiaries
beneficiaries of this
28
transparency are individuals with foreign-sourced
foreign-sourced personal
personal information,
information,2811
double standards are frequently problematic
problematic for corporate
corporate management.
management.
commitments by U.S.
The required disclosures are likely to prompt
prompt commitments
companies to refrain from secondary use of transferred personal

280. This power may only
only be available where national data protection law requires
protection
protection in the case of international transfers.
281. Many of these individuals are unlikely to be U.S. citizens or residents.
residents.
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information.
The commitments made by U.S companies
companies to satisfy
satisfy their foreign
counterparts
important spill-over effect on U.S.
U.S.
counterparts are likely to have an important
practice. Companies
Companies will be reluctant to provide fairer treatment for
for
foreign-sourced personal
personal information than to U.S.-based
U.S.-based information. The
pressure
pressure for good corporate citizenship makes it hard for a U.S. company
than
to justify treating foreign personal
personal information with higher standards
standards than
information processing systems
personal information
information of U.S. origin. Since information
transparency and commitments
commitments in one part of the
are global systems, transparency
network can circle back to other areas in the network.
enforcement
The new contractual
contractual solution also introduces
introduces enforcement
exporters
against
data
possibilities. Individuals could pursue remedies
remedies
protection law. While individuals may not be
according to the local
local data protection
able to stop unfair foreign practices directly, the civil and criminal
criminal
protection laws provide a
penalties available
available under many national data protection
exporter with potential
powerful incentive for the exporter
potential liability to include
"agent."
contractual controls over the information recipient, the exporter's
contractual
exporter's "agent."
This supervision, however, preserves the philosophy of limited government.
exporter places the burden on
The allocation
allocation of responsibility to the data exporter
on
compliance at the destination. If the exporter fails
the exporter
exporter to assure compliance
to obtain
obtain sufficient disclosure, adequate commitments,
commitments, and satisfactory
compliance certifications,
certifications, the exporter
exporter would face liability for directly
compliance
violating
violating the data protection
protection law in the jurisdiction
jurisdiction of export.
government
This arrangement
arrangement establishes
establishes private contract
contract rather than government
regulation as the prime source
source of standards
standards between
between parties to
international data transfers; the local data protection
protection law provides the
international
protection authority
motivation. Yet, the role of the data protection
authority would be
significant. As a matter of prudence, data exporters would consult
consult with
with
arrangements are
data protection
protection agencies
agencies to assure that contemplated
contemplated arrangements
satisfactory. For example, a data exporter
exporter would need to seek guidance
from the data protection
protection authority to confirm that the disclosure is
adequate and that the audit mechanism is strong enough.
international data transfers, pressure
With enforcement
enforcement in place for international
should build to establish U.S. standards that treat domestic data in the
International data transfers
same fair fashion. International
transfers will force exposure
exposure of U.S.
U.S.
industry norms and business practices and give transparency
transparency to U.S.
U.S.
companies'
treatment of foreign-sourced personal
companies' treatment
personal information. Companies
fair information practice for at least
will have to implement standards of fuir
least
some personal
personal information, and their partners will be able to penalize
penalize
information properly. Without similar
them for failure to treat personal
personal information
similar
standards of fair information
information practice
practice in the United States, companies will
will
American public. At the
find
fmd it difficult to justify a double standard to the American
same time, the adoption of standards
standarcls of fair information practice
practice by
information will make it easier to accommocompanies
companies for their foreign information
date the extension of similar treatment
treatment to domestic
domestic data.
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CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
Business
and
citizen
confidence
in the "Inforlnation
"Information Superhighway"
Superhighway"
Business and citizen confidence in
will depend
depend on their
their perception
perception that
that there
there is fuir
fair treatment of
of personal
personal
information.
The
ninimal
restrictions
on
information
through
targeted
niinimal
on
through targeted
information.
standards
in
the
United
States
have
not
fulfilled
the
underlying
goals
nor
the
goals nor
standards in the United States have
have
they
provided
benchmark
standards
of
fair
information
practice.
have they
standards of
Foreign pressure will set the stage for new standards in the
the U.S. private
sector.
The call
call for standards
standards of fair
fair information practice is not aa call for
The
interventionist
or
intrusive
government
regulation. The values of minimal
minimal
regulation.
interventionist or intrusive
government
and
the
possibilities
of
state
abuses
of
power
are
ever-valid
government
the possibilities
ever-valid
policies. Instead, the call for
for standards is a call to equalize
equalize the playing
playing
policies.
field.
In
an
Information
Society,
the
private
sector
has
not
satisfactorily
sector
field. In an Information
handled the making of norms through technical or corporate
corporate sources.
handled
Industry
trade
groups
are
hampered
in
their
ability
to promote the
Industry trade
implementation
of
standards
by
their
members.
implementation
Individuals lack
representation in
in these
these groups, and the cross-industry and context-specific
context-specific
representation
uses
of
personal
information
defy
a
uses of personal
defY single point of view. Legal
Legal benchmark
standards are needed to force private sector companies to develop
develop
appropriate information practices.
appropriate
At
the same time, the implementation
interpretation of any
At the
implementation and interpretation
standards
must
remain
a
flexible
and
private
sector-driven exercise. The
standards
sector-drlven
significance of contextual
significance
contextual evaluations
evaluations for both domestic
domestic and international
international
analyses is
information has unique
that any given treatment
treatment of personal information
analyses
is that
characteristics that defY
defy a generic
"right and wrong."
characteristics
generic assessment of "right
The
mix
of
conditions
The
conditions vigorously
vigorously renews
renews repeated
repeated calls
ca11s for the
creation of
commission in the United
of aa federal privacy
privacy commission
United States. A
creation
commission is now in the interests
interests of the U.S. private sector
sector and the
commission
public.
consensus on new
The development
development of a consensus
new standards with
with the
public. The
participation
of government,
participation of
government, citizens, and business
business will, in
in the long run,
directly benefit
corporate America. The commission
, directly
benefit corporate
commission could provide a forum
for
resolving
the
struggles
for resolving
struggles between
between different
different internal
internal corporate
corporate divisions
divisions
and
and society
society over
over the treatment
treatment of personal
personal information.22822 For the Global
Global
Information Infrastructure,
Information
Infrastructure, a U.S.
U.S. privacy
privacy commission
commission could
could also provide
valuable
assistance to
valuable assistance
to companies
companies dealing
dealing with
with foreign data
data protection
protection
authorities.
Such
a
commission
authorities. Such a commission could
could also restore
restore the
the United
United States to a
position
of agenda
agenda setting
setting for
for the
the treatment
treatment of
of personal
personal information
information on
on
position of
global
networks;
today,
foreign
data
protection
authorities
monopolize
the
global networks;
today,
data
protection
authorities
monopolize
the
2285
agenda.
agenda. 83

282.
282. For
For example,
example, tensions
tensions among
among marketing,
marketing, security, and
and customer
customer relations
relations
departments
departments will
will highlight
highlight different
different views
views of
of the
the treatment
treatment of
ofpersonal
personal information.
information.
283.
283. See
&e Paul
Paul M.
M. Schwartz,
Schwartz, European
European Data
Data Protection
Protection Law
Law and
and Restrictions
Restrictions on
on InternationInternational
al Data
Data Flows,
Flows, 80
80 Iowa
Iowa L.
L. Rev.
Rev. 47-1
47,1 (1995).
(1995).
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INTRODUCTION

The information infrastructure has significant implications for the governance of
of an information society. Despite the popular perception, the global
nance
information infra'Structure
infrastructure ("GIl")
("GI") is not a lawless place. Rather, it poses a
fundamental challenge for effective leadership and governance. Laws, regulations, and standards can, do, and will affect infrastructure development
GII participants. Rules and rule-making do exist. Howand the behavior
behavior of GIl
ever, the identities of the rule-makers
ever,
rule-makers and the instruments used to establish
establish
rules will not conform to classic patterns of regulation.
The global network environment defies traditional regulatory
regulatory theories and
policymaking
policymaking practices. At present, policymakers and private sector organizations
encourage
nizations are searching
searching for appropriate
appropriate regulatory strategies to encourage
1 Most attempts
and
channel
the
GI.
to
define
new
rules
for
the
developand channel
GILl
attempts
development of the GIl
rely
on
disintegrating
GIl r,~ly
disintegrating concepts
concepts of territory and sector, while
ignoring
technological borders that transcend national
ignoring the new network and technological
boundaries.'
GIl creates
creates new models and sources for rules. Policy leadboundaries.2 The Gil
ership requires
requires aa fresh
fresh approach to the governance of global networks. Inership
Gil requires a new paradigm for
stead of foundering on old concepts, the GIl
complexity of networks, builds constructive
constructive
governance that recognizes the complexity
relationships
among
the
various
participants
(including
governments,
relationships
governments, systems operators,
information
providers,
and
citizens),
operators,
and promotes incentives for the attainment
policy objectives
objectives in the private
tives
attainment of various public policy
sector.
sector.

Conclusions, G-7
Information Society, Brussels
I See,
See. e.g.,
e.g.• Chair's
Chair's Conclusions,
G-7 Ministerial
Ministerial Conference on the Infonnation
Brussels
(Feb.
(Feb. 25-26,
25-26, 1995)
1995) <http://www.ispo.cec.be/g7/keydocs/G7en.html>.
<http://www.ispo.cec.belg7Jkeydocs/G7en.html>.
2 See., e.g., INFO. INFRAsRucTRE TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLEC2 See. e.g., INFO. lNFRAsTRUCIURE TASK FORCE, REPoRT OF TIlE WORKING GROUP ON 1NrnLLEcTUAL
TUAL PROPERTY
PROPERTY AND
AND "m
'mE NATIONAL
NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
lNFRAsTRUCIURE (1995)
(1995) (<http://www.uspto.gov
(<http://www.usplo.gov
/niiip.html>)
NIl WHrrE
WHITE PAPER].
PAPER]. Various
Various equivalent
equivalent foreign
foreign reports
reports from
from Canada,
Canada, the EuropeEuropeIniiip.html» [hereinafter
[hereinafter Nil
an
to focus
focus similarly
similarly on
on changes
changes to
to national
national laws
laws and
and the applicability
applicability in specified
specified
an Union,
Union, and
and Japan
Japan tend
tend to
territories
rights. See,
e.g., <http://www.ic.gc.calic-datalinfo-highway/general
territories of
of 'information
"information society"
society" rights.
See. e.g.,
<http://www.ic.gc.calic-<latalinfo-highway/general
/report.april94.e.txt>
Ireport.apriI94.e.lxt> (Canadian
(Ctmadian report);
report); <http://www2.echo.lulother/national.html>
<http://www2.echo.1u1other/national.html> (EU
(EU country
caunlly reports);
<http://www.mpt.go.jp/Report/unofficial.html>
<http://www.mpt.go.jplReportlunofficial.html> (unofficial
(unofficial translation
translation of
of Japanese report with references
references
only
only to national
national monopolies).
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THE DISINTEGRATION
DISINTEGRATION OF
OF TRADITIONAL
TRADmONAL SOVEREIGNTY
SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGMS
PARADIGMS
I. THE
Global
Global communications
communications networks
networks challenge
challenge the
the way economic
economic and
and social
social
behavior
usually
governed
rules
past,
legal
regulated.
In
the
are
interactions
interactions
legal
usually governed behavior
in
in distinct
distinct subject areas
areas for defined territories. These
These national
national and substansubstantive borders
borders formed the sovereignty
paradigms for regulatory
regulatory authority
authority and
and
sovereignty paradigms
decision-making. For example, intellectual
intellectual property
property rights and privacy
privacy
decision-making.
rights--each
rights-each critical
critical for the ordering
ordering of an
an information
information society-have
society-have been
designed
patent, trademark, and
and trade
designed as distinct bodies of law. Copyright, patent,
information and its economic
economic value,
secret law
law protect
protect specific
specific attributes
attributes of information
secret
while
guards specific
specific information
information about
about individuals
individuals from parwhile privacy law guards
ticular harms. Customarily, such distinct
distinct rules applied only in
in the rulerulein
the
rights"
Few
"transnational
maker's
maker's geographically
geographically defined
defined territory.'
territory.3
"transnational rights"
economic and
and social sphere truly exist;
exist; international treaties
treaties and regional
regional
obligations
harmonized, national stanobligations typically
typically establish
establish some degree of harmonized,
"global" right.44 With the GIl, however,
dards instead of a single, unique
unique "global"
territorial borders and substantive
substantive borders disintegrate as key paradigms for
regulatory governance.
governance.
A.

PermeableNational
Permeable
National Borders
Borders

For centuries,
centuries, regulatory
regulatory authority derived from the physical proximity
proximity of
of
political, social, and economic communities. International
International law grants
grants legitiexercises sovereignty
sovereignty over a physical termacy to a governing authority if it exercises
people.'s Constitutional
ritory and its people.
Constitutional governance
governance predicates sovereignty on
geographically distinct political
existence of geographically
political and social units.66
the existence
last re1883, as last
Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
reIndustrial Property,
'3 See,
See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Literary
U.N.T.S. 305; Berne Convention for the Protection
1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S.
vised, July 14, 1967,21
U.S.T. 1583,828
Protection of
ofLiterazy
GORMAN
1967, 828 U.N.T.S.
U.N.T.S. 221; ROBERT A.
last revised,
and Artistic Works,
Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last
revised, July 1,
I, 1967,828
A. GoRMAN
1993).
NINE= 873-901 (4th ed., 1993).
COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES
& JANE C.
C. GINSBURG,
GINSBURG, COPYRIGlIT

Apr. IS,
15, 1994,
1994,
Organization, Apr.
'• See, e.g.,
e.g., Final
Final Act and Agreement
Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Trade Organization,
1C,33 I.L.M. 1197 (<http://iti.irv.uit.no/trade-law/documents/freetradelwta-94/art/ii.htn-l>).
Annex lC,
(<bttp:llitl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/documents/freetradelwta-94/art/ii.html». OrganiOrganiRecommendation of the Council Concerning
Development: Recommendation
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development:
Concerning GuideGuidezation
1, 1980,
1980, 20
lines Governing the Protection of Privacy
Privacy and Transborder
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Oct. I,
Regard to Automatic
Automatic
Individuals with Regard
I.L.M. 422; Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of Individuals
(<http://www2.echo.lu/legal/enldataprot
1981, 20 I.L.M.
LL.M. 317 (<bttp:llwww2.echo.IuIlegallenldataprot
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981,
/counceur/conv.html>).
lcounceur/conv.html».
(1987).
OF FOREGN
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987).
REsATEMENT (fHIRD)
(rIRD) OF
, See REsTATEMENT
internally
sovereignty was internally
eg., U.S.
CoNsT. amend. IX. Even in nondemocratic states, sovereignty
66 See, e.g.,
U.S. CONST.
THE
SoviET LEGAL
LEGAL SYSTEM:
SYSTEM nm
Er AL.,
AL, THE
HAZARD ET
territorial borders. See JOHN N. HAzARD
equated with
with distinct territorial
nm SOVIET
(1984).
14-17, 25-29 (1984).
THE 1980s 14-17,25-29
LAw IN THE

HeinOnline -- 45 Emory L. J. 913 1996

914

JOURNAL
EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

Regulatory power has always been defined in terms of national borders.
Key rights establishing the structure of an information society, such as intellectual property protections, fair information practice standards, and competition rules,
rules, are
are nIl
all territorially based.77 The adjudication of disputes also
tition
typically depends on territorially-empowered
territorially-empowered courts. Similarly, police powers to
to enforce regulatory policies and decisions through property seizures
seizures or
ers
or
incarceration are territorially restricted.

GII undermine these foundational
Transnational information flows on the GIl
borders and erode state sovereignty over regulatory policy and enforcement.
borders
Geographic limits have diminishing value. Physical borders become transparent and foreign legal systems have local relevance. Network activities
may make participants subject to legal rules of distant jurisdictions. Political
and economic
economic communities based predominantly
predominantly on geographic
geographic proximity
cyberspace because
and physical contact
contact have less relevance in cyberspace
because network
communities can replace physically proximate communities.
communities
communities. Political discourse can ignore national borders, while affinities and affiliations transcend
transcend
distances and
and human
"listservs 's and "usenet
"usenet groups"
distances
human contact. Internet "listservs"s
groups"99 involve participants
volve
participants from around the world communicating
communicating directly with each
other on
on topics of mutual interest. Economic relationships need no physical
situs. With electronic
electronic stored value, such
situs.
electronic cash and new means of electronic
as
those
developed
by
Cybercash
Cybercash and Mondex,
Mondex, Internet transactions may
as those developf:d
take place
place entirely on the network without the physical delivery of goods or
take
services and
without resort
services
and without
resort to any national payment system. Even social
relationships
evolve in the absence of physical contact. On-line chat
relationships now
now evolve
rooms
rooms provide live, but remote, contact, and cybersex offers the very intimate, albeit electronic, relationships. 10"

See, e.g., PAUL B. STipHAN III Er AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND
7 See, e.g., PAUL B. STEPHAN ill EI' AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
AND ECONOMICS: LAw AND
PoucY 397-405,
420-21 (1993).
POllCY
397-405,420-21
(1993).
' A listserv is a fiaure of electronic mail software that automatically distributes messages to subI A listserv is a fi:ature of electronic mail software that automatically distn'butes messages to subscribers of
list To
sen'bers
of aa specified
specified li.!:t.
To participate,
participate, a computer
computer user sends
sends a subscription
subscription message to the host computer.
Once the
the host
computer accepts
the subscriber,
may post
post messages
puter. Once
host computer
accepts the
subsen'ber, the
the person
person may
messages to all participants
participants on
on
the list
the
list by
by sending
sending aa single e-mail
e-mail to the host.
host Depending
Depending on the type of
of list, each
each single, incoming mesmessage may
sage
may automatically
automatically be
be copied
copied to all members
members on the list, whether
whether the
the list has 10
10 or 10,000
10,000 members,
members,
or may
may be
be copied
copied to
to all members
members on the
the list
list only after
after screening
screening by
by a list moderator.
'9 Usenet
Usenet groups
groups allow
allow computer
computer users
users to
to post
post messages
messages on a bulletin
bulletin board
board at
at a host site.
site. Access
Access to
to
the bulletin
bulletin board
board is unrestricted.
unrestricted.
0 For
10
For an
an illustrative
illustrative experience,
experience, adult-oriented
adult-oriented chat
chat rooms may
may be
be found on the Internet
Internet at
<http://chat.bianca.com/cgi-binldisplaychatshack/quickref.html>.
<bttp:l/chat.biancacomlcgi-bin/displaychatlshack/quickre£htm1>. See
See also Anastasia
Anastasia Toufexis, Romancing
the Computer,
19, 1996,
cyber-romances and
the
Computer, TIME,
TiME, Feb.
Feb. 19,
1996, at
at 53
53 (reporting
(reporting on
on cyber-romances
and the filing
filing of a divorce petition
petition
in New
New Jersey
Jersey because
because of
of aa spouse's
spouse's alleged
alleged "on-line"
"on-line" affair).
in
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The permeability
destabilizes territorial rights. Inevitapermeability of national borders
borders destabilizes
bly, differences will exist among various key national rights in an information society. The scope, for instance, of intellectual
intellectual property
property rights is not
not
uniform across state lines."
mechanisms by which countries may
lines. ll Even the mechanisms
assure rights such as privacy may vary significantly.
significantly.122 Yet the GIl creates
"global" rightholders. A given activity may be subject
difsimultaneous "global"
subject to differing rights at the same time, such as trademark or antitrust protections,
protections, because
itself
cause the activity transcends
transcends the borders of any single nation. This by itself
imposes conflict. In addition, the temptations to apply national laws and
standards
extraterritorially further compound
standards extraterritorially
compound the legal uncertainty. The patent law of the United States, for example, has extended
extended to restrict foreign
foreign
activities
protection
activities that were legal where conducted, 13 while the new data protection
directive
requires the evaluation
evaluation of foreign data
directive of the European Union requires
processing
processing standards."
standards. 14 Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the erosion of national borders places
places
an important
important degree
degree of network activity beyond the physical grasp of state
authorities, although states may still force individuals or corporations
corporations within
their borders
borders to behave in particular
particular ways. This enforcement problem challenges the uniformity of any right.
B. Ambiguous Substantive
Substantive Borders
Borders
B.
Beyond
Beyond the disintegration of territorial borders, the GIl also undermines
undermines
clear
substantive legal sovereignty. Governance has relied historically on clear
substantive law. For example, telecommunicadistinctions and borders in substantive
telecommunications law has been distinct from financial
financial services law, and intellectual
property
law
has
been
distinct
from
privacy
of
property
privacy law. Similarly, the borders of
protection
within
any
particular
field
were
usually
well
defined.
A
"comprotection
mon carrier" had a set of regulations quite apart
apart from those of a "cable"
"cable"
provider
providerls5 or broadcaster.

" See, e.g., Symposium,
Fordham Conference
InternationalIntellectual
IntellectualProperty
II
Symposium, Fordham
Conference on International
Property Law and PoliPoliFoRDHAM INrELL.
INTELL PROP.
L.1 1 (1993).
(1993).
PRoP. MEDIA & ENT. L.1.
cy, 4 FORDHAM
2 See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: HurdlingBarriers to TransnationalFinan12 See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to Transnational Financial Services,
FoRDHAM L. REv. S 137 (1992);
EuropeanData
Services, 60 FORDHAM
(1992); Paul M. Schwartz,
Schwartz, European
Data Protection
Protection Law and
cial
Restrictions
Flows, 80 IOWA
IOWA L. REV.
International Data
Data Flows,
REv. 471 (1995).
(1995).
Restrictions on International
" See 35 U.S.C.
Il
U.S.C. § 271(g)
271(g) (1994) (extending the scope of U.S.
U.S. process patent protection to prevent
importation of legally
products)..
the importation
legally manufactured foreign products)
1995 OJ. (L 281)
•"4 See Directive 95/46 of the Eur. Parliament
Parliament and of the Council, arts. 25-26,
25-26,19950.1.
281) 31,
31,
45-46 [hereinafter Privacy Directive].
BRUCE ET
Er AL.,
ELECTRONIC SERVICES
SERvICEs 153-68
"1$ See ROBERT R. BRUCE
AL., FROM
FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELEcOMMUNICATIONS TO ELECTRONIC
153-68
(1986).
(1986).
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GII obscures these substantive
substantive boundaries; critical substantive rights
The Gil
become muddled. The new technological abilities of a telephone company
company
to offer ''video''
"video" dial tone and a cable company to propose voice communications undercut the well-defined borders of communications law. The digital environment
environment challenges the applicability of basic information
information society
rights, such as copyright, as well as the boundaries
boundaries among other intellectual
property rights. Designers of information products can, to a certain extent,
works to pick and choose legal protection. Processing instrucpackage their wo:rks
example, be embedded
embedded in a semiconductor
benefit
semiconductor chip to benefit
tions can, for ex.ample,
protection, 6 stored on a floppy disk to be covered
from sui generis legal protection,16
under copyright,t'
copyright," or incorporated
incorporated in a device to obtain patent protecIS This substantive blurring
tion."
of rights creates significant uncertainty;
tion.
the degree and scope of protection
protection become variable.
categorization.
In addition, network
m:twork interactions
interactions defy clear disciplinary categorization.
information transfer or transaction
transaction can easily cross
The regulation of an information
sectoral
sectoral lines. For example, a packet
packet of information
information may contain electronic
electronic
cash or payment instructions, along with digitally reconstructed
reconstructed images of
of
an individual. In such a case, the legal interests
cross
many
sectoral
lines,
interests
including
including telecommunications,
telecommunications, financial services, intellectual
intellectual property, and
privacy. Even pure information
information processing activity may cross sectoral lines.
For example, a third party may process transaction information for a retail
chain that includes
inc1U<ll:s netting of payments.
payments. In one sense, this activity is unreginformation processing;
ulated information
processing; yet in another sense it is a banking
banking activity
and might be subject to bank safety and soundness requirements.
requirements.
More significantly, digitalization
information infrastructure
digitalization and the information
infrastructure enable
the objectives
objectives of one distinct body of law, such as privacy, to be achieved
achieved
by application of the rules of another
intellectual propby
another field of law, such as intellectual
erty. Secondary
personal data, for example,
example, is a core issue for inforSecondary use of personal
mation privacy law, but in the multimedia
multimedia context, copyright
copyright law can also
also
regulate the manipulation
of
data
relating
to
individuals.'
manipulation
individuals. 199 In essence,
essence, funcfunctional
more relevant than sectoral
tional activity
activity is
is more
sectoral legal boundaries.

16
16

,
17
n
II

See
See
See
See
See
See

17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994).
17 U.S.C. !i§ 901-914 (1994).
§§
101-102, 106,
106, 117.
117.
§§ 101-102,
35
U.S.C. § 1-376 (1994).
35 U.S.C. !i§ 1-376 (1994).

'9
19 See
See Joel
Joel R.
R. Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, Multimedia
Multimedia as
as aa New
New Challenge
Challenge and Opportunity
Opportunity In
in Privacy:
Privacy: The Examples
Sound and Image Processing,
amples of
o/Sound
Processing, 22
22 Materialien
Materialien zum
zum Datenschutz
Datenschutz 99 (1995).
(1995).
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THE
THE EMERGENCE
EMERGENCE OF
OF NETWORK SOVEREIGNTY
SOVEREIGNTY

Just as
as traditional
traditional foundations for
for governance are
are breaking
breaking down,
down, new
Just
boundaries are
are emerging on
on the GIL
GIL, The infrastructure itself
itself contains
contains visiboundaries
ble borders. Network borders replace national borders. Network service
service providers, as well as the infrastructure architecture, each establish rules of parviders,
ticipation for
for defined
defined network
network areas.
areas. These rules form visible borders on
on the
ticipation
GII.
In
addition
to
these
visible
borders,
GIl.
addition
network communities also develop
distinct sovereign
sovereign powers. Thus, infrastructure
infrastructure organizations acquire attribdistinct
utes of the traditional territorial sovereigns.
A.

Visible Network Borders
Borders
Visible

The demarcation
demarcation lines among network service providers such as America
OnLine,
CompuServe, EUNet, or Prodigy create important boundaries. PriOnLine, CompuServe,
vate
contractual
vate contractual arrangements determine the availability and the conditions
of
access for network connections. These contractual arrangements
arrangements define
of access
distinct borders among various service providers. Participants
GII
Participants on the GIl
will be
subject to
to different
different contractual
will
be subject
contractual rules, benefit from different
different resources,
adhere to different pricing plans, according
es, and
and adhere
according to network service
service
agreements."
In essence,
essence, the reach of a service provider's network
network estabagreements.20 In
lishes an important boundary line in an information society.
System
Network architecture
architecture also creates a significant type
type of border. System
design
imposes
rules
of
order
on
an
information
society.
Technical
choices
design imposes
information
are
are policy
policy decisions
decisions that have inherent consequences
consequences for network
network participants.
For
example,
integrated
services
digital
network
(ISDN)
technology
pants. For example, integrated
digital
technology
and the World Wide Web transmission
transmission protocol offer superior
superior interactive
interactive
capabilities
capabilities and choices
choices when
when compared to analog technology
technology and simple
simple
file
file transfer
transfer protocols. Gateways
Gateways between different systems or between
between a
proprietary
proprietary network
network like America
America OnLine and the Internet
Internet establish
establish fundamental
of conduct;
conduct; without a gateway,
gateway, interactions
interactions are effectively
effectively
mental rules
rules of
prohibited.
prohibited. In
In effect, technical
technical standards exert
exert substantial
substantial control
control over
over infor1
21
mation
mation flows.
flOWS. The
The degree
degree of system
system interoperability
interoperability thus
thus determines
determines the
='
20 See
See Robert
Robert L.
L. Dunne,
Dunne, Deterring
Deterring Unauthorized
Unauthorized Access
Access to
to Computers:
Cyberspace
Law Paradigm,
Paradigm, 35
35 JuuIErcs
JUR!METRICS 1.
J. 1 (1994)
(1994)
Cyberspace Through
Through aa Contract
Contract Law
tracts).
tracts).
21
21 See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., Mark
Mark A.
A. Lemley,
Lemley, Shrinkwraps
Shrinkwraps in
in Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 35
35 JUEar-Mcs
JUR!METRICS
ing
ing for
for technical
technical self-help
self-help as
as an
an alternative
alternative to
to model
model contracts).
contracts).
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openness
of the information
information society and determines
determines whether
whether network archiarchiopenness of
tectural
tectural "borders"
"borders" can be crossed.
Technical
Technical standards
standards set
set default
default boundary
boundary rules
rules in the network
network that tend to
empower selected
selected participants.
participants. For example,
example, transmission protocols can
can
empower
embed
control on the use of personal
personal information
information collected
collected by the
embed rules of control
Web browsers
browsers such
such as Netscape
Netscape record
record transaction
transaction
network. World Wide Web
information
available
on Internet users'
users' hard drives and make
make the
the information available to
to
data on
22
JavaScript in
in Netscape
Netscape similarly allows
allows Web
Web sites
sites to colsites. The JavaScript
host sites.'
lect
lect real-time
real-time data on visitors'
visitors' activities
activities and to
to examine
examine the directory
directory of
of a
drive.23 These designs
designs set as a default
default rule the empowerment
empowerment
visitor's hard drive.'
visitor's
sites. Yet, at least
least in the
the case
case of
of Netscape,
Netscape, the software
software allows
allows savof Web sites.
24 Other protocols
vy users
users to override
ovenide the recording
recording feature.24
protocols tend to enable
enable
producer
intellectual property.'
prOperty.25 For
For example,
example, copy
copy
producer choice
choice in the use of intellectual
protection
protection techniques
techniques for digital
digital audio tapes assist producers
producers to control the
Electronic rights management
copies.'26 Electronic
reproduction of perfect
reproduction
perfect digital copies.
management pro27
intellectual property.
property.27
emerging to enable
enable on-line
on-line protection of intellectual
tocols are emerging
These visible
visible network
network borders arise from complex rule-making processes.
processes.
Technical
standardization may be the result of a purely market-driven
market-driven proproTechnical standardization
alternatively may be adopted
cess or alternatively
adopted through a standards body. The classic
example
market-promulgated standard
standard is the QWERTY
QWERTY keyboard. Once
Once
example of a market-promulgated
the now famous keyboard configuration
configuration became
became popular, public
public acceptance
acceptance

program directory
<cookies.txt>) in the program
' Netscape creates
22
creatl:S a log file (usually named <cookies.IX!»
directory that allows
Web sites to record
access this data
data from the user's perrecord the pages viewed by the user. The Web site may access
Specifications <http://home.
sonal computer
computer when the user revisits
revisits the site. See Cookies Technical
Technical Specifications
<http://home.
netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie_spec.html>.
netscape.comlnewsreflstdlcookie_spec.html>.
RISKS DI' See John Robert LoVerso, Netscape Navigator 2.0 Exposes User's Browsing History, RIsKS
2J
<http://catless.ncl.ac.ukIRisksl7.79html> (describing bug that allows collection of
GST, Feb. 23, 1996 <http://catless.nc1.ac.uklRiskslI7.79html>
GEST,
of
real-time
real-time data); John Robert LoVerso, Report
Report of Netscape
Netscape 2.01 JavaScript
JavaScript Problems
Problems <http://www.osf.org
<http://www.osf.org
/-Iloverso/javascriptlwww-see-Mar22.html> (describing ability to browse
1-loverso/javascriptlwww-sec-MlII22.html>
browse a user's directory).
changing the attributes
concerned about their privacy
244 Users
Users concern(:d
privacy may disable the feature by changing
attributes of the
the
<cookies.txt> file to a read-only file.
<cookies.IX!>
'2J See
See. e.g.,
e.g.• Peter H. Lewis, Microsoft Backs Ratings
Ratings System for the Internet,
Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
TiMES, Mar. 1,
I,
1996, at
at DI.
D1.
1996,
Vigilantism: Intellectual
Intellectual
Reverse Engineering
and the Rise of Electronic
26 See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse
26
Engineering and
Electronic Vigilantism:
REV. 1091
1091 (1995);
(1995); Pamela Samuelson,
CAL L. REv.
Lock Out" Programs,
Programs, 68 So. CAL.
Property
Implications of "Lock
Samuelson,
Property Implications
Technological Protection for Copyrighted Works, Paper presented at the Randolph W. Thrower Sympowith the author).
1996) (on file with
(Feb. 22, 1996)
in Cyberspace
Cyberspace at Emory Law School (Feb.
sium on Legal Issues ill
PRIVAAND PRIVAASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECURITY
OFFICE OF
OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT,
1 See U.S.
U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE
27
SECURITY AND
Media
INFORMATION SECURITY];
SECuTrrY]; Interactive Media
110 (1994)
(1994) [hereinafter
[hereinafter INFORMATION
NETWORK ENvrRONMENTS
ENVIR.ONMENTS 110
CY IN NETWORK
Content <http://www.imaorglforumslip/ip_
<bttp://www.ima.org/fomms/ip/ip_
Commerce for
for Content
IP Requirements
Ass'n, IF
Requirements Forum: Electronic Commerce
meet.html>.
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user-friendly configurations was unlikely. In contrast, stanof other, more user-friendly
dards bodies seek to identify and recommend technical specifications
specifications for
danis
particular
particular network needs such as security. Standards bodies range from
industry groups to combined industry/government
industry/government organizations.
organizations. These
organizations,
such
as
the
American
National
(ANSI)
organizations,
Standards Institute CANSI)
and the International
International Organization
Organization for Standards (ISO), play a critical role
in the development
development and promotion of technical standards. In essence, these
organizations assure and reinforce the contours of network borders.
B. Powerful
Powerful Network Communities
Communities
In addition to the new "geography" of borders, networks may now even
supplant substantive, national regulation with their own rules of citizenship
and participation.
participation.'28 Networks themselves take on political characteristics
characteristics as
self-governing
entities.
Networks
determine
the
rules
of
self-governing
and conditions of
membership. Private contracts
of
contracts mediate the rights and responsibilities of
29
participants.
participants.29
Service providers offer different
different terms of adherence. America OnLine and Prodigy, for example,
example, have varying policies on user privacy,
message-posting rules for lawyers differ
cy,Jo0 while Counsel
Counsel Connect's message-posting
from those for law students.3l1 Discussion groups
groups on the Internet have their
own rules of access and participation.
participation. Usenet groups are open to all, while
listserv groups are available only to subscribers authorized
authorized by the list owner
according
to
some
criteria,
such
as
knowledge
of
a particular
particular field, although
according
a list owner
owner may open the list to anyone without restriction.

determine the rules of participant
Networks also determine
participant behavior. This charactercharacteristic can result in
in rules that reverse
reverse established territorial laws. For example,
by means of private contract
contract with network participants,
participants, Counsel Connect
Connect reversed, in effect,
effect, the traditional copyright allocation
allocation of rights of authorship
32 Alternatively, network
for bulletin
conduct rules
bulletin board
board message
message postings.
postingS.32
network conduct

23
23

See David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders--The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 49 STAN.
See David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise ofLaw in Cyberspace, 49 STAN.

L. REv.
REV. (forthcoming
(forthcoming 1996).
2 Networks have the rule-making capability of private associations. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Prop29 Networks have the rule-making capability of private associations. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspaceo " 55 U. PUT. L. REV. 993, 1028-32 (1994).
er Legal RegimejOr "Cyberspace," SS U. Pm. L. REV. 993, 1028-32 (1994).
3 Compare "Prodigy Service Agreement" §§ 6-7 with "America Online's 'Rules of the Road'
30 Compare "Prodigy Service Agreement" §§ 6-7 with "America Online's 'Rules of the Road'"
§§ 7c
(<www.cdtorg/privacy/oline services/chart.html>).
7c (<www.cdt.org/privacy/online_services/chart.htm1».
31 For
example, the
Schools Online
31
For example,
the Law
Law Schools
Online service
service allows
allows law
law students
students to "listen
"listen in on one
one of
of LCC's
Lee's
350
3S0 discussion
discussion groups
groups as
as practicing
practicing lawyers,
lawyers, judges
judges and
and law professors
professors discuss law
law as
as it's really
really practiced."
3.1 (1996).
ticed." Lexis-Nexis
Lexis-Nexis Law
Law Schools
Schools Online,
Online, version
version Win
Win 3.1
31 See Hardy,
1031.
3% See Hardy, supra
supra note
note 29,
29, at 1031.
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may be sui generis. Microsoft, for example, is endorsing a ratings system
distributed on the World Wide Web to allow voluntary
for information
information d'dstributed
voluntary
screening
inappropriate for children. 333 In contrast, CompuServe
material inappropriate
CompuServe
screening of material
participants worldwide from
and Netcom each initially
initially chose to exclude all participants
various Internet discussion groups because
German probecause of an inquiry by a German
vincial state prosecutor into the availability of pornographic
pornographic content and the
fear of potential criminal liability. These on-line services could have tainarrowly the restrictions, if in fact they would have incurred
lored more narrowly
German
German liability for use of their networks within Germany. For the nonproof customary rules of behavior has even
prietary Internet, an entire body
' 34
as "netiquette.
"netiquette.,,34
been formulated
formulated as

Like nation-states, network communities
communities have significant
significant powers to enforce rules of participant conduct. In the case of proprietary networks such
such
as America OnLine or CompuServe, service
service providers
providers may terminate access
access
for offending participants.
participants. Netiquette rules for the Internet
Internet may even be
be
technologies by individual
individual members of the
enforced through the use of technologies
selfnetwork
community. For example, the Internet
network communi.ty.
Internet has the equivalent of self"Spamming," the sending
appointed policemen and policymakers.
policymakers. "Spamming,"
sending of unso"cancelbots," programs
licited messages,
messages, results in "cancelbots,"
programs that delete messages
circulating on the Internet from offending
offending senders. Even the Guardian
Guardian Angels have begun to patrol the Net with their "CyberAngels"
"CyberAngels" to look for
35
3S
"technologies of justice"
justice" will
crime and safety problem areas. Similarly, "technologies
36 For example,
regulate
regulate and enforce
enforce behavioral
behavioral standards or expectations.36
developers have created filters for the World Wide Web protocol
software developc;:rs
to allow network
network participants
participants to mask commercial
commercial advertisements
advertisements while
viewing Web sites. Even collective
collective efforts in adjudication of disputes are
likewise emerging in the network community. There is at least one mechanism, the Virtual Magistrate, for on-line dispute settlement with network37
based tribunals of experts.37

DI.
supra note 25, at DI.
See Lewis, supra
An Internet guide to netiquette is available
<ftp://ds.intemic.net/rfc/rfc1855.txt>.
available at <ftp:/Ids.internic.netlrfclrfcI855.txt>.
3 See <http://proxis.com/-safetyed/cyberangelseyberangelsO5.html>.
35 See <bttp:/Iproxis.com/-safetyedicyberangels/cyberangels05.html>.
EMORY L.J.
L.J. 869 (1996).
(1996).
3' See Lawrence Lessig, Reading
Reading the Constitution
36
Constitution in Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 45 EMORY
" The Virtual Magistrate Project
37
Project was launched
launched in March 1996 to "assist
"assist in the rapid,
rapid, initial resoluresolution of computer network disputes" by a pool of on-line neutral arbitrators.
arbitrators. The project
project is based on the
the
<http://vmag.law.vill.edu:8080/>. The National Center for Automated Information
Internet at <http://vmag.law.vill.edu:80801>.
Information Research, a
work exploring on-line
on-line dispute
dispute mediation and held
held
prominent nonprofit foundation, is similarly supporting
supporting work
"The On-Line Dispute Resolution Conference,"
an invitational
invitational meeting, "'Ibe
Conference," in May 1996.
"
33

"
34
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IV. THE INCONGRUITY
TRADITIONAL REGULATORY
INCONGRUITY OF TRADmONAL
REGULATORY
POLICYMAKING
POLICYMAKING

When faced with these new dimensions
dimensions of network
network governance, existing
existing
regulatory approaches are incongruous and ill-situated to resolve the challenges of the network environment.
environment. Despite the fundamental impact
impact of the
GII
Gil on governance,
governance, U.S. regulation and the American policy decision-maklegal
ing process remain wedded to the traditional paradigms of distinct legal
philofields and territorial borders. The U.S. approach to regulation and its philosophical
preference for narrowly
sophical preference
narrowly targeted
targeted law obscure the dramatic evolution of the information society. At the same time, European
European regulation simijurisdictional areas, although
larly anchors rules in territorial
territorial and substantive jurisdictional
it tends to favor proactive
government intervention. These differing approactive government
proaches
offer
a
contrasting
proaches
contrasting set of difficulties arising from the problems
problems
governments have
change in this
governments
have in coping with the speed and magnitude
magnitude of change
area.
A.

Obscured
Obscured Vision

decision-makers an obThe U.S. approach
approach to regulatory policy
policy gives decision-makers
GII. The American
structural boundaries on the Gil.
American
scured vision of the new structural
legal tradition eschews a powerful
state
role
in
society
and
draws
on a
powerful
8
38
deep-seated
philosophy
of
limited
government.
constitutional
deep-seated philosophy
govemment.
The constitutional
structure itself,
itself, by emphasizing a citizen's
citizen's rights against the state, expresses
structure
increases in
a commitment
commitment to limits on state power. Even
Even in the wake
wake of increases
government regulation following the New Deal and Progressive Eras, U.S.
industry.39
law-making rhetoric remained
remained hostile toward the regulation
regulation of industry.39
Whether the boundary
boundary is between the federal and state governments or between legal disciplines, legal standards evolve primarily in response to discrete identified
identified problems
problems or crises, and jurisdictional lines are vitally
vitally important.
tant.
In the area of information
information policy, the U.S. approach
approach has a distinct preference
for
ence
self-regulation in the private sector. For example, important
important fair

38 See Joel R.
R. Reidenberg,
Standardsfor
FairInformation
Information Practice
II
Reidenberg, Setting Standards
for Fair
Practice in the U.S. Private
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REv. 497 (1995).
tor,
(1995).
3' See Morton
History of the Public/Private
Public/PrivateDistinction,
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
39
Morton L
J. Horwitz, The History
REv. 1423,
1423,
(1982).
1426 (1982).
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information
information praclice
praclice standards
standards are not typically found in legislation, but
rather are determined
activities."40 Legal rules tend to be nardetermined by company
company activities.
rowly drawn, as for example, the strong protections for video rental rec 441'
cords
records, 2 or they purport
and the scant protections
protections for health care records,42
cords
to seek only mintor
minor adjustments
adjustments to existing regimes, such as the National
Information
Infrastructure Task Force work on intellectual property
Information Infrastructure
43 Over the last decade, intellectual property laws and information
rights.
th(~
property
information
rights.43
privacy
hav,~ evolved only modestly, as compared to the dramatic evoprivacy rules have
lution of information technology. Perhaps the most significant
significant legal
legal reGII thus far has been the arduous process of telecommunisponse to the GIl
restructuring of communications
communications incations reform.'
reform.44 Despite the de facto restructuring
extraordinary difficulty
dustries, fragmented policymaking
policymaking in Congress had extraordinary
change in information
information technology
technology
dealing with the complexity of both the change
and special
special interests.
inter~:sts. The resulting law is a striking display of well-funded
well-funded
45
of
special interest klbbying.
lobbying.45
Congress did not even try to deal with many of
the intertwined
intertwined issues of privacy and intellectual
intellectual property.
consequence of the U.S. approach is that policymaking
The consequence
policymaking for global
equipped to face the goverinformation flows is widely
widely dispersed and ill equipped
challenges.'46 Under the U.S. system,
government organizasystem, no single government
nance challenges.
redefinitions of traditional regulatory bortion is in a position to assess the redefinitions
ders. Multiple
United
Multiple federal agencies, including the State Department, the United
States Trade
Representative, the Federal
Trade Representative,
Federal Communications
Communications Commission, the
Commerce
Telecommunications and Information
Information
Commerce Department's National Telecommunications
Administration, ~md
and the National Institute for Standards and Technology,
each have narrow and overlapping
of
overlapping claims to various discrete aspects of
information policy. Regulators
information
Regulators then compete
compete with one another
another for jurisdicTelecommunications and Information
Th(~ National Telecommunications
Information Administional power. The
tration, the Federal
Fede:ral Trade Commission, and the Federal Communications
Communications

' See Reidenberg,
<0
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 38, at 508-11.
508-11.
U.S.C. § 2710 (1994).
(1994).
..4 18 U.S.C.
42
See
Paul
M.
Schwartz,
The
Protection
of Privacy in Health CareReform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 295
'2 See Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform. 48 VAND. L. REV. 295
(1995).
(1995).
See NU WHrrE PAPER., supra note 2. However, these adjustments are not truly "minor."
<l See Nil WHITE PAPER, supra note 2. However, these adjustments are not truly "minor."
" This two-year
Telecommunications Act
..
two-year process resulted in the Telecommunications
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Telecommunications
of 1996, Pub. L. No. Hl4-104,
104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
U.S.C.C.A.N., 110
I10 Stat.
Stat. 56.
56.
4S See id.;
id.; Telecom Bill Rated One of
Sweetheart Deals
1995, WASH.
WAsH. TELEcoM.
NEwS, Jan.
.,
of Top Sweetheart
Deals in 1995,
TELEcOM. NEWS,
8,
8, 1996.
1996.
46 See
DiFORMATION INFASTRUCrURE:
STRATEOmS FOR
FOR U.S.
U.S. PoulcY
<6
See, e.g., THE
nm NEW
NEW INFORMATION
INFRAsTRUCTURE: STRATEGIES
Poucy (William J.
Drake ed,
ed., 1995).
1995).
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Commission have each, for example, tried to stake
stake out claims to privacy
privacy is47
sues.47
significance of the paradigmatic
paradigmatic shift in borders becomes lost
The significance
in the bureaucratic
bureaucratic maze. For example, government
government agencies
agencies do not generally have the combination
combination of technical skills and public policy mandates to
examine
technological standards
standards on regulatory
examine the impact
impact of choices in technological
perspective on the structural
policy or objectives. No agency
agency has a complete perspective
changes
changes taking
taking place in society as a result of the GIl.
GIl. Even the Clinton
Clinton
Administration's present effort
to
develop
a
vision
for the information infraeffort
structure
Infrastrucstructure and its governance through the work of the Information
Information Infrastructure Task Force (IlTF)
(IITF) remains captive to sectoral thinking and reactive
reactive
tendencies. The study groups are divided along sectoral lines and some of
of
the most time-consuming
time-consuming projects,
intellectual property,
projects, like privacy and intellectual
remain focused on territorial borders
borders and the transposition
transposition of status quo
subcommittee groups compete with
interests to cyberspace. In addition, the subcommittee
one another for recognition. For privacy alone, the U.S. Advisory
Advisory Council
(expert advisors to the IlTF),
I1TF), the Working Group on Privacy, the GovernGovernment Services
Services Group, and the Security Issues Forum have each issued separate policy statements.

Gil has its origins in the United States, the U.S.
Although the GIl
U.S. regulatory
impediment to effective
effective
policy process is beginning
beginning to appear as a serious impediment
GIl's
leadership. The incongruity of American regulatory practices
practices with the GIl's
multidisciplinary character and rapid technological
technological pace seems to enshrine
GIl policies.
significant inefficiency
inefficiency and narrowness in the development of Gil
The United
States
can
no
longer
assume
that
its
legal
and
policy
standards
longer
United
will dominate the GIl merely by the strength of the American market. In the
Union has already
already set the global
case of information privacy, the European Union
agenda with its 1995 data protection directive. The United
United States, like other
other
countries,
encompass the
countries, must develop new governance paradigms that encompass
GIl.
shifting borders of the GIl.

47 See.
See. e.g.,
eg., U.S.
47
U.S. DEmT.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
COMMERCE, NAT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFO.
INFO. ADMIN.,
ADMIN., PRIVACY
PRIvACY
AND
THE NU1:
SAFEGUARDING TELEcOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED
TELECOMMUNICATONS-RELATED PERsONAL
PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995);
AND mE
NIl: SAFEGUARDING
(1995); Calling
Calling

§§
Number Identification Service-Caller ID, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,489
29,489 (1995)
(1995) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. §§
64.1600-64.1604);
Fed. Trade
Comm'n Woricshop:
Workshop: Consumer
Protection and the Global
Information InfraInfra64.1600-64.1604); Fed.
Trade Comm'n
Consumer Protection
Global Infonnation
structure
(Apr. 10-11,
10-11, 1995)
1995) <http://www.fte.gov/opp/ii.htm>.
structure (Apr.
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gii.htm>. The Federal Trade Commission
Commission also runs a
privacy discussion Iistserv
listserv on the Interet
<http://www.fte.gov/flc/privacy.htm>.
Internet at <http://www.ftc.gov/ftclprivacy.htm>.
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Overloaded Vision
Overloaded

By contrast to the American experience, other regulators outside the UnitBy
GH from comprehensive vantage points. In Europe,
ed States confront
confront the GIl
regulation is not anathunlike the United States, comprehensive
comprehensive government
government regulation
43 For example, European
ema to society.
society.48
European policymaking
policymaking often comes from
centralized
independent "data
"data protection agencies,"
institLltiOns, such as the independent
agencies,"
centralized institutions,
information policy, with
which play an important role in the formulation
formulation of information
information flows rather than narrow sectoral regumandates that attach
attach to information
49 Omnibus
lations.49
legislation 500 and sui geneOmmbus rules such as data protection legislation
ris laws, such as relatively new intellectual
rights,5 present
intellectual property
property rights,sl
present faron information policy
policy rather than ad hoc solutions to narrow
reaching views 011
government agencies
comprehensive powers instituproblems. Central
Central government
agencies with comprehensive
European Union, for
tionalize broad
broad policy planning and issue debates. The European
example, has est'lblished
established an Information
Information Society Project Office to coordiwide-ranging European Commission
Commission activities. Yet at the
of wide-ranging
nate a number
number of
same time, an omnibus
omnibus view cannot possibly address the full scope
scope of issues simultaneously
confronting
the
GII.
As
an
illustration
of
this crucial
crucial
simultaneously confronting
GIL
problem, the European
Commission
had
to
narrow
the
range
of
issues adEuropean Commission
dressed in its recent
recl~nt Green
Green Paper on copyright. 522
Although the omnibus approach to regulation
regulation may offer a broader
broader vision
for public
environment than the U.S. approach,
public policy
policy in a global network environment
approach,
the vision inherent in European efforts still tends to preserve important, yet
evaporating, foundations, based on territorial principles and subject matter
distinctions.
of
~tinctions. National
Nati.onal application
application remains
remains pre-eminent. The principle
principle of
"subsidiarity" in
in European
"subsidiarity"
European Community
Community law reflects this continued commit" See MARY
Am, GLENDON,
GLENDON, RIGHTS
TALx: THE IMPoVERISHMENT
IMPOVERSHMENT OF POUJ1CAL
POLrICAL DISCOURSE
DISCOURSE 1-17
4S
MARy ANN
RIGIITS TALK:
1-17
(1991)
(observing differences
"rights" between the United States and European
(1991) (observing
differences in the political culture of "rights"
societies).
49 See Privacy Directive, supra note 14,
arts. 1,28.
1, 28.
49 See Privacy Directive, supra
note 14, at arts.
' See Spiros Simitis, From
From the Market
Market to the Polis:
Polls: The EU Directive
Directive on the Protection
Protection of Personal
50
Personal
Data, 80 IOwA
(1995).
Data,
IOWA L. REv. 445 (1995).
Council Directive
Directive 91/250/EEC
(L
,."l See Council
9112501EEC on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L
122) 42 (requiring European Community member
member states to adopt a special
special set of rules for the copyright
protection of
of computer
software). Previously,
when faced with
with the
the problem of software protection,
protection
computer !.oftware).
Previously, France,
France, when
added an
si generis
the French
French copyright
copyright law. See Loi No. 85-660,
85-660, 1985
1985
an essentially
essentially sui
generis protection
protection into the
added
A.L.D. 357.
A.L.D.357.
a See European Comm'n, Green Paper on Copyright
Copyright and Related Rights
52
Rights in the Information SociSociety,
reprintedin 43
43 J. COPYRIGHT
CoPYRiGHT SOC'y
Soc'Y 50, 55 (1995)
(noting that the Green Paper addresses only a
ety, reprinted
(1995) (noting
property issues for the information
information society).
subset of intellectual pmperty
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boundaries.s33 Under "subsidiarity,"
"subsidiarity," the Eument to territorial and sectoral boundaries.
ropean Community may only act on matters that are not more properly
properly
within the boundaries of member-state competence. When actions are taken
at the European
European level through "Directives,"
"Directives," each European member state
must enact conforming national rights that implement the legal standards
defined in the relevant
relevant Directive;
Directive; Directives do not in themselves create
supranational rights that can be invoked directly by citizens.
citizens.
supranational

approach also illustrates the problems of omnibus control. No
The broad approach
matter how an omnibus regulatory policy is decided,
decided, the extraterritorial
extraterritorial
impact foreshadows
foreshadows difficulties. Under the European data protection
protection rules,
for example, personal information may not be transferred
transferred outside the Euro5'
pean Union unless adequate privacy protections
protections exist at the destination. 54
The very omnibus character
character of European
appropriate compariEuropean rules makes appropriate
comparisons to other legal systems, like that of the United States, complex.5"55 Simiintellectual property rules offer disparate
larly, reciprocity provisions in intellectual
available foreign protections.
treatment depending
depending on the type of available
GII, the institutionalized
institutionalized vigilance
In the rapidly developing GIl,
vigilance for information flows that follows from an omnibus
omnibus approach risks becoming
becoming rigid. The
implementing a European Directive
adopting and implementing
Directive is slow.
very process of adopting
For example, the first draft of the data privacy directive was released
released in
1990, the final text was adopted
in
1995,
and
member
state
implementation
adopted 1995,
implementation
need not be completed
completed before 1998.
1998. By the time standards are implemented
in national legislation, certain rules may be obsolete
obsolete due to the rapid pace
pace
bureaucratic processes
of technological
technological development. Similarly, bureaucratic
processes do not lend
themselves well to rapidly changing
changing technologies.
technologies. The information system
registration
registration schemes common
common in some European countries over the last
twenty years frequently relied on concepts
concepts such as "data files." While this
information in
made sense initially, techniques
techniques for the storage of personal information
distributed databases no longer associate data with particular idenan age of distributed
tifiable locations.

'$l Maastricht
Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 1992 OJ.
O.J. (C 224) 1 (Feb. 7, 1992). See GEORGE A.
A
BEuANN Er
AL., CASES
CASES AND
AND MATERIAlS
MATEIALS ON
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
CoMMUNrY LAW,
BERMANN
ET AL,
ON EUROPEAN
LAw, 1995 Supp.,
Supp., 11-14
11-14 (1995);
A. Bennann,
European Community and the UnitUnitGeorge A
Bennann, Taking Subsidiarity
Subsidiarity Seriously:
Seriously: Federalism
Federalism in the European
ed States. 94 COLUM.
COLUM. L. REV.
REV. 331 (1994).
(1994).
Directive, supra
supra note 14, at art. 25
25.•
54 See Privacy Directive,
"
STUDY OF UNII'ED
UNITED
..
See PAUL
PAUL M.
M. SCHWARTZ
SCHWAR1Z &
& JOEL R.
R. REIDENBERG,
RElDENBERG, DATA
DATA PRIVACY
PRIvACY LAW:
LAW: A Snrny
DATA PROTECTION (1996).
STATES DATA
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Because
Because the omnibus approach
approach encourages extensive and customarily
customarily
slow dehoeration,
regulatory policies risk network circumvention.
circumvention. If particideliberation, regulatory
pants structure
their network activities to avoid a jurisdiction, the omnibus
structure th(~ir
approach makes a government
government response
response difficult and enforcement
enforcement uncertain.

V. A NETWORK
NETWORK GOVERANCE
GoVERANCE PARADIGM
PARADIGM
The development of a new model for governing networks is crucial for
GIl. The new paradigm must recognize all
effective policy leadership
leadership on the GIl.
regulatory power. As a complex mix of rule-makers
dimensions of network regulatory
emerges to repla(:e
replace the simple, state sovereign model, new policy instruments must appear
appear that are capable
capable of establishing important norms of conPolicymakers must begin to recognize network soverduct for networks. Policymakers
eignty and begin to shift the regulatory role of states toward indirect means
that develop
develop network rules.

A.

Complex Mix of
ofRule-Makers

GII, governance
On the GIl,
governance can no longer be viewed as an exercise in state
edict. The relationships
relationships among the different participants
participants in the information
information
infrastructure
become
interactive.
States
have
direct interests
infrastructure become
interests in the developinformation society. The private
private sector has a crucial role in the
ment of an infomlation
Technologists have a pivotal
GIl. Technologists
pivotal position for policy
policy choices
choices
creation of the GII.
Gil empowers citizens
Policymaking
and the GIl
citizens to establish rules of their own. Policymaking
different interest centers is intertwined. For example, technoamong these difff:rent
logical choices
choices may frustrate or support state interests or citizen goals.
Overlapping jurisdiction
technology
Overlapping
jurisdiction and the rapid evolution
evolution of information technology
defy the traditionid
traditiomu forms of state control.
of
For global networks, governance
governance should be seen as a complex mix of
state, business, technical,
and
citizen
forces.
Rules
for
network
behavior
tf:ChniCal,
behavior
will come from c;:ach
each of these interest centers. Within this framework, the
mU!lt be a driving force in the development
development of the information
private sector
sector must
society and gover:nments
governments must be involved to protect public interests. At the
concerns and techsame time, policyimaking
policymaking cannot ignore technological concer:ns
nologically-driven decision-making.
nologically-driven
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B. New Policy
Instruments
B.
Policy Instruments
The recognition of new network borders opens new instruments for the
achievement of regulatory
regulatory objectives. Executive and legislative fora lose aa
achievement
degree
standards organizations. Standards
Standards decisions
degree of relevance to technical standards
fundamental public concerns
of
affect fundamental
concerns and are no longer technical rules of
commercial interest. Standards
Standards now contain significant policy rules.
purely commercial
"clickstream," or keystroke, data such as those contained
The availability of "clickstream,"
S6
in the Netscape file <cookies.txt> is, for example, a default policy rule.56
The debate over encryption standards and key escrow mechanisms similarly
reflects the critical new instrumentality of standards-setting.
standards-setting.ss77
In the network governance paradigm, standards bodies will not be able to
to
Standards Associavoid robust public policy debates. Already, the Canadian
Canadian Standards
ation has tried to incorporate
incorporate policy debate through the promulgation of a
s and
government agencies are encouragstandard,S8
other national government
privacy standard,
ing technical
technical decision-makers
decision-makers to implement
implement policy objectives.
objectives.5 S99 This recognition will change the process
nition
process of making
making decisions at standards
standards organizations. At present, citizen interests are either weakly
or
indirectly
weakly indirectly represented
represented
in setting standards. For example, the American
American National
National Standards Institute
("ANSI") is an umbrella organization
prepared
organization in the United States that has prepared
a framework
for
identifying
requirements
framework
requirements for national
national information infraInfrastructure Standards Panel only
structure standards.'
standards.60 The Information
Information Infrastructure
indirectly considers
considers user needs through the standards
standards developers and tech61 Governments
Governments can
can and should seek standards that facilinology vendors.
vendors.61
policy objectives. Without a widening of the
tate or incorporate broader policy
policy concerns
concerns inherent in technical
technical standards,
standards, the results may be distorted.
For instance,
instance, standards
of electronic
management for intellectual
intellectual
electronic rights management
For
standards of

supra note 22.
$6s See supra
SECURniY, supra
supra note
OFFICE OF TECH. AS" See
See INFORMATION SECURITY,
note 27,
27, at 111-34;
111-34; U.S.
U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESS, OFFICE
AsSESSMENT, IsSUES
ISSUES UPDATE
1-34
SESSMENT,
UPDATE ON
ON INFORMATION
INFORMATION SECURITY
SECURITY AND
AND PRIVACY
PRIvACY IN
IN NETwORK
NElWORK ENVIRONMENTS
ENVIRONMENTS 1-34
(1995);
Reidenberg &
& Frangoise
FundamentalRole of
(1995); Joel
Ioel R.
R. Reidenberg
Franyoise Gamet-Pol,
Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental
ofPrivacy
Privacy and Confidence in
the
the Network,
Network, 30
30 WAKE
WAKE FOREST
FOREST L. REV.
REv. 105,
105, 109
109 (1995).
(1995).
38
'8 See
See CANADIAN
CANADIAN STANDARDS
STANDARDS ASS'N,
Ass'N, MODEL
MODEL CODE FOR THE
TIlE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL
PERsONAL INFORINFORMATION
MATION (1996).
(1996).
-$9 See
& PRIVACY
See INFORMATION
INFORMATION &
PRIvACY COMM'R
COMM'R OF
OF ONTARIO,
ONTARIO, CANADA
CANADA &
& REGmTRATEKAMER
REGlSTRATlEKAMER OF THE
TIlE
NEHERLANDS,
NEIlIERLANDS, PRIVACY
PRIvACY ENHANCING
ENHANCING TECHNOLOGImS:
TECHNOLOGIES: Ti
THE PATE
PATH TO
TO ANONYMITY
ANoNYMITY (1995).
(1995).
'60 See
See ANSI,
ANSI, Framework
Framework for
for Identifying
Identifying Requirements
Requirements for
for Standards for the National
National Information
Information
Infrastructure, Apr.
Infrastructure,
Apr. 11,
11, 1995
1995 (visited
(visited Mar.
Mar. 15,
15, 1996)
1996) <-http.//www.ansi.org/iisp/fiam4nii.htmrl>.
<ht!p:l/www.ansi.orgfiisp/fram4nii.html>.
61 Id.
1.
61 Id. 'Ill.
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practices if the
trallsgress policy goals for fair information practices
property may transgress
technical decisions do not consider the privacy implications. The Canadian
experience and growing government interest in technologies
technologies of privacy,
experience
consideration at
including encryption, are beginning to force this broader consideration
standards bodies.
Nevertheless, the practicality
practicality and consequence
regulatory
Nevertheless,
consequence of embedding regulatory
policy in technical standards pose a number of important dilemmas. If technical systems implement policy decisions through particular standards,
standards, desirable policy
policy changes might necessitate rebuilding the infrastructure. Some
Some
incorporated into standards
policy objectives
objectives might also be more readily incorporated
(~xample, the basic data protection principle
principle that personal
than others. For example,
not
be
retained
any
longer
than
necessary
to accomplish
information
accomplish the
information
collected may easily translate
translate into a standard for
purpose for which it was collected
data purging, but the principle
purpose
principle that data may only be used for the purpose
for which it was collected
collected is far more difficult
difficult to build into the system,
because data may be reused and recycled.
C. Network Federalism
Federalism
C.
recognize
Governance in the network environment
environment suggests a need to recognize
network
semi-sovereign entities."
network systems as semi-sovereign
entities.62 Networks have key attributes
of sovereignty: participant/citizens
participant/citizens via service
service provider membership
membership agreeagreements, "constitutional"
"constitutional" rights through contractual
contractual terms of service, and police powers
powers through taxation
taxation (fees) and system operator sanctions. In effect,
network
stakeholders in transnational political and economic
economic
network users become stakeholders
elimination of certain Internet usenet
communities. As CompuServe's elimination
illustrates, network management
participant discourse.
discourse.'63
groups illustrates.,
management affects participant
These
independence from state
These characteristics
characterisdcs warrant a degree of network independence
intervention.
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, where networks
networks develop parallel
parallel to physical society, traditional governments retain
crucial
public
responsibilities
and significant
significant inretain
terests. For example, distance learning through video conferencing
conferencing may
replace the public
public
substitute for local schools, but it does not diminish or replace
educated citizenry. Similarly, physical points of contact
contact beinterest in an educated
6 See, eg., Johnson & Post, supra note 28 (arguing that cyberspace should be recognized as its own
61 See. e.g.. Johnson & Post, supra note 28 (arguing that cyberspace should be recognized as its own
jurisdiction).
' See text accompanying notes 33-34.
63 See text accompanying notes 33-34.
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tween networks and states as a result of the location of users, as well as the
states aa
location of network infrastructure (such as cables and nodes), give states
direct interest in network activities.
The overlap of interests between the physical world and the virtual world
governance model that contains distinct rules for the separation
separation
suggests aa governance
of powers. Territorial
borders
will
retain
an
important
role
in
structuring
Territorial
structuring
overlaps between network boundaries
of
boundaries and state jurisdictions. Principles of
federalism offer a valuable lesson for the relationship between territorial
governments and cyberspace. Just as Lex Mercatoria did not displace the
law of
of the
the situs of trade fairs,64
fairs,' a new Lex Informatica
Informatica suggests that soverlaw
eign states should act only within particular spheres or zones of influence.66S' State governments
ence.
governments can and should be involved in the establishment
governments cannot and should
should
of norms for network activities, yet state governments
not attempt to expropriate all regulatory power from network communities.
communities.
In some ways, the European principle of subsidiarity
subsidiarity666 fits the network
model. States can act to govern behavior
behavior on networks only when state competence and direct state interests are established or when they are more
capable of doing so than networks.

D. Role of the State
State
D.
though national
less meaning
meaning in an information soci.. Even
Even though
national borders
borders have
have less
ety, states retain a critical ability to influence
influence rule-making
rule-making by networks
themselves.
States
can
provoke
the
creation
of
network
themselves.
provoke
creation
network standards
standards like the
the
development of content filters on the CompuServe
CompuServe network.67
67 With power
power
development
over physical
physical situs points (users and infrastructure),
infrastructure), states have
have the
capability to set conditions
operations, such as free expression
expression
capability
conditions of network operations,
or minimal
minimal service obligations,
obligations, in exchange
exchange for legally permissible
permissible access
access to
users or infrastructure
infrastructure situs points. States have a potent tool in the ability to
impose
impose and enforce a certain degree of liability on networks and their participants. This
capacity to influence
This power
power thus gives states the capacity
influence network
network
behavior
as
well
as
the
capacity
to
create
legal
conflicts.
behavior
capacity
conflicts.

6<

See Hardy, supra note 29,
29, at
at 1020.
1020.

64
65 See id. at
at 1025.
1025.

666 See text accompanying
accompanying note
note 53.
53.
6'
67 See
See Michael
Michael Meyer, A
A Bad Dream
Dream Comes True in Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, NEwswEEK,
NEWSWEEK, Jan.
Jan. 8, 1996, at 65.
65.

HeinOnline -- 45 Emory L. J. 929 1996

930

EMORY LAW JOURNAL
JOURNAL

[Vol.
4S
[Vol. 45

As the GIl moves forward, the governance
governance of networks
networks suggests a movement toward a system of state-provided
state-provided incentives
incentives through encouragement,
encouragement,
as well as allocation of liability, that will induce networks
networks themselves to
adopt desirable public policies."
policies.68 For example, as stakeholders in a network system, users may pressure networks to adopt principles of democracy
democracy
mnthe vigorous on-line debates regarding
for network decisions,
decisions, as seen In
CompuServe's action. However, under different circumstances,
circumstances, public interCompuServe's
ests may dictate that governments
governments actively seek elements
elements of network democracy
mocracy as a condition of network operation. With physical power over
over
persons
persons and infrastructure,
infrastructure, states can exercise a control over key network
situs points. The allocation
allocation of liability might evolve
evolve as a policy instrument
to promote network
network self-regulation.
self-regulation. Yet this policy instrument requires
cautious use. State intervention that imposes an excessive
excessive burden of liability may impede
impede the advantages of a robust network and result in censorship
censorship
of valuable
valuable information
infonnation flows.
CONCLUSION
VI. CONCLUSION

challenge to the conventional
conventional foundations of
of
The Gil
GIl poses a fundamental
fundamental challenge
structurally alter regulatory decision-making.
governance. Global networks structurally
National
National borders and sectoral
sectoral boundaries lose an important
important degree of relevance while network borders and network communities
communities gain prominence.
Basic regulatory policymaking, whether under the anti-statist American approach or the comprehensive
comprehensive European approach,
GIl. Inapproach, is ill suited to the GIl.
stead, a new "network
"network governance paradigm"
paradigm" must emerge to recognize
recognize the
complexity of regulatory power centers, utilize new policy instruments
such
instruments such
as technical
standardization to achieve regulatory
objectives, accord status
technical standardization
regulatory objectives,
semi-sovereign entities, and shift the role of the state toward
to networks as semi-sovereign
an incentive
incentive structure for network self-regulation.
the creation of all

" Professor Hardy
61
Hardy makes
makes a similar point in arguing for strict liability of network operators as the
achieving a desired
supra note 29, at 1041-48.
desired regulatory
regulatory policy outcome. See Hardy, supra
1041-48. This
best means of achieving
runs the risk, however, that
lhat network operators will adopt a policy
policy of "when
"when in doubt, take it out" and consequently
censorship.
sequently engage
engage in broad censorship.
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1.

Introduction to Lex Informatica
Informatica
Introduction

During the middle ages, itinerant
itinerant merchants
merchants traveling
traveling across Europe
to trade at fairs, markets,
markets, and sea ports needed common ground rules to
create trust and confidence
confidence for robust international
differences
create
international trade. The differences
law
provided
a
significant
feudal,
royal,
and
ecclesiastical
among local,
local,
ecclesiastical
degree of uncertainty and difficulty for merchants.
merchants. Custom and practices
"Lex Mercatoria,"
Mercatoria," which
evolved into a distinct body of law known as the "Lex
commercial participarticiwas independent
independent of local sovereign rules and assured commercial
pants of basic fairness in their relationships.'
relationships. I
technologies, participants
In the era of network and communications
communications technologies,
uncertain
traveling
information infrastructures
traveling on information
infrastructures confront an unstable and uncertain
environment
environment of multiple governing laws, changing national rules, and conflicting
fiicting regulations. For the information infrastructure,
infrastructure, default ground
as
in
the Information
Society as
are just
as
essential
for
participants
rules are
just as essential for participants in the
Information Society

This paper
paper was
was prepared
prepared and
and funded
funded during
during
University School
School of
Law. This
** Professor,
Professor, Fordham
Fordham University
of Law.
Research
a Fordham University Faculty
Faculty Fellowship and as part of a sabbatical in the Public Policy Researeh
Department at AT&T Network Services Research Laboratory. I am particularly
particularly indebted to Paul
Resnick at AT&T for discussions of the paper, guidance
guidance on technical issues, and comments on earlier
earlier
Lessig, and Paul
drafts. In
In addition, I want to thank Ira Heffan,
Heffan, Bob Gellman, Mark Lemley, Larry Lessig;
author.
on earlier drafts. Any
Any errors remain the sole responsibility of the author.
Schwartz for comments on
CommercialTransactions
Transactions
Kaufman, The Law of International
InternationalCommercial
Harold J. Berman &
& Colin Kaufman,
1.1. See Harold
-- 76 Tex.
L. Rev. 553 1997-1998
19 HARV.
HARV. INT'LHeinOnline
221, 274-77
(1978).
(Lex Mercatoria),
Mercatoria), 19
L.J. 221,
(1978).
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Lex Mercatoria
Mercatoria was to merchants
merchants hundreds of years ago.2 Confusion and
conflict over the rules for information flows run counter to an open, robust
Information
Information Society. Principles
Principles governing
governing the treatment of digital information must offer stability and predictability so that participants
participants have enough
confidence
confidence for their communities to thrive, just as settled trading rules gave
confidence
communities. At present, three subconfidence and vitality to merchant
merchant communities.
stantive legal policy areas are in a critical
critical state of flux in the network
network
environment.
environment. The treatment of content, the treatment of personal
information,
information, and the preservation
preservation of ownership rights each presents conflicting policies within nations and shows a lack of harmonization
harmonization across
across
national borders. In addition, serious jurisdictional
jurisdictional obstacles confront the
enforcement of any substantive legal rights in the network
enforcement
network environment.'
environment. 3
But just as clear accounting
accounting rules reassured participants
participants in twentieth
twentieth century
century
financial markets, ground rules for the access,
distribution,
and
use of
access,
of
twenty-first
information will shape the trust, confidence,
confidence, and fairness in the twenty-first
century
century digital world for citizens, businesses, and governments.
government regulation
Historically, law and government
regulation have established
established default
rules for information
constitutional rules on freedom of
information policy, including constitutional
expression
expression and statutory rights of ownership
ownership of information.44 This Article
will show that for network
network environments
environments and the Information
Information Society,
government regulation
however, law and government
regulation are not the only source of rulemaking. Technological
Technological capabilities
capabilities and system design choices impose rules
on participants.
participants.55 The creation and implementation
implementation of information policy

2.
2. On the essential role and establishment
establishment of information
information policy
policy default rules, see generally Joel
R. Reidenberg
Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental
Confidence in the
Fundamental Role of Privacy
Privacy and Confidence
Reidenberg &
& Francoise
Francoise Gamet-Pol,
Network, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 105,
105, 107
WAKE FORESf
107 (1995); Joel R. Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, Governing
Governing Networks and
Rule-Making in Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 45 EMORY
EMORY L.J. 911,
911, 917-18 (1996).
(1996).
3.
3. For an excellent
exceIlent treatment
treatment of personal
personal jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdictional problems in
the United States,
Federalismin
in Cyberspace,
REV. 1095,
1095, 1107 (1996).
(1996).
States, see Dan L. Burk,
Burk, Federalism
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv.
4. See generally
BOYLE, SHAMANS,
(1996); M. ETHAN
KATSH,
generally JAMES BOYLE,
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE
SOFIWARE AND SPLEENS (1996);
ETIIAN KATSH,
(1995).
LAW IN
IN A DIGITAL WORLD
WORLD (1995).
Reading the Constitution
Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869,
896-97 (1996)
5. See Larry
Larry Lessig,
Lessig, Reading
Constitution in Cyberspace,
869, 896-97
(1996)
constraints); M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First
First
(arguing that software
software codes are societal constraints);
Amendment: Virtual
Doorkeepersin Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
of
Vinual Doorkeepers
CHI. LEGAL F. 335 (exploring the role of
structuring speech in the on-line environment);
918, 927-28
software in structuring
environment); Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 2, at 918,
(arguing that technical
choices). Some argue that
(arguing
technical standards set boundary rules and embed
embed policy
policy choices).
that
technical standards and legal rules may either supplement
supplement each
each other or, in some
some circumstances,
circumstances, be
be
substitutes. See Joel R. Reidenberg,
for Global
Global Electronic
ElectronicHighways:
Highways: Merging
Merging the
substitutes.
Reidenberg, Rules of the Road
Roadfor
Trade and
and Technical
287, 301-04 (1993)
(1993) [hereinafter Reidenberg,
& TECH.
Reidenberg,
Trade
Technical Paradigms,
Paradigms, 6 HARV.
HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 287,301-04
Rules of the Road]
Road] (arguing that technical considerations
considerations establish normative standards which, in turn,
tum,
impact
Reidenberg, Setting
Setting Standards
FairInformation
Practicein the
impact system practice);
practice); Joel R. Reidenberg,
Standards for Fair
Information Practice
U.S. Private
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REv. 497,
U.S.
Private Sector,
497, 508-09 (1995)
(1995) (arguing
(arguing that legal rules may be supplemented
considerations as well as business
Cavoukian, Go Beyond
mented by technical considerations
business practices);
practices); Ann Cavoukian,
Beyond
Security-Build in Privacy: One Does Not Equal the Other, CardTech/SecurTech
CardTech/SecurTech '96
Security-Build
'96 Conference
Conference (May
(May
14-16, 1996)
1996) (on file with the Texas
Texas Law Review) (describing technological
14-16,
technological innovations and arguing
arguing
privacy). The Canadian government is,
for them to be built into systems and applications to enhance privacy).
technological options
exploring technological
on
for example,
example, exploring
options for information privacy. See Ministerial
Ministerial Conference
Conference on
Networks, Bonn, Germany
Global Information
Information Networks,
Germany (July 7, 1997)
1997) (statement of John
John Manley,
Manley, Canadian
Canadian
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are
are embedded
embedded in network
network designs
designs and
and standards
standards as well as
as in system
system
choices
preferences
and
technical
configurations.
Even
user
configurations.
Even
preferences
technical choices create
create
6
6
overarching,
This Article
Article argues,
argues, in essence,
essence, that the
overarching, local default rules.
rules. This
set of rules
rules for information
information flows imposed
imposed by technology
technology and
and communicacommunication networks
networks form a "Lex
"Lex Informatica"
Informatica" that policymakers
policymakers must
understand,
understand, consciously
consciously recognize,
recognize, and encourage.77
The Article begins in Part
Part II with a sketch
sketch of the information
information policy
of content,
content, personal
personal information,
problems inherent
inherent in the legal
legal regulation
regulation of
and intellectual
intellectual property
property on global networks.
networks. Part II proceeds
proceeds to show
specific
speciflc technical
technical solutions and responses
responses to these policy
policy problems as an
an
illustration of
of the rule-making
rule-making power of
of technology
technology and networks. These
These
illustrations serve
theory of Lex
serve as
as a prelude
prelude to the articulation
articulation of a theory
Informatica.
Informatica.
Part III
III then defines
defines the theoretical
theoretical foundation
foundation for Lex Informatica
Informatica by
informashowing technological
technological constraints
constraints as a distinct source of rules for information flows. Lex Informatica intrinsically links rule-making
rule-making capabilities
capabilities well
well
information
policy
Information Society with substantive
suited for the Information
substantive information
choices.
choices. Lex Informatica
Informatica may establish a single, immutable norm for
customization and
information
network or may enable the customization
information flows on the network
automation
information flow policies for specific circumstances
circumstances that
automation of information
adopt a rule of flexibility.
Part IV applies
applies the theory
theory to demonstrate
demonstrate how Lex
Lex Informatica
Informatica can be
a useful policy device. The
The characteristics
characteristics of Lex Informatica
Informatica provide
ways to accommodate
accommodate different national public policies for controversial
treatment of personal
problems, such as content restrictions, 88 the treatment
Industry) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
Minister of
ofIndustry)
Review). Industry Canada has also held an important
important
SeeBig
Brother:Friend
orFoe?,
INDUSTRY CANADA
symposium on privacy
privacy enhancing
enhancing technologies. See
Big Brother:
Friend or
Foe?, 1I INDUSfRY
UPDATE 2, 1 1-2 (Oct. 1, 1996) <http://www.ic.gc.ca/ic-datalwelcomeic.ns>.
<http://www.ic.gc.ca/ic-data/welcomeic.ns>.
caller
example, a telephone subscriber's choice between
6. For example,
between per line and per
per call
call blocking of caller
identification information creates
creates a default
default rule applicable to all users of the particular
particular telephone line.
affirmaPer line blocking means
means no information
information is conveyed;
conveyed; per call blocking requires
requires the caller to act affirmainformation for each call.
tively to block information
7.
7. This Article will not address the specific role of
of community ethos and norms in setting network
rules.
Valauskas, Lex Networlda:
Networkia: Understanding
Understandingthe
rules. For a discussion of these aspects, see Edward
Edward J. Valauskas,
10-13 (Oct. 7,1996)
7, 1996) <http://www.firstmonday.dklissues/
<http://www.firstmonday.dk/issuesl
InternetCommunity, 1I FIRSfMONDAY5,
FIRsT MONDAY 5, 110-13
Internet
Internet community practices in normalizing on> (discussing the role of Intemet
issue4/valauskas/index.html
issue4/valauskas/index.html>
line behavior).
8. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
(1997) (upholding the fmdings
findings of aa three-judge
transmission of "indecent"
"indecent"
panel that provisions of the Communications Decency Act proscribing transmission
speech); Shea
material were overly broad and thus violated the First Amendment's
Amendment's guarantee
guarantee of free speech);
Reno, 930 F. Supp.
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)
1996) (reviewing
Communications Decency Act under a
v. Reno,
Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.
(reviewing the Communications
(1997). Other countries may
legislation), ajJ'd,
aft'd, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997).
standard applicable to content-based legislation),
denial
also have additional content concerns, such as Germany's and France's prohibitions on holocaust deuial
See Tribunal de Grande Instance,
12,
Instance, Paris, June 12,
and Germany's restrictions on neo-Nazi
neo-Nazi expression. See
of July 24, 1881 and its application to anti-Semitic
1996,
Ref. 53061-96 (discussing
1996, Ref.
(discussing Art. 24 of the law ofJuly
available in
in <http://www.aui.fr/Groupes/GT-RPSIUEJF/
<http:l/www.aui.frlGroupeslGT-RPSIUEJFI
and revisionist messages),
messages), available
and
Expressionas
as aaBasic
Basic Right: A German
GermanView, 37 AM.
ordonnance.hrml >; Ulrich Karpen,
Karpen, Freedom
FreedomofExpression
ordonnance.html
HeinOnlinerestrictions
-- 76 Tex. L.
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onRev.
speech in
in Germany);
(1989) (discussing
restrictions
COMP. L. 395, 399 (1989)
J. COMPo
on
the right
of free speech
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information,9 and the protection of intellectual
intellectual property'
propertylO° circulating on
information,9
transnational
transnational networks. As a consequence,
consequence, policymakers
policymakers can and should
should
look to Lex Informatica as a useful extra-legal instrument
instrument that may be used
to achieve
objectives that otherwise challenge
achieve objectives
challenge conventional
conventional laws and
attempts
by
governments
to
regulate
across
jurisdictional
lines.
attempts
governments regulate
The rise of a new regulatory regime for information policy has striking implications for public officials and government policy. Part V
explores
explores redirecting public policy rule-making strategies. Because the
formulation of the substantive
substantive rules of Lex Informatica bypasses customary
legal regulatory processes, the traditional law approach,
approach, such as
government-issued decisions, will be less effective
government-issued
effective in achieving desired
desired
technological approach,
information policy results than
than a technological
approach, such as the
promotion
promotion and development
development of flexible, customizable systems. Technical
standards and standard-setting
standard-setting mechanisms
mechanisms acquire important political
characteristics.
For
the
development
of information policy rules in Lex
characteristics.
Informatica,
Informatica, policymakers
policymakers must use strategies and mechanisms that are
different from traditional
regulatory approaches.
traditional regulatory
approaches.
II.
ll.

Information Policy Problems
Problems and Technical Solutions

world is known, enables beneficial
virtUal w~rld
beneficial as well
Cyberspace, as the virtual
as nefarious activities to thrive. Global networks are a powerful
powerful infrastructure for national
transnational human interactions
structure
national and transnational
interactions involving
entertainment, and politics. The regulation of content on
commerce, entertainment,
networks, the circulation of personal information,
information, and the distribution of
intellectual property
intellectual
property raise profound conflicts for national and international
law. The substantive standards, jurisdictional
enforcement
law.
jurisdictional authority, and enforcement

Christopher
HolocaustAre in Constant
Flux, USA
USA TODAY,
TODAY,
Christopher P. Winner, Contemporary
Contemporary Views ofHolocaust
Constant State ofFlux,
Feb. 17, 1997,
1997, at 8A
8A (discussing the sentencing
sentencing of a German
Gennan neo-Nazi
neo-Nazi for inciting racial hatred).
95/46 of the European
9. See, e.g., Council Directive 95146
European Parliament and of the Council
Council on the
of
to the processing
processing of personal
personal data and on the free movement
movement of
protection of individuals with regard to
(L 281)
281) 31 [hereinafter
(attempting to harmonize
such data,
data, 1995 O.J. (L
[hereinafter European
European Privacy
Privacy Directive]
Directive] (attempting
the protection
infonnation within the European
European Union); PAUL M. SCHWARTZ
SCHWARTZ &
& JOEL R.
protection of personal information
REIDENBERG, DATA
STUDY OF U.S.
(1996) (exploring the
REIDENBERG,
DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STuDY
U.S. DATA PROTECTION
PROTECflON (1996)
approach taken by American
computerized era
privacy in a modem, computerized
American law to the problem
problem of protecting privacy
Data Protection
Protection Law and the
and comparing that approach
approach to European standards);
standards); Symposium, Data
European
Union's Directive:
Directive: The Challenge
Challengefor the United
United States, 80 IOWA L. REV.
(1995)
European Union's
REv. 431
431 (1995)
(debating data privacy issues as they relate to the European Directive).
10.
See, e.g.,
INFORMATION INFRASTRUcruRE
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
AND THE
10. See,
e.g., INFORMATION
lNTELLEcruAL PROPERTY AND
NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUcruRE:
ON INTELLECTUAL
INTELLEcruAL
PROPERTY
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995)
(1995) [hereinafter
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER] (canvassing
(canvassing the current law of copyright, patent,
trademark,
Secretary of
of
trademark, and trade secret and making
making recommendations
recommendations for possible changes to the Secretary
Commerce);
Right to
to ReadAnonymously: A
CloserLook
Commerce); Julie E. Cohen, A Right
A Closer
Look at "Copyright
"Copyright Management"
Management n
CONN. L. REv.
REv. 981,
1019-30 (1996)
(1996) (arguing that legal protection for copyrightin Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 28 CONN.
981, 1019-30
First Amendment); Pamela Samuelson,
Samuelson, The Copyright
Grab,
Copyright Grab,
management technologies might violate
violate the FirstAmendment);
WIRED, Jan. 1996,
1996, at 134 (arguing that Congress
WIRED,
Congress should wait to see what kind of free market
the White--Paper's
recommendations).
protections evolve
evolve before
before pursuing
legislative
recommendations).
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technology creates
creates and compounds
compounds these
these
powers all clash. Just as technology
technology also offers new solutions for infonnation
information policy rules
conflicts, technology
controversial legal arenas.
in these controversial

A.

Content

Basic Policy
Policy Dilemma.-The legal regulation of content on
1. A Basic
global networks poses intricate philosophical,
philosophical, practical,
practical, and political
complications. Censorship
information is anathema in some legal
complications.
Censorship of infonnation
cultures, like the United States,"
States,l1 but not in others, like Singapore and
China.'122 Even within any single jurisdiction, the regulation
informaregulation of infonnaChina.
tion content poses a fundamental political issue for democratic societies.
For example, in the United States, concerns
concerns over the easy access that
children had to pornography
pornography and obscenity on the Internet
Internet resulted in the
3 which imposed liability
Communications
Decency
Act,'
information
liability on infonnation
Communications Decency Act,13
of
service and access providers
providers who were conduits to the dissemination of
offensive material
material to minors. Two separate federal courts have held the
statute unconstitutional
unconstitutional on various grounds,
Supreme Court has
grounds,144 and the Supreme
affirmed
affinned that the indecency section of the statute violates the First
Amendment
Amendment with its overbroad
overbroad sweep-without reaching the argument that
it violates the Fifth Amendment
Amendment as well.
well."'
15 The Supreme Court let stand
obscenity.'166 Yet at the same
same time, the operator
operator of a
the prohibitions on obscenity.
pornographic bulletin
pornographic
bulletin board may be held liable for trafficking in illegal
content across state lines.
lines."'17

11.
U.S. CONST.
CONSr. amend.
governmentally imposed restrictions on speech).
11. See U.S.
amend. I (prohibiting governmentally
speech).
12. Singapore
Internet traffic
gateways. See
12.
Singapore has recently required all Inlemet
traffic to pass through monitored gateways.
Silencing
Threat to Freedom
Expression On-line,
On-line, 8 HUM.
46-50
Silencing the Net: The Threat
Freedom of Expression
HUM. RTS. WATCH 2,
2, 146-50
(May
<http://www.epic.org/freespeech/intl/hrwreport_5_96.htnl>
(May 1996)
1996) <
http://www.epic.org/free_speechlintl/hrw_report_5_96.html> [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH]; see also
Implementing the NIl
NII Vision:
also Poh-Kam Wong,
Wong, Implementing
Vision: Singapore's Experience and
and
Future Challenges,
presented at Harvard Symposium on National and International Initiatives for
Challenges, Paper
Paper presenled
the Information
Information Infrastructure
the
Infrastructure (Jan. 24-26, 1996) (discussing Singapore's
Singapore's governmental
governmental policy toward
public access
access to network content),
available in <http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/GIIconf/
<http://ksgwww.harvard.eduliip/Glfconf/
public
content), available
wongpap.html>. China similarly
Minutes of
wongpap.html>.
similarly filters
flllers all in-bound and out-bound Internet
Inlemet traffic. See MinuleS
of
the 21st Meeting of the Inlernational
International Working
Working Group
Group on Data
Data Protection
Prolection in Telecommunications
Telecommunications 5,
Paris, (Apr. 3,
1997) (report
Paris,
3, 1997)
(report of Stephen Lau, Data Protection
Protection Commissioner
Commissioner of Hong Kong)
[hereinafter Minutes]
file with the Texas
Texas Law Review).
[hereinafter
Minules] (on flle
13.
REP. No.
104-458, at 189 (1996) ("[Rlequiring
13. See H.R. REp.
No. 104-458,
("[R]equiring that access restrictions
restrictions be imposed
imposed
to
protect minors from exposure
to prolect
exposure to indecent material...
material ... merely
merely puts it in its appropriate place:
place: away
away
from
also Communications
502, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223
from children.");
children. "); see also
Communications Decency
Decency Act § 502,
223 (West
(West Supp.
1997).
1997).
F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
930F.
1996), aft'd,
affd, 117 S.
S. Ct. 2501 (1997);
(1997); ACLU
14. See Shea v. Reno, 930
v. Reno,
(E.D. Pa. 1996), aft'd,
117 S.
S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
(1997).
affd, 117
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.
ACLU, 117
(1997).
15. Reno v. ACLU,
117 S. Ct. 2329, 2347 (1997).
Id. at 2350.
16. [d.
701, 711 (6th Cir.) (rejecting the defendant's
17. See United States v. Thomas,
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,711
defendant's claim that
obscenity must be judged against the standards
standards of a cyberspace community rather than
than a geographic
geographic
community),
denied, 117
cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
(1996).
community), cert.
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A similar debate is raging in France with the passage of the new
Telecommunications Reform
Act,18t" which requires information service
service
Telecommunications
Reform Act,
providers to offer technical
technical means for users to filter content. 19
19 The
French Constitutional Court, however, struck down companion sections
regulating
regulating indecency
indecency for reasons
reasons of separation of powers and vagueness.2200
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, two presidents of Internet service providers were indicted
under existing French
French law for making
making illegal material available
available over their
country-Singapore-has sought to
networks.221 Elsewhere, at least one country-Singapore-has
monitor all information
information content entering its physical jurisdiction.
jurisdiction.
Singapore requires the registration of all Internet service providers
providers and also
monitors their activities
Singapore.'
activities in S
ingap ore. 22
While these debates are just beginning in national capitals around the
world, the practical
practical implications are significant. Global access to information content means that information providers
providers may face liability for actions
viewed.23
that, although legal where performed,
performed, were illegal where viewed.'
Fundamental
threatened
Fundamental political freedoms in one jurisdiction
jurisdiction thus may be threatened
by the risk of liability in another jurisdiction. In other words, network
network
self-censorship
service providers
providers may opt for the overly cautious route of self-censorship
and adopt policies
policies of "when in doubt, take it out."
out. "
2. A Technical
Technical Solution.-The Platform
Selection
Platform for Internet Content Selection
(PICS) is a prime example of a technological
technological solution designed to resolve
(PICS)
the policy problem
standards for content withproblem of accommodating
accommodating different standards
24
A consortium of computerout compromising
compromising free speech
speech values. 24
science
designed PICS to facilitate the
science scholars and industry representatives
representatives designed
selective
selective blocking of access to information on the Internet and to provide
content on the
an alternative to legal restrictions on the dissemination of content
Internet. 25 PICS is a set of technical specifications that define a standard
18.
96-659 of July 26,
26, 1996,
1996, art. 15, J.O.,July
J.O., July 27,
1996, p.
p. 11384,
11384, available
18. Law
Law No.
No. 96-659
27,1996,
available in LEXIS,
LEXIS,
Loireg Library,
Library, JO File.
19.
id.
at art. 15.
19. See id.
20. Cons.
Cons. const.,
const., Decision
D6cision No. 96-378
1996, available
availablein LEXIS, Public Library,
96-378 DC, July 23,
23,1996,
Consti
in <http:/lwww.conseil-constitutionnel.frldecisions/96196378.doc>.
< http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decisions/96/96378.doc > .
Consti File,
File, and in
21. See HUMAN
WATCH, supra note
note 12.
12. Similarly,
head of
of CompuServe's
21.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
Similarly, the head
CompuServe's
German
German subsidiary was indicted for facilitating the trafficking in pornography.
pornography. See Edmund L.
Andrews, CompuServe
CompuServe Unit
Unit Chief Is
inGermany,
1997, at
Andrews,
Is Indicted in
Germany, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
TruB., Apr. 17, 1997,
at
13, available in
inLEXIS, World Library,
13,
Library, Allnws
AIlnws File.
22. See supra note 12.
12.
23. See,
States v.
v. Thomas,
Thomas, 74
F.3d 701,
117 S.
S. Ct.
74
23.
See, e.g., United
United States
74 F.3d
701, 711
711 (6th
(6th Cir.),
Cir.), cert.
cert. denied,
denied, 117
Ct. 74
(1996) (affirming
(affirming the
the application
application of
of Tennessee's
Tennessee's community
community obscenity
obscenity standards
standards to
to material
material placed by
(1996)
the defendant on
on an electronic
electronic bulletin board
located in California
California but viewed in Tennessee).
Tennessee).
the
board located
24. But
But see
seeJonathan
Jonathan Weinberg,
Net, 19
19 HASTINGS
HAsTNGS COMM.
COMM. &
& ENT.
ENT. L.J.
455, 45424.
Weinberg, Rating the Net,
L.J. 453,
453, 455,
45455 (1997)
(warning that
that the
self-rating of Internet sites presents free speech
speech concerns
concerns and that self(1997) (warning
the self-rating
rating !Day
may be increased
increased as PICS makes it easier
easier to "create and market such ratings").
ratings").
25.
Industry was
proposing nonregulatory
responses to
to Senator
Senator Exon's
25. Industry
was particularly
particularly interested
interested in
in proposing
nonregulatory responses
Exon's
efforts promoting
promoting antipornography
antipornography Internet
Internet legislation.
PICS was developed
World Wide
efforts
legislation. PICS
developed by
by W3C,
W3C, the World
Wide
Web Consortium,
James
Miller-- of
of
and
Paul 558
Resnick
of AT&T.
for
Web
Consortium, co-chaired
co-chaired by
by HeinOnline
James Miller
MIT
AT&T. See Pla(form
Plat/ann/or
76MIT
Tex. and
L. Rev.
1997-1998
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format for rating labels describing materials available on the Internet and
26
those labels.26
originally
a standard mechanism for distributing those
As originally
conceived, parents or other supervisors could then set filtering rules that
would selectively block a child's access to materials associated with the
chosen rating labels, much like the way a parent might prohibit a child
from seeing an "R"
"R" rated movie.'
movie.27 In essence, the set of specifications
specifications
sought to empower parents with a means to screen out inappropriate materials for their children
children without hindering the dissemination to the child next
door or to anyone else.
The PICS standard itself is neutral with respect to the terms used in
in
rating labels, the actual rating of materials, and the filtering criteria.28
criteria. s
Multiple terms and rating labels may coexist for the same information. For
"violence" and "nudity,"
example, one set of ratings may use the terms "violence"
while another set may adopt "blood"
"blood" and "sex."
"sex." Content providers can
corresponding rating labels for the
rate their own material
material and distribute corresponding
information.2299 Third parties may also associate rating labels with particu30
lar information disseminated
disseminated over the Internet. 30
of
With the existence
existence of
standardized labels,
standardized
labels, a supervisor, such as a parent, may then set criteria for
for
terns
filtering, including
including which rating sources to use and which rating terms
acceptable or inappropriate
inappropriate materials.3131 Software
Software mechanisms
indicate acceptable
built into web browsers
elsewhere in the network
browsers or elsewhere
network may accomplish
accomplish this
32
32
filtering.

Internet
Selection (last
July 18,
18, 1997)
1997) <http:lwww.w3.orglPICS/>.
Internet Content
Content Selection
(last modified
modified July
<http://www.w3.org/PICS/>. For an
explanation
the technology
development, see
see Paul
Paul Resnick
of lhe
technology and
and its
ilS development,
Resnick &
& James
James Miller, PICS: Internet
Internet
explanation of
Access
Without Censorship,
Censorship, COMMUNICATIONS
THE ACM, Oct. 1996,
Access Controls
Controls Without
COMMUNICATIONS OF TIlE
1996, at 87,
87, 87-93.
87-93.
26.
Miller, supra
26. See
See Resnick
Resnick &
& Miller,
supra note
note 25, at
at 87.
87.
27.
at 88.
27. See
See id.
id. at
88.
28. See id. at
at 92.
92.
29. This
taken by
SafeSurfing. The
The respective
29.
This is
is the
lhe approach
approach taken
by RSACi
RSACi and
and SafeSurfmg.
respective groups
groups have
have defined
defmed
distinct rating
terms and
and content
content providers
according to
to lhose
those terms.
distinct
rating terms
providers self-label
self-label according
terms. See Recreational
Recreational
Software Advisory
on the
Internet, About RSAC
1997)
RSAC (visited Aug.
Aug. 29,
29, 1997)
Software
Advisory Council
Council on
lhe Internet,
<http://www.rsac.org/>;
Rating System
Aug. 29,
1997)
<http://www.rsac.org/>; SafeSurf,
SafeSurf, The
The Original
Original Internet
Internet Rating
System (visited
(visited Aug.
29, 1997)
<http://www.safesurf.com/>; see also Weinberg, supra note 24, at 462-64 (comparing
<http://www.safesurf.coml>;seealsoWeinberg.supranote24.at462-64
(comparing RSACi
RSACi with
wilh
SafeSurfmg
SafeSurfmg and
and noting
noting the
lhe inherent
inherent limitations
limitations of
of self-rating).
self-rating). Self-labelling,
Self-labelling, however,
however, runs
runs the
lhe danger
danger
that
lhat content
content providers
providers may
may mislabel
mislabel their
lheir materials.
materials. Dishonest
Dishonest labelling
labelling may be discouraged
discouraged by legal
legal
sanctions
as possible
sanctions for
for deceptive
deceptive behavior
behavior as
as well
well as
possible marketplace
marketplace retribution.
retribution.
30.
(last
30. This
This is
is the
lhe approach
approach taken
taken by
by SurfWatch
SurfWatch and
and Cyber
Cyber Patrol.
Patrol. See
See Internet
Internet Cyber
Cyber Patrol
Patrol (last
modified
modified Sept.
Sept. 15,
15, 1997)
1997) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com>;
<http://www.cyberpatrol.coml>; SurfWatch
SurjWatch (visited
(visited Sept.
Sept. 15,
15, 1997)
1997)
<
http://www.surfwatch.com/> (showing
both services
third parties).
<http://www.surfwatch.coml>
(showing that
lhatbolh
services rate
rate the
lhe sites
sites of
oflhird
parties). Independent
Independent
labelling
distribute rating
falsely purporting
labelling runs
runs the
lhe risk
risk that
lhat someone
someone might
might distribute
rating labels
labels falsely
purporting to
to come
come from
from
another.
can be
used to detect and
and
anolher. This
This practice
practice is
is known
known as
as "spoofing."
"spoofing." Cryptographic
Cryptographic techniques
techniques can
be used
deter
deter such
such spoofs.
spoofs.
31.
25, at
31. See
See Resnick
Resnick &
& Miller,
Miller, supra
supra note
note 25,
at 63.
63. Microsoft's
Microsoft's Internet
Internet Explorer
Explorer 3.0,
3.0, for
for example,
example,
can
source, whether
and allows
can read
read PICS
PICS labels
labels from
from any
any source,
whelher self-labelled
self-labelled or
or third-party
lhird-party labelled,
labelled, and
allows users
users
to
the filtering
filtering rules.
AM., Mar.
to specify
specify lhe
rules. See
See Paul
Paul Resnick,
Rcsnick, Filtering
Filtering Information
Information on
on the
the Internet,
Internet, So.
SCI. AM.,
Mar.
1997,
1997, at
at 62,
62, 62.
62.
32.
32. See
See Resnick
Resnick &
& Miller,
Miller, supra
supra note
note 25.
25. Various
Various techniques
techniques may
may also
also be
be deployed
deployed to
to make
make itit
HeinOnline
-- 76 installed
Tex. L. Rev.
559 1997-1998
difficult
for children
the
by
or
difficult for
children or
or others
olhers to
to bypass
bypass
lhe filters
filters
installed
by parents
parenlS
or supervisors.
supervisors. See
See Internet
Internet
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The structure of PICS
PIes allows several
several different content-evaluation
content-evaluation
standards
to
be
applied
to
the
same
applied
information on a web site and different
standards
viewers to use different filter criteria.333 Thus, PICS
PIeS can work well to
conflict
segment permissible content in various jurisdictions.'
jurisdictions.34 If laws conflict
PICS technology
technology as
between jurisdictions,
jurisdictions, network
network proxy servers can use PIeS
part of a firewall to filter content that is impermissible
impermissible in the local
jurisdiction but legal elsewhere.
elsewhere.' 3s Similarly, if laws use potentially
potentially
incompatible
community standard"
standard" for pornoincompatible standards such as the "local community
36 PICS technology allows
graphy
graphy classifications,
classifications,36
PIeS technology
different filters within a
single jurisdiction. This technology
technology provides
provides individual choice of filtering
rules, yet it still offers automatic enforcement.
enforcement. 377 Finally, PIes
PICS technology can allow transborder enforcement
by
providing
a
means
to label mateenforcement
rial that is located elsewhere. Third-party
Third-party rating labels may be distributed
distributed
documents. 388 Thus, the
through a server that is separate
separate from the labelled documents.
document authors and web sites where the documents are posted need not
cooperate with law enforcement
enforcement efforts.
cooperate
B.

Personal
Information
Personal Information

1.
1. The Policy
Policy Problem.-The
Problem.-The fair treatment of personal
personal information
information
in an Information
Information Society poses another enormous
enormous challenge for legal
regulation.
regulation. Over the last three decades, fair information practice
practice principles
39
39
have been enshrined
in
industrialized
societies.
The
penetration
enshrined
industrialized
penetration of
of

Cyber Patrol
Patrol(last modified Sept. 15,
15, 1997)
1997) <http://www.cyberparrol.com/>
<http://www.cyberpatrol.com/> (noting the presence
Cyber
of multiple safeguards that prevent users
usets from disabling Cyber Patrol or renaming
renaming blocked
blocked materials).
33.
PICS Statement of Principles
Principles (visited Aug. 29, 1997)
1997)
33. See World Wide
Wide Web Consortium, PICS
<http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/PICS/principles.hml>
<http://www.w3.org/pub/WWWIPICS/principles.htm1> (explaining
(explaining how the standards devised by
PICS facilitate third-party labelling).
web
critical mass of labels and rated web
34. However, the platform will only
only be effective if there is a critical
Weinberg, supra
supra note 24. An incentive
sites. See Weinberg,
incentive structure
structure still needs to emerge that will encourage
Reidenberg, The Use
Use of Technology to Assure
Assure
the development
development of the critical mass.
mass. See Joel R. Reidenberg,
Internet
Privacy:Adapting
Adapting Labels and
and Filters
Filtersfor Data
Data Protection,
Protection, LEX ELECrRONICA
ELECTRONICA (forthcoming
(forthcoming
Internet Privacy:
availablein <http://home.sprynet.comreidenberg/picprv.htm>
1997 ), draft
draft available
< http://home.sPtYnet.com/reidenberg/picprv.htm > (discussing the criticalmass problem for petsonal
personal information).
information).
35.
WATCH, supra
HUMAN RIGHTS
RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note
note 12;
35. This is the approach in Singapore
Singapore and China. See HUMAN
Minutes, supra
supra note 12.
12.
Minutes,
36.
See, e.g., United
701, 711,
(subjecting
36. See,
United States v.
v. Thomas,
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,
711, 710-11
710-11 (6th Cir.) (subjecting
pornographic,
where the
pornographic, electronic
electronic materials
materials to the community standards of "the geographic area where
cert. denied,
(1996).
materials are sent"), cert.
denied, 117 S.
S. Ct. 74 (1996).
37. This is the basis for CyberParrol
CyberPatrol or Microsoft
Microsoft Internet
Internet Explorer
Explorer Content Advisor. See
supra note 31 (noting that both services
standard).
Resnick, supra
services use the PICS standard).
supra note 25, at 89; Federal Trade Comm'n, Public
Public Workshop on
38. See Resnick & Miller, supra
Consumer
GlobalInformationInfrastructure,F.T.C. ProjectP954807,
Project P954807, Washington,
Washington, DC
Consumer Privacy
Privacy on the GlobalInformationInfrastructure,
Research) (transcript available at
(June 4, 1996) (statement
(statement of Paul Resnick, AT&T Research)
at
<http://www.ftc.govlbcp/privacy/privacy.htm>)
<http://www.ftc.govlbcp/privacy/privacy.htm
» [hereinafter
[hereinafter FTC Testimony].
Testimony].
39.
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG,
39. See SCHWARTZ
REIDENBERG, supra
supra note 9, at 6-13 (showing the emergence of rights
rights in the
private and public sectots
sectors in the United
significant commitment
commitment
United States, but also demonstrating a more significant
to the free flow of information); Symposium, supra
supra note 9 (observing
(observing that fair information
information practices
have become law throughout
throughout Europe).
Europe).
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technology around the world during the last decade, however,
information technology
infonnation
information
has provoked re-examination
re-examination of the application
application of core fair infonnation
practice principles
principles in network environments.40 In the United States, legal
rights are limited, and public concern
high. 4 1
concern for privacy invasions is high.41
Public-policy
Public-policy debates continue to search for a consensus on privacy
comprehensive legal rights exist and government
standards. In Europe, comprehensive
standards.
government
42 At the same time, public-policy
enforcement
enforcement plays an important role.42
debates throughout Europe reflect similar concerns for the development
development and
standards to infonnation
application
application of privacy standards
information circulating on global
networks.4433 The widely ranging legal standards
information pracstandards for fair infonnation
flows.'44
different countries present conflicts for global information
infonnation flows.
tice in different

Information Infrastructure
Force, Privacy
Privacyandthe National
National
40. See Privacy Working Group, Infonnation
InfraslruclUre Task Foree,
Information
Principlesfor Providing
Providingand Using
Using Personal
PersonalInformation
Information Infrastructure:
Infrastructure: Principlesfor
Information (last
(last modified June
1995) <http:I/www.iitf.nist.govlipclipclipc-pubslniiprivprin
fmal.html>
(articulating basic princi6, 1995)
< http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/ipc/ipc-pubslniiprivprinJmal.html
> (articulating
ples for the "fair
"fair use of personal
Infrastructure);
personal information" by users of the
the National Information InfraslruclUre);
U.S.
COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND
SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED
TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
AND THE NII:
Nfl: SAFEGUARDING

PERSONAL
(1995) (recommending
(recommending a re-evaluation of existing
PERSONAL INFORMATION
INFORMATION (1995)
existing telecommunications
telecommunications laws
laws
in light of the threat that information
infonnation technology
technology poses to privacy); European Privacy
Privacy Directive,
Directive, supra
supra
note 9 (providing
(providing harmonized European Union standards for the privacy rights and free flow of
of
COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L'INFORMATIQUE Er DES LlBERTEs
LIBERTS [C.N.I.L.],
VOIX,
personal data); COMMISSION
[C.N.I.L.], VOIX,
IMAGE Er
ET PROTECTION
of
PROTECTION DES DONNtES
DONNEES PERSONNELLES
PERSONNELLES (1996)
(1996) (discussing the risks and applicability
applicability of
data protection
protection principles
principles to the digitalization of sound
sound and images); International
International Working Group on
and Privacy
Privacy on the Internet:
Report and
Data Protection in Telecommunications,
Telecommunications, Data
Data Protection
Protection and
Internet: Repon
Guidance
<http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/diskus/13_15.htm> (recommending
Guidance (Nov.
(Nov. 19,
19, 1996) <http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/diskus/13_15.htm>
(recommending
increased privacy safeguards
safeguards on the Internet).
41. See SCHWARTZ
SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra
supra note 9, at 6-7 (recognizing the American commitment
41.
& REiDENBERG,
information, the limited
over
to the free flow of infonnation,
limited scope
scope of existing legal rights,
rights, and the public concern
concern over
privacy).
privacy). Public opinion polls over
over the last decade consistently show that more than 75 % of Americans
feel as though they have lost control of their personal information.
information. See, e.g., LOUIS HARRIS &
& ASSOCS.
Assocs.
&
WESTIN, THE
EQUIFAX REPoRT
REPORT ON CONSUMERS IN
INTHE INFORMATION
INFORMATION AGE, at xxi (1990)
& ALAN F. WESTIN,
THE EQUIFAX
(1990)
79% of Americans
"somewhat" or "very"
Americans were
were either
either "somewhat"
"very" con(reporting survey results indicating that 79%
cered
Minefields in
cerned about threats to their personal
personal privacy); Humphrey Taylor, Opportunities
Opponunities and Minefields
Interactive
& AM.
1995, at 9 (reporting that 76
% of the public believes
Interactive Services, PRIVACY &
AM. BUS.,
Bus., Mar. 1995,
76%
believes
business
ASSOCS., EQUIFAX-HARRIS
EQUIFAX-HARRIS
business asks for too much personal information); see also
also LouIs
LOUIS HARRIS &
& AssOCS.,
CONSUMER
CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY
SURVEY 71 (1996)
(1996) (reporting
(reporting that 64% of Americans believe on-line service providers
users' Internet surfing habits).
viders should not track users'
habits).
42. See European Privacy
(requiring that all member states
Privacy Directive,
Directive, supra
supra note 9,
9, at Art.
An. I
1 (requiring
citizens' privacy);
BENNETT, REGULATING
PROTECTION AND
REGULATING PRIVACY:
PRIVACY: DATA
DATA PROTECTION
protect their citizens'
privacy); COLIN J. BENNElT,
PUBLIC POLICY IN
INEUROPE AND
AND THE UNITED
UNrrED STATES 192
(1992) (describing
PuBLIC
192 (1992)
(describing the regulatory
regulatory approaches
Sweden, West Germany,
Germany, the United
taken in Sweden,
United Kingdom,
Kingdom, and the United States).
States).
43. The European
European Commission has,
study of data
has, for example, sponsored a comprehensive
comprehensive slUdy
1997. See European Commission,
protection and on-line
on-line services
services to be completed
completed by the end of 1997.
Invitation to tender No. XV/96/20/D.
XV/96/201D. The French National
National Commission
Commission on Informatics and Freedom
has established
composed of European
European data privacy
established a "Study
"SlUdy Group on International
International Networks"
Networks" composed
privacy
commissioners,
seeCOMMISSION
DEL'INFORMATIQUE
Er DESLIBERTtS
[C.N.I.L.],
commissioners, see
COMMISSION NATIONALE
NATIONALE DE
L'INFORMATIQUE Er
DES LlBERTEs [C.N
.I.L.], 17hPME
17IEME
RAPPORT
Meeting
RAPPORT ANNUEL 65 (1997),
(1997), and the Berlin Privacy Commission
Commission devoted
devoted much of the 21st Meeting
of the International
Telecommunications to Internet issues. See
International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications
International
International Working
Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications,
Telecommunications, Agenda for the 21st Meeting
of the International
International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications
Telecommunications in Paris (Mar. 20,
20, 1997)
1997)
(on file with the Texas Law Review).
The Privacy
Course: Hurdling
Hurdling Barriers
44. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, 1he
Privacy Obstacle
Obstacle Course:
Barriers to
HeinOnline
76REv.
Tex. L.
Rev.(1992).
561 1997-1998
Transnational
FORDHAM--L.
REV.
FORDHAM
S137
(1992).
Transnational Financial
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Information
national jurisdiction.
jurisdiction. European
European data protection
protection
Information flows defy national
authorities have the legal right to interdict transborder
transborder data flows if the
45
destination does not have adequate standards
standards for information
privacy.4S
destination
information privacy.
supervision of foreign data processing
processing and the actual enforceHowever, the supervision
enforcement of interdiction powers are extremely
extremely difficult to implement for transnational networks.
networks.'46
2. Technical
Technical Solutions.-Several
Solutions.-Several technical solutions provide valuable
valuable
tools to establish
establish fair information practice policy
policy on global networks. At
the first level, technological mechanisms
anonymize information that
mechanisms can anonymize
would otherwise
be
associated
with
particular
otherwise
associated
particular individuals. Identity
Identity
47 or anonymous
electronic mail47
anonymous remailers
remailers for electronic
anonymous
masks, such as anonymous
browsers"48 for Internet surfing, offer users control of their personal inforbrowsers
enable
mation. One company, I/PRO, developed mapping features that enable
demographic and other information
web sites to learn demographic
information about site visitors
sites' discovering the identities of the individuals,
individuals, unless an
without those sites'
499 A user
individual
affirmatively
chooses
to
reveal
personal
information.
individual affirmatively
reveal
demographic information
reveals demographic
information to a trusted third party, in this case
case
I/PRO. When the user connects
connects to a web site, the user gives the web site
a numeric identifier. The web site then can gain access to some of the
party. If the user grants authorizaauthorizademographic data from the trusted third party.
tion, the user's name and other personal
personal information may be released to the
web site. These technical configurations
configurations allow information flows to avoid
configurations can reproblems with privacy issues because the technical configurations
solve issues of conflicting privacy standards either with data that no longer
longer
relates to specific individuals or with data that relates to identified persons
50
who have expressly
expressly agreed
agreed to particular use of their information.
information. so
id. at S160-65
45. See id.
S160-65 (discussing European policies
policies on restricting transborder data flows); see
also European
European Privacy
Privacy Directive,
Directive, supra
supra note
note 9, at Art. 25.
C.N.I.L., supra
1995.
46. See C.N.I.L.,
supra note 40, at 1995.
47.
remailer is an Internet site that forwards mail to a specified address and masks
47. An anonymous
anonymous remailer
and its Enmities, 1995
the identity
identity of the original
original sender. See A. Michael
Michael Froomkin, Anonymity
Anonymity and
1995 J.
ONLINE L. artA,
art. 4, 1 10 (Aug. 29,
1997) <http://www.law.comell.edu/jol/froomkin.htm>
29, 1997)
<http://www.law.comell.edu/jollfroomkin.htm> (explaining
that the common
information
identifying infonnation
common characteristic
characteristic of all anonymous remailers is that they delete identifying
on electronic
electronic mail and they replace the sender's
sender's name with that of the remailer or attach an anonymous
name tag).
information about an individual
48. While Internet surfing does not necessarily
necessarily reveal any infonnation
individual other
other
than the Internet
Internet Protocol address
address for the particular surfing
surfing session,
session, fully anonymous browsing may
may be
accomplished by directing all traffic through an anonymizing
accomplished
anonymizing web site. See, e.g.,
e.g., Anonymizer.com
(visited Oct. 22,
1997) <http://www.anonymizer.com/open.htnl>
(providing anonymous web
22, 1997)
<http://www.anonymizer.comlopen.html> (providing
web
browsing through
through its anonymizer buffer).
49. See FTC Testimony,
Testimony, supra
supra note 38 (statement of
I/PRO). Although IIPRO
I/PRO has discontinued
ofIIPRO).
discontinued
this particular service, the technological concept
configurations like I/PRO's,
IIPRO's,
concept remains valid. For configurations
however, aggregations of information
infonnation must be carefully
carefully constructed to avoid the inadvertent
inadvertent disclosure
of identities.
indirectiy identify particular
identities. For example,
example, the level of detail may indirectly
particular individuals
individuals when few
people could
could actually match the disclosed information.
50. If particular legal rules for data processing
processing may not be waived by individuals,
individuals, then technical
technical
HeinOnline
76effective
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PICS-based rating labels and software filters similarly offer promise
promise
PIeS-based
Internet."SI
for the resolution of conflicting legal privacy rules on the Internet.
legal standards differ,
differ, such as between the United States and most
Where legal
European countries,52
countries,' and where an individual may consent to deviations
PIeS
from default legal standards,
standards,533 filter configurations using the PICS
protocol allow users to make determinations about the use of personal
information and to assure the implementation of those decisions on the
Net.' Users may express their privacy preferences,
preferences, and web sites may
Net.54
be rated for their treatment of personal infonnation.
information. 55
When the
preferences
and
treatment
can be
preferences
defaults do not match, a software filter Can
designed to disclose the discrepancy to the user and to stall the
6
transaction. 56 Users may choose either to proceed or to cancel the
interactionY
explanations of
PIeS-based model can also support explanations
interaction. 57 The PICS-based
information
practices
by
web
sites
to
assist
users
in
making
infonnation practices by
making their
their
8
58
decision."
This
vehicle
can thus create disclosure-of-infonnation
disclosure-of-information
decision. .
requirement, and it can automate
automate
practices even in the absence
absence of a legal requirement,
information policies that are satisfactory
satisfactory to the user.
the negotiation
negotiation of infonnation
permits customization
customization of information
infonnation
This automation of notice and choice permits
privacy to individual needs without imposing a time or information
infonnation
59
processing
processing burden on
on individuals.
individuals. S9
PICS-based filters and configuration
The PIeS-based
configuration arrangements
arrangements are not,
PICS rating labels for
for
however, a complete
complete solution. Unlike the context of PIes
content,
content, information
infonnation privacy rating labels cannot readily be made without

51.
51. For a description
description of
of PICS
PICS technology,
technology, see supra
supra section Il(A)(2).
II(A)(2).
52. See
& REIDENBERG,
(comparing U.S.
52.
See generally
generally SCHWARTZ
SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra
supra note
note 9 (comparing
U.S. fair information
information
practices to European
European norms).
53.
there is
information only be used
53. For
For example,
example, there
is aa basic
basic data
data privacy requirement
requirement in Europe
Europe that information
used
to achieve
the purpose
purpose for
id. at 14.
Secondary uses
personal informainformato
achieve the
for which
which it was collected.
collected. See id.
14. Secondary
uses of personal
individual concerned.
concerned. See id. at 15.
15. The default rule
rule
tion are permissible
permissible only
only with the consent
consent of the individual
limits
the legal
limitations.
limits the
the purposes
purposes of
of data
data use,
use, and
and the
legal rule allows individuals to waive those limitations.
54.
PICS-based mechanism
54. See
See Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra note 34,
34, Part
Part IV (arguing that
that aa PICS-based
mechanism may be
be able
able
to
satisfy the conflict
supra note 38,
38,
to satisfy
conflict between European
European and American
American privacy law); FTC Testimony,
Testimony, supra
at 96-99.
96-99.
55. See FTC Testimony,
Testimony, supra
supra note 38, at 96-97.
96-97.
56. See id. at 98.
98.
57.
57. See id.
58.
58. This
This application
application is technically
technically feasible,
feasible, but it is not
not yet built
built into the
the existing PICS
PICS standard.
standard.
See
See id.
id. In
In April
April 1997,
1997, the
the World
World Wide
Wide Web
Web Consortium
Consortium launched
launched aa development
development effort
effort to
to create
create a
negotiation
negotiation protocol
protocol for
for privacy
privacy that
that provides
provides for
for this
this functionality.
functionality. See W3C,
W3C, Platformfor
Platform for Privacy
Preferences
Preferences (P3P)
(P3P) Project:
Project: Platform
Platform for
for Privacy
Privacy Preferences
Preferences Initiative
Initiative (visited
(visited Oct.
Oct. 29,
29, 1997)
1997)
<http://www.w3.org/P3/Overview.html>. P3P
<http://www.w3.orgIP310verview.html>.
P3P seeks
seeks to
to set
set up
up an interoperable
interoperable way of expressing
expressing
privacy
privacy preferences
preferences by
by web
web sites
sites and
and users.
users. Users will be
be able to decide
decide whether
whether to accept
accept the terms
terms
of
of the web site
site before
before browsing.
browsing.
59.
59. Although
Although the
the coexistence
coexistence of
of multiple
multiple rating
rating terms and preference
preference choices may suggest
suggest a
confusing
for an
confusing array
array of
of decisions
decisions for
an individual,
individual, this
this downside
downside of
of the
the PICS
PICS standard
standard can
can be minimized
minimized
with
with competing
competing default
default settings.
settings. For
For example,
example, organizations
organizations such
such as
as the
the Direct
Direct Market
Market Association
Association
could
could make
make one
one set
set of
of rating
rating terms
terms and
and default
default preferences
preferences available
available to
to the public,
public, just
just as
as Privacy
Privacy
HeinOnline could
-- 76 Tex. L. Rev.
563 1997-1998
International,
of the
the spectrum,
spectrum, could distribute
distribute rating
rating terms
terms and default
default settings.
settings.
International, at
at the
the other
other end
end of
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cooperation of the web site.
site.'6O The entity actually performing the data
the cooperation
processing
processing must assist third-party labellers
labellers if the third parties are to
6'
be able to assign appropriate
ratings.
Self-reported rating labels by
61
Self-reported
appropriate
web sites do, however, offer a novel connection
connection with legal rules. If
If
self-reported
accurately reflect information practices,
self-reported rating labels do not accurately
practices,
nonprivacy
nonprivacy legal claims
claims may be created as a result, including
including potential
claims
claims such as misrepresentation
misrepresentation under tort law and breach of promise
under contract law. In either case, however, independent
independent verification and
certification
confidence and
certification of rating labels will provide a vital element of confidence
of
trust in the site's information practices.
practices.62
62
In addition, the efficacy of
PICS for information privacy depends on the emergence
PIeS
emergence of rating
vocabularies'63 and a critical mass of sites with rating labels. If widely
widely
vocabularies
acceptable
rating
terms
do
not
exist
and
if
few
sites
are
given
rating
labels,
acceptable
PICS-based filters will not offer a very robust means of solving the
then PIeS-based
problem of conflicting information
information policy rules because the choice for
individuals would remain a theoretical possibility rather than a real,
automated process.
The possibility that PICS
flows in the
PIes can facilitate transborder data fiows
European Directive
face of restrictions contained in the European
Directive on data privacy
specifically the value of technology
illustrates more specifically
technology as an instrument for
6'
information
PICS technology
policy.64
PIeS
technology can provide a means to assure
information policy.
foreign regulatory agencies of the adequacy of off-shore standards of fair
fair
develops appropriate
appropriate rating
information practice. If the private sector develops
terms based on accepted fair information practice
practice principles and rating
labels are attributed
attributed to sites according
according to those terms, European
European data-protection authorities
authorities can be assured of technical
technical rules that impose fair information practices
law. 6S Filters using the PICS
PIeS
practices in the absence of law.'6
protocol
protocol can read the rating labels and match site ratings to the user's

60. Web content can readily be observed and characterized
characterized by outside observers. The extent or
or
lack of fair treatment
treatment of personal information at a web
web site, however, will not be observable to an
outsider without access to the processing
processing activities.
activities.
61. For a third party
information practices of a web site,
61.
party to be able to label accurately the infonnation
site, the
files and will need to conduct an audit of the processing
outside observer
observer will need
need access to the site's flies
activities.
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 34, Part II; see also
also Internet
Internet Privacy
Privacy Survey, PRIVACY & AM.
62. See Reidenberg,
BUSINESS 7 (1997)
(1997) (showing a lack of trust in business use of personal information
BUSINESS
infonnation on the Internet).
63. At
At least one set of labelling
labelling terms based on the Canadian Standards Association
Association Model Code
Code
of Fair Infonnation
Information Practices
supra
Practices exists,
exists, as well as one based on the European
European Privacy Directive,
Directive, supra
note 9.
FrC Testimony, supra
9. See FIC
supra note 38 (statement
(statement of Paul Resnick); Reidenberg, supra
supra note 34,
at app.
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 34, Part IV.
64. See Reidenberg,
65. European
European data protection
protection commissions
commissions will still need
need to accept that the rating terms are
satisfactory.
of
satisfactory. Under the European Directive,
Directive, the rating terms
tenns can
can be approved
approved as a form
fonn of a code of
conduct. See
Directive, supra
supranote 9, at Art. 27 (encouraging the adoption of codes
See European
European Privacy Directive,
codes
implement the national
of conduct to help implement
national provisions).
provisions).
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preferences.'66 This electronic handshaking assures the user's consent to
preferences.
In contrast to the difficult legal probthe use of the personal information. In
enforcement of standards for extraterritorial data prolems associated with enforcement
cessing, a PICS-based filtering system directly implements and enforces
fair information practices. "Certification
"Certification agents"
agents" that verify the accuracy
of rating labels at the filtering stage can also achieve decentralized
decentralized supervision of information practices. In other words, PICS allows configurations that include rating labels and certifications of those labels before web
browsing software makes the connection to the web site for an interactive
session.67 If the private
mechanisms,
private sector does not develop these mechanisms,
sessionY
European data protection regulators could encourage the implementation
implementation of
European
PICS technology. Rather than prohibit transborder
transborder data flows because of
of
uncertain information policies, regulators would be able to require rating
labels by particular entities based on specific rating terms and would be
able to accredit
"certifying agents"
agents" so that supervision
accredit "certifying
supervision would be
assured.6"68 In other words, through the application of PICS technology
European
European data protection agencies may identify
identify as well as create a subset
of locations
protection
locations outside the European
European Union that assure "adequate"
"adequate" protection
in the absence of a legal regime.
C. Ownership
C.
Ownership Rights
1. The Policy Issue.-Beyond a few possible solutions
solutions for content
content and
information privacy
privacy policies, technology
technology also presents
presents a valuable response
response
legal-policy problems
problems associated
associated with the management
management of
of
to some of the legal-policy
intellectual
property
rights.
Application
of
the
existing
intellectual
property
intellectual property
Application
existing intellectual property
regimes of copyright,
electronic
copyright, patent,
patent, trademark, and trade secret
secret to the electronic
world
world reveals problems similar
similar to those found in the regulation of both
both
content and information privacy. Intellectual
Intellectual property
property rights are territorial
and the scope of national
national rights remains to a certain degree uncertain for
for
digital works.6969 For
example,
the
treatment
of
file
caching
under
For
treatment
under
66.
"adequacy" standard, European
66. To
To satisfy the European
European Directive's
Directive's "adequacy"
European data protection
protection commiscommissions
stipulate to the use of a default set of preferences
sions may
may stipUlate
preferences for the filtering
filtering process.
process. See Reidenberg,
Reidenberg,
supra
supra note 34,
34, Part
Part IV.
67.
"trusted" system
system can
can also preclude the
the exchange
exchange of
of any information
infonnation to the
67. The use of a "trusted"
destination
personal information.
destination site
site prior
prior to
to the
the negotiation
negotiation of
of the treatment of personal
infonnation. See generally
generally Mark
Mark
Stefik,
TrustedSystems,
Stefik, Trusted
Systems, Sci.
SCI. AM.,
AM., Mar.
Mar. 1997,
1997, at
at 78-81
78-81 (discussing trusted
trusted systems
systems and the
the challengechallengeresponse
response technique).
technique).
68.
68. In essence,
essence, this means
means that the European
European Union
Union might be able
able to avoid confrontation
confrontation with
foreign countries
foreign
countries over
over the
the legal
legal standards
standards in
in the
the foreign
foreign country.
countty. The European
European Union
Union can
can define
define a
set of
set
of PICS
PIeS compliant
compliant rating terms,
tenns, approve aa set of
of preferences
preferences for those rating terms
tenns that meet the
the
"adequacy" standard, and accredit auditors to certify the accuracy of rating labels. Trusted servers
"adequacy" standard, and accredit auditors to certify the accuracy of rating labels. Trusted servers
filtering
filtering European
European approved
approved preferences
preferences against rating labels
labels certified
certified by
by the accredited
accredited auditors provide
provide
assurance
assurance that
that "adequacy"
"adequacy" is satisfied.
satisfied. The
The pronouncement
pronouncement by European
European data
data protection
protection commissioners
commissioners
on
on rating
rating terms,
tenns, preferences,
preferences, and
and auditor
auditor accreditation
accreditation is both
both politically
politically and practically
practically easier than
than
selectively
selectively judging foreign law.
law. See Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
supra note
note 34
34 (discussing
(discussing accrediting
accrediting rating terms).
tenns).
69.
69. See
See WHrrE
WHITE PAPER,
PAPER, supra
supra note 10,
10, at
at 10 (discussing the needs
needs for and
and problems
problems with
with
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intellectual
intellectual property laws may
may be a noninfringing use of the underlying
0
protected work or may be an unauthorized
unauthorized copying; 70
the answer is
is
unlikely to be uniform across national borders. In addition, works that are
globally distributed or accessed internationally
internationally on networks face serious
multimedia
enforcement of legal protection.771 Digital multimedia
impediments to the enforcement
in
works highlight the difficulties of .protecting
.protecting intellectual
intellectual property
property in
or
manipulated, changed,
changed, or
network environments.'
environments. 72 The works can be manipulated,
owner's
retransmitted by the recipient,
recipient, often with little possibility of the owner's
discovery. 3
discovery.73
Finding infringements and enforcing
enforcing rights in distant
locations
easy. Even if these scope and enforcement
enforcement problems were
locations is not easy.
resolved,
resolved, that technological developments
developments outpace the rate of legal change
change
law
poses another particular
particular problem for intellectual
intellectual property
property rights; the law
always lags behind the technology.
2. The Technical
Technical Response.-In
Response.-In this context, technical solutions also
intellectual property rights
become an instrument for the management
management of intellectual
' Technical standards can enable inteland offer some policy solutions.774
lectual property producers
producers to choose the type of protection they want. For
example, technical
technical copy protection can reverse the copyright law's fair use
doctrine. If software is distributed in a copy protected
protected form, the acquirer
will not be able to make backup copies even though the law may permit
permit
identify
European Comm'n, Green Paper
Copyright and
and Related Rights in
identify similar
similar problems.
problems. See European
Paper on Copyright
Information Society, reprinted
COPYRIGHT SOC'y
SOC'Y 53-54 (1995)
European
the Information
reprinted in 43 J. COPYRIGHT
(1995) (arguing that European
intellectual
enhanced and harmonized for the digital environment);
environment); Preparing
Preparing
intellectual property rights need to be enhanced
Canada
FinalReport of the Information
InformationHighway
Council, Ch. 5 (visited
Canada for
for a Digital
Digital World: Final
Highway Advisory Council,
(visited
Sept. 9,1996)
9, 1996) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ihOl643e.html>
< http://strategis.ic.gc.calSSG/ihOI643e.html> (Canadian report) (emphasizing the need
see also
also
to ensure
ensure that intellectual
intellectual property-right
property-right protections
protections continue to be adequate in a digital age); see
Pamela Samuelson, Consequences
Consequences of Differences in Scope of Copyright
International
Copyright Protection on an International
"Information, National
National Policy and the Information Infrastructure,"
Infrastructure," John F.
Scale, Proceedings of "Information,
Kennedy School of Government/Harvard
GovemmentlHarvard Law School
School (Jan.
(Jan. 28-30, 1996),
1996), available
available in
<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/>.
<
http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/> •
70. See Cyberspace
Cyberspace Law Institute,
Institute, Copyright
CopyrightLaw
Internet:The Special
SpecialProblem
Problemof
Caching
lAw on the Internet:
ofCaching
and Copyright
Copyright Protection
Protection (visited Aug. 29,
29, 1997
1997)) <http://www.cli.orglCaching.htnl>
<http://www.cILorg/Caching.html> (arguing that
that
the subtleties should
should distinguish
distinguish protected
protected and nonprotected cache copying).
copying).
71.
WHITE PAPER, supra
10, at 130-55 (articulating
policymakers
71. See WHITE
supra note 10,
(articulating the challenges
challenges facing policymakers
as they attempt to
to protect intellectual
electronically over
intellectual property
property rights in materials that are distributed electronically
international
iuternational networks).
networks).
generally the excellent
contained in
72. For an overview of the problem,
problem, see generally
excellent collection of papers contained
THE FUTURE
IN ADIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
ed., 1996)
1996) (discussiug
(discussing
FuTURE OF COPYRIGHT
COPYRIGHT IN
ENVIRONMENT ( P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed.,
the applicability
applicability of copyright
copyright regimes to information
information on the Internet).
Internet).
73. Netscape 3.01,
3.01, for example,
example, allows a user to save anomer
another person's
person's web page-including
images-and then manipulate or modify
modify bom
both the text and image in an editor mode.
images-and
mode. See Navigator Gold
Authoring
1997)
<http://home.netscape.com/eng/
Authoring Guide
Guide (visited Nov.
Nov. 15,
15, 1997)
<
http://home.netscape.com/eng/
mozilla/3.0/handbook/authoring/navgold.htm>
supranote 10,
10, at
985 (discussing copyright
moziIIal3.0Ihandbooklauthoring/navgold.htm>;;cf.
if. Cohen, supra
at985
copyright
owners'
unauthorized reproduction
reproduction by developing copyright management
management systems
systems that
that
owners' desire to prevent unauthorized
track manipulations
digital works).
manipUlations of digital
74. See, e.g.,
Is in the Machine,
Machine Is
Machine, in THE FuTURE
FUTURE OF
OF
e.g., Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine
COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL
ENVIRONMENT 139, 143-44
COPYRIGHT
DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
143-44 (1996)
(1996) (discussing technical protections as a
means to control the use of electronic
electronic
documents).
documents).
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it."
it.7S5 The technology prevents the acquirer of the software to make
duplications by establishing a read-only format; the law, in contrast, may
have adopted a default rule permitting certain
certain copying.7766 Technical
mechanisms will also allow information policies such as web file caching
mechanisms
negotiable.'77 Web caching occurs when world wide web pages
to become negotiable.
on remote servers that are visited by users are copied into the user's local
Microsoft Explorer or
or
memory. Internet
Internet sites or browser software, like Microsoft
Netscape Navigator, typically perform web caching for quick and easy
manipulation.778
" The provider of the original web page
repeat access
access or manipulation.
does not presently participate in the caching
visitor's system
caching decisions;
decisions; the visitor'S
Technical architectures
determines when to save a copy in a cache. Technical
architectures such
as labelling and the interposition of middleware, however, can offer
offer
capabilities for web
web sites to refuse remote system caching. 799 Labelling
web pages in the transmission protocol can allow web-page
web-page developers to
s° Proxies or
express
Proxies
interexpress their rules for dissemination of the page. 80
mediaries that sit between
the
transmission
between
and the user's system
system could then
read the affixed labels and either
access
either allow the caching
caching or require that access
to the page pass through a secure
secure viewing mechanism that does not permit
permit
information."81 These
capabilities allow for selfThese capabilities
transfers of accessed information.
enforcement of the choices desired by owners of intellectual property.
enforcement
Copy protection also employs self-executing protection
protection analogous to the
intermediary option for the customization
customization of file caching.
proxy or intermediary

(allowing copying ofa copyrighted
computerprogram
forarchival
75. See 17 U.S.C.
U .s.c. § 117 (1994)
(l994)(allowing
copyrighted computer
program for
archival
purposes).
Surprisingly, the United States govermnent
government has argued for criminal
purposes). Surprisingly,
criminal penalties
penalties against those
trying to circumvent
circumvent technical protections
protections that might discourage even lawful copying. See WHrrE
WHITE
PAPER,
defeat
PAPER, supra note 10,
10, at 230 (recommending
(recormnending that the Copyright Act prohibit mechanisms that defeat
technical
Professor
technical protections
protections even if such circumvention might constitute permissible "fair use").
use"). Professor
Cohen has argued persuasively,
persuasively, however,
however, that legal mechanisms criminalizing
criminalizing tampering
tampering with technical
protections
individual from viewing information
protections may be unconstitutional if applied to prevent an individual
anonymously.
supra note 10,
10, at 1019-31.
1019-31. Nevertheless,
restriction
anonymously. See Cohen,
Cohen, supra
Nevertheless, such a constitutional
constitutional restriction
would only shorten the time window for commercial exploitation
exploitation because the electronic
electronic lock is bound
to be picked,
eventually rendering
picked, eventually
rendering the information insecure.
76. See,
See, e.g.,
Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
(holding
e.g., Sega Enterprises,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a defendant's
defendant's copying of
of the plaintiff's software
software with the mere purpose of studying
studying the functional
requirements of compatibility was a "legitimate,
"legitimate, nonexploitive
requirements
nonexploitive purpose" that did not violate
violate the
copyright laws).
laws).
77. See generally Rohit Khare
& Joseph Reagle,
Reagle, Rights Management,
Detection, and
andAccess
Khare &
Management, Copy Detection,
Access
Control (Proceedings
of NRC/CSTB/Information Systems Trustworthiness Project) (visited Sept. 21,
21,
(Proceedings ofNRC/CSTBlInformation
1997)
<http://www.w3.org/IPR/work/NRC-vl.htm
ofmeta-data
1997) <
http://www.w3.org/IPRlworklNRC-vl.htm > (describing the possibility of
meta-data formats
negotiation).
that would allow intellectual-property-rights
intellectual-property-rights negotiation).
example, Netscape
78.
Netscape Navigator 3.01
3.01 typically
typically stores web pages from visited sites
sites in the
78. For example,
Netscape
Netscape directory within a subdirectory named "cache."
"cache." The size
size of
of the cache
cache file may be specified
specified
by the user
Caching Work
user through
through network
network preferences in the options menu.
menu. See How Does Document Caching
in Netscape Navigator?
(last modified May 24, 1996) <http://help.netscape.comlkb/clientl
<http://help.netscape.com/kb/clientl
Navigator? (last
960514-44.html
>.•
960514-44.html>
Reagle, supra
supra note 77, §§
2.1.1, 2.3.2.
79. See Khare &
& Reagle,
§§ 2.1.1,
2.3.2.
80. See id.
id. §§ 2.1.2,
2.3.1.
2.1.2, 2.3.1.
HeinOnline -- 76 Tex. L. Rev. 567 1997-1998
81. See id.
id.§§ 2.3.2.
81.
2.3.2.

568

Texas Law Review
Review

[Vol. 76:553

network-based enforcement
enforcement of
Similarly, technical solutions can enable network-based
other intellectual property
property rights. Technical systems
systems can automate permisworks.' Secure viewers may be
sions and payment
payment for use of protected
protected works.82
implemented
to
assure
that
an
owner's
choice of restrictions
restrictions are selfimplemented
executing.' 83 Alternatively, trusted systems may be used to enforce
executing.
enforce a
property
of
property owner's rules on a computer
computer that is outside the actual control of
intermediary between
the property owner.'
owner.84 The trusted system acts as an intermediary
the property
property owner and user to assure that conditions
conditions for use and access are
8S
respected.'
In
effect,
technology
provides
network-based instruments
effect, technology
respected.
that enable
enable owners to manage intellectual
intellectual property in ways that legal
regulation
regulation finds problematic.
problematic.
Ill. Network Technology as a Distinct Source of Information
III.
Information Flow
Rule-Making:
Distinguishing
Lex
Informatica
from
Legal Rules
Rule-Making:
The technical responses
responses and solutions
solutions to policy
policy conflicts
confiicts show new
ways to establish
establish information flow rules. Policymakers typically, though,
associate rule-making with the elaboration
through the political
political proelaboration of law through
cess within and among
among states. Rules established in this fashion form a
legal regulatory regime. In the context
context of information flows on networks,
the technical solutions begin to illustrate that network
network technology itself
itself
imposes rules for the access
access to and use of information. Technological
architectures may prohibit certain actions on the network, such as access
access
without security clearances,
clearances, or may impose certain
certain flows, such as mandatory address routing data for electronic messages. Technology may also
offer policymakers
policymakers a choice
configuration
choice of information flow rules through configuration
impositions on information
decisions. In effect,
effect, this set of impositions
information flows through
technological defaults and system
technological
system configurations
configurations offers two types of substantive rules: immutable policies embedded
embedded in the technology
technology standards
standards
that cannot be altered
altered and flexible policies
policies embedded in the technical
technical
architecture
Informatica has
architecture that allow variations
variations on default settings. Lex Informatica
a number of distinguishing features that are analogous to a legal regulatory
regulatory

82.
example, beginning to use an on-line clearing system
82. The Copyright
Copyright Clearance
Clearance Center is,
is, for example,
system
for granting permissions for the use of copyrighted works and for collecting royalty payment. See,
e.g., CCCStatementofMission(visited
http://www.copyright.com/cccframes.html >.
CCCStatement oJMission (visited Oct. 7,1997)
7,1997) <
<http://www.copyright.comfcccJrames.html>.
Legal mechanisms
mechanisms for tracking
tracking access to on-line
on-line works may, however, pose significant
significant constitutional
constitutional
hurdles. See Cohen, supra
10, at 1024-30
1024-30 (discussing how the government's
government's interest
supra note 10,
interest in
antitampering mechanisms
mechanisms may violate the First Amendment).
83. A secure viewer acts as a sort of "embassy on the Net."
Net." It enables "extraterritorial"
83.
"extraterritorial"
access restrictions. Data is distributed
enforcement of a data provider's
provider's access
distributed encrypted and can only be
accessed
accessed or managed
managed through the secure
secure viewer
viewer controlled by the information
infonnation distributor. This is
"trusted system."
system." See generally
supra note 67 (explaining the technologies of
of
generally Stefik, supra
known as a "trusted
secure access and trusted systems).
systems).
84. See id. at 81.
81.
85.
example, a file downloaded in Adobe PDF fonnat
format and rcad
read using Acroread.exe
cannot
85. For example,
Acroread.exe cannot
be printed.
the
user permissions.
printed. Folio Views software
software
similarly allows
the L.
owner
specify
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an Informaregime and support its role as an important system of rules for an
Society. In
In essence, policy choices are available either through
tion Society.
technology itself, through laws that cause technology to exclude possible
options, or through laws
laws that cause users to restrict certain actions.
actions.'86
flow rules
Specific information policy technologies that set information fiow
significance of Lex Informatica
Informatica as a parallel rule system.
show the significance
A. Features
Featuresof Lex
Informatica
Lex Informatica
1-Rule Regimes
Table I-Rule

I

Framework
Framework

I

Legal Regulation
Regulation
Law
Law

JI

Lex Informatica
Architecture
Architecture
standards
standards

Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction

Physical
Physical Territory
Territory

Network
Network

Content

Statutory/Court
Statutory/Court
Expression
Expression

Technical
Technical
Capabilities

I

Customary Practice
Practice
Source

State

Technologists

Customized
Customized Rules

Contract
Contract

Configuration
Configuration

Customization
Process

Low Cost

Off-the-shelf
Off-the-shelf
configuration
configuration

Moderate
Moderate cost
cost
standard
standard form

Installable
Insta1lable
configuration
configuration

High cost negotiation
negotiation
User choice
choice
Primary
Primary Enforcement
Enforcement

Court
Court

Automated,
Automated, Selfexecution
execution

As illustrated
illustrated in Table 1, Lex Informatica
Informatica has analogs for the
the key
elements
elements of a legal regime.
regime. The basic building
building block
block or framework for
for

86.
86. Professor
Professor Lessig
Lessig has
has argued
argued aa similar
similar point
point from
from the perspective
perspective of
of interpreting
interpreting the
the United
United
States
States Constitution
Constitution for cyberspace.
cyberspace. See
Se~ Lessig,
Lessig, supra
supra note
note 5,
5, at 871
871 (discussing
(discussing the
the traditional
traditional legal
legal
HeinOnline
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law. For Lex Informatica,
legal regulation
regulation is law.
Informatica, architectural
architectural standards are
an analogous
standards such as
analogous set of building blocks. Architectural
Architectural standards
HTTP 7 define the basic structure
HTTp87
structure and defaults of information flows on
on
a communications
communications network. Jurisdictionally, the legal regime and Lex
Informatica
Informatica provide overlapping
overlapping rule systems.
systems. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction for legal
regulation
regulation is primarily based on territory. Legal rules apply only in a well88 In contrast, the
defined place where the sovereign
sovereign can exert its power.88
jurisdictional
jurisdictional lines for Lex Informatica
Informatica do not depend on territorial borders.
Instead, the jurisdiction
of
Lex
Informatica is the network itself because the
jurisdiction
default rules apply to information
network spheres
spheres rather than
information flows in network
physical places.
places. Legal rules, consequently, can apply to each
each constituent part of the network that is located in a particular
particular physical
jurisdiction.
jurisdiction.
The substantive content of the rules in a legal regime derives
from statutory language, government
government interpretation,
interpretation, and court decisions.
Lex Informatica
Informatica also contains substantive
substantive content defined through
through technical capabilities
capabilities and customary
for
customary practices.
practices. For example, the protocol
protocol for
sending
SMTP,'9 sets a substantive
substantive policy default rule for
for
sending electronic
electronic mail, SMTP,89
the circulation of identifying information
information which is an immutable rule of
of
communications
transmission.
The
standard
message
format
contains
a
communications
required data fleld
field labelled
"FROM"
to
labelled "FROM"
identify the sender, and the cuscustomary practice of electronic mail servers establishes that the data in the
9
0
message. 90
the message.
sending the
person sending
actual person
"FROM"
"FROM" field pertains to the actual
Similarly, digital telecommunications
telecommunications signaling capabilities establish
establish a
default policy rule for the circulation of caller information. 991 This
rule allows flexibility and customization
customization of the information flow.
Compared to earlier analog switches, digital signaling provides more
options for the stream of transaction information. With digital signaling,
signaling,
call identification
blocked, and unidentiidentiflcation information may be transmitted or blocked,
fied calls
calls may be rejected by recipients. Actual
Actual practices
practices give great control
to network users.92
users.' Thus, these technological
technological capabilities
capabilities and practices
set default rules for the circulation of all information.

87. HTTP is an acronym for "Hypertext
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol,"
87.
Protocol,» which is the transmission
transmission structure
for exchanging
exchanging information on the World Wide Web. See RICHARD W. WIGGINS,
WIGGINS, THE INTERNET
INTERNEf FOR
EVERYONE
(1995).
EVERYONE 268 (1995).
(1987).
88. See RESATEMENT
REsrATEMENT (THIRD)
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
89.
"Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol." See JOHN R. LEVINE &
89. SMTP
SMTP is an acronym for the "Simple
Transfer Protocol.»
&
CAROL BAROUDI,
BAROUDI, THE INTERNEf
INTERNET FOR DUMMIES
DUMMIES 69 (1993).
(1993).

90. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, anonymous or forged senders are also technically possible
possible and illustrate the case
case
of a deviation from the customary
customary default expectation.
expectation. This immutable rule
rule may thus be bypassed with
the customization
customization of information
information policy for the particular message.
91. See Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, Rules o/the
of the Road,
Road, supra
91.
supra note 5, at 300 n.53.
n.53.
92. See Glen Chatmas Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It
It Constitutional
ConstitutionalTo Give It
It Out?):
Out?):
CallerIdentification
and the Right to Informational
145, 149
Privacy, 37 UCLA
149
Caller
Identification Technology and
Informational Privacy,
UCLA L. REV.
REv. 145,
(1989)
and services
available).
(1989) (describing the technology
technology
services
available).
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The source of default rules for a legal regime is typically the state.
The political-governance
political-governance process ordinarily establishes the substantive law
law
default
of the land. For Lex Informatica, however, the primary source of default
rule-making is the technology developer and the social process by which
customary
customary uses evolve. 933 Technologists design the basic infrastructure
features that create
create and implement information policy defaults. Although
states may infiuence
influence the decisions
decisions made by technologists through legal
restraints on policy choices,94
choices,' the technologists otherwise
"enact" or make
otherwise "enact"
interpretations through
the technical
technical standards, and the users adopt precise interpretations
practices.
practices.
In the legal regulatory regime, private contractual
contractual arrangements can
be used both to deviate from the law's default rules and to customize the
95
Such deviations
deviations are only available if
relationship between the parties. 95
the law permits freedom of contract and does not preclude the participants'
participants'
actions; circumstances exist in which the law may not permit
customization.
example, public policy
policy generally rejects contractual
customization.996 For example,
waivers of liability for intentional or reckless harms inflicted
others.'97
infiicted on others.
customization of rules and
Like a legal regime, Lex Informatica offers both customization
inalienable
inalienable rules. Customization
Customization for Lex Informatica
Informatica occurs
occurs through
through technological configurations. For example,
example, Internet browsers
browsers such as Netscape
9
This protoprotocontain log files that record the user's web traffic patterns. 98
col establishes a default rule for the collection of personal
data
that
a user
personal
99
can override by altering file attributes or by disabling the log feature. 99
As with legal regulation,
regulation, these customizations
customizations through reconfigurations
reconfigurations are
only possible
architectural standards
standards support the deviations. In the
possible if the architectural

93.
93. See
See Lessig,
Lessig, supra
supra note 5,
5, at 897
897 ("With
("With respect to the architecture
architecture of
of cyberspace,
cyberspace, and the
worlds itit allows,
God.").
allows, we are God.
").
94. See
See infra
infra section V(B)(2).
94.
95. See
See Ian
Ayres &
& Robert
Theory
95.
Ian Ayres
Roben Gertner, Filling
Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Incomplete Contracts:
Contracts: An
An Economic Theory
ofDefault
99 YALE
87 (1989)
of Default Rules,
Rules, 99
YALE L.J.
L.J. 87,
87, 87
(1989) (observing
(observing that parties
parties are sometimes
sometimes free to contract
contract
around
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Contractual
around the
the default
default rules);
rules); Randy
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence:
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV.
824 (1992)
REv. 821,
821,824
(1992) (analogizing
(analogizing default rules
rules to word-processing
word-processing programs
programs that
that
Consent,
set
the absence
absence of
of the user
user expressly
expressly changing
changing the
the setting).
setting).
set margins
margins in the
96.
1990) (providing
96. See E.
E. ALAN
ALAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
CONTRACfS §§ 5.2,
5.2, at 353 (2d
(2d ed. 1990)
(providing examples
examples of
of
agreements
agreements that
that courts
courts will not enforce
enforce because
because they
they contravene
contravene public
public policy).
policy).
97.
97. See id.
98.
ClientStateHTTP
98. See Netscape
Netscape Communications
Communications Corp.,
Corp., Persistent
Persistent Client
HTTP Cookies (visited Aug.
Aug. 29,
1997
thatcookiescanbeused
1997)) <
< http://home.netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie._spec.html
http://home.netscape.com!newsref/std!cookie_spec.html >
> (explaining
(explainingthatcookiescanbeused
to
to store
store information
infonnation about
about aa user
user on
on the
the user's
user's computer,
computer, which
which isis then accessed
accessed by the
the server
server visited
visited
on subsequent
on
subsequent visits).
visits).
99.
The data
storage files
attributed "Read-only"
99. The
data storage
files may
may be
be attributed
"Read-only" status,
status, which prevents
prevents the Netscape
Netscape from
recording the
For example,
example, a user
user of
of Windows
Windows 95 may do this using
recording
the information
infonnation on
on the
the hard
hard drive.
drive. For
the
Explorer Software
Menu, Properties
the Windows
Windows Explorer
Software packaged
packaged with
with Windows
Windows 95.
95. At the
the File Menu,
Properties Sub-menu,
Sub-menu,
General
Selection, the user may
General Tab,
Tab, and
and Attributes
Attributes Selection,
may impose
impose "Read-only"
"Read-only" attributes on
on the
the selected
selected file.
Netscape
3.0 offers
offers users the option
option to disable the log file,
file, but
but neither
neither informs
infonns of
of nor
nor explains
explains
Netscape Version
Version 3.0
the
of "cookies"
"cookies" tracking.
tracking.
the existence
existence of
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case of log files for Internet use, reconfigurations
reconfigurations can only be effective if
if
the logging feature is designed to collect
collect and store the data on a user's
local
collected and stored directly by the
local disk drive. If the information is collected
Internet
Internet service provider, the user will not have the capability to override
the default rule. Lex Informatica can thus have substantive
substantive inalienable
inalienable
rules as a result of architectural
architectural decisions.
The customization process shows a number of significant differences
customization
between the legal regime and Lex Informatica.
Informatica. Law allows customization
either through high cost, individualized
individualized contract negotiations,
negotiations, or through
100
the moderate-cost
standardized forms. lOO
Lex Informatica offers
moderate-cost use of standardized
a wider range of options. Off-the-shelf
Off-the-shelf configurations, like those contained
in software packages
packages bundled
bundled with equipment, are a relatively low-cost
low-cost
10 1 Manufacturers
customization
configurations
customization of rules. 101
Manufacturers determine these configurations
or customizations, such as the routine packaging of Windows 95 with
Texas Instrument laptop computers.
computers."I02z User installable
installable configurations,
such as printer fonts, are a slightly more expensive
expensive method of
13
I03
customization.
Users must invest time and effort for the selection and
customization.
installation of the configuration,
configuration, but these are nevertheless
nevertheless available. And,
analogous to the costly negotiation process for contractual arrangements,
arrangements,
configurations to achieve
achieve rule customization.
customization.
users may individually select configurations
For example, users may deviate from the default configuration by selecting
customized color schemes
schemes for the appearance
appearance of the Windows operating
104
system. 104
Finally, Lex Informatica
Informatica has distinct enforcement properties.
properties. Legal
regulation
enforcement.
regulation depends primarily
primarily on judicial
judicial authorities for rule enforcement.
Rule violations are pursued on an ex
ey post basis before the courts.,
courts. lOS5
Lex Informatica, however, allows for automated and self-executing
self-executing rule
°
enforcement."
Technological
Technological standards may be designed
designed to prevent
prevent
enforcement. I06
actions from taking place without the proper permissions
permissions or authority. 1077

100. See,
See, e.g., Ayres &
supra note 95,
& Gertner, supra
95, at 90-92.
90-92.
101.
pre-programmed set of
example, the Internet Wizard on Windows 95 contains
contains a pre-programmed
of
101. For example,
configurations
configurations for the use of Internet Explorer
Explorer and the MSN
MSN network.
102. For example,
102.
example, the Texas
Texas Instruments Extensa 650CDT sold in December 1996 gave the buyer
buyer
a one-time
one-time choice of a Windows 95 installation or a Windows for Workgroups
Workgroups installation.
installation. See Texas
Instruments,
Information-Extensa 650CDT
650CDT Notebook (visited Mar. 28, 1997)
1997)
Product Information-Extensa
Instruments, Notebook Product
<http://www.ti.com/notebook/docs/ext650t.htm>
<http://www.ti.comlnotebookldocs/ext650t.htm>..
103. These configurations require an investment
103.
investment of time and skill by users.
patterns or to
104. The display options in
in Windows 95 allow users to choose alternate color patterns
custom design their own if they wish to spend the time and effort.
effon.
105. Lawsuits
to enforce
enforce rules
rules ordinarily
ordinarily occur
occur after the
the alleged
alleged violation has taken place.
105.
Lawsuits to
place. See,
e.g., EOW
EDWARD
YoRio, CONTRACT
INJUNCTIONS § 1.2.2,
1.2.2,
ARC YORIO,
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
PERFORMANCE AND
AND lNJUNCfIONS
e.g.,
8-9 (1989).
(1989). Injunctions
expost
Injunctions to prevent
prevent violations ex
ex ante are still enforced by ex
post contempt actions.
at 8·9
Id.
Id. § 4.5.2, at 96.
96.
106. Technology
Technology may, however,
106.
however, prevent an action that violates the rule from occurring
occurring at all.
107. See Lessig, supra
supranote 5,
107.
5, at 896 (noting that software code can control access to information).
infonnation).
HeinOnline -- 76 Tex. L. Rev. 572 1997-1998

1998]

Lex Informatica
Informatica

573

For example, PolicyMaker, a cryptographically
cryptographically based trust management
management
PolicyMaker is a language for
for
mechanism, illustrates this attribute. 101088 PolicyMaker
sophisticated trust management
sophisticated
management that can certify permissions for both users
°
PolicyMaker will block the execution
if
PolicyMaker
execution of transactions
transactions if
and actions."
actions. I09
PolicyMaker checks
credentials are not appropriately verified. PolicyMaker
checks the authenticity of a cryptographic
cryptographic key (usually that of a particular
particular person) and,
before
keyholder
before allowing the transaction to proceed, verifies that the keyholder
meets a set of criteria required for the transaction. 1100 For instance,
PolicyMaker
password for an electronic paypayPolicyMaker can check the validity of a password
ment order and verify that the password is held by a corporate
corporate officer
officer
entitled
orders."'
If either
entitled to issue such payment orders.
III
either the password
password is
fraudulent or the holder does not have the rank permitting payment orders,
orders,
PolicyMaker
enforcement is implemented
implemented
ex ante enforcement
PolicyMaker blocks
blocks execution. This cc
automatically
automatically using information processing capabilities.
B.

Setting Information
Information Flow Rules with Technology

2-Policy Rules and Technologies
Table 2-Policy
Information
Information
Flows

Default

Customization

Policy
Technology
Technology

Content
Transmission
Transmission

Public

Private

Cryptography

Identified
Identified

Anonymous

Remailers

Payment
Payment
Transaction
Transaction

Identified
Identified

Anonymous
Anonymous

E-cash
E-cash

Web Surfing
Surfing

Anonymous
Anonymous

Identified

Browser
Web Browser

Identified

Anonymous
Anonymous

Masking Sites

Unrestricted
Unrestricted

Pre-screened
Pre-screened

PICS Label
Filters

Information
Distribution

Trust Management,
108. See Matt Blaze et al.,
aI., Decentralized
Decentralized Trust
Management, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND
1996).
AND PRIVACY
PRIVACY (Oakland, Cal.)
Cal.) (May
(May 1996).
109. See id.
id.
110. See id.
111. PolicyMaker,
111.
PolicyMaker, in this example,
example, would authenticate the password
password of the
the corporate
corporate officer and
verify that the officer was
verifY
was authorized to issue aa payment order for the amount
amount required
required by the
the

transaction.
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As demonstrated
demonstrated in Table 2, technologies
technologies designed
designed expressly for
for
information policy
policy already exist and demonstrate the capabilities
capabilities and
existence of flexible as well as immutable
immutable substantive
substantive rule features of Lex
Informatica.
Technologists have specifically designed "privacy
"privacy enhancing
Informatica. Technologists
'2
technologies""
technologies"l12
to customized particular
particular information flow rules. In
addition, new policy technologies
technologies are under development or are available
available
to facilitate the customized
customized management
management of information rights in the face
of existing technological
technological default rules.
Privacy-enhancing technologies
Privacy-enhancing
technologies focus on the preservation
preservation of confidentiality in the transmission of messages.
messages. Many networks, like the Internet,
have architectural
architectural designs and standards that implement the default rule of
open information
information access. Public key cryptography
cryptography is a classic example
example of
of
a privacy-enhancing
privacy-enhancing technology. This technology allows the contents of
of
.*information
information to be secured against unauthorized
unauthorized access."'
access. 113 Because most
network architectural designs do not preclude
preclude cryptography, network
participants
can
use
it
to
engage
in
private
communications. Cryptographic
participants
communications.
Cryptographic
choices override the default rule of public disclosure and form a customized rule for the particular users. This customized
customized system configuration
configuration
may be accomplished
off-the-shelf products such as PGP and RSA or
accomplished by off-the-shelf
by user-created mechanisms."
mechanisms. 1144 In any case, once the user chooses
chooses to
encrypt information, the privacy protection applies throughout the network
and is self-executing-ordinarily,
self-executing-ordinarily, only recipients with the'
proper keys will
the'proper
5
have access.
access."liS
Technologies
Technologies of anonymity also exist to establish
establish network privacy
rules for message transmission, electronic
electronic transactions, and Internet web
surfing."1166 Where
Where network architecture
architecture and technical
technical capabilities set the
surfing.
identification of users as a default mandatory transmission rule, participants
participants
may nevertheless
nevertheless desire to interact anonymously. Network architecture
architecture
allows technologies
technologies of anonymity to override the standard practice of
of
linking particular senders to messages
messages and thus allows flexibility within the
substantive rules governing information
information flows. For example, electronic
substantive
electronic
112. This terminology has been
agencies. See INFORMATION
112.
been adopted by several government
government agencies.
INFORMATION AND
AND
PRIVACY
ONTARIO, CANADA
& REGISfRATlEKAMER,
REGISrRATIEKAMER, THE
PRIVACY COMMISSIONER,
COMMISSIONER, ONTARIO,
CANADA &
THE NETHERLANDS
NETHERLANDS PRIVACYPRIVACYENHANCING
TECHNOLOGIES: THE
THE PATH TO ANONYMITY
ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES:
ANONYMITY (1995).
(1995).
113.
CONGRESS, INFORMATION SECURITY
SECURITY AND
PRIVACY
113. See OFFICE OF TECH.
TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S.
U.s. CONGRESS,
AND PRIVACY
IN
ENVIRONMENTS 113 (1994)
SECURITY AND
IN NETWORK
NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS
(1994) [hereinafter INFORMATION
INFORMATION SECURITY
AND PRIVACY].
PRIVACY]. Public
Public
Key cryptography,
cryptography, or asyrnmetric
asymmetric cryptosystems,
cryptosystems, involves two keys: the first to encrypt and a second
second
related
related key to decrypt. The first of the two keys is publicly distributed, but the second remains private
and
assures that
that only
id. at 38-39.
and assures
only the keyholder can decrypt. See id.
id. at 39. Users
114. See id.
Users may also define their own cryptographic
cryptographic algorithm such
such as a simple
code name
name to
to replace
replace an actual identity or a complicated
code
complicated mathematical
mathematical formula to cipher text. These
may be more expensive
expensive than existing products.
115. This
is not
to say
say that
that cryptography
cryptography is
is fail-safe.
the encryption
encryption algorithm is weak or if the
If the
115.
This is
not to
fail-safe. If
keys
not safely
safely stored,
stored, unauthorized
unauthorized access
access to
to the information
information may
may still take place.
keys are
are not
place.
116.
generally Froomkin, supra
supra note 47.
116. See generally
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mail messages
messages may be routed through anonymous remailers to mask the
sender, 1 7 electronic payment transactions
transactions may
identity of the message sender,117
similarly be structured to anonymize
anonymize the payor,"
payor,11s8 and even anonymous
similarly
credit cards can be created
created through communications
communications networking
techniques."1199 These configurations
techniques.
configurations offer customized rules which deviate
norm. Like confidentiality technologies,
from the network nonn.
technologies, those of anonymity may be used from off-the-shelf configurations
configurations or from more elabocertain
example, Internet surfers
surfers have a certain
rately designed arrangements.
arrangements. For example,
"off-the-shelf' anonymity when they visit web sites because
because only
degree of "off-the-shelf'
the Server
Server Internet Protocol address"
address l20 is revealed to the site hosting the
web page, not the individual user's name.'
name. 121 This level of anonymity is,
nevertheless,
often
by-passed
by
browsers
that are configured to reveal user
nevertheless,
l22
identities.'
Alternatively, web surfers may choose to surf through
identities.
several
anonymity.T I One
several layers
layers of anonymizing sites to assure greater anonymity.l23
of the Lex Informatica
Infonnatica features of these technologies of anonymity is
occur
that they operate
operate throughout the network. Anonymization
Anonymization may occur
automatically, providing ex ante enforcement.
enforcement.
The development
distribution
development of "policy technologies"
technologies» for information
infonnation distribution
also illustrates the rule-making
rule-making features of Lex Informatica.
Infonnatica. These
These technologies create network-based
network-based rules which enhance
enhance the access,
access, distribution,
architecture of the Internet, for
infonnation. The basic architecture
and use of information.
example, embodies
information distribution.
example,
embodies the default rule of unrestricted infonnation
4
l24
pre-screening or
or
The PICS technical
technical standard creates a mechanism for pre-screening
modifying the default rule. The Internet
Internet architecture allows rating terms
and rating labels based on the PICS fonnat
format to be included in data

Remaiter FAQ
1995)
117. See Andre Bacard,
Bacard, Anonymous Remailer
FAQ (last
(last modified Mar. 27,
27, 1995)
<http://www.paranoia.comdrugs/kef/remailer-faq.htmi>
;see also Ralph Levien,
Levien, Remailer
RemailerList (last
(last
<http://www.paranoia.com/drugs/kef/remailer-faq.html>;seealso
modified Oct. 23, 1997)
1997) <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/-raphlremailer-Iist.html>
<http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/-raphremailer-list.html> (listing of
of
A similar technique
surfing. See Your
anonymous re-mailers).
re-mailers).Asimilar
technique may be used for anonymous web surfmg.
Your
Anonymized
Starts Here
Here (visited Oct. 28, 1997)
1997) <http://www.anonymizer.com/open.html>.
<http://www.anonymizer.com/open.html>.
Anonymized Surf Starts
118.
41.
118. See Froomkin,
Froomkin, supra
supra note 47, at 141.
119.
See, e.g., Steven
& Nicholas
Maxemchuk, Anonymaus
Anonymous Credit
Credit Cards,
Cards, in
119. See,
Steven H. Low &
Nicholas F. Maxemchuk,
PROCEEDINGS
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND ACM CONFERENCE ON
ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS
(Fairfax,
(Nov. 2-4, 1994).
(Fairfax, Va.)
Va.) (Nov.
120.
(IP) address is a numeric address
120. The Internet
Internet Protocol (IP)
address that identifies the message server
server
rather
rather than the individual user. IP addresses may also be assigned domain names such as
"law.fordham.edu" for easy
accessing the Internet
Internet from an Internet
Internet
"Iaw.fordham.edu"
easy user recognition.
recognition. For many users accessing
service provider such as America Online or CompuServe,
CompuServe, the IP address will be different
different each
each time
the user logs onto the Internet. This dynamic IP address provides
provides a further degree of anonymity.
anonymity .
121. There may,
domain name correspouds
corresponds to an
121.
may, however, be instances
instances when an IP address or domain
individual user and thus more completely
completely reveals identity.
individual
ideutity.
122. Netscape Navigator, for example,
example, reveals the user's identity to web sites if the user has
entered the information
information to the Netscape program.
123. Technological
Technological configurations
123.
configurations can also be constructed
constructed to give the benefits of anonymity
anonymity to
users and the value
value of personal
personal information
information to web sites.
sites.
124.
general description
supra section II(A)(2).
ll(A)(2).
124. For a general
description of the PICS technology, see supra
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transmissions throughout the network."as
network. 125
This technical
technical capability
enables individual
individual network participants to set customized
customized rules through
participant may receive, rather
filters for the type of information that each participant
information disseminated
than forcing a unique restriction on the type of information
disseminated
throughout the network; and either "off-the-shelf" customizations
or
customizations or
rule-setting.
intensively designed policies can accomplish this rule-setting.
For
parent-teacher association
example, a parent-teacher
association may distribute computer
computer disks with
preconfigured, or parents may tailor their choice of rating
suggested filters preconfigured,
terms and screening to their children and their family values.126
values. 126
Similarly, the creation and distribution of rating terms and rating
labels for the fair information
information practices
practices of web sites allows users to set
particular practices
practices before
before disclosing personal
filters to warn of particular
z
information."l27
Combining PICS rating terms and rating labels with
information.
software gives users the ability to judge others'
personal
filtering software
others' use of personal
information,
customizing
the
network
default
policy
of
total
web
site
information, customizing
policy
control. In essence, filtering provides assurance
assurance that a user's information
information
1"
policy
The PICS-based examples
policy matches the policy at a remote
remote site. l28
self-executing nature of Lex Informatica. The filteringalso illustrate the self-executing
software
software technology
technology performs
performs the permission check prior to displaying
displaying
content on the user's screen or warns the user of remote-site
remote-site privacy
29
standards in advance of certain information disclosures.1
disclosures. 29

IV. Applying Lex Informatica
Informatica
The substantive norms and flexibility of Lex Informatica
Informatica provide new
and useful public-policy
public-policy tools. Networks challenge traditional legal means
to establish
establish ground rules for information access and use. Global
Global access and
jurisdictional dilemmas and
communications pose extraordinarily
extraordinarily difficult jurisdictional
30
problems.1130
choice of law problems.
Any particular activity
activity may be subject
subject to

125. See FrC
FTC Testimony,
125.
Testimony, supra
supra note 38 (statement
(statement of Paul Resnick, AT&T
AT&T Research).
Research).
126. CyberPatrol,
CyberPatrol, for example,
screening. See Microsystems
Software,
example, offers off-the-shelf
off-the-shelf screening.
Microsystems Software,
Welcome to Cyberpatrol
19, 1997)
1997) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com/>
alsoWeinberg,
Cyberpatrol (visited Sept. 19,
< http://www.cyberpatrol.com!> ;see also
Weinberg,
supra note 24, at 454-55 (noting that, although a common
supra
common language for Internet rating systems makes
it easier to create ratings and therefore easier for parents
parents to block access, there are
are drawbacks).
drawbacks).
established by PICS for content127. Such a label-and-filter
label-and-filter mechanism employs the paradigm established
contentsupra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
access control.
control. See supra
mechanisms, such
independent certification of rating labels, are
128. Additional infrastructure
infrastructure mechanisms,
such as independent
prerequisites
to effective participation
user in actual
information practices.
Reidenberg,
actual information
practices. See Reidenberg,
prerequisites to
participation by the user
supra
supra note 34.
129.
information will be received
129. In the case
case of information
information privacy,
privacy, some transaction information
received by the host
web site in
PICS-based customization. Nonetheless,
in order to implement the PICS-based
Nonetheless, the use of trusted thirdparty sites may be used to assure anonymity
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 34, Part
anonymity of this information.
information. See Reidenberg,

ll.
m.

130. Network
localize, thus challenging concepts of in
130.
Network actors and activities
activities may be difficult
difficult to localize,
generally Burk, supra
supra note 33 (discussing the jurispersonam jurisdiction and applicable law. See generally
dictional problem in the context
context of United States law); David R. Johnson
Johnson & David Post,
Post, Law and
dictional
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varying national legal standards,
standards, and the decentralization
decentralization of networks
creates
opportunities to circumvent national
creates opportunities
national laws and evade state enforceenforcement powers. Alternatively, decentralization
decentralization may impose the most restricharmonization of legal
global activities. At the same time, hannonization
tive laws on all global
information issues.
issues.'131 A
standards is not a realistic
realistic solution
solution for global infonnation
legal regulatory regime
regime lacks an important
important degree of flexibility that the
32
Information Society
By
Informatica has a
By contrast, Lex Infonnatica
Infonnation
Society requires. 132
series of valuable characteristics
characteristics that may flexibly advance
advance information
infonnation
policy goals. The formulation
Informatica rules may,
fonnulation of customized Lex Infonnatica
to an important
important degree, avoid many significant difficulties inherent in legal
solutions, such as conflict
conflict and uncertainty. For example, Lex Informatica
Infonnatica
offers
a
new
means
to
deal
with
the
difficult
problems
that
the
legal
regime
offers
faces with Internet
content
regulation,
Internet
regulation, circulation
circulation and abuse of personal
information,
infonnation, and preservation of intellectual
intellectual property interests on global
networks.

A. Advantages of Lex
A.
Lex Informatica
Informatica
Lex Infonnatica
Informatica has three sets of characteristics
characteristics that are particularly
valuable
information policy
valuable for establishing
establishing infonnation
policy and rule-making in an
Information
Infonnation Society. First, technological
technological rules do not rely on national
33
borders. 133
Second, Lex Infonnatica
Informatica allows easy customization of rules
Second,
with a variety of technical mechanisms."'
technological rules
ruechanisms. 134 Finally, technological
may also benefit from built-in self-enforcement
compliance-monitoring
self-enforcement and compliance-monitoring
capabilities.
capabilities.
1. JurisdictionalAdvantages.-The
Information Society poses impor1.
JurisdictionaIAdvantages.-The Infonnation
Network activities
tant jurisdictional
jurisdictional issues.
activities may take place on a

Borders-The
Law in Cyberspace,
(1996) (distinguishing Cyberspace
Cyberspace
Borders-The Rise of
o/Law
Cyberspace, 48 STAN.
SrAN. L. REV.
REv. 1367 (1996)
regulation from other
geographically based and arguing
arguing that Cyberspace has its
regulation
other areas of law that are geographically
own jurisdiction);
jurisdiction); Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice o/Law
of Law in the American Courts
Courts in 1995: A Year in
Symeonides, Choice
Review,
Review, 44 AM. J. COMP.
COMPo L. 181 (1996)
(1996) (discussing the complexities of court decisions in the choiceof-law area).
131. The Uruguay
GATT negotiations
coordinating
131.
Uruguay Round of GAIT
negotiations illustrated the difficulty of coordinating
international
regulation. See Final Act Embodying
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
international regulation.
15, 1994,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994); Agreement
Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Trade Negotiations,
Negotiations, Apr. 15,
Organization, Apr. 15,
15, 1994,
1994, 33 I.L.M.
I.L.M. 1144
1144 (1994). The negotiations took eight years to complete
Organization,
Similarly, the TRIPS accord, a major
major
and still did not resolve
resolve thorny issues for international services. Similarly,
achievement regarding intellectual
achievement
intellectual property
property that emerged from the Uruguay Round,
Round, does not address
address
property. See Agreement
Agreement on Trade-Related
Trade-Related
key questions
questions of the scope of protection for intellectual property.
1994, Agreement
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Rights, Apr. 15,
15, 1994,
Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Trade
Organization, Annex IC,
(1994).
Organization,
lC, 33
33 I.L.M. 1197
1197 (1994).
132.
132. The Information Society has dynamic and complex
complex characteristics that are at odds with
See, e.g.,
926-30.
standard regulatory
regulatOlY approaches. See,
e.g., Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 2, at 926-30.
133.
133. See Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 2,
2, at 917
917 (suggesting that national borders
borders are being replaced
replaced by
network
network borders).
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transnational
transnational basis. For the legal regime, various
various national
national authorities and
policymakers
make legitimate claims to regulate users and information
may
information
policymakers
35
flows.
However,
the
very
nature
of
network
behavior
makes
these
flows. 135 However, the very nature
claims subject to complex choice of law decisions. States are generally
generally
reluctant to impose their laws on activities taking place
place in foreign
36
jurisdictions. 136
threshold
Consequently, jurisdiction
jurisdiction becomes a critical threshold
to
sensible
information
policymaking.
obstacle
obstacle
information
Informatica is the network itself.
In contrast, the jurisdiction
jurisdiction of Lex Informatica
Technologically implemented rules apply throughout
throughout the relevant network.
Technologically
Informatica reaches across borders and does not face the
As such, Lex Informatica
encounter
same jurisdictional,
jurisdictional, choice of law problem that legal regimes encounter
when networks cross territorial
state
jurisdictional
or
jurisdictional
lines.
Lex
territorial
Informatica faces conflict of rules at the gateways
between
networks.
If
gateways
If
technological
technological standards on both sides of the gateway are interoperable,
information flows can cross the gateway without difficulty. When the
standards
difference
standards are not compatible, the flows will be impeded by the difference
in technical
technical specifications.
specifications. For example, software modules
modules written for one
computer
computer operating system cannot
cannot usually function on another operating
operating
problem forces a
system. However, the legal regime's choice of law problem
selection of one governing
technical rules may be
selection
governing law, while both sets of technical
applicable through the use of translations and conversions. In the example
example
operating systems, software programs exist to translate standards
of operating
computer operating systems.'
This duality feature allows
J37
between computer
systems. 37
flexibility in accommodating
accommodating many information policy rule choices
simultaneously.
Technical rule formulations for information access may also avoid the
risk of liability imposed by conflicting
conflicting legal rules and may offer solutions
for the problem of self-censorship
self-censorship that conflicting
conflicting content regulation
regulation
encourages.
Policy
technologies
offer
substantive
rules
in
Lex
Informatica
encourages.
technologies
Informatica
that shift the issue from censorship, or blocking distribution, to filtering the
38
reception of information. 138
This shift allows different rules to apply to
different recipients.
recipients. Policy decisions about information
information reception
reception can be
power to make
made at various levels. Recipients themselves can have the power

135. The state where access or use occurs,
occurs, the state where processing takes place,
135.
place, or the state
where the server
server is located may all try
tty to claim jurisdiction.
jurisdiction.
136. See, e.g.,
e.g., Update Art, Inc. v.
1988) (stating
136.
v. Modiin Publ'g,
PubI'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67,
67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988)
that United
States copyright
supra note 3, at 1107-32
1107-32
copyright law cannot generally be applied abroad); Burk, supra
United StaLes
(recognizing
dormant Commerce Clause limitations on states'
(recognizing the due process
process and dormant
states' ability to regulate
regulate
activities outside
outside their borders).
Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
137. See ComputerAssocs.
Computer Assocs. Int'),
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing
program in controversy as an "operating
"operating system compatibility
the program
compatibility component"
component" that'translates
thaftranslates between
between
operating systems).
138. See supra
supra section II(A)(2)
138.
II(A)(2) (describing PICS filtering
fIltering technology).
technology).
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39 A
informed
information content. 139
computer
infonned decisions about infonnation
particular computer
may be configured with its own filtering rule. A local area network may
have a network-wide
network-wide policy rule, while an information service provider
may adopt a particular
particular rule system-wide. All ISPs in a given country may
even have the same filter policy. This flexibility
fiexibility and emphasis on receprecepunnecessary for global distribution of
of
tion means that a unique rule is unnecessary
information because distributors
contravene the
infonnation
distributors in one jurisdiction
jurisdiction need not contravene
norms of another jurisdiction.
jurisdiction.

Advantages.-Flexibility and customization
2. Customization
Customization Advantages.-Flexibility
customization of
of
information policy
Because
infonnation
policy are critical for an Information
Infonnation Society. Because
activities
activities conducted on global networks may be transnational,
transnational, network
participants need certainty
relationships
participants
certainty in the rules applicable to their relationships
accommodate potentially
and need to accommodate
potentially varying national laws. Legal regimes
typically allow for these objectives to be met through freedom of
of
" However, freedom of contract
contract is neither absolute nor always
contract. 14O
network issues. Public-order
Public-order rights may not
an efficient
efficient means to deal with network
4' and the negotiation
be waivable,'
waivable,141
negotiation process for developing an appropriate
international contract
international
contract will either
either be complex or unlikely to give any choice
to individual participants.
participants. 42
142
Lex Informatica
Infonnatica allows customized
customized rules to suit particular network
network
situations and preserve choices
choices for individual participants.143
participants. 143 Lex
Informatica
customization through the
Infonnatica can provide for this flexibility and customization
configurations that may tailor rules
adoption of technological standards and configurations
to the precise
empower individual participants
participants
precise circumstances
circumstances or that may empower
to make their own decisions. System-wide
System-wide configurations may be specified
to follow different rules in different national jurisdictions. For example,
automatic data purges may be set for European data to comply with data

supra section n(A)(2).
II(A)(2).
139. See supra
140. See FARNSWORTII,
FARNSWORTH, supra
1.7, at 20-24 (discussing freedom of contract
140.
supra note 96, § 1.7,
contract as a
historical
promoting economic
economic activity in the United States).
States).
historical way of promoting
141.
5.1, at 345-50 (listing
141. See id. § 5.1,
(listing reasons why courts will sometimes refuse to enforce contracts
contracts
based on public
public policy grounds).
142.
142. On-line service
service provider contracts, for example,
example, are presented to users on a take-it or leave-it
leave-it
basis. As providers adopt standardized contracts
fewer
contracts for transnational
transnational services, users will encounter
encounter fewer
choices
"freedom to contract."
Lemley, Shrinkwraps
Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS
choices in their "freedom
contract." Mark A. Lemley,
Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace,
JURIMETRICS
J. 311,
311, 321 (1995)
(1995) (noting
(noting that uniform contracts for on-line services would not allow
allow bargaining).
143. Arguably,
by pressures
143.
Arguably, this
this advantage
advantage may be mitigated by
pressures for product standardization
standardization that
would reduce the desirability of extensive choices. See,
and the
See. e.g., Mark A. Lemley,
Lemley, Antitrust
Antitrust and
Internet
StandardizationProblem,
CONN. L. REv.
1041, 1043-54 (1996) (suggesting that network
Internet Standardization
Problem, 28 CONN.
REv. 1041,
externalities, the advantages of compatibility,
commitments all push the Internet toward
compatibility, and resource
resource commitments
externalities.
standardization). However,
Lex Informatica
Informatica customization
does not
refute product
product standardization.
standardization.
standardization).
However, Lex
customization does
not refute
Lex Informatica customization
customization only requires that the underlying base standard
standard not preclude
preclude configuration choices.
configurations that
tion
choices. The desirable
desirable product
product standardization
standardization would take the form of default configurations
might nevertheless be modified.
modified.
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l44
privacy laws
laws"'
but not set in parts of the network where laws
laws do not
not
require it. Alternatively, technological
technological choices may be made to give
individuals
content
individuals various configuration
configuration options such as PICS-based
PICS-based content
screening."s
technological standards may be used to customscreening. 145 Similarly, technological
ize rules for transnetwork differences.
differences. Protocols exist,
exist, for example,
example, to
connect
on-line
service
providers
such
as
America
Online
(AOL)
to the
connect
l46
Internet."
At the same time, technical
Internet.
technical choices may be developed to
accommodate differences
differences in network and national information
accommodate
information policy rules.
If rules for content evolve differently
differently in various states, users may receive
47
differentiated access."
Lex Informatica
Informatica offers a panoply
panoply of opportunidifferentiated
access. 147
ties in configuration
configuration choice and frequently allows users to override standard
standard
configurations.
system configurations.
Informatica is also distinct from legal regulation because
Lex Informatica
because
its mechanisms
mechanisms may implement customizations
customizations with minimal effort.
Technological
"filters," for example, assure
Technological "filters,"
assure that a particular rule is applied
to information wherever
the
information
wherever
goes. Security filters are a
paradigmatic illustration
paradigmatic
illustration such as the use of passwords
passwords to access data no
matter where the user or data are located. Similarly, technological
"translators" provide a significant
significant mechanism
"translators"
mechanism to facilitate customization.
Translation converts either a rule or a data set from one system to another
Translation
for execution.
execution. For example,
example, one set of PICS content rating labels may be
translated
Other translation
translated into another group's rating scheme."
scheme. l48
mechanisms
anonymization of data,
mechanisms include anonymization
data, use of an anonymous remailer,
or encryption-decryption
encryption-decryption operations.
operations.

3. Enforcement Advantages.-For
enforcement
Advantages.-For the legal regime,
regime, the enforcement
capability
of
rights-holders
or
states
is
a
serious
issue. Legal regulation
regulation
capability
relies on ex post actions against rule violators. However, because of the
fluid and global nature
nature of network
network activities, rule violators will increasingly
increasingly
be difficult to identify, find, and ultimately prosecute. Self-help
Self-help measures
may be available
or
available for private parties, such as requiring security bonds or
full payment
in
advance
of
service
or
delivery,
but
these
measures
payment
advance
measures can be
cumbersome and risky.
cumbersome

144. See European Privacy Directive,
Directive, supra
supra note
note 9, at Art. 6 (establishing a limitation on the
the
duration of data storage for personal information).
information).
145. See supra
lI(A)(2).
145.
supra section II(A)(2).
146. On-line
On-line service
service providers such as AOL, MSN, and CompuServe all offer Internet
Internet access to
their subscnoers,
subscribers, though the terms
example,
tenns of Internet use may be different
different among
among the providers. For example,
AOL's Internet connection does not give unrestricted access to Newsgroups.
Newsgroups.
147. Although
based on
Although today the Internet may allow circumvention
circumvention of
of access limitations based
on
geography because
because a user could log onto the Internet
Internet from an unrestricted site, one should not assume
that future architectural
segmentation.
architectural decisions
decisions preclude network segmentation.
148.
148. Cf.
Cf. Stefik, supra
supra note 67, at 79 (describing
(descnoing current
current attempts to develop a formal language for
for
conveying fee information
information that could then be translated
translated by individual users).
HeinOnline -- 76 Tex. L. Rev. 580 1997-1998

1998]
19981

Lex Infonnatica
Informatica

581

enforcement
Lex Infonnatica
particularly valuable
valuable enforcement
Informatica offers two particularly
advantages.
advantages. First, technological devices can be readily developed
developed to
monitor compliance
compliance with both information
infonnation policy rules and legal norms and
and
Technology allows automated
automated monchoices. 41499 Technology
to enforce specific policy choices.'
itoring of infonnation
information access and use, through techniques such as data
rules,'-' data srriffers
sniffers'isl and search
tagging to identify the applicable rules,lso
52
1
5
l52
engines, such as AltaVista or Yahoo!,
YahoO!,IS3 to locate data users or use,
engines,
and public or accredited
accredited private organizations
organizations to verify system compliance.
compliance.
technologies such as secure viewers and encrypted data provide selfOther technologies
information distributor's own data-use
data-use
executing enforcement
enforcement of an infonnation
restrictions. And second, in contrast to the ex post enforcement of legal
restrictions.
Informatica relies typically on ex ante measures of selfrules, Lex Infonnatica
translations, for example,
execution. Filters and translations,
example, apply to block information flows that violate the infonnation
information policy rules. If a PICS-based
PIeS-based
filter is applied to screen the content of a web page,
page, those pages rated
inappropriate for the user will simply not be displayed-only
inappropriate
displayed-only permissible
permissible
Likewise, translations such as decryption
viewing will take place.
place."ll54 Likewise,
decryption will
only allow execution
permissible under
under the applicable
applicable inforexecution of actions permissible
Informatica has efficient self-help
self-help
mation policy rule. In essence, Lex Infonnatica
characteristics.
characteristics.
B.

Implications
Implications

The advantages
advantages of Lex Informatica
Infonnatica give it strength as a policy
instrument. Technological
Technological configurations allow security
security wrappers to be
placed
placed firmly around information
infonnation wherever
wherever it travels on the network.
PolicyMaker, for example, can be used to assure that information
PolicyMaker,
infonnation is only
only
55
used by authorized individuals for permitted
uses.
Technological
ISS Technological
permitted
mechanisms
mechanisms even allow data sources to specify information
infonnation policies
policies that
infonnation at remote sites.
sites.
impose restrictions on the manipulations of information

149. Such monitoring
monitoring would,
WOUld, of course,
course, raise significant privacy
privacy concerns.
concerns.
DOI (visited Oct. 26, 1997)
1997) <http://www.doi.org/abouUhe_doi.html>
<http://www.doi.org/about-the-doi.html>
150. See About the DOl
(promoting the Digital Object Identifier (DOl)
(DOI) as "a
(promoting
"a way to link users of the [digital] materials to the
environment").
rights holders themselves to facilitate automated digital commerce in the new digital environment").
151. See SnifferFAQ
20, 1997) <http://www.iss.net/vd/sniff.html>.
151.
Sniffer FAQ Version 3.00 (visited Nov.
Nov. 20,1997)
<http://www.iss.netlvdlsniff.html>.
Although packet
packet sniffing is usually conceived as a security threat,
threat, the technique may also be used to
search for specific data;
Field Exercise Using
Using Snoop, (visited Nov. 13,
1997)
data; see, e.g.,
e.g., Field
13, 1997)
<http://www.vuse.vanderbilt.edu/<
http://www.vuse. vanderbilt.edu/- apon/courses/cs283s97/assignmentslsniffing.html>
apon/courses/cs283s97/assignruents/sniffing.hUnI > (class
exercise
1997).
exercise for CS283 course at Vanderbilt
Vanderbilt University, Spring 1997).
152.
Corp., AltaVista: Main
1997)
152. See Digital Equip. Corp.,
Main Page
Page (visited Sept. 6, 1997)
<<http://www.altavista.digital.con>.
http://www.altavista.digital.com!> .
153.
1997) <http://www.yahoo.com/>.
153. See Yahoo! Inc.,
Inc., Yahoo! (visited Sept. 6, 1997)
<http://www.yahoo.com!>.
FTC Testimony,
Testimony, supra
supra note 38 (statement
154. See FI'C
(statement of Paul Resnick).
155. See supra
supranote 107.
107. PolicyMakerdoes
PolicyMaker does not, however, assure "downstream"
"downstream" activities; it only
verifies the authority of particular
particular users to perform
perform permitted
permitted actions.
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Encrypted data may be provided only with a secure viewer, giving the
"secure" data even at the remote
source control
control over access to "secure"
location.156
location. 156 These mechanisms are part of the everyday
everyday concerns and
experiences
experiences of technologists;
technologists; technologists
technologists have expertise in designing these
systems. With these security features, Lex Informatica
Informatica offers the possibility of designing enforceable
enforceable information policy rules on a customized
customized
57
basis throughout networks. 157
. The nuances
nuances of Lex Informatica require its use to be a careful
exercise. For example,
example, information policy rules located deep within the
architecture
architecture of networks, such as those built into the transmission
protocols,
greater force than those located
located at a higher level on
on
protocols, will have greater
pes. The higher-level
higher-level choices, in general,
general, provide
provide more
servers or user PCs.
information flow policies
flexibility and greater
greater opportunity to customize
customize information
than rules designed for all network transmissions. However, the flexibility
of technological
technological configurations
configurations also means that these technologically
technologically
mediated rules can be circumvented.
circumvented. If configuration
configuration choices establishing
rules are located on a user's hard drive, users may be able to by-pass the
configuration
configuration and establish
establish a different rule. For example, a teenager could
install a new version of Internet browsing software in order to by-pass
technopc. However, if a technoparental restrictions installed on the family PC.
logical rule is built into the network software, the possibilities
possibilities for
for
circumvention may be eliminated.
eliminated. For example,
example, a network
network protocol could
could
circumvention
information
strings-only information
require that content codes be included on all data strings-only
with selected codings would be transmitted to the same
same teenager
teenager who knew
how to by-pass the local content filter. The teenager
teenager in this instance
instance would
would
not be able to circumvent
circumvent the network rule.
nonderogable, public-order
public-order
The power
power of Lex Informatica
Informatica to embed nonderogable,
rules in network systems is not benign. Once a technical
technical rule is established
established
level, the information
at the network level,
information policy rule is both costly and difficult
to change. All participants
participants in the network must adopt and implement any
new rule. At the higher, local level,
level, changes in information policy are
easier and likely to be less expensive
pressure will exist for
expensive to modify. Yet pressure

156. See Steflk,
Stefik, supra
supra note 67, at 79-81 (describing new techniques and technology that allow
publishers to distribute
"trusted" users
distribute encrypted
encrypted work that only "trusted"
users can view or print). JavaApplets, for
example,
programming modules
example, are programming
modules that operate remotely through web browsing software.
software. A data
source
preserve the source's control
source could package
package information
information with a JavaApplet
JavaApplet to preserve
control of the data at
at
remote locations.
locations.
157. One
consequence pointed out by Professor
157.
One interesting consequence
Professor Mark Lemley is that different policy
rules could, thus, apply to the same conduct
conduct by the same person depending
depending on whether the
the person acted
on-line or off-line.
Lemley, supra
supra note 142,
142, at 318-19.
Nevertheless, this is not a cyberspace
off-line. See Lemley,
318-19. Nevertheless,
cyberspace
phenomenon because
because actions by the same person in different legal
legal jurisdictions might have
have different
applicable legal standards.
standards. In contrast,
contrast, however, technical rules can provide a means to avoid the risk
risk
of inadvertently
inadvertently contravening
contravening information policies.
policies.
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standardization
convenience and to minimize user confusion.
standardization to provide convenience
In any case, this decision
decision will rest with local users. However, the cost of
change at the local level will be imposed directly
directly on individual users, while
change at the network level will be borne directly
directly by network
network operators.
implementation will affect the success or failure of embedded
embedded
In addition, implementation
policy
rules.' 158 Software
Software bugs and design defects are weak links in Lex
policy rules.
Informatica. The deeper these occur in network architecture, the more
problematic
lower
greater difficulty in modifying lower
problematic they are because of the greater
level architecture. The location decision for an information policy configuration is thus significant in many respects.
C.
RelationshipBetween Lex Informatica
C. The Relationship
Informatica and Legal Rules
The advantages
advantages and implications
implications of Lex Informatica
Informatica reflect an intersecting relationship
between
Lex
Informatica
Informatica
relationship between
Informatica and law. Lex Informatica
may constrain law's ability
ability to deal with a problem. As seen with the
present Internet
Internet architecture
architecture and the very existence of the world wide web,
infrastructure
infrastructure decisions that enable multiple paths of communication
communication
diminish the territorial
territorial authority to address social policy choices
unilaterally. Lex Informatica
technologiInformatica may also substitute for law when technologi59
159
Lex Informatica can,
cal rules are better able to resolve policy issues.'
issues.
for example, offer content filtering rather than distribution censorship."
censorship. 160
Law, nonetheless, has an important
elaboration of Lex
important place in the elaboration
encourage the development
Informatica. Law may encourage
development of Lex Informatica by
imposing liability on various
network
various network actors, and law may provide
implementation of technical rules. For
immunity or safe harbors for implementation
For
instance, in the case of personal
personal information
information and international
international privacy
61
rules,'
a web site that erroneously reports its practices should be subject
subject
rules,161
to both criminal and civil fraud claims,
claims, but a web site that is labelled and
certified
certified by an accredited third party may enjoy the presumption of
62
satisfying
Similarly, law may sanction
sanction the
satisfying international
international standards. l62
embedded information policy is
evasion of Lex Informatica. If an embedded
circumvented, then law may intersect to redress this problem by allocating
circumvented,
liability for evasions. For example, computer tampering laws can deal

158.
158. For example, Microsoft
Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0 implements
implements PICS technology,
technology, while
while Netscape
Netscape
of
Navigator 3.0 does not. This means that PICS technology
technology will be limited by the market share of
Internet Explorer
Explorer 3.0.
159.
Lessig, supra
note 5,
885 ("Congress's
("Congress's power
power is contingent upon the available technotechno159. See Lessig,
supra note
5, at 885
logies of regulation.").
regulation. ").
supra note 31,
31, at 62 (observing that filtering systems such as PICS allow
160. See Resnick, supra
individual
individual users to specify safety and content requirements).
requirements).
161. See supra
161.
supra subpart
subpart 1(B).
II(B).
162. See supra
162.
supra note 68 and accompanying
accompanying text.
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mechanisms to corrupt filtering
with the problem of third parties setting up mechanisms
63
mechanisms
mechanisms built into web browsers. 163
controversial case
selection," laws similar to the
In the controversial
case of content
content selection,l64
Communications
Communications Decency Act (CDA)
(CDA) in the United
United States and the recent
communications
encouragecommunications law in France might have also provided this encouragement function in an unexpected fashion. Although initially rejected by
their respective
respective national
national courts, these laws allocated liability to Internet
service providers,
providers, among others, who distributed indecent material
material to
minors. Opponents
Opponents of these measures
measures believed them to be unacceptable
unacceptable
restrictions on free speech. The United States Supreme Court, in a
landmark decision, found the statute overly
overly broad and denounced its
Internet."165 In France, the strong rejection of
restraint of speech on the Internet.
the liability provisions emphasized separation of powers
powers but also reflected
reflected
66
concern
Net.'l66
Ironically, the long-term effect
effect of
of
concern for speech on the Net.
these broadly worded court decisions may be counterproductive
counterproductive for
accommodating
accommodating robust speech and democratic
democratic values. While counterintuitive to ardent supporters
supporters of free speech, provisions
provisions imposing liability
would be unlikely to have a significant
significant censorship effect if they were
coupled with a safe harbor for those instituting configuration-choice
configuration-choice
coupled
67 Such laws would more likely
167
mechanisms such as PICS-based
filtering.
PICS-based
likely
force a change in the Net's structure, rather than impose serious censorship
censorship
68
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence,
on the Net's content.'
content. 168
concurrence, even
technological tools would give Congress
suggested that the existence
existence of technological
Congress
69 Because the
greater regulatory latitude. 169
Because
entire philosophy and present
design of the Net is nevertheless
nevertheless geared to maximize information flow, the

163. Note
163.
Note that the computer
computer tampering
tampering laws would apply to nonauthorized
nonauthorized system users. See 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (1994);
(1994); Scott
& Kent Alexander, Computer
Computer Crime,
Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931,
931, 950U.S.C.
Scott Charney &
(1996). If, for example,
example, evasion of NetNanny
SurfWatch filtering mechanisms
NetNanny or SurfWatch
mechanisms takes place
place by
53 (1996).
the family's
family'S twelve-year-old,
twelve-year-old, then the problem should belong to the parents. If a hacker changed the
filter mechanism,
mechanism, then the law should sanction
sanction the hacker. One should recognize,
recognize, nevertheless,
nevertheless, that
the technology must exist before society
parents bear responsibility to prevent their
society can say that the parents
their
child from replacing the Parent Teacher Association's browser with
with the Penthouse browser.
164. See supra section ll(A)(1).
II(A)(I).
165.
S. Ct. 2329, 2347,
2347, 2350 (1997)
(1997) (proclaiming
(proclaiming that the "wholly
"wholly
165. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.
unprecedented"
unprecedented" breadth of the CDA's coverage
coverage placed
placed an "unacceptably
"unacceptably heavy
heavy burden on protected
speech").
speech").
166. See Cons. const.,
23, 1996,
1996, available
available in LEXIS,
166.
const., Dcision
Decision No.
No. 96-378 DC July 23,
LEXIS, Public
Library,
and in <hnp:llwww.conseil-constitutionneI.fr/decisions/96/96-378.doc>.
<http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decisions/96/96-378.doc >.
Library, consti File, and
provided this type of safe harbor, the scope of
of
167. Though neither
neither the CDA
CDA nor the French
French law provided
the respective court's rejections makes consideration of such
such an approach extremely
extremely difficult as a
practical matter.
Cf. Lessig, supra
supra note 5, at 888 (claiming that the current
architecture could be
168. Cf
current cyberspace
cyberspace arehitecture
be
Weinberg, supra
desired such change).
change). But see Weinberg,
supra note 24,
24, at 2 (arguing
changed to limit access
access if society desired
that blocking
librarians).
blocking software might lead
lead to censorship by intermediaries such as employers
employers and librarians).
169. See Reno, 117 S.
S. Ct. at 2354 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the availability
availability of
of
technology
teclmology could
could offer less restrictive means to address the content problem).
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measure would most likely be
resulting change due to this type of liability measure
a widespread
Informatica solutions to the pornowidespread implementation of Lex Informatica
7
graphy issue. 170
Technical solutions would put decisions in the hands of
of
citizens-the network
individual citizens-the
network users-because
users-because the Net community
community would
seek ways to customize
customize the legal allocations of liability.
liability.
In any case, the CDA and the French law also illustrate that liability
rules do not offer an easy legal solution. Public interest must be significant
and,
appropriately tailored legislation
legislation will be difficult given the
and, even then, appropriately
variety
fluidity of the Net."'
Net.171 Drafting a well-defined liability
liability law
variety and fiuidity
will generally pose an extraordinary
extraordinary problem,
given
that
networks
problem,
networks create
create
complex situations which tend to necessitate customized
customized rules. To this
extent,
governments may have no choice but to acquiesce to Lex
extent, governments
Informatica solutions.
Informatica
Despite the initial judicial rejections of the CDA and the French
statute, law can still successfully
successfully embed
embed an immutable
immutable rule in the
infrastructure when society
infrastructure
society has a fundamental principle
principle at stake. The
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
of
Enforcement Act of
United States's Communications
1994,11
1994,172 for example, mandates that new telecommunications
telecommunications switching
ready. 73 The political process in the United States
equipment be wiretap ready.173
determined that the police have a fundamental need to obtain
obtain access to
communications. Responsibility for this information flow policy
policy was
communications.
allocated
telecommunications companies that in tum
turn had to adopt a Lex
allocated to telecommunications
Informatica rule at a very low level in their networks. Likewise in France,
Informatica
the Constitutional
Constitutional Court let stand a provision in the telecommunications
telecommunications act
act
requiring service
service providers
providers to offer technical means to filter access to
74
certain services. 174
In essence, Lex Informatica
Informatica and legal rules both parallel and overlap
overlap
one another. This relationship
relationship means that policymakers must add Lex
Informatica to their set of policy instruments and should pursue Lex

170. PICS, for example,
170.
example, owes much of its existence to Senator Exon
Exon and his early draft of the
CDA. See Resnick, supra
supra note 31,
(identifying the impetus of
PICS as regulatory avoidance);
31, at 62 (identifying
ofPICS
PICS Statement
Statement of Principles
1997 ) <
http://www.w3.org/PICS/principles.html >
PIeS
Principles (visited Oct. 23, 1997)
<http://www.w3.orgIPICS/principles.html>
1995, before the enactment
(adopted in August 1995,
enactment of the CDA).
171. To the extent that constitutionality
available technologies,
technologies, statutory legitimacy
171.
constitutionality may depend on available
will
supra note 5,
5, at
at 888-89 (describing
(describing the
the changing nature
will be a moving target. See Lessig,
Lessig, supra
nature of
eyberspace); see also Reno, 117
cyberspace);
117 S.
S. Ct. at 2349 (suggesting
(suggesting that Congress
Congress should have considered
considered techtechnological feasibility).
feasibility).
1001-1010 (1994).
(1994).
172. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
173. See id.
id. § 1002 ("[A]
telecommunications carrier shaU
shall ensure
... [is]
("[A] telecommunications
ensure that its equipment •••
... enabling
... to intercept
communications
... all wire and electronic communications
capable of •.•
enabling the government
government ...
intercept ..•
.... ").
). Unlike the features of analog conversations
••••
conversations transiting copper wires, digitally switched
switched
communications
fiber optic cables
cables did not readily offer the capability
particular
communications over fiber
capability to monitor particular
conversations.
conversations.
174. Law No. 96-659 of July 26,
1996, art. 15,
J.O., July 27, 1996, p. 11384, 11395.
11395.
26, 1996,
IS, J.O.,
174.
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as an effective substitute for
for law where self-executing,
Informatica norms as
customized rules are desirable.
V.
v.

Redirecting Public Policy Strategies

Policymakers should accept and take advantage
Policymakers
advantage of the distinguishing
controlling information
features of Lex Informatica and its usefulness for controlling
information
flows on global networks. Lex Informatica gives policymakers new tools
to use in the development of information policy; without these new tools,
policymaking authorities.
marginalize national policymaking
information flows will marginalize
center
Moreover, working with Lex Informatica places policymakers
policymakers at the center
periphery of solutions. Lex Informatica must be seen as a
rather than the periphery
distinct source of policy action. Effective channeling of Lex Informatica
Informatica
requires a shift in the focus of government action away from direct regulanevertheless, still
tion and toward indirect influence. The shift can, nevertheless,
preserve
oversight.
preserve strong attributes of public oversight.
A.
A.

The Sources
Sources of Action

Policymakers are accustomed to traditional avenues for establishing
rules through legal regulation. However, legal regulation confronts three
tendencies which increasingly
increasingly marginalize
marginalize its effectiveness.
effectiveness.
First,
technological
developments
outpace
the
rate
of
legal
evolution.
technological developments
Consequently, today's regulations
yesterday's
regulations may easily pertain to yesterday'S
technologies.
Second, today's technology
of
technology may limit the ability of
government to regulate. For
For example,
example, digital networks
networks can no longer be
information flows
wiretapped like analog phone
phone systems.
systems. 1755 And finally, information
may be impervious to the actions of a single
single government.
government. As pundits
pundits have
observed,
the
United
States
Constitution
may
just
be
a
"speed
bump
on the
observed,
Constitution
"speed
76
Information
Information Superhighway."
Superhighway. "176
Informatica has very
Lex Informatica
very different
different avenues
avenues for rule formation. Lex
Informatica's
Informatica's action takes place
place in standards
standards organizations
organizations and in the
market place.
Standards determine
determine basic architectural
architectural features
features for
7
information policy."
Yet, several
policy.177
several different
different processes
processes can
can result in the
adoption of standards.
standards. 7178 There
There are formal standards organizations
organizations such
such

175.
175. See
See INFORMATION
INFORMATION SECURITY
SECURITY AND
AND PRIVACY,
PRIVACY, supra
supra note 113,
113, at
at 97 (describing
(describing how digital
digital
information
user
infonnation differs
differs from
from traditional
traditional information
infonnation in that digital
digital information
infonnation is "inaccessible
"inaccessible to the user
without
without hardware
hardware and
and software
software tools
tools for
for retrieval,
retrieval, decoding,
decoding, and navigation").
navigation").
176.
176. See
See Mark
Mark Lemley,
Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric
Rhetoric of Property,
Property, 75 TEXAS
TExAs L. REV.
REv.
873,
"horrible" metaphors
873, 874
874 (1997)
(1997) (book
(book review)
review) (referring to the "horrible"
metaphors used to describe
describe the
the information
infonnation
infrastructures
and obstacles
infrastructures and
obstacles to information
infonnation flows).
177. See
177.
See supra
supra subpart
subpart II(A).
m(A).
178. See Lemley,
143, at 1054-59,
1054-59, 1079
178.
Lemley, supra
supra note
note 143,
1079 (noting
(noting how standards
standards can
can result
result from aa single
firm's
finn's success
success in
in aa competitive
competitive market
market or
or from
from aa collaborative
collaborative industry
industIy accord
accord to utilize
utilize one
one standard).
standard).
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79 as well
Europe l79
well as important
important industry
industry consortia
consortia such
such as
as those in Europe
Committee T1 in the United
United States."r
States. ISO Market
Market forces influence
influence the
the accepaccepCommittee
tance of configuration
configuration standards,
standards, and pressure
pressure from both
both industry
industry represenrepresen8'
tatives
tatives and consumers
consumers can
can affect
affect the direction
direction of standards-setting.'
standards-setting. 181

B.

Shifting Focus
Focus

information
technical arena serving
serving as a critical
critical source
source of
of infonnation
With the technical
policy
policy through
through Lex
Lex Informatica
Infonnatica rule-making, government
government policymakers
must
must shift
shift their focus if
if they wish to contribute effectively. The promotion
promotion
of technical standards
standards must become a key
key goal.
goal. Because
Because technical
technical designs
designs
technologists, government
government policymakers
policymakers should
should
and choices
choices are made by technologists,
play an important
important role as public policy advocates
advocates promoting
promoting policy
objectives. This
This involves a shift in goals, instrumentalities,
instrumentalities, and
and institutions
for policymakers.
policymakers.
1. Goal Shift.-Lex
Shift.-Lex Informatica should shift the focus of policypolicymakers
makers away from specific policy-rule
policy-rule content
content and toward greater
greater
flexibility. In general,
general, flexibility is only undesirable
undesirable when fundamental
public interests
interests are at stake and the public interest
interest requires
requires rules that
network
might
not
choose
individual
participants
in
the
individual participants
network
choose themselves."
themselves. 182
Policymakers
Policymakers should thus become
become advocates
advocates for flexible
fiexible standards
standards that
customization of configurations.
allow for individual policy choices
configurations.
choices through
through customization
By promoting
promoting flexible standards, policymakers
policymakers advance the capability to
of
information policy rules rather than attempt a specific exercise of
establish infonnation
substantive
decision.
power
to
impose
a
particular
government
goverument
particular substantive
development phases of new
Policymakers must be involved early in the development
technologies to assure that options and flexibility are maximized."'
maximized. l833 This

Communication from the Commission to the
179.
179. See Commission
Commission of the European Communities,
Communities, Communication
the
Information Society:
"Standardization and the Global Information
Council and the European Parliament: On "Standardization
Society: The
European
European Approach,"
Approach," COM(96)359
COM(96)359 (final)
(fmal) at 4 ("Formal standards organi[z]ations
organi[z]ations in Europe,
omitted)),
CENELEC, and ETSI."
ETSI." (citation omitted»,
... are
recogni[z]ed by law at [the]
[the] European level •..
are CEN,
CEN, CENELEC,
1997)
and the
the Global
Information Society (visited Nov.
available
Standardization and
available in Standardization
Global Information
Nov. 14, 1997)
<http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/legregldocs/96359.htm1>.
<http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/legreg/docs/96359
.html > •
the American National Standards
180. TI,
Tl, a privately
privately sponsored organization accredited by the
of
interconnection and interoperability
"develops technical standards and reports regarding interconnection
Institute, "develops
interoperability of
enhancedinformation and enhancedtelecommunications
telecommunications networks at interfaces with end-user systems, carriers, information
TI Overview
Comm., Ti
Telecomm., Tl
premises equipment."
equipment." Standards
service providers,
providers, and customer premises
Standards Comm.,
Tl Telecomm.,
14, 1997)
1997) <http://www.t1.orglhtmllintro.html>.
<http://www.tl.org/html/intro.html>.
(visited Sept. 14,
companies competing to set an industty
industry standard
supra note 143,
143, at 1055 ("[I]f
("[IIf companies
181. See Lemley, supra
are offering different technology, this competition may serve a temporary market-disciplining purpose,
technical standard on a one-time
one-time basis.").
basis. ").
allowing consumers to choose the best technical
Essentially this means that flexibility does not work when the public interest would otherwise
182. Essentially
prohibit freedom of contract.
committed interests of
of
late in the development phase,
phase, the inertia and committed
183. If policymakers
policymakers arrive late
183.
the developers may seriously
seriously hamper any significant changes.
changes.
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involvement
of
involvement does not
not entail
entail policymakers'
policymakers' seeking
seeking to control the
the design of
new
new technologies,
technologies, but
but this involvement
involvement does mean
mean that they
they instead
instead should
should
become partners
partners in the development
development of
of system
system capabilities."8
capabilities. 184
become
Policymakers
Policymakers must
must emphasize
emphasize the creation
creation of an incentive
incentive structure
structure
both that encourages
encourages new
new developers
developers to design
design technologies
technologies with
with informaof
tion flow flexibility and
and that offers incentives
incentives for the implementation
implementation of
l85
For example,
technologically
technologically mediated
mediated information
information policy
policy rules."
rules.
example, new
choices
choices in privacy-enhancing
privacy-enhancing technologies
technologies are likely
likely to come
come from entreentrepreneurial
preneurial developers. PICS-based
PICS-based filtering will only become
become a robust
robust
information privacy
privacy if authors emerge to write
instrument in the context of information
instrument
rating terms,
terms, services
services emerge
emerge to assign rating labels,
labels, and an infrastructure
is established
established that
that would support the rating
rating terms
terms and rating labels
labels on
on the
t
information
Internet. 186 Similarly, confidence
confidence in PICS filtering for information
can
privacy will rely on the creation
privacy
creation of certifying
certifying agents.
agents. Government
Government can
create both positive and negative
create
negative incentives
incentives to stimulate
stimulate such technology
technology
implementation. Threats of liability
liability tend to be an effeceffecdevelopment and implementation.
or
tive negative stimulus for industry, while favorable tax treatment or
81 Government may also begin
incentives.1l87
publicity
Government
begin
publicity often act as positive incentives.
to look more carefully
way to both channel technotechnocarefully at accreditation
accreditation as a way
logical developments
developments toward public
public policy goals and to reward developers.
Shift.-Policymakers have
Instrumentality
2.
Instrumentality Shijt.-Policymakers
have six significant
significant
approaches
technical designs: (1) the bully
approaches to influence
infiuence the development
development of technical
(3) funding, (4) procurement,
pulpit, (2) participation, (3)
procurement, (5) regulated
regulated
development of Lex
behavior, and (6) regulated standards. For the development
policymakers must use strategies and
Informatica
Informatica information policy rules, policymakers
approaches.
mechanisms that are different from traditional
traditional regulatory approaches.
Government can use the bully pulpit approach to threaten and cajole
cajole
industry to develop technical rules. For example,
example, in the context
context of

184. I am indebted
indebted to Professor Lessig for pointing
pointing out that such indirect regulation raises norappropriate role of democratic
mative issues regarding the exercise of government power. The appropriate
government
government in a technologically mediated
mediated society
society is beyond the scope of this Article, but an important
subject of future work.
governments must abdicate responsibility to others, but rather
185. This point does not suggest that governments
185.
choices-may be far more effective
instrumentality-the creation of incentives
that this instrumentality-the
incentives for technical choices-may
in achieving desired policy results than a difficult to draft and hard to enforce
enforee piece of legislation such
Communications Decency Act. See supra
as the Communications
supra note 165.
Weinberg nevertheless
186. Professor Weinberg
nevertheless argues that any PICS-based rating system will be skewed
supra note 24, at 477 (explaining how blocking
against the distribution of information. See Weinberg, supra
software can block desirable information). He ascribes an implicit illegitimacy to all rating labels
software
subjective element. If arguably there is such an illegitimacy,
because of an inherent SUbjective
illegitimacy, it should become
terms, preferences, and rating labels
freely chooses to adopt the particular
irrelevant when a user freely
particular rating terms,
labels
irrelevant
with knowledge of their meaning and creation.
or
striving to take advantage or
187. A company will seek to avoid liability or shift its risk while striving
187.
favorable tax
tax treatment.
qualify for favorable
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children's programming, the Senate
Senate sought to encourage
encourage video games
producers to restrain the dissemination
dissemination of violent programming to
s Hearings resulted in an industry decision
children."l88
decision to create and adopt
children.
189 and ESRB
ESRB'I90 systems-two
systems-two competing
competing rating systems that
the RSAC Is9
allow parents
parents to restrict their children's access to inappropriate
inappropriate material.
material.
The government's
government's bully pulpit resulted in a flexible mechanism
mechanism that can
customized by network participants
provide
provide an information
information policy rule customized
participants
architectural rule. The resulting rating systems
rather than an immutable architectural
prohibitions on the network's
network's
choose filtering rules without prohibitions
can let parents choose
dissemination
particular content.
content.
dissemination of particular
The participation
participation approach requires government to work with standstandCanadian Standards
ards bodies to help develop technical rules. The Canadian
Association Code for the Protection
Personal Information reflects this
Protection of Personal
approach. 191 The Canadian Standards Association
approach.191
Association worked with stakegovernment, industry, and consumer groups to define the
holders from government,
9
standard that was ultimately adopted as a Canadian standard.
standard."192
Representatives from all sides participated
participated in the actual negotiations.1"3
negotiations. 193
Policymakers
Policymakers often have significant
significant influence through public funding
of
encourage the development of
decisions. The power of the purse can encourage
particular
technological capabilities. For example, the present Internet
particular technological
routing structure owes its birth to the specifications
specifications established by the U.S.
today's
precursor to today's
Defense Department. Funding for ARPANET, the precursor
preserve communications
Internet, sought a network that would preserve
communications in the event
9
The
of local disruptions or a nuclear
nuclear attack on the United States."
States. l94
network
network thus automatically routes around problems
problems and bottlenecks.
Government can also use its power to make the public interest voice
heard through public sector procurement. The government's massive
example, the U.S.
purchasing power
power can adopt particular standards.
standards. For example,
government
government adopted as a federal standard the Data Encryption Standard

Makers Pledge
Pledge to Set Up Ratings
188. See Laura Evenson,
188.
Evenson, Video Game Makers
Ratings System, S.F. CHRON.,
CHRON.,
1993, at Bl.
BI.
Dec. 10, 1993,
1997)
Internet (visited Sept. 14, 1997)
189. See Recreational Software Advisory Council on the Internet
empowerment of "the public,
<http:llwww.rsac.orgl>
(describing the RSAC's mission as the empowerment
<http://www.rsac.org/>(describingtheRSAC·smission
public,
especially parents[,]
especially
parents[,] to make informed decisions" about electronic media).
1997)
Guide (visited Sept. 14,
Rating Bd., ESRB-Parent's
190. See Entertainment
Entertaimnent Software Rating
ESRB-Parent's Gaide
14, 1997)
(illustrating the ESRB's goal to inform parents about the "high<http://www.esrb.org/parent.html> (illustrating
<http://www.esrb.org/parent.htm1>
tech environment
enviromnent of the nineties").
191.
1996)
191. CAN/CSA-Q830-1996, Model Code for the Protection of Personal
Personal Information
Information (Mar. 1996)
Codes,
<http://www.csa.ca/83000-g.htm>
[hereinafter CSA Code]; see also Colin Bennett, Privacy Codes,
<
http://www.csa.cal83000-g.htm>[hereinafterCSACode];seealsoColinBennett.Privacy
WhatThey Can Achieve,
Privacy
Standardsand Privacy
Privacy Standards
Privacy Laws: The InstrumentsforData
Instruments/or Data Protection
Protection and What
Achieve,
INTHE 21sr
21st CENTURY
in VISIONS FOR PRIVACY
PRIVACY IN
CENTURY (Colin Bennett
Bennett ed.,
ed., forthcoming 1998).
1998).
192. See CSA
CSA Code, supra
supra note 191.
19l.
193. See id.
193.
id.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, June 1997,
of the Internet,
Internet,TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
194. See Andrew Zimmerman,
Zimmerman, The Evolution o/the
at 39,
40, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
39,40,
available in
Library, CURNWS
CURNWS File.
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"DES") originally
developed by IBM.I95
IBM.'" As a result, if the
(the famous "DES")
originally developed
government
needed
encryption,
the
products it used had to incorporate the
government
DES. This adoption had an important
important ripple effect on the private sector.
The government's
government's reliance
reliance on the standard gave a certain imprimatur to the
DES, and the private sector consequently
consequently adopted it as a security
standard.
standard. 91966
The regulated-behavior
regulated-behavior approach provides an indirect but significant
Informatica norm-construction.
norm-construction. Here the government
government can
stimulus to Lex Informatica
can
require
activities like the distribution of
of
require or prohibit particular activities
98
97
money. 198
of money.
pornography197
or the unauthorized electronic transfer
transfer of
pornography'
Behavior
Behavior regulation leads to a search for the means to assure conforming
practices. Technical rules can become
become a cornerstone of that assurance.
Finally, policymakers
policymakers may regulate particular
technical standards.
particular technical
standards. For
For
example, both the Communications
Enforcement Act's
Act's
example,
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
99 mandate
(known
Act)l99
mandate of wiretap-ready
wiretap-ready capa(known as the Digital Telephony
Telephony Act)'
bilities for telecommunications
telecommunications switching
switching equipment
equipment and the Clinton
Chip2;' for
Administration's unsuccessful
Administration's
unsuccessful attempt to impose the Clipper
Clipper Chip2°O
access to private communications
communications have looked to set immutable rules in the
basic network
architecture. By forcing the technical
technical rule lower in the
network architec~re.
network
policymakers can reduce the possibilities
network protocol, policymakers
possibilities of circumvention of the Lex Informatica
Informatica default.
The six different mechanisms for policymakers
policymakers to influence Lex
Informatica
each
present
different
attributes.
A traditional regulatory
regulatory
Informatica
solution, like government
government mandated standards,
standards, will be the hardest to
accomplish because it requires the government imposition
imposition of an immutable
immutable
rule in the network
network infrastructure. In contrast, the bully pulpit approach
approach
and the regulated behavior approach provide greater leeway
leeway for networkor
driven solutions. Other approaches, such as funding, procurement,
procurement, or
especially participation,
incorporation of public policy
participation, encourage
encourage the incorporation
objectives
objectives in the heart of system design and market adoption. In situations
in which public goals call for mandatory
policymakers may use
mandatory rules, policymakers
combinations
combinations of the various approaches
approaches to increase
increase their effectiveness.
effectiveness. For
For
example,
if
the
policy
goal
is
to
incorporate
an
intellectual
property
rights
incorporate
intellectual
example,
management system that is difficult to evade, the system must be

195. See OFFICE
113, at 121-22 (noting the adoption
195.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
AssESSMENT, supra
supra note 113,
adoption
of DES as a federal
standard).
federal encryption
encryption standard).
196. See id. (noting that the banking industry adopted the DES standard).
196.
standard).
197. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.
S. Ct. 2329 (1997),
197.
(1997), did not strike
strike down the portions of the
Communications
Decency Act relating
Communications Decency
relating to obscenity.
1693g-1693h (1994).
(1994).
198. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693g-1693h
199. 47 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
(1994).
communications that would allow
200. Clipper
Clipper Chip is a proposed encryption tool for electronic communications
information content
enforcement.
access to infonnation
content by law enforcement.
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incorporated with sufficient
sufficient security
security at various places in the network.
Government participation in the standards-creation
standards-creation process
process can assist the
Government
development of a technical
technical standard
standard accepted by all network actors-one
development
that adopts, for example,
example, mandatory
mandatory rather than optional data fields for
for
behavior
labels. 201s Governmental
Governmental influence
influence may be supported
supported by behavior
rating labels.'0
regulation, namely the imposition of liability if technical means are not
regulation,
intellectual property rights.'
rights. 202
adopted to manage intellectual

3. The Institutional
Institutional Shift.-The shift in focus toward technical
technical
standards as a source of policy rules emphasizes technical
technical fora whose
normally associated
associated with governance.
governance. The Internet
Internet
institutions are not nonnally
Society,'
the World Wide
Force, 2 3 the Internet Society,204
Engineering
Engineering Task Force,203
ISO,'
Consortium,' and traditional
Web Consortium,20S
traditional standards organizations
organizations like ISO,206
8
2
208
are the real political centers of
ETSI,
ETSI,207
and committees like T1
of
201. This would mean that transmission could
201.
could not occur without a rating label and would facilitate
particular Lex Informatica
widespread implementation
implementation of a particular
Informatica rule.
202. This means that users or distributors of browsers might be liable for infringement if the
management codes
browser does
does not recognize management
codes for intellectual property
property rights. It does not mean that
material.
users should be prohibited from anonymous browsing
browsing or fair uses of copyright protected material.
"protocol
Engineering Task Force is a self-selected
203. The Internet Engineering
self-selected organization that is the "protocol
operators, vendors,
vendors,
engineering
engineering and development
development arm of the Internet" composed of network designers,
designers, operators,
1997)
Glossary (visited Aug. 30, 1997)
researchers.
and researehers.
See Internet
Internet Eng'g Task Force,
Force, Glossary
ofthe IE7F(visited
IETF(visited
InternetEng'g
<http://www.ietf.org/glossary.htm#IESG>;
>; Internet
Eng'g Task Force,
Force, Overview o/the
<http://www.ietf.org/glossary.htm#IESG
Aug.
1997) <http://www.ietf.org/overview.html>.
<http:/www.ietf.orgloverview.html>. The IETF engages
Aug. 30, 1997)
engages in the development
development of new
Internet
Internet technical standards.
non-governmental international
Society, ISOC,
204.
204. The Internet Society,
ISOC, is a non-governmental
international organization that seeks to
coordinate
internetworking technologies
technologies and applications for the Internet. See Internet Soc'y, What Is
coordinate internetworking
1997) <http://www.isoc.org/whatislindex.htrl>.
the Internet
Internet Society? (visited Sept. 14, 1997)
<http://www.isoc.org/whatis/index.html>. ISOC
promulgates
promulgates voluntary
voluntary standards for the Internet
Internet that have been developed
developed by the Internet Engineering
Engineering
Task Force and approved by the Internet
Internet Engineering
Engineering Steering Group
Group (or, in disputed cases, the Internet
14, 1997)
1997)
InternetSociety Standards
Architecture Board).
Arehitecture
Board). See Internet
Internet Soc'y,
Soc'y, Internet
Standards Page
Page Index (visited Sept. 14,
>.
<http://www.isoc.org/standardslindex.htil
<http://www.isoc.orglstandards/index.html>.
(W3C) is an international industry consortium run jointly
205. The World Wide Web Consortium
Consortium (W3C)
by the MIT Laboratory for Computer
Computer Science in the United
United States
States and the Institut national
national de recherche
recherche
en informatique
informatique et en automatique
automatique in France that seeks
seeks to promote standards for the evolution of the
Consortium, About the
Web and interoperability between WWW
Wcb
WWW products.
products. See World Wide Web Consortium,
<htp://www.w3c.org/Consortium/>.
14, 1997)
Consortium[W3C]
[W3C] (visited Sept.
World Wide Web Consortium
Sept. 14,
1997) <http://www.w3c.org/Consortiuml>.
id.
software. See id.
W3C produces
produces specifications and reference
rcference software.
(ISO) in Geneva is a world wide federaStandardization (ISO)
206. The International
International Organization for Standardization
federacountries. Its objective
approximately one hundred
tion of national standards bodies from approximately
hundred countries.
objective is "to
"to
promote the development
development of standardization and related
related activities in the world with a view to facilitating
of
the international exchange of goods and services,
services, and to developing cooperation
cooperation in the spheres of
activity." International Org. for Standardization,
intellectual, scientific,
intellectual,
scientific, technological
technological and economic activity."
Standardization,
1997) <http://www.iso.ch/infoe/intro.html>.
Introduction
Introduction to ISO: What Is ISO? (visited Sept. 14, 1997)
<http://www.iso.chlinfoe/intro.html> .
ISO's
ISO's work results in international agreements
agreements which are published as standards.
standards. See id.
id.
207.
Telecommunications Standards
207. The European Telecommunications
Standards Institute sets voluntary telecommunications
telecommunications
standards
standards for Europe and cooperates
cooperates with the European Broadcasting
Broadcasting Union and CEN/CENELEC for
for
SeeEuropean
Telecommunications Standards
broadcasting and office
office information technology
technology standards.
standards. See
European Telecommunications
1997) <http://www.esti.fr/admlrules/statute.htm>.
<http://www.esti.fr/admruleslstatute.htm>.
Inst.,
ETS! Statutes
Statutes (last
Inst., EISI
(last modified
modified Sept. 10, 1997)
208.
208. See supra
supra note 180.
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Lex Informatica.
Informatica.
Yet these groups are generally not governmental
governmental
organizations. Rather, they tend to be consortia of interested persons and
organizations.
companies.209
companies.3 9
For the moment,
moment, standards
standards bodies tend to be loosely organized
organized and
have few, if any, universal requirements for membership
membership other than enough
enough
generally make
money to attend the various meetings. The organizations
organizations generally
decisions by consensus. When the network community was small and
homogeneous,
homogeneous, this process worked well. However, it is unlikely that the
consensus model
model will persist to function effectively because global
networks now reflect more diverse interests. The commercial
commercial politics that
drove standards organizations will be succeeded
politicized
succeeded by far more politicized
of
social politics. This evolution is likely to make the technical tasks of
standards
bodies
more
difficult
to
accomplish.
The
technical
community,
standards
accomplish.
technical
willingly or not, now has become a policy community, and with policy
influence comes public responsibility. Policymakers
Policymakers by necessity
necessity must pay
closer attention to the activities of these organizations,
organizations, and they must
must
participate
developments
participate more aggressively if they wish to push technical
technical developments
in a direction responsive to public goals and the need for customization
customization
Policymakers should argue for particular
capabilities. Policymakers
particular technical
technical capabilities
objectives (i.e., what the network
and functions that will incorporate
incorporate public objectives
network
can and should do), while leaving the specifics of the protocols to the
engineers
(i.e., how the infrastructure
infrastructure will provide the capabilities
engineers (i.e.,
capabilities and
functions). This task will not be easy because the policy and technical
communities have very different cultures.
Finally, in addition
addition to formal standards organizations,
organizations, technical
effectively influenced
decisions can be effectively
influenced by ideas generated
generated outside of the
organization structures. Culturally, engineers start designing when
when
presented
presented with particular goals. Engineers therefore tend to be receptive
to presentations that state the public
public goal as a design objective. For this
reason,
reason, policymakers
policymakers can and must engage and participate in nontraditional
nontraditional
fora. Conference
Conference speeches, workshops, and interest group meetings
meetings thus
influence impacting
become key tools of influence
impacting the direction
direction of Lex Informatica
Informatica
development. In essence, the dynamics of Lex Informatica change the
development.
types of activities in which government
government should be engaged.
engaged.
VI. Conclusion
Conclusion
Lex Informatica
Informatica is an existing complex source of information policy
rules on global networks. Lex Informatica
Informatica provides useful tools to
formulate rules customized
customized for particular situations. Lex Informatica
Informatica

209.
209. The membership
membership of these organizations
organizations by and large reflects domination of industry
industry
representatives.
representatives.
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coexistence of varying infonnation
information policies in a heterogeneous
heterogeneous
allows the coexistence
environment. The pursuit of technological rules that embody flexibility for
information
maximizes public policy options; at the same time, the
information flows maximizes
ability to embed an immutable
architecture allows for the
immutable rule in system architecture
preservation of public-order
preservation
public-order values. These tools can lessen a number of
of
problems that traditional legal solutions face in regulating
regulating the Information
Infonnation
Society. Yet a shift in public policy planning
planning must occur in order for Lex
Informatica
to
develop
as
an
effective
Inf9rmatica
effective source of information
infonnation policy rules.
The new institutions
institutions and mechanisms will not be those of traditional govPolicymakers must begin to look to Lex Informatica
ernment regulation. Policymakers
Infonnatica
to effectively fonnulate
formulate information
infonnation policy rules.
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ELECTRONIC COMMERCE SYMPOSIUM

RESTORING AMERICANS' PRIVACY IN ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE
Ily 10cl R Reid(JI//""l!. f

ABSTRACT
In the United States today, subswnce abusers have greater privacy
than web users and privacy has become the critical issue for (ile development of electronic commcn:c. Yet, the U_S. government's privacy
policy relies on industry self·regulation rather than legal rights. This arti·
cle argues that the theory of self-regulatioll has normative flaws and that
public experience shows the failure of industry to implement fair information practkes. Together the Hawed theory and data scandals demonstrate the sophistry of lrS. poliey_ The article then examines the compre-·
hensive legal rights approach to data protectioll that has been adopted by
governments around the world, most notably in the European Union, but
finds that difficulties implementing tllese laws for online services pose
important challenges for the effective protection of citizens' privacy. The
[essons show that safeguarding citizens' rights requires a combination 01'
law and technology and that a legal incentive structure is necessary to
stimulate the rapid development and implementation of privacyprotecting technologies. The article concludes with a recollllllendation
for a framework privacy law in the United States modeled on the
O.E.CD_ guidelines that includes a safe harbor provision for policies and
technologies and that creates a U,S. Information Privacy Commission to
assure the balance between citizens' privacy, indnstry needs, and global
competitiveness.

Privacy is a critical isslie for the growth of electronic commerce_ During the last few years, an overwhelming majority of Americans reporl that
they have lost control of their personal information and that currcnt laws

© 199910el R. Reidenberg,
l' Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Program Academic

Aff~lirs,

Pordham

University School of Law. An earlier draft of this paper WHS pr<%cllted lit the University
of California, Berkeley Symposium The u'gal and Policy Framework }i'r Global Elec·
tronic Commerce: A Progress Report held March 4-6, 1999. J ;;un very grateful [or the
thoughtful comments of Symposium participants and of (he editors of the Berkeley Technology [~IW Journal.
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arc not strong enough to protect theiT privacy, I In 1998, Business Week
found thai consumer worries about protecting privacy on the Internet
ranked as "the top reaSOll people are staying off the Web above cost, ease
of usc and annoying marketing messages,,,2 The fair treatment of personal
information and citizen confidence are each necessary conditions for electronic commerce over the nex.( decade, Yet, sadly, at the political birth of
the electronic commerce movement in 1997, the W11ite House's report, A
Frwrwworkfor Glohal Electronic Commerce,.l more commonly referred 10
as the Magaziner l~ep()rt, missed a key opportunity 10 assure the protection
of citizens' privacy on th01nl0rneL
For years, the United States has relied on narrow, ad hoc lcgal rights
enacted in response to particular scandals involving abusive iuformat;oll
practiees,4 The approach has led to incoherence and significant gaps in the
protection of citizens' privacy'> For ex.ample, substance abusers have
stronger privacy righl.s than web users in the United States." Yet, rather
than revise American privacy protection, the MagazineI' Repol1 adopted a
position enshrining the slatus quo,
This paper will first examine the philosophy and sophistry behind the
U,S, policy of industry ,df-regulation, Next, the paper examines the comI. Privacy Exchange,org, 1998 Prh·acy COt1c'(;tnS & Consumer Choice ,)'urvey,
Executive
SumnwlY,
al
1
(lasl
modified
Dec.
15,
1(98)
<http://www.pd vacyexchangc,orgli"isurvcysl! 298execslIm,html> (reporting thai 82% of
those surveyed fccl Ihat consumers hav" losl all control over how c(\lllpani.es collect and
usc their personal infonnalion): Am, Ass'n, ur Retired Persons, AARP lv/embers' Con,
cems a/Jout [Il[ormatio/! Privacy, Dec, 1998 (reporting Ihat 78% of those polled found
existing staUJlOry protections inadequare to prOleCl privacy).
2, BW!Harris Poll: Online insecurity, Bus, WK" Mar. 16, 1998, al 102
<hllp:llwww.busineS5weck.collliI998/1 I/b35691 07,hlm>,
3, WILLIAM J, CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOnA!.
E112CTRONIC COMMm,CE (1997), available at <llllp:llwww.iilf.nisl.gov/cieccommi
econun.hlln> {hcreinafler PRMfEWORK).
4, See PAUL M, SCHWARTZ & 101)1, R. REmENlJIlRG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A
STUDY OF UNHllD STATES DATA PROTECTION to (1996),
5. See generally FRED H, CATE, PRIVACY I~ THE INFORMATION AGE (1997):
SCHWARTZ & RElDENIlERG, DATA PIUVACY LAW, supra nOle 4.

6. l-;'ederal law carefully prOlccls the personal information of imHvidual;; who HUN
dcrgo u"e~ttl11cnt tor alcohol Or drug abuse in programs receiving federal funds or subject
LO ]eoernl reglll~lion, See 42 USC. §§ 290dd-l, 290dd-2 (1994); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, DATA PRrvACY LAW, supra 110le 4, all77-78, Al tne same lime, only limiled
protection is availabfe for Internet users. Stallliory protection applies to telecommuuica"
1ions transactIon information when collected by lclecommunications service providers,
See 47 U,S,C, § 222, However, if the data is collected by web ,iles, ins lead of service
providers, Ihen the statutory protectiol1 does not apply.
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prehellsive legal righls approach to data protection tilat has becn adopted
by governments elsewhere aroLlnd the world, in a movcment led by IIIC
European Unioll. While conceptually the cross~sectoral approach is better
suited to the treatment of personal information in electronic COlllmerce, the
foreign experience illustrates a number of challenges for effective protection of citizens. The concluding section argues for a more desirable policy
that combines legal and technological means in order to safeguard the pri~
vacy of eitizcns on the InterneL

I.

THE PHILOSOPHY AND SOPHISTRY OF U.S. PRIVACY
POLICY

Broad, international consensus exists on the hasic standards of fair illformation practice and the protection of citizen privacy in a democratic
soeiety7 As recently as June 1998, the Clinton Administratioll even said
that the "OEC-D. Guidelines have served as the basis for virtually all privacy legislation and codes of conduct that have been developed over the
years:,g Bcginning with the U.S. Department of Health and Education's
elaboration of the first computer privacy policy i.ll 19739 and the United
States' approval of the Organization for Economic Co~Operation and Developmcnt's privacy guidelincs in 1980, the United States has recognized
benchmark norms for fair information practice. These llorlllS include
s[Jceification of the purpose for data collection, the cOllsent of individuals
to process personal information, the transparency of data processing, such
as notice to individuals and access to their personal information, special
7. See Council of Europe, Convention for the protection or individuals with regard
to automatic processing of personal data. Jan. 28, 1981, lOUIe T.S. No. 108, reprillted ill
20 LLM. 377 (t9gl), "vailaM" at <http://www.coe.frleng/legaltxUI08e.htm> [hereinaf·
ter European Convention); Directive 95/46IEC of the European Parliament and of [he
Coullcil of 24 Oct. 1995 on 1l]{, protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on rhe free Jl]ovement of such data, 1995 OJ. (L2SI) 31 (Nov. 23,
(995), available at <http://europa.eujll!leur~lexlcllllifJdat/en_395L0046.html> [herein·
after European Directive]; O.l3.CD., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COUNCtL CONCERNING
GUIDELINES GOVllRNJNG THE PROl1iCTtON or PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLows OF
PERSONAL DATA, O.E.CD. Doc. C58 (filla!) (Oct L (980), reprinted in 20 LLM. 422

(1981 l, «!'ailable (JI <i1ttp:llwww.oecd,orgidstilstiliUse<;ur/prodII'RtV,EN.hrlll> Lben,in'
after OReD Guidelinesl.
8. U.S. DEPT, OF COMMERCE, PRlVACY AND ELECI'RONIC COMMERCE (June 1998)

<http://www.doc.gov!ecommerce!pri vacy.htm>.
9. See U.s. DEP'T OF HEAL'llI, EDUC & WELFARE, SECRETARY'S ADVtSORY
COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, Records, Compuler,l' and 11", Righls
of CUlzens (1973), reprinted ill U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION,
I'ERSONALPRtVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCllJTY, 15 n.7 ([977).
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treatment or particularly .~ensitivc information, such as medical data, and
the existence of enforcement remedies and mechanisms.
The United States, however, has rejected all allempts to legislate any
full set of standards w Rather, Congress and state legislatures have enacted
isolated and narrow stallites slich as the Fair Credit Reporting Act [I and
the Video Privacy Protection Aet,12 after the discovery of particularly
scandalous practices. This type of statutory protection only covers the
particular activities committed by specific actors slIch as a consumer credit
reporting agency or a video rental service provider. This reactive policy
for fair informatiou practices has historically been predicated on the philosophy that self-regulation will accomplish the most meaningful protection of privacy without intrusive government interference, and with the
greatest flexibility for dynamically developing technologies, The theory
holds that the marketplace will protect pri vacy because the fair treatment
of personal information is valuable to con:mmcrs; in other words, industry
will seek to protect personal information in order to gain consumer conn. . pro f'ItS. 13
dence and maxlImze
For more than twenty years, however, govemmcllt agency task forces
and reports regularly illustrated the lack of fair infolmation practices in
American society, but nevertheless resortcd to the mantra that busjnc"
should be gi ven more l.ime to sclf-regulate. 14 With the Internet revolution,
10. See Robert M. Gellman. Fragmented, Incomplete, and lJiscontinuous,' 'l71e F(1i!~
€ire of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and fnslilHtwns, 6 SOFTWARE LJ. 199
(1993),
I L 15 U.S.c. § 1681 (SllP!,. 3).
12. 18 UXc. § 2710-2711 (1994),
13. See, e.g" U.S, DEPT. OF COMMERCE. NA1"L TELECOM~L AND INFO. ADM.,
PRIVACY AI'D SELF· REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION Aml, ell I.A (June 1907)
<http://www.nlla.doc.gov/reports/privacy/privacY_JP1.htm> _
14. See. e.g .. U.S. PmVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY
IN AN INFORMATION SOClETY (1977); PEIlERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE:

A REPORT 1Xl CONGRESS (Jllne 1998) <http://www.l'rc,govlrcporls/privacy3/loc.lltm>;
INFORMATION POLICY COMMITI'EE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PROMOTlNG PRIVACY ON THE NATI01>:AJ. I1>:FORMAnON IN
FRASTRUCTURE (Apr. 1997) <hl4>:llwww.iiIInisl.g()vlipciprivlIcy.hlm>; FCDERALTH'IJ)Ji
COMMISSION, STAW REPORT: PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER PRIVACY ON TilE
GWBAL iNFORMATION INI~(ASTRlJCruRE (Dec, 1996) <l1llp:llwww'(k,govlreporlsl
privacylprivacyLhIm>; NAT'L TIlU;COMM. AN]) INFO. ADM., U.s. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
PRIVACY AND 1'1113 NIl: SAFEGlJAl(I)ING TELECOMMUNICATIONS·RllLATEn PERSONAL
INFORM AT\ON (Oel. 1995) <htlp:llwww.nlia.doc.gov/nIiahomelprivwhilct1aper.hlml>:
U,S. ADVISORY COUNCIL, Nt,noNA!' INFORMATION INI'RASTRUCTURE, COMMON
GROUND: FUJ>,;[)AMENTAL PRINCIPlLS FOR THE NATrONA!' INFORMATION INFRA,
STRUCTURE (MaL (995) ; U,S. INFORMATlON INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE WORKING
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the Clinton Administration had a chance to conceive a new vision of
American privacy. UnforlUnately for American citizens, the MagazineI'
Report soughlto preserve the slatus <juo:
The Administration considers data proteclion critically impor"
lant We believe that private efforts of industry working in cooperalioll with consumer groups are preferable to government
regulation, but if effective privacy protection cannot he provided
in this way, we will reevaluate this policy."

In effcct, the Magaziner Report catered to the industry of personal data
rather than enshrining citizen participation in decisions about their personal data. Indeed, the marketplace of personal information is big business
in the United States. By 1998, the gross annual revenue of companies
selling personal informatioll and profiles, largely without the knowledge
or COHsent of the individuals concerned, was reportedly $ 1.5 billion. Hi
Despite the claims of industry pmtisalls, there are critical nonnative
flaws in the !lleory of self-regulation for information practices. Selfregulation assumes that all privacy values can and should be resolved by a
marketplace. Yel privacy interests are central to democratic governance l ?
and privacy has been hailed as a necessary condition for participatory
lR
governance In contrast, totalitarian governments prefer the surveillance
I9
state Indeed, 11 democratic government typically docs not sell basic political rights. But evcn if one rejects this position, a marketplace call only
function efficiently if there is transparency; citizens lUust be able to identify the collectors and users of their personal information. However, for
personal information, the naturaltcndency of the marketplace is to obscure
its treatment
This is a classic case of market failure. Without disclosure by corporations, citizens canuot ascertain how their personal information is acquired
and llsed. In the pri vate sector, the economics are wmng for lTansparGROUP ON PRIVACY, PRIVACY AND nm NATtONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING ANn UStNG i'ERSOr-iAL INFORMATION (0,,1. 1995)

<hllP://WWw.jjlLnisl.gov/ipciipciipc-pubsioiil,rivprin.jllc.l.hlml>.
15. FRAMEWORK, ""pm note 3, al 14 (Issue 5).
[6. Sec {n re Tran,. Uniol1. FTC Dockel No. 9255, al 53 (July :11. 1998)
<htlp:liwww.flc.g()viosI199819808Id9255pub.id.pdf>.
17. See ALANE WESTIN, PRIVA(:YANDFREEOOM 23-26 (1967).
HL See Paul Schwartz, Privacy alld Parlicipation: Personal brformalioll ami Public
S(!clOr Regu/aItO/1 in the Ullited Slates, 80 IOWA L REV. 553 (1995); Spiros Similis, Re·
viewing Privacy in an In/ormatioll Society, J 35 U. PA, L REV. 707, 732 (1987).

19. S(!C WESTIN,supra note 17, at 23.
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cncy20 Companies make significant profits from Ihe secret colleclion and
sale of pe!'>;onal information; the $1.5 billion market in personal il1forll1a~
lion is largely hidden from pnblic view. Fcw individuals have ever heard
of companies such as Acxiol1l or First Data. Yet, these companies have
data warehouses with the most intimale details of the lives of million!; of
Americans, For example, Acxiom even sells information such as ethnic
and religions armiatiollS, the type of car a per;;on drives, and whether a
21
person buys specially clothing like particular types of underwear. With~
out transpareney, an information tralTicking industry has emerged in the
United Stales with no accountahility and minimal risk of harm to corpo~
rate financial intercsts from ahuRes of personal information. Not sllrpris~
ingly, an analysis of industry codes of ptivacy practice reveals policics
that fail to address the most basic principles of cili.zens' rights lO personal
information,22

In effecl, the American experience during the last two decades shows
that the Ulcory of self~rcglliation is pure sophistry. Time and again, the
U.S. government has acknowledged that self-regulation remains hypothetical in corporate America. The Department of Commerce lleid a long
awaited Public Meeting on internel Privacy in June 1998, initially de~
signed to give industry a chance to show ib self· regulatory sllcccsses 21
Unfortunalely, industry had very little to show in terms of concrete im~
plemcntation of privacy practices and the Secretary of Commerce
conceded that the business community was failing to demonstrate effective self~regLJlatioll.24 The Chainnan of the Fcderal Trade Commission, in
testimony to Congress during the summer of 1998, staled Ihat "despite the
Commission's considerable efforts to encourage and facilitate an effective

2tl See Jerry Kang. !t~f()rmati()n Privacy in Cyberspace Tl'anS{lt:,'liof'ls, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1248 (1998) (observing lhalu'allslIclioo costs arc 'gOOfed inlhe market-based
solutions); Paul Schwmtz) Pri"vacy awi fhe Economics (~f' Personal Health Care Inf(umalio", 76TEX.L. REV. I (l997).
21. See Acxiom COla/og, at 9 (ethnic dalal, Il (specialty apparel dalal, 12~ 13 (car
data) (1999) <hllp:llwww.acxiom.comlinfobasc!caraloglealalog99.pdf> (PDF file).
22. See Joel R. Reidenberg & Paul M. Schwartz, L,'gai Perspecfi.ves ()ll Privacy, ill
INFORMATION PRIVACY: LOOKING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK (M",y Culoan & Robert
Bics cds., forlhcoming 1999) (noting particular failure of industry code:-. to encompass
significant amounts of personal informalion and the failure Lo include remedies for victims of infonuulion abuse).
23, See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, Agenda ji". Public Meeling on in",mef Prime),
(June 23-24, t 99H) <hUp;//www.nlia.docgov/ntiahome/privHcyJconfinfo/agenda..htm>.
24. See Commerce Secretary William H. Daley, Remarks to Privacy Sumntil (June
23, 1998) (Iranscripl available al <htlp:llwww.doc.govlopaiSpecches/98()623.htmi.>j.
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self-regulatory system, we have not yel seen one emerge,"}' Several
monlhs laler, the first government review of the position paper A Ffillfl('work f{)J' Glo/}(I/ Electron,,: COl1l1nerCe wistfully admits thaI industry has
only tentatively responded to privacy concerns even in the face of heavy
26
government pressure.
lL is wonhy 10 note, however, lhal industry has improved ils privacy
talk over the last few years. Trade associations are now addressing the issucs of dala privacy (and lobbying Congress against rcguhllion). The Secretary of Commerce has also tried to highlight self-regulatory initiatives
such as TRUSTe and B BBOnLine as evidence of progress'"]
But, ironically, these examples themselves demonstrate the slructural
defects in self~regulalory theory, TRUSTc, for example, is a program
111roUgh which websites agree to disclose their privacy p()licie~ and license
the ri!fshl,to use, a spedallogo designating tllC site as oue tbal protects privacy:' 1 RUSl e may audrl licensees to venfy conlpllatlCC WIlll the stated
privacy policy, However, the program has had a few major problems. Although about 450 companic.s arc licensed to use the logo 10 date, this
number is trivial cotl1rared to the number of website operators in tI\(;
United Stalcs. In facl, one of the companies, GeoCities, holds the distinclion of being Ihe first company prosecuted by the Fedcral Trade Commission {'or information Irafficking,29 and fifty percent of the TRUSTe sponsors do nOI bother to subscribe to the program and license tbe logo.30
TROSTe even features a link on its web page to a look-up service sile that
25. E.lectronic COInmerce: Privacy 11l Cyberspace, Hearings 011 H.R. 2368 Before
the Subcomm. oN Telecommunications, Trade and ConslUner Pro/ection of tlif House
COllun. Oil Comn",!'ce, 105 COllg, , 2nd Se,"" July 21, 1998 (leslimony of Robert PilOfsky,
of
the
FTC).
available
at
<hllp:llwww.l.lc.govlosIl998/98071
Chairman
pt1vac98,htm#N_3 j ,
26, U.S. GOV'1' WORKIKG GROUP O~ ELlie. COMMERCE, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 16
(Nov, 1998), a!'ailable al <llllp:l!www.doc.gov/ecornmcrcclE-comm,pdf>,
27, See Commerce Secretary William H. Daley, Remarks al Press Conference on ECommerce (Feb. 5, 1999) (lranseript available al <hllp:l!www.doc.govlopaISpeecl1csl
ecoilimerceremarks.htnll> ).
28. Sec TRUSTc, TI?UST" Program Pril1ciples (visiler! Mnr.30, 1999)
<hltp:llwww.I(IlSle.orglwebpublisherslpub""principles,hI111I>,
29. See In re GeoCilie" Decision and Order, 1'-T.C, Docket No. C-3850 (vi.,ited
Mar.29, 1999) <htlp;llwww,tic.govlos!l9991990219823015d&O,hlm>.
30, As of March 2, 1999, TRUSTc bad 51 sponsors; only 26 were registered as Ii,
censecs of the TRUSTe logo 10 show a commilmenl to privacy. Compare TRUSTe,
n~USl"
Sp"".>'o!'.>'
(visiter!
Mar.
30,
19(9) <hrlp:llwww.truslc.orglnbou(f
abm"_sponsOl's,hlml>, lVilh TRUST", /.ook Up A ('01111'(111)' (visited ModO, 19(9)
<hllp:ilwww.ll.usle.orgluscrslusers_lookup.hlml>.
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fails to disclose its privacy policy and is owncd by a company thaI is not
even listed as a TRUSTe licensce 31
A similar pallern exists at BBBOnLine, a project of the Beller Business Bureau proposed more than a year ago in response to U,S, government ~ressure on indnstry to demonstrate that self-regulation might
worL' BBBOnLine hopes to provide an enforcement mechanism for pri
vHey disputes online, However, f()f the moment, the BBBOnLine mechanism remains hr)OtheticaL While the program officially launched 011
March 17, 1999, 3 BBBOnLine ignores the issue that consent might not be
an appropriate basis for the processing of some personal information, slIch
as health data, only requires Ihal websites disclose particular practices,
fails 10 require thai remedies be afforded to victims of information abusc,
and fails to require that individuals be granted complete access to their
personal informalion 34 In addition, BBBOnLine uses a ncbulous and nndefined term, "individually identifiable informatioll," to circumscribe the
scope of its participants' obligations, It also remains to be seen whether
the online industry will. participate Oil significant scale,
Allother important privacy initiative likewise remains unavailable even
aftcr three years of development and government encouragement Internet
labeliug and filtering technology based on the world wide web's prolocol,
Platform for Internet Content Selection ("pres:,) has been under development for a privacy application, the Platform for Privacy Preferences

31. ·l'RUSTe requires that 'lweb siles .. , IHUsl disclose fheir personal information
collt;ction and privacy practices." TRUSTe, The TRUSTe Program: HOl'I! it Protects )lour
Pl'il'Gc), (visited Mar. 30, 1999) <http;!lwww,truste,org!users!users_how,IHml>, However,
fromthc main TRUST" memoer directory web page, TRUSTe, Member Directory (vis,
il",1
MaL
30,
1999)
<hllp:!/www,trusle,C()Ill>,
there
is
a
link
to
<hllp:IJwww.woddpagc!>.com/whitcpagc:;>.This lalter sHe allows a uSer to search for the
address and phone number of anyone in the United States. The site does not display a
TRUSTe logo, nor does it disclose any privacy policy. There is a link in fine print at thl~
bottom of the web page About Vr'or/dpages to another web page:
<http://www.woridpages.cOIll/(iocs/aboul.whtllll>(visitedMar.30.1999).This last web
page simHarly says nothing nbout privacy. bul docs identify the owner of the pa,ge: Weh
YP, Inc, Web Yl', Inc, is not listed as a licensee or TRUSTe, though a company identified as "World Pages, Inc," i~ lis;tcd.
32, See
!lBIlOnLine,
liomepage
(visited
Mar.
31,
1999)
<hltp:llwww,bbbonline,i,:nm>,
33. ,)'et: Robert O'HarfOw, Better Business Bureaus Offer Online Privacy Seal,
WASn.I'OST, Mar. 17, 1999, at EL
34, See B!lBOnLillc, EligiiJili1y Cd1eriaj{}/' BlJBOnLine Privacy Seal (visited Mar,
31, 1999) <hUp:!Iwww.bbconiinc.com/busincs.• csipri vacy/eligibility ,I1tml >,
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("]>3P"), sincc 1996 35 The World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C,,)16, an

inl1uenlial standards selling body for Ihe Internet, has led thc development
effort for P3P teclHloiogy. Yet after three years, W3C has still not obtained
sufficient industry agreement to conclude the developmcnt phase, let al.one
find companies willing to implement the technology. In addition, P3P
faces a patent licensing problem lhal jeopardizes its ultimate adoption hy
.III d ustry.",/
The cornerstone of these self-regulatory efforts and U.S. policy seems
to he the concept thaI notice and consent will solve the privacy issues. In
describing the noticc principle, tbe Magaziner Report articulates that
"Idjata-gatherers should inform consumers what informatiolllhey are collecting, and how they intend to use such data."i~ The report describes the
consent standard by asserting that "Idjata gatherers should provide consumers with a meaningful way to limit usc and re-use of personal information.,,19 The MagazineI' Report even argues that "principles of fair in··
formation practice [] rest on the fundamental precepts of awareness and
choicc.,,4o This position is also emphasized dearly in the U.S. Department
of Commerce's Elements of ~Yfe(;tiJie Seif-Regulation. 41 Yet, these pronouncements seriously misconstrue hasic fair information practices principles. These basic principles inclllde key standards, such as purpose
limitatiolls, data 111lnimization, and duration or storage that arc not satisfied merely through notice and consent; notice aud consent arc not
e!lough. The United States has evcn recognized this broader range of isslies when it endorsed the O.E.C.D, Guidcliues. 42 In the rare instance
when a government agency, the Federal Communicatiolls Commission,
35. See I'HDEltA!. TRADE COMMISSION, TRANSCRlJ>T: PUIlLlC WORKSHOP ON
CONSUMER PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INf~'ASTRUCTURE, ETC. PROJECT
1'954807, a[ 79-90 (June 4, 1996) (stalement of Paul Resnick, AT&T Research)
(Iranscnpt available at <i1llp:!lwww.tkgovfbcp/privacy/wkshp96/pw'J60604.pdf».
36. See W3C, About tlte World Wide Web Consortium (visited Apr. 20, 1999)
<hup:/Iw\VIV. IV3 .org/Consortium!>.
37. ~""(!e Chris Oakes, Pawn! May Thnwten E~Prjvacy, WiRED, Nov. 1 1,1998, available (II <hnp:J[www.wired.comfnews!llcws/tccilllologyfstoryfI6180.html>; lntennlnd,
A.hoUl
Inlermind
Comrnul1iauion's
Patents
(visited
Apr.
20,
1999)
<h up :JJwww.in(ermlnd.comima te ri aIs!patent~d-esc. huni> .
38. FRAMEWORK, sUl'm nOle 3, at 12 (Issue 5).
39. Id.
40 Ilf.
41. See U.S. DEI'T, OF COMMERCE, NT.!.A., ELBMEN1S OF EH'ECTIVE SELFREGl)LATlON FOR PROTllCTlON OF PRIVACY (Jan. 1998) <illtp:/lwww.lll;a,Joc.govlreporL\
Elements II)fivacydrafl/t98dftprill.hl!!l>.
42. See supra nolc 8 and accompanying lexl; Gellman, supra nOie 10, nl 200.
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gave considered analysis [0 the effectiveness of consent as a legitimate
basis for the sale of personal informatioll to markelers, the FCC found optout to be a deficient basis for processing personal information under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that mandated the protection of subscriber privaey.41
Thlis, to rely principally all notice and consent ignorcs the other basic
fair information practice principles and underlines how self-regulation has
not worked. Indeed, for the online world, technological defaults routinely
favor privacy invasions over the implementation of fair information practices for citizens. Recent examples. such as the incorporation by Intel of an
embedded identifier 011 each of iL~ Pentinm !II chips44 and the "sman
browsing" features of Netseape Commnnicator and Internet Explorer
software that upload from the user's computer a hidden file containing the
Internet addresses of sites visited by the user:; illustrate techniques that
facilitate the surrcptitious surveillance of eitizens. These examples demonstrate that the full range of fair information practice principles are marginalized by self-regulatjon defined in terms of notice and consent. Smart
browsing, for instance, confronts the basic principle of purpose limilatioHS
and storage duration as addresses, processed to make website connections,
are stored beyond the durati.on of the connection and now uploaded [0 a
remote site for profiling purposes.
These basic flaws in the theory and practice of the U.S. self-regulatory
approach pose an increasingly tronbling problem for companies developing electronic commerce. Electronic eommerce is global, yet American
privacy policy is at odds with the growing movement around the world to
establish clear, comprehensive legal rights. Ironically, American companics' global electronic commerce activities face an heretical choice: either
provide better protection for U.S. citizens in order to have a single set of
practices for global operations (because foreign laws require fair illfol'lnalion practices) or maintain a double standard, treating foreign citizcns to
better privacy than U.S. citizens. The MagazineI' Report largely ignores

43. Sce FCC Second Rep"'t and Order and Further i':oliee of Proposed Rulcmaking,
FCC Docket No. 96~149, '[ 91 (Feb. 19. 19(8) <hllp:llwww.fce.gov!Burealls!
CommollJ~arrier/Orders/l 998/f0c98027 ,tXI>.
44. See Jeri Clausing, After Illtel Chip's Debut, Critics Step Up Attack, i':.Y. l1MES
ON Ttm Wllll (Feb. 19, 1999) <hup:llwww.llytimes.com/library/tech199/02lcybcr/articles!
19inlel.hlml>.
45. See Neweapc Corp., What's Related l'IIQ (visiLcd Apr. 20, 19(9)
<hup:/Ii1ome.l1c(scapc.com/cscapcs/relaledlfaq,htmltlo6>.
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this incongruity in boldly assuming that t.he rest of the world would simply
accept the U.S. status quo with better educational eiTorts 46
The international consequence o/" this self·regulatory pretense is an
embarrassment for the U .5. government. Without demonstrable privacy
protection in the United Stales, Europe threatens to block the now of personal information to the United States 47 The U.S. Department of Commerce has sought to ncgotiate with the European Commission a "sak harbor" code Ihal would assure privacy for international data lransfers to the
48
United Slates and avoid any European data export prohibitions The proposal met with resounding criticism and virtual ridicule for its lack of
.
conletll. 49 Because
the Department of Commerce cannot propose any
meaningful privacy staudards, such as implementation mechanisms or enforcement devices providing remedies to victims, without undermining
support for self-regulation, it is lluequipped to respond to such criticism.
Yet, without meaningful privacy standards, the United States isolales itself
from the rest of the world. The time has come to reevaluate and reverse
the policy that enshrines electronic surveillance and information trafficking against citizens.

II. THE CHALLENGE OF COMPREHJ£NSIVE LEGAL
STANDAIUlS
The recycling of unsuccessful and outdated privacy policies in the
United States is in direct contrast to the data protection movement around

46. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, at (4 (Issnc 5) ("The United Slates will continue
policy discussions ... to increase understanding about the U.S. approach to privacy and to
assure thal the criterin [Europeans) use for evaluafing adequacy are sufficientiy flexible to
accommodate our approach.").

47, See Elfropean lJirective, supra note 7, at tIrt. 25.
48. See U.S. Dept of COlluucrce, Draft Infernational 5'afe Harbor Privacy Princi~
pies (Nov. 4, 1998) <htlp:llwww.ita.doc.govleconllmenu.hrm>.
49, See International Trade Admhlistration, U,S. Depe Of Commerce, Public Com-

ments

filed

on

"Draft

Imernational

Safe

Harbor

Privacy

Principles"

<http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecomicom.htm>; Working Patty of European Data Protection
Supervisory Aulhorilies, O{Jinion 1199 concerning the level of data protection ill the
United SlaM,'>' and the ongoing discussion beftVi~efl the European Commission and the
Unired Slates GOl'ern",clIl, DO XV 5092/98IWP15 (.fltll. 26, 1999) <http://europa.eu.inll
oolllln/dg 15/ell/mediaJdataprollwpdocs/wp 15eu.htl1l>; Working Party of European Data
Protection Supervisory Authorities. Tran.sfers of personal data 10 third countries: Applying Anicles 25 alld 26 oj Ihe EU dara pro/cction direnive, DO XV D/5()251981WPJ2
(July
24,
1998)
<bttp:/leuropa.uc.inllco!llm/dgI5/ellimediaJdalaprollwpdocsi

wpI2en.htm>.
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the world. Foreign countries, led hy the fifteen stales of the European Un·
ion (the "Memher States"),50 more typically follow an omnibus or comprehensive approach. Ironically, Europe learned its post-war lessons alloll1
information privac( from the movement in the United Slates during the
J 960s and 1970$. S But, unlike the United States, as European countries
faced the computcr processing of large quantities of personal information
in the 1970s and 1980s, they adopted comprehcnsive data protection statntes to enshrine a rights-hased, rather than market-based, approach to prj··
vacy. Indeed, in 1981, the Council of Europe opened for signature and
ratification a data privacy treaty that has as its object and purpose "to se
cure in the territory of eacll Party for every individual, whatever his na~
tionality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamcntal freedoms, and
in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of
personal data,,,52
Under the European model, framework legislation guarantees a broad
set of rights 10 assure the fair treatment of pcrsonal information and the
protection of citizens. In general, the modem European data protection
laws define each eitizen's basic legal right 10 "information self.··
determination."SJ 'nlis European premise of self-determination [luts the
citizen in control of the collection and usc of personal information. The
approach imposes responsibilities on data processors in connection with
the acquisition, storage, use, and disclosure of personal information and, at
the same time, accords citizens the right to consent to the processing of
their personal information and the right to access stored personal data and
have errors corrected. Rather thall accord pre-eminence to business inter-

50. These Slates arc Auslria, Belgium, Dcnmal'k.l:"'inland, France, GermanYl Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, POltugal, Spain, Sweden, and the Uniled King
dom.
5!. Sec, e.g.. COUN BENNETI', REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND
PUULlC POLlCY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992): DAVID 1"'.AIIEllTY,
PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIBS (1989): Fred H. CalC, The EU Dala
Protection mteClive, b!for!lw/ioll Privacy, and the Public [l1leres/80 IOWA L. REV. 431

(1995).
52, European Convention. supra note 7 at art, 1.
1

53. This term "information self-determination" was coined by II 1983 Gemmll court
decision prohibiting the inlrusiveness of a nalional census, See Judgment of Ihe FirS! Senale [ilvelfge, Karlsruhe], Dec. 15, 1983, tram/flied ill 5 HUM. RrS. L.1. 94 (1984).
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ests, the European approach seeks 1.0 provide for a high level of proteclion
for citizcns 54
Although the comprehensive rights approach has conceptual appeal for
electronic commerce, it poses nonnative challenges for thc structure of
electronic commercc ventlll'es and the effective protection of citizens. Because the rights-based approach relies 011 omnibus legislation, it C()Vem the
electronic processing ()f personal information regardless of context. 55
These statutcs apply the same standards of fair treatment for personal information across sectoral boundaries of collcction and usc. In theory, this
cross-sectoral application of principle correlates well to an information
society where industry boundaries blur and dala use defies clear categorization.
However, with the proliferation of European data protection laws during the coume of the last two decades, tile national laws evolved 56 and different standards in various Member States threatened the now of personal
information within Europe. For example, the scope of application of data
protecllon laws and transparency requirements varied across national laws,
posing conflicts for pan, European data processing 57 In response, the
Member States of the European Union sought to harmonize daw protec,
lion principles and launched a five-year negotiating process that ultimately
resulted in the enactment of the European Directive on daw protection. 55
The European Directive contlrmcd,the pre-existing comprehensive
rights-based approach and contained both general and exacting mles aggregated from the laws of various European Union Memher States 59 Like
the existing national laws, the European Directive's mtes address the full
set of intel1lationally recogniz,ed principles. Each Member Slate must enact legislation implementing standards conforming to those defined by the
54. See, e.g., European Directive, supra note 7, at Recilal IO (explaining that the
purpose of (he DirectiYe is to "seek to ensure a high level of protection in the Commu~
nity").
55. See id., at Recital t2, art. 3.
56. See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Generatioual Development of Data Protectioll
ill Eumpe, ilt TECHNOLOGY AND PRIV ACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 220 (Philip E. Agre &
Marc Rotenberg cds., (998).
57. See Eumpea!! Directive, slIjJI'a nOle 7, at Recilal 7; JOEL R. REfDENBERG &
PAIn. M. SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: REGULATORY

RnSPoNSES (Eur. Comm. [998). (1Fail£lble a/ <hup:lleuropa.cli.inllcommldgI5Ien/medial
datapwtJSI lid ieslreg u I. pdf> .
58. Sce European Directive, supra note 7.
59, ..\'ei? Spiros Shuitis, From the Mark(u to tlte Poli!:;: The EU DireClive on Jhe Protectioll oj Persollal Dala, 8() IOWA L REV. 445 (t995).
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Emopean Directive,60 and each Member Slale mllst maintain an independent, national supervisory authority for oversight and enforcement of these
privacy protections. 61 Significantly, the European Directive also mandates
that Member State law require any person processing personal information
to notify the supervisory authority and the supervisory authority must keep
a public register of data processors 62
While the harmonization of European data protectioll around compre"
hensive standards seems eonceptually better suited to electronic commerce, ill practice, the complexity of data processing arrangcmcnts in an
infonnation society makes the application of general principles to particular contexts challenging. Indeed, the registration mechanisms designed
[0 assure transparency of processing activities can become onerous and
problematic. Within Europe, critics have argued that compliance with
these registration obligations is lacking.(i} Elsewhere, required notification
10 a government agency of nata collection might be seen as an overly in"
tlUsive government action_ (nthe Uuited States, for example, the European
commitment to the registration of dala processing activities with a government agency would clash WillI Fourth Amendment values against government intrusion into the activities of eitizens.
Furthermore, the applicatioll of the European Directive does nol rcmove all divergences and ambiguities in the European national Iaws M
Small divergences and ambiguity will inevitably exist where the principles
must be iuterpreted by differeIll supervisory organizations in each of the
Member States. These remaining divergenees in standards can pose significant obstacles for the complex information processing arrangements
typical ill electronic commerce, For example, the European Directive requires that privacy rights attach to information abont any "identifiable per-

60. This 'transposition' of the European Directive's standards into national law was
to have occurred by October 1998. See EUl'Opean Directive, "li!'fa note 7, at art 32_
However, as is nOl uncornmon in the European sys{ern, few Member States have complied with the deadline.
6l, Set; European Directive. supra note 7, al art 28,
62. Ste id_al art 18·10_
63. See Existing case~law on compliance with data. protection laws alld principles in
lite Member States iJf the Europea/l Ullia ... Annex to the Annuat Report 1998 of the
Working Party Established by Article 29 of Directive 95/4GlEC (Douwe Korff cd_, EUL
Comm: (998)64_ See RmDENBERG& SCHWARTZ, DATA I'ROT!l(.'TlON LAw, supra note 57; PETER
SWIRE & ROBERT LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLowS, ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, AN)) TIOJ EUl{()l'EAN PRlVACY DnUlCTIVIl188·96 (1998).
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SOtl.,,65 Yel, the scope of this definition is not the same across the Member
States; what some Member States consider "identifiable" others do 1I0!."('
Similarly. the disclosures that must be made to individuals prior to data
collectiotl vary within Europe."1 These differences distort thc ability and
desirability of performing processing operations in various Member States
since potentially conflicting requiremellts might apply to cross-border
processing of personal informatioll.
The errecl of this challengc to comprehensive standards is, however,
mitigated by consensus building options and extra-legal policy instruments
that are available under the European model. Thc European Directivc creates a working party of thc Member Siaies' data protection commissiollers. 68 The Working Party offcrs a fOllnal channel i()f data protection om·
cials to consult each otller and to reach consensus on critical interpretive
questions. But, policy gnidelines from the Working Palty will not be sufficient to assurc privacy in electronic commerce. Guidelines will not be
meaningful in a dynamic network environment without a technical infrastl1lcture that also promotes data protection. This has been recognized interuationally by data p!ivacy commissioners: "it is mandatory to develop
design principles for infonnation and communications technology."
which will enable the individual user to control ". his personal data.,,69
fnterestil1gly, the European model includes a provision for consensus on
industry codes of conduct that might prove quite useful to facilitate the
implementation of privacy compatihle techno\ogies 70 The European Directive, building on Dutch law, provides for approval of codes of conduct
as conforming to the privacy standards. This provision can be used to certify technical codes and configurations to assurc privacy?! The use of such
technical measures may also be designed to avoid problems found in staudards divcrgence, such as the differences in notice requirement~n
65. European Directive, supra nole 7, at art. 2(a).
66. See REl[lEI'-lBERG & SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECl10N LAW, supra flole 57, al 124-

26.
67. See id aI133-34.
68. See Buropean Directive~ supra nole 7, al arlo 29.

69. i<llcl1laliona! Working Group on Dala Proleclion and Telecoll1ll1unicallons, Data
Protectioli alld Privacy all the {mernet: Report and Guidance (Berlin, Nov. 18, 1996)
<hUp:llwww.datenschulz-berlin.de/diskus/13 _15.hll11>.
70, See European Directive, supra note 7, at art. 27.
71. See RElDENDERG& SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW, supra nole 57, at 147.
72. See iii. at 153-54; Working Parly of European Data Prolection Supervisory
Authorities, Opinion II'JS: Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) ami the Opell Profiling Standard (OPS), DG XV D/5032/98IWPl1 (June 16, 1998) <illlp:lleuropa.eujnli
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For global information networks and electronic commerce, the com··
prehensive approach also inevitably invokes tension, Without the statutory
authority to restrict transborder data flows, tbe balance of citizens' rights
in Europc could easily be compromised by the circumvention of Europe
for processing activities. Consequently, the European Directive includes
two provisions to assure that personal information of European origin will
be treated with European standards, Tbe choice of law clause in the European Directive assures that the standards of the local state applies to activities within its jurisdiction and the trans border data flow provision prohibits the transfer of personal information to countries that do not have
"adequate" privacy protection 73 Some commentators have predicted that
any European action will spark a trade war that Europe might lose before
the new World Trade Organization,74 While, in theory, such a situation is
possible, it is equally remotc,75
Evcn with the difficu lties of the European approach, countries elsewhere are looking at the European Directive as the basic model for information privacy, and significant legislative movements toward Europcanstyle data protection exist in Canada, South America, and Eastern
Europe 76 This movement can be attributed partly to the pressure from
Europe arising from scrutiny of the adequacy of foreign privacy rights, but
is also partly duc to the conceptual appeal of a comprehensive set of data
comm/dgIS/en/medialdataprot/wpdocs/wpllen,htm>; Joel R. Reidenberg, International
Data FIOli.lS and Methods (0 Strengthen International Co-operation (paper presented at
the 20lh internalional Conference of Data Protection Authorities, Santiago de Compostela, Spain) (Sept. 17, 1998) <http://home,sprynel.com/-reidenberg/idLhtm>.
73. See European Directive, supra nole 7, at art. 4 (choice of law) and art. 25 (expOI'I prohibition),
74, See SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 64, at 188-96.
75. See .loci R. Rcidcnberg, The Movefnen! toward Obligato!}' Standards for Fair
b~formati()n

Practices in the United States, in VISIONS FOR PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES

FOR THE DIGITAL AGE (Colin Bennel & Rebecca Grant eds., 1999).
76. See, e.g., HUNGAIUAN REPUBLIC, THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF '!HE PAR·
LIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR DATA PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF iNFORMATtON
68-72 (1998) (discussing the influence of the European Directive for Hungarian dala
protection law); Council of Europe, Chatt of Signatories and Ratifications (visited Apr.
20, 1999) <htlp:llwww.eoe.frllablconvIl08r.htl1l> (listing countries thai have ralified Ihe
treaty 011 dala privacy); [ndustry Canada, Task Force on Electronic Commerce: 'l7w International Evolution (!f Data Protection (Ocr. I, 1998) <hLLp:l/e-col1l.ic.ge.ca/englishl
fastfacls/43dlO.htl1l> (juslifying Ihe Canadian proposal [or a comprehensive privacy law
by referencc to the European initiative); Office oUhe Privacy Commissioner for Personal
Dala, Hong Kong, Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, Ch. 486 (visited Apr. 20, 1999)
<htlp:l/www.pco.org.hk/ord/secliOldlO.htl1ll> (displaying Hong Kong slatule thai fol·
lows the European comprehensive model).
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protection standnrds. In effect, Europe has displaced the United States in
setting the global privacy agenda with the enactment of the datn privacy
directive.
Bnt, as illustrated by the European experience, the resolution of these
difficulties cannot derive from law reforlll alone. In short, the comprehensive standards approach has two serious problems. First, general principles, while needed, leave significant margin for implementation and interpretation, especially in countries with very different legal cultures. For
electronic commerce, any ostensibly small divergences in implementation
or interpretation can gcnerate significant distortions affecting the coverage
for personal information and the incentives for protection by companies 77
Second, the process to enact data protection law in Europe shows that
adoption of legal rights is exceedingly slow. The existing European data
protection directive took five years and transposition into national law was
scheduled for three additional years 78 In Internet time, these delays are
generational.

III. SAFEGUARDlN(; CITIZENS' RIGHTS WITH A
COMBINATION OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
The lessons from the American experience with self-regulation show
that government cannot abdicate responsibility for the protection of citizens' privacy to a marketplace skewed in favor of sale of personal information. At the same time, lhe lessons from the European experience
involving detailed comprehensive statutes illustmte that effective privacy
does not end with a legislative enactment The guarantee of ptivacy (or
citizens requires a combination of law and technology that affords mechanisms to assure the fair treatment of personal information.
rn a democratic state, privacy is and remains a basic right of citizens. 79
In contrast to lIlany other aspects of privacy, informational privacy is
unique in that citizens cannot determine how their personal infonnation is
being used without access to internal activities of those processing the
data. To paraphrase Justice Stewart, "I do not know it when I cannot see

77. See REU>ENIlBRO& SCHWAR:IZ. DATAPRO'IllCTION LAW, s"pm 1I0le 57. at 14246.

78, See European Oirective, supra note 7, at art 32,
79. See Job Rubenfeld, The Rigra oj Privacy, W2 IIARV. L. REV. 737 (l9R9); OECD
Gu,idelines. supra note 7, at Preamble C"M'ember countries have a common interest in
protecting privacy and individual HbcJties."); Schwarlz supra nole J 8; Similis, supra note
18; WESTIN, supra nole 17.
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il. "RO As a consequence, the citizcn confidence in tile Ireallllent or personal
informatioll thai is so necessary for robust eleclronic commerce will nOI
develop without a clear underlying sel of rights,
To restore privacy for American citizens, the Uniled Slates need;; a
framework Ihal provides cOllsistenl fair information practices across different types of uses of personal information and different forms of proe"
essing arrangements, The United States governmcnt, however, need not
try 10 reinvenl [<IiI' information praclice principles, The O,E.C,D, guidelincs offcr a full sel of slandards already recognized by the United Slates,81
The content of these guidelines provides a clear basis and level playing
ficld for cilizen privacy, and the ~uidelilles Ihemselves have heen praised
as sensitive to business concerns, 2 These principles should be adopled in
law as the American framework for information privacy.
Nevertheless, as both the American and European experiences show,
technological capabilities and configuratiolls hold the balance between
effective [ail' trcatment of personal information and defective privacy,
Technical choices embcd a set of ~olicy rules for information flows in data
processing systems, This "code"s or "lex informatica"S4 contained ill the
technical infrastructure has a direct rule-making effect. on privacy, For ex·

80, Iacobelli" v, Ohio, 378 U,S. [84, 197 (1964) (describing attempts to calegori"e
pornographic materials as "1 know il when I see it"),
81, See O,E,CD, Guidelilles, supra uo10 7; U.S, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY
AND
BLECTRONIC COMMERCE (June 1998) <http://www,doc,gov/ecommeree/
privacy,hllll> (recognizing the OECD Principles as the standard); U,S, Dert of COlllm.,
Nat'( Telecomm. and Info. Adm., nrc Global Information lnfl'astrucrure: Agenda for
Cooperafioll, GO Fed, Reg. 10359, 10367 (Feb, 24, (995) (recognizing that the US ne"
eepts the OECD Principles),
82, After lhe O.E.C.D, adopted the guidelines, major U.S. companies subscribed In
the principles, See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRtY ACV POLlCY ACl'lvl'rmS OF THE
NATIONAL TllLECOMMUNtCATlONS AND INFORMATION AGENCY (Aug. 31, 1984) ciied in
Gellman, supra nole 10, at 227 n.60; H,I', Gassman, Vcrs UII cadre juridiqu" intemotion·
ale pour /,inj(}f71lafique et aulres fJOlwelles Jechuiques de l'infi)rnUllioll1 ANNUA1RE
FRANCAIS DE DROIT iNTIJRNATIONAL 747, 750 (1985) (according to the allinor, who was
a staff official at Ihe O.E.c'D" 180 U,S, cOl1lranie, had subscribed 10 Inc O,E,c'D,

guidelines),
83. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L. .1.
869,898 ([996).
84. See Joel R. Reidenhcrg, Governing Networks and Rule Making in Cyberspace,
45 BMORY [" J, 911, 917-19,929 (1996); Joel R, Reidenberg, f.RX lilformafica: The Fal"
l1tu/afion of lr~f(}rm(ftion Policy Rules through Technology, 76 TEX, L. REV. 553 (1998)
[herein.fier Lex Informatico] ,
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ample, the protocol P3p R5 is designed to empower web users by grvlllg
them information about website privacy policies and affording web u,ers
choices in the provision of personal information. However, P3P can only
be effective if fairly written and appropriately implemented. The technical
way in which the 1'31' protocol allows the expression of privacy policies
and the choices given to web users are value-based decisions B6 Furthermore, the manner in which P3P is incorporated in browsen;, including the
default settings and the fashion by which websites actually describe their
practices, arc critical for fair treatment of personal information. The development of "cookies" and their ability to track users across the Internet
is another example of policy rules embedded in technical standards B7 The
initial default settings buill into browsers encouraged the secrcl transfer of
nser's information, and only when faccd with scandal did the software developers increase users' control over the disclosure of infonnation B8
These eases show that the technology can "go either way." The availability of privacy-protective technologies and privacy-enhancing default seltings must exist. Yet, industry has demonstrated ils lethargy in developing
and implementing these technologies. Already, P3P has been in the development stage for three years and wide-spread usc of the standard is, at
best, a long time away.
Government must, therefore, act in a fashion that assures technological
development in a direction favoring privacy protections rather than privacy intrusions. During the debate over self-regulation, U.S. industry took
privacy more seriously only when government threats of regulation were
perceived as credible. For example, the threats and cajoling from the Federal Trade Commission was a key impetus for the development of the
BBBOnLine, Online Privacy Alliance, and TRUSTe programs. But, despile deadline extensions for action by the Fcdentl Trade Commission,
none of these programs has yet to demonstrate accountability by their cor85, P3P is a protocol to enable disclosure and negotiation of the terms of consumer
privacy between a web user and a web sile coHecHng personal informalion. See W3C,
Platform for Privacy Pn(ferell£es 1'.11' Projecl (v;s;(ed Mar. 31, 1999)
<hup:llwww.wJ.orgIP3P>.
86, See Joel R. Reideuberg. The Use of Technology 1o Assure Imernet Privacy.'
Adapting LabeL. and Nltus for Da/a Proteclion, LEX ELECnwNlcA (Fall 1997)
<htlp:ll www.!ex-elec(f()niea.orglreidenlle.hunt>.
87. See Mark Slayton, All Introduction to Cookies, HOT WIRED, Nov. 7, 1996
<http://www.holwired.com/weblllO)lkeylwellmonkeylgeeklalkI96145Iindex3a.lltml>.
88. See James Glave, Next NeL,,,ape Will Clrew Cookies on Command, WIRED
NEWS, Feb. 22, 1997, available at <htlJl:!lwww.wired.com/newslnewsllecimology/sLOfyl

2t96.h(ml>.
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porate members for violalions of privacy to individuals Indeed, to tlte
contrary, industry created policies tend toward privacy myopia in the development of new products. Intel, for example, seemcd genuinely surprised by the outrage expressed against its planned use of an unique identifier on its Pcntium III chips.9()
With the enactment of a basic set of rights, the incentive structure for
industry would shift to the development of effective protection for citizen
privacy rather than the elaboration of vaguc policies to forestall corporate
accountability. The existence of basic legal rights will force industry to
deploy fair information prucliees thai are well-balanced rather than
skewed against citizens. To stimulate the quick development of privacy
protecting system designs, these legal rights should allocate liability to
cOIllV<lnies that fail to develop and deploy privacy-enhancing technology. I In doing this, legal standards will create new markets and opportu··
nities for the development of privacy pmtecting products.
In any case, the promotion of privacy-friendly technologies and the
implementation of fair information practices in particular eontexts and especially in the electronic commerce context require COllstant vigilance.
While counterintuitive for wany in the United Slates, a U.S. Jnfol1l1ation
Privacy Commission is urgently needed. Privacy policy requires a (JI'lun
with a de.ar mandate for independeut judgmenl to build consensns on solutions in partienlar contexts and 10 arbitrale disputes among stakeholders.
In addition, U.S. business interests need an advocate in the face of international data nows. For years, the United States has remained Oil the sidelines of the annual meeting of data protection commissioners from around
the world because the United States has no privacy conllllission.
At present, no existing agency or department in the United Slates is
well suited to the tripartite role of consensus builder, privacy arbitrator,
and international advocate. The Department of Commerce, where international privacy policy is presently formcd, Illay be politically expedient, b11l
is inappropriate for the range of privacy issues in the [nfortnation Society.
The Commerce Department does not, for example, have particular expertise or competence in health privacy issues or glohal flows of employee
data and is notoriously captured hy business interests at the expense of
89. None of the programs offers any damage rcm~dy to individuals when the
pany adhcren'R {'ail to fulml their privacy commilments.

COlll-

90. See Polly Sprenger, [Illef Oil p,.iva"y: 'Whoops", WIRED NEWS, Jan. 25, 1999
<hllp:l/www.wiroo.com/ncws/newsfpolilics/st(Jl.y/17513.blml>.
91. See Lex btformatica. supra nOle 86, at 584 ({liscu;.;;;ing the effect of liabililY ~H1d
lhe struclure of the lmcmel.).
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citizens' concerns92 The State Departlllent might be more appropriate for
the foreign policy role, but has no expertise on the myriad of domcstic privacy issues. Similarly, existing independent agencies such as the Federal
Communications Commission would be poor choices for (he centralizaliol1
of privacy policy. The competence of these existing agencies is scc(oral
and each lacks expcrtise in cross-sectoral issues. The recent creation of a
new position in the White House Office of Management and Budget is a
good, but insufficient sIep93 Unfortunately, the new position is placed
within the layers of the OMB bureaucracy and docs not fulfill all the
needed roles. Instead, thc po,t has a coordinating role aml docs not have
policy decioion-making authority nor does the posilion have authority for
the international negotiations with Europe.
If the United States hopes to protect effectively citizen pdvacy in
eleclronic commerce, an independent privacy commission offers a number
of allractive hellefits both for citizens and businesses. The application or
general privacy principles in the dynamic and complex online environment will inevitably require illlerpretalion of the standards. Sillce a citizen's perspective may undervalue the interests of industry and societyal
large to information flows, while a corporate perspective will undervalue
citizen's privacy, an independent privacy commission can offer critical
guidance. In patticular, such a commission can be accorded the authority
94
to grant safe harbor protections for company practices Like a no-action
letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission, a company seeking
guidance and assurance that its policies arc appropriate should be able to
request approval from the privacy commission. Such an approval would
mean that the practice conforms to the legal obligations for the fair treat ..

92. For example, instead of publishing nolice in the Fede.."l Register for public
comment on the draft international privacy prindples, Undersecretary Aaron scnl a leiter,
dated November 4, 1998, addressed "Dear Industry Representative" and posted il on a
hidden web page several days later See Lener from David Aaron, Undersecretary of

Commerce 10 Industry Representalives (Nov. 4,
[998), (lvailabie al
<11 tlp:llwww.iw.doc.gov/eeotllJaaron I ! 4.htnll>.
93. Ded"u McCullagh & James Glave, ClilllOIl Tabs Privacy Poinl Mall, WnUlD
NEWS, Mar. 3, 1999, available (/1 <htlp:l1www.wired.cominewsJnewsipolilics/S(Dryi

IB249.htmt>.
94. ~)'ee Joel R. Reidenbcrg, Privacy ill (111 Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier Jor Illriividualliighls?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195,242 (1992) (proposing a legislative model \vilh a sufe harbor mechanism for induslry),
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mcnt of personal information. This safe harbor approach was recently endorsed by the Federal Trade Commisslon 91
In the context of electronic COlllmerce, the sal'c harbor concept is especially powerful for guidance 011 technical infrastructure decisions. Technical protocols, default settings, and implementations can be treated the
same way as company practices and policies for purposes of a safe harbor 96 The existence of such a voluntary approval mechanism would give
companies an important tool to avoid myopic, internal evaluations of the
privacy ramifications, prolect against data scandals, insulate the cOIllJlany
from liability for privacy invasions, and satisfy foreign privacy regulators
such as those in the European Union.
AI the same lime, the safe harbor process would afford citizens an opportunity for public comment on the eonformity of practices to framework
legal obligations and would not immunize practices outside the safe harbor
nor immunize Ihose safe harbor practices thai change. Over time, safe harbor deeisions would develop a body of public guidance thai would in·
crease transparency for all citizens. For citizens, the independent eommissiclIl and a safe harbor proeedure would also assure that the interpretation
of fair infonnatiol1 practices for electronic COlllmerce continues as an on·
gomg process.

IV. CONCLUSION
The time has come for the U.S. government to become serious about
privacy and restore protection to citizens. The MagazineI' Report clearly
erred in charting a conventional approach for a most unconventional, new
environment Citizens participating in global electronic comm~rce need to
be assured that their personal informatioll will be treated fairl.y. Companies engaged in electronic commerce eanllot be crippled in their usc of
personal infOlmatioll. Fundamental values are at stake and ollc-sided policies and solutions will undermine democratic society.

95.

~)'ee

Electronic Comm-cree: Privacy in Cyberspace. Hearings on I-rR. 2368

Before the SubcotTIm. on Telecommunications. Trade and Consumer Protection o[ the
HOllse Comm. 00 Commerce, 105(11 Coog., 2nd Sess., July 21. 1998 (testimony of Roberl
p(torsky, Chairmao of the I'TCl, available at <h(tp:llwwwJIC.gov/osIl998198071
prjvac98.hlm#N~3j.

96. See, <'.8., REIDENUERG & SCHWARTZ" DATA PROTEC'110N tAW, supra nole 57, al
153,54.
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computerization in the 19705.
infonnation since
since the first wave of computerization
omnipresprocessing, fears of omnipotent and omnipresDuring the early days of data processing,
ent collections
collections of personal
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personal information
infonnation were
were largely
largely conceived
conceived in terms
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centralized computing and foreign data havens akin to tax havens.!
havens.' Until the
centralized
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See, e.g
e.g.,.• ANDRt
L'INFORMATIQUE 67 (1987) (describing the fear of
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personal computer
computer revolution, large
large scale
scale processing
processing of
ofpersonal
personal information
information
personal
to institutions
institutions with
with centralized
centralized databases.
databases.22 The
The InterInterwas generally reserved to
net and personal computers,
computers, however,
however, multiply
multiply the
the number
number of
of participants
participants
net
generating and
and using
using personal
personal information
information in aa way
way that
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was unimaginable
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Web site
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occurring for
for many
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though cross-border transfers of
reflect both a quantitative and
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eral years and the decentralization of information processing arrangements
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exponentially increased the flow of personal information across national borders. From the processing of German railway card data in the
gastronomic products through the Hong
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March6 de France,s
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economy and fair information practices have never been more important for
for
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treatment
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citizen privacy is essential
essential to the robust development of electronic com8
S
merce.
At the same time, however, privacy rights for personal
personal information
infonnation vary
considerably across national borders.99 The United States, for example, has a
considerably
market-dominated policy for the protection
personal information
market-dominated
protection of personal
information and only
only
information privacy.O
privacy.lO In
accords limited statutory and common law rights to information
European norms reflect a rights-dominated
rights-dominated approach and the Eurocontrast, European
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International data flows on the Internet,
statutory protections for citizens.
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intracorporate data management,
management,
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United
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raise the stakes for individuals, businesses and government. In the absence
likely.133
of coherent privacy protection, data flow embargoes are increasingly
increasingly likely.1
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Part I of this article defines
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Internet
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ofthe House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong.
tioll o/the
Congo (July 21, 1998) <http:Avwwv.ftc.gov/osl1998/
<http://www.ftc.gov/oslI998/
9807/privac98.htm> (prepared statement of Robert
9807/privac98.htm>
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman
Chairman of the FTC) (describing
(describing the
the
FTC's position on the privacy
American citizens); European
privacy protections
protections necessary
necessary for American
European Data
Data ProProtection
supra note 11
tectioll Directive,
Directive, supra
II (setting
(setting out privacy standards for the 15 Member
Member States of the
European Union); Council of Europe (COE),
European
(CaE), Convention
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
1981, 20 I.L.M. 377 (1981)
[hereinafter
Regard to Automatic
Automatic Processing of Personal
Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981,20
(1981) [hereinafter
COE
CaE Convention]
Convention] (defining the standards for adoption
adoption by signatory countries to the international
treaty); OECD, Guidelines on Governing
Governing the Protection
Protection of Privacy
Privacy and Transborder
Transborder Flows of Per1980, 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981)
[hereinafter
sonal Data, Sept. 23,
23, 1980,20
(1981) <http:/coe.fr.englleglatxt/108e.htm>
<http://coe.fr.eng!1eglatxtl108e.htm> [hereinafter
OECD Guidelines]
Guidelines] (recommending
countries). See gen(recommending a set of standards
standards for adoption
adoption in member
member countries).
supra note 10 (explaining
erally BENNETT,
BENNETT, supra
(explaining different solutions to privacy protection in different
countries); DAVID
countries);
DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING
PROTEcrING PRIVACY
PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE
SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA,
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
REpUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN,
CANADA, AND THE
TIrE UNITED
UNITED STATES
STATES (1989)
(1989)
& REIDENBERG,
REIDENBERG, supra
(critiquing the differences in government
government data protection); SCHWARTZ &
supra note
9 (comparing
(comparing U.S.
U.S. law and practice to European
European standards and finding important
important differences);
ALAN F. WESTIN,
(1967) (describing perspectives
ALANF.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
AND FREEDOM (1967)
perspectives on privacy from different cultures).
cultures).
15. See generally
SCHVARTZ & REIDENBERG,
REIDENBERG, supra
generally SCHWARTZ
supra note 9 (analyzing
(analyzing the differences
differences beapproaches and standards); SWIRE
& LITAN, supra
supranote 10 (arguing
(arguing
tween the U.S. and European
European approaches
SWIRE &
for confrontational differences
The
differences between
between the United States and Europe); Joel R. Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, Tlte
Privacy
Obstacle Course:
HurdlingBarriers
TransnationalFinancial
FinancialServices,
Privacy Obstacle
Course: Hurdling
Barriers to Transnational
Services, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. S137, S148-60 (1992) (describing
(descnoing differences between
between ad hoe
hoc and omnibus approaches).
approaches).
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or a socially-protective,
socially-protective, citizen's
citiz~n's rights norm. This insight means that efforts
to harmonize
harmonize specific standards would conflict
conflict with the way any given model
embodies a market-based
or
a
rights-based
market-based
rights-based philosophy
philosophy of governance.
governance.
If the harmonization
of
privacy
rules
is,
thus,
harmful
for the political
harmonization
privacy
balance adopted in any country, then the peaceful
coexistence of different
peaceful coexistence
privacy rules becomes
becomes essential to avoid online confrontations.
confrontations. Part V presents a theory for the coregulation of information
information privacy that identifies key
institutional players and mechanisms to minimize
minimize regulatory conflict. And
finally,
Part
VI
offers
shortlong-term strategies for coordination
fmally,
and long-term
coordination and
cooperation among different
different privacy
privacy regimes. The article concludes with a
coregulation might have on the governance
discussion of the effect that this coregulation
governance
norms that posed the original
original conflicts.

I.

CHARACTERISTICS
DATA FLOW CHARACTERISTICS

On the Internet, four characteristics
international transfer of
characteristics frame the international
of
characteristics reflect
personal information. These characteristics
reflect a trend that marks dramatically increased capacity and incentives
incentives to abuse personal information
information
across national borders. The salient points range from the actual uses of dedeployed technologies (specifically, collecting clickstream
information
and
clickstrearn
multinational
commercial incentives that drive the procmultinational processing) to the commercial
processing of personal
personal information
information (notably, data warehousing
warehousing and profiling).
Taken together, these characteristics
characteristics set the stage for intense conflicts
conflicts over
over
information privacy.
A. Clickstream
ClickstreamData
Data
A

In a network
network environment, every
every click of a computer's mouse leaves a
16
data trace.
"clickstream data" is far more robust than the typical
trace)6 This "clickstream
"transaction data" from an electronic
electronic payment or telephone call. "Transac"Transac"transaction
tion data"
contain discrete information
information on the parties, date, time and
tion
data" typically
typically contain
type of transaction)7
transaction.17 In contrast, by its very nature, the clickstream reflects
type
For useful illustrations, examine
16. For
examine the cookies.txt files, the .hst files or the cache
cache subdirecsubdirectory files
files on
on any
any personal
cookies.txt files contain
information about actions taken
tory
personal computer. The cookies.txt
contain infonnation
taken
by a user at specific
PersistentClient
Client State HTTP
Cookies <http://home.netscape.
<http://home.netscape.
specific websites. See Persistent
HITP Cookies
comfnewsreffstd/cookiespec.html> (describing information
comlnewsret7stdlcookie_spec.htmI>
infonnation that can be stored on a client's hard
bard
drive when he connects to a server). The .hst files contain the addresses of all recently visited webwebsites accessed
accessed by the personal computer and the cache subdirectory contains copies of the Web
Web
pages
recently viewed
pages and
and images
images recently
viewed on the personal
personal computer. Often, similar data
data reflecting a user's
activities
be hidden
hidden on
hard drive. See Peter H. Lewis, What's
What's on Your
YourHard
Drive?,N.Y.
activities will
will be
on the
the hard
Hard Drive?,
TIMES, Oct
Oct. 8, 1998,
1998, at G1
GI (noting that people
TIMES,
people may be unaware that sensitive and embarassing
embarassing files
may be found on their computers).
See, e.g.,
Implementation of the Telecommunications
Telecommunications
17. See,
e.g., Implementation
Telecommunications Act of 1996:
1996: Telecommunications
Carriers'
Information and other Customer
SecCarriers' Use
Use of Customer Proprietary
Proprietary Network Infonnation
Customer Information, Second Report
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-115, FCC
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not just the existence of interactions, but also includes the content of those
those
clickstream and not just the
interactions; every keystroke is included in the clickstream
information provides
fact that an interaction
interaction took place. The clickstream
clickstream infonnation
continuous,
continuous, recordable surveillance of individuals and all of their activities.
clickstream infonnation
information is increasingly sought. For example, softThis clickstream
ware is now
now readily available and used to establish
establish monitoring programs for
clickstream
workplace.t8
economy moves society
IS As the Internet economy
clickstream data in the workplace.
from an economy of mass production
transactionproduction to mass customization,
customization, transactiongenerated information
generated
infonnation becomes
becomes an integral part of the process to predict and
websites
modify consumer
consumer behavior.19
behavior.l9 On the Internet, most web
sites collect some
20 These log files routinely
clickstream data in the form
files.20
collect
routinely collect
clickstream
fonn of log files.
browsing the site and record the Web pages
the Internet addresses of visitors browsing
of
that the visitors read.21 Internet service providers similarly can record logs of
all subscribers'
subscribers' interactions, but, for the moment, are unlikely to retain the
information. The sheer volume of such records exceeds the useclickstream infonnation.
fulness for Internet service providers. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, advertising
advertising arrangements on the Internet
clickstream data
Internet seek to recapture the attributes of the clickstream
that the online service providers forgo. Companies such as DoubleClick22

98-27 (rel.
1998) <http://www.fcc.govlBureausiCommon_Carrier/OrdersI1998/fcc98027.
<http:llwww.fcc.gov/BureausCommonCarrier/Ordersl1998/fc98027.
(reI. Feb. 26, 1998)
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
txt>; NATIONAL TELECOMM.
TELECOMM. AND INFO.
INFO. ADMIN. (NTIA), U.S.
COMMERCE, PRIVACY
AND THE
TIIE Nil:
N1I: SAFEGUARDING
SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED
TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED PERSONAL INFORMATION
INFORMATION (1995)
(1995)
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html>
transac<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html> (describing
(describing the ease with which transaction data can be accessed
accessed by private individuals).
individuals).
18.
18. For example, a product called
called Surf Control
Control Scout is designed to show employers "'who's
"'who's
doing what and when."'
Internet Monitoring
and Reporting
Reporting <http://
when.'" Surf
Surf Control Scout Corp., Internet
Monitoring and
<http://
www.surfeontrol.comfproducts/index.html>.
www.surfcontroI.comlproductsiindex.html>. There is even a monitoring product
product offered to netBrother." See Kansmen Corp., Kansmen Corporation
Corporation
work administrators
administrators that is called
called "Little
''Little Brother."
<http://www.littlebrother.com/products/lb/pr.htm>.
Announces LittleBrother
LittleBrother 2.0, Oct. 22, 1997
1997 <http://www.littlebrother.comlproductsflb/pr.htrn>.
Nearly two-thirds of U.S. employers report that they implement employee
employee surveillance
surveillance programs.
See AMERICAN
AMERICAN MGMT. ASS'N INT'L, 1997 AMA SURVEY:
SURVEY: ELECTRONIC
ELECTRONIC MONITORING &
SURVEILLANCE
SURVEILLANCE 1 (1997)
(1997) <http:llwww.amanet.orglsurvey/elec97.htm>.
<http://www.amanet.orglsurvey/elec97.htrn>.
Interactivityas
as though Privacy
Privacy Mattered,
Mattered, in TECHNOLOGY
TECHNOLOGY AND
19. See Rohan Samarajiva, Interactivity
PRIVACY: THE NEW
NEW LANDSCAPE, supra
supra note 21, at 277-81 (discussing
(discussing the trend toward mass customization and the threat it poses to personal privacy).
20. See Joseph I. Rosenbaum,
Rosenbaum, Privacy
Privacyon the Internet:
Internet: Whose Information
Inforntation Is itAnyway?,
Anyway?, 38
38
JURIMETRICS
"dossier effect"
effect"
JURIMETRICS 3.565,571-572
J. 565, 571-572 (1998)
(1998) (discussing how the Internet
Internet contributes
contributes to the "dossier
in which large amounts of small pieces of information
information about individuals
individuals are amassed).
amassed). See genergenerally lean-Marc
es traitenlents
traitenentsinvisibles
Internet (June 1998) <http://www.droit.fundp.
<http://www.droit.findp.
Jean-Marc Dinant, Les
illvisibles sur Internet
ac.be/cridleclip/Iuxembourg.html>
ac.be!cridlccliplluxembourg.htrnl> (describing hidden collections of personal
personal information on the
Interet).
Internet).
21. Network operating software can
can be configured
configured to record the log files as a default.
default. System
System
operators
operators must affirmatively
affirmatively disable the feature. See Cliff Wootton, Analyzing Log Files,
Files, WEB
DEVELOPER'S J.
<http://www.webdevelopersjoumal.com/arficles/loganalysis.html>.
DEVELOPER'S
J. <http://www.webdevelopersjoumal.com/articlesllog_analysis.htrnl>.
22. DoubeClick's Web site is located at <http://www.doubleclick.com>.
<http://www.doubleclick.com>.
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propose
"cookies" technology
users'
propose through the use of "cookies"
technology to track Internet users'
browsing
browsing patterns
patterns across many websites.23
clickstream data offer a quantitative leap forward in the amount
In effect, clickstream
amount
24
circulation.24 At the same time, the surveillance
surveillance
of personal
personal information
information in circulation.
clickstream data is also qualitatively
of
aspect of clickstream
qualitatively different from earlier
earlier forms of
transaction
transaction data. The detail offers a picture
picture that was previously
previously not readily
readily
compiled. While the depth of information
information available from clickstream
clickstream data
might have
have been obtainable with a private investigator
investigator recording an individual's every move, such surveillance
surveillance would have been treated as harassment.
In the past, privacy
privacy was preserved from the isolation of discrete
discrete bits of information. The difficulty in assembling such information
information provided
provided protecprotecindividuals.25 Clickstream data break
tion to individuals.25
break down this protection.
Sourcing
B. Multinational
Multinational SourCing
The Internet
Internet and emerging electronic
electronic commerce
commerce activities encourage
6
26
architecture of the Interinformation. The entire
entire architecture
multinational sourcing of information.2
net is based on the principle
principle of geographic
geographic indeterminacy. The information
make distance and
processing capabilities of the network were designed to make
arrangegeographic location irrelevant. As a result, servers
servers and processing arrangements migrate;
migrate; data may be stored in one location and readily shifted to another location
location just as transmission and computing resources may be moved
moved
instantaneously from one place to another.27
another27 Corporate intranets, built using
instantaneously
adopted the same feasome of the same technology as the Internet, have adopted
28
tures. 28
elsewhere, and
Data may be collected
collected in one location, processed
processed elsewhere,
23. See DoubleClick
PrivacyStatement <http://www.doubleclick.com/privacYJ)oIicyl>
<http'//www.doubleclick.com/privacy policyk (deDoubleClick Privacy
scribing
Services, supra
scribing the company's
company's policy regarding information collection
collection and use); On-line Services,
supra
note 5, at 80-95 (discussing DoubleClick's development,
development, operation, and data protection
protection practices).
practices).
24. See Schauer, supra
supra note 3, at 557-59 (discussing the quantitative
quantitative increase in data
data availability).
25. See
See id.
id. at 559 (noting that modem information technology allows access
access to information
information
previously
previously unavailable).
26. See, e.g., OECD, THE
THB ECONOMIC
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
SOCIAL IMPACTS
IMPAcrs OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
(1999) <bttp:/Iwww.oecd.org/subjectl
<http://wwV.oecd.org/subject/
PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS AND RESEARCH AGENDA
AGENDA Chap. 33 (1999)
e._commerce/summary.htm>
IMPACTS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE];
Communication
e_commerce!summary.htm> [hereinafter
[hereinafter IMPAcrs
COMMERCE]; Communication
from the Commission
European Parliament, the Economic
Commission to the Council, the European
Economic and Social
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
AND THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE
Regions, in GOBALISATION
GOBALISATION AND
THB INFORMATION
THB
NEED FOR STRENGTHENED
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION
COORDINATION COM(98)50 § 2.1 <bttp:l/europa.eu.
<http.//europa.eu.
STRENGTHENED INTERNATIONAL
int/comm/dg03/publicat/commstinfosoclomiscen.pdf> (discussing
inticommldg03/publicaticommslinfosoc/comiscen.pdf.>
(discussing the growth of global
global electronic
commerce).
commerce).
27. See CATE supra
supra note
10, at 10 (discussing the original
note 10,
original ARPANET and how it "encour"encouraged
IMPACTS OF
OF
aged the creation
creation of multiple links among the computers on the network");
network"); lMPAcrs
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra
interfinm colsupra note 26, at 79 (discussing technology diffusion and interfmn
laboration
laboration as changes brought
brought about by the growth of electronic commerce).
28. See generally
Training: Cmbank's
Citibank'sNet Division
generally Deborah Asbrand, Banking on Intranet
Intranet Training:
Division
Delivers Soft Skills and
Technology with Online Trainillg
Training Courses,
Courses, INTRANET 3.,
Delivers
alld Teclmology
J., Aug. 23, 1999
1999
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stored at yet another site. In addition, the open architecture also means that
29 For
intermediaries have access to and may process data in transit.
transit.29
multiple intermediaries
For
example, third-party data collectors, such as Internet advertising companies
like DoubleClick, obtain and pass on information about other websites'
websites' visitors. These arrangements radically increase the complexity of data processing and obscure the responsibility for data protection.

C. Data
Data Warehousing
Warehousingand
andData
DataCreep
Creep
C.

isolated
With the costs of computing
computing and storage diminishing rapidly, isolated
bits of data that in the past were useless or too expensive to process may now
retained. 30 Since information
be collected and retained.3D
information will always have value in an
"Information Society,"
Society," the almost zero cost of processing
"Information
processing incremental
incremental bits of
of
data offers a powerful incentive
incentive for "data warehousing."
warehousing." "Data warehouswarehousing" is the stockpiling of millions of bits of personal information for future
analysis. While each isolated piece of information
information may have little meaning
or risk minimal potential harm to the individual,
individual, the aggregate
aggregate collection
collection
takes on an entirely different character. Analyzing
Analyzing the aggregate
aggregate can reveal
behavior, profiles, and an intimate slice of the lives of individuals,
patterns of
ofbehavior,
segregate individuals in society.31
which can be used to categorize and segregate
society.3!
"Data
creep" is closely related to data warehousing.
creep" repre"Data creep"
warehousing. "Data creep"
sents the "more is better"
better" school of thought.32
thought.32 More
More and more
more bits of personal information
information are sought because of a vague belief that somehow the

<http:l/www.intraneqoumal.com/deploymentweb_trainingO82399.html>
<http://www.intranetioumal.com/deploymentlweb_training_082399.hlml> (describing
(describing Citibank's
Citibank's
use
use of
of Web technology
technology for intranet development).
development).
29.
IMPACTS OF
supra note
26, at 79-103
29. See IMPACTS
OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE,
COMMERCE, supra
note 26,
79-103 (addressing the
the
changing
market structures).
structures).
changing business models and market
30. See,
& HALR.
HALR. VARIAN,
See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO
SHAPIRO &
VARIAN, INFORMATION
INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
GUIDE
TO
THENETWoRK
TO TIlE
NETWORK ECONOMY
ECONOMY 33-34, 36-37 (1999)
(1999) (discussing the collection of consumer information);
GROUP, U.S.
PRIVACY AND
NATIONAL
PRIVACY WORKING
WORKING GROUP,
U.S. DEP'T
DEP'T OF
OF COMMERCE,
COMMERCE, PRIVACY
AND THE
THE NATIONAL
tion); PRIVACY
INFORMATION
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
INFRASTRUCI1JRE: PRINCIPLES
PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING
PROVIDING AND USING
USING PERSONAL
PERSONAL INFORMAINFORMATION ~ 6 (1995)
(1995) <http://www.ittf.nistgov/documents/committee/nfopolniiprivprinfmal.html>
<http://www.ittf.nist.gov/documents/committee/infopollniiprivprin_imal.hlm1>
("[B]ecause
("[BJecause the
the costs
costs associated with
with storing,
storing, processing,
processing, and
and distributing personal
personal records
records are
continuously
accumulating personal
continuously decreasing,
decreasing, accumulating
personal information
information from disparate
disparate sources
sources will become
become a
cost-effective
enforcement to direct
cost-effective enterprise
enterprise for
for information
information users
users with interests
interests ranging
ranging from law enforcement
direct
marketing.").
marketing.").
31.
31. See Jerry
Jeny Kang, Information
Information Privacy
Privacy in Cyberspace
Cyberspace Transactions,
Transactions, 50 STAN.
STAN. L. REV.
REV.
1193, 123941
1193,
123941 (1998)
(1998) (discussing
(discussing the construction and economic
economic value
value of
of detailed
detailed personal
personal profiles
to database
database marketing
marketing firms).
32.
creep." In
32. "Data
"Data creep"
creep" is analogous
analogous to "function
"function creep."
In political
political science
science terms,
terms, "function
"function creep"
creep"
describes the
the tendencies
tendencies of bureaucracies
bureaucracies to gradually
gradually expand
expand their functions or missions. "Data
creep"
creep" is the
the tendency
tendency to continually expand
expand the
the scope of
of collection
collection and use of personal information.
tion. See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., Samarajiva,
Samarajiva, supra
supra note 19,
19, at
at 301
301 (noting
(noting the .'creeping'
"'creeping' redesign
redesign of public teletelecommunication
communication networks
networks throughout
throughout the
the world to include
include covert
covert surveillance
surveillance capabilities").
capabilities").
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33 Since the cost to collect
information
information will have use.
use)3
collect and process information has dropped and the push for data warehousing has grown, more seemindividuals for storage and
ingly innocuous information is collected from individuals
future processing. For example, companies now ask for a customer's
customer's zip

conducted with cash.3
cash.344 A company
company
code even if the purchase transaction is conducted
does not need the customer's zip code to process
process cash transactions. But, the
zip code offers a key piece of data to generate
demographic profiles. By aggenerate demographic
gregating
seemingly anonymous data, the congregating innocuous information or seemingly
struction
detailed individual
individual profiles becomes
becomes routine.
struction of detailed
D. Pressures
Pressuresfor
Profiling
D.
for Secondary Use and Profiling
The ease of collecting
collecting and storing personal information
information coupled
coupled with an
enhanced
commercial pressures
enhanced capability to use it create
create tremendous commercial
pressures in favor of unanticipated
uses. 35S U.S.
U.S. industry has a long and enunanticipated or secondary uses.3
surreptitious and secondary use of personal
trenched tradition of surreptitious
6
information.36
These
diverted
uses of collected
collected personal information can
information.3
generate additional value. In the name of efficiency, an existing pool of pergenerate
37
sonal information becomes an attractive
attractive source of data for new uses. 37
This
particularly acute with respect to profildiversion of personal information is particularly
ing. Something
Something as routine as a magazine
magazine subscription
SUbscription becomes the basis for
for
a detailed profile
interests.
the
ability
of
Once
a
substantial
database
exists,
profile
to profile individuals within the database
database becomes easier and more valuable.388
able.3

33.
Kang, supra
supra note 31,
sophisticated database
33. See Kang,
31, at 1239 ("A sophisticated
database marketing initiative thus acacquires as much data on potential customers as legally possible.").
34. Staples, the office supply store chain,
chain, routinely
routinely asks customers for their zip code. The
cashiers
competing chain,
cashiers at Office Max,
Max, a competing
chain, cannot
cannot process credit card transactions without storing a
digital image of the customer's
customer's signature unless the manager intervenes.
35. See Adam L. Penenberg,
Penenberg, On the Web, No One
aile Is Anonymous, FORBES, Nov. 29, 1999,
1999, at
at
http:llwww.forbes.comlforbes/99/1129/6413182sl.htm (noting the existence of a Microsoft
184-85 htlp:llwww.forbes.comlforbes/99/1129/64l3182s1.htm
"watermark" and other technology that allows websites to track users).
''watermark''
SCHWARTZ &
& REIDENBERG,
36. See SCHWARTZ
tolerance
REIDENBERG, supra
supra note 9, at 391-92 (discussing the greater tolerance
R.Reidenberg,
for secondary
secondaI)' use of personal information in the United States
Stales versus Europe); Joel R.
for Fair
FairInformation
U.S. Private
Setting Standards
Standards/or
Infonnation Practice
Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector,
Sector, 80 IOWA
IOWA L. REV. 497,
(1995) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Setting Standards]
Standards] ("As seen in the direct marketing and em530 (1995)
U.S. private
ployment contexts, secondary
secondaI)' use is a problem in the u.s.
private sector, particularly with respect
respect to
marketing applications.").
applications.").
CORPORATE
37. See H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING
MANAGING PRIVACY:
PRIVACY: INFORMATION
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE
increasing
AMERICA 7-8 (1994)
(1994) (discussing the concern that privacy
privacy is harder to maintain
maintain with increasing
computerization).
computerization).
Kang, supra
31, at 1238-41
1238-41 (discussing the myriad opportunities
"data
38. See, e.g., Kang,
supra note 31,
opportunities for "data
mining" once large databases
constructed); Josh Mchugh, Mind
Mind Readers,
databases have
have been constructed);
Readers, FORBES,
FORBES, Nov.
29, 1999,
http:/wvww.forbes.com/forbes/99/1129/6413182s4.htm (noting the ''wealth
"wealth of
of
1999, at 18889
188~89 http://www.forbes.comlforbesl99/1129/6413182s4.htm
data" Yahoo! Gathers on its customers).
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II. INTERNATIONAL
PruvACY PRINCIPLES
PRINCIPLES

These information processing
processing characteristics
characteristics present
present the same problem
problem
for citizens around the globe;
globe; namely, how to assure privacy in the complex
personal informaworld of online transactions. Norms for the treatment of personal
tion exist and share many common attributes across different legal systems
and cultures.39
illustrated in multilateral
instruments40 and academic
cultures. 39 As illustrated
multilateral instruments40
academic
4
democracies converge
scholarship I democracies
scholarship,41
converge on a basic set of principles
principles for "data
"data
protection"
"data privacy."
protection" or "data
privacy." These norms of fair information practice
practice constitute what can be termed First Principles, and their acceptance
acceptance separates
42 Yet, important divergences
democratic societies from totalitarian
divergences
democratic
totalitarian regimes.42
level. 4433
nationalleve1.
in the execution
execution of these First Principles can be found at the national
For the Internet, these divergences
divergences promote significant
significant conflict.
A. Convergence
Convergenceon First
FirstPrinciples
Principles

In democracies
democracies around the world, information
recognized as a
information privacy
privacy is recognized
critical element of civil society44 and as a necessity for the development
development of
of
4
the Intemet.45
Internet. s Trust and confidence
confidence online will not be possible without data

39. See,
eg., WESTIN,
WESTIN, supra
See, e.g.,
supra note 14, at 29-30 (illustrating that concern for privacy
privacy protection
is a cross-cultural
cross-cultural phenomenon).
Convention, supra
Guidelines, supra
European
40. See,
See, e.g., COE Convention,
supra note 14; OECD Guidelines,
supra note 14; European
DataProtection
ProtectionDirective,
11.
Data
Directive, supra
supra note 11.
41. For a scholarly
BENNETT, supra
supra
41.
scholarly discussion
discussion of data privacy in a democracy
democracy see generally
generally BENNElT,
10, at 96-111; CATE, supra
supra note 10; FLAHERTY,
supra note 14; WESTIN, supra
note 10,
FLAHERTY, supra
supra note 14;
and Overlap
Overlap in Privacy
Regulation: National,
Bennett, supra
supra note 2; Robert Gellman, Conflict and
Privacy Regulation:
National,
International,
and Private,
POLICY AND THE
[lltemational, al/d
Private, in BORDERS
BORDERS IN
IN CYBERSPACE:
CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL POLlCY
THE
GLOBAL INFORMATION
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
INFRASTRUCTURE 255 (Brian Kahin & Charles
Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
42. Data protection is necessary
necessary to protect
protect citizen freedoms and liberties from totalitarian repression.
Privacy, Democracy,
iformation, in
pression. See Charles D. Raab, Privacy,
Democracy, hzjomlation,
ilz THE GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE OF
OF
ed., 1997);
Privacyin an [nfomlation
Information
CYBERSPACE 161 (Brian D. Loader ed.,
1997); Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy
Society, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
REV. 707,
(1987) (discussing
707, 734 (1987)
(discussing the West German Federal Constitutional
information collected
Court's protection
protection of information
collected in the census as a way to protect other constitutional
rights).
rights).
43. See, e.g.,
10, at 193-219
193-219 (explaining the differences
e.g., BENNET,
BENNElT, supra
supra note 10,
differences in data protecprotection practices between
between Sweden,
Sweden, West Germany, Britain, and the United
United States); JOEL R.
REIDENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
RElDENBERG
SCHWARlZ, ON-LINE
ON-LINE SERVICES AND DATA PROTECTION
PROTECTION AND PRIVACY:
PRIVACY:
REGULATORY
(1998).
REGULATORY RESPONSES
RESPONSES (1998).
44. See Michael Donald Kirby, Privacy
PROc. XXI INT'L
Privacy Protection-A
Protection-A New Beginning?,
Beginning?, in PROe.
INT'L
CONF.
COMM'RS (1999)
(1999) <http'//www.pco.org.hk/conproceed.html>
[hereinafter
CONP. DATA PROT. COMM'RS
<http://www.pco.org.hk!conproceed.html> [hereinafter
"[w]hat is at stake [with privacy] is nothing less than the
PROC. XXI INT'L CONF.] (arguing that "[w]hat
condition"); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
andParticipation:
Participation:PersonalinformaPersonalInformafuture of the human condition'');
Privacy and
tion alld
andPublic
UnitedStates,
(1995) (arguing
tion
Public Sector Regulation
Regulation in the Ullited
States, 80 IOWA L. REV.
REv. 553, 557 (1995)
(arguing
deliberative democracy).
that a goal of data protection is to protect deliberative
45. See A Framework for Global Electronic
Electronic Commerce, supra
supra note 8, at 13-14 (pledging U.S.
support for personal data privacy protection
to ensure continued growth of the Internet).
protection
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protection.
common definition of information privacy
privacy is the right
right
protection.4466 The most common
4
of the individual to "information
self-determination."47
"information self-determination." 7
governments and theorists
Over the last thirty years, governments
theorists around the world
citizens' parinformation practices
practices to assure citizens'
have identified
identified a core set of fair information
ticipation in the collection and use of their personal information. These
benchmarks
benchmarks form the First Principles of information privacy and revolve
revolve
openness
around four sets of standards:
standards: (1) data quality; (2) transparency or openness
particularly sensitive data, often defined as
of processing;
processing; (3) treatment
treatment of particularly
data about health, race, religious beliefs, and sexual life among other attributes; and (4) enforcement
enforcement mechanisms.4
emergence of
of
mechanisms.488 In examining
examining the emergence
national
degree
national data privacy
privacy rules, Professor Colin Bennett has shown
shown a high degree
49
convergence regarding the treatment
of policy convergence
treatment of personal information.
information.49
Professor Bennett distills these standards into ten elements
elements that parallel the
1972 recommendation
recommendation of the Younger Committee
Committee in the United Kingdom50
Kingdom,SO
namely that an organization:
all personal
•* Must
Must be
be accountable
accountable for
for all
personal information
infonnation in its
its possession;
possession;
Should identifY
identify the purposes
for which
which the
the infonnation
information is
is processed
at or
or
•* Should
purposes for
processed at
before
of collection;
before the time of
•
•*

Should only collect personal
information with the knowledge and consent
personal infonnation
of the individual (except under specified
circumstances);
specified circumstances);
collection of personal infonnation
information to that which is necesShould limit the collection
S!ll}' for pursuing the identified purposes;
purposes;
sary

46. See European
European Initiative
Initiative in Electronic Commerce, supra
supra note 8, at 20 (discussing the need
to create
create consumer
consumer confidence).
FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, SELF-REGULATION
SELF-REGULATION AND
AND
to
confidence). See generally
generally FEDERAL
PRIVACY
TO CONGRESS
PRIVACY ONLINE: REPORT
REPORTTO
CONGRESS (1999) <http:/lwvw.ftc.gov/opa1999/9907/reportl999.htm>
<http://www.ftc.gov/opal1999/9907/report1999.htm>
[hereinafter SELF-REGULATION];
[hereinafter
FEDERAL TRADE
TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE:
ONLINE: A REpORT
SELF-REGULATION]; FEDERAL
REPORT TO
(1998) <http:l/www.ftc.gov/reportsLprivacy3/toc.htm>
CONGRESS (1998)
<http://www.ftc.gov/reportslprivacy3/toc.htm> [hereinafter
[hereinafter PRIVACY ONLINE]
ONLINE]
(discussing the FTC's approach to online privacy).
47. The term "information
"information self-determination"
self-determination" was first used in a famous German
German census decision.
PartiallyUnconstitutional,
(Karlssuhe,
cision. See Census Act of 1983 Partially
Unconstitutional, Judgment
Judgment of the First Senate (Karlsruhe,
Dec. 15, 1983), translated
translatedin 5 HUM. RTS.
Rrs. L.J. 94 (1984);
(1984); Simitis, supra
supra note 42,
42, at 734-35
734-35 (discussing the ruling in the German census case). The American
American formulation, according the individual
control
information, traces its roots to a study project
control over the disclosure of personal
personal information,
project of the Association
supra
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York, later published by Alan Westin. See WESTIN,
WESTIN, supra
note 14,
14, at xiii. Attributed to Alan Westin, rather than the Bar project, this formulation defines
defines
information
information privacy
privacy as the right of the individual
individual to control the use of personal
personal information:
information: "Privacy is the claim of individuals,
individuals, groups or institutions
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and
and
to what extent
extent information about them is communicated
communicated to others." Id.
ld. at 7. More recently, Paul
Schwartz
"control" definition of privacy
Schwartz has argued that the "control"
privacy misses important contextual
contextual distinctions in modem society. See Paul M. Schwartz,
Cyberspace,52 VAND.
VAND.
Schwartz, Privacy
Privacy and Democracy
Democracy in Cyberspace,
L. REV. 1609,1663-65
1609, 1663-65 (1999).
(1999).
& REIDENBERG, supra
48. See SCHWARTZ
SCHWAR1Z &
supra note 9, at 12-17
12-17 (discussing
(discussing the development and
substance of the First Principles in Europe);
Setting Standards,
Europe); Reidenberg, Selling
Standards, supra
supra note 36, at 51216.
BENNETr, supra
49. See BENNETI,
supra note 10, at 95-115.
95-115.
50. In May
interdepartmental committee to
1970, the British Labour government appointed an interdepartmental
May 1970,
Parliament. See id.
85-86. The chair
study privacy issues and report back to Parliament
id. at 85·86.
chair of the committee
committee
was Sir Kenneth
id. at 85.
Kenneth Younger. See id.
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*•

Should
information for purposes
Should not use or disclose personal
personal infonnation
purposes other than
those identified, except with
(thefinalityprinwith the consent
consent of the individual (the
finality principle);
ciple);

*•

Should retain
information only as long as necessary;
retain infonnation
necessary;

Should
information is kept accurate,
accurate,complete,
complete, and
Should ensure that personal infonnation
and up
date;
to date;
*•
Should protect personal
information with appropriate security
security safeguards;
personal infonnation
safeguards;
*•
Should be open about its policies and practices
practices and maintain
maintain no secret information
fonnation systems;
access to their personal information,
vith an
• Should allow data subjects
subjects access
infonnation, \vith
ability
if necessary.5l
ability to amend it ifnecessary.51
important
In the context of the Internet, these First Principles
Principles remain as important
as ever. As the
!he Internet increases
the
capacity
and
incentive
for
organizaincreases
organizations to engage
information trafficking, rigorous application of the First
engage in infonnation
Principles
information flows on
Principles becomes ever more critical.
critical. In particular, infonnation
on
the Internet
norms that require: (1) the specificaInternet might readily infringe the nonns
tion of the purpose for data collection;
collection; (2) the consent of individuals
individuals in coninformation; (3) the transparency
transparency
nection with the treatment of their personal infonnation;
of data practices for individuals, including
including awareness of data collection
collection and
information; (4) special protection for sensitive
access to stored personal infonnation;
data; and (5)
(5) the establishment
establis~ent of enforcement
enforcement remedies and mechanisms.
*•

international consensus on the First
Nevertheless, the wide degree of international
Principles is reflected in major policy instruments and national laws that,
52 The United States, for example, has
over the years, endorsed the norms.
nonns.52
selfthrough law adopted various data privacy
privacy standards and relied on self53 Although the resulting standards
restraint to fill the gaps in protection.53
standards
particular with respect to
to
hardly address
address the full set of First Principles (in particular
information)54 the
secondary use of personal
personal infonnation)S4
transparency of processing and secondary
51. Colin J. Bennett
& Rebecca
Bennett &
Rebecca Grant, Introduction,
Introduction, in VISIONS
VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY
& Rebecca
Rebecca Grant eds., 1999) [hereinafter
[hereinafter
CHOICES FOR THE
TIlE DIGITAL AGE 6 (Colin J. Bennett
Bennett &
VISIONS
PRIVACY].
VISIONS OF PRIV
ACyl.
52. See generally
PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK:
STATES LAW, INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL
generally THE PRIVACY
SOURCEBOOK: UNITED
UNITED STATES
LAW, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DEVELOPMENTS (Marc Rotenberg
Rotenberg ed.,
ed., 1999) (consolidating
(consolidating the texts of various
national Jaws
laws and international
international instruments on data privacy).
1974,55 U.S.C. § 552a (1994)
53. See Privacy Act of 1974.
(1994) (regulating government data processing);
(1994) (regulating credit
Electronic
Fair Credit Reporting
Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681
1681 (1994)
credit reporting); Electronic
Communications
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2501 (1994)
(1994) (providing for privacy of electronic
communications); Video Privacy Protection
1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994)
(1994) (regulating pricommunications);
Protection Act of 1988,
vacy for video rental customers);
customers); Cable Communications
Communications Policy Act of 1984,
1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551
generally Robert M. Gellman,
(1994) (protecting privacy of cable
cable subscribers).
subscribers). See generally
Gellman, Fragmented
Fragmented.
Incomplete,
7he Failure
Failureof Federal
FederalPrivacy
PrivacyRegulatory
Proposalsand
andInstituInstituII/complete. and
alld Discontinuous:
Discontinuous: The
Regulatory Proposals
tions, 66 SOFTWARE
SOFTWARE L.J.
L.L 199 (1993)
tiol/s,
(1993) (discussing the attempts and failures to enact statutory protections incorporating
incorporating the full set of First Principles).
Principles).
54. See SCHWARTZ
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG,
9, at 379-405 (showing that law and practice
REIDENBERG, supra
supra note 9.
practice
in the United States fail to respond to the complete set ofnonns,
of norms, but do include narrow protections
protections
that cover
cover some of the elements
elements of the First Principles).
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United States has made
made a public commitment
commitment to the broader
broader set of First Principles. Beginning in 1973, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
55
information practice. ss
Welfare elaborated
elaborated one of the first full codes of fair information
The code embodied norms for transparency
transparency of data processing, access td
to
stored personal
information, restrictions
personal information,
restrictions on secondary
secondary use of personal inforinformation, accuracy, and security safemation, correction of erroneous information,
56 Fifteen
guards.s6
years later, the Clinton Administration recognized that the
complete set of First Principles
Principles were
were still the basis for privacy protections.
complete
But despite the failure of non-regulatory
protecting
non-regulatory policies
policies to succeed in protecting
information privacy, the Administration still sought industry development
development of
of
s7
codes.57
voluntary
voluntary codes.
During the 1970s
emerged that con1970s and 1980s, national laws in Europe
Europe emerged
58 By the
tained comprehensive
comprehensive standards embodying the First Principles.
Principles.8
early 1980s, international
international instruments
instruments ratified this basic common set of principles for data protection. The Organization
Organization for Economic
Cooperation and
Economic Cooperation
Development (OECD), comprised of the major industrialized
industrialized nations of the
world, adopted
adopted voluntary guidelines for fair treatment of personal information5
Justice Michael Kirby of Australia,
Australia, the chairman of the OECD group
tion.599 Justice
drafting
major
drafting the voluntary guidelines
guidelines observed:
observed: "Surprisingly,
"Surprisingly, in all of the major
international
.. [data
[data protection],
protection], there has
has
international efforts that have so far addressed.
addressed ...
been a broad measure of agreement on the 'basic
rules' around which do'basic rules'
cluster."60 Contemporaneously,
Contemporaneously, the Counmestic privacy legislation
legislation should cluster."6o
organization dedicated
post-World War II intergovernmental
intergovernmental organization
dedicated
cil of Europe, a post-World
international treaty
to the protection
protection of human rights, opened for signature an international
adopting essentially the same norms for data privacy, but the treaty created
created
binding rules for signatories.
sigatories.6161 These instruments provided a model for later
later
62 By 1990,
international laws such as the New
international
New Zealand
Zealand data protection act.62
1990,
55. See H.E.W. GUIDELINES,
GUIDELINES, supra note 14.
See id.
56. Seeid.
U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCE,
COMMERCE, PRIVACY
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1998)
(1998)
57. See generally
generally U.S.
PruvACY AND ELECfRONIC
<http://www.doc.gov/ecommercelprivacy.htm>
<http://www.doc.gov/ecommerceiprivacy.htm> (showing
(showing that the OECD Guidelines containing the
complete
complete set of First Principles
Principles is the guidepost for privacy protection and calling on industry to
develop private sector
INFORMATION
sector codes of conduct);
conduct); PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE,
INFRASTRUCTURE, supra
supra note 30 (rephrasing
(rephrasing First Principles
Principles in the context of the Clinton Administration's Internet policy). For a highly critical view
IL Reidenview of U.S. policy, see generally
generally Joel
Joel R.
berg, Restoring
ElectronicCommerce,
Commerce, 14 BERKELEY
(1999).
berg,
Restoring Americans'Privacy
Americans' Privacy in Electronic
BERKELEY TECH.
TECH. L.J. 771 (1999).
58.
developments in the area of data privacy, see generally
generally
58. For a description of statutory developments
supranote 14; BENNETr,
BENNET , supra
FLAHERTY, supra
supra note 10, at 95-115.
59. See OECD Guidelines, supra
supranote 14.
60. Michael
Michael D. Kirby, Trallsborder
TransborderData
"BasicRules" of Data
Privacy, 16
Data Flows
Flows and
alld the "Basic
Data Privacy,
STAN. J. INT'L
L. 27, 29 (1980).
(1980).
STAN.
INT'LL.
61. See COE Convention,
Convention, supra
61.
supra note 14. The convention,
convention, however, requires safeguards for
id.
sensitive data unlike the OECD guidelines which are silent
silent on the issue. See id.
See, e.g., Blair Stewart, Adequacy of Data Protection
62. See.
Protection Measures:
Measures: The New Zealand
Zealand Case,
Paper
d'Privacy
& Business
Conference, Cambridge,
U.K.,
Paper presented
presented at the 12
121b
Privacy Laws &
Business International Conference,
Cambridge, U.K.,
June
1999 <http:lwww.privacy.org.nzlmedialadequacy.html>
Zealand's law
June 29, .1999
<http://www.privacy.org.nzlmedialadequacy.html> (noting that New Zealand's
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even the Unit~d
United Nations had adopted a resolution affirming the First Princi63
imperative.63
ples as a global imperative.
concluded a regulatory pro1995, the European Union concluded
More recently, in 1995,
proData
ProDirective
on
adoption
of
the
European
the
that
culminated
in
cess
European
64 The Directive
Directive requires that the Member
Member States of the European
European
tection.64
substantive
Union enact national legislation conforming to a defined set of substantive
Europe's goal is to harmonize fair information
information practices
practices at a
standards.66S5 Europe's
standards is a comprehensive
high level of protection. This set of standards
comprehensive endorsebecome the model for legislation
legislation in many
ment of First Principles, and has become
66
non-European
countries.~6
non-European countries.
As a further demonstration
demonstration of this consensus on First Principles, today in
Eastern Europe and in South America, data protection has become a critical
67
part of the national movements to establish open, democratic societies. 67
Indeed, the international
international community
community has affirmed the applicability
applicability of First
Principles to Internet
Internet activities.6688
THE FIRST THREE
REPUBLIC, TIlE
was modeled on the OECD Guidelines); HUNGARIAN
HUNGARIAN REpUBLIC,
THREE YEARS
YEARS OF THE
THE
PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER
PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
INFORMATION 66
PARLIAMENTARY
COMMISSIONER FOR DATA PROTECTION
(1998) (hereinafter
[hereinafter HUNGARIAN
(1998)
HUNGARIAN REPORT] (reporting that the Council ofEurope
of Europe Convention was the
Hungarian data protection).
model for Hungarian
protection).
Guidelinesfor
Regulation of Computerized
Computerized Personal
PersonalData
U.N. GA Res.
63. See Guidelines
for the Regulation
Data Files,
Files, U.N.
45195 (1990)
<http:llwww.unhchr.chlhtrltmenu31b/lI.htm> (adopting "Guidelines
"Guidelines for the Regula(1990) <http://www.unhchr.chlhtmVmenu3lbnI.htm>
tion of Computerized
Computerized Personal
Personal Data Files').
Files'?
64. See European
ProtectionDirective,
Directive,supra
64.
European Data
Data Protection
supra note 1I.
11. For a discussion of the adoption
Polls: The
7he EU Directive
of
process, see Spiros Simitis,
Simitis, From
From the Market to the Polis:
Directive on the Protection
Protection of
PersonalData,
Data,80 IOWAL.
IOWA L. REV 445 (1995).
Personal
65. For a discussion of the European
European law-making process
process see GEORGE
GEORGE A. BERMANN,
BERMANN, ROGER
3. GOEBEL,
3. DAVEY
J.
GOEBEL, WILLIAM J.
DAVEY &
& ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW (1993
(1993 &Supp.1995).
& Supp. 1995).
COMMUNITY
66. Many Eastern European
European countries,
countries, including Hungary, the Czech
Czech Republic, and Slovenia,
along with Latin American
American countries such as Chile and Argentina, have adopted
adopted or are in the process of adopting European-style
European-style laws. See CATE, supra
ess
supra note 10, at 45-47 (1997)
(1997) (discussing the
European
REPORT, supra
supranote 62, at 68 & n.19 (inEuropean consensus on privacy principles); HUNGARIAN
HUNGARIAN REpORT,
dicating the use of the European Data Protection
Protection Directive
Directive to promote development
development of Hungarian
Hungarian
law).
11; Pablo A. Palazzi, Proteccion
Dates,
67. See HUNGARIAN
HUNGARIAN REPORT,
REpORT, supra
supra note 62, at II;
Proteccion de Datos,
Privacidady
HabeasData
<http://members.theglobe.com/pablop/LatinoAmerica.htnl
Privacidad
y Habeas
Data en America <http://members.theglobe.com/pabloplLatinoAmerica.html
?nfhp=948126670&rld=446232546>
?nfltp=948126670&rId=446232546> (compiling data protection laws and jurisprudence
jurisprudence in Latin
America). Even in Asia, global trade and services along with the recognition and expectation
expectation of the
affluent countries for the respect
respect of human rights has led to interest in the First Principles. See
Stephen Lau,
Status witTz
with Respect to the Observance
Guidelinesalld
andthe EU
Lan. The Asian Status
Observance ofthe OECD
OECD Guidelilles
Directive,
<http:llwww.privacy.
Directive, in PROC. XIX
XIX INT'L CONF. DATA
DATA PROT.
PROT. COMM'RS
COMM'RS (1997)
(1997) <http://www.privacy.
fgov.belconference/authors.html>
[hereinafter PROC. XIXTH INT'L CONF.].
fgov.be/conference/authors.html> [hereinafter
Privacy on Global Networks,
68. See, e.g., Ministerial
Millisterial Declaration
Declaration on the Protection
Protection of Privacy
OECD Doc.
Doe. DSTIIICCPIREG(98)
DSTI/ICCP/REG(98)10,
18, 1998) <http://appli1.oecd.org/olisl
<http://applil.oecd.org/olis/
10, FINAL
FINAL (Dec. 18,
1998doc.nsfL4cf568b5b90dad99412567lbO(4bed59/61cc8ca3lf9457c12566de0506c
3S$FILE
1998doc.nsY4cf568bSb90dad994125671b004bedS9/61clc8c0a31f9457c12566de00506c13/SFILEY
12E81013.ENG>
[hereinafterMinisterial-Declaration]
MinisterialDeclaration](reaffirming
for
12E81013.ENG> (hereinafter
(reafflOl1ing the 1980 OECD Guidelines
Guidelines for
global networks); Working Party Established under Art. 29 of Directive 95/46/EC,
Working DocuDocu951461EC, Workillg
ment:
Processingof Personal
Data on the Internet,
Internet, E.C. Doc.
Doe. DG XV 5013199
mel/t: Processing
Personal Data
5013/99 WP 16 (Feb. 23,
1999) <http:lleuropa.eu.intlconmlintemalmarketlenlmedialdataprotAvpdocslwpl6en.htm>
1999)
<http://europa.eu.int/commlinternal_market/enlmedia/dataprot/wpdocslwpI6en.htm> [hereHeinOnline -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1329 1999-2000
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B. Divergence
Divergence on Execution
Execution
Even though democracies
democracies have converged on First Principles and have
reaffirmed their applicability to the Internet, studies of national legislation
legislation
reaffirmed
countries
reflect
varying
degrees
of
of
and data protection policies in numerous
numerous
69
adherence
adherence to these basic principles.69
principles. In effect, the execution of First Principles diverges significantly
significantly across countries. At the outset, national policies
can implement
implement First Principles in multiple ways; some effective, others not.
Principles quite differently.
More subtly, national policies may interpret First Principles
divergences in execution present a fundamental challenge
challenge to Internet
These divergences
Internet
information
flows
and
the
structure
of
information-processing
activities
on
information-processing
information
structure
the global network. The danger is that seemingly small differences
can
have
differences
incentives for the dissignificant effects as obstacles to online services or as incentives
services.70O
tortion of services.7

1. hnplementation.
Implementation.
1.
There are three approaches
approaches to the implementation
implementation of First Principles.
Principles.
comprehenThe predominant approach, found outside
outside the United States, is a comprehento
sive data protection
protection law. Under this model,
model, omnibus legislation strives to
create a complete
complete set of rights and responsibilities
responsibilities for the processing
processing of persector.71 First Principles
sonal information,
information, whether
whether by the public or private sector.71
become statutory rights and these statutes create data protection
supervisory
protection supervisory
72
rights. Within this
agencies to assure oversight and enforcement
enforcement of those rights.72
through
framework, additional precision and flexibility may also be achieved through
73 Overall, this implementation
devices.3
approach
conduct and other devices.
implementation approach
codes of conduct
anchored among the panoply of fundatreats data privacy as a political right anchored

inafter
Recommendation No. R(99)5 of the Comm.
inafier Processing
Processing of
of Personal
Personal Data];
Data]; Recommendation
Comm. of Ministers,
Guidelines
Guidelines for the Protection of Individuals with Regard
Regard to the Collection
Collection and Processing of Personal Data on Infonnation
Information Highways
<http-.//www.coe.fr/DataProtectionl
Highways (Feb. 23,
23, 1999) <http://wwVI.coe.frillataProtection!
elignes.htm>.
69. See, e.g., Sophie Louveaux,
Louveaux, Comment concilier Ie
le commerce
protection
commerce electronique et la protection
de la vie privee?,
privde?, in Etienne Montero
ed., DROIT DES
Montero eeL,
DES TECHNOLOGIES DE L'INFORMATION:
L'INFORMATION:
REGARDS
& SCHWARTZ, supra
supra note 43;
REGARDS PROSPECTIFS (Etienne
(Etienne Montero ed. 1999); REIDENBERG
REIDENBERG &
43;
SCHWARTZ
& REIDENBERO,
supra note 9; ADRIANA
ADRIANA C.M.
SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra
C.M. NUGTER,
NUGTER, TRANSBORDER
TRANSBORDER FLOW OF
OF
PERSONAL DATA
DATA WITHIN
THE EC (1990).
(1990).
PERSONAL
WITHINTHEEC
SCHWARTZ, supra
supranote 43,
70. See REIDENBERG
REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ,
43, at 142-49.
142-49.
71. See CATE, supra
Euro71.
supra note 10, at 32-48 (describing
(descnoing the content of data privacy
privacy laws of
ofEuroorganizations).
pean countries and multinational organizations).
BENNETT, supra
72. See BENNF:IT,
supra note 10, at 153-92 (explaining
(explaining how the First Principles were impleimplemented in Sweden,
Sweden, West Germany,
Gennany, Britain,
Britain, and the United States).
Electronicmail.
mail, electronic
ethical codes, in PROC.
73. See Stefano Rodota, Internet:
Internet: Electronic
electronic sales,
sales. ethical
COMM'RS (1998).
XX INT'L
INT'L CONF. DATA PROT. COMM'RS
(1998).
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subjects" or citimental human rights and the rights are attributed to "data subjects"
74
zens.74
implementation, found in the United States,
In the second approach to implementation,
the role of the state is far more limited. Legal rules are relegated to narrowly
targeted
targeted sectoral protections. For example, the Video Privacy Protection Act
prohibits the disclosure of titles of particular
particular films rented by a customer at a
store,75 while viewing habits on the Internet of streaming video remain
video store,75
unprotected. Under this sectoral approach, the primary source for the tenns
terms
and conditions of information
infonnation privacy is self-regulation. Instead of relying
on governmental
governmental regulation, this approach seeks to protect privacy through
norms, codes of conduct, and contracts
practices developed by industry nonns,
rather than statutory legal rights. Data privacy becomes a market issue rather
rather
than a basic political question, and the rhetoric casts the debate in terms
tenns of
of
6
"citizens."7
than
users
rather
and
"consumers"
"consumers"
"citizens."76
The third approach to implementation
implementation of First Principles is technical.
technical.
Under this "code"
"code" or "lex
informatica" model,77 engineering
"lex infonnatica"
engineering specifications
specifications
embody
embody policy rules for data protection.
protection. This is particularly noteworthy
noteworthy for
for
privacy rules in the online
online environment.
environment. Technical rules and default settings
establish data privacy nonns,?8
norms.78 This approach is, thus, a hybrid: The model
contains fonnal
formal rules but is neither state regulation nor industry selfselfregulation. Unlike state-centric
state-centric policymaking in the case of comprehensive
comprehensive
statutes and industry-centric
policymaking in the case of self-regulation and
industry-centric policymaking

74.
supra note 10, at 42-43
74. See
See generally
generally notes 184-215 infra and accompanying
accompanying text; CATE,
CATE, supra
(discussing
(discussing the importance
importance of privacy
privacy in
in the European
European Directive;
Directive; Simitis, supra
supra note
note 64 (discussing
(discussing
the E.U. Member
Member States'
States' emphasis on protecting
protecting personal privacy
privacy rights).
75. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-11
2710-11 (1994).
(1994).
76. See Pamela
Samuelson, A
Pamela Samuelson,
A New Kind ofPrivacy?
Privacy? Regulating Uses ofPersonal
Personal Data
Data in the
Global
Global Izfonnation
hz,fonllation Economy, 87 CAL.
CAL. L. REV.
REv. 751,
751, 770-73 (1999)
(1999) (commenting
(commenting that the marketbased treatment of personal data
data privacy
privacy might change).
77. Lany
Larry Lessig
Lessig refers
to technical "code"
77.
refers to
"code" as law. See LARRY
LARRY LE[SIG,
LESSIG, CODE
CODE AND
AND OTHER
OrnER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
(1999).
CYBERSPACE 6
6 (1999).
78. See
See id.; see also Lawrence
Lawrence Lessig, Reading
Reading the Constitution
Constitution in
ill Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 45 EMoRY
EMORY
L.L
869, 898
Cyberspace] (discussing the use
L.J. 869,
898 (1996)
(1996) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Lessig, Constitution
COllstitution in Cyberspace]
use of
of comcomputer
puter code
code as a regulatory tool
tool or constraint on
on the use of
of a document
document or program);
program); Joel
Joel R.
R. ReidenReidenberg,
berg, Governing Networks
Nenvorks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 45 EMORY
EMORY L.L
L.J. 911,
911, 929 (1996)
(1996)
[hereinafter Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, Governing
GoverningNetworks]
[hereinafter
Nenvorks] ('State
("State governments can and
and should
should be
be involved
involved in
the
the establishment
establishment of norms
norms for network
network activities,
activities, yet state
state governments cannot and should
should not
not
attempt
attempt to
to expropriate
expropriate all regulatory
regulatory power
power from network
network communities");
communities."); Joel
Joel R. Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, Lex
informatica: The Formulation
hz,fornlatica:
Formulation of
ofInformation
Infornlation Policy Rules through Technology, 76 TEx.
TEX. L.
L. REv.
555 (1998)
553,
553, 555
(1998) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, Lex
Lex Informatica]
Informatica] (noting that
that "the
"the set
set of rules
rules for information
flows imposed
imposed by
mation flows
by technology
technology and communication
communication networks form a 'Lex
'Lex Informatica'
Informatica' that
policymakers
policyrnakers must
must understand,
understand, consciously
consciously recognize,
recognize, and encourage");
encourage''); Joel
Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules
of the
of
the Road
Roadfor
for Global
Global Electronic
Electronic Highways:
Highways: Merging
Merging the Trade and Technical Paradigms,
Paradigms, 6
HARV.
technical solutions
HARV. J.L.
J.L. &
& TECH.
TECH. 287,
287, 296-301 (1993)
(1993) (commenting
(commenting on the use
use of
oftechnical
solutions to
to resolve
resolve
various
various information
information integrity
integrity and
and interoperability
interoperability issues).
issues).
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developed
narrowly targeted
targeted sectoral
sectoral rules, technical
technical rules have historically developed
discourse.7799
in technical fora outside the realm of public policy discourse.
2. Interpretation.
Interpretation.
Beyond
implementation of the First Principles,
Beyond the divergence
divergence in implementation
Principles, there is
also important variation in the contextual
contextual interpretation
interpretation of the Principles.80
Principles.so
The meaning ascribed to each of the First Principles
is
not
harmonized
at the
Principles
international
interpretations can
international level. These divergent interpretations
can have great significance
cance for the structure and development
development of online services on the Internet.
processing in a global network
network
The complexity and fluidity of information processing
enable participants to engage in regulatory arbitrage.
arbitrage.8sl' This means that an
Internet participant
participant might shift the location of a server or database to take
advantage of more permissive
interpretations. At the same time, this diverpermissive interpretations.
gence provides challenges and opportunities for the effective
of
effective protection of
personal data.
interpretation of the very applicability of First PrinciAt the outset, the interpretation
ples is hardly uniform, especially for clickstream
clickstream data. In particular, the apclassification of data as
plicability of First Principles depends on the classification
information." Since information
"personal information."
information traces on the Internet
Internet are rampant, the distinction between
anonymous
and
"personal
information"
between
information" is, thus,
particularly
critical.82
For
some
Internet
participants'
particularly critica1.82
Internet participants' traces may never be
linked to the individual Web user and the user has effective
effective anonymity. A
Web site's log files may, for instance, only identify the visitor's information
information
broadly
service provider and not the specific
specific visitor. However, the more broadly
"personal
information" is interpreted
"personal information"
interpreted for data protection purposes, the harder
harder
anonymity is to achieve. The same Web log files could identify a visitor if
the information service provider reveals the identity of its subscriber. Thus,
if the interpretation
interpretation is broad, data protection law will apply more widely to
Internet activities and more frequently to Internet participants.
participants.
Some countries treat information
information about legal entities as "personal
"personal information."83 Most limit the scope
scope to "information
or
"information relating to an identified or
79. See Reidenberg, LexInformatica,
Lex Infomlatica, supra
supra note 78, at 554.
BENNMtT, supra
supra note 10,
10, at 111-15,
111-15, 222-23; CATE, supra
10, at 97-100;
97-100;
80. See BENNETI,
sllpra note to,
FLAHERTY,
supra note 14, at 371-407.
FLAHERTY,supra
81. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet
Internetas a Source
Source ofRegulatoryArbitrage,
81.
Arbitrage, in BORDERS
IN
151-52 (noting that it would be very difficult to eliminate
IN CYBERSPACE,
CYBERSPACE, supra
supra note 41,
41, at 129,
129, 151-52
eliminate

"data havens").
havens").
Kang,supra
1208-10, 1220-33 (drawing
82. See Kang,
supra note 31,
31, at 1208-10,1220-33
(drawing distinctions
distinctions between personal
personal and
nonpersonal
nonpersonal information and illustrating the breadth of data traces left by Internet
Internet users).
83. Iceland,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland are among the countries that apply
privacy protections to information
Inventory of Instruments
information about corporate entities. See OECD, Inventory
IIIS/nlnlelllS
and Mechanisms
Mechanisms Contributing
OECD Privacy
Privacy
and
Contributing to the Implementation
Implementatioll and
alld Enforcement
Ellforcemellt of the OECD
Guidelines on
Global Networks, OECD
OECD Doe.
(98)12/FINAL '1i~ 143,
154, 179,
Guidelines
Oil Global
Doc. DSTI/ICCP/Reg
DSTIJICCPlReg (98)12IFINAL
143, 154,
<http:llwww.olis.oecd.orglolisl1998doe.nsflinkto/dsti-iccp-reg(98)12-final>.
198, 226 <http://www.olis.oecd.orgjolislI998doc.nsminkto/dsti-iccp-reg(98)12-final>.
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84 The
identifiable natural
natural person."
person."84
The meaning
meaning of
of "identifiable
"identifiable person,"
person," howhowidentifiable
variable. France
France and
and Belgium,
Belgium, for example,
example, under
under pre-European
pre-European
ever, is variable.
Data Protection
Protection Directive
Directive law that remains
remains in effect,
effect, treat
treat data as personal
personal
Data
85
person.
there is
is any
any way
way to link
link the information
information to
to a natural
natural person.85
information if there
information
The United
United Kingdom, however, took a more restrained
restrained view
view and examined
examined
The
data user could
could actually
actually link
link the
the information
information to a specific
specific perperwhether the data
whether
86 These
These particular
partiCUlar interpretive
interpretive subtleties
subtleties are
are unlikely
unlikely to change
change with
with the
the
son.86
son.
transposition of
of the European
European Directive
Directive into
into member
member state
state national
national law.
transposition
ofinformation
information
Further, some
some countries
countries also explicitly
explicitly exclude
exclude differing
differing types of
coverage whether
whether or not
not the
the data relates to an individual.
individual.
scope of coverage
from the scope
Belgium's statute, for example,
example, excludes
excludes any informtion
information published
published by the
Belgium's
United States,
States, interpretations
individual concerned8
concerned.877 In the United
interpretations of the Fourth
individual
Amendment to the Constitution
Constitution emphasize
emphasize a "reasonable
"reasonable expectation
expectation of priAmendment
enforcement,
law enforcement, which
oflaw
which
vacy" against government
searches in the context
context of
government searches
vacy"
available
excluding publicly available
translates into
into a general policy preference
preference of excluding
translates
Statutory protections
protections in the United
United States
States
information from protection.S8
protection.88 Statutory
information
activities rather
rather than individuals.
individuals.
address applicability
applicability in terms of activities
tend to address
Fair Credit Reporting
Reporting Act defines
defines covered
covered information
information in
For example, the Fair
terms of "consumer
"consumer reports"
reports" rather than identifiable
identifiable individuals.8
individuals. 899 The Cable
Communications Policy Act and the Video Privacy Protection
Protection Act each refer
Communications
90
information," but never define the term. 90
identifiable information,"
to "personally
"personally identifiable

Europeall Data
Data Protection
Protectio1l Directive,
Directive, supra
supra note 11, at art. 2(a).
2{a).
84. European
priv6e, Recommandation No. 01196 du 23 sep85. See Commission de
protection de Ja
la vie privee,
do la protection
i propos de
priv~e a
]a vie privee
]a protection de la
tembre 1996, Recommandation
Recommandation de la Commission de Ja
m~dicaments en Belgique base
l'analyse de
basee sur des informations
informations issues des
consommation de medicaments
do la consommation
considered anonymous if the person remrdicales, at 5 (noting that data cannot be considered
prescriptions medicales,
sponsible for the treatment
treatment can reidentify the person concerned
concemed without an important special effort);
do 39 juin 1997
l'informatique et des libertis,
Commission nationa1e
libertes, D6liberation
Deliberation No. 97-051 du
nationale de l'informatique
files
<http:www.cnil.fr!thematicldocs/ra181a.pdf.>
as personal information
<http:www.cnil.fr/thematic/docs/ral 8la.pdt> (treating Web server log files
COMMISSION
access to the actual identity of visitors); COMMISSION
not have access
server did not
even though the server
ET LIBERTEs
LIBERTES 42
D'INFORMATIQUE lIT
Dix ANS D'INFORMATIQUE
LIBERT.S, DIX
NATIONALE
ST DES LlBERTEs,
L'INFORMATIQUE ET
NATIONALS DE L'lNFORMATIQUE
'nominative informaterm 'nominative
interpretation to the teon
(1988)
(1988) (noting that the Commission gives a broad intetpretation
tion' in the French law).
INTERNET:
AND THE INTERNET:
86. See
See U.K. DATA PROTECTION REGISTRAR, DATA PROTECTION AND
(discussing
<http://www.open.gov.uktdpr/intemet.htm> (discussing
(1997) <http://www.open.gov.ukldpr/intemethtm>
GUIDANCE
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION (1997)
ch. 29, §
1998, ch.
Data Protection Act, 1998,
Act); Data
"identifiable
"identifiable information" under the old Data Protection Act);
definitional terms
1(1)
<http://www.hmso.gov.ukfactsfactsl99880029-a.htm#l> (adopting defmitional
I(1) (Eng.) <http://www.hmso.gov.uklactslacts1998/80029-a.htm#l>
earlier Guidance),.
with the earlier
in accordance with
2.
art. 3,
3, §§ 2.
1992, art.
decembre 1992,
87. Loi du 88 decembre
87.
lacked
individual lacked
thatindividual
88.
437 (1976)
(1976) (holding that
435,437
425 U.S. 435,
v. Miller, 425
States v.
See, e.g.,
e.g., United States
88. See,
the Supreme
Supreme Court's decision
responded to the
Congress responded
records). Congress
interest in bank records).
Fourth Amendment interest
(1994).
§§ 3401-3422 (1994).
12 U.S.C.
U.S.C. §§
of 1978, 12
Act ofl978,
Financial Privacy Act
in
the Right to Financial
inMiller
Millerwith the
1681a(d)(1) (1994).
15 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 1681a{d)(l)
89. See 15
89.
"does
"aggregate" data which "does
indicates only that "aggregate"
Act indicates
Communications Policy Act
90. The Cable Communications
551(a)(2)(A)
47 U.S.C. §§ SSl(a)(2)(A)
See 47
the definition. See
is excluded
excluded from the
particular persons" is
identify particular
lot
iot identify
informastates that
that the term includes infonnaProtection Act, however, merely states
Privacy Protection
The Video Privacy
1994).
1994). The
18 U.S.C. §§
See 18
materials. See
specific video materials.
on
requested specific
having requested
as having
person as
that identifies a person
on that
(1994).
7l0{a)(3)
710(a)(3) (1994).
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The interpretation of the transparency
transparency element
element of the First Principles also
varies significantly
significantly across countries.
countries. Transparency
Transparency requires that the processing
essing of personal information
information be open and understandable.
understandable. Yet, the precise
precise
meaning of this element is inconsistent
inconsistent in different places. Belgium, for example, required that individuals be informed of the details of the use of perinformation prior to collection. In particular, the purpose for
sonal information
collection,
collection, also termed the finality of data use, must be disclosed with specificity.91
ficity.9l The Belgian
Belgian courts have interpreted this requirement strictly, ruling,
ruling)
for example, that a general
general statement
statement disclosing
disclosing that personal information
information
services and better service
service to the client is
will be used to provide financial services
92
insufficient to cover the use of the information
information in insurance
insurance solicitations.92
The notice must be provided prior to collection
collection of personal
personal information
information if the
collection is directly from the person concerned;
concerned; otherwise the notice must
collection
contemporaneously with the storage of the personal informabe provided contemporaneously
93
tion. 93
tion.
France only required notification from those collecting information
information
directly from individuals. Further, the French notification
notification must contain a
including whether
whether the information must be given and
specific set of details, including
94 In contrast, U.S.
what consequences
follow
in
the
absence of a response. 94
consequences
individuals that data
law does not generally impose an obligation
obligation to inform individuals
about them is being collected. However, a number of targeted statutes do
require
dissemination of certain perrequire that individuals
individuals be informed prior to the dissemination
95 credit resonal
information to third parties, namely video rental records,
sonal information
records)9s
credit
96
7
ports for nonstatutorily permitted purposes,96
purposes, telephone
records,9
cable
telephone records,97 and cable
subscription
records.9B
subscription records.98
Oversight
Oversight of information privacy
privacy is also handled in many different ways.
supervisory agencies are a common feature in democracies,99
democracies,99
Data protection supervisory
but agency powers
powers are often specific
specific to each country. Some countries, for
example, established
regulatory enforcement
established regulatoIY
enforcement agencies and licensing
licensing boards,
00
position.1OO
Within the European
European Unwhile others adopted an ombudsman position.l
ion, the European Data Protection Directive mandates that each Member
Member
State create
of
create an independent
independent supervisory agency to monitor the application
application of

91. See Trib. Comm. Anvers, 77juillet
1994, reprinted
reprintedill
in 4 Droit de l'informatique et des te}et&l 91.
juillet 1994,
comms 52-53 (1994).
(1994).
caroms
See id.
92. Seeid.
93. Loi
Loi du
du 88decembre
decembre 1992,
1992, art.
9.
93.
art. 4(l),
4(1), 9.
94. Loi
du 66janvier
1978, art.
27 <http:lww.cnil.fr/textestext02.htm>.
94.
Loi No.
No. 78-17
78-17 du
janvier 1978,
art. 27
<http://www.cnil.fr/textesltext02.htm>.
95. See 18
18 U.S.C.
2710(b) (1994).
95.
U.S.C. §271O(b)
(1994).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(a)(2)
1681b(a)(2) (1994).
(1994).
96. See lSU.S.C.
97. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 222(c), 222(e) (1997).
(1997).
98. See 47 U.S.C. §§551(c)
551(c) (1994).
discussions of different supervising
supervising models see BENNETt,
supra note 10, at 158-92;
99. For discussions
BENNE1T, supra
FLAHERTY, supra
supra note 14, at 11-16.
100.
100. See, e.g., Mayer-Schonberger, supra
supra note 2, at 228.
228.
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violations.OIl In contrast, the United
data protection laws and to investigate
investigate violations.Io
repeatedly rejected an agency
agency enforcement
enforcement model for privacy
States has repeatedly
o2
self-regulation.102
oversight, favoring industry self-regulation.I
compliance with
supervisory agency to monitor compliance
In order for the national supervisory
data protection requirements
requirements and to assure that the processing
processing of personal
information
infonnation is not done secretively, European countries
countries require public notifi03
agencies.03
supervisory agencies.1
cation of data processing activities to the national supervisory
Nevertheless, the content
content of the notifications
notifications among European countries
countries has
not been uniform.
unifonn. Although the European
European Data Protection
Protection Directive
Directive stipufiled,104 existing European
European nalates the minimum information
infonnation that must be filed,lo4
tional laws have small but significant variations that are likely to persist.05
persist. los
France
France requires that the origin of personal information
infonnation be included on the
public notification, while Belgium does not, and the United Kingdom
Kingdom requires a textual description in connection with declarations
declarations of Internet activities involving personal
personal information.I06
infonnation.I o6 In the United States, there is no
obligation to disclose the existence
existence of data processing activities
activities to a government agency; any such obligation would run counter
counter to the U.S. constitulo7 Only
intrusions.107
tional tradition, which is suspicious of such government
government intrusions.
the Fair Credit
Credit Reporting Act contains a general
general obligation to notify the pubadvertisements of the treatment of personal
informapersonal infonnalic through newspaper advertisements
tion, and its requirement
requirement concerns only one specific
use
of
credit
specific
credit report
information-the sale of names for junk mail solicitations.108
infonnation-the
solicitations.Io8
interpretation demonstrate
The substantial differences in interpretation
demonstrate that First Principles have significant
significant idiosyncratic
idiosyncratic national
national features. Along with the varyimplementations of First Principles, these divergences
ing implementations
divergences take on a critical
I I, at art. 28.
101. See European
European Data
Data Protection
Protection Directive,
Directive, supra
supra note 11,
102.
102. See Gellman,
Gellman, supra
supra note 53.
103.
11, at art.
art. 18.
103. See European
European Data
Data Protection
Protection Directive,
Directive, supra
supra note 11,
18.
104.
id.at
atart.
19.
104. See id.
art. 19.
105.
& SCHWARTZ,
105. See REIDENBERG
REIDENBERG &
SCHWARTZ, supra
supra note 43, at 127-31 (discussing
(discussing important divergences
European Data Protection Directive is silent). The transposition
transposition of the Eurogences on which
which the European
pean Data Protection Directive
Directive will allow the Member States an important "marge de manoeuvre"
to interpret the standards
Rigaux notes that the Directive
standards in the Directive. Indeed, Professor Rigaux
Directive has
many conditional
conditional provisions that are drafted to "leave
"leave without doubt to the national and European
European
supervisory authorities the interpretation
interpretation of the text along with the courts and tribunals, and in the
last instance
[European] Court offustice."
privie, une libertdparmi
les
instance the [European]
ofJustice." Francois Rigaux, La vie privee,
liberte panni /es
autres,ill
in XDXTH
CONK, supra
autres,
XIXTH INT'L CONF.,
supra note 67, at 2 (translated by author).
106. Compare
Compare Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 19 (France), with Loi du 88 decembre
belge.htm>, with U.K. DATA
1992, art. 3 (Belgium) <http:llwww.privacy.fgov.be/Ioivie_priv6e
<http://www.privacy.fgov.belloi_vie.Jlrivee_belge.htm>.
supranote 86.
REOISTRAR, supra
PROTECTION REGISTRAR,
CATH, supra
"scheme is anathema to the U.S.
107. See CATE,
supra note 10, at 124 (noting that such a "scheme
constitutional system");
COMMITTEE, NATIONAL
NATIONAL INFORMATION
system"); INFORMATION POLICY COMMITIEE,
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
STRUC11JRE TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING
PROMOTING PRIVACY
PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
1997) <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/privacy.htm>
<http.lwww.iitf.nisgovipclprivacy.htm>(highlighting that the
INFRASTRUC11JRE (Apr. 1997)
U.S. prefers
prefers non-regulatory
non-regulatory solutions)
108. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681b(e)(5)
1681b(e)(5) (1994).
108.
15U.S.C.
(1994).
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dimension for the Internet where competition
competition among information privacy
conflict.
rules ensures
ensures confrontation
confrontation and conflict
III. ONLINE CONFRONTATION
CONFRONTATION AND CONFLICTS

The lack of harmonization in the execution
execution of First Principles
Principles poses a
fundamental challenge
challenge to international
international data flows and the Internet. The
Internet
architectural features
Internet places divergent rules in proximity through architectural
that promote geographic
geographic indeterminacy. If the policies achieved by diver0 9then intergent executions
executions of First Principles were "functionally
"functionally similar,"'
similar,"I09
national data flows would not face challenges. But, since the degree of
of
substantive
widely,10 international
international data flows assure consubstantive protection varies widely,110
frontation and conflict among the different
different national regimes
regimes for protection
protection of
of
personal information.
destabilize III the fair treatIn effect, the characteristics
characteristics of data transfers destabilize"'
clickstream inMultinational processing
processing of clickstream
ment of personal information. Multinational
formation, warehoused data, and the pressures for secondary
secondary use, in
particular, place the legal rules, data protection
protection policies,
policies,. and information
information
1I2
practices
jurisdictions in direct conflict.12
conflict If access to, collection,
collection,
practices of various jurisdictions
and processing of personal information occur
occur in several countries
countries over the
network, then each of the implicated
implicated countries may assert legal jurisdiction.113
tion.l I3 At the same time, multiple regulatory regimes attenuate
attenuate the enforcement
country." 4 This paradox is not readily
readily
forcement jurisdiction
jurisdiction of each country.1l4
109. This term refers to the search by comparative
find similarity
109.
comparative law scholars to fmd
similarity in the substantive results across different countries rather than identity of legal instruments
legal
instruments in different legal
cultures. See Preparation ofa
of a methodology
methodology for evaluating
ofprotection
of
evaluating the
th~ adequacy of the level of
protection of
individuals with regard
individuals
regard to the processing
processing of personal data, Annex to the Annual Report 1998 of the
Directive 95/46/EC,
95/461EC, Eur. Comm. Doc. No. XV D/5047/98
Working Party Established
Established by Art. 29 of Directive
(1998)
& RElDENBERG,
REIDENBERG,
(1998) <http://www.droit.fimdp.ac.be/crid/privacy/Tbdf/Chapitrel.pdf>;
<http://www.droitfundp.ac.be!cridlprivacy/fbdf/Chapitre1.pdf>; SCHWARTZ
SCHWARTZ &
supra note 9, at 24-25 (describing use of "functional
"functional similarity" analysis to compare
U.S. and
supra
compare U.S.
European data protection
protection practices).
.
Mayer-Schonberger
110. See generally
generally CATE,
CATE, supra
supra note 10; SWIRE & LITAN,
LITAN, supra
supra note 10; Mayer-Schonberger.
supra note 2; Existing
Existing Case-Law on Compliance
Compliance with Data
supra
Data Protection
Protection Laws and Principles
Principles in the
Member States
States of the European
Party
European Union,
Union. Annex
Annex to the Annual Report 1998 of the Working Party
Establishedunder
under Article 29 of Directive
95/46/EC,E.C. Doc.
Established
Directive 95/46/EC,
DOC. XV D/5047198
DI5047/98 (Douwe Korff ed.,
1998) [hereinafter
Existing Case-Law].
Case-Law].
[hereinafter Existing
accompanying text.
111. See notes 16-34
16-34 supra and accompanying
Internet
112. Robert Gellman writes that the uncertainty
uncertainty of legal rules for interactions
interactions on the Internet
supra note 41,
41, at 272272results in conflicting
conflicting and overlapping privacy laws and rules. See Gellman, supra
77.
Cyberspace: The Role of Intermediaries,
113. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace:
Intermediaries, in
supra note 41,
BORDERS IN
IN CYBERSPACE,
CYBERSPACE, supra
41, at 164 (examining the jurisdictional problems that the
Data Protection:
Protection:Jurisdiction
and the Choice
Choice ofLaw, in PROe.
PROC. XXI
Bing, Data
Jurisdiction and
XXI
Internet presents);
presents); Jon Bing,
INT'L CONF, supra
supra note 44 (analyzing jurisdictional
jurisdictional and choice of law problems
problems for data protection
protection
law).
Goldsmith,Against Cyberanarchy,
Cyberanarchy,65 U. CHI. L. REv.
REV. 1199,
1199, 1216·21
1216-21 (1999)
114. See Jack L. Goldsmith,
(1999)
(arguing that the threat of liability for individual users is far less than what many commentators
commentators
have suggested because of the difficulty
difficulty of establishingjurisdiction
jurisdiction over the users).
HeinOnline -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1336 1999-2000

May 2000]
May

CYRULES
INTERNATIONAL
DATA PRIVA
PRIVACY
RULES
INTERNATIONAL DATA

1337
1337

1lS The overlapping
overlapping and
traditional "conflict of law" principles.
principles.,1s
resolved by traditional
international data flows present
present a basic challenge to the
malleable nature of international
malleable
of law analysis."1
analysis. 1l66 Multiple laws may apply
localization required for choice oflaw
localization
to an unique activity. In terms of substantive conflicts, a number of key
problems
problems arise.

andSystemic Legal Conflict
A.
A. Implementation
Implementation and
The most well-known conflicts
conflicts arise from systemic differences in the
1I7 In Europe,
rights."7
approach and the specific
specific content
content of data protection rightS.
comprehensive data protection
comprehensive
protection laws establish
establish rights and obligations for the
treatment
personal information."S
information. lls Elsewhere, information privacy may be
be
treatment ofpersonal
assured by narrower legal rules, policies
policies or practices,
practices, or alternatively, data
1I9 In the absence
ignored.119
protection may even be ignored.
absence of comprehensive
comprehensive data
protection legislation,
internationally-recognized principles
legislation, the full range of internationally-recognized
for fair information practice may be hard to satisfy; narrow, sectoral laws,
of
policies, ad hoc protections and practices
practices typically ignore key elements of
the First Principles.
Principles.
should
If data protection
protection is taken seriously, then systemic
systemic legal conflicts should
120
cause
international data flows.120
flows.
Both the European Union's
Union's
cause disruption of international
Data Protection Directive and existing European Member State laws provide
for the prohibition
prohibition on data flows to countries
countries without satisfactory
satisfactory privacy
21
justification to restrict
restrict
protection. 121
protection.1
For the United States alone, Europe has justification
U.S. legal rights are too
European personal
the processing of European
personal information;
information; U.S.
self-regulation has proven
U.S. reliance on self-regulation
narrow and too rare, while the U.S.
115. See id.
id. at 1210 (discussing
(discussing the dichotomy
dichotomy between default and mandatory rules along
along
with the problem of spillover effects).
effects).
113.
116.
Bing,supra
116. See Bing,
supra note 113.
Art. 29 of Directive 951461EC, Discussion Docu117. See Working Party Established
Established under Art
Possible Ways ForForThird Countries
Countries- Possible
Transfers of Personal
FirstOrientations
Orientationson Transfers
ment.
ment: First
Personal Data
Data to Tlzird
1997) <http://europa.eu.
D15020197-WP4 (June 26, 1991)
ward
ill Assessing Adequacy, E.C. Doc. XV D15020/91-WP
<http://europa.eu.
ward in
First
[hereinafter Working Party, First
int/comm/intemalmarketen/media/dataprot/wpdocshvp4en.htrn> [hereinafter
intlcommlintemaLmarketlenlmedialdataprotlwpdocs!wp4en.htm>
Orientations];Working Party
Oriel/tations];
party Established
Established under Art.
Art 29 of Directive 95146/EC,
951461EC, Working
Worl..ing Document:
Document:
Proand 26 ofthe EU Data
Data to Third
Third Countries:
Transfers of Personal
PersonalData
Tral/sfers
Countries: Applying Articles 25 and
Data Pro<http.//europa.eu.int/comni/
Doc. DG XV D15025198WP
Directive, E.C. DOC.
DI5025198WP 12 (July 24, 1998) <http://europa.eu.intlcomml
tection Directive,
Transfers of
of
internal market/en/medialdataprotwpdocslwpl2en.htm> [hereinafter Working Party, Transfers
intemaLmarketlenlmedialdataprotlwpdocslwpI2en.htm>
Personal
Persol/al Data].
Data].
ProtectionDirective,
Directive,supra
EuropeanData
1118.
18. See European
Data Protection
supra note 11.
11.
& REIDENBERG, supra
119. See SCHWARTZ &
supra note 9, at 24-25 (discussing
(discussing U.S. data privacy
privacy regime).
Ahead, in
Europe: Looking Ahead,
Ulf Brflhann,
Data Protection
120. See, e.g., UIf
Brilhann, Data
Protection in Europe:
ill PROC.
PROe. XIXTH
XIXTIl
3-4 ("Nobody should
INT'L CONF.,
CONF., supra
supra note 67, at 34
should underestimate
underestimate the problem
problem by doubting the
citizens.").
political will of the European Union to protect the fundamental human rights of citizens.").
7811, at art. 25; France, Law No. 18Directive,supra
ProtectionDirective.
EuropeanData
121. See European
Data Protection
supra note 11,
Data Protection,
Protection, I1
1978, at art. 24; see also Peter Blume, An EEC Policyfor
17 of Jan. 25,
25. 1978.
for Data
11
Transborder Data
COMPUTERIL.J 399 (1992);
COMPUTSRIL.J.
(1992); Michael Kirby, Legal Aspects of Transborder
Data Flows,
Flows, 11
11
supranote 12;
(1992); Schwartz,
COMPUTER/L.L 233 (1992);
COMPUTERIL.J.
Schwartz. supra
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ineffective in protecting privacy at the level of European standards.12
standards.l222 Similar justifications
justifications exist for other countries lacking analogous
analogous laws and basic
data protection
protection rights. Thus, systemic differences in the approach and rules
of national data protection regimes place each other in direct conflict.
Interpretationand Detail
B. Interpretation
Detail Conflict
In addition to systemic conflicts,
important
conflicts, online services face another important
of
Seemingly minor divergences
risk to international data flows. Seemingly
divergences in the laws of
several countries have significant ramifications
several
ramifications for international
international data flows
information.123 For example,
of personal information,123
example, slight differences in the requirements for the contents of notification
of
notification to individuals
individuals prior to the collection of
their personal
information
mean
that
data
collectors
cannot
use
the
same
nopersonal information
jurisdictions. 124 Since the network
network environment
environment
tice for residents of different jurisdictions.124
obscures
obscures the location
location of users, data collectors often face a difficult choice:
Either they ignore the requirements
requirements of countries where data collection
collection might
might
These
be taking place or they unwittingly contravene
contravene these requirements. These
conflicts of divergence become
become particularly
particularly pronounced
pronounced for intracorporate
intracorporate
data-sharing
commerce actividata-sharing arrangements and for emerging electronic
electronic commerce
ties,125
ties.l25
C. Compliance
Complianceand
and Conflict
differences and interpretive diverBeyond conflicts created by systemic differences
compliance deficiencies within a national framework may lead to
to
gences, compliance
claims of discrimination.
European websites
discrimination. For example,
example, many European
websites surreptiprotiously capture information about their visitors in violation
violation of local data pro126 in the United States, an FTC study of online services
services reported
reported
tection laws; 126
SCHWARTZ &
supranote 9 (demonstrating the significant weaknesses
122. See SCHWARTZ
& REIDENBERG, supra
weaknesses
supra note 57
in U.S.
U.S. privacy law and practice
practice as compared
compared to European principles); Reidenberg, supra
57
U.S. DEP'T
COMMERCF, DRAFT
(arguing that U.S.
U.S. privacy
privacy protection
protection has poor
poor results); U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
DRAFT
INTERNATIONAL SAFE HARBOR
<http:llvW.ita.doc.gov/
INTERNATIONAL
HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES (Nov. 15, 1999) <ht1p:/I\'1ww.ita.doc.govl
ecom/Principlesi 199.htin> (proposing
ecomlPrinciplesl199.htm>
(proposing a privacy
privacy accord between
between the United States
States and the EuroEuropean Union that implicitly
& LITAN,
LiTAN, supra
implicitly recognizes the inadequacy of U.S.
U.S. law). But see SWIRE &
supra
note 10 (arguing that U.S.
U.S. data privacy
privacy law is sufficient).
123.
& SCHWARTZ,
SCHWARTZ, supra
supra note 43, at 139-49
123. See REIDENBERG &
139-49 (discussing
(discussing the impact of conof law rule in the European Directive).
flicts on online services and the role of the uniform choice oflaw
124.
If notice requirements
cumbersome, to
124. Ifnotice
requirements do not conflict, then it would be possible, though cumbersome,
aggregate
aggregate all notice
notice elements of all relevant laws into one detailed notice.
See, e.g., Processing
ProcessingofPersonal
SWIPE &
& LITAN,
supranote 10.
10, at
125. See,
Personal Data, supra
supra note 68; SWIRE
LiTAN, supra
at
60-64.
126. Among the notable examples: In Belgium as of August 5,
1997, none of the major on126.
5,1997.
line service providers (MSN,
(MSN, Skynet, CompuServe,
Interpac) had complied
CompuServe, Datapak
Datapak and Interpac)
complied with the
& SCHWARTZ, supra
supra note 43.
43, at 195.
registration requirements of Belgian
Belgian law. See REIDENBERG
REIDENBERG &
In Germany, also in 1997,
1997, the websites
websites ofDer
of Der Speigel and Kaufhof (a major department
department store) each
failed to disclose their information practices
violation of German
practices in violation
German law, see id.
id. at 77, and in
France, La Redoute (a major online retailer) uses "cookies"
"cookies" and fails to disclose its practices in
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in
dismal adherence
adherence to even minimal standards of fair information
information practice in
127 In
1998.
In Spain, the small number of transfer
transfer requests made to the data
1998.127
disproportionately small when compared
compared to the
protection authority must be disproportionately
protection
28 This gap between
protection
reality of data exports.1
exports.l 28
data
protection
principles and
between
protection
international debate
debate on the protection
actual practice transforms
transforms the terms of international
of personal information. In the international
international context, instead of focusing on
protection afforded to personal information, the debate bethe quality of protection
29 If compliance
comes one of unfair discrimination.l
compliance is a problem
problem in a coundiscrimination.129
try, then to hold foreign data processors to a higher level of actual practice is
discriminatory. The wider the national gap between principle
principle and practice,
are only applied
principles
if
the
discrimination
applied
the stronger the claim of discrimination
international data flows.
stringently to international
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAWS
GOVERNANCE CHOICES AND
IV. GOVERNANCE
AND INFORMATION

efOver the years, the conflicts
conflicts have led to several major international
international efthe
Organiharmonization of information
forts at harmonization
information privacy standards.
standards. Indeed,
zation for Economic
Economic Cooperation
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
(OECD) Guidelines
Guidelines and
Convention were pre-Internet
pre-Internet responses
responses to the growthe Council of Europe Convention
information around the world. As ProProing disparity in treatment of personal information
observed, however, "implementation
"implementation
fessor Charles Raab has astutely observed,
administrative use of perdifferences coupled with national differences
differences in administrative
differences
configuration of commercial competitive positions in
in
sonal data and in the configuration
international trade have made harmonization
international
harmonization difficult to achieve even when
confined
Union."130 Just within the context of Europe's
Europe's
confined only to the European
European Union."130
online
online environment, the European
European Data Protection
Protection Directive
Directive is unlikely
unlikely to

<http://www.laredoute.fr'>. Despite the obviousness of
violation of French law. See La Redoute <http://www.laredoute.frl>.
of
companies have
these violations, none of the companies
have been
been prosecuted
prosecuted for violations of the national laws.
supra note 46; see also SELF-REGULATION,
ONLINE, supra
127. See PRIVACY ONLINE,
SELF-REGULATION, supra
supra note 46 (re14% of web
websites'
sites' privacy notices comply with the FTC's set of standards
standards for
porting that fewer than 14%
conducted at Georgetown University
notice and choice). One year later, a study conducted
University found that 65.9%
form ofprivacy
commerical websites sampled
of the comrnerical
sampled in the study posted some fonn
privacy disclosure. See Mary
Mary
to the Federal
PolicySurvey: Report 10
GeorgetownInternet
J.. Culnan,
Culnan, Georgetown
Intemet Privacy
Privacy Policy
Federal Trade
Trade Commission, at
13.6% of
1999) <http://www.msb.eduifaculty/culnanmlGIPPS/romrptPDF>.
<http:llwww.msb.edulfaculty/culnanni/GIPPS/mrrptPDF>. But only 13.6%
10 (June 1999)
of
id. at 10.
these sites had a complete policy. See id.
128. During 1997, only 793 international
international transfers
transfers were
were declared to the Spanish data protecprotecInternationalData
tion agency. See Agencia
Agencia de Proteccion
Proteccion de Datos, Intemational
Data Transfers,
Transfers, at 4 (May 1997)
<http://www.privacyexchange.orgltbdiltbdistudieslspaindt97.html>.
<http://www.privacyexchange.orgltbdiltbdistudieslspaindt97.htm1>.
The Movement toThe Globalization
129.
129. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, TIle
Globalization ofPrivacy
Privacy Solutions:
Solutions: Tlze
supra note
Standardsfor
wards Obligatory
Obligatory Standards
for Fair
Fair Information
Infomlation Practices,
Practices, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY, supra
information must, thus, satisfy
51,
51, at 219-20 ("Any European
European restrictions on the flow of personal infonnation
and Social
the tests of non
non-discrimination
-discrimination among third countries.');
countries."); Gregory
Gregory Shaffer, Globalization
Globalization and
U.S. Privacy
PrivacyStandards,
Standards,
RatchetingUp of u.s.
InternationalRules in Ratclleting
Impact ofEU andIntemotional
Protection:The Impact
Protectio1l:
1,50 (2000).
INT'L L. 1,50
25 YALE J.INT'LL.
25YALEJ.
130. See Raab, supra
supra note 42, at 168.
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l3l
harmonization.131
These efforts,
efforts, nevertheless,
achieve the goal of full hannonization.
strengthen the policy convergence
convergence on First Principles.

information practice
The consensus on First Principles of fair infonnation
practice and the
search for harmonized
search
harmonized rules obscure the intrinsic connection
connection between governance and fair information
information practices. Professor Colin Bennett, in his pioernance
neering
work,
attributes
the degree of convergence
convergence on First Principles
neering
Principles and
(1) common features of inrecent harmonization
harmonization efforts to several forces: (1)
formation
technology; (2) an elite network of policy activists; and (3)
(3) EuroEurofonnation technology;
132 Bennett explains well the
flows.132
pean restrictions on transborder data flOWS.
political influences
influences on the policy-making
policy-making process and the universality of First
First
Principles. But, he limits his analysis to the "policy
toolkit"f33--the
"policY toolkit"133-the choice
choice
of instruments
instruments to achieve
achieve First Principles-and
Principles-and finds political explanations
explanations
for the choice of different policy instruments.
differences are more profound
This Part argues, instead, that the national differences
profound
than the politics leading
leading to the choice of policy instruments. Rather, the divergence in execution
execution derives
derives from
from fundamentally
fundamentally distinct visions of demovergence
democratic governance. Democratic countries do not share the same traditions
traditions
and views on the role ofthe
of the state in protecting
protecting the rights of citizens
citizens and the
ability of the market
market to
to assure
assure the
the fair treatment of citizens. In these societal
ability
balances,
information privacy
privacy rules
rules have
have an essential and normative
nonnative governbalances, infonnation
ance function.l
function.13344 Indeed,
Indeed, the distinct executions of First Principles show that
ance
particular
particular information
infonnation privacy rules either help to shape a liberal, self-reliant
self-reliant
governance
socially-protective governance balgovernance balance or help to establish a socially-protective
ance.
A. The Normative
NormativeRole ofPrivacy
Governance
ofPrivacy in Democratic
Democratic Governance

Privacy is
an essential
essential feature
feature of
of aa citizen's
citizen's ability to participate
Privacy
is an
participate fully in
35 Laslo
democratic society.t
democratic
Majtenyi, the Hungarian
society.135
Lfsl6 Majtrnyi,
Hungarian Parliamentary
Parliamentary Com131. See European
EuropeanData
Directive,supra
supra note 11,
of
131.
Data Protection
Protection Directive,
11, at Recitals 7-8 (defining goal of
harmonization); REIDENBERG
SCHWARTZ, supra
supra note
hannonization);
REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ,
note 43,
43, at 123-46 (arguing
(arguing that important divergences
European national
vergences in European
national laws
laws will persist after the transposition
transposition of the European Directive).
132.
supranote 2.
132. See BENNETr,
BENNE1T, supra
supra note 10, at 220-50; see also Bennett, supra
BENNE, supranote 10,
133. See BENNE1T,Sllpra
10, at 194.
134. Bennett argues that "each
"each national choice reflects something about the political system in
134.
in
question."
BENNETT, supra
connecquestion." BENNE1T,
supra note 10,
10, at 192. This section,
section, however, seeks to show that the connection between
between the execution of First Principles
Principles and national politics is normative rather than derivative.
135. See Raab, supra
supranote 42, at 161-65 (noting that data privacy
in
privacy is a necessary
necessary protection in
(1989) (arguing
(arguing
democratic state); Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV.
REv. 737 (1989)
a democratic
that privacy is a basic right of citizens); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
Privacy and Participation:
Participation: Personal
Personal
Information and
and Public
Regulation in the United States,
States, 80 IOWA
(1995)
Infonnation
Public Sector Regulation
IOWA L. REV. 553, 555 (1995)
(arguing that data privacy is necessary for public participation
participation in government);
government); Simitis, supra
supra note
democratic
42, at 732-37 (arguing that privacy is
is essential for citizens to exercise freedom in a democratic
society).
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missioner for Data
Data Protection
Protection and Freedom of Information, observed as his
missioner
country moved from Eastern European
European communism to Western European
European
country
democracy that "nearly
"nearly every case we handle has to do, in one way or anstate."3 6 As such, privacy rights
constitutional state."136
constructing the constitutional
other, with constructing
playaa normative
nonnative role in democratic
democratic governance.
governance. These rights delineate
delineate the
play
of
boundary of state control over individuals and define the basic attribute
attribute of
citizenship.
citizenship.
Privacy is often cast as an individual's desire for seclusion from the pubWarren and Louis Brandeis
Brandeis made this strain of privacy
lic realm. Samuel Warren
of
alone." 37 This conception of
argument for a "right to be let alone."137
famous in their argument
articulates a particular
privacy implicitly
implicitly articulates
particular vision of the individual's liberty in
in
to
society, namely that the individual should have the ability to withdraw and to
associate with others. This also shows that privacy
privacy rights define relation138
ships among citizens.
citizens.I 38
Competing theories of privacy are more direct in the link between privacy and governance. The autonomy theory
theory of privacy argues that individuspecifically interprets
als have the right to define themselves for others and specifically
participation.13399 This "right to control the
privacy
privacy as necessary
necessary for political participation.l
others" sets the framework for private
personal information
infonnation to others"
disclosure of personal
40 The dignity theory calls
interchange.140
social interaction
interaction as well as political
political interchange.I
calls
for privacy
privacy protection
protection as a means for individuals
individuals to ratify their identity and
self.141 In effect, the protection
protection of dignity would broadly set the constitutional ground rules for an individual's interactions with others. Lastly, civilof
ity theory sees privacy as protection for community boundaries
boundaries of
42
decency.1 Perhaps most directly, civility presents privacy as a key instrudecency.142
ment of social governance.
governance.
linked
In a networked
networked environment, individual identity and liberty are linked
intrinsically
information.I 43 Data privacy
privacy rules
intrinsically to the treatment of personal information.143
are often
often cast as a balance
balance between two basic liberties:
liberties: fundamental human
PROC.
Change oJthe
of the Political
Majt~nyi, Data Protection in the Era
136. Usl6
Lasl6 Majtenyi,
Era of
oJChange
Political System,
System, in PROe.
supranote 67, at 3.
XIXTH INT'L CONF.,
CONF., supra
137. Samuel
Samuel D. Warren
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,
193,
195-96 (1890).
(1890).
define
"information territories"
supra note 47, at 68 (arguing for "infonnation
138. See also Schwartz,
Schwartz, supra
territories" to defme
relationships).
supranote 14.
139. See WESTIN, supra
475,477
Privacy,77 YALE
140. See Charles Fried, Privacy,
YALE L".
LJ. 475,
477 (1968).
(1968).
Privacyas an
an Aspect of
141.
141. See Edward
Edward J.. Bloustein,
Bloustein, Privacy
ojHuman Dignity:
Dignity: An Ansver
Answer to Dean
Dean
962,965-66
Prosser,
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
REv. 962,
965-66 (1964).
Privacy: Community and Self in the
Social Foundations
142. See Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundations of
oj Privacy:
invasion-of-privacy tort
(1989) (arguing that the invasion-of-privacy
CAL. L. REV.
Tort, 77 CAL.
Common Law Tort,
REV_ 957, 957 (1989)
protects rules of civility but that the expansion of mass media poses an important threat to the
rules).
jurisprudencerelafrancaiseet tendence de Ia
143. See Herbert Maisl,
Maisl, Etat de la
fa legislation
legislalionfrancaise
lajurisprodence
relacompare 559.
protectiondes donneespersonelles,
tives a la
fa protection
donnees personelles, 1987 Rev. int'l de droit compare
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4
rights on one side and the free flow of information
information on the other side.1
side.I444 Yet,
because
information should be
be
because societies
societies differ on how and when
when personal information
14
5
available for private
and
public
sector
needs,
interaction
private
needs,145 the treatment
treatment and interaction
between the state, civil
of these liberties
liberties will express
express a specific
specific delineation between
society, and the citizen.

LiberalNorms and Data
DataPrivacy
B. Liberal
Privacy
The liberal state emphasizes
characemphasizes limits on government power
power and is characterized by its hostility toward the regulation of private
Lockean
private relations. In Lockean
46
terms, the role of the state is to protect propertyt
property146
and the state is a force to
4
148
rights148
be restrained.1
restrained,1477 For privacy, the liberal approach prefers private
private rights
and regards the state with suspicion.149
In this context, personal
information
suspicion.I49 hI
personal information
needs to be protected
interference. State regulation should be sparse
protected from interference.
sparse
and as narrowly constructed as possible. To the extent that the free flow of
of
information promotes
promotes private activity and autonomy, private contract, rather
rather
Indiregulation for information. hIdithan state regulation becomes the source of regulation
viduals must vindicate their own rights.
The United States conceives
conceives of its democracy as such a liberal state. The
U.S. Constitution synthesizes
synthesizes commitments
commitments to self-governance
self-governance and individ50
ual rights.1SO
With
these
commitments,
there
is
a strong anti-statist
anti-statist element.
rights.I
Indeed, there is an ideological hostility to regulation of private relations deAmerica,lSI For information
information
spite the rise of the social welfare state in America.1SI
of
flows, there is a reflexive impulse against any restrictions on the treatment
treatment of
information.S2 This draws on the powerful
personal information,1S2
powerful First Amendment
Amendment tradition in the United States.

144. See Rigaux,
105, at 3.
Rigaux, supra
supra note 105,
3.
Privacy in Comparative
Comparative Perspectives,
Perspectives, in PRIVACY NOMOS XIII
145. See Herbert J. Spiro, Privacy
121-22, 128 (J. Roland
& John w.
W. Chapman eds., 1971)
1971) (noting that Americans more
Roland Pennock &
organizations than government
government while continental
readily share personal information
information with private
private organizations
Europeans do the reverse and arguing that Germany
Germany and the United
United States are at polar positions
with respect to privacy
privacy while England
England falls in the middle).
146. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
GOVERNMENT 70-73 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
ed.,
(1690).
Liberal Arts Press 1952)
1952) (1690).
id. at 75-82.
147. See
Seeid.at75-82.
Privacy'sPlace
Place in the Intellectual
IntellectualHistory
of
148. See, e.g., David W. Leebron,
Leebron, The Right to Privacy's
History of
Tort Lam,
RES. L. REv. 769,
antimajoritarian
Tort
Law, 41 CASE W.
W. REs.
769, 785-88 (1991)
(1991) (discussing
(discussing the liberal antirnajoritarian
emphasis of Brandeis'
emphasis
Brandeis' approach to privacy).
privacy).
149. See,
See, e.g.,
129-31.
e.g., Spiro, supra
supra note 145, at 129-31.
150. See Martin
History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism,
Constitutionalism, 95
Martin S. Flaherty, History
COLUM. L. REv.
REV. 523,579-90
(1995).
523, 579-90 (1995).
151.
J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Public/PrivateDistinction,
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
151. See Morton
Morton J.
REV.
1423, 1424
(1982) (arguing that it was the development
REv. 1423,
1424 (1982)
development of the economic
economic market in the nineteenth
teenth century that brought
brought the public/private
publicIprivate distinction into focus for the legal community).
152.
Setting Standards,
152. See Reidenberg, Setting
Standards, supra
supra note 36, at 502-04.
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For the execution
execution of First Principles, the liberal commitment has parconcerned with-coercive
ticular significance. Specifically, liberal politics are concerned
5 3 Sectoral rather than omnibus laws minimize
minimize state intrustate behavior1
behavior. 153
Sectoral laws, such as the Fair Credit Resions on information processing. Sectoral
porting Act,154 react to specific problems and provide only narrow state
intervention to protect privacy. For information privacy, this also means that
the public sector and police
police powers, rather than private conduct, are suspect.
The scope of legal protection
protection executing First Principles under liberal
as
seen
in
the
Untied
States is quite narrow. The political philosophy
norms
of nonintervention
nonintervention translates into a narrow definition of personal information. Discussion in the United States tends to exclude public record information from protection as "personal
"personal information."155
information."155 This narrow definition,
in effect, places a limit on the state's power to regulate information
information privacy.
At the same time, the focus of any information privacy legislation will be
surprisingly, in the United States, law targets discrete invery narrow. Not sUIprisingly,
formation processing
processing activities and the most important legislative protections
Privacy Act
Act
for information privacy emphasize restraint on government. The Privacy
1974,156 the Freedom of Information
Information Act of 1974,157
of 1974,156
1974,157 the Right to Financial
1978,158 and the Electronic
Electronic Communications
Communications Privacy
Privacy Act of
of
Privacy Act of 1978,158
exclusively or predominantly
1986159 are exclusively
predominantly about the treatment of information
information
by the government.
Of equal importance
importance under liberal theory is that markets, rather than law,
shape information
information privacy. Privacy is conceived
conceived as a fully alienable commodity and individual autonomy depends on the ability to make atomistic
atomistic
perceived to
decisions about the sale of personal information. Regulation is perceived
intrude on the commitment
interference in incommitment to freedom from government interference
60 As a result, law emphasizes
formation flows.l
flows.160
emphasizes regulation
market
regulation of the market
process rather than the substantive
substantive contours of information privacy. The expectation is that the market will then execute the First Principles. This marregulatory
ket emphasis
emphasis means that transparency should be the prime regulatory
focus.161
161 In
In the
the United
United States,
States, for
for example,
example, there are few legal restrictions
fOCUS.
restrictions on
supranote 146, at 112-18
153. See LOCKE,
LOCKE, supra
112-18 (describing tyranny
tyranny as power beyond
beyond right).
154. 15 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 1681 (1998).
(1998).
155.
eg., SWIRE
supranote 10,
10, at 36 (noting the broader scope
155. See, e.g.,
SWIRE &
& LITAN,
LlTAN, supra
scope of public recrecords in the United States);
States); McHugh,
McHugh, supra
supra note 38, at 188-89 (citing Yahoo!'s chief marketing
officer's
rationalization that Yahoo!'s
officer's rationalization
Yahoo!'s user profiles are not personal information).
infonnation).
(1996).
156. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1996).
157. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
(1996).
158. 12 U.S.C.
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422
(1994).
3401-3422 (1994).
(1994).
159. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522,2701-2711
2510-2522, 2701-2711 (1994).
supranote 10,
160. See, e.g., CATE, supra
10, at 68-72.
161. Cate notes that a key feature of public sector privacy laws "is the emphasis, carried over
over
161.
Amendmentjurisprudence,
democratic
from First Amendment
jurisprudence, on ensuring widespread
widespread access
access to data to support democratic
self-governance."
Id.at 76.
self-governance." ld.
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62 The absence of
the collection,
collection, storage, or dissemination of information.1
information. 162
of
law also encourages
information policy rules through technical
technical
encourages the rise of information
code.16633 These technical
code.1
technical rules embed information
information privacy decisions, or more
often privacy violations,64
violations,l64 in network architecture. Ultimately, they leave
the rule-making
rule-making to private standards groups such as the Internet Engineering
Engineering
65 and the World Wide
66
Wide Web Consortium.1
Consortium.166
Task Force165
For the market approach,
approach, three issues are of paramount
paramount importance:
importance: notice, consent, and accuracy. In the United States, the sectoral statutes tend to
address accuracy
accuracy of information.167
information.1 67 But, they do not give broad access
access to
personal
personal information held by others. For example,
example, there is no legal right in
6S
the United States for an individual to compel Acxiom
Acxiomi168
to reveal the personal information that Acxiom sells about the inquiring person. This narrow
narrow
1
69
169
construction of the First Principle calling for rights of access favors the
interests
interests of those holding information about others. In staying true to Locke,
the narrow construction
construction protects the effort of the collector
collector of personal information.
With respect to notice and consent, U.S.
U.S. government policy stresses
stresses
these two elements of First Principles.170
Principles.170 Yet, the execution
execution of these elements generally remains outside the boundaries
boundaries of law and is left to the marketplace. The anti-state perspective
perspective disdains government
government interference
interference in

Reidenberg, Setting
SettingStandards,
162. See Reidenberg,
Standards, supra
supra note 36, at 528-29.
163. See LESSIG,
ex Informatica,
supranote 78.
LESSIG, supra
supra note 77; Reidenberg, Lex
Informatica, supra
164. Richard Smith, a technical
technical expert, has, in pioneering work, identified the privacy invasive architectures
architectures of a number ofpopular
of popular products such as the fingerprinting of Microsoft
Microsoft Office
Office 97
97
files with a Global Unique Identifier
Identifier (GUID) and Internet design features such as Web bugs that
that
preclude
anonymous browsing. Richard M. Smith,
Issues <http://www.tiac.netl
<http://www.tiae.net/
Smith, Internet
Internet Privacy
Privacy Issues
preclude anonymous
users/smiths/privacy/>.
users/smiths/privacy/>.
165.
Engineering Task Force
IPv6, a protocol for
for
165. The Internet
Internet Engineering
Force is, for example, working on lPv6,
internet addressing, that will require a unique identifier for each machine connected
connected to the Internet.
See Thomas Narten &
PrivacyExtensions
Extensions for
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
& R. Draves, Privacy
for Stateless
Autoconjiguration in
Ipv6, at § 2 (Oct
(Oct. 1999) <http:l/www.ietforglintemet-dmfts/draft-ietf-ipngwg-addrconf-privacyipv6,
<http://www.ietf.orglinternet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipngwg-addrconf-privacyOl.txt>.
166. W3C has sought to develop a number of
technological privacy tools such as the Platform
oftechnological
for Internet Content Selection
Selection (pIeS)
(PICS) and the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P).
(31). The W3C
M3C
Web site is at <http://www.w3c.org>.
<http:/lwww.w3c.org>.
167. See,
See. e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1994)
(1994) (Fair Credit Reporting Act error correction
correction requirerequirement); 15 U.S.C. § 1693(f)
1693(f) (1994)
Preserva(1994) (Fair Credit Billing
Billing Act error
error correction
correction requirement);
requirement); Preservation of Records
Records of Communication
Communication Common Carriers, 51 Fed. Reg. 32653 (1986) (to be codified at
47 C.F.R. pt. 42) (telephone
(telephone billing regulations
regulations providing
providing for dispute procedures).
procedures).
168. Acxiom
168.
Acxiom is one of the largest
largest companies
companies in the United
United States selling personal information
information
to direct marketers.
<http/www.acxiom.com>.
marketers. See Axciom
Axciom <http://www.acxiom.com>.
169. See text accompanying
accompanying note 51, supra.
supra.
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra
supranote 8,
8, at Issue 5 ~44 (stating that "principles of fair
170. See, e.g.,
e.g., 1HE
information practice
practice [] rest on the fundamental precepts of awareness and choice");
choice"); PRIVACY
GRoup, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
COMMERCE, supra
WORKING GROUP,
supra note 30 (relying principally
principally on notice and
choice as the privacy paradigm for the Information Age).
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in
contained in
consensual decisions.'71
decisions. 171 The most recent privacy legislation, contained
consensual
Modernization ACt,172
Act,172 allows rampant sharing
sharing of perthe Financial Services Modernization
corporate affiliates
affiliates provided consumers are ininformation among corporate
sonal infonnation
approach
fonned periodically
periodically that their privacy will be violated. This approach
formed
willfully ignores "public order"
order" considerations
considerations such as the validity of consent
activity.t 73
processing activity.173
for certain types of processing
Next, the American
American liberal philosophy
philosophy minimizes
minimizes execution of the First
Principle of finality. Purpose limitations on the use of collected personal
informacontrary to the ideology of free flows of infonnainformation are seen as contrary
infonnation
174 In fact, one of the few statutes to impose purpose limitations on the
tion.
tion.174
information, the Fair Credit Reporting Act,175 interprets
personal infonnation,
interprets the
use of personal
Fair
purposes compatible with the rationale for collection broadly. The Fair
Credit Reporting Act explicitly allows the use of credit report for certain
certain
ofmarketing purposes; namely, to make unsolicited credit and insurance offers. 1766
fers.J7
informaSignificantly, the American
American commitment to liberal values for infonnation flows is supported by the absence
absence ofpublic
public enforcement mechanisms
mechanisms for
First Principles. The sparse existence
existence of legal
legal rights proffers few judicial
remedies and there is no Data Protection
Protection Commission in the United States.
The state does not act as the direct protector of citizens. Instead of public
enforcement of fair
sanction, private initiative offers the principal means of enforcement
fair
information practices. By relying on private action, citizens
infonnation
citizens must vindicate
their own interests and the opportunities for state interference
interference with informainfonnalimited.177
tion privacy
privacy are limited.177
interference with
171. Indeed, the U.S.
171.
U.S. Constitution also prohibits
prohibils state interference
with private contract. See
of
("No State shall
shall. •••
. . pass any
any...
cl.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
1I (''No
••• Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts."); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)
Contracts.'');
(1819) (voiding the New
New
Hampshire
Hampshire legislature's
legislature's attempt to modify a private college's charter).
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization
172. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338.
1338.
of
of a patient's consent
173. For years,
173.
years, U.S. law has ignored the legitimacy ofa
consent to the sharing
sbaring of
medical
medical information
information as a condition for insurance payment. A typical medical insurance
insurance form includes
cludes language
language such as the following: "I authorize any Health
Health Care Provider, Insurance Company,
.. to any CIGNA company, the Plan
Employer, Person or Organization to release
release any information.
information •••
agents for the purpose of validating and determining benefits
Administrator, or their authorized
authorized agenls
benefils
payable." Cigna HealthCare
payable."
HealthCare Group Medical
Medical Direct Reimbursement Claim Form (CL505517 2-96)
StanfordLaiv
(on file with the Stanford
Law Review).
Review). The release includes
includes no obligation
obligation for CIGNA to keep the
information confidential,
confidential, nor does it preclude
preclude CIGNA
CIGNA from using any acquired information for
for
other purposes. These terms are not negotiable.
supranote 10, at 99 ("Privacy laws in the United States most often prohibit
174. See CATE, supra
ofpersonal
information.').
certain disclosures, rather than collection, use, or storage, of
personal information.").
1681 (1998).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(1998).
(1998).
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c) (1998).
"czar." See, e.g.,
177. U.S. rhetoric
rhetoric typically refers pejoratively
pejoratively to any privacy
privacy regulator as a "czar."
e.g.,
of
Remarks
Remarks of Ambassador
Ambassador David L. Aaron, Under Sec'y of Conum.
Corom. for Int'l Trade, U.S. DEP'T of
Comm.,
Comm., before the World
World Affairs Council Panel on the WTO
WTO &
& E-Commerce, Seattle, WA 3 (Nov.
<http:llwww.ita.doe.gov/mediaIEWTO1 12.htm>; Remarks
12, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/medialEWT01112.htm>;
Remarks of David L. Aaron,
Aaron, UnderHeinOnline -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1345 1999-2000
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By
law is ad hoo
By design, in this liberal approach, law
hoc and reactive. Faced
Faced
personal information,
infonnation,
with rapidly changing, technologically
technologically driven uses of personal
17s
wayside.178
fall by
the execution
execution of many of the First Principles
Principles tends to fall
by the
the wayside.
Sectoral
circumvented by cross-sectoral
Sectoral regulation
regulation is circumvented
cross-sectoral information
infonnation processing
processing
and key areas are intentionally
intentionally ignored. Indeed, sectoral borders themselves
themselves
79 Non-economic values such as human dignity
define.179
impossible to define.I
may be impossible
do not enter into the calculus. At the same time, key conditions necessary
necessary
ISO
for the market to successfully
successfully account for privacy interests are missing.
missing.IB0
Basic transparency and infonned
informed consent are far from the reality in the
United'States.
United "States.
nonexecution of First Principles
The nonexecution
Principles in the United
United States leads to an interesting network effect.t1
restraints on information
infonnation trafficking have
effect. lsl Few restraints
enormous volume of personal
information to be collected
personal infonnation
collected and
allowed an enonnous
of
disseminated. For those who seek customized
customized products, the larger
larger volume of
personal infonnation
information in circulation gives business a greater ability to develop
those products.82
externality: It becomes harder
products.1 S2 But, there is an important externality:
information privacy as more infonnation
information about
for individuals to maintain infonnation
others circulates.
circulates. Profiling and inferential predictions based on aggregate
information
individual.18383 The collective
collective market treatment
treatment of
of
information affect each individual.I
personal information restrains
restrains any individual's decisionmaking
decisionmaking freedom.
While liberal objectives
objectives might be frustrated by the suppression
suppression of indimarket-dominated decisionmaking,
decisionmaking, the execution of First
vidualism through market-dominated
First
Principles in the United States clearly
enshrines
a
liberal
philosophy.
Whatclearly
ever criticism might be made regarding the sorry state of information privacy
in the United States, the free market,
self-regulatory approach adopts govmarket, self-regulatory
ernance
in the United States.
ernance choices
choices.in
Comm., before
sec'y of Comm. for Int'l Trade, U.S.
U.S. Dep't of Corom.,
before the Information
Infonnation Technology
Technology Association of America Fourth Annual IT Policy Summit, Washington,
15, 1999)
1999)
Washington, DC 2 (Mar. IS,
<http:lwww.ita.doc.gov/medialItaapr3l599.htm>
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/Itaapr31599.htm>
Reidenberg, supra
supranote 57, at 775-76,
775-76,779-80
178. See Reidenberg,
779-80 (describing market
market failure and missing
information practice); Schwartz
supra note 9, at 338-90 (showing
elements of fair infonnation
Schwartz & Reidenberg, supra
(showing
lack of transparency).
supra note 78,
179. See Reidenberg, Governing
Governing Networks, supra
78, at 915-17 (discussing
(discussing the breaksubstantive bodies of law); Robert M. Gellman,
PrivacyBe Regudown of borders
borders between
between substantive
gelIman, Can
Can Privacy
lated Effectively
Thoughts on the Possible
for International
lated
Effectively on a National
National Level? Thoughts
Possible Need
Needfor
International Rules, 41
VILL.
VILL. L. REV.
REv. 129, 143-45 (1996) (noting overlaps
overlaps in sectoral
sectoral industry
industry codes
codes of conduct).
conduct).
180. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
Health Care
Information,
Privacy and the Economics of Personal
Personal Health
Care Information,
76 TEx.
TEX. L. REv.
REV. 1 (1997)
(1997) (arguing that the operation and economics of complex economic markets,
health care
care and employment for example, actually
actually favor data privacy protection).
181. See Mark
& David McGowan,
Legal Implications
Ef181.
Mark A. Lemley &
McGowan, Legal
Implications ofNetwork Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv.
REV. 479 (1998).
supranote 19,
278-81. "In sum, mass customization
customization requires the sur182. See Samarajiva,
Samarajiva, supra
19, at 278-81.
veillance of spatially dispersed,
dispersed, dynamic target markets and the building of relationships
relationships with customers. Customized production goes with customized
customized marketing, which goes with customer
customer
surveillance. This is the surveillance imperative."
imperative." Id.
Id. at 279.
183. See Simitis, supra
supranote 64, at 726-29.
183.
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Social-ProtectionNorms and
andData
DataPrivacy
Privacy
Social-Protection

States' liberal philosophy, other democracies,
democracies,
In contrast to the United States'
of
typically European, approach information privacy from the perspective of
social protection. Under this governance philosophy, public liberty derives
individuals and law is the fundamental basis to purfrom the community of individuals
vision of governance genprotection.l 84 This :vision
sue norms of social and citizen protection.184
erally regards
the
state
as
the
necessary
player
to
frame
the social
regards
necessary
socil:j.l community
community
85
develop, and information practices must serve indiin which individuals develop,185
vidual identity.186
identity. 8 6 Citizen autonomy, in this view, effectively depends on a
backdrop of legal rights.
In this context, data privacy is a political
political imperative
imperative anchored in fundaprotection.18877 Citizens trust government more than the
mental human rights protection.l
88 Consequently, European democprivate sector with personal information.l
information.88
racies approach
protection as an element of public law.I
law.18899 Louise Caapproach data protection
doux, former Vice President of the French
French National
National Commission
Commission on Data
Processing and Liberties, succinctly
succinctly notes: "[F]or
Processing
"[F]or Europe, the choice is
clear: privacy
of law."19 0
privacy protection
protection is an exclusive issue oflaw."190
184. See
SUR LA DEMOCRATIE EN
184.
See LAURENT COHEN-TANUGI,
COHEN-TANUGr, LE
LE DROIT SANS L'ETAT:
L'ETAT: SUR
society'
FRANCE ET EN AMERIQUE
AMERIQUE 10 (1985)
(1985) (noting that the American model of "a 'contractual
'contractual society'
opposes naturally the other
other great model of regulation,
regulation, the Social Contract,
Contract, a meta-contract
meta-contract uniting
uniting
the entire society to the creation ofa
of a State by a general and absolute delegation of
power from the
ofpower
former to the second)
fonner
second") (translation by author).
185.
freedoms
185. See Rigaux,
Rigaux, supra
supra note 105
105 (arguing that
that privacy is one of several
several competing freedoms
that must be
Propertyand
be decided on by the legislature); Yves Poullet, Data
Data Protection
Protection Between Property
Liberties:
175
Liberties: AA Civil Law Approach, in AMONGST FRIENDS
FRIENDS IN
IN COMPUTERS
COMPUTERS AND LAW 170-71,
170-71, 175
(H.W.K. Kaspersen
fundamental
Kaspersen & A. Oskamp
Oskamp eds.,
eds., 1990)
1990) (noting that civil law looks to create fundamental
privacy
privacy rights).
186.
"computer proc186. As an example, the very first sentence
sentence of the French
French data privacy
privacy law is "computer
essing must
citizen." See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, at art. 1 <http://www.cnil.fr/
<http:llwww.cnil.fr/
must serve the citizen."
textes/text02.htm>.
textes!text02.htm>.
187. See COE Convention,
1. The Convention
Convention, supra
supra note 14, at preamble
preamble & art. 1.
Convention provides:
Considering
safeguards for everyone's
Considering that it is desirable
desirable to extend
extend the safeguards
everyone's rights and
and fundamental
freedoms,
freedoms, and in particular
particular the right to the respect
respect for privacy, taking account ofthe
of the increasing
flow across
11 The puracross frontiers
frontiers of personal
personal data undergoing
undergoing automatic
automatic processing
processing ....
•••• [Art.
[Art. 1J
pose ofthis
this convention
convention is to secure in
in the
the territory
territory of each Party
Party for every individual,
individual, whatever
whatever
his nationality
nationality or
or residence,
residence, respect
respect for his rights and
and fundamental
fundamental freedoms, and
and in particular
particular
his
his right
right to privacy, with regard
regard to automatic
automatic processing
processing of
ofpersonal
personal data relating
relating to him
hint ("data
protection").
protection").
.
Id.
fd.
188.
122.
188. See Spiro, supra
supra note 145, at 122.
189.
ofHuman Rights Protection,
189. See generally
generally T. Koopmans, Privacy
Privacy and the Dilemmas a/Human
Protection, in
PROC.
<http://cwis.kub.nl/
PROC. XVITH
XVIrn INT'L
INT'L CONF.
CONF. DATA PROT. COMM'RS
COMM'RS 72,
72, 72-77 (Sept. 1994) <http://cwis.h."Ub.nIl
--dbi/regkamer/proc.htm> [hereinafter
[hereinafter XVIrn
XVITH INT'L
-dbilregkamer/proc.htm>
lNT'L CONF.]
CONF.) (discussing
(discussing the development
development of data
protection
jurisprudence); Peter Blume,
Control,
protection in European
Europeanjurisprudence);
Blume, Legal Culture
Culture and the Possibilities
Possibilities of
o/Control,
in
ill 33 LECTURES
LEcruRES ONDATA
ON DATA PROTECTION
PROTECTION 19,35 (1992).
(1992).
190.
l'informationet vieprivee:
oi,
190. Louise Cadoux,
Cadoux, Autoroutes
Autoroutes de
de l'infonnation
vie privee: ethique,
etlzique, auto-regulation
auto-regulation et loi,
in
ill PROC.
PROC. XIXTH
XIXm INT'L
INT'L CONF.,
CONF., supra
supra note 67 (translated
(translated by
by author).
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To assure social protection, data protection norms in Europe interpose
interpose
the state in creating parity
France
parity between organizations
organizations and individuals.
individuals. France
of
and the European Data Protection
Protection Directive, for example, prohibit the use of
191 This socially-protective
purely
citizens.91
purely automated decisions about citizens.
socially-protective apapproach
fully execute First
proach to regulation seeks to manage relationships and :fully
Principles.
prophylactic protection
Principles. Law, thus, enshrines
enshrines prophylactic
protection through comprehencomprehen1 2
sive rights and responsibilitieS,l92
responsibilities. 9 The
expansive.
The scope of coverage is expansive.
cross-sectoral, affecting all industries and
European data protection
protection laws are cross-sectoral,
1 93
information is
the public sector.
sector.193
Indeed, the commitment to free flows of information
is
far narrower
approach. For example, in the interest of asnarrower than in the liberal approach.
suring freedom of speech, Europeanjournalists
European journalists enjoy
eIijoy some exceptions
exceptions to the
94
94
information.1
exceptions are
But, these exceptions
rules for processing personal information.1
Amendment protections afforded to journalists in the
weaker than the First Amendment
attacked as unconstituunconstituUnited States, where virtually
virtually any restriction will be attacked
I95
tional.195
tional.
Under the social-protection
social-protection approach, the execution
execution of First Principles
emphasizes the legitimacy of processing
processing personal information. Not surprissurprisemphasizes
ingly, European
law
rejects
consent
as
an
absolute
basis
for
the
treatment
of
European
treatment of
personal data,l96
data.196 In addition, European
European law insists on the "fair]
"fairO and lawful["processing
information.197 The interpretation
interpretation ofIegitimacy
of legitimacy
:fuIO"processing of personal information,l97
will, however, be circumscribed by the extent of the social protection sought.
For example, the United Kingdom and Germany, until transposition of the
European Data Protection Directive,
Directive, did not explicitly control the processing
processing
of sensitive data,198 while France and Belgium did. 1199 These latter countries
countries
191. See Law No. 78-17
1985, 1978 <http://www.cnil.fr/textesitext02.htm>;
<http://wv.cnil.fr/textes/textO2.btrn>; EuroEuro191.
78-17 of Jan. 6, 1985,
pean
ProtectionDirective,
Directive,supra
supranote 11,
art. 15(1).
15(1).
pean Data
Data Protection
11, at art
192. See SWIRE
Swimr &
LITAN, supra
192.
& LITAN,
supra note 10, at 22-31
22-31 (discussing the application of the European
European
supranote 12.
Directive's privacy protections
protections in Europe);
Europe); Schwartz,
Schwartz, supra
193. See European
EuropeanData
DataProtection
ProtectionDirective,
Directive,supra
supranote II,
11, at recital
art. 3(1).
3(1).
193.
recital 12, art
194. See id.
id. at art.
of
art 9 ("Member
("Member States shall provide for exemptions...
exemptions ••• for the processing
processing of
purposes....").
personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes
•••.").
195. See SwIRa
& LIT
LTAN,
supra note 10, at 31 ("The use of 'only'
'only' and 'necessary'
'necessary' suggest
195.
SWIRE &
AN, supra
suggest
First
that free expression will prevail over privacy rights less often than would be true under the First
Amendment
Privacy and the
Amendment to the U.S.
U.S. Constitution?);
Constitution."); Jane Elizabeth Kirtley, Privacy
tlte News Media:
Media: A
Question of Trust.
Trust, or of Control?,
Control?, in PROC.
PaOC. XXIST
supra note 44 (criticizing the
Question
XXIsT INT'L CONF., supra
European
European Data Protection Directive as restrictive of press freedoms)
196. See European
EuropeanData
ProtectionDirective,
Directive,supra
supranote II,
11, at art.
196.
Data Protection
art 8 (requiring protection for
sensitive
sensitive data).
id. at art
197. See id.
art 6.
198. The U.K. Data Protection Act of 1984 allowed
allowed the Secretary
Secretary of State to issue regulations
regulations
for four types of sensitive data, but none were ever
1984, § 2(3)
ever issued. See Data Protection Act, 1984.
(Eng.).
incorporated higher protection
balancing
(Eng.). The German law incorpomted
protection of sensitive
sensitive data through a balancing
clause. See RElDENBERG
REIDENBERG &
& SCHWARTZ,
SCHWARTZ, supra
supra note 43, at 96-97.
199. See
PROTECTION DE
VIE PRIVtE,
RAPPORT D'ACTIVITE
D'ACT1VITE 38
199.
See COMMISSION
COMMISSION DE
DE PROTECTION
DE LA
LA VIE
PRlVEE, 1996 RApPORT
38
(1997)
(noting that
that advance
advance consent
Law No.
(1997) (noting
consent is required for processing sensitive data in Belgium); Law
78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978,
1978, at art
art 31 <http:llwww.cnil.fr/textesltextO2.htm>.
<http://www.cnil.fr/textesltext02.htm>.
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had, perhaps,
perhaps, aa stronger
stronger tradition
tradition of
of state
state paternalism than
than the
the United
United KingKingdom or
or Germany.
Germany.
Finality isis similarly
similarly aa key element of social protection.
protection. European data
data
protection
law places a critical
critical finality restriction
restriction on the
the processing of
protection law
of per2oo To assure
information.200
assure the enforcement of First Principles, public
sonal information.
public
oversight mechanisms
mechanisms also
also embody the social protective approach. Eurooversight
20 1
data protection
protection law
law establishes
establishes powerful
powerful state supervisory
supervisory agencies.
agencies.201
pean data
Denmark even calls its public agency the ''Data
"Data Surveillance
Surveillance
Indeed, Denmark
Authority."202
These
agencies
accomplish
their
through declaratory
Authority.''202
agencies
mission through
declaratory
schemes and licensing.
203 Criminal sanctions
licensing.203
sanctions are also a feature of public en204
forcement in
in many
many states.204
These contrast dramatically with the liberal apforcement
of
proach, which eschews such deep state involvement in the regulation of
information flows.
Although social-protection
social-protection norms pervade the execution of First PrinciAlthough
ples
20s The scope of coverdemocracies, divergences
exist.205
ples in European democracies,
divergences do exist.
age
of
data
protection
laws
is
broader,
for
example,
in France and Belgium
age of data protection
than
in
the
United
Kingdom.206
In
than in
Kingdom.2oG
Germany, there is even an explicit mandate to
to provide
provide anonymous
anonymous and pseudonymous online interactions.207
date
interactions.207 These
diverging
diverging scopes appear
appear to reflect the respective political cultures of state
involvement
in the
the private
private sector; France and Belgium have a Colbertist trainvolvement in
dition of governance,
independent and
governance, whereas the United Kingdom
Kingdom is more independent
and
200.
See European
11, at
200. See
European Data
Data Protection
Protection Directive,
Directive, supra
supra note
note 11,
at art.
art 6 ("Member
("Member States shall
provide
provide that
that personal
personal data
data must
must be
be ...
.•• collected
collected for
for specified, explicit,
explicit, and legitimate
legitimate purposes
purposes and
not
further processed
incompatible with
not further
processed in
in aa way
way incompatible
with those
those purposes.").
purposes.'').
201.
201. See
See id.
id. at
at art.
art 28
28 ("Each
(''Each Member
Member State shall provide
provide that
that one or more public
public authorities
are
monitoring the
the application
application within
within its
its territory
territory of
of the
the provisions
provisions adopted
adopted by
by the
the
are responsible
responsible for
for monitoring
Member
Member States.").
States.").
202.
202. See
See Data
Data Surveillance
SurveillanceAuthority
Authority <http://www.registertilsynet.dk/eng/index.html>.
<http://www.registertilsynetdkleng/index.htmI>.
203.
See
203. See BENNETT,
BENNEIT, supra
supra note
note 10;
10; FLAHERTY,
FLAHER1Y, supra
supra note 14
14 (discussing
(discussing the
the role, politics,
politics,
and
and operation
operation of
ofdata
dataprotection
protection agencies);
agencies); European
European Data
Data Protection
Protection Directive,
Directive, supra
supra note
note 11,
11, art.
art
19
19 (describing
(describing the
the information
information that
that must
must be
be provided
provided to
to the
the supervising
supervising agency
agency prior
prior to aa data
data colcollection).
lection).
204.
204. See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., DIRECTORATE
DIRECTORATE FOR
FOR SCIENCE,
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY
TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY,
INDUS1RY, OECD,
OECD,
INVENTORY
INVENTORY OF
OF INSTRUMENTS
INSTRUMEN1S AND
AND MECHANISMS
MECHANISMS CONTRIBUTING
CONTRIBUTING TO
TO THE
THE IMPLEMENTATION
IMPLEMENTATION AND
AND
ENFORCEMENT
ENFORCEMENT OF
OF THE
THE OECD
OECD PRIVACY
PRIVACY GUIDELINES
GUIDELINES ON
ON GLOBAL
GLOBAL NETWORKS,
NETWORKS, OECD
OECD Doc.
Doc.
DSTI/ICCP/REG(98)12/FINAL
DSTmCCPIREG(98)121FlNAL at
at 18-50
18-50 (May
(May 11,
11, 1999)
1999) <http'//www.olis.oecd.orglolis/1998doc.
<http://www.olis.oecd.org/olislI998doc.
nsf/4cf568b5b9dad99412567lb004bed59/0663flef6343f3a78025677dOO529a52/SFIL./05E95540
nsU4cfS68b5b90dad994125671b004bed59/0663flef6343f3a78025677d00529a521SFILE/05E95540
.ENG>
OECD guidelines
.ENG> (reporting
(reporting on
on implementation
implementationof
ofOECD
guidelines and
andnoting
noting relevant
relevant criminal
criminal sanctions
sanctions in
in
various
various countries).
countries).
205.
205. See
See FLAHERTY,
FLAHER1Y, supra
supra note
note 14
14 (analyzing
(analyzing differences
differences in
in public
public sector
sector regulation
regulation of
ofdata
data
privacy);
privacy); REIDENBERG
REIDENBERG &
&SCHWARTZ,
SCHWARTZ, supra
supra note
note 43
43 (studying
(studying divergences
divergences across
across several
several European
European
national
national laws).
Jaws).
206.
206. See
See notes
notes 82-86supra
82-86 supra and
andaccompanying
accompanyingtext
text (discussing
(discussing the
thedefinition
definitionof
of"identifiable"
"identifiable"
information).
infonnation).
207.
207. See
See REIDENBERG
REIDENBERG&& SCHWARTZ,
SCHWARTZ, supra
supra note
note 43,
43, at
at 39-40
39-40 ("The
("The IuKDG
IuKDGrequires
requires service
service
providers
'to
offer
providers 'to offerthe
theuser
useranonymous
anonymous use
useand
andpayment
paymentof
ofteleservices
teleservices or
oruse
use and
andpayment
paymentunder
underaa
pseudonym
pseudonymtoto the
the extent
extent technically
technicallyfeasible
feasible and
andreasonable.").
reasonable."').
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the modem
modern German
German history of the Holocaust offers a compelling
compelling motive to
to
Transparency rules in Europe also include
include differing
promote anonymity. Transparency
levels of intrusiveness
intrusiveness for the collectors
collectors and users of personal information.
The notices to individuals
for
the
processing of personal information
information and the
individuals
processing
supervisory authoriregistration statements
statements that must be filed with national supervisory
authori208
details.208
ties vary in their details.
social-protection approach has an important
For the online context, the social-protection
important
conceptual appeal. The approach is cross-sectoral
cross-sectoral and inclusive;
conceptual
inclusive; personal
personal
processing arinformation receives privacy protection
protection regardless of the processing
rangement. In contrast, the liberal approach restricts protection to increasincreasingly irrelevant sectoral boundaries. At the same time, however, the socialprotection approach poses normative challenges.
challenges. The complexity
complexity of dataarchitectures on the Internet makes the application
application of First Principrocessing architectures
ples to particular contexts difficult. An illustration of this point is found in
the registration mechanisms
mechanisms designed
designed to assure transparency. With respect to
online services, these requirements can prove rather
rather onerous and problematic. In fact, there is a debate as to the effectiveness
effectiveness of compliance and en2099 Beyond this implementation
forcement.20
implementation of First Principles, the interpretaforcement.
tion of standards poses additional problems. Small divergences
divergences and ambi210 Differpersonal information.
information.210
guities will distort the structure
structure and flows of personal
ences in the treatment
treatment of
of Internet
Internet Protocol
Protocol addresses may, for example, affect
affect
ences
where service providers locate address servers.
In the face of the growing issues of divergence with European data protection laws despite the shared governance philosophy, harmonization of inThe European
goa1.
European
formation privacy rules became an important goal.
Commission proposed a Directive
Directive in 1990,211 but the adoption did not con95/46/EC. In the interclude until enactment five years later of Directive 95/461EC.
vening years, Europe sought deeper political integration
integration following the
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on European
European Union.2M
Union.212 While there is no
overt linkage
between
the
political
integration
of
the European
European Union follinkage between
political
lowing the Maastricht Treaty and the final enactment of the data protection
protection
directive, the Maastricht
Maastricht Treaty did push European
European political governance to2 3 Indeed,
greater convergence.213
Indeed, the European Data Protection
Protection Directive
ward greater
208. See id.
id. at 131-35 (examining variations in requirements between European Union Member States).
209. See Existing Case-Law, supra note 110.
210. See REIDENBERG &
supranote 43, at 139-46.
& SCHWARTZ,
SCHWARTZ, supra
Individuals in Rela211. See Proposal for a Council Directive
Directive Concerning
Concerning the Protection of
ofIndividuals
tion to the Processing of Personal Data, COM(90)314
COM(90)314 final.
212. Treaty
7, 1992, 1992 O.J.
O.L (C 224) 1 <http://europa.eu.intleur<http://europa.eu.intleurTreaty on European Union, Feb. 7,1992,
lex/en/treaties/datleu _cons_treaty
cons treatyen.pdf>.
lexlenltreatiesfdatleu
_en.pdf.>.
eg., Annin
Armin Von Bogdandy, The Legal Casefor
Casefor Unity:
Unity: The European
Union as a
213. See, e.g.,
European Union
Single Organization
Organizationwith a
Legal System, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
REV. 887 (1999)
(1999) (arguing
(arguing
a Single Legal
that the European
European Union is creating a unitary legal order).
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contraceptives
Most jurisdictions, however, have declined to exempt oral contraceptives
35 Courts emphasize
"although a
emphasize that, "although
from the learned intermediary rule.35
greater degree of patient participation
participation may be involved
involved in the choice of a prescription contraceptive
prescription drugs, the physician
physician
contraceptive than in some other prescription
contraceptive rewhether a particular
particular contraceptive
makes the ultimate decision as to whether
appropriate. '36 The physician
quested by the patient is appropriate."36
physician still exercises indi"evaluate[s] a patient's
vidualized medical
medical judgment. He or she typically "evaluate[s]
patient's
vidualized
medical
medical and family history to elicit potential
potential risk factors, perform[s]
perform[s] a physi"determine[s]37
cal examination"
examination" and, in cases where a prescription is issued, "determine[s]
patient.
dosage to prescribe for a particular
particular patient."37
appropriate type and dosage
the appropriate
existence of serious side effects associated with
Courts also argue that the existence
oral contraceptives
underscores the importance
importance of the physician's role
contraceptives only underscores
38 Direct
evaluation of risks and benefits
in the evaluation
benefits associated
associated with their use. 38
Direct
patient package inand the FDA requirements for patient
marketing to consumers 'and
serts do not undermine
undermine the physician's crucial
crucial role in prescribing
prescribing oral contraceptives. 399 Finally, opponents
ceptives.3
opponents of the exception argue, "[t]he fact that oral
contraceptives do not usually require
require frequent check-ups bespeaks of the importance of the initial decision to prescribe
prescribe them and fails to provide
provide a prinportance
40
cipled basis to depart from the learned
learned intermediary
intermediary doctrine."
doctrine."4o
intermediary doctrine
learned intermediary
Despite the widespread justification
justification of the learned
in reproductive
reproductive health cases, critics of the doctrine have used the rationales
rationales
springboard for advocating
contraceptive exception as a springboard
supporting the oral contraceptive
advocating
additional
exceptions to the rule. The reasoning behind the oral contracepadditional exceptions
contracepextended to other drugs and medical detive exception
exception could arguably
arguably be extended
effects; 41 those prescribed elecvices such as those with high risks of side effects;41
e1ec1991) (applying
(applying
& Co.,
35. See MacPherson
MacPherson v. G.D. Searle
Searle &
Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 425 (D.D.C. 1991)
(E.D. Mich.
1290-91 (B.D.
District of Columbia law); Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287,
1287, 1290-91
1511, 1514-15 (S.D.
& Co.,
1991) (applying Michigan
1991)
Michigan law); Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 748 F. Supp. 1511,
& Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48
Fla. 1990)
1990) (applying Florida law);
1147-48 (D. Or.
law); Allen
Allen v. G.D. Searle &
1031-33 (D.N.J.
& Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024,
1989) (applying Oregon law); Spychala
1024, 1031-33
1989)
Spychala v. G.D. Searle &
1305-06 (D.
1988) (applying
1988)
(applying New Jersey law); Kociemba
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle &
& Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293,
1293, 1305-06
Stafford v. Nipp, 502 So. 2d 702, 704 (Ala. 1987); West v.
Minnesota law); Stafford
Minn. 1988) (applying Minnesota
Searle &
& Co., 806 S.W.2d
Searle
S.W.2d 608, 613-14 (Ark. 1991); Lacy v. G.D. Searle &
& Co., 567 A.2d 398,
398, 400
400
(Del. 1989); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032,
1032, 1040-41 (Kan. 1990); Taurino v. Ellen, 579 A.2d
(Pa. 1991); Terhune v. A.H. Robins
925, 927 (Pa.
(pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal
appeal denied,
denied, 589 A.2d 693 (pa.
1978).
Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978-79 (Wash. 1978).
1148.
36. Allen,
Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1148.
37. Reaves, 765 F. Supp.
Supp. at 1290.
id. at 1291.
1291.
38. See id.
infra and accompaaccompadirect-to-consumer advertising, see notes 59-80
59-80 infra
39. For a discussion of direct-to-consumer
infra
nying text. For a discussion
discussion of FDA regulations requiring
requiring direct warnings, see notes 48-58 infra
and accompanying
accompanying text.
I, at 867.
supra note 1,
40. Walsh, supra
(E.D. Penn. 1990)
41. See Ferrara v. Beflex
Berlex Lab.,
Lab., Inc.,
Inc., 732 F. Supp. 552 (B.D.
1990) (rejecting
(rejecting the arguanti-depressant drug Nardil wan-anted
warranted a direct
direct
ment that the especially dangerous
dangerous nature of the anti-depressant
warning to users).
users).
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tively by patients for use over a long period of time;42
time;42 those for which the
43
PPI;43 and those prescription drugs marketed directly to conFDA requires a PPI;
sumers.44
2. Intrauterine
Intrauterinedevices and
and breast
implants.
breast implants.
Relying
contraceptive exception, plainRelying on the rationales behind the oral contraceptive
tiffs'
tiffs' attorneys and others have vigorously argued, for instance, that excepexceptions to the learned intermediary
intermediary rule also be carved out for intrauterine
intrauterine de45 Efforts in this area, however, have met
vices (IUDs) and breast implants.45
with very limited success.
success. Courts have uniformly
uniformly declined
declined to impose a direct
duty to warn patients in the case of breast implants, and only one court has
imposed
Circuit
imposed such a duty in the case of IUDs. Standing alone, the Eighth Circuit
in Hill
intermediary rule should
Searle Laboratories
Laboratories4466 held that the learned
learned intermediary
should
Hill v. Searle
not apply to the IUD for the same reasons other courts had not applied
applied it to
47
oral contraceptives.
contraceptives.47
3. FDA regulations
regulationsrequiring
requiringdirect
direct warnings.
warnings.
exception
learned intermediary
intermediary doctrine advocate an exception
Some critics of the learned
to that rule when the FDA has mandated direct patient warnings. Federal
Federal
currently require
manufacturers to supregulations promulgated
promulgated by the FDA currently
require manufacturers
ply PPIs for a number of products, including all isoproterenol
isoproterenol inhalation
inhalation
preparations,
preparations, prescription-only
prescription-only contraceptives, estrogens, and progestational
48 Violation
Violation of the federal regulations-by
drug products. 48
regulations-by failure to include a
42. Intrauterine
Intrauterine devices and breast
breast implants
implants fall under this rubric. For a discussion
discussion of efforts
efforts
to carve out exceptions
exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine in this area, see notes 45-47 infra and
accompanying
accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of efforts to carve
carve out such an exception to the learned intermediary
intermediary docdoctrine, see notes 48-58 infra
infra and accompanying
accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of efforts to carve out a direct-to-consumer
direct-to-consumer advertising exception to the
learned
infra and accompanying
accompanying text.
learned intermediary doctrine,
doctrine, see notes 59-80 infra
45. See, e.g., Desmarais v. Dow Coming
13, 17
Corning Corp.,
Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13,
17 n.5 (D. Conn. 1989)
1989) (rejecting
exception to the learned
plaintiffs request to establish a breast implant exception
learned intermediary
intermediary rule);
jecting plaintiffs
Lee v. Baxter Healthcare
Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89,
94-95 (D. Md. 1989), aff'd,
aff'd, 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir.
Cir.
89,94-95
1990) (denying
intermediary doctrine
breast
1990)
(denying plaintiff recovery
recovery under the learned intermediary
doctrine in a ruptured breast
prosthesis case); Casey, supra
supra note 25, at 952-54 (advocating
(advocating a breast implant exception
exception to the
learned
prescription drugs per se, intrauterine devices and breast
breast
learned intermediary
intermediary rule). Although not prescription
implants are medical devices,
devices, available only through a physician,
physician, which illustrate attempts
attempts to carve
out exceptions to the learned
learned intermediary rule.
46. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th
1989).
(8th Cir. 1989).
47. See id.
id. at 1070-71 (reasoning
(reasoning that birth control decisions are made independently
independently by the
patient, thereby reducing the physician's
individualized medical judgment).
physician's role in making an individualized
48. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.305
(1998) (isoproterenol
201.305 (1998)
(isoproterenol inhalation
inhalation preparations,
preparations, used in the treatment of bronchial asthma); id.
id. § 310.501(a), (b)
(medroxypro(b) (oral contraceptives);
contraceptives); id.
id. § 310.501a (medroxyprogesterone
injectable for contraception);
contraception); id.
id. § 310.502 (intrauterine
310.515
(intrauterine devices);
devices); id.
id. § 310.515
gesterone acetate
acetate injectable
(estrogens,
(estrogens, hormones used to therapeutically
therapeutically prevent or stop lactation and to improve malignant
malignant
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November 1997 Ministerial Summit in Turku,224 the February 1998 workprivacy22S and the Ottawa Summit,226 the OECD has reasserted its
shop on privacy225
role in data protection, particularly in the context of electronic commerce
co~erce and
online activities. Although the OECD strives to examine data privacy in aa
cross-sectoral manner,227
manner,227 it continues to emphasize
emphasize the economic perspective
cross-sectoral
"users" and "consumers,"
"consumers," rather than
on data protection; attention is paid to "users"
"citizens." This
This institutional emphasis draws on the liberal governance
governance
"citizens."
model for data protection.
In contrast, from the citizen's rights perspective, the Council of Europe
has also begun to address the application
application ofprivacy
privacy principles to the Internet.
In May 1998, the Council of Europe released "Draft Guidelines for the protection of individuals
individuals with regard to the collection
collection and processing of personal
data
on
the
information highway, which
which may be incorporated
incorporated in or annexed
data
to Codes of Conduct,"
and by
by February 1999
1999 the Internet guidelines were
Conduct," and
adopted.228
specifically sought to deadopted.228 Interestingly, the Council of Europe specifically
velop these Internet privacy guidelines
guidelines in conjunction with the European
Commission and these guidelines follow a social-protection
social-protection model. The
guidelines reiterate
the
basic obligations
obligations of data collectors and detail the
reiterate
ways in which those collectors
collectors should satisfy their data protection
protection obligations.
These
institutions clearly want to preserve their relevance
These institutions
relevance and secure an
important
in the
the field ofInternet
of Internet privacy policy. In the Internet
Internet context,
important role in
countries
like the
United States,
States, with
liberal governance
countries like
the United
with aa commitment to liberal
governance
norms, will clearly
support
OECD
efforts.
This
does
not,
however,
preclude
clearly support
preclude
active
participation
countries
from
with
social-protection
active participation
social-protection governance
governance norms.
To
that such
such countries
countries can influence
To the
the extent
extent that
influence the results of OECD efforts,
points of
of divergence
divergence and
conflict may
may be
reduced.
points
and conflict
be reduced.
2. New entrants.

Despite
Despite the reawakening
reawakening of the OECD and the Council
Council of Europe, these
institutions
face competition
from new
institutions face
competition from
new entrants to data protection
protection policy
policy that
draw
on liberal
Organization
draw heavily
heavily on
liberal governance
governance norms. The World
World Trade
Trade Organization
(WTO),
(WTO), a creation
creation of the Uruguay
Uruguay Round
Round negotiations
negotiations of the General
General
224. See Dismantling
Commerce:International
Conference,
Dismantlillg the
tlte Barriers
Barriers to GlobalElectronic
Electronic Commerce:
International Conforence,
OECD Doc.
Doc. No. DSTIIICCP(98)13/FINAL
DSTIlICCP(98)13IFINAL (JuL.
(Jul. 3,
3, 1998)
1998) <htip'./lvww.oecd.orgldstilsti/itleclprodl
<http://www.oecd.orgldstilstilitlec/prod/
turkufin.pdf>.
turkufin.pdf.>.
225.
225. See
See OECD,
OECD, PRIVACY
PRIVACY PROTECTION
PROTECI'ION IN
IN A
A GLOBAL NETWORKED
NETWORKED SOCIETY: AN
AN OECD
OECD
INTERNATIONAL
ADVISORY
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP
WORKSHOP WITH
WITH THE
THE SUPPORT
SUPPORT OF THE
THE BUSINESS
BUSINESS AND
AND INDUSTRY
INDUSTRY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE, OECD
OECD DOC.
Doc. NO.
NO. DSTL/ICCP/REG(98)5/FINAL
DSTIIICCPIREG(98)5IFINAL <http:llwww.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/
<http://www.oecd.orgldstilstilitl
secur/prod/reg98-5final.pdf>
SOCIETY].
secur/prodlreg98-Sfinal.pdf.> [hereinafter
[hereinafter GLOBAL
GLOBAL NETWORKED
NETWORKED SOCIETY].
226. See A Borderless World, supra
supra note
note 8; Ministerial
Ministerial Declaration,
Declaration, supra
supra note 68.
227. The
Guidelines, for
for example,
example, apply
apply to
to all
all sectors.
The OECD Guidelines,
228.
228. See Processing
Processing ofPersonalData,
ofPersonal Data, supra
supra note
note 68.
68.
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Agreement
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,229
become involved
involved in data
Trade,229 will inevitably become
protection and will face privacy issues from the organization's
organization's historical
commitment to trade liberalization,
commitment
liberalization, growth of economic markets, and constraints on state behavior. Indeed, the services provisions of the new trade
accords prohibit signatories
signatories from imposing restrictions on transborder
transborder data
230
flows.230
While
these
provisions
grant
exceptions
for
privacy-related
flOWS.
provisions
privacy-related restricrestrictions, they still preclude
signatory country from taking discriminatory
discriminatory
preclude each signatory
231 Consequently,
action against other signatories.
signatories.231
have jurisConsequently, the WTO will haye
diction to hear complaints against any national restrlPnt
restraint on transborder
transborder data
flows.232
flOWS.232 The WTO must also initiate studies of issues that affect interna23 3 Information flows and data protection will clearly be relevant
trade.233
relevant
tional trade.
34 The emphasis will draw on distinctly
and unavoidable
unavoidable under this mandate.234
distinctly
liberal norms.
The other main intergovernmental
intergovernmental entrant is the World Intellectual
Intellectual PropOrganization (WIPO).235 Although the mission of the WIPO is to proproerty Organization
mote intellectual property protection and rights management,
management, the digital
of
environment merges many intellectual
intellectual property rights issues with those of
data protection. Data protection
protection has implications for the ownership
ownership rights to
data and the mechanisms
implications
mechanisms for electronic rights management
management have implications
6
236
for the fair treatment of personal information.
information.23 The WIPO cannot ignore
the study of data protection as it moves toward the adaptation of intellectual
intellectual
property rights for electronic commerce.
intergovernmental organizations,
Outside of intergovernmental
organizations, technical standards
standards bodies
organizations, these
have become stealth
stealth entrants. As non-governmental
non-governmental organizations,
groups represent the market forces of liberal norms. These bodies establish
international flow of personal intechnical rules that embed policies for the international
formation. The technical
capabilities
of
new
systems have critical ramificatechnical
229. See FINAL ACT
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF
OF
Acr EMBODYING THE REsULTS
URUGUAY ROUND
MULTILATERAL TRADE
ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE
MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
NEGOTIATIONS: AGREEMENT EsTABLISHING
ORGANIZATION (1994) <ht
p:l/wwv.wto.orglwto/eolle/pdf/04-wto.pdf> [hereinafter
[hereinafter AGREEMENT
ORGANIZATION
<http://www.wto.orglwto/eolle/pdfl04-wto.pdf.>
AGREEMENT
ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION].
EsTABLISHING
ORGANIZATION].
Agreement on Trade in Services, in AGREEMENT
230. See General
General Agreement
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING
ESTABLISHING THE
THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
1B, art. XIV(c)(ii) <http://vlWW.wto.orgl
<http.//iwww.wto.orgt
ORGANIZATION, supra
supra note 229, at Annex 1B,
wto/eol/e/pdf/26-gats.pdf>.
wto/eollelpdfl26·gats.pdf.>.
231. See id.-at
art. XIV(c)(ii).
ld.-atart.
232. For a discussion
discussion of possible WTO claims, see Shaffer, supra
supra note 129, at 46-55.
id. at art. XXIV (creating Council for Trade in Services).
233. See ld.
234. In fact, the European
consideration of data privacy
European Commission has requested
requested consideration
privacy issues by
Internet and Privacy:
Regulation
the Council
Council for Trade in Services. See Mario Monti, The Internet
Privacy: What Regulation
(May 9, 1998)
1998) <http:/europa.eu.int/conmn/intemalmarket/en/speeches/romeO598.htm>.
<http://europa.eu.intlcommlintemaI_marketlenlspeecheslrome0598.htm>.
IntellectualProperty
Organization<http://www.viipo.org>.
235. See World Intellectual
Properly Organization
<http://www.wipo.org>.
236. See Graham Greenleaf,
Greenleaf, 'IP,
Phone Home' ECMS,
©-Tech, and Protecting
236.
,[P, Phone
ECMS, ©-Tech,
Protecting Privacy
Privacy
Against Surveillance
INT'L CONF.,
supra note 44; Lee Bygrave
Surveillance by Digital
Digital Works, in PROC.
PROe. XXIST
XXIST JNr'L
CONF., supra
Bygrave
& Kamiel Koelnaan,
Privacy,Data
Protectionand
and Copyright:
Copyright: Their
Their Interaction
Interactionin the Context of
&
Koelman, Privacy,
Data Protection
of
Electronic
Electronic Copyright
Copyright Management
Management Systems (June 1998) <http://www.imprimatur.alcs.co.uk/
<http://www.imprimatur.alcs.co.ukI
IMP_FTP/privreportdef.pdft.
IMP
_FTP/privreportdef.pdf.>.
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tions for data protection. For
For example, the results of
of reforms to
to the
the domain
name system for the Internet may make localization of users and servers easy
impossible. Organizations
Organizations such
such as the
the World Wide
Wide Web Consortium
or impossible.
Internet Society,238
Society,s the
the Internet Assigned
Assigned Numbers
Numbers Authority
Authority
(W3C),237 the Internet
(LANA)
(now
replaced
by
the
Internet
Corporation
for
Assigned
Names
(lANA) (now
the Internet Corporation
and
(IETF)240
Ehgineering Task Force (IETF)240
(ICANN)),239 and the Internet Engineering
Numbers (ICANN»),239
Numbers
are each forming data protection policies, though
though often inadvertently.
inadvertently.
These
in any case, will
will reflect norms of
of information priThese new entrants, in
vacy from liberal governance rather than social protection. They focus on
WTO's
market development and the allocation of economic interests. The WTO's
to
guiding principle is to increase international trade. The WIPO's mission is to
secure intellectual
intellectual property rights for creators to commercialize their work.
And, the prime mission of technical standards bodies, like W3C and IETF, is
to promulgate
promulgate technical standards for market adoption. Nevertheless, proposocial-protection norms for information
nents of social-protection
information privacy have much to gain
by working with these new entrants. The constituencies are different from
from
the
traditional
institutions
and
the
opportunity
to
find
accommodations
the traditional
accommodations is
valuable.
B. Technical
Technical Codes
Codes o/Conduct
of Conduct

These key institutional
institutional players reflect
reflect a mix of public law-making institutions
and
rule-setting
bodies.
The
divergence in governance
governance norms, howtutions
ever,
assures
that
attempts
to
create
public
law
instruments
executing
ever, assures that attempts
create public
executing First
First
Principles
will
not
satisfactorily
resolve
data privacy
Principles
satisfactorily
privacy issues for global
global information
mation networks. International
International cooperation
cooperation can,
can, however, focus on technical
technical
standards
governance constandards and private
private solutions as a means to bridge these governance
flicts.
Standards
Standards decisions,
decisions, in effect,
effect, mix technical
technical issues
issues with
with policy
policy
4
choices.2
The Berlin
Berlin Group, an organization
organization of
of national
national data protection
protection
choices.2411 The
supervisory
agencies, has recognized
supervisory agencies,
recognized this effect for data protection
protection and idenidentified a set of
technical
design
issues
to
assure
the
implementation
of
issues
implementation of First
First

237.
237. See
See W3C,
W3C, About
About the
the World
World Wide
Wide Web
Web Consortium
Consortium <http://www.w3.org/Consortiuni/>.
<http://www.w3.org/Consortium/>.
238.
238. See
See Internet
Internet Society Mission
Mission Statement <http:llwww.isoc.orgtisocfniission/>.
<http://www.isoc.org/isocfmission/>.
239.
The Internet
239. See
See Tile
Internet Corporation
Corporation for
for Assigned Names
Names and Numbers
Numbers <http://www.icann.
<http://www.icann.
orgY.
org/>.
240.
240. For
For aa useful
useful history
history of
of these
these organizations
organizations by
by one
one of
of the
the founders,
founders, see
see Vint
Vint Cert, IETF
IETF
andISOC,
July 18,
18, 1995
1995 <http://www.isoc.orgisoc/related/ietf/>.
<http://www.isoc.org/isoc/relatedfietfi'>.
alld ISOC, July
241.
241. See
See LESSIG,
LESSIG, supra
supra note
note 77,
77, at
at 66 (arguing
(arguing that
that technical
technical codes
codes regulate
regulate cyberspace);
cyberspace); LorLorrie
rie Faith
Faith Cranor,
Cranor, The
The Role
Role of
ofTechnology
Technology in
in Sef-Regulatory
Self-Regulatory Privacy
Privacy Schemes, in
in PRIVACY
PRIVACY AND
AND
SELF-REGULATION
SELF-REGULATION IN
IN THE
THE INFORMATION
INFORMATION AGE
AGE (1997)
(1997) <httlAwwv.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/
<http://www.ntia.doc.govlreportsiprivacy/
selfreg5.htmn#5B>
setfreg5.htm#5B> (discussing
(discussing the
the capabilities
capabilities of
of technology
technology to
to provide
provide solutions
solutions for
for privacy
privacy proprotection).
tection).
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Principles on global networks.242
technical choices are "codes of
of
networks.242 In reality, technical
conduct" implementing First Principles just like trade association
conduct"
association policy
policy
information practices. Technical standards,
statements seek to define information
standards, combined with their deployment
of
deployment and implementation, offer a direct guaranty of
243
243
fair information
information practices in any information
information transfer.
These standards
standards
operate at the network level and can be independent
independent of national borders. For
For
if the infrastructure
infrastructure of an online
allows
example, if
online payment
payment system only aIIows
anonymous
transactions, data protection is absolute wherever the transaction
anonymous transactions,
transaction
2444 Alternatively, an infrastructure
takes place on the network.
network.24
infrastructure that uses
trusted third parties to authenticate and verify the identity of participants in
the online payment system may automatically
automaticaIIy assure fair treatment of per245
sonal information
information by some participants, but not others.
others.245
By incorporating data protection within the infrastructure's
infrastructure's architecture,
By
specifically be used to arbitrate divergences
divergences in natechnical solutions may specifically
46
tional laws.2246
tionallaws.
The W3C's "Platform for Privacy Preferences"
Preferences" (P3P)247 iniserver-based
tiative, for example,
example, might one day serve this purpose if server-based
filtering can be used to identify and protect against deviations from a jurisinformation and communications
communications
242. These principles are: sensitive data must be encrypted; infonnation
technologies must enable users to control and give feedback with regard to his personal data;
data;
anonymous access to online
online services should
should be available;
available; secure encryption
encryption methods
methods must be a
quality stamp certification should be explored
explored to improve
improve
legitimate option for Internet users; and quality
transparency for users. See International
International Working Group on Data Protection in TelecommunicaTelecommunications (IWGDPT),
(WGDPT), Report and Guidance
Guidance on Data
Data Protection
Protectionand
and Privacy
Privacy on the Internet,
Internet, Apr. 16,
1996 <http:llww.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/lntliwgdptbbmem-en.htm>
<http://www.datenschutz-berlin.deldoc/intliwgdptlbbmem_en.htm> [hereinafter
[hereinafter IWGDPT,
lWGDPT,
and Guidance].
Report and
GUidance].
243.
Reidenberg, Lex Inforinatica,
supranote 78, at 581; see also
also Lessig.
Lessig, Constitution
Constitution ill
in
243. See Reidenberg,
Infomlatica, supra
Cyberspace, supra
supra note 78,
Cyberspace,
78, at 898-99
898-99 (arguing that technical code is self-enforcing);
self-enforcing); Reidenberg,
GoverningNetworks, supra
decisions set default
Governing
supra note 78, at 918 (arguing that technical decisions
default rules).
244. See Paul F. Syverson,
Syverson, Stuart G. Stubblebine
Stubblebine & David M. Goldschlag, Unlinkable
UnlinkableSerial
Serial
CRYPTOGRAPHY (Rafael
Transactions, in FINANCIAL
Transactiolls,
FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
(Rafael Hirschfed ed.,
ed., 1997) <http://www.cs.
<http://Y/ww.cs.
columbia.edu/-stu/97fc.pdf> (proposing alternatives to rectify
between
columbia.edul-stul97fc.pdf.>
rectify conflict of interest bel
ween service
service
providers and users with respect to personal
personal information).
infonnation).
245. See, e.g., eCash Technologies, Information
Information for
for New eCash Issuers
Issuers <http:llwwvw.
<http://www.
ecashtechnologies.com> (allowing
ecashtechnologies.com>
(allowing for the exchange of ecash payment for goods and services while
while
Technology, ill
in PROC.
maintaining security
security and anonymity for users); David Chaum, Privacy
Privacy Technology,
XVITH
XVITH INT'L CONF.,
CONF., supra
supra note 189.
246. See Working
Established under Art. 29 of Directive 9S/461EC,
95/46/EC, RECOMMENDATION
246.
Working Party Established
RECOMMENDATION
1/99 ON INVISIBLE AND AUTOMATIC PROCESSING OF PERSONAL
PERSONAL DATA
DATA ON THE INTERNET
INTERNET
PERFORMED BY SOmVARE
SOFTVARE AND
WPI17 (1999)
AND HARDWARE, E.C. Doe.
Doc. No. DG XV 5093/98 WP17
(1999)
<http://europa.eu.intcorm/internal-marketen/media/dataprotfwpdocs/wpl7en.htm>
<http://europa.eu.inticommlinternaCmarketlenlrnediaidataprotlwpdocslwp17en.htm>
(noting the
rule making capacity
capacity of software
software and hardware
hardware to support or frustrate European privacy norms);
95/46/EC, OPINION 1/98: PLATFORM
Working Party
Party Established under Art. 29 of Directive 95/461EC,
PLATFORM FOR
FOR
XV
PRIVACY PREFERENCES
PREFERENCES (P3P) AND
AND THE OPEN PROFILING
PROFILING STANDARD
STANDARD (OPS),
(OPS), E.C. Doe.
Doc. No. XV
D15032198
D/S032/98 WP 11 (1998)
(1998) <http.//europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/entmedia/dataprotlwpdocs/wpllen.htm>
<http://europa.eu.intlcommldgI5/enlmedialdataprotlwpdocslwpllen.htm>
[hereinafter WORKING
[hereinafter
WORKING PARTY, PLATFORM
PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY
PRIVACY PREFERENCES]
PREFERENCES] (suggesting that technical
technical
standards might operate
operate within the European legal framework to assure
assure the protection of privacy
privacy in
international data flows).
247. See W3C, The Platform
Platform for
Privacy Prejerences
Preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0)
Specification, Nov. 2,
for Privacy
(p3P1.0) Specification,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/WD-P3P-19991102>.
1999 <http://www.w3.orgffRII9991WD-P3P-19991102>.
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248 In particular, P3P might be able to bridge the
rules.248
diction's mandatory rules.
assuring
conflict between the European
European Union and the United States by assuring
"adequate"
protection
in
connection
with
data
flows
to
the
United
States.
"adequate" protection in connection with data
Intelligent agents, as another example, might be used to protect against the
Intelligent
secondary
secondary use of stored personal information.249
infonnation.249 Agents could be developed
developed
information and signal any deviation from
to monitor the use of personal infonnation
either case, such arbitration can maximize international
specified uses. In 'either
international
compromising data protection rules and governance
governance
data flows without compromising
norms.
nonns.
technical arrangements
arrangements might effectively narrow the
In this respect, technical
execution of First Principles. For example, to the
scope of divergences
divergences in the execution
extent that technological
technological features make Internet interactions
interactions anonymous, data
protection issues are minimized or inapplicable. If an Internet protocol addynamically so that only the service provider
provider can identify
dress is assigned dynamically
the Web surfer, then a Web site will not know, without more data, who the
surfer is. Such features may, however, prove elusive where hidden tools like
Web bugs or cookies undercut anonymity. Similarly, to the extent that
transparency requirements
transparency
requirements and registration
registration requirements
requirements diverge
diverge according to
technological tools
liberal or social protective approaches to First Principles, technological
might allow the automated satisfaction of different rules for the same transaction. Different notices might be served to users in jurisdictions
jurisdictions with speautomatically generated
cific content requirements
requirements and registrations
registrations might be automatically
generated
if data collection
collection occurs in jurisdictions
jurisdictions requiring declaration
declaration to public
authorities. This assumes a circumvention
circumvention of the Internet's geographic
geographic indeterminacy.
detenninacy. Likewise, technical restraints analogous
analogous to electronic rightsmanagement protocols might be developed to assure finality according
management
according to
varying obligations. Security protocols can be deployed
deployed to prevent all but
authorized uses of personal data.
From the perspective of existing data protection regulatory
regulatory authorities,
implementation as "codes
"codes of conthe treatment of standards as well as their implementation
governance confrontations.
confrontations. For example, the
duct" offer a way to avoid governance
more recent data protection
protection laws such as the Dutch law and the European
Data Protection Directive
Directive include
include procedures
procedures for the approval of industry

supranote 246 (noting
248. See WORKING
WORKING PARTY, PLATFORM
PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY PREFERENCES,
PREFERENCES, supra
that European
norms need to be incorporated in the technical
European nonns
technical specifications);
specifications); see also Joel R. ReiFiltersfor
Data
dcnberg,
The Use ofTecltnology
ofTechnology to Assure Internet
denberg, Tile
Internet Privacy:
Privacy: Adapting Labels and Filters
for Data
Protection, 33 LEX ELECfRONICA
ELECTRONICA (Winter
<http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v3-2/
Protection,
(Winter 1997) <http://www.lex-electronica.orglarticleslv3-21
reidenbe.htmnl>.
reidenbe.html>.
249. See International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications,
Telecommunications. Common
Commol!
Position
on Intelligent
Positioll Oil
Intelligent Softare
Software Agents,
Agents. Apr. 29, 1999
1999 <http://vww.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/int/
<http://www.datenschutz-beriin.deldoclintl
Technology:
iwgdpt/agent.en.htm>; Netherlands
Registratiekamer, Intelligent
Intelligent Software Agents and Technology:
iwgdptlagenLen.htm>;
Netherlands RegistratiekaIner,
Turning a Privacy
Threat Into
Into a Protector
(1999) <http:llwww.registratiekamer.nl/bistop_2_
Turning
Privacy 17lreat
Protector (1999)
<http://www.registratiekamer.nllbisltop_2_
5.html>.
S.html>.
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codes of conduct.50
conduct.250 This moves privacy protection
protection to a new forum-the
organization preparing
Nevertheless, the forum shift
organization
preparing the code of conduct. Nevertheless)
Regulators will exdoes not vitiate the key role of data protection agencies. Regulators
amine how the codes execute the First Principles
Principles and how representative
representative the
2 51 If
code will be.
be.1St
technical codes are included
included within this purview, then the
infrastructure designed to
procedural device can encourage
encourage the creation of an infrastructure
assure data protection
rather
than
challenge
it.
Data
protection
protection rather
challenge
protection regulators can
can
approve
implementation configurations
configurations like industry
approve technical codes and implementation
policy guidelines. As a consequence,
consequence, non-European
non-European information
information privacy
rules and their national governance norms would lose relevance for Europeexecution
ans because
because the technical
technical codes and configurations would assure execution
of the First Principles. Through technical standards, international
data
flows
international
can
respect
diverging
governance
norms
through
automated
compliance
'can
diverging
compliance rules
Significantly,
countries. Significantly,
that satisfy obligations in both the home and host countries.
multiple technical
technical standards
standards can coexist for information
information flows in cyber2 52
space.
space.252
Hence, one standard that might satisfy the disclosure requirements
requirements
in a given country
simultaneous use of another standard
country does not preclude simultaneous
that assures finality in a different
different country. The biggest obstacles will be the
time necessary
to
reach
agreement
leave-it choice
necessary
agreement on a code and the take-it or leave-it
that some companies may find difficult.

C. Multistakeholder
MultistakeholderSummits
Although technical codes of conduct can minimize
minimize the conflict
conflict among
divergent information privacy norms, the dynamic nature of information
processing
processing in the online environment
environment means that national governments must
stakeholders, including industry and privacy
have an ongoing dialog with all stakeholders,
advocacy groups as well as independent
independent experts and scholars. Such an open
international data flows and the development
dialog is crucial to the future of
ofintemational
development
coherent policies.
of coherent
The OECD
OEeD Workshop on Privacy in February 1998253
1998253 and the White
conference on privacy in June 1998254 are useful models for this form
House conference

250. See European
EuropeanData
DataProtection
ProtectionDirective,
Directive,supra
supranote 11,
11, at art. 30(1)
30(1) (d).
(d).
251.
251. See Working Party Established
Established under Art.
Art 29 of Directive 95/46/EC,
951461EC, FUTURE
FuTuRE WORK
WORK ON
ON
CODES
CODES OF CONDUCT: WORKING
WORKING DOCUMENT ON THE PROCEDURES
PROCEDURES FOR
FOR THE CONSIDERATION BY
BY
COMMUNITY CODES OF CONDUCT, E.C. Doc.
,VPI3
THE WORKING PARTY OF COMMUNITY
Doc. DG
DG XII D/5004/98 WP13
(1998)
marketlmedialdataprotlwpdocslwpl3en.htm>.
(1998) <http://europa.eu.int/conimimtemal
<http://europa.eu.intlcommfmternaLmarketlmedia/dataprotlwpdocslwpI3en.htm>.
252. This conceptual
conceptual insight underlies the W3C movement for P3P. The technical protocol
protocol
for P3P allows mUltiple
multiple privacy
privacy ratings and filtering to coexist.
coexist
253. See generally
generallyGLOBAL NETWORKED
NETWORKED SOCIETY, supra
supra note 225.
254. See generally
generallyU.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
COMMERCE, Public
PublicMeeting,
supranote 219. The meeting
Meeting, supra
meeting
was designed
designed as a forum to discuss issues for the Commerce
Commerce Department
Department and the Office of Management
agement and Budget (OMB)
(OMB) report
report to the President
President on self-regulation
self-regnlation and Internet privacy.
privacy. See
National Telecomm.
Telecomm. and Info.
Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Comm., Elements of Effective Self RegulaHeinOnline -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1358 1999-2000
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of multi-interest summitry. Though few substantive advances were
achieved, dialog and information sharing occurred among the private sector,
experts, advocates, and government. The business lobby is inacademic experts,
consent
creasingly seeking to synthesize data protection into a notice and consent
framework, so this type of multistakeholder approach helps preserve consenconvergence
sus on the First Principles and may lead to greater governance convergence
implementation.
for implementation.
At the international
international level, the OECD is a logical organization to convene
such conferences.
conferences. The OECD has experience
experience in fostering diAlog
dialog between
government and business.2Ss
business.255 More recently, however, the OECD has been
quite sympathetic to business and less directly concerned with citizen's
citizen's
rights. For example, the Business and Industry Advisory Committee is a
observer,25 6 but no privacy organizations
organizations have such
nonvoting, accredited observer,2S6
257
official observer
obserVer status.
statuS.2S7 Although many country delegations to the OECD
contain representation
representation from national data protection regulators, the U.S.
significant role at intergoverndelegation does not, and it typically plays a significant
intergovernmental meetings, stressing the liberal, market approach. The success of future summits will, thus, depend on the balance achieved between
between the airing
of business views and the critiques of those without commercial
of
commercial interests
interests at
stake.
For the OECD to continue to proceed
proceed effectively, it must seek the participation of each of the interest
groups.
Accreditation
interest
Accreditation for privacy organizations and the formation of a standing expert advisory committee will be
necessary. Such multi-interest
multi-interest summits
summits should occur
occur on a biennial basis to
assure sufficient
sufficient frequency and high-level
high-level participation.

D. General
D.
General Agreement on Information
Information Privacy
Privacy
While technical
technical codes and international
international summitry may facilitate the coexistence of divergent executions
executions of First Principles,
Principles, fundamental
fundamental differences
existence
governance norms force a clash
are likely to persist in areas where governance
clash of public
2S8 When, for example,
order.258
example, data privacy violations have
have criminal sancorder.
tions,
divergences may
ofsensitive
sensitive data
data
tions, divergences
may be
be hard
hard to
to coregulate.
coregulate. The
The treatment
treatment of
presents
such
a
case.
Where
consent
is
rejected
as
a
basis
for
presents such a case. Where consent is rejected as a basis for processing
processing
tion for
for the
the Protection of Privacy
Privacy and
and Questions
Questions Related to Online Privacy, June
June 5, 1998
1998
<http:llww.ntia.doe.gov/ntiahomelprivacyl_5_98fedreg.htm>.
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahomelprivacy/6_5_98fedreg.htm>.
255.
255. For
For example,
example, the OECD consults
consults regularly
regularly with the Business
Business and Industry
Industry Advisory
Advisory
Committee, an international
OECD and the Public
international consortium
consortium of trade associations. See OECD
Public <http://
<http://
www.oecd.orglaboutpublic/index.htm>.
www.oecdorg!aboutlpubliclindex.htm>.
256.
256. SeeAboutBLIC<http:lwww.biae.orgtbiae.htn>.
See About BIAC <bttp://www.biac.org/biac.htm>.
257.
257. The Trans
Trans Atlantic Consumer
Consumer Dialogue,
Dialogue, aa consortium
consortium of national
national consumer groups,
groups, isis
also
organization.
also an
an observer
observer to the OECD,
OECD, but is not
not expressly a privacy
privacy organization.
258.
resolving con258. See Goldsmith,
Goldsmith, supra
supra note 114,
114, at 1210
1210 (discussing
(discussing the relative
relative ease
ease of
ofresolving
flicts
compared with
with mandatory
mandatory laws).
laws).
flicts between
between default
default rules as compared
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certain
information,259 such as medical information, techcertain forms of personal information,259
nical rules based on consent
arbitrate among divergent
consent cannot function to arbitrate
divergent
national laws.
The time has come, therefore, for a new type of international treaty on
260 At the 1997 International Privacy Conference in Montdata protection. 260
Conference
real, the Quebec organizers proposed the creation of a new international
international pri6
261
secretariat.2 1 The goal was to
vacy organization,
organization, an international privacy
privacy secretariat.
move toward a more coordinated
coordinated international
international response to information
information privacy divergence.
divergence. The real problem, however, is not lack of convergence
convergence on
First Principles, but instead the lack of harmonization
harmonization on democratic
democratic governance norms for information
information privacy.
Rather than the establishment
secretariat
international privacy secretariat
establishment of an international
composed of interested
interested participants, data protection needs an intergovernintergovernmental "General
"General Agreement
Information Privacy"
Privacy" (GAIP) that includes a
Agreement on Information
large number and wide range of signatory countries.
countries. GAIP should focus on
on
establishing
development designed to faciliestablishing an institutional
institutional process of norm development
coexistence of differing regimes, and over time protate in the near term the coexistence
mote harmonization
harmonization of governing standards for information privacy.
The GATT compromise
compromise in 1947 offers a useful model for this first step
toward effective international cooperation. After the failure of the Havana
Havana
Charter
Organization, the resulting GATT
Charter to create an International
International Trade Organization,
establishment of an institutional mechawas as important originally
originally for the establishment
subnism that allowed countries to address trade disputes as it was for the sub262 Like
1947,
stantive reductions
reductions in tariffs and quotas.
quotaS.262
the GATT concept
concept in 1947,
the GAIP treaty should recognize basic principles
of
data
protection
and
creprinciples
ate a high-level negotiating
negotiating forum for consensus-based
consensus-based decisions. By institutionalizing such negotiations
negotiations in a multilateral
multilateral setting, two important data
protection
counterparts for data protection
protection
protection objectives may be achieved. First, counterparts
policy discussions will be clearly designated even in countries without ex-

259. See Mayer-Schonberger,
supra note 2, at 233 (discussing various European laws imposMayer-Schonberger, supra
ing forms of mandatory legal protection).
260. Although the Council
Council of Europe
Europe Convention
Convention has had some success
success as an international
treaty on data protection, the instrument lacks a sufficiently
sufficiently broad
broad range of signatories and has not
not
achieved the degree of harmonization necessary
necessary for information
information flows in the online world to function effectively.
effectively. Twenty
Twenty countries have
have ratified the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals
Signatures
Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Automatic Processing of Personal Data. See Chart
Chart of
o/Signatllres
and Ratifications,
11, 1999 <http'/i/wvv.coe.fr/tablconv/108t.htm>.
and
Ratifications, Feb. 11,
<http://www.coe.fr/lablconv/108thtm>. Most notable among the
signatory absences
States. Since the United States is unlikely to agree in the near term
absences is the United Slates.
to an obligatory
obligatory set of data protection
protection principles
principles as a result of its liberal, market approach,
approach, the
Council
effectively.
Council of Europe Convention will not be able to expand
expand effectively.
261. See Raymond
of the Conference,
in PRIVACY: THE
261.
Raymond Doray, A Word From
From the President
President o/the
Conference, in
THE
NEw FRONTIER,
PROGRAM BOOK
NEW
FRONTIER, PROGRAM
BOOK OF ABSTRACTS
ABSTRACfS FROM
FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ON
PRIVACY 5 (Sept
(Sept 1997).
1997).
Havana to Marrakesh
262. See WTO, Roots: from
from Havana
Marrakesh <http://www.wto.orgwtolaboutfacts4.
<http://www.wto.orglwto/aboutlfacts4.
htm#GATT>.
htm#GATI>.
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isting data protection
protection authorities. This applies specifically to the United
indiscriminately among differStates where data privacy issues rotate almost indiscriminately
government agencies
ent government
agencies depending
depending on the interests
interests of particular
particular people at
the agencies.263
representation and regular negotiations
expansive representation
agencies. 263 Second, expansive
can predictably
predictably lead to increased
increased consensus over time on necessary
necessary standards. The GATT evolution toward the Uruguay
Uruguay Round accords and the
adoption
adoption of the GATT 1994 illustrate this latter trend. Between 1948 and
1994, GATT was tremendously successful in liberalizing
liberalizing world trade and
including
including new concepts such as intellectual property and services within the
64 Moreover, the diversity of countries represented
system.264
represented
global mercantile system.2
developing countries
better
in GATT afforded developing
countries and less-powerful
less-powerful countries a better
influence trade issues in the multilateral
chance to influence
multilateral framework than they
would have had on a bilateral basis.265
basis.26s The resulting accords would have
stronger consensus around the world.
Beyond a mere model, the World Trade Organization
Organization (WTO),
(WTO), successor
successor
to the GATT, offers a useful launching point for the GAIP. The WTO has an
institutional
institutional mechanism to study and negotiate new trade issues. Every two
years, WTO members
ministerial-level conference to review
members must convene
convene a ministerial-level
266 Although
and examine
world
trade,
including
trade
in global services.
services.266
examine
including
pursuing a WTO strategy places data protection in the trade arena rather than
a political arena, WTO increasingly
increasingly faces the incorporation noneconomic
noneconomic
policy.267 The risk of placing GAIP within the WTO trade
values in trade policy.267
framework is that the WTO has an inherent bias toward liberal, market
market
norms;
GATT
and
the
WTO
are
founded
on
the
principle
of
free
trade
and
nonns;
principle
and
6
268
market economies.2
economies. 8 The typical remedies for a violation of WTO principles are trade sanctions
sanctions rather than private
private damages or injunctions to vindiNonetheless, the breadth of membership
membership in WTO and
cate personal rights. Nonetheless,
the growing recognition at WTO that social values such as workers'
workers' rights
and environmental
environmental issues are intrinsically
linked
to
trade
will
blend governintrinsically
263. See Gellman, supra
supra note 53, at 237 (describing the agencies
agencies that have had general or intemational
ternational privacy policy responsibilities).
264. See WTO, Roots:from
Roots:front Havana
supranote 262.
264.
Havana to Marrakesh,
Marrakesh, supra
265. See id.
id. at 55 ("Developing countries and other
other less powerful participants have a greater
greater
chance of influencing
influencing the multilateral
multilateral system in a trade round than in bilateral relationships with
nations.').
major trading nations.'1.
266. See AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING
EsTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
ORGANIZATION, supra
supra note 229, at
art
Policy Review Mechanism
art. IV; WTO, The Trade
Trade Policy
Mechanism <http:llvww.wto.orgwtolreviewstprrn.htm>
<http://www.wto.orglwtofreviewsftpnn.htm>
(explaining the regular review
review process for signatory
signato!), countries
countries that includes services).
Environmental and labor/workers
267. Environmental
laborfworkers rights issues were topics of discussion
discussion at the Seattle
Ministerial
Seattle: What's at Stake? Concerns
Concerns...
Responses <http://
Ministerial Conference.
Conference. See WTO, Seattle:
• •• And Responses
www.wto.orglwtolministl/stak
e_6.htm>. Despite the protests and controversy surrounding the
www.wto.orglwtofministllstak_e_6.htm>.
the
Seattle
Seattle Ministerial
Ministerial Conference,
Conference, these social issues remain at the forefront of international
international trade
discussions.
268. See SWIRE
SWIE & LiTAN,
supra note 10, at 195-96
195-96 (discussing
LITAN, supra
(discussing the WTO as a forum for negotiating privacy
privacy concerns).
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ance ideologies.269
ideologies.269 Noneconomic
Noneconomic values will bring non-market
non-market based govnorms to WTO. This is likely to happen with or without GAIP neernance nonns
infonnation flows,
gotiations in a WTO context. Indeed, in the context
context of information
transformation has already begun. The WTO accords expressly recogthis transfonnation
nize privacy as a value that can override
information princioverride the free flow of infonnation
princi27o The significance of
ple enshrined in the annex agreement
agreement on services.
services.270
of
framework
putting GAIP before
before the WTO is, thus, twofold. First, the WTO framework
offers an institutional
institutional process
process with wide membership.
membership. Second, while the innorms, the incorporation of GAIP within
stitution leans toward market-based
market-based nonns,
noneconomic values will transplant socialthe WTO along with other noneconomic
protection
norms
to
the
trade
arena.
In effect, this transplantation
protection
transplantation will promote convergence
convergence of governance
governance norms.
.
VI. STRATEGIES
STRATEGIES FOR CO-ORDINATION
CO-ORDINATION AND
AND COOPERATION
COOPERATION

For transplantation and convergence
convergence to occur in the context of First Principles, a map of strategies
strategies and partners is needed to inform and promote
coregulation
coregulation and eventual consensus on the governance
governance issues related
related to the
information in data transfers. Since the release of the
protection of personal infonnation
Protection Directive in 1990, Europe has
proposal for the European Data Protection
271 Strategies
international privacy issues.
issues.27I
Strategies
shaped the debate and agenda
agenda for international
and alliances
must,
therefore,
start
with
the
international
political
dimensions
alliances
international
of Internet data flows. Moreover, Europe
Europe has well-established
well-established and active
active
national regulatory agencies for data protection. These data protection commissions are, thus, at the heart of the movement
movement building a deeper
deeper consensus
on the integration of First Principles in different countries.
A.
A Political
Political Dimensions

The political dimensions are at a critical stage for international data
of
flows. The European Union has taken a strong rhetorical position in favor of
the examination
embargoes
examination of foreign data protection
protection rules and in support of embargoes
Ministerial Conference
269. See WTO, Director-General's
Director-General's Message: Seattle Ministerial
Conforence Must Deliver
for the Poorest,
Poorest, Says Moore <http:llwww.wto.orglwto/ministl/02dg_.e.htm>
<http://www.wto.orglwto/ministl/02dg_e.htm> (quoting WTO
Director-General
environmental and labor
labor
Director-General Michael Moore noting the importance of considering
considering environmental
issues in the next
next trade negotiating round).
270. See General Agreement
supra note 230, at annex
Agreement on Trade in Services,
Services, supra
annex 1B,
IB, art. XIV(c)
XIV(c)
(ii).
See, e.g., Bennett, supra
108-14 (describing
271. See,
supra note 2, at 108-14
(describing the impact
impact of the European
European Data
Protection
measures); Priscilla M.
Protection Directive
Directive on the policies of states that have not passed similar measures);
Regan,
EuropeanData
Strategies and
Regan, American Business
Business and the European
Data Protection
Protection Directive:
Directive: Lobbying Strategies
199, 200-01 (describing the reaction
Tactics, in VISIONS
VISIONS OF PRIVACY,
PRIVACY, supra
supra note 51,
51, at 199,200-01
reaction of U.S.
industry
supra note 76, at751-52
at 751-52 (describ(describindus!Iy to the European Data Protection Directive); Samuelson, supra
ing the reasons why American
will have to become familiar with
vith the emerging
of
American lawyers
lawyers wiII
emerging body of
information privacy law).
infonnation
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272 But, the
of data going to destinations with inadequate
inadequate levels of protection.
protection.72
enforcement of these
challenges to the strict enforcement
European
European Union faces many chaIIenges
these
rules. The Member States are likely to have different views on particular
particular
fortress.273
273
cases, and Europe does not appear to seek an impenetrable
impenetrable data fortress.

Internal
consequences for internaInternal or national political
political realities also have
have consequences
international data flows. Within Europe, for example, the transposition
transposition ofthe
of the EuroEuropean Data Protection Directive into Member State
law
illustrates
the
political
State
illustrates
274 Bureaucratic
fluidity of data protection.
protection.24
Bureaucratic squabbles and political maneuvering will determine the specific outcomes of transposition and will set the
275 Outside of
Outside
Europe, these
tone for each country's
country's international posture. 27S
"turf'
particularly acute in countries without data protection
protection
"turf" battles will be particularly
authorities, like the United States. Where there is no existing data protection
authority, differing government
government agencies are likely to fight over jurisdiction
jurisdiction
27 6 Compromises are
Compromises
likely to result in a series of agencies
and hence power.276
responsibility for data protection
protection policy. In addition, as
having pieces of responsibility
seen in the United States,
States, industry lobbyists are likely to promote
promote agencies
such as the U.S. Department of Commerce, Which
which are traditionally
traditionaIIy more

EuropeanData
DataProtection
Directive,supra
I1, at art.
Brlhann, supra
272. See European
Protection Directive,
supra note II,
art 25; Brilhann,
supra note

120.
273. See, e.g., Letter from Fred H. Cate, Robert E.
E. Litan, Joel R. Reidenberg, Paul M.
& Peter P. Swire to the Ambassador
Undersecretary for International
Schwartz &
Ambassador David L. Aaron, Undersecretary
International
<http://wwv.acs.ohio-state.edu/units/lav/swirel/
Trade, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (Nov. 17, 1998)
1998) <http://www.acs.ohio-state.edulunitsflaw/swirell
Harbor
DOCCOMME.htm> (noting that the U.S. Commerce
Commerce Department's
Department's Draft International
International Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles,
Principles, although designed to comply with EU data privacy policy, fails to meet E.U.
data privacy standards on several important
important points).
274. As of July 1999, nine Member States
States (France, Luxembourg,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Netherlands, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, and Austria)
Austria) had failed to transpose the Directive
European
into national law and received a formal warning from the European Commission. See European
Commission,
Commission Decides to Send Reasoned Opinions
Opinions to Nine Member
Commission, Data
Data protection:
protection: Commission
States,
States, July 29,
29, 1999 <http://europa.eu.int/commldgl5/en/medialdataprot/news/99-592.htm>.
<http://europa.eu.intlcomruldgI5/enlrnedialdataprotlnewsl99-592.htm>.
275. In France, for example,
example, the Braibant
Braibant Report issued in March of 1998 on the transposition
transposition
of the European Directive into French law has led to various public discussions.
Donn~es perdiscussions. See Donnees
societ6 de l'information:
l'information: Rapport au Premier Ministre sur la transposition
sonnelles et societe
transposition en droit frangais
<http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/PM/
~ais de la directive no. 95/46, Mar. 3,
3, 1998 <http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.frIPMI
RAPPORTSI.HTM#1> (linking to the Bmibant
RAPPORTS1.HTM#1>
Braibant Report). But, there is still no bill
biII before the ParPolicy Paper
Paperon the Adaptation
the
liament. See Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry, Policy
Adaptation of
oJthe
Legal Framei
ork [sic]
[sic] tile
the Information
Society, at § 1.6 (Oct. 1999)
1999) <http://www.fmances.gouv.fr/
<http:llwww.finances.gouv.fr/
Framework
hz.[omlation Society,
societe.information/anglaislchapitrel-ang.hm>.
societe
_information/anglaislchapitre1_ang.htm>.
276. In the United States, there is a musical chairs
chairs approach to agency responsibility for inSee, e.g., Gellman,
Geliman, supra
supranote 53. Interest has rotated among the OMB,
formation privacy
privacy policy. See,
OMB,
NTIA, USTR, FCC, FTC, the State Department, and the Commerce
Commerce Department.
Department. At the moment,
the FTC seems to be taking the lead on privacy
privacy issues. In 1998, the Clinton
Clinton Administration
Administration estabestablished an office within
Swire was appointed to
within the bureaucratic
bureaucratic layers of the OMB and Professor Swire
the post. See
Glave, Clinton
Clinton Tabs Privacy
PointMan,
NEWS,
See Declan McCullagh & James G1ave,
Privacy Point
Man, WIRED
WIRED NEWS,
Mar. 3, 1999 <http:llwww.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/18249.html>.
<http://www.wired.com/newslnewslpoliticslstory/18249.html>. The position does
not, however, have policymaking
policymaking authority and Professor
Professor Swire's
Swire's precise role in privacy issues
supranote 129,
129, at 62-63.
remains unclear. See Shaffer, supra
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217 These political
individuals.277
sympathetic to the interests of industry than
than of individuals.
complicate efforts for international
international cooperation.
alignments will complicate
Yet, despite the political
Member
political flux, each of the European Union Member
States has an existing data protection agency. These regulators will seek to
development of international
international
define their institutional
institutional place
place in the further development
poiicymakers,278
norms. Since they form an important elite community of poiicymakers,28
they will strive for an active
active role.
ofData
Commissions
B. Roles of
Data Protection
Protection Commissions
international data flows and
As the instruments
instruments and institutions affecting international
protection authorities will
the protection of personal information evolve, data protection
have a vital role in the resolution
international conflicts. Data protection
resolution of international
authorities can act as emissaries for fair information
information practices,
practices, but also serve
as advocates
for
the
rights
of
individuals
in
the
tradition
advocates
individuals
of their sociallygovernance norms. These
protective governance
These two key strategies and their corresponding
sponding partners
partners offer data protection
protection authorities a powerful means
means to promote convergence
convergence on socially-protective
socially-protective norms for international
international data flows.
1. Emissary
Emissarystrategy.
strategy.
1.

The emissary
emissary strategy consists of representing the socially-protective
socially-protective apapproach
international contexts. By exposing and highlighting
highlighting
proach in a variety of international
governmental and nongovfair information practice
practice standards with different governmental
nongovernmental partners at the international
international level, data protection
protection authorities
authorities can
reduce
coexistence of
of
reduce misunderstandings,
misunderstandings, find ways to enable
enable the peaceful coexistence
national data protection approaches,
and
move
toward
approaches,
toward consensus
consensus on execution of First Principles. Three types of partners are critical to this endeavor:
data protection authorities themselves, foreign governments, and international organizations.
International
International cooperation among data protection authorities
authorities is well established
Commissioners'
tablished on both
both formal and informal levels. The annual Commissioners'
meeting,279"the
regular
meetings
of
the
International
Working
Group on Data
meeting,279'the
International
28
0
Protection in Telecommunications
Telecommunications (the Berlin Group),
Group),28D and the quarterly
quarterly
277. See PRISCILLA
REGAN, LEGISLATING
PRISCILLA M. REGAN,
LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES,
VALUES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 78 (1995)
AND
(1995) (noting the early
early opposition
opposition to privacy
privacy regulation by the U.S. De-

partment
partment of Commerce).
278. See BENNETT,
10, at 127-29 (describing how these policymakers
separately
BENNETI, supra
supra note 10,
policymakers sepaJ'Btely
lobby their
their governments
governments to effect change).
•
INT'L CONF.,supra
CONF., supranote 44.
279. See, e.g., PROC. XXI
XXIINT'L
280. The International
International Working
Telecommunications was estabestabWorking Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications
information about their activities, see
Data Privacy
Privacy Commissioner. For infonnation
see Interhlterlished by the Berlin Data
national
Group on Data
Protection in Telecommunications
Telecommunications <http:/www.datenschutznational Working Group
Data Protection
<http://www.datenschulzberlin.deldoc/intliwgdptlindex.htm>.
berlin.de/doc/intliwgdptlindex.htm>.
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European commissioners under the auspices of the Article
Article 29
sessions of European
28l each reflect organized efforts to promote shared data proParty281
Working Party
interests among national authorities.
authorities. More informally, direct contacts
tection interests
international conferamong Commissioners and discussions at prominent international
Business
conference organized by Privacy Laws &
& Business
ences such as the annual conference
at the University of Cambridge82
Cambridge282 also serve an important role in coordinating resources
resources and expertise.
Yet, these emissary contacts should move to the next stage and exploit
new opportunities to promote international
Emissaries can take
international consensus. Emissaries
of fair information
information
that
advance
the
understanding
collective
policy
positions
collective
international data flows. The Berlin Group and the Article 29
practices for international
interpretations of
of
Working Party have begun to issue such declarations and interpretations
283 These documents help set and define the interdata protection principles.
principles.283
Conferences
Commissioners' Conferences
national agenda. Future Data Protection Commissioners'
of
the
Commisdeclarations
at
the
conclusion
issue
final
substantive
should
substantive declarations
284
sioners' annual private session.284
Such a strategy
strategy would focus preparatory
preparatory
sioners'
session.
Commission and promote consensus among the data prowork by the host Commission
declarations would build a strong and
tection authorities. Over time, such declarations
of
clear
clear set of standards for the execution of First Principles in the context of
international data flows.
international
However, since many countries
countries around the world, including the United
United
States, do not have a national data protection agency, contacts between data
protection authorities and foreign governments
governments must also be developed. A
number of data protection authorities have pursued this strategy
strategy with the
United States as has the European
European Commission.285
Commission.285 The strategy is a complicounterparts may not be stable. In the
cated one because foreign government
government counterparts
government
United States, for example,
example, each year seems to find a different government
the domestic privacy
agency in charge of
ofthe
privacy agenda. As many at the Commissioners' conference
sioners'
conference have noted, when the U.S. government sends observers
observers
11, at art. 29.
EuropeanData
281. See European
Data Protection
Protection Directive,
Directive, supra
supra note 11,
282. See Privacy Laws & Business, Conferences
Conferences <http:l/www.privacylaws.co.uk/conferences.
<http://www.privacylaws.co.uklconferences.
htn>.
htm>.
Telecommunications,supra
Group on Data
Protectionin Telecommunications.
283. See International
hlfemationai Working Group
Data Protection
supra note
280, at I (listing declarations
declarations of the Berlin Group and links to texts); European Comm., Documents
<http"//europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-marketen/
Protection Working Party
Adopted by the Data
Data Protection
Party <http://europa.eu.intlcommlinternal_marketlenl
media/dataprot/wpdocs/index.htm>.
medialdataprotlwpdocslindex.htm>.
internaDatatransfers
Reidenberg, International
284. See Joel
Joel R. Reidenberg,
Intemational Data
transfors and methods to strengthen
strengthell illfema(1998) <http:/Ihome.
tional cooperation,
cooperation, in
ilz PROC.
PROe. XXTH INT'L CONF. DATA PROT. COMM'RS
COMM'RS (1998)
<http://home.
tiollai
Declaration on
declaration); Declaration
spryneLcom/-reidenberg/idLhtm> (arguing
SP1J'I1et.coml-reidenberg/idt.htm>
(arguing for a final conference declaration):
all
and Icelalld.
Iceland,Nonvay and
Internet of the European
EuropeanPrivacy
Privacyand the Internet
Privacy
Privacy Commissioners
Commissioners and
alld Switconclusion
zerland
zerland <http:llwww.cnil.frlactulcommuniclactu6.htm>
<http://www.cnil.fr/actulcommunic/actu6.htm> (common position
position taken at the conclusion
of the conference by many of the commissioners).
European Commission
285. In particular, negotiations are underway
underway between
between the European
Commission and the U.S.
U.S.
Department of Commerce
Commerce to try to find a "safeharbor"
"safeharbor" policy for the U.S. to qualify for internainternaEuropean Directive. See Letter from Ambassador
tional data transfers under
under the European
Ambassador David L. Aaron
Aaron to
15, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/tdlecomlaaronmemoI199.htm>.
<http://www.ita.doe.gov/tdlecomaaronmemol 199.htm>.
Colleagues (Nov. 15,
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to the annual meeting, there is little continuity in either the staff or the U.S.
286
government agency
agency being represented.
represented.286
Since several different government offices
offices in many countries may have
have
jurisdiction
jurisdiction over data protection matters, data protection authorities risk begovernment bureaucracies.
ing caught in the internal disputes of foreign government
bureaucracies.
If a councounThis makes
makes emissary contacts more elusive, but no less critical.
critical. If
try's internal
internal data protection
protection policy apparatus
apparatus is not stable, the potential for
international conflicts multiplies.
international
multiplies. Data protection authorities will need to
government offices to sort out some of the
seek the assistance of their own government
diplomatic issues and identify the key domestic policy players.
As the traditional institutions of data protection
protection (the OECD and the
Council of Europe) seek to expand
expand their role in international
international conflict resolution and as the new entrants (the WTO and the WIPO) begin to address fair
issues,2 87 data protection
information practice issues,287
protection authorities can offer
offer valuable
valuable
expertise and insight, while ensuring
ensuring that their perspectives are not lost. This
This
will be a particularly
particularly critical
critical role since the new entrants tend to approach
of liberal governance
governance norms. The emisdata protection from the perspective
perspective ofliberal
sary strategy with international
international organizations
organizations will, in essence, help frame
these organizations'
organizations' agendas for international
international cooperation.
Nevertheless,
organizations are not
not
Nevertheless, the avenues for input at most of these organizations
familiar to data protection authorities.
For
the
OECD,
the
WTO,
and
the
authorities.
OEeD,
WTO,
finance or economic minisWIPO, it is typically commerce departments
departments or fii1ance
tries that coordinate
coordinate national participation. Data protection
protection authorities will
participate on country delegations to these fora. In conneed to vigilantly participate
trast, at the Council of Europe, foreign affairs ministries are more active and
data protection authorities have had regular channels of participation. These
These
must continue.
2. Advocacy
strategy.
Advocacy strategy.

In addition
addition to the emissary strategy, data protection
protection agencies
agencies should purexesue an advocacy
advocacy strategy
strategy that involves the active promotion of specific execution standards of First Principles.
Paradoxically
for
international
Paradoxically
international
cooperation, this strategy
cooperation,
strategy may be confrontational
confrontational at times. Confrontation
Confrontation can
facilitate ascertaining
ascertaining whether differences on issues are slight or fundamenfundamental. Where the differences are fundamental, advocacy may force comprocompromises and solutions. This advocacy strategy for data protection agencies
agencies
applies
counterparts: foreign governments,
governments, technical
technical orapplies to three types of counterparts:
286.
Commissioners' Conference, a representative
representative from the State
286. For example, at the 1992 Commissioners'
Department
Department attended as the U.S. observer;,
observer; at the 1998 conference,
conference, the United
United States sent a representative from the NTIA (an agency
agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce) and at the 1999
1999 conferrepresentative from the OMB participated.
ence, a representative
287. See text accompanying notes 229-236 supra.
supra.
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ganizations, and foreign organizations
organizations (e.g., companies and trade associations).
The advocacy
advocacy strategy
strategy is clearly in progress between the United States
European
and Europe over the implementation
implementation of Articles 25 and 26 of the European
8
8
288
Data Protection Directive
equivalents in national laws.2
Since the
Directive and its equivalents
laws.
start
Protection Directive, the inprocess to adopt the European Data Protection
start of the process
ternational
ternational agenda
agenda on specific data protection standards has largely
largely been set
set
by the European Union and several of the Member State data protection
protection
authorities. By setting a minimum threshold of protection as a condition for
data exports from Europe, the Directive along with the prior law in several of
of
the Member States embodies
embodies a strong position against data havens and a potentially
non-European Union govtentiaIIy confrontational position with respect
respect to non-European
ernments.
ernments.
In response, the American
American position for the past eight years has been
largely defensive. At first, the U.S.
U.S. government
government firmly asserted that Amerito
can data protection was equal to that in Europe. Europeans
Europeans had access to
unfiltered sources of information
information about the U.S.
U.S. system and were not per289 Continued
suaded.289
U.S. government
government to try
Continued European advocacy
advocacy pushed the U.S.
suaded.
self-regulation. This example illustrates that the conto justify reliance
reliance on self-regulation.
transborder data flow restrictions has worked
worked as an effeceffecfrontational risk of transborder
tive negotiating tool and that the agenda-setting
agenda-setting function is a particularly
particularly
valuable
advocacy strategy.
valuable aspect of the advocacy
The advocacy strategy is particularly
particularly important
important to influence
influence the work ocorganizations such as W3C, the International Organizacurring in technical organizations
(ISOC),
tion for Standards (ISO), the Internet Society (ISO
C), and IANA. Too often,
data protection authorities ignore technical
discussions.
technical discussions. While the Berlin
consultations with
becoming involved in consultations
Group took an important step by becoming
W3C over a privacy transmission protocol,
protocol, this input appears more in an ad1998, the U.S.
Commerce and the Directorate
288. Since
Since November 1998,
U.S. Department
Department of Commerce
Directorate General
General
U.S. data privacy under
XV of
of the European Commission have been negotiating the evaluation of U.S.
the "adequacy"
"adequacy" criteria of Art
Art. 25 of the European Directive. The Working
Working Party established
established under
Article 29 of the European Directive, which
which is composed
composed of representatives
representatives from each of the national regulatory
regulatory authorities, has insisted on strong protections
protections from the U.S.
U.S. side. See Working
Opinion 1199
1/99 Conceming
Concerningtlte
the Level of
ofData
Party Established Under
Under Art.
Art 29 of Directive
Directive 951461EC,
9S/46IEC, Opinion
Data
Protection
the United States
States and the
Ongoing Discussions
the European
European Commission
Commission
Protection in tlte
tlte Ongoing
Discussions Between tlte
and tlte
the United
United States
States Government,
alld
Govemment, E.C. Doc. DG XV 5092/98
S092198 WP 15
IS (Jan. 26, 1999) <http://
europa.eu.int/comm/intemal market/enlmedia/dataprotlvpdocslwpl5en.htm> Working
europa.eu.int/commlintemaCmarket/enlmedialdataprot/wpdocs!wpISen.htm>;
Working Party Established Under
the Adequacy oftlte
of the "Intemational
"International
Under Art.
Art 29 of Directive
Directive 951461EC,
95/46IEC, Opinion
Opinion 2/99
2199 on tlteAdequacy
Safe Harbor
Principles" Issued by the
US. Department
Commerce on 19t1t
19th April 1999, E.C.
Harbor Principles"
tlte U.S.
Department of Commerce
Doc. DG XV 5047199
3, 1999)
S047/99 WP 19 (May 3,
1999) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internaImarket/en/
<http://europa.eu.int/commlintemaCmarket/enl
media/dataprotlwpdocslwpl9en.htm>;
medialdataprot/wpdocs!wpIgen.htm>; Working Party Established
Established Under Art.
Art 29 of Directive
951461EC,
Opinion4199
4/99 on the
FrequentlyAsked
U.S. Department
Departmentof
of
9S/46IEC, Opinion
tlle Frequently
Asked Questions
Questions to Be Issued by the
tlte U.S.
Commerce in Relation
Relation to the Proposed
"Safe Harbor
HarborPrinciples"
Principles"on
"InternaCommerce
Proposed "Safe
011 the Adequacy ofthe "IntemaDoe. DG XV
5066199 WP
WP 21 (June 7, 1999)
tional Safe Harbor
XV S066199
1999)
tiollal
Harbor Principles,"
Principles," E.C. Doc.
<http:lleuropa.eu.intlcommlintemal-marketenmedialdataprotwpdocswp2len.htm>.
<http://europa.eu.int/commlintematmarket/enlmedialdataprot/wpdocs!wp21en.htm>.
SCHWARTZ&
REIDENBERG
supra
289. See Spiros
Spiros Sinitis,
Simitis, Foreivord,
Foreword,
in SCHWARTZ
REIDENBERG,
supra note 9, at viii-ix.
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90 As advocates, data protection authoriadvocacy role.
role.229o
visory role than an advocacy
capabilities as a prerequisite
ties can insist on certain standards
standards or technical
technical capabilities
informato the permissible
pennissible use of the technology
technology for processing
processing personal infonna291
tion.291
tion.
France, for example, used this approach with the providers of software for airline reservation
incorporated this strategy in the
reservation systems and incorporated
1996 Telecommunications
Telecommunications Law that imposes liability on service
service providers
who fail to offer content filtering capabilities
capabilities to their Internet service
service sub292
scribers.292
Nonetheless,
Nonetheless, the Berlin Group's involvement in technical
technical fora seems exceptional.
involvement is not a priority
protection
ceptional. Such involvement
priority of many data protection
authorities.
For
example,
the
data
protection
authorities
were
hardly
inauthorities.
protection
volved while the structure of the Internet
Internet domain name
name system was reorganized.293
significant
organized.293 These policy debates in technical areas offered a significant
opportunity
opportunity to build specific data protection options into the architecture
architecture of
the Internet. The name system could be structured to both assure anonymity
of personal
information and to enable the application
personal infonnation
application of data protection principles to online activities. In other areas of technical standardization
standardization there
are significant
anonymous use of the Internet more
significant opportunities to make anonymous
accessible or to establish
reflect
accessible
establish data protection icons, like a logo, that might reflect
particular
technical
particular substantive
substantive rules, policies,
policies, and practices.
practices. Similarly, technical
standards that enable automation devices to bridge differences
differences across data
protection rules could be developed. For example, protocols might be used
to automate compliance with different notice requirements
prerequirequirements such as prerequisite disclosures and different consent
consent mechanisms.
mechanisms.
One of the explanations for the hesitance
hesitance of data protection
protection authorities in
the technical arena is that this advocacy strategy changes the personnel dynamic within data protection agencies. Agency
Agency staff need greater
greater technical
expertise. In partiCUlar,
particular, staffers
staffers must be as comfortable
comfortable speaking of "meta-

290. See Internet Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications,
Telecommunications, Commnon
Common PosiPosifor Privacy-Enhancing
Privacy-EnhancingTechnologies (e.g.
15,
tion on Essentials
Essentialsfor
(e.g. P3P)
P3P) on the WorldWideWeb (Apr. 15,
1998) <http://www.datenschutz.berlin.de/doc/intliwgdpt/priv_en.htm>
<http://v vw.datenschutz-berlin.deldoc/intiwgdptpriv-en.htrm> (setting forth broad objec1998)
tives that any privacy
privacy protocol should meet).
291. See.
See, e.g.,
&g., IWGDPT, Report
and Guidance,
Guidance,supra
supranote 242,
4 (In
291.
Report and
242, at '114
("In many instances
instances the
decision to enter the Internet and how to use it is subject to legal conditions under national data
protection
protection law.").
292. Law No. 96-659 ofJuly 26, 1996,
art. 15, J.O.,
.0., July 27, 1996, p. 11384, 11395.
11395.
1996, art.
293.
293. As ICANN and the WIPO have outlined rules for the collection and dissemination of
of
information, data protection commissioners
Professor
domain name registry information,
commissioners have remained
remained silent. Professor
Michael
Froonkin, as the "public interest representative"
Michael Froomkin,
representative" to a panel of experts convened by the
the
WIPe,
singlehandedly brought
WIPO, singlehandedly
brought the privacy issue onto the table in his stinging critique of the early
draft of the WIPO
WIP0 guidance.
WIPO's RFC3
RFC3 Ver.
Ver. 1.0a
guidance. See A. Michael
Michael Froomkin,
Froomkin, A Critique
Critique of MPO's
(Mar. 14, 1999) <http://www.law.miami.edut-amf/critique.htm>
<http://www.1aw.miami.edul--amflcritique.htm> (describing initial proposals
proposals as
"zero
WIPe, Pallel
Panel of Experts <http:llecommerce.wipo.intldomains/processlengl
"zero privacy"); WIPO,
<http://ecommerce.wipo.intldomains/processleng/
experts.htmlj
expert).
experts.html) (listing Prof. Froomkin
Froomkin
as consulted
consulted
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-- 52 Stan.
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specifications." This shift is necestags" as they are thinking about "purpose specifications."
sary, but likely to be difficult for some agencies.
In any case, without a strong advocacy strategy from data protection
protection
unlikely
to impleare
and
their
clients
organizations
authorities, technical
technical organizations
actively promotes basic principles
principles of data
ment standards in a manner that actively
protection.
protection. W3C provides a useful illustration of the resistance. The technology
nology for filtering Internet content as well as privacy practices
practices has been
294 The PlatfOITIl
available
Platform for Internet Content Selecavailable for almost four years.294
tion (PICS) began
prohibbegan at W3C as a response to Congressional interest in prohibiting children's access
to
offensive
material
on
the
Internet
and
was
access
offensive
developed
developed as a transmission protocol
protocol to enable content labeling and filtering.
The same technology
technology can be applied to match Web site privacy policies
policies with
visitor privacy preferences;
preferences; W3C began to develop this application,
application, Platform
Preferences (P3P), in 1996. Yet, to date, neither PICS nor P3P
P3P
for Privacy
Privacy Preferences
have settled standards and wide-spread
wide-spread acceptance.
acceptance. And, the P3P effort is
essentially a U.S.-Ied
essentially
U.S.-led exercise. In the absence of an advocacy strategy
strategy with a
confrontations, the incentive structure does not exist for the technical
few confrontations,
organizations to focus on the international dimensions of national standards
organizations
and companies have little real incentive
incentive to implement privacy technologies
technologies
that adequately secure
secure citizens'
citizens' rights.
In many countries without data protection
protection agencies,
agencies, like the United
States, the advocacy strategy plays a critical
role
in persuading foreign orcritical
ganizations
Communications
ganizations to adopt standards of fair information practice. Communications
from data protection authorities to foreign organizations such as companies
or trade associations
associations fill the gaps where data protection authorities
authorities have no
strategy is demonstrated by the Eurocounterpart. The effectiveness
effectiveness of this strategy
pean Commission's dialog with U.S. business groups. Many U.S. industries
and companies have developed
developed data protection programs during the last several years largely in response to the perceived
perceived threat from the European Data
29s
Directive.295
Protection
Protection Directive.
advocacy to foreign organizations
The expansion of direct advocacy
organizations offers a means
for data protection authorities to assure execution
execution of First Principles for international data flows. As advocates,
advocates, data protection officials
officials can use confrontations over transborder data flow prohibitions to find solutions such as
contracts
stipulating liability of exporters like the CitibanklBahncard
Citibank/Bahncard examcontracts stipUlating
Public Workshop on Consumer
Privacy on tlte
the Global Information
294. FTC,
FTC, Public
Consumer Privacy
Information Infrastructure
Infrastructure
1996) <http://www.fle.gov/bcplprivary/wkshp96/pw960604.pdf>
(June 4, 1996)
<http://www.fic.govlbcp/privacy/wkshp96/pw960604.pdf.> (statement of Paul Resnick, AT&T Research) (describing
(describing the possibility
possibility of adapting
adapting PICS for information
information privacy protecprotection).
See, e.g.,
ag., Trans Atlantic Business Dialogue, Statement
Statement of Conclusions
295. See,
Conclusions (1999)
(1999) <http://
<http://
www.tabd.org/recom/berlin.html> (discussing industry protection
www.tabd.orgirecomlberlin.html>
protection of personal data
data for ePrivacyDiagnostic
Diagnostic(1998)
commerce); U.S. Council for International
International Business,
Business, Privacy
(1998) <http://www.uscib.
orglpolicylprivmin.htm> (offering tool for companies
orgipolicy/privrnin.htm>
companies to develop privacy policies that facilitate
transborder data flows).
transborderdata
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296 In the long term, direct advocacy to foreign organizations
ple in Germany.
pIe
Germany.296
organizations
is likely to lead to increased participation
participation by the governments
governments of those countries and an increasing centralization of data protection policy in those councounterpart for
tries. This will, in turn,
tum, promote the establishment
establishment of a counterpart
for
discussions with existing foreign data protection
protection authorities. This is starting
to occur in the United States. With the emphasis from Europe on internaadministration created
Counselor
tional data protection, the Clinton administration
created a Chief Counselor
OMB.297 Ironically, the practical
practical effect returns the focus to
for Privacy in the OMB.297
the convergence
convergence of governance norms: Centralization
Centralization of data privacy policy
is anchored
socially-protective norms rather than liberal, market norms.
anchored in socially-protective
Thus, the advocacy strategy
convergence of governstrategy promotes international
international convergence
ance norms for the protection
information privacy.
protection of information

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

This article makes
makes a number of claims about the nature of information
information
privacy rules and their variation across borders. First, the article claims that
a global convergence exists in democracies
democracies on First Principles,
Principles, a core set of
of
standards for fair information practice. But, divergence
divergence in the execution of
standards
of
interpretation of law remains
those principles
principles both in approach to law and interpretation
significant. Second, the article argues that the nature of these divergences
differences in legal systems and goes to the core
runs much deeper than differences
norms of a democratic society's organization
organization regarding
regarding choices
choices about the
role of the state, market, and citizen in society. Liberal, market norms of
of
democratic organization
lead
to
different
expressions of information privacy
organization
expressions
socially-protective norms.
rules than socially-protective
International
to
International data flows on the Internet force these divergent
divergent rules to
confront each other with increasing
increasing frequency. The claim that divergences
divergences
draw on different governance norms means that privacy
privacy conflicts will only
be resolved by finding compatibility
convergence of those very
compatibility points or by convergence
governance
governance norms. Starting with a search for compatibility, the article develops a theory for coregulation and highlights both strategies and methods
for data protection
protection authorities to promote international
international data flows through
multinational
coordination
and
cooperation.
multinational coordination
cooperation. None of the instruments
instruments and
strategies are mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they collectively
collectively form an
convergence on the execution of
of
important basis to strengthen
strengthen international
international convergence
First Principles.
Principles. Indeed, these are methods to steer privacy.298
privacy. 298 ParadoxiFirst
Paradoxi296. See
Dix, supra
supra note 4 (describing
296.
See Dix,
(describing the requirement
requirement of the Berlin Privacy Commission for
for
Citibank to execute a data privacy
German affiliate prior to the transfer of credit
credit
privacy contract
contract with its Gennan
card data to the United States).
297. See James Glave, Privacy's
Privacy's Protector
Protector Makes Debut,
NEWS, Mar. 5, 1999
1999
Debut, WIRED NEWS,
<http://www.wired.conlnews/politics/0,1283,18301,00.html>.
<http://www.wired.com/newslpoliticslO.1283.18301.OO.html>.
Steering: New Directions
298. Charles
Charles D. Raab, From
From Balancing
Balancing to Steering:
Directionsfor Data Protection, ilill
OF PRIVACY, supra
supranote 51,
51, at 83-88.
VISIONS OFPRlVACY,
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coregulation facilitates infonnation
information privacy
cally, if coregulation
privacy on global networks, then
the increasing and successful
successful contact
contact between
between different
different systems should lead
to legal transplantation-the
transplantation-the incorporation by one legal system of rules de299 In effect, this will become a force of converveloped in another system.299
norms. To the extent that countries
countries adopt information
infonnation
gence for governance nonns.
privacy
mechanisms from other democracies,
adopting
privacy mechanisms
democracies, they will also be adopting
philosophies
citizens, and markets in society. In the
philosophies about the role of states, citizens,
convergence on govlong term,
tenn, privacy issues may turn
tum out to drive a global convergence
ernance norms
nonns for the Information
Infonnation Society.

299. See Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM.
AM. J. COMP.
COMPo L. 335, 335 (1996)
(1996)
(1) extreme pmctical
practical utility;
(3)
(discussing four forces affecting legal transplants: (1)
utility; (2) chance; (3)
difficulty
difficulty of clear sight; and (4) the need for authority).
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For almost aa decade, the United States and Europe have
anticipated
information.'1
anticipated a clash over the protection
protection of personal
personal information.
comprehensive legal
Between the implementation in Europe of comprehensive
protections pursuant
protection 22 and the
pursuant to the directive
directive on data protection
protections
continued reliance
self-regulation in the United
continued
reliance on industry self-regulation
3 trans-Atlantic
States,
privacy
States,3
privacy policies
policies have been at odds with
e-commerce is now sparking
the
each other. The rapid growth
growth in e-commerce
sparking the
long-anticipated trans-Atlantic privacy clash.
long-anticipated
E-commerce highlights
more general societal uncertainty
E-commerce
highlights the more
and debate
debate over fair information practices.
practices. Online activity both
both
generates
generates and requires substantial
substantial databases
databases of personal
personal
information.44 Whether
Whether transactions are person-to-person,
person-to-person,
business-to-consumer,
or
business-to-business,
the
global growth
business-to-business,
growth
business-to-consumer,
and promise
of
promise of e-commerce
e-commerce means that large
large quantities
quantities of
personal
personal information
information will move across national borders in the
context
context of transaction
transaction processing. The digital privacy divide
between
Europe
and the United
between
United States
States is an important
important obstacle
that will cause significant conflict for e-commerce
e-commerce participants.
participants.
American econtext of American
eThis Article
Article will first look at the context
commerce
and
the disjuncture between
citizens' privacy and
between citizens'
commerce
1.
Union's Directive:
1. See
See Symposium,
Symposium, Data
Data Protection
Protection Law and the European
European Union's
Directive: The
Challengefor
(1995); PETER
IOWA L. REV. 445 (1995);
PETER P. SWIRE
SWIRE & ROBERT
ROBERT
Challenge
for the United States, 80 IOWA
E.
E. LITAN,
LITAN, NONE
NONE OF YOUR
YOUR BUSINESS:
BUSINEss: WORLD
WORLD DATA
DATA FLOWS,
FLOWS, ELECTRONIC
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE,
COMMERCE, AND
THE EUROPEAN
EUROPEAN PRIVACY
PRIVACY DIRECTIVE
DIRECTIVE 2-3 (1998) (noting that the United
United States and Europe
Europe
are
are on
on a "collision
"collision course" over
over the
the adequate
adequate protection
protection of privacy).
2.
24 October
2. Directive
Directive 95/46/EC
95/461EC of the
the European
European Parliament
Parliament and
and of
of the
the Council
Council of
of24
October
1995 on the
the protection
protection of
of individuals
individuals with
,vith regard
regard to the
the processing
processing of
of personal
personal data and
on
free movement
of such
1995 O.J.
95/46/EC].
on the
the free
movement of
such data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter
[hereinafter Directive
Directive 95/46IEC].
3.
3. Joel
Joel R.
R. Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting
Conflicting International
International Data
Data Privacy
Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace,
STAN. L. REV.
REV. 1315, 1318 (2000) ("The
("The United
United States...
States ... has
has a marketCyberspace, 52 STAN.
dominated
the protection
protection of
of personal
personal information
information and
and only
only accords limited
limited
dominated policy
policy for
for the
statutory
and common
statutory and
common law
law rights to information
information privacy.").
4. Paul M. Schwartz,
Schwartz, Privacy
Privacy and
and Democracy
Democracy in Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 52
52 VAND. L. REV.
1609,
1609, 1624,
1624, 1627,
1627, 1629
1629 (1999)
(1999) (noting
(noting the
the large
large amount
amount of
ofpersonal
personal information
information generated
generated
from
from Internet
Internet use and that this information
information is
is shared
shared and
and commercialized).
commercialized).
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business practices. The Article will then turn to the international
international
context and explore
explore the adverse impact, on the status quo in the
United States, of European data protection law as harmonized
harmonized by
Directive
95/46/EC
of
the
European
Parliament
Directive 95/46/ EC
European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 Oct.
Oct. 1995 on the protection
protection of individuals
Council
individuals with
regard
data and on the free
regard to the processing
processing of personal
personal data
free
data55 ("European Directive"). Following this
movement of such data
analysis, the Article will show that the "safe harbor" agreement
agreement
between
Commerce and the
between the United States Department
Department of Commerce
6
European
Commission-designed
of
European Commission
-designed to alleviate the threat of
disruption in trans-Atlantic data flows and, in particular, to
mollify concerns
concerns for the stability
stability of online data transfers-is only
a weak, seriously flawed solution for e-commerce.
e-commerce. In the end,
extra-legal
e~rtra-legal technical measures and contractual
contractual mechanisms
mechanisms
might minimize
e-commerce transactions,
minimize privacy conflicts for e-commerce
international treaty is likely the only sustainable solution
solution
but an international
long-term growth
growth in trans-border
interchange.
for long-term
trans-border commercial interchange.
I.

E-COMMERCE
PROTECTION
E-CO:M:MERCE AND U.S. DATA
DATA PROTECTION

E-commerce
E-commerce does not raise particularly
particularly new data privacy
issues. E-commerce
E-commerce does, however, increase the level of
complexity
complexity in dealing
dealing with the interests of citizens in the fair
fair
treatment
treatment of their personal
personal information
information and with the commercial
commercial
goals of transacting
qualitative change in
transacting parties. There is also a qualitative
the nature of data processing activity for e-commerce.
e-commerce. Online
commercial
creation and
commercial transactions depend
depend on both the, creation
availability
about
availability of unprecedented
unprecedented and extensive data about
individuals. At the same time, the boundary lines between
between
sectors, and between offline and online data, are blurring. Ecommerce, in effect, pushes a dramatic increase
the
increase in the
importance
importance of data privacy issues for consumers,
consumers, business, and
society. But, United States policy lags far behind and, despite
greater public attention, remains relatively stagnant
stagnant with a
culture of data stalking and information
trafficking.'
information trafficking. 7
5.
5. Directive 95/461EC,
95/46IEC, supra
supra note 2.
6.
6. Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles
Principles and Transmission
Transmission to European
European Commission,
Commission,
65 Fed. Reg. 45,665, 45,665-686 (July 24, 2000); Commission
Commission Decision
Decision of 26 July 2000
2000
95/461EC of the European
European Parliament and of the Council
pursuant to Directive
Directive 95/46IEC
Council on the
Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe
Related
Safe Harbor
Harbor Privacy Principles and Related
Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L
Frequently Asked Questions
Questions Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
215) 7.
and Electronic
Electronic Communications:
Communications: Hearing
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
7. Privacy
Privacy and
on
Courts and
and Intellectual
Propertyof the House
House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Judiciary,106th Congo
Cong. 52-53
Courts
Intellectual Properly
[hereinafter Hearing]
(2000) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Joel R. Reidenberg, Professor of Law and
Director of the Graduate
Graduate Program,
Program, Fordham University School of Law) (noting that data
stalking and information
information trafficking are normal practices
practices in the United States and "legal
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A. Transactional
TransactionalData
and Profiles
Data and
Profiles
E-commerce leaves an extensive
E-commerce
extensive trail of personal
information. Internet
user
Internet service providers
providers and Web
Web sites log user
interactions
commercial operations.
operations.'8
interactions for technical and commercial
Online payment systems record basic details about the
transacting
information may
transacting parties and their transactions.99 This information
be passed
passed along to a variety of participants
participants in the settlement
settlement of
of
those transactions.0lO Over time, these data trails create rather
rather
intensive
information."l l
intensive databases
databases of personal
personal information.
of
The warehousing
warehousing of transaction information and profiling of
online
of
online users has become
become a key strategy in the business models of
e-commerce
companies."
Businesses
believe
they
can
better
e-commerce companies. 12
better
service
prospects if
service customers and better target prospects
if they analyze
detailed
detailed behavioral
behavioral information.
information. Many of the prominent InternetDoubleClick
based companies
companies such as Amazon, Yahoo, and DoubleClick
started
with
business
models
that
depended
on
advertising
started
business
depended
advertising
revenue."13 Complex
Complex information
information sharing arrangements among
revenue.
online
commercial Web sites-such
sites-such as banner ad placement,
online commercial
cookies,
transfer
software-that each transfer
cookies, or "phone home" software-that
clickstream
information
to
third
parties
become
extremely
clickstream information
extremely
behavioral information
information
important to business ventures. The behavioral
enables
categorize users and present them with content
enables sites to categorize
content
assumed
assumed to be of interest. In fact, as the technological
technological
capabilities become more sophisticated,
capabilities
sophisticated, the transfer of personal
users.I4
information is increasingly
increasingly buried or hidden from users."
rights...
rights
... do not respond to abusive data practices").
8. See Jerry
Information Privacy
Privacy in
in Cyberspace
Cyberspace Transactions,
8.
Jerry Kang, Information
Transactions, 50 STAN.
STAN. L.
REV. 1193,
1193, 1199-1200
1199-1200 (1998).
REv.
(1998).
9. See Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 3, at 1320 (noting that electronic payment
payment systems
record data about the transacting
transacting parties).
1322-23 ("Data may be collected
10. Id. at 1322-23
collected in one location, processed elsewhere,
elsewhere, and
stored yet at another
another site...
site ... [and]
[and] that multiple intermediaries have access to and may
process data in transit.").
1323-24 (discussing the phenomenon
phenomenon of "data creep," which subscribes
subscribes to
Id. at 1323-24
11. Id.
the school of thought
thought that "more is better"-thus, companies are warehousing
warehousing more
seemingly innocuous and anonymous
anonymous data to generate both demographic
demographic and detailed
detailed
individual profiles).
coupled
information coupled
12. See id.
id. at 1324 ("The ease of collecting and storing personal information
with
it create
commercial pressures
of
\vith enhanced capability to use it
create tremendous
tremendous commercial
pressures in favor of
unanticipated
supra
unanticipated or secondary uses...
uses ... [and]
[and] generate
generate additional
additional value.");
value."); Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1627 n.1l4
n.114 (asserting the collection
collection of personal
personal information
information has '"enormous'
financial
value...
economy.'" (quoting Edward
financial value
... [and
[and is] the new currency
currency of the digital economy.'"
Edward C.
Baig et al.,
Privacy, Bus. WK,
aI., Privacy,
WK., Apr. 5, 1999,
1999, at 84)).
84».
13.
See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc., Form 10-Q,
10-Q, at *16 (Sept. 30, 1998) ("successfully
("successfully achieving
achieving
our growth plan depends on .
our
. .. .. the successful sale of web-based advertising
advertising by our
internal
internal sales-force."),
sales-force."), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/0001047469-98http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal1011006/0001047469-98040804.txt.
040804.b,.1;.
14. For example,
example, users needed a packet sniffer
sniffer or personal
personal firewall to discover the phone
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Transaction data
data and
and profiles
profiles are
are not limited
limited to
to the
the online
Transaction
The blurring
blurring of
of borders
borders between
between offline
offline activities
activities and
and
world. The
online
interactions
creates
significant
information
privacy
privacy
information
significant
online interactions creates
concerns. DoubleClick
DoubleClick and Alexa
Alexa each
each sought
sought to merge
merge online
online
concerns.
information with the offline data to create
create more detailed
detailed
information
individuals. 15 Both
Both faced
faced lawsuits
lawsuits and public
dossiers of individuals."
blurring of borders also extends
extends to the
outrage.16I6 In fact, the blurring
sector's use of private
private sector
sector data. The FBI, for example,
example,
public sector's
private databases.
databases.17I7 Most
Most likely, Congress could not, as a
uses private
FBI to create
create the same
authorize the FBI
political matter, authorize
2000 Presidential
database. More troubling, during the 2000
election thousands
thousands of Florida
Florida voters
voters were excluded
excluded from the
election
because ChoicePoint,
ChoicePoint, a private company
company working
working for the
polls because
identified those individuals
individuals as convicted
convicted
inaccurately identified
state, inaccurately
were ineligible
ineligible to vote. 188
felons who
who were
collapse of many start-up
start-up Internet
Internet companies, the
With the collapse
transaction databases
disposition of transaction
databases becomes a troubling
unwitting
problem. I99 Toysmart.com,
Toysmart.com, an online toy store, was the unwitting
privacy.2" The
between bankruptcy
bankruptcy and privacy.20
pioneer in the conflict between
company's database was just another asset for sale in the
company's
liquidation, notwithstanding
commitments made to
notwithstanding the privacy commitments
information would be transferred
transferred to third
users that no personal information
More recently, eTour.com
eTour.com ran into the same
same issue when
when
parties.221' More
the failing company
company sold its database
database to AskJeeves."
AskJeeves.222 Between
Between
Microsoft smart download. See Brad
home features of Real Network's products
products and of the Microsoft
Brad King,
File Trader
Far (May 11, 2001) (describing stealth file tracking software), at
File
Tracker May Go Too Far
http'vww.wired.com/newsfmp3/0,1285,43714,00.html.
http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0.1285.43714.00.htInl.
15. In re DoubleClick,
DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 00 CrV.
CIV. 0641 NRB, 2001 WL 303744,
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001).
at ~'5
against
16.
See id. at "1
':'1 (stating the plaintiffs'
plaintiffs' federal and state law claims against
at http://
http:ll
Lawsuit (Apr. 27, 2001), at
DoubleClick); Amazon Unit Settles Lawsuit
www.siliconvalley.comldocs/news/techl063587.htm.
www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/tech/063587.htm.
FBI Hopes
Hopes to Get
Get the Goods on
17.
If the FBI
Brother-in-Law:I{the
17. Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law:
("[In the past several
Al ("mn
You, It
point, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at Al
several
It May Ask Choice
Choicepoint,
Revenue Service and other agencies have started buying
years, the FBI, the Internal Revenue
troves of personal data from the private sector.").
Cleansing" Program,
'Voter Cleansing"
Florida's Flawed
Flawed "Voter
Program, at
18. Gregory Palast, Florida's
http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2000/12/04/voter_file/index.html (Dec. 4, 2000).
http://www.salon.comlpolitics/featurel2000/12104lvoter_filelindex.html
Privacy
A. O'Rourke,
O'Rourke, Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy
Jr. &
& Maureen
19. See Walter M. Miller, Jr.
Maureen A
Card? 38 HouS. L. REV. 784-86 (2001) (noting that
Holds the Trump
Trump Card?
Rights: Which Holds
data).
bankruptcy trustees may be able to sell transaction data).
banlrruptcy
Site, Toysmart.com,
Toysmart.com,
With Bankrupt
Bankrupt Web Site,
Settlement With
FTC Announces Settlement
20. See FTC
at http://www.ftc.gov/
http://www.ftc.gov/
Policy Violations
Violations (July 21, 2000), at
Regarding
Regarding Alleged Privacy
Privacy Policy
opaI2000/07/toysmart2.htm.
opal2000/07/toysmart2.htm.
21. Id.
Id.
Fears Over
Over eTour
Privacy Fears
& Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Privacy
Heavens &
See Andrew Heavens
22. See
database), at
at
2001) (discussing the sale of eTour.com's customer database),
Deal (May 23, 2001)
Deal
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi.
http://news.ft.comlftlgx.cgi.
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data warehousing, profiling, and bankruptcy
bankruptcy asset liquidations,
American consumers
consumers perceive that they have lost control over
over
their personal
personal information. 233 For e-commerce,
e-commerce, this belief becomes
becomes
an obstacle to the growth of online transactions.
transactions. 244
B. Data
Stalking and Information
United States
Data Stalking
Information Trafficking in the United
States
information is a longSadly, the protection of personal information
1977, after three years
standing problem in the United States. In
In 1977,
Congressionally mandated
Protection
of Congressionally
mandated study, the U.S. Privacy
Privacy Protection
Study Commission, reported
reported back to Congress that "neither law
nor technology now gives an individual the tools he needs to
legitimate interests in the records organizations
protect his legitimate
organizations keep
him." 5 Today, almost
about him.,,25
almost twenty-five
twenty-five years later, the
Commission's conclusion
conclusion remains equally
equally true despite
despite the
rhetoric of self-regulation,
technological
mechanisms,
and
self-regulation, technological
sectoral rights.
While there has been important progress
progress in online privacy
over the last few years, the state
of
Americans' data privacy
state
Americans'
nevertheless
nevertheless is appalling. Data stalking and information
information
trafficking
become the norm in the United States. 2266 As
trafficking have become
technical
capabilities advance, commercial
enhance the
technical capabilities
commercial pressures enhance
tracking of citizens.
citizens. Over the last two years, Americans
Americans have
been horrified to learn of Intel's plan to impose a hidden digital
chip, of Microsoft's
Microsoft's
fingerprint for the users of every Pentium
Pentium III chip,27
equivalent
equivalent to a digital social security number secretly
emblazoned
files,288 of DoubleClick's surprise
surprise plan to match
match
emblazoned on files,
9
offline
data, and of
of
offline data with hidden collections
collections of online data,29
23. See Business
Business Week/
Weeki Harris Poll: A Growing
Growing Threat, Business
Business Week,
Week, March 20,
[hereinafter Business
2000, at 96 [hereinafter
Business Week Poll]
Pol[] (revealing
(revealing consumer
consumer fears of privacy
invasions online).
See, e.g., Exposure
Exposure in
Cyberspace, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at B1 (reporting,
24. See,
in Cyberspace,
in a Wall Street Journal and Harris
Interactive poll, that eighty-one
Americans
Harris Interactive
eighty-one percent
percent of Americans
"rarely," from using a Web site or making an online
refrained, at least "rarely,"
online purchase
purchase due to
privacy concerns).
25. THE REPORT
REpORT OF THE PRIVACY
PRIVACY PROTECTION
PROTECTION STUDY
STUDY COAIAI'N,
COl\Il\l'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY
INFORMATION SOCIETY 88 (1977).
IN AN INFORMATION
26. Hearing,
Hearing, supra
supra note 7, at 52 (statement of Joel R. Reidenberg).
Pentium III
III Processors:
Processor Serial
Questions & Answers
27. See Pentium
Processors: Processor
Serial Number Questions
http://www.intel.com/support/
(describing the Intel processor
processor serial number
number feature), at http://www.intel.com/support/
processors/pentiumiii/psqa.htm (last visited July 11, 2001).
processors/pentiumiiilpsqa.htm
Junkbusters:Privacy
HardwareIDs
IDs (warning that
28. See Junkbusters:
Privacy Advisory on Microsoft
Microsoft Hardware
"[fliles produced
Microsoft applications programs include
include a fingerprint
fingerprint
produced by several popular Microsoft
at http://wvv.junkbusters.comI
or tattoo"
tattoo" that may identify
identify a particular
particular computer), at
http://www.junkbusters.com/
microsoft.html#history (last visited July 17, 2001).
microsoft.html#history
29.
See Letter from Joel
Joel Winston, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of Fin. Practices,
Practices, Fed.
Trade
Trade Comm'n, to Christine
Christine Varney, Counsel for DoubleClick, Inc. (Jan. 22, 2001)
(discussing the FCC's investigation
investigation of DoubleClick's plan to merge offline
oftline and online
online

HeinOnline -- 38 Hous. L. Rev. 722 2001-2002

2001]

E-COMMERCE

723
723

RealNetwork's surveillance
surveillance of music
music listeners."
listeners.3o Despite
Despite these
RealNetwork's
public scandals,
scandals, even
even now,
now, a popular
popular version
version of
of Microsoft's
Microsoft's
public
Internet Explorer
Explorer (Version
(Version 5.0) comes
comes equipped
equipped with
with default
default
Internet
a still
and
users,
of
settings
that
facilitate
hidden
surveillance
users,
and
surveillance
hidden
settings that
version of
of Netscape
Netscape Communicator
Communicator (Version
(Version 4.72)
widely used version
back to Netscape
Netscape every time a user reads Messenger
Messenger
reports back
generation Internet
Internet transmission
transmission protocol may
email. The next generation
even force every
every device
device connected
connected to the
the Internet
Internet to have
have the
even
331
1 In effect, the
number.
equivalent of a national identification
identification
effect,
equivalent
tendency in
in the United States
States is to develop
develop technology
technology that
that
tendency
increases data
data collection
collection and
and decreases
decreases the transparency
transparency to
to
increases
citizens of such monitoring.
citizens
computing and communications
communications
increased computing
As a result of increased
previously unimaginable
unimaginable profiles
profiles of citizens
citizens are now
now
power, previously
readily available
available on
on the Internet. For example, Venture
Venture Direct, aa
readily
New York based company, sells a list of heavy black women
women who
32
offered as targets
targets for self-improvement
self-improvement products. 32 Not to be
be
are offered
outdone, Acxiom,
Acxiom, a company unknown to the public at large
large but
but
outdone,
holding dossiers
dossiers on 160 million Americans,
Americans, boasted
boasted of its "new
. . . identifying
identifying individuals
individuals who may
may speak
speak their
their
ethnic system
system...
ethnic
3 3 Acxiom was
native language, but do not think in that manner."
manner.,,33
essentially offering
offering a list of ethnic
ethnic Americans
Americans who "speak
"speak
essentially
but "think American."
American." Not surprisingly, within
within weeks
weeks of
of
foreign," but
receiving publicity for this outrageous
outrageous example at a meeting
meeting of
of
receiving
the National Association of Attorneys
Attorneys General
General in September
September
1999, Acxiom removed its full data catalog
catalog from the company's
34
3
4
Web site. Now the site merely offers
offers "specialty
"specialty lists" with a
specific mention
mention of the Hispanic
Hispanic market
declines to state
market3535 and declines
specific
clearly that those on the list can even learn of the existence
existence of
of
their profile.3 36
data), at http://wwwv.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/doubleclick.pdf.
http://www.ftc.gov/oslclosings/staffldoubleclick.pdf.
30. See Brian McWillianls,
Hit With Privacy
Privacy Lawsuit, INTERNET
McWilliams, Real Networks [sic] Hit
practice of uploading
uploading information about
about
RealNetworks' practice
NEWS, (Nov. 9, 1999) (discussing RealNetworks'
http://www.internetnews.com/streaming-news/
customers' listening habits), at http://www.internetnews.comlstreanling-news/
their customers'
articlel0,,8161_235141,00.html.
article/0,,8161_235141,00.html.
14,
TIMES, May 14,
Addresses, N.Y. TIMES,
Plan to Expand
31. See John Markoff, A Plan
Expand Internet
Internet Addresses,
C10.
2001, at ClO.
subscribers to BELLE,
List (advertising a list of subscribers
Venture Direct
32. See Venture
Direct List
BELLE, The
http:/vww.venturedirect.com/scripts/
Magazine for Full-Figured Black Women), at http://www.venturedirect.comlscripts/
12, 2001).
index.php?script&&response&&list4416 (last visited July 12,
index.php?script&&response&&list4416
33. Acxiom Product Catalog, p. 5 (1999) (on file with author).
example at the meeting of state
34. The author used Acxiom as an illustrative eXanlple
counsel was
September 1999. Acxiom's general counsel
Attorneys General
General Privacy Task Force in September
also a participant at the meeting.
at http://www.acxiom.comiDisplayMaini
http://www.acxiom.com/DisplayMain/
Lists, at
Infobase Specialty
Specialty Lists,
35. Acxiom, Infobase
35.
2001).
0,1494,USA-en~938-976-0-0,00.html (last visited July 9, 2001).
0,1494,USA-en-938-976-0-0,00.html
not
that "Acxiom's
"Acxiom's policy does not
(stating that
Choice (stating
Notice, Access, Choice
36. See Acxiom, Notice,
36.
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These egregious
egregious practices in the business
business community are
just a few examples
examples that offend common decency
represent
decency and represent
companies that try to engage
invidious stereotyping. Even for companies
engage in
fair information practices, the threshold
threshold of acceptable conduct
conduct
advocacy groups learn of new
keeps rising. As the public
public and advocacy
abuses, their expectations
expectations for fair treatment increase.
Nevertheless, industry
industry lobbyists like to say that such
such
Nevertheless,
abusive practices have not resulted in economic
economic loss to
to
individuals and that protection of privacy would
would be costly
costly to
to
society." Lobbyists report astronomical
society.37
astronomical costs to increase privacy
8 but the methodology used
for personal
personal information,
information,38
methodology
to come up
with many of these cost estimates is staggeringly
staggeringly specious."
specious. 39
Recent
Recent studies seem to start with the highest target the study
authors think is politically
politically correct and then seem to figure out
how to get there. For example, one well publicized
publicized study "found"
that privacy legislation for Web sites in the United States would
cost between
between $9
$9 and $36 billion."
billion.40 Curiously, this particular
particular study
calculated the cost by asking a group of consultants
much
calculated
consultants how much
they would charge to write software
software from scratch that would
enable Web sites to provide
provide data subject access. 411 The consultants
consultants
were asked to assume
the
database
contained
Web site
assume
database
registration
100,000 to 10 million users and that
registration information on 100,000
that
the Web site already "allow[s] users to review and update their
their
" " The consultants estimated
basic [information]
[information]. ."42
estimated costs ranging
from $44,000 to $670,000
$670,000 per site!43
site!43 The study then used
$100,000
$100,000 per Web
Web site to come up with its headline
headline numbers. 44
Does anyone
anyone really believe
believe that off-the-shelf
off-the-shelf products
products would
would not
not
be developed at a fraction of this cost if
if data subject access were
allow non-public
information to be provided
non-public individual
individual information
provided directly
directly to a consumer" but
but
also offering to "provide an individual
individual with a copy of the non-public information" they
http://www.acxiom.com/DisplayMain/
maintain for a five dollar fee), at http://www.acxiom.com/DisplayMainl
1,1494,USA-en-745-616-0-0,00.html
1,1494,USA-en-745-616-0-0,00.html (last visited July 12,
12, 2001).
2001).
37.
See, e.g., ROBERT
ASSESSMENT OF THE COSTS OF PROPOSED
See,
ROBERT W. HAHN, AN AsSESSMENT
PROPOSED ONLINE
ONLINE
proposed laws to protect privacy]
PRIVACY LEGISLATION 23-24 (May 7,
7, 2001) ("[Closts [of proposed
could be in the billions
if not tens of billions
http:/www.actonline.orglpubs/
billions if
billions of dollars."), at http://www.actonline.orglpubs/

HahnStudy.pdf.
Resources (providing links to
38. See, e.g., id; see also
also ONLINE PRIVACY ALLIANCE,
ALLIANCE, Resources
to
recent studies
studies on the economic impact
impact of increasing the privacy
privacy of personal information),
http:/wwv.privacyalliance.orgfresources/research.shtml (last visited
at http://www.privacyalliance.orglresources/research.shtml
visited July 11, 2001).
2001).
Costs Consumers
and Why
39. See Robert
Robert Gellman, Why the Lack of Privacy
Privacy Costs
Consumers and
Why
Business Studies
Studies of Privacy
Privacy Costs
Costs are
Biasedand Incomplete
Incomplete 20-24, presented
are Biased
presented at the Ford
Foundation Digital Media Forum (June 2001)
2001) (on file with the author).
40. HAHN, supra
supra note 37, at 23.
41. Id.
Id. at 16.
42.
Id.
Id.
43.
Id.
Id. at 20.
44. Id.
Id. at 21.
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required? The
The study
study also assumed
assumed that small
small to
to medium
medium sized
sized
required?
sites would
would hire
hire expensive
expensive outside
outside consulting
consulting firms rather
rather
Web sites
high school
school computer
computer whizzes
whizzes to write
write software
software from
from
than high
4 5 Worse
ignored any financial
financial losses
losses
scratch!45
Worse yet, the study ignored
scratch!
attributable to
to weak
weak privacy
privacy protections.
protections.4466 For example,
example, Forrester
Forrester
attributable
Research reports that U.S. consumers
spent $12
$12 billion less
consumers spent
Research
online last
last year
year as a direct
direct result of
of inadequate
inadequate privacy
privacy
online
47
4
protection. "
Even aside
aside from a game of numbers,
numbers, economic
economic damage
arguments seriously misconstrue
misconstrue the harm
harm to society
society from the
arguments
confidence in the fairness of information
information
loss of faith and confidence
practices. Privacy
Privacy is about the democratic
fabric of
of society.48
The
society.48 The
democratic fabric
practices.
misuse of
of personal
personal information
information is a harm
harm to the individual
individual
very misuse
citizen
citizen in democratic
democratic society
society that calls
calls for redress.
redress.
not
Existing legal
simply do not
legal rights in the United States simply
respond to abusive
abusive data practices
practices and
and the need for sanctions
sanctions
against
against the misuse of personal
personal information.4949 American
American law is
is
sporadic, confused,
confused, and wholly inadequate
inadequate to protect
protect citizens in
in
sporadic,
the face of
privacy-invasive technical
of privacy-invasive
technical advances
advances and pervasive
pervasive
online commercial
commercial surveillance. The principal
principal statutes protecting
protecting
online
electronic communications
Americans' privacy in the context of electronic
Americans'
communications
information
simply not kept pace
pace with private
private sector information
have simply
Electronic Communications
processing
Communications
processing developments.
developments. The Electronic
Privacy Act of 1986,50
1996,51 the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,1
1986,"0 the Telecommunications
Privacy
Communications Policy Act of 1984,52 and the Video
Cable Communications
53
contain narrow
Privacy Protection Act of 1988
narrow data privacy
1988'3 each contain
provisions that do not cover
cover the vast array of online
online activities.5454
Indeed, Congress has granted drug abusers greater privacy
45. HAHN, supra
supra note 37, at 16.
16.
46. See id. at 21-24
21-24 (declaring
(declaring that online
online privacy legislation
legislation would be costly to the
attributable to weak
consumer without
without accounting for losses attributable
weak privacy protections).
Marketing Gurus
Gurus Clash
47. See Paul Davidson, Marketing
Clash on Internet
Internet Privacy
Priuacy Rules, USA
TODAY,Apr.27,2001,atlB.
TODAY, Apr. 27, 2001, at lB.
1325 (noting that information privacy is
48. See Reidenberg, supra
supra note 3, at 1325
democracies around the world);
recognized as aa vital element of a civil society by democracies
democratic
1653 (arguing that data privacy is necessary for democratic
supra note 4, at 1653
Schwartz, supra
deliberation
deliberation and individual self determination).
& JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY
49. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ &
of
OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION
PROTECTION 33-35 (1996) (discussing the limited reach of
constitutional
constitutional rights in protecting information privacy in the private sector).
& Supp. V 2000).
18 U.S.C §§ 2510-2522 (1994 &
50. 18
104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
51. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104,
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
U.S. C.).
52. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994 &
& Supp. V 2000).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2710 (1994).
53. 18
WL 303744,
303744, at *6-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
See, e.g., In
In re
re DoubleClick, 2001 WL
54. See,
54.
ECPA to online data
data sharing).
sharing).
difficulty of applying
applying ECPA
(discussing the difficulty
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5 Even the recent
than lawful
lawful users
users of
of the
the Internet.
Internet.5 55
Even the recent
protection than
protection
of
the
more
in
several
country
lawsuits
filed
across
across
the
the
country
in
several
of
the
more prominent
prominent
lawsuits
Internet data
data scandal
scandal cases
cases are
are forced
forced to
to rely
rely on
on deceptive
deceptive trade
trade
Internet
practice theories
theories because
because basic
basic privacy
privacy rights
rights are
are not
not clearly
clearly
practice
established in
in either
either the
the common
common law
law or
or by
by statute.
statute.5566
established

c. Self-Regulation
Self-Regulation and Technological
Technological Mechanisms
Mechanisms
C.
to
Protect
Privacy
to ProtectPrivacy
Despite the rising expectations
expectations of the American
American public
public for
for
Despite
online privacy,
privacy, policy decisions
decisions continually
continually defer
defer to industry
industry selfonline
regulation and
and technological
technological mechanisms
mechanisms for fair
fair information
information
regulation
57
practices. E-commerce
E-commerce proponents
proponents are strong
strong advocates
advocates of
of the
practices."
8 But
self-regulatory philosophy.
philosophy.58
But the history
history of industry
industry selfself-regulatory
regulation and
and technological
technological privacy
privacy demonstrate
demonstrate that
that these
regulation
for
protection
effective
provide
mechanisms
have
and
not
provide
effective
protection
for
will
not
not
and
have
mechanisms
59
9
citizens without
without the support
support of legal rights. The
The non-regulatory
non-regulatory
citizens
may have
have been promoted
promoted with the best intentions
intentions of
of
solutions may
solutions
and government
government policy-makers,
policy-makers, but
but the conditions
conditions of
of
industry and
self-regulation and
In the end, self-regulation
market failure are too strong. In
technical tools have proven
proven to be more public
public relations
relations than
technical
meaningful
information privacy for citizens. Indeed, as
meaningful information
expectations for
technology advances, so do public
public concerns and expectations
for
technology
privacy protections.
online privacy
self-regulatory
deeper than the practical
practical experience
experience of self-regulatory
Yet, deeper
efforts, privacy rights mark the boundary
boundary between
between totalitarian
and democratic
democratic governance.
governance. Privacy is central
central to our freedom of
of
our ability to define ourselves in society.60
association and our
society." These
fundamental
are basic political rights in a democracy and are fundamental
In contrast to the political nature of privacy,
American values. In
self-regulation
self-regulation assumes that all privacy values can and should be
resolved by aa marketplace. Democratic societies do not, however,
(imposing
& Supp. V 2000) (imposing
55.
Compare
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-1 to -2 (1994 &
55.
V
(Supp. V
substance abuser's personal information), with 47 U.S.C. § 222 (Supp.
confidentiality of substance
only to
to service providers).
2000) (making
applicable only
(making protections applicable
four
inter alia, four
on, inter
at ':'1'1 (relying on,
56.
DoubleClick, 2001 WL 303744, at
56. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick,
supranote 30.
state common
claims); McWilliams, supra
common law claims);
Commerce,
Electronic Commerce,
Privacy in
in Electronic
RestoringAmericans' Privacy
R. Reidenberg, Restoring
57. See Joel R.
on] fair information practices has
(1999) ("[U.S. policy on]
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
L.J. 771, 774 (1999)
the
self-regulation will accomplish the
on the philosophy that self-regulation
been predicated on
historically
historically been
and
interference and
government interference
intrusive government
most
most meaningful protection of privacy without intrusive
technologies.").
,vith
developing technologies.").
for dynamically
dynamically developing
with the greatest flexibility for
58.
at 775.
775.
58. Id. at
59.
Id. at
at 773-8l.
773-81.
59. Id.
1980)
(8th Cir.
Cir. 1980)
1094 (8th
1091, 1094
612 F.2d
F.2d 1091,
60.
Bank, 612
State Bank,
v. Citizens State
United States v.
60. United
be necessary
necessary to
may be
associations may
of one's
one's associations
the privacy
privacy of
that "maintaining the
(holding
(holding that
(1958).
462 (1958).
U.S. 449, 462
v. Alabama,
Alabama, 357 U.S.
NAACP v.
ofassociation")
association") (citing NAACP
guarantee
freedom of
guarantee freedom
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typically
typically sell off the political rights of citizens. Indeed, article 1,
1,
section 1 of the California state constitution
constitution was amended by
by
referendum
referendum to include express protection
protection for privacy
privacy and to apply
that protection
gathering and using personal
protection against businesses
businesses gathering
information."61i
information.
Reliance
appropriate mechanism
Reliance on self-regulation
self-regulation is not an appropriate
mechanism
to achieve
Self-regulation
achieve the protection of basic political rights. Self-regulation
in the United States reduces
reduces privacy protection to an uncertain
uncertain
62
regime of notice and choice.62
As
AB a set of privacy
privacy principles,
principles, this
approach misses key elements of the package
package of universally
recognized
recognized fair information practice principles such as data
minimization, data access, and storage limitations.6363
minimization, data access, and storage limitations. Selfregulation
collectors to change the rules after
after
regulation also enables
enables data collectors
the data has been collected
collected from individuals.
individuals.
As a practical matter, most Web privacy
AB
privacy notices are nothing
more than confusing
confusing nonsense for the average American
American citizen.6464
Policies
Policies are often found only through obscure links buried at the
bottom of a Web page and are routinely made "subject to change."
Once
of ten major Web
Once found, a linguistic analysis
analysis of the policies
policies often
sites affected
affected by data scandals
scandals shows that readers will not be
able to understand the privacy statements without at least a
college
college education
education and many could not be understood without a
post-graduate
post-graduate education.6565 In fact, privacy
privacy policies are practically
impossible to draft at a reading level most Americans can
comprehend. Self-regulation, thus, denies the average American
comprehend.
American
opportunity to make
make informed
informed choices and reserves
citizen an opportunity
privacy for the nation's college
educated citizens.
college educated
The Web seal programs are not a substitute for clear
clear
independent legal recourse. Seals, at best, offer an incomplete
independent
incomplete
response to the misuse of personal
personal information. Seal programs
programs
establish inconsistent
inconsistent substantive
substantive privacy standards
standards for Web
generally Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (relying on the referendum
61. See generally
referendum
ballot pamphlet in holding that constitutional protections
protections apply against nongovernmental organizations).
TELECOMM. AND INFo.
INFO. ADMHN.,
COMMERCE, ELEMENTS
62. See NAT'L TELECOMM.
ADIIUN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SELF-REGULATION FOR PROTECTION
OF EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
PRIVACY (Jan. 1998) (stating that,
for
to be meaningful, businesses must adhere
for self-regulation
self-regulation to
adhere to substantive
substantive rules
regarding
regarding notification
notification and choice,
choice, rather than
than articulating broad policies
policies or guidelines in
in
these areas), at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacydraft/198DFTPRIN.htm.
httpJ/wvv.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacydraft198DFTPRN.htm.
63. See Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 3,
3, at 1325-29.
consumers in understanding
understanding the
64. These
These notices parallel the problems faced by consumers
myriad
myriad of vaguely worded,
worded, but lengthy, privacy
privacy notices
notices sent by conglomerate financial
institutions
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act obligations. See 15 U.S.C. §§
institutions pursuant to their Gramm-Leach-Bliley
6801-6803 (Supp. V 2000).
65.
See Will Rodger, Privacy
Knowledge: Online
Online Policies
Spread
Privacy isn't Public
Public Knowledge:
Policies Spread
Confusion with Legal Jargon,
Jargon, USA TODAY, May
Confusion
May 1,
1, 2000,
2000, at 3D ("Every policy studied
studied is
written
written at a college level or higher.").
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66

sites'
sites' use of personal
personal information.6 Programs such as TRUSTe
omit key fair information practice
practice standards
standards from the minimum
minimum
requirements of certification
certification such as mandatory access to stored
requirements
personal information.6677 With the rare exception of the
Entertainment
Entertainment Software
Software Rating Board
Board (ESRB), seal programs
programs do
not require, as a condition for certification, that damage
damage remedies
granted to the victims of information misuse.6868 Seal programs
programs
be granted
are also unlikely to cover the vast majority
majority of Web sites. The two
collectively
major seal
seal programs, BBBOnline and TRUSTe, collectively
69
69
certify a miniscule
fraction
of
American
Web
sites.
Major
sites
miniscule
American
Amazon.com do not even appear to participate.
such as Amazon.com
of
Furthermore, seal programs narrowly restrict the scope of
their certifications
in
ways
that
defy
reasonable
expectations
of
certifications
reasonable
of
privacy. For example,
example, TRUSTe
TRUSTe only certifies
certifies sites with respect
respect to
the information
information that is "used to identify, contact, or locate a
person."" Yet, Business Week
sixty-three percent
of
percent of
person.,,70
Week reports that sixty-three
Internet
users
were
uncomfortable
with
Web
sites
tracking
their
Internet
uncomfortable
tracking
movements even though
though the sites did not tie the surveillance
surveillance
identity.' Seal programs
data with a user's name
name or real world
world identity.71
tend to apply only to the collection of data during specific,
specific,
interactions such as those with Web sites. As a
narrowly defined interactions
scandals involving TRUSTe
licensees-such as
result, major data scandals
TRUSTe licensees-such
RealNetwork-turned out to be outside the
Intel, Microsoft,
Microsoft, and RealNetwork-turned
of TRUSTe's certification.7272
scope ofTRUSTe's
66. Compare,
Compare,e.g.,
ProgramPrinciples
Principles(requiring only
66.
e.g., TRUSTe Program
only that businesses offer
offer
opt-out opportunities,
personally identifiable
users opt·out
opportunities, encryption of personally
identifiable information,
information, and
mechanisms
at
mechanisms for users to verify
verify the accuracy
accuracy of their personal information),
information), at
http./www.truste.com/programs/pub-principles.html
http://www.truste.comlprogramsipub_principles.html (last visited July 22, 2001), with
BBBOnline: Privacy
TRUSTe's program
Privacy Program
Program Eligibility
Eligibility Requirements
Requirements (including TRUSTe's
requirements
requirements that the business does not share
requirements in addition to requirements
share users' personal
information
information with
with outside
outside parties
parties operating
operating under a different
different privacy notice
notice and
and that the
business
business takes reasonable
reasonable steps to assure
assure that personal information is accurate, complete,
complete,
it is used), at http://www.bbbonline.orgl
http:/vwivv.bbbonline.org]
and timely for the purpose for which it
privacy/threshold.asp
2001).
27,2001).
privacy/threshold.asp (last visited July 27,
67. See TRUSTe Program
Program Principles,
Principles, supra
supra note 66.
Privacy Online
PrinciplesGuidelines
68. See ESRB Privacy
Online Principles
Guidelines and Definitions,
Definitions, para. 6 ("If the
participating
company has not adhered to its privacy
offered
participating company
privacy practices, consumers must be offered
a remedy
remedy for the violations."), at http://www.esrb.org/wpdefinitions.asp
http://www.esrb.orglwp_definitions.asp (last visited July
10, 2001).
10,2001).
69. See Just
Just Two Months After its One-Year Anniversary,
Anniversary, BBBOnline
BBBOnline Privacy
Privacy
Program
500th Seal (May 9, 2000), at http://www.bbb.orgladvertisinglalerts/
http://www.bbb.orgladvertising/alerts/
Program Awards its 500th
bbbolseal.asp;
(Jan. 12, 2000) (reporting on the
bbbolseal.asp; TRUSTe Approves 1000th
lOOOth Web Site (Jan.
at http://www.truste.com/aboutabout_1000th.html.
1000th seal approved by TRUSTe), at
http://www.truste.comlaboutlabout_1000th.html.
70.
TRUSTe
ProgramPrinciples,
Principles,supra
TRUSTe Program
supra note 66.
71.
Business Week Poll,
Business
Poll, supra
supra note 23.
72.
TRUSTe's
TRUSTe's program only covers data
data collected
collected by a company's Web site from
users. TRUSTe Program
Program Principles,
Principles, supra
supra note 66. In
In the case of Intel, the
microprocessor
microprocessor serial number was a hardware
hardware issue, the Microsoft Global
Global Unique
Unique
Identifier
RealNetwork's phone home feature was also
Identifier was a software issue, and the RealNetwork's
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self-regulation and seal programs
Just as self-regulation
programs are flawed, the
promise
In a society
promise of technology
technology does not work by itself.
itself. In
society in
in
program a
which the typical citizen cannot figure out how to program
can we legitimately
legitimately expect the American
American public to
to
VCR, how can
understand
understand the privacy implications
implications of dynamic HTML, Web
bugs, cookies, and log files? The commercial
commercial models, however, are
predicated
predicated on "personalization" and "customization" using these
technologies.
technologies.
Technologies are not policy neutral.7373 Technical decisions
make
make privacy rules and, more often than not, these rules are
privacy
privacy invasive. For technology
technology to provide effective privacy
protection, three conditions must be met: (1) technology
technology
respecting
information practices must exist; (2) these
respecting fair information
technologies
implementation of
of
technologies must be deployed; and (3) the implementation
these technologies
default
technologies must have a privacy protecting
protecting default
configuration."74
configuration.
marketplace alone does not rise to meet these three
The marketplace
conditions.
conditions. One of the most celebrated technologies,
technologies, P3P, has
75
8
been on the drawing board since 1996.
1996.' Indeed, pressure from
European
requirements was instrumental
instrumental in moving the
European legal requirements
standard
substantive privacy provisions.
standard forward and in affecting substantive
provisions.
The standard, however, is still only a proposal. Even if
if the
standard
standard is finalized this year, P3P will be useless unless
incorporated
incorporated in Web browsers and widely adopted by Web sites.7676
if P3P is incorporated
incorporated in Web browsers
And, even if
browsers and widely
adopted
configurations may still be set
set
adopted by Web sites, the default configurations
a software
software tool. Hearing,
Hearing, supra
supra note 7,
7, at 52 (statement of Joel R. Reidenberg).
CYBERSPACE 34-35
73. See, e.g.,
e.g., LAWRENCE
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
34-35
(1999)
(1999) (noting that although "cookies" avoid the expense and inconvenience
inconvenience of passwords,
accompanied by the danger that a user's cookie
or
their use is accompanied
cookie file could be manipulated or
copied
copied to other systems, thus making them appropriate for use by sites, where little is at
at
stake, but dangerous
dangerous for granting access to databases securing sensitive information);
Formulation of Information
Information Policy
Policy Rules
Joel R. Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:
Informatica: The Formulation
through Technology, 76 TEx.
TEX. L. REV.
through
REv. 553, 571-72
571-72 (1998) (observing that the use of log
log
browsers use to record
files, which Internet
Internet browsers
record the user's Web traffic patterns,
patterns, can result in
"substantive inalienable
inalienable rules as aa result of architectural
architectural decisions" because the recording
recording
protocol establishes
establishes a default rule for collecting
collecting personal data that a user can not change
architectural standards
unless the architectural
standards allow reconfiguration).
74. See Hearing,
Hearing, supra
supra note 7, at 54 (statement of Joel R. Reidenberg).
Trade Comm'n: Public
Privacy on the Global
Global
75. See Fed.
Fed. Trade
Public Workshop on Consumer
Consumer Privacy
InformationInfrastructure,
Infrastructure,official transcript, at 79-90
Information
79-90 (June 4, 1996)
1996) (statement of Paul
Resnick, Technical Staff,
Staff, AT&T Infolab) (describing the then newly
newly developed
developed technology,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/
http'/www.ftc.gov/
PICS, the platform on which P3P would be built), available
bcp/privacy/wkshp96/pw960604.pdf.
bcp/privacy/wkshp96/pw960604.pdf.
Microsoft has announced
announced that it will incorporate
incorporate P3P in the next version of
76. Microsoft
Explorer. Glenn
Battle Over Web Privacy,
at
Elqllorer.
Glenn R. Simpson, The Battle
Privacy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at
B1. But, Microsoft
Microsoft will, at best, be using an incomplete
Bl.
incomplete version of P3P, i.e. a P3P-Lite,
because the final standard
standard has not yet been adopted.
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privacy-invasive implementation. Even if
if the default
as a privacy-invasive
configurations
are
set
to
afford
maximum
privacy
protection,
P3P
configurations
offers no means to assure that the practices of Web sites actually
conform to stated standards. To paraphrase Justice Potter
"I do not know it
it when I cannot see it.,,77
Stewart, "I
it.""
Average citizens are in no position to make judgments
judgments about
the impact of these technologies on their privacy. Despite
widespread press reports about "cookies" technology and the
widespread
routine deployment of this technology
technology by Web sites to track site
visitors, almost thirty percent of computer
computer users still do not know
about "cookies," and almost forty percent of computer users do
them."78
not know how to de-activate them.
In short, self-regulation
self-regulation and technology will not be adequate
adequate
to ensure the public's right to privacy. With rising public
expectations
and increasing technical
technical capabilities,
capabilities, the
expectations
commercial
environment
becomes
highly
unstable.
Seemingly
commercial environment
innocuous data processing
activity
for
an
e-commerce
participant
processing
e-commerce participant
may easily
easily become
become the next front page privacy
privacy scandal. The
e-commerce data-flows
data-flows in a legal void guarantees
complexity of e-commerce
continued public concern and conflict.
continued
II. THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGES
CHALLENGES
Where
Where online services
services suffer from a volatile environment
environment of
of
legal
uncertainty in the United States, the situation
legal uncertainty
situation in Europe is
quite different. The European
European Directive on data
data protection
protection takes
another approach. The implications of the European
European legal
United States
States are significant.
significant.
approach for e-commerce
e-commerce and the United
A. The EU Data
Data Protection
Protection Directive
Directive
The
The background
background and
and underlying
underlying philosophy
philosophy of the
European
Directive
differs
in
important
ways from that
European
differs
that of the
United States."
States. 79 While
While there is a consensus
consensus among
among democratic
democratic
states
states that
that information
information privacy
privacy is a critical element of civil
civil
society,
United States
States has, in
in recent
recent years,
years, left the
society, the United

77. See
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
77.
See Jacobellis
Jacobellis v.
197 (1964)
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
concurring)
(asserting, in Justice
Justice Stewart's
Stewart's famous words about
about pornography,
pornography, "I know
know it when II see
it").
it").
78. Exposure
78.
Exposure in Cyberspace, WALL
WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at
at BI
B1 (reporting
(reporting the results
of a Wall
Wall Street
Street Journal
Journal and Harris Interactive
Interactive online
online survey).
79.
79. See
See generally
generally Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
supra note
note 33 (noting that, while
while Europe
Europe has a strong
history
history of
of privacy
privacy legislation
legislation embodying
embodying first
first principles,
principles, the United
United States-despite
States-despite its
adoption
ofvarious
various privacy
privacy laws-has
laws-has historically
historically relied
relied primarily
primarily on
on self-restraint
self-restraint for the
adoption of
implementation
implementation of
of data
data privacy
privacy standards).

HeinOnline -- 38 Hous. L. Rev. 730 2001-2002

2001]
20011

E-COMMERCE
E-COMMERCE

731

protection
law."so In
protection of privacy to markets rather than law.
In contrast,
Europe treats
treats privacy as a political imperative
imperative anchored in
fundamental
democracies approach
approach
fundamental human rights.8s1 European
European democracies
information
privacy
from
the
perspective
of
information privacy
perspective
social protection.
In
In European
European democracies,
democracies, public liberty derives from the
fundamental basis to
community of individuals,
individuals, and law is the fundamental
pursue
pursue norms of social
social and citizen protection."
protection. 52 This vision of
of
governance
player
governance generally regards
regards the state as the necessary player
to frame the social
community in
social community
in which individuals develop
develop
and in which information practices must serve individual
in this view, effectively
identity. Citizen autonomy, in
effectively depends on
on
a backdrop
backdrop of legal rights. Law thus enshrines prophylactic
protection
protection through comprehensive
comprehensive rights and responsibilities.
responsibilities.
Indeed, citizens
government more than the private
sector
citizens trust government
private sector
information."83
with personal information.
In this context, European
democracies approach
European democracies
approach data
protection
1970s,
protection as an element of public law. Since the 1970s,
comprehensive data privacy
European countries
countries have enacted
enacted comprehensive
84
statutes.84
European approach, cross-sectoral
Under the European
cross-sectoral
guarantees a broad set of rights to ensure
fair
legislation guarantees
ensure the fair
treatment of personal
information
personal information and the protection of citizens.
In general, European
European data protection laws define each
each citizen's
self-determination."85 This
basic legal right to "information self-determination."s5
self-determination puts the citizen in
European premise of self-determination
control of the collection and use of personal
personal information. The
approach
approach imposes responsibilities
responsibilities on data processors
processors in
connection with the acquisition, storage, use, and disclosure of
connection
of
personal
personal information and, at the same time, accords citizens the
right to consent
consent to the processing
processing of their personal
personal information
information
and the right to access stored personal
personal data and have errors
corrected.8886 Rather than accord
accord pre-eminence
pre-eminence to business
interests, the European approach
approach seeks to strike a balance
balance and
provide for a high level
of
protection
for
citizens.
level
As data protection
protection laws proliferated
proliferated across Europe during
the 1980s, there were significant divergences among those laws,
and harmonization
harmonization became an important
important goal for Europe. 87 In
80. Id.
ld. at 1331.
ld. at 1347.
81. Id.
ld.
82. Id.
Id.
83. ld.
84. Id.
ld. at 1328.
85.
Id. at 1326.
ld.
Id. at 1326-27
1326-27 (listing Professor Colin Bennett's distillation of the First
First
86. ld.
Principles of information
information privacy).
87.
See JOEL R. REIDENERG
& PAUL
SCHWARTZ, DATA
LAW AND
REIDENERG &
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
DATA PROTECTION LAw
AND
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1995, following the Maastricht Treaty
Treaty of
of the
the European
European Union,
Union,
1995,
the European Union
Union adopted the
the European
European Directive8888 to
to
the existing
existing national laws
laws within
within the European
harmonize the
89
The European
European Directive sought to ensure that all
all
Union.89
The
Member
States
provided
satisfactory
privacy
protection,
and
to
Member States provided
protection,
to
ensure the free flow of personal
personal information across
Europe
90
protections.90
standardized protections.
basic, standardized
of basic,
respect of
through the respect
Under European Union law,
law, aa "directive" creates an
Under
obligation on each Member State to enact national legislation
legislation
implementing standards that conform to those defined in
in the
the
implementing
law
directive.9911 The European Directive requires that national law
protect all information about an identified or identifiable
protect
individual whether or not the data is publicly available.992" The
European Directive also requires an individual's consent prior to
European
personal information for purposes other than those
processing personal
contemplated by the original
European
contemplated
original data collection. 93 The European
Directive
allows
Member
States
to
further
restrict
the
processing
Directive
"
of defined "sensitive" data-such
data-such as health information. 94
The
European Directive restricts the collection
European
collection and use of personal
processing."95
purpose of processing.
information not relevant for the stated purpose
The processing of personal information
information must be transparent
transparent with
notice provided to individuals
individuals for the treatment of their personal
information.9966 Organizations
processing personal
information.
Organizations processing
personal information
information
must provide the data subjects
subjects with access
access to their personal
information
information and must correct
correct errors.9797 The European
European Directive
ONLINE SERVICES:
SERVICES: REGULATORY
REGULATORY RESPONSES
ONLINE
RESPONSES 125
125 (1998) (discussing divergences
divergences in
Member
law related
Member State
State law
related specifically
specifically to online services).
88.
95/46/EC, supra
88. Directive
Directive 95/461EC,
supra note 2.
89.
fair
89. Reidenberg,
Reidenberg, supra
supra note 3,
3, at 1329 ("Europe's goal is to harmonize
harmonize fair
information
level of
of protection.").
protection.").
information practices
practices at a high level
90.
the Market to the Polis:
90. See
See Spiros
Spiros Simitis,
Simitis, From
From the
Polis: The EU Directive
Directive on the
Protection
of Personal
Protection of
Personal Data,
Data, 80
80 IOWA
IOWA L. REV.
REv. 445, 446-52
446-52 (1995) (chronicling the
the
Commission's
Commission's desire
desire to
to establish
establish a regulatory
regulatory scheme
scheme that
that would harmonize the already
existing
existing national
national laws adopted
adopted by the Member
Member States).
91.
91. Treaty
Treaty Establishing
Establishing the
the European
European Community,
Community, art. 249, available
available at
http'//europa.eu.intleur-lexen/treaties/datec-consLtreaty
en.pdf
http://europa.eu.intleur-lexlenltreaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.
pdf (last visited
visited Sept. 14,
14,
2001).
92.
92. Directive
Directive 95/46/EC,
95/461EC, supra
supra note
note 2, at arts.
arts. 2(a),
2(a), 3, 4.
93.
Id. at arts.
arts. 7(a),
7(a), 14(b).
14(b).
93. Id.
94.
94. Id.
Id. at
at art.
art. 8.
8. For
For insightful
insightful discussions
discussions of the
the flaws
flaws in
in consent
consent as
as a model
model of
privacy
privacy protection,
protection, see
see the
the series
series of
of articles
articles written
written by
by Paul
Paul Schwartz:
Schwartz: Beyond
Beyond Lessig's
Lessig's
Code
Code for
for Internet
Internet Privacy:
Privacy: Cyberspace
Cyberspace Filters,
Filters, Privacy-Control,
Privacy· Control, and Fair
Fair Information
Information
Practices,
Practices, 2000
2000 WiS.
WIS. L.
L. REV.
REv. 743,
743, 783-85
783-85 (2000);
(2000); Internet
Internet Privacy
Privacy and the State,
State, 33
33 CONN.
CONN.
L.
L. REV.
REV. 815,
815, 821-23
821-23 (2000);
(2000); and
and Privacy
Privacy and Democracy
Democracy in Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 52
52 VAND.
VAND. L. REV.
1609,
1609, 1660
1660 (1999).
(1999).
95.
95. Directive
Directive 95/46/EC,
95/461EC, supra
supra note
note 2,
2, at
at art.
art. 6(1)(c).
6(1)(c).
96.
96. Id.
Id. at
at art.
art. 10.
10.
97.
97. Id.
Id. at
at art.
art. 12.
12.
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organizations maintain appropriate
further requires that organizations
security for the processing of personal information.
For global information
information networks and electronic
electronic commerce,
comprehensive approach
the comprehensive
approach inevitably
inevitably invokes some
some tension.
Without the statutory authority to restrict transborder
transborder data
flows, the balance
balance of citizens'
citizens' rights in Europe could easily be
compromised by the circumvention
circumvention of Europe for processing
compromised
processing
activities. Consequently,
Consequently, the European Directive includes two
European
information of European
provisions to ensure that personal information
origin will be governed
by
European
standards.
First,
a
choice
of
governed
European
choice of
European Directive assures
law clause in the European
assures that the standards
of the local state
state apply to activities within its jurisdiction."
jurisdiction.98
Second, a transborder
transborder data flow provision
provision prohibits the transfer
transfer
of personal information
information to countries
countries that do not have "adequate"
privacy protection.9999
In terms of enforcement, each Member State must maintain
maintain an
authority for oversight and
independent, national supervisory authority
0
enforcement of these privacy protections.
protections.'lOO
enforcement
Significantly, the
mandates that Member State law require
European Directive also mandates
any person processing
processing personal information to notify the national
of
supervisory authority, which is required
required to keep a public register of
lOl
data processors."'
processors.
The European Directive provided a transition
transition period, ending
ending
in October
October 1998, for Member
Member States to transpose these standards
into national law."
law.0lo22 However, as is not uncommon in the
European system, nine Member States failed to comply strictly
with the deadline.1lo3
"' By January 2000, the European
European Commission
Commission
began proceedings
proceedings before
against
before the European
European Court of Justice
Justice against
for
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands for
their delays in transposition.lo
transposition." 4 Although each of these countries
had strong, existing
existing data protection statutes, the European
Commission argued
argued that not all of the standards contained
contained in the
European
addressed in
in their
European Directive were satisfactorily
satisfactorily addressed
their
national
laws.
At
present,
proceedings
before
the
European
Court
national
proceedings
European Court
of Justice continue
continue against
against France, Germany, and Luxembourg.

art. 4.
98. Id. at art.
99.
Id. at art. 25.
100.
Id. art. 28(1).
Id.
100.
Id. at arts. 18-19.
101. Id.
Id. at art. 31(1).
102. Id.
Id.
103. Id.
104.
Data Protection:
Commission Takes Five
Five Member States to Court,
at
Data
Protection: Commission
Court, at
http//europa.eu.int/comminternal-market/en/media/dataprotnews/2k-10.htm
(Jan. 11,
http://europa.eu.inticommiinternal_marketlenimediaidataprotinews/2k-10.htm(Jan.11,
2000).
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Notwithstanding
the
delays,
Notwithstanding
transposition
the
harmonization
harmonization achieved by the European
European Directive is significant,
significant,
but does not remove
ambiguities in,
remove all divergences
divergences among, and ambiguities
l05
European
national
laws.'
By
and
large,
the
European
European national laws.
European Directive
creates a strong baseline of protection
protection across Europe. But small
divergences
divergences and ambiguities will inevitably
inevitably exist where the
principles
agencies
principles must be interpreted by different supervisory agencies
in each
of
the
Member
States.
These
remaining
divergences
each
Member
These
divergences in
standards
standards can pose significant obstacles for the complex
arrangements that are typical in
in
information processing
processing arrangements
electronic commerce. For example,
electronic
example, the European Directive
requires that privacy rights attach to information about any
"identifiable person.""
person.,,1066 Yet, the scope
scope of this definition
definition is not the
same across the Member
Member States; what some Member
Member States
States
consider "identifiable" others do not.01017 Similarly, the disclosures
disclosures
that must be made to individuals
individuals prior to data collection
collection may still
l08
0
8
vary within Europe. These differences can distort the ability
desirability of performing processing
and desirability
processing operations
operations in various
Member States because
because potentially
potentially conflicting requirements
might apply to cross-border processing
processing of personal
personal information.
The effect of this challenge to comprehensive
comprehensive standards is,
however, mitigated
mitigated by consensus
consensus building
building options and extra-legal
policy instruments
available within the European
instruments that are available
European
creates a ''Working
"Working Party"
system. The European Directive creates
Party" of the
Member
authorities."'l099 The Working
Working
Member States' national supervisory authorities.
Party offers a formal channel for data protection
protection officials
officials to
consult each other and to reach consensus
consensus on critical interpretive
interpretive
questions.
questions.
national laws has also been an issue in
Compliance with the national
Europe. The notice and registration
registration requirements, in particular,
particular,
appear
to
have
a
spotty
reception.
One
study
conducted
appear
conducted for the
European
European Commission
Commission questioned whether
whether data processors
processors were
adequately
adequately notifying their treatment of personal information to
0
the national supervisory authorities,
authorities,l1O
and a recent
recent study by
by
Consumers
International found that European Web sites were
Consumers International
not routinely informing Web users of their use of personal
REIDENBERG &
& SCHWARTZ,
SCHWARTZ, supra
105. For an analysis of these divergences, see REIDENBERG
supra note
88, at 125.
106.
Directive 95/46/EC,
art. 2(a).
95/46IEC, supra
supra note 2, at art.
107. See REIDENBERG &
& SCHWARTZ, supra
supra note 87, at 124-26.
124-26.
108.
108. Id.
Id. at 133-34.
109.
109. Directive 95/46/EC,
95/46IEC, supra
supra note 2,
2, at art. 29.
110.
Case-law on Compliance
Data Protection
110. Existing
Existing Case-law
Compliance with Data
Protection Laws and Principles
Principles in
Member States
European Union,
Union, Annex to the Annual Report 1998 of the
the Member
States of
of the European
Working
Working Party Established by Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC
95/46IEC (Douwe Korffed., 1998).
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information."'
information. 1ll Nonetheless, the existence
existence of national laws and
penalties
enforcement actions in these cases
penalties does allow for enforcement
cases of
of
non-compliance.
non-compliance.
Implicationsfor
United States
States
B. Implications
for the United
The European
significant pressure on U.S.
European Directive exerts significant
information
information rights, practices, and policies. The Directive
facilitates
facilitates a single
single information market place within Europe
through a harmonized
harmonized set of rules, but also forces scrutiny of U.S.
for
data privacy. In this context, the lack of legal protection for
privacy in the United States threatens the flow of personal
information
information from Europe to the United States. While business
business
practices
self-regulation may yield
practices may offer privacy, and self-regulation
protections
protections for personal
personal information, the sheer complexity and
confusion
confusion among such mechanisms
mechanisms becomes a handicap
handicap for data
flows to the United
United States. At the same time, the European
Directive
Directive is both having an important influence on privacy
protection
protection around the world and leaving Americans
Americans with legal
protections
marketplace."H2
protections as second class citizens in the global marketplace.
Despite
implementation
implementation
divergences,
the
overall
harmonization
harmonization effect of the European Directive creates a common
common
set of rules for the information market place in Europe.
Companies
Companies operating within the European Union have the
rather
benefit of common standards
standards across the Member States rather
than fifteen diverse sets of conflicting
conflicting national rules. This creates
creates
a large, level playing
playing field for the treatment of personal
personal
information
protection
information in Europe. With a high level of legal
legal protection
available
cross-sectoral basis, Europeans
available on a cross-sectoral
Europeans do not face the
same privacy obstacles for e-commerce
e-commerce that currently threaten
threaten
experience. The culture of legal protection
the American experience.
protection in
in
Europe provides European
European companies with a competitive
privacy
competitive
advantage-when
advantage-when doing business in Europe-over
Europe-over the many
American
American companies
companies that are unaccustomed
unaccustomed to applying fair
information practices
information
practices to personal
personal information.
The European Directive also requires
requires the national
supervisory authority in each of the Member States and the
European Commission to make comparisons
European
comparisons between
between European
European
INTERNATIONAL, Privacy@Net:An
Study
111.
CONSUMERS INTERNATIONAL,
Privacy@Net: An International
International Comparative
Comparative Study
of
ConsumerPrivacy
Internet 24 (Jan.
(Jan. 2001) ("Only a third (32.5%)
of Consumer
Privacy on the Internet
(32.5%) of the sites that
that
collected personal
personal information
information and had a privacy policy bothered
bothered to alert
alert the visitor
visitor to the
privacy policy at the point
point where that information was collected.").
collected.").
112.
Countries from Asia to Latin America have followed the European
self-regulatory philosophy
comprehensive legal approach
approach more closely
closely than the American self-regulatory
including Australia, Argentina, Canada, Hungary,
120
Hungary, and New
New Zealand. Refer to note 120
infra and accompanying
accompanying text.
infra
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data protection principles and foreign standards of fair
113 The European
practice."'
European Directive further requires
information practice.
that foreign standards of fair information practice be "adequate"
in order to permit transfers of personal information to the foreign
14
destination.'114
destination.
For the United States, this means that both the national
Commission must
supervisory authorities and the European Commission
assess the level of protection
offered
in
the
United
States to data
protection
of European
European origin. Because the United States lacks directly
comparable, comprehensive
comprehensive data protection legislation, the
"adequacy" is necessarily
complex.' lIS The European
assessment of "adequacy"
necessarily complex.
Commission and the national
supervisory
national supervisory authorities recognize
that the context of information processing must be considered to
"adequacy." 6
make any determination
determination of "adequacy.,,116
Under the European Directive, the national data protection
protection
supervisory
authorities
supervisory authorities and the European
European Commission must
must
report to each other the non-European countries that do not
not
bifurcated assessment
of
provide adequate
adequate protection."'
protection. l17 This bifurcated
assessment of
foreign standards means that intra-European
intra-European politics can play
playaa
significant role in the evaluation of U.S. data practices. While
significant
While a
Member
European level decision is supposed to apply in each Member
supervisory authorities are independent
State, the national supervisory
independent
over
agencies and will still have a degree
degree of interpretive
interpretive power
power over
any individual
case.
individual
American
The end
end result for the United
United States, and for American
companies, is that U.S. corporate
information practices
companies,
corporate information
practices are under
under
scrutiny in Europe
and
under
threat
of
disruption
when
Europe
threat
disruption when fair
fair
information
standards are not applied to protect
protect
information processing
processing standards
European
commentators have predicted that any
European data. Some commentators
European
European export
export prohibition
prohibition might
might spark a trade war
war that
Europe
could
lose
before
the
new
World
Trade
Organization
Europe could
before
World Trade Organization
113.
Directive
95/46/EC, supra
supranote
113.
Directive 95/461EC,
note 2, art. 25.
114. Id.
Id.
115.
See
115.
See First
First Orientations
Orientations on Transfers
Transfers of Personal
Personal Data
Data to
to Third CountriesCountriesPossible
Possible Ways
Ways Forward
Forward in
in Assessing
Assessing Adequacy:
Adequacy: Discussion
Discussion Document
Document of
of the Working
Working
Party
Party on
on the
the Protection
Protection of
of Individuals
Individuals with
with Regard
Regard to the
the Processing
Processing of Personal
Personal Data, DG
DG
XV
criteria that
XV COM(97)
COM(97) D
D 5020
5020 final, at para.
para. 22 (June
(June 26, 1997)
1997) (suggesting
(suggesting several
several criteria
that
should
should be
be met
met to meet the minimum
minimum standard
standard of
of "adequacy"
"adequacy" and noting
noting the difficulties
difficulties in
in
applying
States and
applying standards
standards to
to the
the United
United States
and other
other countries
countries without data protection
protection
legislation), available
legislation),
available at
at http:/europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/media/dataprot/
http://europa.eu.intlcommlinternal_marketlenlmedialdataprotl
wpdocshvp4en.htm;
wpdocs/wp4en.htm; Preparation
Preparation of a Methodology
Methodology for Evaluating
Evaluating the
the Adequacy
Adequacy of the
the
Level of Protection
Protection of Individuals
Individuals with Regard
Regard to
to the
the Processing
Processing of Personal
Personal Data, Annex
Annex
to
to the
the Annual
Annual Report
Report 1998
1998 of
of the Working
Working Party
Party Established
Established Under
Under Article 29 of
of the
Directive
DG
COM(98)
Directive 95/46/EC,
95/461EC,
DG XV
COM(98) D
D 5047,
5047, available
available at
at http'/!
http://
www.droit.fumdp.ac.b/crid/privacy/Tbdf/Chapitrelpdf.
www.droit.fundp.ac.bC!cridiprivacylTbdf/Chapitrel. pdf.
116.
116. Id.
Id.
117.
117. Directive
Directive 95/46/EC,
95/461EC, supra
supra note
note 2,
2, at art.
art. 25(3).
25(3).
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(WTO).118's While
While such
such a situation
situation is possible
possible in
in theory, an adverse
adverse
(WTO)."
WTO
ruling
is
unlikely.1l9
WTO ruling unlikely."'
Even with
with the
the difficulties
difficulties of the
the European
European approach,
Even
countries elsewhere
elsewhere are looking
looking at
at the European
European Directive
Directive as the
countries
basic
model
for
information
significant
legislative
legislative
significant
and
privacy,
information
basic model
movements toward
toward European-style
European-style data
data protection
protection exist in
in
movements
Canada, South
South America,
America, and Eastern
Eastern Europe. 212o' This movement
movement
of
can be attributed
attributed partly to pressure
pressure from Europe
Europe and
and scrutiny
scrutiny of
can
foreign privacy
privacy rights. But the movement
movement is also
also due,
due, in part, to
to
foreign
conceptual appeal
appeal of
of a comprehensive
comprehensive set
set of data
data protection
protection
the conceptual
standards in an increasingly
increasingly interconnected
interconnected environment
environment of
of
standards
offline and online
online data. In effect, Europe,
Europe, through
through the European
European
offline
displaced the role that
Directive, has displaced
that the United
United States
States held
held
Directive,
121
in setting
since the famous Warren
Warren and Brandeis
Brandeis article
article121
setting the
global privacy
privacy agenda.
global
European Directive's
Directive's imposition
imposition of both
With the European
for
the fair treatment
requirements
harmonized
European
legal
requirements
treatment
legal
European
harmonized
of personal
information and limitations on transborder
transborder data flows
flows
personal information
companies recognize
recognize that they will have
outside of Europe, U.S. companies
respect European
European legal mandates.121222 Unless American
American
to respect
European
companies
business in Europe choose to flout European
companies doing business
privacy
stringent
must
provide
businesses
e-commerce
law, U.S.
U.S. e-commerce
must provide
privacy

supra note 1, at 188-96.
118. See, e.g.,
e.g., SWIRE &
LITAN, supra
& LrTAN,
of
Protection:The Impact of
Globalization and Social Protection:
119. See, e.g., Gregory
Gregory Shaffer, Globalization
Standards,25 YALE J.
in the Ratcheting
Ratcheting Up
of U.S.
Privacy Standards,
J.
U.S. Privacy
Up of
EU and
and International
InternationalRules in
the
lNT'L
very unlikely to rule for the
(explaining that the WTO would be very
1, 49-51 (2000) (el>."plaining
INT'L L. 1,

United States
States in an action
action for the following reasons:
reasons: (1) the EU Directive is facially
applicable
equally to all countries and companies;
companies; (2) the EU has a legitimate policy
policy
applicable equally
prudential concerns).
objective; and (3)
(3) prudential
and Ratifications
120. See, e.g.,
e.g., Council
Chart of
ofSignatories
Signatories and
Ratifications ETS 108 (listing
Europe, Chart
Council of Europe,
http://conventions.coe.int/ Treaty/EN
countries that have ratified the treaty on data privacy), at http://conventions.coe.intiTreatyIEN
INTERNATIONAL EVOLUTION
CANADA, THE INTERNATIONAL
EvOLUTION OF DATA
Gast
INDUSTRY CANADA,
(last visited July 10, 2000); INDUSTRY
(justifying the Canadian
PROTECTION (justiiYing
Canadian proposal for a comprehensive
comprehensive privacy law by reference
reference to
to
(last modified Dec.
http'//e-com.ic.gc.ca/englislbfastfacts/43dlO.htm Gast
the European initiative), at http://e-com.ic.gc.ca/englishlfastfactsl43dl0.htm
PERSONAL DATA, HONG KONG,
PRIVACY COMl\USSIONER
COM IISSIONER FOR PERSONAL
OFFICE OF THE PRIvACY
10, 2000); OmCE
PERSONAL DATA (PRIvACY)
(PRIVACY) ORDINANCE, ch. 486 (showing that the Hong Kong statute follows
httpAvwwv.pco.org.hk/english/ordinanceordfull.html;
European comprehensive model), http://www.pco.org.hklenglishiordinancelordfull.htmI;
COMMISSIONER FOR
FIRSr THREE
THREE YEARS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY
REPUBLIC, THE FIRST
HUNGARIAN REpUBLIC,
PARLIAMENTARY COMl\USSIONER
of
DATA PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 68-72 (1998) (discussing the influence
influence of
the European Directive for Hungarian data protection law); Pablo Palazzi, Data
Data Protection
Protection
legislation
emergence of data protection legislation
Countries (detailing the emergence
Latin American
American Countries
Materials
Materials in Latin
in Latin America),
http://www.ulpiano.comJDataProtection-LA-links.htm (last
Gast modified Nov.
at httplAvwwv.ulpiano.com/DataProtection-LA-links.htm
America), at
12, 2000).
12,2000).
HARV. L. REV.
121. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
Privacy, 4 HARv.
193 (1890).
at 72-73 ("The timing of the multiple [privacy
supra note 119, at
122. See Shaffer, supra
with the EU Directives coming in
conjunction with
U.S. companies)
companies] in conjunction
protection] efforts [by U.S.
protection)
1998 is no coincidence.").
coincidence.").
force in October 1998
force
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European origin
origin when
when processing
processing that
that data
data
protections to data of European
protections
Europe or in
in the United
United States.
States.
in Europe
Concurrently, American
American law
law and practice
practice allows
allows those same
Concurrently,
companies to provide
provide far less protection,
protection, ifif any, to data
data about
about
companies
American citizens.
citizens. This is
is a particularly
particularly troubling
troubling aspect
aspect of
of U.S.
American
opposition to the European
European Directive's
Directive's standards.
standards. American
American
opposition
companies will
will either
either provide
provide Europeans
Europeans with
with better
better protection
protection
companies
than they provide
provide to Americans,
Americans, or they will treat
treat Americans
Americans in
in
than
accordance with
with the higher
higher foreign
foreign standards
standards and disadvantage
disadvantage
accordance
local U.S. companies.
companies.
those citizens doing business with local
In effect, the proliferation
proliferation of
of European-style
European-style data
data protection
protection
measures around the world increasingly
increasingly means
means that American
American
measures
citizens will be left with second
second class
class privacy
privacy in the United
United States
States
citizens
greater privacy
privacy protection
protection against
against American
American
while being afforded greater
companies
companies outside
outside U.S. borders.
III. UNSAFE HARBORS
HARBORS
In response
response to the risk that Europe would
would block
block data flows to
to
the United States
States and to great
great pressure from online industries,
the U.S. Department
Department of Commerce
Commerce entered
entered into negotiations
negotiations with
the European
European Commission
Commission to create
create a "safe harbor" agreement
agreement
that would assure Europe of the adequacy
adequacy of protection
protection for data
data
123
businesses.'23
processed by U.S. businesses.
In the absence
absence of statutory
processed
protection in the United States, the concept
concept was that the
conduct
European
Commission would
would endorse a voluntary
voluntary code of conduct
European Commission
124
that would meet the "adequacy"
businesses
standard."' American businesses
"adequacy" standard.
could then publicly commit to adhere to this code for the
of
treatment of European
European origin data and be assured of
uninterrupted data flows from Europe.
uninterrupted
The lengthy and troubled negotiations on the code
code began in
in
1998 between the U.S. Department
Department of Commerce and the
European Commission."
Commission. l25 Toward
Toward the end of the negotiations,
of
some of the particularly difficult
difficult issues were: (1)
(1) the existence
existence of
a public
public commitment for companies adhering to the code; (2) the
States."1266 A final
access rights; and (3) enforcement
enforcement in the United States.
123. See Letter from David L. Aaron, U.S.
u.s. Dep't of Commerce, to Industry
Industry
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ ecom/aaronl14.html.
Representatives (Nov. 4, 1998), at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecomlaaron114.html.
Id.
124. ld.
Id.
125. ld.
Secretary for Int'l Trade
126. See Letter from Robert S. LaRussa, Acting Under Secretary
Commerce, to John Mogg, Director, DG Internal Market, European
Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
European
of
[hereinafter LaRussa Letter]
Commission, (July 21, 2000) [hereinafter
Letter] (addressing final concerns
concerns of
"safe harbor" and offering
with negotiations
negotiations over a voluntary "safe
the European Commission ,vith
choose to adhere to the
establishing a public list of companies that choose
compromise by establishing
foreign
principles, agreeing that future U.S. data privacy legislation should apply to foreign
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documents-including an exchange of letters, the Safe
set of documents-including
Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles, Frequently
Frequently Asked Questions setting
out interpretative understandings of the principles, and various
Commission
annexes and representations made to the European Commission
by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade
Commission (collectively the "Safe Harbor")-was
Harbor")-was released
released in
127
July 2000
20002' and approved
European Commission.
Commission.'128
approved by the European
While the approval was an important short-term
short-term political
political
victory for both the United States and the European Commission,
the Safe Harbor agreement is unworkable
unworkable for both sides and will
not alleviate the issues of weak American
American privacy protection.
Indeed, choice of law issues may make Safe Harbor irrelevant
irrelevant for
for
many e-commerce
e-commerce activities.
"Safe Harbor"
Harbor"
A. The Adoption of the "Safe
1. The Political
Dimension. For the European
the
Political Dimension.
European side, the
United States posed a major problem. American
not
American law did not
provide comparable
comparable protections
protections to European
European standards, and fair
spotty. 29'
rather spotty.129
information practices
practices in the United States were rather
Yet, European
European regulators
regulators did not want to cause a disruption in
3 ' The prospect
international data flows. 13o
prospect of change
change in U.S. law
European Commission would have
seemed remote, and the European
enforcement action
action
serious political difficulty insisting on an enforcement
processing in the United States
against data processing
States prior
prior to the full
implementation
European Directive
implementation of the European
Directive within the European
European
Union. Similarly, while transposition
transposition remained
remained incomplete,
incomplete, an
an
aggressive enforcement
aggressive
enforcement strategy by a national supervisory
supervisory
hampered the national
authority could
could have hampered
national legislative
legislative debates
on transposition.
Safe
Harbor
offered
a
mechanism
transposition. Safe Harbor offered
mechanism to delay
facing tough decisions about international
international privacy and, in the
meantime, hopefully
hopefully advance
advance U.S. privacy protections
protections for
for
European
European data.
On
On the U.S. side, the Department
Department of Commerce
Commerce faced strong
pressure
pressure from the
the American
American business
business community
community to block
block the
transfers,
transfers, and
and assuring
assuring the
the Commission
Commission that
that the
the agreement
agreement would
would do nothing
nothing to change
change
jurisdiction), at
at http:www.export.gov/safeharbor/USLETTERFINALI.htm.
http://www.export.gov/safeharborIUSLETTERFINAL1.htm.
Safe Harbor
Harbor Principles
Principles and
and Transmission
Transmission to
to European
European Commission,
Commission,
127. Issuance
Issuance of Safe
65
Commerce, July 24, 2000) [hereinafter
65 Fed.
Fed. Reg. 45,665,
45,665, 45,665-686
45,665-686 (Dep't Commerce,
[hereinafter Safe
Harbor].
Harbor).
128.
Commission
Commission Decision,
Decision, 2000/520/EC,
2000/520IEC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.
129. Refer
Refer to Part
Part II supra.
supra.
130.
130. See
See Shaffer,
Shaffer, supra
supra note
note 119,
119, at
at 44-45
44-45 (noting
(noting the reluctance
reluctance of
of EU
EU officials
officials to
to
enforce
enforce the Directive's
Directive's provisions
provisions during
during negotiations
negotiations with
\vith the U.S. due to
to pressures
pressures from
from
European
European businesses
businesses and
and the
the fact
fact that
that the
the majority
majority of the
the EU countries
countries had
had not met the
deadline
deadline for
for passing
passing data
data privacy
privacy legislation).
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3 ' The
European
European Directive. I31
United States was not prepared
prepared to
respond to the Directive with new privacy rights and wanted to
I32 Safe Harbor
transborder data flows.132
prevent interruptions
interruptions in transborder
Harbor
became a mechanism
mechanism to avoid
avoid a showdown judgment on the
status of American
American law and defer action against any American
American
companies.
companies.
As such, the acceptance
acceptance in July 2000 of Safe
Safe Harbor
Harbor by the
European Union was a transitory political
European
political success. At the
agencies have
national level in Europe, however, data protection agencies
expressed substantial opposition to Safe Harbor, and they will
expressed
still have
considerable
latitude in dealing with the United
considerable latitude
133
I33
States.

2. The Dubious
Dubious Legality of Safe Harbor.
Harbor. In the United
United
States, however, Safe Harbor
Harbor faces a serious
serious jurisdictional
jurisdictional
enforcement-one of the key European criteria
criteria for
for
obstacle to its enforcement-one
acceptance. The U.S. Department
Department of Commerce
Commerce issued
issued Safe
Harbor documents
documents "to foster, promote, and develop international
commerce.,,134
agreement is predicated
commerce." 134 The agreement
predicated on the enforcement
enforcement
powers
powers of the Federal
Federal Trade Commission under section 5 of the
135
Indeed, as part of the
the
Federal Trade
Trade Commission Act. 135
negotiations,
the
negotiations, the Federal
Federal Trade
Trade Commission represented
represented to the
European
European Commission that it
it would
would "give priority
priority to referrals
referrals of
of
non-compliance
member
non-compliance with safe harbor principles
principles from EU member
states.,,136
underlying legal authority of the FTC to
states.""' 6 Yet, the underlying
enforce Safe Harbor is questionable.
As originally enacted
enacted by the Federal Trade Commission
Act
Commission Act
in 1914, section 5 applied only to unfair methods
of
methods of
competition."137' Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over "unfair or deceptive acts or
or
competition.
practices" was extended
Wheeler-Lea Act of
extended to the FTC by the Wheeler-Lea
of
131.
Id. at 70-72.
131. Id.
132.
132. See id. at 22-39 (explaining the historic and cultural preference
preference for selfregulation
regulation over
over legislation
legislation to ensure
ensure data privacy in the United
United States and
and noting
noting the
enormous
enormous market
market pressure exerted
exerted by a threat to impede
impede data European
European data flow).
See, e.g., On the Level of Protection
133.
Harbor
Protection Provided
Provided by the "Safe Harbor
Principles":
Individuals With
Principles": Opinion
Opinion of the Working Party
Party on the Protection of Individuals
With
Regard
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, DG XV CA07 COM (00)434 final,
[hereinafter Opinion of the Working
Safe
[hereinafter
Working Party]
Party] (objecting to the ambiguity
ambiguity of Safe
Harbor, questioning the propriety
to
propriety of relying on the limited jurisdiction
jurisdiction of the FTC to
enforce
exceptions enumerated
enumerated by Safe Harbor
enforce the principles, and noting exceptions
Harbor beyond the
scope
http://europa.eu.int/comm/
allowed by the European
European Directive), http://europa.eu.intlcomm/
internal-market/enmedia/dataprot/wpdocs/wp32en.htm.
internal_market/enlmedialdataprotlwpdocs/wp32en.htm.
134.
LaRussa
supranote
LaRussa Letter, supra
note 126.
126.
135.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994).
136.
Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed.
Comm'n, to John Mogg, Director, DG
136. Letter
Letter from Robert PitofSky,
Fed. Trade Comm'll,
XV, European
European Conm'n
Comm'n (July 14, 2000), http./Avww.exportgov/safeharbor/FTCLETIERFNAL.htm.
http://www.export.gov/safeharborlFTCLETI'ERFINALhtm.
137.
Fed. Trade Comm'n
Comm'n Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719,
719, 719 (1938).
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1938."138 The stated Congressional
Congressional purpose was to enable the FTC
1938.
to "restrain unfair and deceptive acts and practices which deceive
139 Indeed, contrary to the
and defraud
generally.,,139
defraud the public generally."
purpose of Safe Harbor
Harbor protecting
protecting U.S. business
business interests
interests in
international
international trade, the Wheeler-Lea
Wheeler-Lea Act amendments
amendments sought to
to
protect the general public
public from unscrupulous
unscrupulous business
business practices.
In fact, at the time of the enactment
enactment of section
section 5, the FTC's
jurisdiction
expressly
excluded
mention
jurisdiction
excluded foreign commerce, not to mention
the protection
Safe
protection of foreign consumers
consumers as envisioned by Safe
"'
Harbor. 140
141
1952141
of 1952
Act of
Price Maintenance
While the McGuire
McGuire Resale
Resale Price
Maintenance Act
jurisdiction into foreign commerce
commerce with respect to
expanded FTC jurisdiction
Supreme Court had specifically
monopolistic pricing, the U.S. Supreme
held that only Congressional
Congressional amendments
amendments could
could expand
expand the
142 In FTC
5.142
scope of the FTC's authority
authority under section 5.
FTC v. Bunte
Bunte
Brothers,
the
Commission
unsuccessfully
sought
an
expansion
of
Commission unsuccessfully
expansion of
Brothers,
its interstate
interstate commerce
antitrust
commerce authority in the context
context of antitrust
enforcement.' 143 Congress eventually responded
enforcement.
responded with the
Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal
Trade
Commission
Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal
Trade
Commission
144
Improvement
Act
of
1975'4
that
was,
according
to
the Senate
Improvement
1975
Conference Report, designed "to improve its [the FTC's]
Conference
45
amendments
The 1975 amendments
consumer protection
protection activities."
activities."145
extended
jurisdiction to acts and practices
extended the jurisdiction
practices "in or affecting
commerce," but at no time contemplated
contemplated protecting
protecting American
American
146
4
6
business
business interests
interests or foreign consumers.'
consumers.
Hence, the assertion
Commerce
assertion by the U.S. Department of Commerce
and the FTC that Safe Harbor comes within the section 5
jurisdiction
departure from the stated
jurisdiction is a radical departure
stated legislative
purposes
purposes of the statute and in direct opposition
opposition to the Supreme
restrictive interpretation
Court's restrictive
interpretation of section 5 authority.
Within Europe, the legality
legality of Safe Harbor is also open to
question. Under the European Directive, "adequacy"
"adequacy" must be
138. Fed. Trade
Trade Comm'n
Comm'n Act Amendments
Amendments (Wheeler-Lea
(Wheeler-Lea Act) of 1938, 49, sec. 3,
§5(a),
111 (1938).
§5(a), 52 Stat. III
REP. CONF. No. 221-1077
139. S. REp.
221-1077 (1937).
140. 15
15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
Maintenance Act)
141. Fed. Trade Comm'n Act Amendments
Amendments (McGuire Resale Price Maintenance
of
1952, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631, 632 (1952).
ofl952,
142. FTC v. Bunte Bros.,
Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 352-55
352-55 (1941) (holding that section 5 of the
Federal
Federal Trade Commission
Commission Act did not give the FTC the authority to reach local
commerce that affected interstate commerce
commerce without
authority).
commerce
without clear congressional authority).
143. Id.
ld. at 353-55.
353-55.
144.
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Improvement Act of
of
Magnuson-Moss
1975, Pub. L. 93-637, § 201, 88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975).
S.CONF. REP. No. 93-1408, at 1 (1974).
145. S.
146. Pub. L. 93-637 § 201, 88 Stat. at 2193.
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light of the prevailing "rules of law, both general and
assessed in Hght
sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the
professional
security measures
professional rules and security
measures which are complied
complied
with in that country."147
country."147 However, Safe Harbor
Harbor was not yet in
existence at the time of the approval
approval by the European
Commission. The European
European Parliament
Parliament specifically
specifically noted this
problem
problem shortly before
before the approval
approval by the European
European
Commission."148 Similarly, according to the European
Commission.
European Directive,
the European
authority to enter into
European Commission
Commission only has authority
negotiations
after
remedy the absence of "adequate" protection after
negotiations to remedy
a formal finding that the non-European
non-European country
country fails to provide
"adequate" protection.
protection.' 149 Yet,
Yet, in
in the context of Safe Harbor
Harbor
"adequate"
negotiations, the European
European Commission
Commission never made a formal
5 ' These
finding. 150
These would appear to be significant
significant administrative
law defects. Although the European
European Commission maintains that
that
the European
European Parliament did not say that the Commission
Commission acted
outside its powers, and the Member
Member States voted unanimously
unanimously in
the political
political committee to accept Safe Harbor,
Harbor/551' this
administrative
administrative process problem
problem remains
remains an open question
question that
that
only the European Court of Justice can resolve and gives the
independent national
supervisory authorities
independent
national supervisory
authorities grounds to vitiate
Safe Harbor
Harbor through strict interpretations
interpretations of the European
European
Commission's
ruling.
Commission's
In addition, the European Parliament pointed out:
exchange of letters between the
[T]he risk that the exchange
Commission
Department of Commerce on the
Commission and the US Department
implementation of the 'safe harbour'
principles could be
implementation
harbour' principles
be
interpreted by the European
European and/or United States judicial
judicial
interpreted
substance of an international
international
authorities as having the substance
agreement adopted in breach of Article
Article 300 of the Treaty
agreement
establishing the European
European Community and the requirement
requirement
establishing
of
to seek Parliament's
Parliament's assent (Judgment of the Court of
Justice of 9 August 1994: French Republic v. the
Commission-Agreement between the Commission
Commission and the
Commission-Agreement
competition
United States regarding the application of their competition
laws (Case C-327/91)).152
C_327/91)).152
147.
art. 25(2).
147. Directive
Directive 95/46/EC,
95/461EC, supra
supra note 2, at art.
148.
EuR.
EUR. PARL. Doc.
Doc. (R5 305)
305) 2 (2000).
149.
Directive
95/461EC, supra
supra note 2, at art. 25(5).
Directive 95/46/EC,
150.
supra
95/461EC, supra
150. The
The procedure
procedure for a formal finding is established in Directive 95/46/EC,
note 2, at art. 25(4).
151.
Bolkestein Tells Parliament
Commission, Frits
Frits Bolkestein
Parliament
151. See Press Release, European Commission,
Committee He Intends To Formally Approve
Approve "Safe Harbor" Arrangement
Arrangement With United
United
States
http'//europa.eu.int/comm/internaLmarkett
States On Data Protection (July 13, 2000), at http://europa.eu.int/commlinternaCmarket/
en/media/
en/media! dataprotlnews/harbor5.htm.
dataprot/newslharbor5.htm.
152. EUR. PARL. Doc. (R5 305) 3 (2000).
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The Limited
LimitedApplicability
Applicability and
and Increased
Increased Risks
Risks
B. The

Notwithstanding its
its validity
validity in
in either
either legal
legal system,
system, the scope
scope
Notwithstanding
of Safe
Safe Harbor
Harbor provision
provision is very
very narrow.
narrow. First, Safe
Safe Harbor
Harbor by
by its
its
of
terms can
can only
only apply
apply to
to activities
activities and
and U.S.
U.S. organizations
organizations that
that fall
fall
terms
within the
the regulatory
regulatory jurisdiction
jurisdiction of the
the FTC
FTC and
and the
the U.S.
U.S.
within
I53
3 As
companies
many
result,
Department
of
Transportation.
AB
many
companies
a
Department of Transportation."
and sectors
sectors will
will be
be ineligible
ineligible for
for Safe
Safe Harbor,
Harbor, including
including
and
particularly the
the banking, telecommunications,
telecommunications, and
and employment
employment
particularly
sectors that
that are
are expressly
expressly excluded
excluded from
from the
the FTC's
FTC's jurisdiction."'
jurisdiction. I54
sectors
Second, Safe
Safe Harbor
Harbor will not apply
apply to most
most organizations
organizations
collecting data
data directly
directly in Europe.
Europe. Article
Article 4 of the European
European
collecting
Directive provides
provides that, if
if a data
data controller
controller is located
located outside
outside of
of
Directive
the European
European Union
Union but
but uses equipment
equipment within
within the
the European
European
the
Union, the
the law
law of the place
place where
where the equipment
equipment is located will
will
Union,
I55
rule
law
This
provision
establishes
a
choice
be
applicable.
of
choice
provision establishes
be applicable."'
greatly reduces
reduces the availability
availability of
of Safe
Safe Harbor
Harbor to
to
that greatly
international business. This provision of the Directive
Directive is
is
international
especially significant
Web-based businesses
businesses
significant in the context of Web-based
especially
because interactive
interactive computing means
means that a European
European user will
always make
make use of computing
computing resources
resources at the user's location.
always
The courts
courts of Member
Member States, such as France, have shown in
other areas
areas a clear willingness
willingness to apply
apply the substantive
of
substantive law of
other
located."I56 Hence,
where an Internet user
user is located.
Hence, many cases,
the place where
particularly in the context
context of e-commerce,
e-commerce, apply the
and particularly
substantive law of a Member State rather than Safe Harbor. The
substantive
national data protection authorities
authorities have also endorsed this
I57
Directive.'57
interpretation
European Directive.
interpretation of the European
Safe Harbor also raises the risks for data
By implication, Safe
subscribe to the code. The
transfers by companies
companies that do not subscribe
European Commission of Safe Harbor as an
approval
approval by the European
accompanying text.
supra and accompanying
153. Refer to notes 127-28 supra
127, at 45, 675-78
supra note 127,
154. 15
see also
also Safe Harbor, supra
45(a)(2) (1994); see
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)
(el>."Plaining
these areas).
(explaining limitations on FTC jurisdiction in these
of this
fact, the
the translation of
art. 4. In fact,
155. See Directive 95/46IEC,
supra note 2, at art.
951461EC, supra
the term
term
of jurisdiction in some countries where the
provision creates aa more liberal rule of
"means," rather
rather than
than "equipment,"
"equipment," is
is used.
used. See
See REIDENBERG
REIDENBERG &
& SCHWARTZ, supra
supranote 88,
"means,"
at 127-28.
127-28.
Joel R.
en ref
r~fdrd
Ord. en
de Paris,
Paris, Ord.
c. Yahoo!,
Yahoo!, TGI de
UEJF c.
ere du 22 Nov. 2000; Joel
156. See,
See, e.g., UEJF
Communic
de l'Internet, Communic
internationale de
democratization internationale
et la democratization
L'affaire Yahoo
Yahoo et
Reidenberg, L'affaire
12 (May
(May 2001).
chron. 12
6lectronique, chron.
Juris Classeur. Commerce electronique,
Online Data
Approach to Online
Integrated EU Approach
157. Privacy on the Internet-An Integrated
Processing
with Regard to the Processing
the Protection of Individuals ,vith
Protection: Working Party on the
the
(00)5063 final at 28 (noting the application of the
XV COM (00)5063
of Personal Data, DG
DG XV
of
in the
the context
context of
Directive in
of the Directive
substantive law of
under Article 44 of
of aa Member State under
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarketlen/
State), http://europa.eu.intlcommlinternal_marketlenl
in aa Member
Member State),
drives in
cookies on hard drives
media/dataprotvpdocswp37en.pdf.
media/dataprotlwpdocslwp37en.
pdf.
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"adequate" basis to transfer
transfer personal
personal information to the United
United
States implicitly
implicitly acknowledges
transfers outside the scope
scope of
acknowledges that transfers
of
Safe Harbor
Harbor will not be adequately
adequately protected. Consequently, nonSafe Harbor transfers must be covered
covered by one of the other
other
exceptions
transborder data flow rules, such as a transfer
transfer
exceptions to the transborder
pursuant to a contractual
contractual arrangement.5ISS8
Ironically, Safe Harbor simplifies the task for national
supervisory authorities to block
supervisory
block data
data flows to the United States.
The national agencies will readily be able to identify those U.S.
not
companies that do not subscribe
companies
subscribe to Safe Harbor and have
have not
presented a data protection
protection contract for approval under the
European Directive's
Directive's Article 26 exceptions. In such cases, the
presumption must be that the protection
protection is "inadequate" and the
prohibited.'51s99
data-flow must, under European law, be prohibited.
Thus, for the United States Safe Harbor approach might
might
compromise many U.S. businesses
compromise
businesses in a way that a legislative
e-commerce, this risk is devastating.
solution would not. For e-commerce,
Standardsand
and Illusory
C. Weakening of European
c.
European Standards
Illusory
Enforcement Mechanisms
Mechanisms

For the national supervisory authorities in Europe, Safe
6 ' In particular,
European standards. 160
Harbor poses a weakening
weakening of European
of
the permissible derogations
derogations from Safe Harbor
Harbor without a loss of
coverage are significant. Safe Harbor
coverage
Harbor exempts public record
"161'
information despite its ordinary
ordinary protection
protection under European law.16
Similarly, Safe Harbor exempts any processing pursuant to
"conflicting obligations"
or "explicit
"explicit authorizations"
authorizations" in U.S. law,
"conflicting
obligations" or
whether
whether or not such processing would be permissible under
6'
Harbor
European standards.162
The access standard
standard set out in Safe Harbor
163
6'
also includes derogations
derogations that do not exist in European law.'
law.
Most importantly, however, Safe Harbor
Harbor weakens European
standards
standards for redress of data privacy violations. Under the
158.
158. Directive 95/461EC, supra
supra note 2, at art. 26. The European
European Commission
Commission has
issued
http'J/europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket
issued a model contract
contract for this purpose. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internaCmarket/
en/media/dataprotnews/clauses.htm (last visited July 14, 2001).
enlmedia/dataprot/news/clauses.htm
159. See Directive 95/46/EC,
95/461EC, supra
supra note 2, at art. 25.
160. Opinion of the Working Party, supra
supra note 134
134 (noting the watering down of the
Harbor due to exceptions
exceptions for obligations under U.S. law,
Directive's standards under Safe Harbor
of
recommending close monitoring of
publicly available data, and other such loopholes, and recommending
exception usage).
for
161. Compare
Compare Safe Harbor, supra
supra note 127, at FAQ 8(7)-(8) (defining exemptions
exemptions for
95/46/EC, supra
publicly available data), with Directive
Directive 95/461EC,
supra note 2, at art. 2(a) (containing
(containing no
exemption for such
such data).
162.
667.
162. See Safe Harbor, supra
supra note 127, at 45,
45,667.
generally id.
id.
163. See generally
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European
recourse
European Directive, victims must be able to seek legal
legal recourse
and have a damage remedy."
remedy.l64 The U.S. Department of Commerce
Commerce
assured the European Commission that Safe Harbor and the U.S.
European victims
legal system provided remedies for individual European
16s
1
65
of Safe Harbor
Harbor violations. The European
European Commission expressly
relied on representations
Department of
representations made
made by the U.S. Department
of
66
Commerce concerning available damages
damages in American law. 166
The
memorandum
Department of Commerce
memorandum presented by the U.S. Department
Commerce to
to
the European
Commission,
however,
made
misleading
European
misleading
67 For
statements
law.'167
memorandum
statements of U.S. law.
example, the memorandum
provides a lengthy discussion of the privacy torts and indicates
16s
available.'68
memorandum failed to
that the torts would
would be available.
The memorandum
to
note that the applicability
processing
applicability of these tort actions
actions to data processing
and information
information privacy
privacy has never been established by U.S.
courts and is, at present, purely theoretical. Indeed, the
memorandum
misappropriation of a name or
memorandum cites the tort for misappropriation
or
likeness as a viable damage remedy, but all three of the state
courts
courts that have addressed this tort in the context of data privacy
69
have rejected it.'
it. 169
Safe Harbor is also predicated
predicated on dispute
70 Yet,
organizations such as TRUSTe.1
TRUSTe. 170
resolution through seal organizations
only one seal organization,
organization, the ESRB, proposes any direct
direct
remedy to the victim of a breach
breach of a privacy
privacy policy, and other
other
organizations'
"Who's Who" of
organizations' membership lists look like a ''Who's
of
7'
privacy scandal-plagued
scandal-plagued companies.
companies. l7l
Lastly, the enforcement
the
enforcement provisions
provisions of Safe Harbor
Harbor rely on the
172
72 Even if the FTC has jurisdiction
FTC.1
to
enforce
Safe
Harbor,
FTC.
if
jurisdiction
enforce
the assertion that the FTC will give priority
priority to European
European
enforcement
enforcement actions is hard to believe. First, although the FTC
M

164. Directive 95/46/EC,
95/46IEC, supra
supra note 2, at arts. 22-23.
.
COMMERCE, DAMAGES
165. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
DAMAGES FOR BREACHES OF PRIVACY, LEGAL
AUTHORIZATIONS AND
AND MERGERS
AND TAKEOVERS
AUTHORIZATIONS
MERGERS AND
TAKEOVERS IN U.S. LAW (July 14, 2000)
[hereinafter BREACHES
PRIVACY], available
available at http://www.ita.gov/tdlecom/
http://www.ita.gov/td/ecom/
[hereinafter
BREACHES OF PRIVACY],
PRIVACYDAMAGESFINAL.htm.
PRIVACYDAMAGESFINAL.htm.
00/520/EC, art. 1(b), 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 8 (listing the
166. Commission Decision 00/520IEC,
memorandum as one of four documents
memorandum
documents the European Commission considered
considered in
determining Safe Harbor's
determining
Harbor's adequacy).
supranote 165.
PRIVACY, supra
167. BREACHES OF PRIVACY,
168. Id.
Id.
169. See Dwyer v. Am. Express
Express Co.,
Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill.
(TIl. App. Ct. 1995) (rejecting
claim of breach
breach of privacy
privacy against credit
credit card company
company for renting information
information of
of
1975)
cardholder's spending habits); Shibley
Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975)
& World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami,
(discussing magazine subscription lists); U.S. News &
1065557 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996) (stating the proposition that
that
No. 95-1318, 1996 WL 1065557
names do not have property value in the context of magazine
magazine subscription
subscription lists).
170.
Safe Harbor, supra
supranote 127, at 45,665-685.
45,665-685.
supra.
171. Refer to Part I.C. supra.
172. Safe Harbor, supra
supra note 127, at 45,668.
45,668.
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has become active in privacy issues recently, the agency's record
Reporting Act, one of the country's
of enforcing the Fair Credit Reporting
most important
important fair information practices
practices statutes, is less than
aggressive. Second, were the FTC to devote its limited
limited resources
Europeans' privacy, Americans should and
to the protection of Europeans'
agency-charged with
would be offended
offended that a U.S. government
government agency-charged
with
energies
consumers-chose to commit its energies
protecting American
American consumers-chose
and U.S. taxpayer money to the protection of European
European privacy
in the United States against
against U.S. businesses at a higher
higher level
than the FTC asserts for the protection of Americans'
Americans' privacy.
companies even these
Sadly, though, for many American companies
weakened
weakened European
European standards impose substantially
substantially greater
greater
obligations than U.S. law. In particular, the notice, choice,
choice,
requirements are only sporadically found
access, and correction
correction requirements
in U.S. law. As a result, pitifully few American
American companies have
fewer
subscribed to Safe Harbor;
Harbor; indeed, as of June 21, 2001, fewer
73
than fifty-five companies
companies had signed up.'
up.173
The upshot of these sui generis standards, the
unenthusiastic
unenthusiastic reception
reception by American
American companies, and
enforcement weaknesses is a likelihood that the national
enforcement
supervisory agencies will be dissatisfied with Safe Harbor and
the Member
Member States will face great political pressure to suspend
Safe
Safe Harbor
Harbor once transposition is completed. Thus, for ecommerce,
commerce, the utility of Safe Harbor is rather dubious.
SOLUTION
IV. AN INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL TREATY
TREATY SOLUTION

With the trans-Atlantic divide
divide on privacy so deeply
entrenched,
entrenched, the United States is on the path to rapidly becoming
the world's leading privacy rogue nation. Just a cursory
scandals over the last year
examination
examination of the data scandals
year and
our
concerns for e-commerce
consumer
consumer privacy concerns
e-commerce suggest that our
national policy of self-regulation
self-regulation will not work to assure public
confidence
information,
confidence and trust in the treatment of personal information,
cannot work to guarantee
guarantee citizens their political right to freedom
of association and privacy, and will leave
leave American businesses
businesses at
a competitive disadvantage in the global information market
market
place. At a time when Internet growth
growth rates are greater outside
the United States, and non-U.S. Web
Web content
content is becoming an
74 United States
Internet
content,
absolute majority of available
available
content,174
173.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
COMIERCE, SAFE HARBOR LIST (reflecting only fifty-five
u.s.
fifty-five
http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/
subscribing company
company certifications), at http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/
subscribing
webPages/safe+harbor+list (last visited July 13, 2001).
webPages/safe+harbor+list
Comes from Outside the
the
Worldwide Comes
Percent of All Web Traffic Worldwide
174. See, e.g., 55 Percent
(Jan. 23, 2001).
http://statmarket.comlSM?c=stat012301 (Jan.
United
United States, STAT MARKET, http://statmarket.com/SM?c=statO12301

HeinOnline -- 38 Hous. L. Rev. 746 2001-2002

2001]

E-COMMERCE

747

interests
interests are ill-served by avoiding the creation
creation of clear legal
privacy
privacy rights.
set
desperately needs to establish a basic set
The United States desperately
must
of legal protections for privacy. Any such regulation must
essential to ensure privacy
recognize that technologies will be essential
recognize
protections
protections across divergent
divergent sets of rules in the global
environment. In fact, technical decisions are not policy neutral.
environment.
not
Technical
Technical decisions make privacy rules, and more often than not
For
in the United States, these rules are privacy invasive. For
technology
technology to provide effective privacy protection, three
conditions must be met: (1)
(1) technology respecting fair
conditions
information practices must exist; (2) these technologies
technologies must be
information
technologies must
must
implementation of these technologies
deployed; and (3) the implementation
privacy protecting default
default configuration.
configuration. Legal
Legal rights in
in
have a privacy
that
the United States should provide an incentive structure that
encourages these
encourages
these developments.
developments.
technological protections
protections in the
But new legal rights and technological
United States will not be sufficient
sufficient to resolve the trans-Atlantic
long-term basis. Any legal rights created
created in
privacy
privacy conflicts on a long-term
in
the United States will be defined in terms of the U.S. governance
system-including the American delineations among state,
system-including
citizen, and market power. As a result, such rights will always
have
have a degree of variance
variance with foreign laws that are set within
within
e-commerce, even
their own governance
governance systems. For global e-commerce,
even
75 When
small differences
differences can have dramatic consequences.1175
When
differences
entrenched in national
national values
values for the governance
differences are entrenched
international law will be able to resolve the
of a society, only international
structural conflicts. Treaties are the inevitable legal instruments
that enable
enable nation-state policies to develop in harmony.
establishment of a legal baseline
conjunction with the establishment
In conjunction
baseline in
in
the United States, the United
United States should promote
promote the
Privacy"
negotiation
negotiation of a "General Agreement
Agreement on Information
Information Privacy"
76 This
Trade
Organization
framework.'
(GAIP) within the World
World
Organization framework. 176
treaty
organization's mission covers e-commerce
treaty organization's
e-commerce and can be used
transborder
to facilitate
facilitate the protection of citizens within the trans
border data
flows. Whether or not desired by various
various interest
interest groups and
confronting
countries, the WTO will be unable to avoid confronting
international
international privacy issues as a result of the biennial
biennial ministerial
ministerial
of
inevitable trade-in-services
conferences and the inevitable
conferences
trade-in-services agenda. Many of

the
175.
REIDENBERG &
175. See, e.g.,
e.g., REIDENBERG
& SCHWARTZ,
SCHWARTZ, supra
supra note 87, at 143-44 (discussing the
distorting
distorting effects for online services of small divergences
divergences in national data protection
protection law
within Europe).
supra note 3,
3, 1359-62
1359-62 (advocating an international
176. See Reidenberg, supra
international treaty on
data privacy
privacy in the WTO framework instead of an international
international directorate).
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the core differences among
among nations on the implementation
implementation of
of
privacy
privacy principles
principles touch upon fundamental
fundamental governance
governance and
177
sovereignty questions.177
These types of problems
sovereignty
problems will only be
be
resolved at an international
international treaty level like the WTO.
At this level, the WTO can define core
core standards for data
data
protection. The WTO parties
had
a
first
experience
with
this
parties
experience
standards-based approach to international
international trade law when
standards-based
when
intellectual property was added to the multilateral
intellectual
multilateral trade accord
178
as a result of the Uruguay
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.
The
negotiations. 178
intellectual
intellectual property
property agreement
agreement sets out the substantive
standards
each
standards for the protection of intellectual
intellectual property each
7
Once
signatory must incorporate
incorporate in its domestic law. 179
Once
implemented, each signatory
signatory must abide
abide by strict trade rules
that recognize the protections
protections afforded by the other signatories.8ISO
Similarly, the WTO
WTO could strive to establish
establish a set of basic data
standards-the GAIP-and incorporate them into the
protection standards-the
multilateral trade agreement. The incorporation of GAIP into the
WTO
recognition
WTO and national law would
would then provide for mutual recognition
of signatories'
signatories' data privacy
rules.
This
approach
would
privacy
would have a
higher likelihood
successfully facilitating e-commerce
likelihood of successfully
e-commerce than any
uniquely national
national or bilateral approach.

v.

V.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

E-commerce poses tremendous challenges
challenges to the fair
E-commerce
fair
treatment
treatment of personal information
information in the United States, in
Europe, and around the world. At present, the trans-Atlantic
relationship
relationship for privacy
privacy is on a collision course. For all the
problems
problems found in U.S. data privacy, Europe cannot lay claim to
to
the only possible system of protection for personal information,
and the export restrictions
restrictions found in European
European law will
necessitate the ban of transborder
transborder data flows for a variety
necessitate
variety of ecommerce
commerce activities. The attempt
attempt to create an ad hoc "safe
"safe
transatlantic data flows, while laudable,
harbor" for transatlantic
laudable, falls far
far
short of its goal. The legality of such an approach is dubious, the
political commitment faces obstacles, and the commercial
environment
companies
environment will be inhospitable
inhospitable for those American
American companies
who might offer better
better protection to foreign-origin
foreign-origin data
data than to

177. Id.
[d.
generally Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
of
178. See generally
Multilateral Trade
Agreement Establishing
Organization
Multilateral
Trade Negotiations:
Negotiations: Agreement
Establishing the World Trade
Trade Organization
(1994) (including the TRIPs
TRIPs annex on intellectual property.)
179. Id.
[d. at 358-59.
358-59.
180. Id.
[d. at 359-60.
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American-origin data. A new international
international data privacy treaty
American-origin
e-commerce.
will be essential for the long-term, robust growth of e-commerce.
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On November
November 20, 2000, the Tribunal
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris re-issued
re-issued
a preliminary injunction'
injunction' ordering Yahoo, an American
American company, to take all
possible
France of web pages
possible measures to dissuade and prevent the access in France
objects or that present any
stored on Yahoo's US-based server that auction Nazi objects
Nazi sympathy or Holocaust denial. Many commentators
commentators saw the November
November 20
20
order
order as a threat to freedom of expression on the Internet, a misguided attempt to
impose national regulations
regulations on the Internet, or as an exercise in futility considering the global nature ofthe
of the Internet.22 Within weeks, Yahoo asked a United States
unenforceable.'3 The sharp
federal district court to declare
declare the French judgment
judgment unenforceable.
criticism
criticism of the French decision, however, is misplaced. The ruling will promote
the respect of democratic values on the Internet and the respect of those values in
the development ofInternet
of Internet technologies.
technologies. For many, this assertion
assertion will be heresy.
"Internet
separatists" believe that the Net is a separate jurisdiction that transcends
"Internet separatists"
national
national borders
borders and the control of nation-states.44 They reject the complex
relationship
relationship between
between the network and physical territory.
territory.s5 They favor allowing
allowing
Internet
of
Internet actors to determine their own rules, and they reject the capability of
democratic
democratic states to regulate
regulate behavior on the Internet. The Separatist philosophy
philosophy
derives
American value placed
of
derives largely from the American
placed on the unfettered
unfettered flow of
information,
information, a value
value that is embedded
embedded in the present architecture of the Internet
Internet
indeterminacy of Internet transmissions.
through the geographic indeterminacy
The Yahoo decision, however, represents
represents an affirmation of non-U.S.
democratic
democratic values and comes at a critical developmental
developmental jjuncture
uncture for the Internet.

oforiginal
I. Tribunal de Grande Instance [T.G.I.] [trial court of
or iginaI jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000,
Ordonnance
Rdfdre, UEJF, LICRA
Ordonnance de Refere,
L1CRA v. Yahoo!, Inc., available
available at http://www.juriscom.net/
http://www.juriscom.netl
txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.htm.
txtljurisfr/ctiltgiparis2000
1120.htm. This decision confirmed
confirmed the earlier ruling of May 22, 2000,
ordering Yahoo to block access to the material deemed illegal to display in France under Article R.
645-1 of the Code
ptnal, the French criminal code. See T.G.!.
T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000, available
Code penal,
available at
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm. An
example of the
the auction
auction page may
http://www.juriscom.netltxtljurisfr/ctiltgiparis20000522.htm.
An example
may
be found at http://www.legalis.netljnetlillustrationlyahoo_auctions.htm
http://www.legalis.net/jnet/illustration/yahoo-auctions.htm (last visited May 1,2002).
1, 2002).
and'Technology have
2. Various civil liberties groups including the Center for Democracy
Democracy andtTechnology
criticized the
the French
French decision,
decision, as
as have French
See, e.g.,
e.g., THE CENTER
CENTER FOR
criticized
French commentators. See,
DEMOCRACY
AND TECHNOLOGY,
TECHNOLOGY, A Briefingon Public
Civil Liberties
Online,
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Affecting Civil
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C.D.T. POLICY POST No. 6.20, Nov. 21,
21, 2000, http://www.cdt.orglpublications/pp_6.20.shtml;
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L'INFORMATIQUE
Valerie
Commentaire de LL'Affaire
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RtSEAUXNO. 130
130 (Nov.
(Nov. 2000),
availableathttp://www.juriscom.net/chr/2/fr20001024.htm;
2000), available
at http://www.juriscom.netlchr/2/fr20001024.htm;
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Boiteuse, DROIT
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Probleme Complexe Solution
DROIT
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Net, LE
MONDE, Feb.
11-12, 2001, at
at 2.
2.
LE MONDE,
Feb. 11-\2,2001,
3.
3. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre
Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme,
L' Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181
(N.D. Cal. 2001).
2001).
4. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
and Borders-The
Borders-TheRise of
ojLaw in Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 48
48
STAN. L. REV.
(1996).
REv. 1367 (1996).
5.
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Yahoo and
and Democracy
Democracy on the
the Internet
Internet
6
The
The French
French democracy
democracy has chosen
chosen rules
rules for free expression
expression in its
its criminal
criminal code
code6
that are
are consistent
consistent with international
international human rights
rights but that
that do not
not mirror
mirror the
the U.S.
constitutional
constitutional protections
protections found in
in the
the First
First Amendment.
Amendment. The Internet
Internet gives
gives
neither policy
policy a greater
greater claim
claim to legitimacy
legitimacy than the other. Yet, Yahoo reflects
neither
reflects aa
shifting economic
economic and political
political power
power struggle
struggle on the
the Internet
Internet that
that suggests
suggests that
that
shifting
the American
American position is becoming
becoming a minority
minority view. Before
Before 2000, the United
United
Internet content
States had an absolute majority "market
"market share"
share" of
ofInternet
content and
and use.
use. During
During
States
however, non-U.S. Internet use grew
grew dramatically. At mid-year, only a
2000, however,
slight majority
use was
was in English.77 By the
the end
end of 2000, 55%
55% of
ofweb
web traffic
majority of web use
originated outside
outside the United States.'
States. 8 In France
France alone,
alone, by August 2001,
2001, the
the
originated
Internet
number of web users who
who were at least
least eleven years old
old and
and used
used the
the Internet
number
several
several times a month
month rose to 14.3 million.'
million. 9
The
The normative
normative impact
impact of Yahoo is
is that Internet
Internet actors will have
have to recognize
recognize
values across national
national borders. The decision
decision begins
begins to
to force the
varying public values
technical
technical elites to respect democratically
democratically chosen
chosen values
values and the rule
rule of law. The
architecture
architecture that makes
makes geographic
geographic filtering difficult is not immutable.
immutable. Ironically,
localization and identificaeconomic
have been promoting
promoting technologies
technologies of
oflocalization
identificaeconomic actors have
management and
tion for commercial
commercial gain, such as intellectual
intellectual property
property rights
rights management
and
enforcement and the development of marketing
enforcement
marketing profiles.'
profiles. lo Even the Internet
Internet
Society, one of the technical groups
groups defining communications
communications standards for the
Internet, has been trying for several years
years to promote
promote a new
new transmission
transmission protocol,
IPv6, that would uniquely
uniquely identify the location of every device connected
connected to the
ordinary case that the French
Internet."
Internet. 11 Yahoo can
can thus be seen as both an ordinary
French court
recognized in
judged according
according to basic jurisdictional
jurisdictional principles
principles that are also recognized
American law, and as an extraordinary case that creates
creates a principle
principle of internaAmerican
non-commercial values
democracy and the respect
tional democracy
respect of non-commercial
values for the technological
technological
infrastructure
infrastructure of
of the Internet.
Part I of this Article
Article will, thus, examine
examine the decision as the routine enforcement of French law within French territory. Part II will then show how the French
democratization of the Internet.
decision promotes democratization

PINAL [C. PEN.] art. R-645-2.
6. See CODE PENAL
Langues Utilisees
Utilisges Sur le
Internautes: Les Langues
7. Les Internautes:
Ie Net, LE JOURNAL
JOURNAL DU NET, at http://www.
2002).
journaldunet.comlcc/ccinter_mde3.shtml
joumaldunet.comlcclcc_inter_mde3.shtml (last
(last visited Mar. 8,
8,2002).
the United
United
from Outside
Outside of the
Comes from
Worldwide Comes
Percentof All Web Traffic Worldwide
8. StatMarket, 55 Percent
available at
at http://www.statmarket.comlcgi-binlsm.cgi?sm&eature&stat
http://www.statmarket.con/cgi-bin/sm.cgi?sm&eature&stat
States (Jan. 23, 2001), available
States
012301.
012301.
D 'internautes,France,
9. Chiffres-Cles,lnternautes:
France, LE JOURNAL DU NET, Dec. 3,
Chiffres-Clds, Internautes:Nombre D'internautes,
at hUp://www.joumaldunet.comlcc/OI_intemautesiinter_nbrJr.shtml
http://www.joumaldunet.com/cc/01_internautes/inter-nbr fr.shtml (last visited Mar. 8,
2001, at
2001,
2002).
2001, at CI0
10. Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce,
E-Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001,
CIO (discussing the business
trend toward website user location identification).
(IPv6)Specification
Version 6 (IPv6)
Hinden, InternetProtocol,
& Robert M. Hinden,lnternet
11. Stephen
Stephen E. Deering &
II.
Protocol, Version
Specification
available at
at http://www.ietf.orglrfclrfc2460.txt?number=2460.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2460.txt?number-2460.
(Dec. 1998), available
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I. THE ENFORCEMENT
ENFORCEMENT OF FRENCH LAW
WITHIN FRENCH TERRITORY
geographically dispersed
While the Internet enables actors
actors to reach a geographically
dispersed
audience, the Internet does not change
change the accountability of those actors for their
conduct within national borders. Similarly, the Internet does not vitiate the
responsibility and the power
responsibility
power of states to police activities within their territories.
Aside from a few Internet separatists, no one could seriously challenge that France
has jurisdiction
jurisdiction to prescribe rules for activities within French
French territory. Yahoo,
places where it did business
business on the
however, thought it was above the law in places
Internet because it operated from U.S.-based servers. The co-founder
co-founder of Yahoo,
"We are not
Jerry Yang, summed up the company's view during a press interview: "We
going to change
change the content of our sites in the United States just because someone
in France
to."122
France is asking us to."'
On the surface, the Yahoo case is a mundane exercise
exercise in the analysis of
of
sovereignty and personal jurisdiction. The American
territorial sovereignty
American company sought
to have a worldwide presence
presence and maintained extensive
extensive contacts
contacts and business
relationships in France.
France. The web pages at issue, though based in the United States,
were expressly
expressly designed to reach a global audience. In this context, one could
hardly imagine a national court refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction and
refusing to apply the local law against a company
company seeking to conduct business
business in
its territory. The order for Yahoo to cease making Nazi material
material available in
France was inevitable. Furthermore,
Furthermore, France is not alone in taking this position.
American courts have themselves exercised personal
American
personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction over foreign
companies
companies violated state rules from distant safe havens. 133
companies when those companies

A. An Inevitable Result
Result
As a sovereign democratic nation, France has outlawed
outlawed the wearing
wearing or public
display of any uniform, insignia, or emblem of any organization
organization or person
person
responsible for crimes against humanity.'
humanity. 144 The French Penal Code classifies this
offense as a serious crime against
against the people, the state, and public safety. While
this prohibition would not be legal in the United States under the U.S. ConstituEuropean democracies
tion, European
democracies had ample justification
justification following World War II to
take a different view on the balance
balance among human rights and the scope of the
expression. Indeed, the French rule is more consistent with internafreedom of expression.
Net, USA
19, 2000,
12.
12. Janet Kornblum & Leslie Miller, The News Behind the Net,
USA TODAY, June 19,2000,
availableat http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/jk061900.htm.
available
http://www.usatoday.comllifeicyber/techljk061900.htm.
See infra notes 45-64 and accompanying
13. See
accompanying text.
spectacle
puni...
sauf pour les besoins d'un film, d'un spectacle
PEN. art. R-645-1 ("Est puni
... le
Ie fait, saufpour
14. C. PtN.
un
ou d'une exposition
exposition comportant
comportant une evocation
evocation historique, de porter ou d'exhiber en public un
uniforme, un insigne ou un embleme
emblme rappelant
rappelant les uniformes,
uniformes, les insignes
ins ignes ou les emblemes qui ont
ont
d~clarde criminelle en application de
dtd
portds ou exhibds
organisation declaree
ete portes
exhibes soit par les membres d'une organisation
Al'accord
I'accord de
de Londres
Londres du 8 aoflt
1945,
l'article
du statut
statut du tribunal militaire international
international annexe
annexd a
l'article 99 du
aoilt 1945,
franqaise ou internationale
internationale d'un ou
soit par une personne reconnue
reconnue coupable par une juridiction
juridiction franf,:aise
ou mentionnes
mentionnds par
par la
laloin'
crimes contre
contre I'humanitd
par les articles 211-1 A
plusieurs crimes
I'humanite prdvus
prevus par
a 212-3 ou
loi n°
d~cembre 1964.").
64-1326 du 26 decembre
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Internet
tional human rights norms than the U.S. doctrine. International
International human rights
or
instruments and many national laws prohibit the advocacy
advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred. IS5
.
Although
Although Yahoo may choose to allow the sale of Nazi objects in the United
States, France
France protects its citizens through an "effects"
"effects" doctrine for territorial
jurisdiction. French criminal law applies to any crime
crime or felony committed outside
French
French territory by a foreign person when the victim is a French national at the
infraction.'166 This doctrine is limited, however, by the restriction
time of the infraction.
restriction that
French courts
courts will only be competent
competent to try cases when an infraction or any
7
element
element of an infraction is committed
committed on French territory. 17
Yahoo's
activities
Yahoo's activities forced the French court to protect
protect French sovereignty by
prescribing rules of conduct within French territory. The company willingly
memorabilia with an active presence
promoted Nazi memorabilia
presence in France. Although Yahoo
claimed
...subscribed to the repugnant ideas of Nazism or neoclaimed that it "never ...
Nazism...
of revisionism,"' 8 the facts suggest otherwise. The rules
... or any form ofrevisionism,"IB
Nazism
of the Yahoo auction service provided
specifically that "[t]here
provided specifically
"[t]here are some things
include...
... any item
item
that you may not list or sell under any circumstances. These include
that is illegal to sell under any applicable law, statute, ordinance, or regulation[,]

Covenant on Civil
Civil and
andPolitical
15. See International
International Covenant
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR,
A/6316 (1966)
1976) ("Any advocacy
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. Al6316
(1966) (entered into force Mar. 23,
23,1976)
of national, racial or religious hatred
hatred that constitutes
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
hostility or
violence shall
Cyberspace Self-Governance:
Self-Governance: A
shall be prohibited by law."); Neil Weinstock
Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace
Skeptical View
Viewfrom
LiberalDemocratic
Theory, 88 CAL. L. REv.
from Liberal
Democratic Theory,
REv. 395,
395, 489-96 (2000) (discussing
(discussing
a hypothetical
Germany ofa
of a neo-Nazi Texas web site); Kathleen
Hate Speech:
hypothetical ban by
by Germany
Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate
Affirmation or Contradiction
Contradictionof Freedom
Freedom of Expression,
REV. 789, 803 (1996)
(1996)
Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv.
(noting countries
countries that outlaw hate speech).
PtN. art. 113-7
pdnale franr,;aise
frangaise est applicable aAtout crime, ainsi qu'A
ddlit
16. C. PEN.
113-7 ("La loi penale
qu'a tout delit
puni d'emprisonnement,
d'emprisonnement, commis par un Franr,;ais
Frangais ou par un etranger
6tranger hors du territoire de la
la
Rdpublique lorsque
'infraction. "); [THE FRENCH
Republique
lorsque lavictime
la victime est de nationalitt
nationalite frangaise
franr,;aise au moment de Il'infraction.");
As AMENDED
AMENDED AS OF JANUARY
JANUARY I,
1, 199934
1999 34 (Edward A. Tomlinson trans.,
PENAL CODE OF 1994
1994 AS
Rothman Publ. 1999)] ("French criminal
criminal law is applicable
applicable to any felony, as well as to any
misdemeanor punishable
punishable by imprisonment, committed
committed by a French national or by a foreigner outside
the territory
Republic when the victim
victim is of French nationality
nationality at the time of the offense.").
territory of the Republic
113-2 ("La loi pdnale
le
17. C. PtN.
PEN. art. 113-2
penale frangaise
franr,;aise est applicable aux infractions
infractions commises
commises sur Ie
territoire
L'infraction
rtputde commise sur le
laRdpublique
territoire de la
la Rdpublique.
Republique. L'
infraction est reputee
Ie territoire de la
Republique dbs
des lors
qu'un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire."); [THE
[THE FRENCH
FRENCH PENAL CODE OF 1994 AS
AS
AMENDED AS
1, 1999
33 (Edward
1999)] ("French
AMENDED
AS OFJANUARY
OF JANUARY I,
199933
(Edward A. Tomlinson
Tomlinson trans.,
trans., Rothman Publ. 1999)]
applicable to offenses committed
committed within the territory
territory of the Republic. An offense is
criminal law is applicable
deemed committed within the territory of the Republic whenever
of its constituent elements has
whenever one ofits
taken place
place within that territory.").
territory.").
18. T.G.I. Paris, Conclusions
3.1
Conclusions de la D4fense,
Defense, Audience
Audience de Rdfdr6
Refere du 15 mai 2000, Partie 3.1
("entend prtciser
preciser qu'elle n'ajamais...
n'ajamais ... souscrit aux iddes
idees ignobles que propagent
propagent le
Ie nazisme ou le
Ie
ndonazisme sous toutes leurs formes, ainsi qu'aux theses des revisionnistes ....
...."),
"),
available
neonazisme
available at
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/citi/tgiparis20000522-cc-def.pdf.
http://www.juriscom.netltxtljurisfr/citi/tgiparis20000522-cc-def.pdf.
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•
..[l]ive
...
[l]ive animals[,]...
animals[,] ... [and]
[and] [u]sed
[u]sed underwear."1
underwear."199 Yahoo's
Yahoo's "Terms
"Terms of
of Service"
Service"
stipulate that
that aa user
user may not "transmit
"transmit or
or otherwise
otherwise make
make available
available any
any Content
Content
stipulate
0
that is
is unlawful
unlawful,....
... hateful,
hateful, or
or racially, ethnically
ethnically or
or otherwise
otherwise objectionable.""
objectionable."20
that
violate
or
unintentionally
not
"intentionally
that
members
Yahoo
Yahoo further
further requires that members
"intentionally or unintentionally violate
any applicable
applicable ...
... international
intemationallaw."21
Nevertheless, Yahoo
Yahoo refused
refused to
to remove
remove
law."'" Nevertheless,
any
Nazi memorabilia
memorabilia and
and
Nazi materials.
materials. Yahoo
Yahoo decided
decided to
to allow
allow the sale
sale of Nazi
its Nazi
service rules regarding
affirmatively
affirmatively chose
chose to ignore the various
various service
regarding illegal sales
sales and
and
offensive content. Yahoo
Yahoo clearly
clearly found commercial
commercial benefit
benefit in promoting
promoting the
offensive
traffic of Nazi
Nazi memorabilia
memorabilia since
since the
the company
company had no difficulty
difficulty banning
banning the sale
sale
traffic
of
of pet
pet hamsters
hamsters and used underwear
underwear and was quite
quite willing to suppress
suppress legal
legal
gambling advertisements
advertisements when
when the National
National Football
Football League
League complained
complained and
gambling
22 Yahoo even
threatened to sever
sever a business relationship
relationship with Yahoo.
Yahoo.22
even had no
no
threatened
23
compunction over the
the voluntary
voluntary censorship
censorship of adult
adult content
content and
and pornography.
pomography.23
compunction
Yahoo
Yahoo argued
argued that its actions were
were committed
committed in the United
United States and
and
therefore beyond French
French territorial
territorial jurisdiction. 24 Yahoo asserted that
that the physical
therefore
servers in the
the United
United States rather
rather than
than the
the transmission
transmission and display
display in
situs of its servers
situs
France
France of Nazi material determined the "localization"
"localization" of Yahoo's
Yahoo's activity. The
Internet does
does not, however, displace the well-established
well-established principle
principle in international
Internet
exercise prescriptive
law that allows
allows states
states to exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction
jurisdiction for conduct
conduct having
having
intentional transmission by
territory.25 The intentional
effects occurring
occurring within
within the national
national territory.25
effects
Yahoo of communications
United States to France
France brings the
Yahoo
communications from servers in the United
conduct within the prescriptive
prescriptive jurisdiction
jurisdiction of France, and the French
French court
court noted
noted
conduct
France was a violation
violation of the French
"visualization" of Nazi objects in France
that the "visualization"
26 the display
law;26
France and satisfies the
display on a computer screen takes place in France
law;
requirement of having an element of
of the infraction
infraction occur
occur within France.
France.
requirement
When Yahoo manifestly refused
refused to comply
comply with the original
original injunction of the
French court,27
court,27 the company expected
expected the American
American First Amendment
Amendment to apply
apply to
its global activities. Under U.S. law, there is no doubt that Yahoo
Yahoo had a legal right

(last visited Dec.
19. See Yahoo! Auctions, at http://auctions.yahoo.com/html/guidelines.html
http://auctions.yahoo.comlhtml/guidelines.html(last
7,2000).
website has since changed and so have the guidelines. See Yahoo! Auctions,
Auctions,
7, 2000). The Yahoo website
at http://users.auctions.shopping.yahoo.comlhtml/guidelines.html(last
http://users.auctions.shopping.yahoo.com/html/guidelines.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2002).
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms (last visited Mar. 7,
20. Yahoo! Terms
Tenns of Service § 6(a), at http://docs.yahoo.comlinfo/tenns
2002).
21.Id.§ 6(k).
21.Id.
Ads, USA TODAY,
-Drops Net Gambling Ads,
22. See Yahoo!
Yahoo! -Drops
TODAY, Dec. 14,
14, 2000, available at
at
http://www.usatoday.com/1ife/cyber/tech/cti914.htm.
http://www.usatoday.comllifelcyber/techlcti914.htm.
Advertisers,NEWSBYTES,
X-Rated Advertisers,
Porn,Swears Off X-Rated
Yahoo Sheds Porn,
23. See Steven Bonisteel, Yahoo
WL 2817635.
Apr. 13, 2001, at 2001 WL2817635.
Apr.13,2001,at2001
http://www.juriscom.net/
Rdfdrd, available at http://www.juriscom.netl
22, 2000, Ordonnance de Refere,
24. T.G.1.
T.G.1. Paris, May 22,2000,
txt/jurisfr/citi/tgiparis20000522.htm.
txtljurisfr/citiltgiparis20000522.htm.
Toward Greater
Is There a There There? Toward
15, at491;
25. See Netanel,
Netanel, supra
supra note IS,
at 491; Michael
Michael Geist, Is
& Alan
L.J. 1345 (2001); Jack L. Goldsmith &
BERKELEYTECH.
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY
Certaintyfor Internet Jurisdiction,
TECH. LJ.
(2001).
110 YALE L.J.
Clause, 110
0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
LJ. 785, 825-26 (2001).
O.
26. See supra note 24.
wwwjuriscom.
http:/
laDefense,
DWfense, available at http://www.juriscom.
27. T.G.I. Paris, Aug. 11,2000, Conclusions de la
l-cc-def.pdf.
net/txt/jurisfr/citi/tgiparis2000081
netltxtljurisfr/citi/tgiparis20000811-cc-def.pdf.
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Yahoo and
Internet
to express reprehensible
reprehensible ideas and policies
policies within the United States. But this right
right
extra-territorially beyond the U.S. border.
is a national right and does not extend
extend extra-territorially
dissemination of web pages in France
The American right does not apply to the dissemination
to French
French web users.
competence offoreign
of foreign courts
With respect
respect to the competence
courts to judge Yahoo's actions
California servers, Yahoo's extensive
launched
launched from California
extensive efforts to reach
reach foreign users
from the United States gives foreign countries
countries the power
power to adjudicate the
company's activities. Yahoo had an active presence in France that was specifically
linked to the display of Nazi
Nazi memorabilia. Yahoo carefully developed a plan to
(including its
reach
reach web users worldwide
worldwide and boasted that "Yahoo!
"Yahoo! Inc. (including
'Yahoo!' or the 'Company')
communications,
subsidiaries, 'Yahoo!'
'Company') is a global Internet communications,
comprehensive branded
commerce and media company that offers a comprehensive
branded network of
of
28
services to more than 120 million users each month worldwide.
worldwide."28
Yahoo
shareholders that "[t]he
"[t]he Company's principal offering,
represented
represented to shareholders
www.yahoo.com,
www.yahoo.com. provides the flagship product for its global Internet
Internet media
media
'2 9
committed
network. ,,29
Also, Yahoo
Yahoo regularly stated that the company "remained
"remained committed
to broadening
broadening its global footprint and maintaining
maintaining a leadership
leadership position world3°
wide."30
wide."
The business strategy includes close business ties to France and direct
profits
profits from France. For the year 2000, Yahoo reported that "non-U.S.
"non-U.S. operations
operations
owned
represented
represented 15 percent of total consolidated revenues."'"
revenues."31 In fact, Yahoo owned
over
70% ofthe French
70%
French subsidiary, Yahoo France, and exerted substantial control over
32
agreement
According
intercorporate license agreement
the subsidiary's web activity.
activity.32
According to the intercorporate
between
between Yahoo and its French
French subsidiary, Yahoo dictates the links and some of
of
agreement, Yahoo's French
French site."
site. 33 Under the license agreement,
the content on the French
subsidiary
subsidiary was even required
required to maintain a link to the U.S.-based server. These
actions
actions in conjunction
conjunction with the transmission into France
France for the display in France
France
of material contravening
contravening the French criminal
criminal code certainly establish the
constituent
competence under Article 113-7
constituent elements
elements for competence
113-7 of the French
French Penal
Code.
More specifically, Yahoo's argument contesting the competence
competence of the
French
French court was disingenuous.
disingenuous. Because Yahoo targeted
targeted French users with
advertisements in French,34
company could not seriously contend
contend that it sought
advertisements
French,34 the company
U.S.-based web services and that
only to reach an American audience with the U.S.-based
1999 Annual Report Form
10-K, filed with the Securities and Exchange
28. Yahoo! Inc., 1999
Fonn IO-K,
Exchange
Commission, Mar. 30, 2000, available
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datalI011006/
.html.
0000912057-00-014598-dI
0000912057-00-014598-dl.html.
29. Id.
29.Id.
30. Press Release, Yahoo! Inc.,
Inc., Yahoo! Reports Fourth
Fourth Quarter, Year
Year End 2000
2000 Financial
10, 2001, available
availableat http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/4q00pr.html.
hup://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/4qOOpr.html.
Results, Jan. 10,2001,
31.
Id.
31. Id.
32. Yahoo! Inc., 1999 Annual Report Form
Fonn 10-K,
IO-K, supra
supra note 28.
10-K, Exhibit 10.33,
33.
Form 10-K,
33. Yahoo! Inc.,
Inc., Annual Report
Report Fonn
10.33, Yahoo! France
France License Agreement
Inc. and
and Yahoo! France.
France, art. 3,
Dated
1, 1996 By and Between Yahoo! Inc.
Dated November 1.
3, filed with the
1997, availableathttp://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datall
availableathttp://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 011006/0000912057S.E.C., Mar. 30,
30, 1997,
011 006/000091205797-011353.txt.
97-011353.txt.
Rdfdrd.
34. T.O.1.
T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ordonnance de Refere.
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Yahoo did not intend to profit from French web surfers. Indeed,
Indeed, Yahoo has even
even
"[m]ost of our revenues are currently derived from agreements
agreements with
reported that "[m]ost
35
sponsorship arrangements."
arrangements.,,35
The display of Nazi objects for sale
advertisers or sponsorship
with banner advertising in French
for
a
French
audience was part of Yahoo's
French
Yahoo's
business model. The record in the case does not establish whether
whether these
advertisements were specifically targeted toward
advertisements
toward those French web users
interested
even
interested in Nazi objects. Such a factual showing would make the case even
stronger.
France'
Once Yahoo's
Yahoo's conduct
conduct came
came within the prescriptive jurisdiction of France
French court
court faced several
several interesting
interesting
and the competence
competence of French courts, the French
options to resolve the violation. One possibility
possibility was to order Yahoo to remove
any Nazi memorabilia
memorabilia items offered on its U.S.-based
U.S.-based auction site. This choice
choice
extraterritorial effects
would have significant extraterritorial
effects within the United States by limiting
legally permissible material. The alternative
United States of
oflegallypermissible
the availability in the United
was to order that Yahoo block access to such material by French web users. This
the
choice could
could be accomplished in a variety of ways that would not limit th~
availability in the United States of Nazi material. The court chose the less
intrusive filtering solution and ordered Yahoo to take all possible
possible measures to
36
of those web pages in France.36
However, the court's
court's order
order did
block the display ofthose
100% accuracy
not require 100%
accuracy and does not hold Yahoo responsible
responsible if users
affirmatively sought to circumvent responsible
responsible measures put in place by Yahoo.
compliance with French law in
Instead, the court ordered
ordered a reasonable level of compliance
recognized,
connection with the transmission of web pages into France. The court recognized,
for example, that Yahoo
Yahoo could not exclude objects
objects from the auction site if the
sellers did not identify
identify them as Nazi origin.
Jerry Yang, a Yahoo co-founder, however, complained
complained that "to ask us to filter
37
access to our web sites according to the nationality
naive.'>37
nationality of web surfers is very naive."
The arrogance of this position was not lost on the French court since Yahoo had
commercial advertising
no difficulty initiating such filtering for its commercial
advertising directed to
French web users. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, in the face of Yahoo's impossibility defense, the
court appointed experts to determine
determine the technical merits of filtering. The experts
70% of French users were readily identifiable by their
their
found that approximately
approximately 70%
Internet service
service providers and Internet Protocol addresses
addresses while the remaining
ambiguous users could be geographically
geographically isolated
of
isolated by requesting
requesting a declaration of
38 The experts
nationality prior to transmitting
transmitting any Nazi material.38
experts predicted that
these techniques
techniques would account for 90%
90% of French Internet users, and the court
noted that there was no evidence
evidence to suggest that the technical mechanisms to
accomplish this filtering would be financially onerous for Yahoo.

35.
0-Q, filed with the SEC, Mar. 31,
31, 2000, available
at
35. Yahoo! Inc.
Inc. Quarterly Report Form IIO-Q,
available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101 i006/0000912057-00-0I 8245-d .html, at 16.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/dataiI011006/0000912057-00-018245-dl.html.atI6.
36. T.G.I.
21, 2000.
T.G.1. Paris, May 21,2000.
37. Yahoo Faces
FacesFines
for Nazi/terns
Nazi Items Auctions, USA TODAY
TODAY TECH
TECH REPORT,
10, 2000,
Fines/or
REpORT, Aug. 10,2000,
availableat
at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/CT374.htm.
available
http://www.usatoday.comllifeicyber/tech/CTI374.htm.
38. T.G.I.
T.G.1. Paris, Nov. 20,
20, 2000, Ordonnance de Rdfrb.
Refere.
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The French court's
court's decision, in the end, sought to force Yahoo to respect
respect
French law while
Nevertheless, Yahoo
while doing business on the web in France. Nevertheless,
continued to look for ways to deny the jurisdictional
jurisdictional authority
authority of France. In
ajudgment in U.S. federal district court declaring
declaring
December 2000, Yahoo sought ajudgment
unenforceable in the United States. 399 Since the Frenchjudgment
French judgment
the French order
order unenforceable
criminal law, the complaint
complaint served most
was based on an underlying violation
violation of criminal
for public relations. Yahoo seemed intent
intent on obscuring
obscuring its true actions: the pursuit
of a business model that relied in part on selling Nazi memorabilia on a worldofa
enforcement of
of
wide basis including
including France. American
American law routinely rejects
rejects the enforcement
foreign penaljudgments."
penaljudgments. 4o In fact, the American complaint seriously misstates the
French court's ruling. Yahoo represented
represented that it had no assets in France
France and
therefore
United
therefore the French
French judgment
judgment and fines could only be enforced in the United
States. Yahoo failed, however, to inform the U.S. court that its 70%
70% stock
stock
Yahoo-France and its royalty interests arising from the
ownership interest in Yahoo-France
licensing agreement
agreement between
between the U.S. parent and French subsidiary
subsidiary could be
is
seized in France
France to satisfy any fines. Yahoo argued
argued that the U.S. Constitution is
applicable to its activities worldwide
worldwide and that the French judgment violates the
First Amendment. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, even American courts have doctrines
doctrines similar to
the French
competence over cases involving
French decision concerning jurisdiction
jurisdiction and competence
involving
parties acting on the Internet.
B. Similar Internet Sovereignty
Courts
Sovereignty Decisions
Decisions in American Courts
exercise of sovereignty has support in the decisions of
The French court's exercise
of
American courts. The United States has long faced the problem of territorial
jurisdiction
of law in disputes involving parties in different states. The
jurisdiction and choice oflaw
Constitution requires
that
the exercise of a state court's territorial
jurisdiction be
territorial jurisdiction
requires
reasonable and fair to the defendant.
defendant."'41 The basic test is whether
whether the foreign party
42 To the extent that a
engaged in "purposeful
"purposeful activity"
engaged
activity" with the forum state.42
of the opportunities
opportunities in the forum, then the
foreign party purposefully availed itself ofthe
43
forum can judge the conduct
conduct of the foreign party.
party.43
Courts must assess the factual
44
situation to make this determination."
determination.
The Internet does not change the principle, but the courts have struggled to
determine if an Internet site actively
of
actively sought to target the forum state. A series
series of
important
important cases are consistent
consistent with the French decision. For example,
example, in People
People
39. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre
Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D.
Contre le
Ie Racismeet
Cal. 2001).
2001).
40. See Banco Nacional de Cuba
(1964);
Cuba v. Sabbatino,
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 414-15 n.17 (1964);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
(1986); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF
REsTATEMENT
LAw § 483 (1986);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAwS
LAWS § 120 cmt. 2 (1969);
(1969); Huntington
(1892).
Huntington v. Attrill,
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657
657 (1892).
41. See,
e.g., World-Wide
World-Wide Volkswagen
(1980); Dan L. Burk,
41.
See. e.g.,
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
1095, 1107-08 (1996);
(1996); Joel Michael
Federalism in Cyberspace,
Cyberspace, 28 CONN.
CONN. L. REv.
REv. \095,
Michael Schwarz, The
The
InternetGambling
Gambling Fallacy
L.J. 1021,
1021, 1039
(1999).
Internet
Fallacy Craps
Craps Out, 14 BERKELEY
BERKELEY TECH.
TECH. LJ.
1039 (1999).
42. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958);
(1958); Geist, supra
supra note 25.
43. See supra
supra note 42.
44. Id.
44.Id.
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InteractiveGaming
Gaming Corp.,"
ex rel.
reI. Vacco v. World Interactive
Corp.,45 a New York court ordered a
casino based
based in Antigua to stop offering gambling
gambling over the Internet to New
New
46
Yorkers. 46 Although the gambling
gambling activities were legal in Antigua, they were not
47 The court found the close contact between the
permitted under New York law.47
casino in Antigua and its U.S. parent provided a sufficient nexus to support
ofNew
" Likewise, Yahoo had
personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction and the application
application of
New York law.448
an extremely
extremely close relationship
relationship with the French
French subsidiary and actively targeted
prohibited
French web users. And, like the New York case, Yahoo's activity was prohibited
where the users were
were located, but legal where the servers were located.
intellectual property rights. In
Similar results have been reached
reached in enforcing intellectual
Twentieth Century
Century Fox v. iCraveTV.com,49
iCraveTV.com,49 a Canadian
Canadian website, iCraveTV.com,
iCraveTV.com,
retransmitted certain television
television shows on the Internet. 5500 The transmissions
originated from the United States but were captured
captured just over the border in
"webcast."' In Canada, the webcasting was purportedly
Canada, and then "webcast."51
purportedly legal. 5522
However, in the United States, where
where users could access
access the Internet
Internet broadcast,
the retransmissions
retransmissions were alleged to violate
violate U.S. copyright
copyright law. 533 The district court
issued a preliminary injunction that prohibited iCraveTV from transmitting the
copyrighted programming
copyrighted
programming into the United States. 544 Like the French court, the U.S.
U.S.
govern the
court decided that the local law of the user's place of access should govern
foreign conduct, and that the retransmission back
back into the United
United States was
55
sufficient to confer
confer jurisdiction
jurisdiction on the American court. 55
Two trademark cases provide similar results. A New York district court, in
Playboy Enterprises,
Enterprises,Inc.
Inc. v. Chuckleberry
ChuckleberryPublishing,
Publishing,Inc.,56 enjoined the use of
of
the American trademark "PLA
"PLAYMEN"
YMEN" by an Italian web server that made a "male
"male
sophisticate
sophisticate magazine"
magazine" available
available in the United States through the Internet. 577 The
PLAYMEN
Italian publisher, Chuckleberry, had the legal right to publish PLA
YMEN in Italy
Italy
but had previously
previously been enjoined from selling the magazine in the United States.58
58
To circumvent this prohibition, Chuckleberry
Chuckleberry established a web site in Italy and
solicited customers
customers to the Italian site from the United States. 599 Much like the

45.
714 N.Y.S.2d
Ct. 1999).
45.714
N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup.
(Sup. Ct.
1999).
Id.at 854.
46. Id.
Id. at 850-54.
850-54.
47. Id.
48.
Id. at 848-50.
48.Id.
49.
49. 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831
1831 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
50. Id.
Id. at 1834.
51.
Id.
51. Id.
52.
Id.at 1837.
52.Id.
53.
Id.at 1834.
53.Id.
54. Id.at 1832-33.
54.Id.
55. Id. at 1834-36.
1834-36. Before
55.Id.
Before the court rendered a final decision, iCraveTV settled and agreed to
stop its webcasting
ofU.S. content. Steven Bonisteel, iCraveTV
iCraveTVSettlement
Legallssue
webcastingofU.S.
Settlement Leaves Legal
Issue Open,
NEWSBYTES,
available at 2000 WL 2273895 (last visited Mar. 11,2002).
11, 2002).
NEWSBYTES, Feb. 29, 2000, available
56. 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
56.939
57. Id.at 1034.
57.Id.
58. Id.
58.Id.
59. Id. at 1034-35.
59.Id.
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Chuckleberry block
French court in the Yahoo case, the U.S. court required that Chuckleberry
Panavision
access to U.S. users. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Panavision
Toeppen, 6° held that an Illinois resident who registered the
International,L.P.
L.P. v. Toeppen,6O
International,
trademark "Panavision"
trademark
"Panavision" as a domain name
name in Illinois was subject to suit in .
determined that it would have specific
California.661 The federal appeals court determined
jurisdiction to hear the case if
there were "'something
ifthere
"'something more'
more' [than
[than a passive web
web
site] to demonstrate that the defendant directed his activity toward the forum
forum
action
state."62
accepted the "effects
"effects doctrine,"
doctrine," where the effects of an action
state."62 The court accepted
63
are directed
directed at a forum state, as a basis for jurisdiction.
jurisdiction.63
of
These decisions show a number of important
important principles for the protection of
territorial jurisdiction on the Internet. The cases reveal
reveal that, to the extent that an
Internet actor strives to target users in a foreign jurisdiction, the foreign forum can
assert territorial jurisdiction
the
ofthe
jurisdiction and apply the forum's law. While a number of
intellectual property of parties in the forum, the vice
cases involved
involved protecting
protecting the intellectual
cases illustrate that the principle applies equally to issues of public order. Courts
assert territorial jurisdiction to protect values held in the forum. In this context,
the French decision
accepted practice
practice in the
the
decision is an ordinary
ordinary exercise of a widely accepted
United States.'
States. 64 A U.S. court faced with the same facts would yield a similar
result.
II. THE DEMOCRATIZING
DEMOCRATIZING IMPACT ON
INTERNET
ARCHITECTURE
INTERNET ARCIDTECTURE
As the Internet matures from an American phenomenon
phenomenon to a truly internainternational
tional infrastructure, the Yahoo decision has important implications
implications for a
world's
pluralistic democracy on the global network. Less than one-third of the world's
States,6" and a minority oflnternet
of Internet content
content
Internet users are located in the United States,65
66 When
significant
When a major democratic
democratic country in a significant
originates in the United States.66
economic
economic market requires that Internet
Internet companies respect local laws and that
60. 141 F.3d 1316
60.141
1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
1323.
61. Id.
[d. at 1323.
Cir. 1997».
1997)).
62. Id.
[d. at 1322
1322 (quoting
(quoting Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell,
Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir.
1321.
63. Id.
[d. at 1321.
64. In fact, the United States has recently legislated
legislated this practice in the Children's Online
Online
IS U.S.C. § 6502(1)(A)(i)
6S02(1 )(A)(i) (2001). COPPA
COPPA specifically
specifically applies to
Privacy Protection
Protection Act
Act (COPPA), 15
non-US web sites collecting information about children in the United States. The proposed
proposed Hague
accepted principles.
Convention on International
Convention
International Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction seeks to create a set of internationally
internationally accepted
See, e.g.,
e.g., Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters,
2001, at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html
(interim text). But, for the
Matters, June 22, 2001,
http://www.hcch.net/e/workprogljdgm.html(interim
moment, the U.S. delegation is interested
the convention.
interested in narrowing the scope of
ofthe
convention. See, e.g., Notice
Jurisdiction and
Announcing
Convention on Jurisdiction
Announcing Public Roundtable on Consumer
Consumer Aspects of Hague Convention
12, 2001).
Foreign
Foreign Judgments, 66 Fed. Reg. 64264,
64264, 64267 (Dec. 12,2001).
World's Online
Online Populations,
Populations,at http://cyberatlas.internet.comlbigyicture/
http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big_picture/
65. CyberAtlas,
6S.
CyberAtJas, The World's
geographics/article/0,,5911_151151,00.html
geographics/articlelO"S911_ISI1SI,00.html (Mar. 12, 2002) (estimating
(estimating that two-thirds
two-thirds of all
Internet
Internet users are outside
outside the United States).
2001,
World's Web Traffic
Traffic Non-US.,
Study-55% of
o/World's
Non-U.S., NEWSBYTES,
NEWSBYTES, Jan. 23,
23, 2001,
66. Dick Kelsey, Study-55%
availableat 2001 WL 2814S64.
2814564.
available
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capability for network participants to comply
technologies offer
offer the capability
comply with local
rules enacted by the country's
representatives, the ramifications for the
country's elected
elected representatives,
development
Internet's infrastructure are profound. States prove that
development of the Internet's
sovereignty still matters in cyberspace.
cyberspace. Technologists
Technologists have largely defined
sovereignty
information
information policy
policy rules through technical choices and decisions
decisions without political
67 The Yahoo case
intervention.
case shifts this rule-making power back to political
intervention.67
representatives. The decision raises the risks for companies who use technologies
technologies
that ignore national laws and creates
creates new incentives
incentives for developers to design
policy-compliant products. Internet companies
infrastructure
policy-compliant
companies and developers
developers of infrastructure
recognize and accommodate varying
technology will be forced to recognize
varying national public
values. The decision imposes the development
development of the technical capability that
accommodates competing
competing democratically
infrastrucaccommodates
democratically chosen rules in the network infrastructure. The French court, along with the consistent
consistent U.S. decisions, promotes the
democratization of Internet
Internet rules and design features.
democratization
Internet Architecture
A. Public Values
Values Embedded in Internet
embedded in the current
Yahoo shows clearly how certain public values are embedded
current
Internet's technical
technical
Internet architecture. Yahoo, in essence, sought refuge in the Internet's
protocol
it
protocol to obtain
obtain immunity for its worldwide behavior. Yahoo argued that it
of
could not filter out French web users because of the geographic indeterminacy
indeterminacy of
68 This defense highlights the extent to which
data transmissions on the Internet.68
which
technological
choices
have
established
information policy rules.
technological
influenced by
These key technological
technological rules have, however, been heavily
heavily influenced
American
American and Internet
Internet Separatist values. In particular, as Yahoo tried to assert,
the First Amendment
Internet architecture.
Amendment plays an important role in the current Internet
The modem
The
modern First Amendment
Amendment jurisprudence
jurisprudence establishes
establishes a standard of an
unfettered flow of information
information as the basic rule. Internet separatists similarly
similarly
69
argue that "information
"information wants to be free."
free."69
Ben Laurie, one of the computer
computer
experts consulted by the French court, boasted
boasted of this bias in values. He
commented that "what is being fought over is literally what people think. No one
commented
should be able to control what I know or what I think. Not the government. Not
Internet is pure
the Thought Police. Not my family. Not my friends. The Internet

67.
L. SHAPIRO,
67. See
See generally
generally LESSIG,
LESSIG, supra note 5; ANDREW
ANDREW L.
SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION:
HOW THE
THE INTERNET
IS PUTTING
PUTTING INDIVIDUALS
INDIVIDUALS IN
IN CHARGE
How
INTERNET Is
CHARGE AND CHANGING
CHANGING THE WORLD
WORLD WE KNOW
(1999); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
REV. 447 (2000); Joel
(1999);
Netanel, Book Review, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L. REv.
R.
Reidenberg, LexInformatica:
oflnformation
PolicyRules Through
Through Technology,
R. Reidenberg,
Lex Informatica: The Formulation
Formulation of
Information Policy
REV. 553 (1998).
76 TEX. L. REv.
(1998).
68.
2000, Audience
Audience de Refere,
Rdfdrd, Conclusions de la
la Soc.
Soc. Yahoo!.
Yahoo!, lnc.§
4.1.
Inc.§ 4.1.
68. T.G.I. Paris, May 15,
15,2000,
69.
Wants to
to Be
Be Free
http://www.anu.edu.au/
69. Roger
Roger Clarke,
Clarke, Information
Information Wants
Free (Feb. 24, 2000), at http://www.anu.edu.aul
people/Roger.Clarke/lIWtbF.html (tracing
2001).
peopleJRoger.Clarke/IVIWtbF.html
(tracing the history of the phrase) (last modified Aug. 28, 200
I).

272

42 JURIMETRICS
JURIMETRICS
HeinOnline -- 42 Jurimetrics 272 2001-2002

Yahoo and
and Democracy
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on the Internet
Internet
7
Laurie
information."
information."70
Laurie endorses
endorses the American
American concept
concept of free expression
expression over the
the
7
'
country, the
the United
United Kingdom.
Kingdom.71
legal rules of his own country,
legal
The
The U.S.
U.S. cultural
cultural value
value of
of the
the free flow of information
information isis embedded
embedded in the
the
technical
technical rules
rules of
ofdata transmission
transmission over the Internet. Current
Current Internet
Internet architecture
architecture
of
seeks to
to make
make distance
distance and
and geographic
geographic location
location irrelevant
irrelevant for the
the transmission
transmission of
seeks
information.
information. Data
Data transmissions
transmissions depend
depend on
on a technique
technique called
called "packet
"packet switching"
switching"
and the use of
of numeric addresses
addresses known
known as "Internet
"Internet Protocol"
Protocol" (IP)
(lP) addresses.
addresses.
These numbers, much
much like a telephone number, enable
enable the switching
switching of
of bits of
of
data from one point
point on the
the Internet
Internet to another.
another. Under the
the transmission
transmission control
control
protocol,
and
protocol, any single message may be
be divided into multiple
multiple packets
packets of data, and
each packet
packet of data travels a different path
path to reach the destination
destination where the
the
reassembled. The effect
effect of
of this design
design is to minimize
minimize borders
borders and
and
message is reassembled.
barriers to the free flow of information
information on the Internet. This philosophy
philosophy matches
matches
barriers
information freedom and the Internet
Internet Separatist
Separatist view ofthe
the American belief
belief in information
the
Nevertheless, these embedded
embedded rules do not reflect more
more subtle
subtle
global network. Nevertheless,
democracies and in
policies of information
information freedoms
freedoms found in other democracies
in international
international
law.72 As the French
human rights law.72
French ruling illustrates,
illustrates, other
other democracies
democracies give more
weight to other fundamental
fundamental human rights and interests, including racial, ethnic
ethnic
and religious
religious freedoms, privacy
privacy and reputation,
reputation, when
when those rights and interests
interests
73
speech.73
conflict with free speech.
Internet architecture
architecture has embedded
embedded rules for information
information
Concurrently, the Internet
self-regulation and free market choice over public decisionflow that advance
advance self-regulation
decisionmaking. For the moment, the advertising models
models on the Internet
Internet are
are based on
on
targeting users'
users' identified
identified and presumed interests. This
This targeting requires
requires the
the
targeting
large quantities of
of personal
personal information often
often without
without the users'
users'
collection of large
increasingly enable the hidden
participation
participation or consent. Transmission protocols increasingly
"cookies" technology
just as "cookies"
technology
collection of users'
users' personal data. For example, just
collection

Expert's Apology, Nov. 21,
70. Ben Laurie,
Laurie, An
An Expert's
21, 2000, at http://www.apache-ssl.org/
http://www.apache-ssl.org/
I1, 2002).
apology.html (last visited
apology.html
visited Mar. II,
U.K., for example, allows greater
greater restriction
restriction on the media. See, e.g., Douglas W. Vick
771.
1. The U.K.,
Kingdom 's Failed
United Kingdom's
Macpherson, An Opportunity
& Linda Macpherson,
&
Opportunity Lost: The United
Failed Reform of Defamation
Defamation
(1997).
Law, 49 FED.
FED. COMM.
COMM. L.J. 621 (1997).
72. For example, the United Nations'
Nations' International
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
requires restrictions
restrictions on hate speech as does the European Convention on Human Rights and
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
InternationalCovenant
Fundamental
Fundamental Freedoms. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political
Political Rights,
A/6316 (1966),
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. N6316
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976); European Convention
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
also Jack
1953); see also
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953);
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
Freedoms,
J. INT'L L.
U.S. Domestic Law?, I CHI. 1.INT'L
Trump u.s.
Goldsmith, Should International Human
Human Rights Law Trump
and Theoretical
TheoreticalFoundations
Molding the Matrix:
Stephanie Farrior, Molding
327 (2000); Stephanie
Matrix: The Historical
Historical and
Foundations of
of
J.INT'L L. 1,
Speech, 14 BERKELEY
Law Concerning
International Law
Concerning Hate
Hate Speech,
BERKELEY 1.
I, 33 (1996);
(1996); Anthony Lester,
International
L. REv. 537 (1988).
(1988).
the American Bill of Rights,
The Overseas
Trade in the
Rights, 88 COLUM. L.
Overseas Trade
OF
Speech, in THE IMPACT OF
Impact on Freedom
McCrudden, The Impact
73.
Freedom of Speech,
Christopher McCrudden,
73. See, e.g., Christopher
1998).
LAW 85 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1998).
THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL ON ENGLISH LAw
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became
became more widely understood, websites began using hidden web bugs.7474 In the
United
corporations face few legal constraints in gathering personal
United States, corporations
personal data,
and technical tools such as cookies and web bugs have become prevalent. This
U.S. preference
preference for marketplace
of the
marketplace privacy solutions is opposed
opposed in the rest ofthe
7
world. Outside the United States, however, comprehensive
comprehensive laws protect privacy.
"
privacy.75
Internet protocols favor the U.S. market approach and subtly undermine
undermine the public
law found in other countries.
With respect to intellectual property, network rules are increasingly at odds
with each other. The U.S. values are inconsistent by favoring the free flow of
of
information
information against data privacy and speech restrictions, but not against
intellectual
embedded
intellectual property. U.S. intellectual
intellectual property
property right holders have embedded
76
intellectual
intellectual property protection
protection tools into certain
certain aspects of the architecture.76
Unique identifiers such as the Microsoft "Globally
"Globally Unique
Unique Identifier" can
fingerprint software to limit use to a single identified machine or can track the
the
77
distribution
software or documents.77
In opposition, technologists have
distribution of software
launched
source" software
software to defeat the existing
launched "open source"
existing popular proprietary
proprietary
systems,"
systems,78 and there is a backlash
backlash underway against the Internet
Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
(lCANN) for the attribution
attribution of domain names in
79
a way that purportedly
purportedly favors trademark
trademark holders.79
To Yahoo and the Internet separatists, the embedding of public values in the
States' architectural
technical infrastructure
infrastructure assures that the United States'
architectural philosophy
philosophy
and free market bias will prevail over all other architectural
architectural choices. Yet, it is
wishful thinking to assume that geographic
geographic indeterminacy will prevail and that the
Visible (Sept. 13,2000),
13, 2000), available
availableat
at
74. Privacy Foundation, New Proposal:
Proposal: Make Web Bugs Visible
http://www.privacyfoundation.org/privacywatch/report.asp?id=40&action=0. "A Web bug is a
http://www.privacyfoundation.orglprivacywatchlreport.asp?id=40&action=O.
graphic on a Web page or in an e-mail message designed to monitor
monitor who is reading the page or
message. Web bugs are
l-by-I pixels in size. In many
are often invisible
invisible because
because they are typically
typically only
only I-by-I
cases, Web bugs are placed
placed on Web pages by third parties interested in collecting
collecting data about visitors
to those pages."
pages." Bugnosis FAQ, available
at http://www.bugnosis.orglfaq.html(last
http://www.bugnosis.org/faq.html (last visited Mar. 27,
available at
2002).
.
O.J. (L 281)
75. See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46/EC,
95/46/EC, 1995 OJ.
281) 31; Hearings
Hearings on the EU Data
Data
ProtectionDirective:
Directive:Implicationsfor
Commerce,
Protection
Implicationsfor the U.S. Privacy
Privacy Debate
Debate Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade,
Consumer Protection
and Commerce
Commerce Committee,
Committee, 107th
Cong.
Protection of
of the House
House Energy and
107th Congo
Trade, and Consumer
(2001),
at http://www.house.gov/commerce/hearings/03082001-49/08082001
.htm.
(200
I), available
available at
http://www.house.gov/commercelhearings/03082001-49/08082001.htm.
76. Mark Stefik,
Shifting the Possible:
Trusted Systems and
and Digital
Property Rights
Stefik, Shifting
Possible: How Trusted
Digital Property
Challenge Us to Rethink Digital
BERKELEY TECH. LJ.
L.J. 137
(1997); Julie E. Cohen,
Challenge
Digital Publishing,
Publishing, 12 BERKELEVTECH.
137 (1997);
Some Reflections
Reflections on Copyright
Management Systems and
and Laws Designed
Designed to Protect
12
Copyright Management
Protect Them, 12
BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 161
(1997).
BERKELEVTEcH.L.J.
161 (1997).
77. See, e.g., Microsoft
Unique Identifier,
Identfier, at
at http://msdn.microsoft.com/
http://msdn.microsoft.com/
Microsoft Corp.,
Corp., Globally Unique
library/psdk/automat/chap8_025b.htm (Dec. 5,2000);
5, 2000); Fingerprinting
Files, at http://
http:ll
Iibrary/psdklautomatlchap8_025b.htm
Fingerprinting of Office 97 Files,
users.rcn.com/rms2000/privacy/office97.htm
11,2002); MicrosoftCorp.,
Microsoft Corp., Combined
users.rcn.com/rrns2000Iprivacy/office97
.hlm (last
(last visited Mar. 11,2002);
Updater
98, at http://www.microsoft.com/macldownload/office98/0fl98Updater.asp
http://www.microsoft.com/mac/download/office98/Off98Updater.asp
Updater for Office 98,
(including a Unique Identifier Patch)
(including
Patch) (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
2002).
LESSIG, supra
supra note 5, at 7-8, 100-08;
100-08; The Philosophy
Philosophy of GNU,
http://www.gnu.org/
78. LESSIG,
GNU, http://www.gnu.orgl
philosophy (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
generallyICANNWatch,
ICANNWatch, at http://www.icannwatch.orglarticle.php?sid=588(1astvisited
http://www.icannwatch.orgarticle.php?sid=588 (last visited
79. See generally
Mar. 27, 2002).
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Internet
Internet is pure information.
information. Regulation
Regulation and market
market pressures are already
Intellectual property
property right holders have insisted on
changing the Internet. Intellectual
enlarging their legal
legal and public rights to exclude
exclude others from information,80
information, 0 and
commercial models are driving the move toward user localization
commercial
localization for product
product
81 The code is not static. In fact, this recognition
customization and marketing.81
recognition has
customization
led Larry Lessig to an insightful discussion of the capability of government to
regulate
constitutional values may be adapted for this
regulate cyberspace
cyberspace and of how constitutional
82 Lessig
regulation.82
proprietary code,
Lessig argues
argues that open code, as opposed to proprietary
reduces
the government's
requirements on its citizens. This
reduces the
government's capacity
capacity to
to impose
impose requirements
reflects
reflects the Internet Separatist value of sui generis network governance. At the
same
predominance of Separatist
Separatist values.
same time, open code offers a challenge to the predominance
While
of
While open code might make it harder for government to control the myriad of
software
software developers around the world, open code can also facilitate the capability
of government
government to impose particular software modules for products sold in its
countervailing values that might be
territory. This capability aptly illustrates the countervailing
accommodated
network architecture.
accommodated in network
B. The Empowerment
Empowerment of States to Protect Local
Local Values
The Yahoo case has valuable
valuable implications
implications for democratizing
democratizing technological
development
democratic pluralism on the Internet. Until now,
development and advancing
advancing democratic
Internet separatists have had a relatively free rein to define the infrastructure
Internet
infrastructure rules,
and the technological
U.S.-centric norms. Yahoo challenged the
technological choices reflected
reflected U.S.-centric
legitimacy
legitimacy of foreign public law when the company argued that the geographic
indeterminacy
web-based data transmission should provide immunity for the
the
indeterminacy of web-based
company's
company's worldwide behavior. The French rejection of this position shows that
Internet
established by elected
elected
Internet companies
companies cannot supplant the rule of law as established
representatives. This position
democratic pluralism on the Internet by
representatives.
position promotes
promotes democratic
developments that allow states to enforce their local laws.
requiring technological
technological developments
France
Franc~ has forced the recognition
recognition of French
French public values in dealing with
French web users. At a time when Neo-Nazi websites
websites flock to the United States
to benefit from the constitutional
constitutional protection accorded to hate-mongering,83
hate-mongering, 3 this
determination
of
liability
enables
France
to
preserve
its
democratically
determination
preserve
democratically chosen
public order law.

80. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2001); A&M Records
Records v. Napster,
Napster, 239 F.3d 1004
1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
2001).
81.
UpgradePins
PinsDown AOL
Users,CNETNEwS.coM,
81. Stefanie
Stefanie Olsen, Quova Upgrade
AOL Users,
CNETNEWS.COM, Feb. 13, 2002,
at http://news.com.coml2I00-1023-836138.html;Bob
http://news.com.com/21 00-1023-836 138.htmi; Bob Tedeschi, Borderless
at
Borderless Is Out; Advertisers
Advertisers Now
Now
If a Customer
Cairo,Egypt,
Cairo,Ill.,
C 10.
Want to Know If
Customer Lives in Cairo.
Egypt. or Cairo,
III., N.Y. TIMES,
TIMES, Apr. 2,
2, 2001,
2001, at CI
O.
82. See LESSIG, supra
supra note 5,
Constitution in
5, at 53-61; Lawrence
Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution
Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L
LJ.
(1996).
Cyberspace,
J. 869 (1996).
83.
MainstreamSites Serve as Portals
N.Y.
Y. TIMES,
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000,
83. See Lisa Guernsey, Mainstream
Portals to Hate,
Hate, N.
GI,
at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/1
1/30/technology/3OHATE.html; Martin Stone,
at G
I, available
available at
http://www.nytimes.coml20001l1/30/technology/30HATE.html;
Neo-Nazi Web Sites Flee
the US,
US, NEWSBYTES,
http://www.newsbytes.
Neo-Nazi
Flee to the
NEWSBYTES, Dec. 21,2000, available
available at http://www.newsbytes.
com/news/00/159663.html; Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197
(7th Cir.)
comlnews/00/159663.html;
1197 (7th
Cir.) (giving constitutional
protection to a neo-Nazi march through aa town
toWn with aa large population of Holocaust survivors).
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separatists' view
Public accountability
accountability under national law rejects the Internet
Internet separatists'
that technologists should
should determine the network rules for democratic
democratic society. As
technical
technical rules are not immutable, local liability gives states a voice in the
architecture. Yahoo forces technological
embedded values of the Internet architecture.
democratically adopted laws.
recognition of democratically
National liability for local conduct obligates a form of policy zoning for the
84 Under
Under
Internet that allows states to protect
protect their values in their own territories.84
to
make
structural
the Yahoo decision, Internet companies
companies will be required
required
structural
changes in their system architecture. France has called
changes
called for geographic
geographic determindeterminism on the Internet
overturned the technologists'
Internet and has overturned
technologists' decision to embed the
geographic ambiguity for the origin of Internet data transmispolitical value of geographic
sions. In a corollary
corollary discussion, Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes note that one
"assume that imperfections
identification and filtering
cannot "assume
imperfections in Internet identification
technologies render these technologies
technologies useless. Regulation
Regulation works by raising the
cost of the proscribed activity."
activity.,,855 For Yahoo to keep selling pro-Nazi items, the
their
company must develop technical
technical measures
measures to identify French users and block their
accordance with the
access, thereby enabling
enabling France to protect its citizens
citizens in accordance
country's chosen public policies. Interestingly,
Interestingly, the French court did not require
100% accuracy
accuracy in blocking
blocking French user access, but only held Yahoo to a
100%
reasonable standard.
standard.8866
Nevertheless, instead of filtering French users, Yahoo's response was to
Nevertheless,
87 Many critics
critics argue that this effect is a socially
socially
suppress the offensive material.87
destructive, extraterritorial
extraterritorial censorship of the Internet. Yet, Yahoo and the
of the Internet have no particularly
particularly compelling claim to hold
technical architects ofthe
democratically chosen values supporting
of
the power to subvert democratically
supporting the prohibition
prohibition of
the glorification of Nazi ideology in France
France and other European
European countries.8888 The
concern over censorship and the potential chilling effect
concern
effect on Internet speech seems
overrated. Internet actors must have sufficient contact with the foreign country to

Lawrence
of Internet zoning and free speech in the American
84. For a discussion
discussion ofIntemet
American context, see Lawrence
MICH.L.
Lessig & Paul Resnick,
Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical Model, 98 MICH.
REv. 395 (1999).
(1999).
at812.
85. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 25, at
86. The court only required reasonable efforts
efforts by Yahoo to prevent French user access. The
experts' report indicated that 70-80% of French users were readily
experts'
readily identifiable
identifiable and the remaining
remaining
could
could easily be geographically
geographically isolated
isolated by requesting a declaration
declaration of residence
residence before
before they could
connect
connect to the Nazi offerings. In fact, the decision does not hold Yahoo responsible if users
affirmatively
reasonable measures
measures put in place by Yahoo. T.G.I.
T.G.1. Paris,
affirmatively seek the circumvention of reasonable
Nov. 20,
Ordonnance de Rdfdrd.
20, 2000, Ordonnance
Refere.
87. See Troy Wolverton & Erich Luening, Will Yahoo's Ban on Auctioned Nazi Items Work?,
007-200-4361 243.html
3,2001,
CNET
NEWS.COM, Jan. 3,
CNETNEWS.COM,
200 I, available at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1
http://news.cnet.com!newsiO-I007-200-4361243.html
Interdit les Enchbres
?tag=rltdnws;
Encheres D 'objets Nazis, NOUVEL
NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
OBSERVATEUR, Jan.3,
Jan.3, 2001,
2001,
?tag=rltdnws; Yahoo Interdilles
http://archquo.nouvelobs.com/cgi/idxlist?a=art&aaaammjj=20010103&num=
available at http://archquo.nouvelobs.com!cgi/idxlist?a=art&aaaammjj=200
101 03&num=
(reporting that Yahoo
000000074&ml=yahoo&m2=&m3=&hosthttp://quotidien.nouvelobs.com
000000074&m I =yahoo&m2=&m3=&host=http://quotidien.nouvelobs.com (reporting
announced
announced that the auction
auction web site
site would prohibit the sale
sale of Nazi objects).
objects).
88. See, e.g.,
e.g., Netanel,
15, at 492 ("to deny Germans the possibility
Netanel, supra note 15,
possibility of applying their
their
self-rule.").
law
law to the web site operators
operators would frustrate their fundamental
fundamental expression of democratic
democratic self-rule.").
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of
make that country's law applicable and to make
make prosecution and enforcement
enforcement of
a final judgment
judgment a realistic threat. If that is the case, then it is very hard to justify
exempting these actors from local requirements where they do business. Yahoo,
exempting
in fact, actively sought global business from its websites in the United States and
ownership and control of its French
French
had significant activity in France through ownership
subsidiary.
Several other considerations diminish the concern over potential
potential adverse
adverse
Several
effects on free expression in countries other than the state imposing
imposing the restriction.
censorship, they will be
To the extent
extent that societies
societies engage in extensive
extensive censorship,
be
marginalized on the Internet. The potential
potential risk of doing business in oppressive
discourage companies
societies will serve to discourage
companies from supporting those repressive
regimes through
through commercial
commercial activities. And, under the Yahoo principle, liability
local citizens try to circumvent
circumvent
is not imposed on the foreign Internet company if
iflocal
geographic filters.
Other more troubling avenues are available for states wishing to impose
censorship on network participants.
participants. When governments
governments can create spy systems
systems
cyber-enforcement agents
Carnivore 989 and Echelon,90
Echelon,9" the deployment
such as Camivore
deployment of cyber-enforcement
denial-of-service attacks to shut
cannot
cannot be far behind. States might easily sponsor denial-of-service
shut
91 or develop viruses to cripple particular foreign
down foreign websites91
computers. These
These would appear
appear to be greater
greater threats to free speech than a
democratic
democratic country seeking to enforce its laws within its own territory.
democratizing benefits of geographic
Despite the democratizing
geographic' determinism for countries
community does not like
to assure their values in their territories,
territories, the technical community
this goal.
goa\. After the Yahoo decision, Ben Laurie, one of the French
French court's
court's own
experts and a well-known
"apology" and harsh critique
experts
well-known Internet pioneer, issued an "apology"
92
of
the ruling.92
Laurie has great authority to address the technical questions, but
ofthe
established legal and
his critique makes policy prescriptions
prescriptions in total ignorance of established
social principles
democratic societies.
principles in democratic
Laurie was troubled that France will require Yahoo to filter out French web
users. Although he admitted that existing technology
technology can be used for a high level
of filtering and noted that users could seek to circumvent
circumvent any such filtering, he
"half-assed and trivially avoidcalled the solution adopted by the French court "half-assed
93
able."
The comment reflects
able."93
reflects a disturbing view often found in the technical
Laurie's
community
community that only technologists
technologists know what is best for society. While Laurie's
point regarding
regarding today's technology
technology is important, he ignores three critical
critical factors.
First, no legal system in a democracy
democracy can assure full compliance
compliance with all laws. For
For
example, drivers routinely exceed
exceed highway speed limits. Yet, no democratic state

the
and Data
Developed by FBI before the
89. Hearing
Hearing on Internet
Internet and
Data Interception
Interception Capabilities
Capabilities Developed
Constitution of the House Judiciary
JudiciaryComm., 106th Congo
Cong. (2000),
available at
Subcomm. on the Constitution
(2000), available
Subcomm.
.htm.
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/con07241
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/con07241.htm.
90. See Echelon
Echelon Watch, at http://www.echelonwatch.org
http://www.echelonwatch.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
1: Denial-of91.
CERT*' Advisory
Advisory CA-2000-0 I:
91. For information
information on denial of service attacks, see CERT'
3, 2000, available
availableat http://www.cerl.orgladvisorieslCA-2000-01.htm!.
http:llwww.cert.orgladvisories/CA-2000-0 1 html.
Service
Service Developments, Jan. 3,
92. Laurie, supra
supra note 70.
93.
Id.
93.Id.
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tries to put
put aa policeman
policeman on
on every
every comer
comer to
to assure
assure perfect
perfect compliance
compliance with the
speed limit. Such
Such an action
action would be totalitarian.
totalitarian. Instead,
Instead, democratic
democratic states
states
speed
94 Second,
frequently rely
rely on
on law
law to shape social expectations
expectations and behavior.94
Second,
frequently
democracies
of
democracies do
do not
not typically
typically hold
hold third
third parties
parties liable
liable for the
the illegal acts of
French
to
circumvent
or
seek
their
nationality
citizens.
Ifusers
misstate
their
nationality
seek
circumvent
French law,
law, then
citizens. If users misstate
95
Lastly, Laurie assumes
users.95
Yahoo can hardly be
be faulted for those
those acts of web users.
Yahoo
incorrectly that the legal rule
rule will
will have
have no effect
effect on technological
technological evolution.
incorrectly
In contrast
contrast to the enforcement
enforcement problems
problems created
created by the Internet's
Internet's locational
In
of
geographic identification
identification empowers
empowers states
states to implement
implement a variety
variety of
ambiguity, geographic
including the enforcement
enforcement of
of intellectual
public policies within their territories, including
consumer protection,
property
property rights, consumer
protection, and
and data privacy
privacy through
through geographic
geographic
enforce
such
states to
such regulations
regulations on
on
The alternative, the incapacity
incapacity of states
filtering. The
democratic society-allowing
society-allowing citizens
citizens to
vitiates the
the basic
basic ideal
ideal of democratic
the Internet, vitiates
96
choose their
their governing
governing rules.96
choose

Constraints on Non-democratic
Non-democratic States
C. Constraints
empowerment of democratic
democratic states through the principles
principles of geographic
geographic
The empowerment
concomitant concern that nondeterminacy and local accountability
accountability brings a concomitant
determinacy
democratic
democratic states will also be able to enforce
enforce repressive
repressive legal rules. While this
concern
non-democratic
concern clearly merits reflection, controlling the behavior of non-democratic
particular
international law than of
of this particular
regimes is more broadly a question of international
technical choice
technical
choice allowing local accountability. Indeed,
Indeed, the inability to ascertain
ascertain
geographic origins will not prevent
prevent dictatoria1
regimes from blocking Internet
Internet
dictatorial regimes
geographic
activities
jurisdictions. Other
Other more invasive
invasive technical
technical options are
activities in their jurisdictions.
available. For example,
example, China
China has created a national
national subnetwork to monitor
monitor
available.
international Internet
Internet traffic
traffic and has
has imposed
imposed a licensing
licensing regime on Internet
Internet
international
provides the government with direct control of domestic
service providers that provides
97 Geographic determinacy
determinacy does not alter this capability.
Internet
Internet use.97
The real issue is the local law's legitimacy
legitimacy under international law.
sovereignty of
International
of
International law requires the recognition and respect for the sovereignty
nations. The U.N. Charter
Charter explicitly protects
protects "the principle
principle of the sovereign

significance of the decision
94. Like many technologists,
technologists, Laurie does not want the behavioral
behavioral significance
recognized. In the Yahoo case, users could bypass
bypass the controls
controls required
required by the French court only if
law by
misrepresented their nationality or if they affirmatively sought to circumvent French law
they misrepresented
establishing off-shore web accounts.
95. Indeed, if such user behavior became widespread,
widespread, the civil disobedience within France
would have political implications for the underlying French law.
supra note 15.
96. For a thorough treatment, see Netanel, supra
Security
China:Internet
Great(Fire)
(Fire)Wall
Wall ofChina:
& Zixiang Tan, The Great
97. See, e.g., William Yurcik &
Internet Security
China, PROCEEDINGS
Republic of China,
and Information
and
Information Policy
Policy Issues in the People's
People's Republic
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH
athttp://www.tprc.org/
(I996), available
availableat
ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE (1996),
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICA
nONS POLICY ROUNDTABLE
http://www.tprc.org/
26,2001,I,
Internet Walls, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,200
Holes in Internet
also Jennifer Lee, Punching
abstracts/tan.txt;
abstracts/tan. txt; see also
Punching Holes
GI, G7
G7 (reporting on other national restrictions).
at G\,
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Yahoo and Democracy
Democracy on the Internet
Internet
98
equality of all its Members."
Members.,,98
the same
same time, international
international legal
legal norms
norms may
may
At the
equality
99
constrain
of a country
country to implement
implement particular
particular domestic
domestic policies 99 and
and
constrain the
the ability
ability of
of domestic
domestic law."°°
law. 100 To
To the
the extent
extent that the laws
laws of
of
may constrain
constrain the
the interpretation
interpretation of
may
non-democratic state
state do
do not violate
violate international
international law,
law, the
the recognition
recognition of that
a non-democratic
state's sovereignty
sovereignty compels
compels the recognition
recognition of
ofthat state's
state's right
right to govern
govern behavior
behavior
state's
within
within its borders.
borders. An Internet
Internet architecture
architecture that
that includes
includes geographic
geographic localization
localization
supports
supports this
this fundamental
fundamental principle
principle of international
international law
law without giving
giving recognition
recognition
governance decisions
that are
are illegitimate
under international
international law.
illegitimate under
decisions that
to governance
surveillance import barriers
A rogue
barrier~
rogue state can
can already impose
impose licensing
licensing and surveillance
Internet access
access points and
and can
can exercise
exercise police authority over anyone
anyone within the
at Internet
state's physical
physical borders. For Internet actors
actors outside
outside the borders
borders of the rogue
rogue state,
state's
geographic determinacy
determinacy will
will not help the state
state enforce
enforce its
its illegitimate
illegitimate policies
policies
geographic
international law
law
against those sending data
data into the
the rogue
rogue state. The
The violation
violation of international
against
the rogue
rogue state
state will preclude
preclude any
any foreign assistance
assistance that
that furthers the
the
by the
violation."
violation. lol1
Although counterintuitive,
geographic determinacy
determinacy can
can even
even facilitate
facilitate the
the
counterintuitive, geographic
Although
rights organizations
making it easier
easier for activists to identify
identify the
organizations by making
work of human rights
"willing audience"
those places
where communications
communications are censored.
"willing
audience" or
or those
places where
censored. In
determinacy can
addition, geographic determinacy
can assist
assist new
new ways to deliver
deliver political
political
messages to the intended
intended recipients.
recipients. For
For example,
example, suppose
suppose a country
country represses all
messages
of international
international human
human rights principles.
blatant violation of
political dissent in blatant
Geographic determinacy
enables the
the creation
creation of technical
technical measures
measures that might
determinacy enables
Geographic
identify
identify certain
certain web navigational
navigational data
data streams
streams from the repressive
repressive country and
and
divert users
users to other political
political web pages.
then divert
determinacy may help promote
Geographic
Geographic determinacy
promote international
international economic
economic norms
norms
against
against rogue nations. For example,
example, the United States maintains that many
many
countries are havens
havens for the piracy
piracy of U.S. intellectual
intellectual property and that those
those
countries
determinacy would
' Geographic
Geographic determinacy
international legal obligations. 102
countries violate
countries
violate international
enable U.S. intellectual
intellectual property
property rights holders to distribute their content on the
countries that do not adequately protect
Internet
Internet and block access
access to countries
protect American
American
03
rights. 103

http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapterl .html
availableat http://www.un.orgiOverview/Charter/chapterl.html
98. V.N.
CHARTER art. 2(1), available
U.N. CHARTER
1,2002).
(last visited May
May I,
Human Rights,
& Jack Goldsmith, Treaties,
99. See Curtis A. Bradley
Bradley &
Treaties. Human
Rights. and Conditional
Conditional
reservations to international
of US reservations
(2000) (discussing
U.PENN. L. REV.
Consent, 149 V.
Consent,
REv. 399 (2000)(
discussing the legality ofuS
human rights norms).
(D.C.
Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C.
e.g., F.T.C. v.
100. See, e.g..
v. Compagnie
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson,
1980) (noting the international law limitations on the F.T.C.'s power to subpoena foreign
Cir. 1980)
witnesses).
U.S. 759 (1972)
e.g., First Nat'l
101. See, e.g..
101.
Nat' I City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 V.S.
(1972) (refusing
of U.S. property).
to recognize the legitimacy of Cuba's expropriation
expropriation ofV.S.
ESTIMATE
REPRESENTATIVE, 2001 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
e.g., OFFICE
OFFICE OF V.S.
See, e.g..
102. See.
http://www.ustr.gov/html/2001_contents.
availableat
athttp://www.ustr.gov!html/
REPORTON
REPoRT
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (2001),
(20011 available
200 I_contents.
various countries).
countries).
html (detailing the deficiencies in intellectual property protection in various
htrnl
103. Attempts to circumvent
103.
circumvent the blocking by routing intellectual property
property through nonboycotted countries might also be thwarted by technical tools.
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In essence, then,
then, geographic determinacy and local accountability
accountability do not alter
the underlying principles ofinternationallaw
of international law applicable
non-democratic states.
applicable to non-democratic
architecture furthers the ability of internaIndeed, in some areas, this choice of architecture
tional law to promote international
international norms in rogue states. An Internet boycott
boycott
enabled through
through geographic
geographic determinacy
determinacy would provide enforcement
enforcement of the
international legal
legal norm against the rogue nation.
-------~-------

The development
development of the Internet
Internet is at a critical threshold
threshold for democratic
law. The Yahoo decision reflects
societies and countries
countries committed
committed to the rule of
oflaw.
a maturing of the regulatory
regulatory framework for the Internet and the beginning
beginning of a
new "effects"
"effects" doctrine. As Michael
"[W]e are beginning to see courts
Michael Geist noted, "[W]e
...moving toward an 'effects
'effects based'
based' analysis for Internet
...
Internet jurisdiction."'"
jurisdiction."I04 The
technological development
development are profound. No longer will
implications for technological
technologists
architectural values of the
technologists be able to ignore national
national policies in the architectural
Internet. The technical
geographic determinacy will allow multiple
technical instrument
instrument of geographic
policies
of international
policies and values to co-exist. At the same time, the constraints ofinternational
capability to boycott rogue nations will protect against
law and the technical capability
against the
repressive policies in a nation's Internet rules. States
States will
implementation of repressive
regain
participants in a pluralistic
pluralistic international
regain their voice in the global network as participants
democracy.

Implications of the Yahoo! Inc.
Inc. Nazi Memorabilia
Memorabilia Dispute,
Dispute,
104. Michael Geist, The Legal Implications
JURISCOMNET
2001),
availableat http://www.juriscom.net/en/uni/doc/
yahoo/geist.htm.
JURISCOM.NET (Jan.-Mar.
(J an.-Mat. 200
I), available
http://www.juriscom.netlenluni/doc/yahoo/geist.htm.
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ANNEXE

NB: La presenteetude a ete preparee en 1997 -1998 dans Ie cadre du projet "Vie privee el socieM de
l'informalion: Elude sur les prob/ernes poses par les nouveaux services en /igne en mOliere de
proteclion des donnees el de fa vie priw3e " con fie a ARETE par la Direction generale XV de la

Commission des Communautes europeennes. Elude ETDI96IBS·30001142. Ce texte a ete tratiuit
.. partir de la version anglais •.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Dans cctte etude, nous nous interesserons II divers aspects juridiques essentiels de la
protection' des donnees et des services en Iigne. Ladite etude a pour objet d'identifier les
consequences du rleveloppement des services en ligne pour la protection des donnees et de
comparer la maniere dont sont traitees les questions f<\ndarnentales dans differents Btats
membres de I'Union europeenne. Dans Ie cadre de cette. comparaison, nous chercherons "determiner comment sont appliques les principes de base de la protection des donnees
enonees par la Directive 95/46/CE (') de l'Union europeenne et nous examinerons la
reglementation et la doctrine de quatre Etats membres. La methode appliquee nous permettra
d'identifier des themes speeifiques et d'analyser les resultats obtenus dans ehaque Btat. Cette
etude s'achevera par une evaluation strategique de la regiementation de la protection des
donnees dans les reseaux numeriques qui mettra en lumierc les points de convergence et de
divergence de I'application des lois nationales en vigueur. Ces conclusions permettront une
analyse des moyens offerts pour resoudre les defis de la protection des donnees face au
developpement des services en ligne. Plusieurs options de regiementation permettant de
preserver les normes europeennes de protection des donnees· dans un cadre de fort
developpement des services en ligne seront proposees.

1.1. Objectif de I'etude

Les preeedents rapports presentes 11 la Commission relatifs 11 I'evolution et au Mveloppement
des services en ligne (') ainsi qu'aux flux d'informations specifiques (') associes it des
services particuliers mettent 'en lumiere des perspectives et des risques importanls pour la
regiementation de la protection des donnees. Comme on l' a vu dans ees precedents rapports,
l'environnement en lignc est earacterise par une grande diversite d'acteurs, par un rythme de
ehangement extraordinairement rapide, par une decentralisation importante de I'activit,; de
traitement de I'information et par une absence de respect des frontieres nationales. Une seule
seance sur Internet peut impliquer la visite de sites web situes dans differents Btals membres
de I'Union europeenne ainsi que de sites so trouvant dans des Btats tiers. De plus, meme la

(1)

e)

e)

Directive 95/46!CE du Parlement europeen et du Conseil, du 24 octobre 1995, relative a la protection
des personnes physiques a l'egard du traitement des donnees a caractere personnel et a 13 libre
circulation de ces donnees, JO L 281 du 23.1 1.1995 [ci~apres la (Directive europeennel}).

ARETEJ Les services en ligne et la protection des donnees et de la vie .privee: Rapport n" 1~~Situation
globale (Etude E1'D196/B5-30oo/142 pour I. Commission des Commun.utes Europeennes, DO
XV)Ouin 1997) [ei-.pres «Ire Partie».]
ARETE, Les services en ligne et la protection des donnees et de ta vie privee: Rapport n° 2~~ Etudes
de cas (Etude E1D/961B5~3000/142 pour ta Commission des Comnmnautes Europeennes,
DGXVXDecembre 1997)[ei-apres "Deuxieme partie}) J.
5

visite d'un seul site web peut etre a I'origine de transmisSions de donnees a I'.schelle
mondiale. L'architecture des services en ligne sur Internet est intercontinentale ('). Moteurs
de recherche (,), «cookies» ("), commerce electronique (\ moyens de paiement en ligne (s),
webcasting ('), analyse des logs ("), jeux (' i) et diagnostics medicaux (") pour ne eiter que
quelques activites el elements d'infrastructurc - font tous apparaltre que la tendance, les
moyens et la pression commerciale vont de plus en plus dans Ie sellS de la collecte et de
J'utilisation en ligne d'informations it caractere personnel. La circulation des informations,
mustree dans les etudes de cas precooemment presentees a la Commission, montre qu'il
existe un besoin fondamental d'appliquer des principes de base aux services en ligne. Ces
etudes de cas demontrent com bien necessaires et benefiques sont les informations a earactere
persOImel et revelent que la valeur commerciale cree une forte pression dans Ie sens de la
surveillance massive des individus. La protection des donnees est llecessa;re pour que la
oonfiance existe a l' egard des services en ligne (!O). Or, les caracteristiques du march': et la
circulation de \'informalion constituent un defi essentiel pour Ie droit europeen de Ia
protection des donnees. L 'application de principes de loyaute aux pratiques liees a
\'information devient extremement complexe dans Ie contexte fluctuant d'lnteme1.
Tandis que Ie developpement technique el commercial des services en ligue fait oourir des
risques substantiels au respect de la vie privee, les technologies offrent egalement de
nouvelles possibilites en matiere de protection des informations a caractere persOlmel. Les
communications peuvent, par exempIe, eIre cryprees afin de preserver la confidentialite ainsi

Ci )

C)
{t>}
1)

(')

C)
eO)
")

e')

C~)

Par exernple) Marcht de France. qui vend des produits gastronomiques franyais sur Ie World Wide
Web, conclut en France les contrats avec les societes dont it propose les produits Ala vente, il dispose
d1un site Web a Hong Kong au it est immatricule a des fins commerciaies. et gere Ie site et les
commandes grace a un serveur americain situe en Arizona, Voir Deuxieme partie, section [1.1. i.
Voir Ire Panie, Section lA.I.
Voir ire Panie, Section 1.3.2
Voir Ire Partie, Section iLl
Voir Ire Partie, Section lJ.D.
Voir Ire Partie, Section 1.43.
Voir Ire Partie1Section 1.3.1.
Ire Partie, Section It.2.4.
Ire Partie; Section 11.2.2.

Voir Communication au Padement europeen, au ConseiJ, au Camite economique et social et au
Comite des Regions. Une initiative europeenne dans Ie domaine du commerce electronique. p, 13, t&
(COM(97) 157)(15 avril 1997), disponible sur <http://www.ispo.cec.belEcommerce>.
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I

I
que I'anonymal des participants ("l. Les paiements electl'Oniques peuvent etre orgamses
d'une fayon anonyme pour minimiser ou eli miner la collecte de donnees personnelles. Des
preferences en matiere de confidential;te des donnees a caracrere personnel peuvent etre
incorporees dans les technologies du navigaleur Internet, Jesquelles, combinees avec Ie
marquage et Ie filtrage des pratiques des siles web en matiere d'information, peuvem garantir
Ie respect de la protection des donnees (IS). II s'agit done essentiellement de savoir dans
quelle meSUre I'organisation de I'infrastructnre creee des problemes pour la protection des
donnees et comment la protection des donnees peut eire mise en place dans Ie cadre de
l' architecture des services en ligne.
En raison de ces nouveaux risques et de ces nouvelles possibilites, l'objectif de cetle analyse
comparee de la r6g1ementation consislera lOut d'abord Ii examiner les reponses actuelles
apportees par les Etats membres de l'Union europeenne aux questions tundamentales posees
par Ia protection des donnees, mnsi que les "'ponses qui seront probablement apportees a
I'avenir. Nous tenterons dans un premier temps d'identifier les differences de trmtement des
services en ligne dans les Etats membres, ce qui pennettra d' evaluer dans quelle mesure la
protection des donnees est susceptible de creer des obstacles a la libre circulation des
services en ligne au sein de la Communaute. Enfin, la comparaison effeclUee nons serviTa a
elaborer des options de traitement convergent pour la protection des donnees dans un
environnement en ligne.

1.2.Principes de base de /a protection des donnees en Europe
Les services en ligne posent des problemes de reglementation dans Ie cadre de l' ensemble
des principes de base de la protection des donnees existant actuellement en Europe. Ces.
principes clefs ont "te adoptes dans de nombreux textes internationaux et dans Ie droit
interne des Etats membres. Les textes. intemationaux fondamentaux comprennent la
Directive 95!46/CE, et les tignes directrices de I'OCDE en matiere de protection des donnees
ainsi que la convention nO 108 du Conseil de l'Europe. D'autres textes internationaux tentent
d'exprimer ces principes dans des secteurs particuliers de I'utilisation des donnees. La

(14)

Voir Information and Privacy Protection Commission of Ontario and Dutch Data Protection
Commissions, Privacy Enhancing TechnOlogies: The Path to Anonymity (1995); International

(15)

Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, Data Protection on the Interoet Report
and Guid.nce,_ Ille, (Budapest Draft)(May 21, 1996); Resolution of the Conference of Data
Protection Commissioners of the Federation and t)1e Laender on key points for the regulation in
matters of data protection of online services, _ 1 (Apr. 29, 1996),
Voir Minutes of the 21st Meeting of the International Working Group on Data Protection in
Telecommunications (Paris: 3 avril 1997)(Presentation de Joel R. Reldenberg sur Ie tMme "Internet
Labeling: Adapting PICS for Data Protection").
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recommandation du Comite des ministres du Conseil de l'Union europeenne relative aux
banques de donnees medicales automatis':es en est un exemple.
Dans Ie contexte de la pn;sente analyse, nous diviserons les elements essentiels du droit
europeen de la protection des dOllnees en quatre groupes principaux: 1) la creation
d'obHgations et de responsabilites pour eeux qui effectuent Ie traitement d'informations a
caractere personnel, 2) la mise en oeuvre d'un traitement transparent des informations it
caractere personnel, 3) la creation d'une protection particuliere pour les donnees sensibles, et
4) la creation de droits relatifs Ii I'application des regles existames et d'un controle efficace
du traitement des donnees a caractere personnel ("). II s'agit Ii> des elements constitutifs de
!'approehe europe.nne qui est une approche complete et d'application generale de la'
protection des informations il caractere personnel. Dans cette section, nous procederons il une
breve description de chaque principe traditionnel du droit europeen de la protection des
donnees, et nous expliquerons, apres chaque description, comment les services en ligne
remettent en cause les idees existant a I'heure actllcile en matiere de reglementation (17).
1.2.1.
La creation d'obligations et de responsabilites en ce qui
concerne Ie traitement des informations a caractere personnel

Le premier element des principes europeens est la definition d'un ensemble de pratiques
loy ales applicables aux traitements des donnees personnelles qui cree obligations et
responsabilites lies au traitement des informations a caractere personnel. Ceci exige, au
minimum, que les informations a caractere personnel soient collectees lici!ement pour les
fmalites determimSes it des finS specitlques ("). Cette exigence est fondamentale pour la
loyaute en matiere d'utilisation des informations il caracti:re personneL
Cependant, I'Internet constitue un defi pour la creation d'obligations e! de responsabilites en
ce qui concerne Ie traitement des informations a caractere personneL A I'heure actuelle, Ie
principe fondamental de finalit'; est devenu I' exception plutot que la regie dans
l'environnement en Jigne. Alors que les donnees personnelles sur un support en papier
representaient de par leur nature une barriere teclmique contre des utilisations second aires,
les informations vehiculees par l'Internet sont des Ie debut numeriques et par consequent

(")

('7)

(")

a la DOXIlI de I.
Commission europeenne qui procedait a une comparaison de la legislation et de In pratique de la
protection des donnees nux Etats~Unis par rapport aux fegles europ&mnes. Voir Paul Schwartz & Joel
R. Reidenberg, Data Priv.cy Law: A Study of U.S. Data Protection (Michie: 1996).
Ces descriptions proviennent directement de Iletude susmentionnee presentee a fa Commission. Voir
id
Directive 95/46/CE, article 6, paragraphe I", alinea a) et alinea b).

Ces regroupements ont deja ete effectues dans un precedent rapport present.

I
,

peuvent eire partagees et combinee, de multiples fayons. Des qu'ils sont en Jigne, les
utilisateurs generent un nombre enorme d'informations it caractere personnel et les
utilisations ulterieures ne se limitent pas a la finalite de la collecre originale. Dans un
precedent rapport remis it la Commission, il a ainsi ete observe qu'un grand nombre
d'ittformations transactionnelles etait collecte par des foumisseurs de services qui s'en
servaient ensuite pcur differenls usages.
Corollaire de Ja collecte d'informations pour une finalite determinee, un autre element
impcrtant dans Ie cadre europeen de la protection des donnees est l'exigence que Les
informations it caractere personnel ne puissent etre utilisees que de maniere compatible avec
La finalite de la collecte des informations. Cette deuxieme composante necessite la mise en
place de limites aux utilisations secondaires et l'interdiction -des utitisations incompatibles
avec les finalites. La Directive 95146/CE precise que la necessite d'one utilisation pour une
finalire determinee et la necessit" de la limitation des utilisations incompatibles constituent
I'un de ses principes fondameniaux en matiere de qualite des donnees. En vertu de cette
directive, les donnees it caracti:re personnel doivent etre « collectees pour des finalites
determinees, explicites et legitimes, et ne doivent pas etre traitees ulterieurement de maniere
incompatible avec ces finalites» (19). Cependant, la structure ouverte de I'lnternet reme! en
cause cette approche. En effet, Ie reseau a ete construit autour de l'idee d'accessibilite et
d'utilisations multiples de I'information.

I

I

La troisieme composante de la structure fondamentale des pratiques loyales applicables aux
informations exclut la collecte d'informations a caractere personnel excessives. Bien que
cetle composante ne foumisse pas de critcre particulier permettant de savoir si telle ou telle
information est necessaire a la finalite identifiee d'une collecte, les personnes qui collectent
des informations Ii caractere personnel en Europe ne disposent pas d'un pouvoir absolu et
sans entrave pour determiner si I' infonnation est necessaire eu egard ala finalite. En effet, au
lieu d'essayer de maximiser la collecte d'informations personnelles, les entites concemees
doivent tenter de minimiser Ie recueil des donnees et de ne collecter que Ie minimum
d'information necessaire qui est compatible avec la finalite determinee. Conone Ie precise la
Directive 95/461CE, les donnees a caractere personnel doivent etre « adequates, pertinentes
et non excessives au regard des finaHtes pour lesquelles elles sont collectees et pour
JesqueJles elles sont traitees uiterieurement» (1ll).
Cependant, l' environnement en ligne constitue egalement une menace pour I' exigence de
cette non-collecte d'infonnations excessives. Sur ce point, les normes techniques actuelles
pennettent en general de maximiser la quantite d'informations a caractere personnel
collectees. Un exemple de cette maximisation est la collecte des informations resultant des

(")
(")

Directive 951461CE, article 6, paragrapne I", aline. e).
Directive 95146!CE, article 6, paragrapne I", alinea e).
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traces des connexions qui surveillent I'utilisateur quand il 50 doplace d'un site web It un
autre. Les donnees collectees peuvent meme indiquer Ie temps pendant Jequel une persanne
regarde une page donnee sur un site web detennine.
Le cadre de In protection des donnees comporte egalement des obligations en ce qui
concerne Ie traitement des infonnations
caractere personnel une fois qu'elles ont ete
collect';es. Une composante importante impose des limites a Ia duree de conservation des
infonnations a caractere personnel. Toute collecte d'infonnations a caractere personnel perd
de son exactitude et de sa pertinence it mesure que Ie temps passe. Les entites ne sont done
pas autorisees a stocker des donnees a caractl:re personnel pendant des peri odes ilIimitees.
En vertu des principes europeens de la protection des donnees, les informations Ii caractere
personnel ne doivent pas etre conservees pendant une duree excedant celie necessaire it la
realisation des finalites pour lesquelles enes ant ete coilect';es
Dans l' environnement du
r';seau, des restrictions it Ia conservation des donnees sont necessaires car iI se peut qu'un
ordinateur n' ((oubHe» pas Ies informations qui y sont stockees. Ainsi, Internet, comme tout
media numerique, requiert la creation de restrictions it la collecte et au slackage des donnees
par l'intennediaire de mesures teclmiques. A noter que, des restrictions au stockage des
donnees peuvent parfois etre creees en raison de preoccupations autres que la protection des
donnees. Ainsi, dans la mesure au un service en ligne considere Ies informations anciennes
comme moins pertinentes pour les finalites commerciales qui sont les siennes, il peut limiter
la conservation des infonnations it caractere personnel. A titre d'exemple de cette sorte de
limitation de la conservation, certains sites web ont installe ulle date d'expiration sur les
cookies qu'i1s installent sur les disques dur de leurs utilisateurs.

a

e").

D'autre part, en vertu des principes de base de la protection des donnees, les particuliers
doivent disposer d'un droit d'acces aux informations a caractere peT'onnel les cbncernant
ainsi que d 'un droit de rectification pour Ies donnees inexactes ("). Ces droits contribuent it
aSSurer I' exactitude des informations Ii caractere personneL En ce qui concerne ces droits
d'acc"s, Internet a un fort potentiel en matiere d'accroissement de la protection des donnees.
Les services en ligne sont techniquement capables de permettre aux interesses d'acceder it
peu de frais aux donnees personnelles les c{)ncernant qui sont generees lors des interactions
avec ces services. Cet acees n'est toutefois pas foUnti de maniere genera Ie. Finalement,
I'ensemble fondamental des droits et obligations pn,voit que des mesures doivent etre prises
pour garal1tir I'integrite des informations Ii caraeti!!e personnel ("). Ces mesures sont
necessaires pour proteger les infonnalions a caractere personnel contre la destruction ou la
modification nOn autorisee. Conune on pouvai! s'y attendre, la s,\curi!e des informations sur
Internet fait l'objet d'une certaine controverse. En l'absence de mesures particulieres quan! a

(")

e")

C")

Directive 95!46!CE, article 6, paragraphe Itf I

alint~a

Directive 951461CE, article 12.
Directive 95f46/CE, article 17.
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e).

la seeurite des donnees, 105 communications sur Internet SOnt gJobalement peu sures, Ce
manque de securite deceule de l'infrastructure d'lnternet. Les infonnations envoyees II
travers Internet voyagent jusqu'a leur destination sous forme de paquets it travers des lignes
non dediees; ces donnees peuvent etre interceptees en de nombreux points de transit. De
plus, l' architecture des systemes client et serveur peut poser des problemes de securite
fondamentaux. Par consequent, Ie risque de manipulation des sites web et des serveurs
constitue une menace importante pour la securite des donnees a caractere personnel
accessibles en ligne. D'un point de vue economique, les services commerciaux en ligne ant
un interet considerable a accroltre la securite des donnees sur Internet. Le developpement des
transactions electroniques ccmmereiales dependra de la conflance que Ie consommateur aura
en ce media. L'utilisation du cryptage est I'un des moyens les plus importants d'acel'oltre
cette contlance. Cependant, les autorit"s chargees de la surete d'Etat et de la repression de la
criminalite ont soulev'; des objections serieuses contre Ie cryptage craignant que cela
permettent aux criminels de dissimuler efficacement leurs activites illegales aux autorites
chargees des poursuites ou des enquetes. Les types de cryptage qui seront autor,ses ill'avenir
font actuellement I'objet d'un debat considerable au plan international, Ce sujet sera trait';
dans la presente etude a la section 2.5 ci-dessous.
1.2.2.
Le maintien de la transparence du traitement des donnees
caractere personnel

a

Le deuxieme element fondamental des principes europeens en matiere de protection des
donnees est Ie maintien de systemes transparents de traitement des donnees it caractere
personnel (24). Cette regie essentielle implique que les activites de truitement soient
stmcturees de maniere ouverte et comprehensible. En Europe, l' opinion generalement
admise est qu'il est necessaire que les interesses soient en mesure de comprendre Ie
traitement des infonnations it caractere personnel les concernant pour participer a la vie
sociale et politique. Le traitement secret des infonnations a caractere personnel entraine Ie
risque d'une suppression de la liberte des individus. Une premiere composante de cet·
element est I' exigence selon laquelle une 'personne concernee doit etre infonnee que des
informations personnelles la concernant ont ete collectees ("). Dans certains cas, une
deuxieme composante prevoi! en plus l'obtention du consentement des personnes concemees
pour certains types de traitements et d'utilisations des informations a caractere personnel.

e

4

)

(")

Voir par ex, la directive 95/46/CE. article 18 (obligation de notification
systemes de traitement des donnees),
Directive 95146!CE, article 10.

II

a un

registre central des

L'expansion des services en ligne ne s'est pas accompagnee d'une augmentation des types
d'infonnations relatives a I'utilisation des donnees fournies aux personnes qui utillsent ces
services. Amsi, i'ere Internet remet en cause la regIe de la transparence.
Cependant, la transparence conserve toujours une importance capitale, et ce, pour de
nombreuses raisons. En premier lieu, en l' absence de transparence, Ie consentement donne
par une personne aux traitements des donnees mises en reuvre par des services en ligne ne
peut etre considere comme valable. La question de savoir si les infonnations pertinentes
seront uniquement foumies en anglais, la langue la plus utilisee sur Ie World Wide Web, ou
bien egalement dans la langue nationale, souleve egalement des questions de transparence it
I' egard au consentement.
Une autre raison fait de la transparence un element important des pratiques loyales
applicables aux informations: son absence entrainerait une sous-representation systematique
du des;r de protection des donnees des consommateurs qui utili sent les services en ligne. S;
les interesses ne savent pas comment les donnees it caractere personnel les concernant vont
etre utilisees, ils ne pourront pas etre a l' origine d'une forte demande de respect de la
confidentialit.! des donnees.
Bien que la transparence soit actuellement remise en cause par Internet, ce media de nature
l1umerique peut aussi pennellre aux interesses d'avoir une plus grande connaissance des
differentes sortes de traitement des donnees a caractere personnel. Ainsi, comme cela a ett!
souligne lors d'un 'precedent rapport present'; Ii la Commission, un site du world wide web
permet aux personnes concemees de tester en temps reelles infonnations qu'un serveur peut
collecter sur la visite qu'elles effeclUent. (<http://www.anonymiser.com>). D'autres sites
proposent egalement un lien offrant une description de leurs pratiques en matiere de
tmitement des donnees.
Plus r"cemment, des groupements industriels ont commence it mettre au point des
infrastructures techniques qui foumiront plus de transparence aux interesses. La ({ Platform
for Privacy Preferences)) (<< P3P») developpee par Ie World Wide Web Consortium et
I'Open Profile Standard (<< OPS ))), it I'origine dUGuel se trouvent certaines societes de
services en ligne, en sont deux exemples. La P3P pennettra de c1asser et de filtrer les sites
Internet en fonction de leurs politiques en matiere de respect de la protection des
donnees ("). L'OPS encouragera la collecte par des navigateurs d'infonnations a caractere
personnel et la foumiture de ces informations it caractere personnel aux sites web apres que

eO)

Volr Joel R. Reidenberg J The Use of Technology to Assure Internet Privacy' Adapting Labels and
Filters for Data Protection, LEX ELECTRONlCA, 111:2 (1991) <www.lex-electtonica.orgl
reidenbe,html >(analysant les avantages et les !oconvenients de l'utilisation de !'etiquetage et du
fHtrage pour la protection des donnees),
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les personne. concernees aient seJectionne des options relatives a I'utilisation de certaines
parties specifiques des infonnations a caractere personnel Jes concernant. Ces exemples
montrent bien que des moyens techniques peuvent facilement etre mis en place pour fournir
les droits d'acces et de rectification. Toutefois, Ii I'heure actuelle, les droits d'acces et de
rectification ne sont pas fournis de maniere generale sor Internet.

1.2.3.
La creation d'une protection particu!iere pour les donnees
sensibles

Le troisieme element des principes europeens implique 1a creation d'une protection
particuliere pour les donm,es sensible. ("'). Ce principe consiste a instaurer lUl controle plus
important et une meilleure protection pour certains types d'infonnations, en particulier, les
informations concernant la race, la religion, la sante ou les opinions politiques. Or, la
creation d'une protection particuliere suppose que ron estime si les infonnations identifient
des aspects sensiblesde la vie d'une personne, mais egalement que ron considere la maniere
dont ces donnees seront concretement utilisees. La capacite des technologies de
l'infonnation pour combiner et partager des donnees rend impossible toute evaluation
abstraite, hors contexte, de l'impact de la divulgation d'lUle infonnation a caraetere
personnel determinee. L'incidence de I'utilisation bureaucratique des infonnations
personnelles, qu'elles soient simplement personnelles ou hautement sensibles, depend des
moycns de traitement, des types de bases de donnees connectees les lUles avec les autres et
des fins auxquelles l'information sera utilisee.

A rheure actuelle, lUl grand nombre d'infonnations sensibles est disponible en Iigne. A lui
seul, Ie succes de differentes sortes de sites pornographiques sur Ie web a abouti 11 Ja creation
de donnees en ligne hautement sensibles - en particulier, des infonnations concernant les
preferences sexuelles et les inten~ts personnels. Par ameurs, il existe des sites web et des
groupes de discussion en ligne qui sont dedj,!s II la race, it la religion, Ii In sante et aux
opinions politiques. Les personnes qui visitent ces sites web et qui participent II ces groupes
de discussion genereront des traces considerables d'infonnations sensibles.
En raison du manque de transparence relativement aux traitements des donnees en ligne, les
interesses ignorent generalement queUes utilisations ulterieures peuvent etre faites de ces
donnees susceptibles d'etre generees a partir des activites en ligne. II peut d'ailleurs y avoir
egalement une meconnaissance quant il la fa~on dont ces activites ell ligne creont des
informations sensibles.

(27)

I

!

L

Directive 951461CE, article 8.

a

1.2.4.
La creation de droits relatifs I'application des regles
existantes et d'un controle effectif en ce qui concerne Ie traitemen! des
informations caractere personnel

a

Le demier element des principes curopeens applicables aux informations est la creation de
droits relatifs a I'application des regles existantes et d'un controle effectif en ce qui conceme
Ie traitement des informations a caractere personnel ("). En Europe, cet dement est
considere comme une partie essentielle de la mise en ~uvre des pratiques loyales applicables
aux informations. La composante de base de cette regie impose que les individus disposent
d'un recours pOUl' Ie cas Oll les droits, obligations ou responsabilites applicables en matiere
d'intommtions a caractere personnel ne seraient pas respectes. En Europe, des dommagesinterets peuvent etre alloues dans certaines circonstances.
D'autre part, cet element necessite un controle independant de la mise en ceuvre des
pratiques loyales applicables aux infonnations. Aux termes de la Directive 95/46/CE, une
auto rite publique independante doit etre cree pour assurer cette surveillance ("'). Ces
autorites exercent leur controle sur Ie developpement et l'appiication tant de la legislation
nationale relative II la protection des donnees que des mesures internationales relatives aux
transierts globaux d'infonnations. Elles doivent etre en mcsure d'agir en toute independance
dans I'exercice des fonctions qui leur sont attribuees.
Dans J'envjronnement global d'!nternet, certains droits de recours prews par Ie droit
national se heurtent it la circulation internationale des donnees. De mome, I'efficacite de
I'action de toute autorit'; de controle nationale va devenir beaueoup plus diffieile. Le
developpement des services en ligne pose la question du degre d'efficacite que peut avoir
une reglementation nationale dans un contexte de services de communications it echeJle
mondiale.

1.3. Identification des pays choisis
Les reponses apportees par la reglementation aux questions soulevees par les services en
ligne seront etudii:es dans quatre Btats membres ("). Trois grands Btats membres, Oll Ie
march<' des services en Iigne est plus significatif du point de vue .oconomique et qui
disposent de lois bien etablies en matiere de protection des donnees, ont ett choisis: il s'ngit
de In France, de I' Allemagne et du Royaume-Uni. Un Etat membre plus petit, la Belgique, a
.ole choisi parce qu'il dispose d'une legislation relative it 1a protection des donnees et que les

(")
(")
eO)

Directive 951461CE, articles 22 et 24.
Directive 95/461CE, article 28, paragraphe I er.
L \~tude tient compte des reglements, des lois et des decis.ions jusqu'en decembre 1997.
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services en ligne y beneficient deja d'un developpement important. Ces quatre pays
constituent egalement un eventai! interessant des systemes juridiques represent';s dans
I'Union europeenne.

1.3.1.

Belgique

Le systeme juridique beige est base sur Ie droit civil. La Belgique est une monarchie
conslitutionnelle et un etat federal compose de « Communautes }) et de " Regions}) (,'). Les
« Communautes» sont composees de trois groupes bases sur I'identite culture lie et de
langue: I) les Wallons au Communaute francophone, 2) les Flamands ou Communaute
flamande et 3) la Communaute de langue allemande. n existe egalement trois « Regions »
qui sont des zones detinies geographiquement : la Region fiamande, la Region de Bruxelles
Capitale et la Region wallonne. Le pOlivoir legislatu et reglementaire est partage entre Ie
gouvemement federal. Ie parlement federdl ainsi qu'entre les differentes Communautes et
Regions. Les affaires "trangeres, la defense, la justice, les finances, la sccurite sociale, la
Sante publique et les affaires interieures relevent du pouvoir federal. Les Regions et les
Communautes peuvent cependant entretenir des relations independantes avec l' etranger dans
les domaines de competence qui sont les leurs, tels que la langue et l' education. Sa structure
juridique et ses institutions sont done articulees en plusieurs niveaux. Au nl veau federal,
I' autorite juridiquc appartiellt a une chambre des reprcsentants, it un senat et 11 des ministres
de gouvernement nommes par Ie rol. Au niveau de la communaute, it existe des consells
communautaires flamand, franyais et allemand ainsi qu'une commission conjointe. Aux
niveaux regional et communautaire, chaque region et chaque communaute dispose d'un
organe de gouvemement.
Conformement a la constitution beIge, la loi doit respecter la vie privee et la vie de famille
En Belgique, la protection des donnees releve de la competence federale et elle est
garantie par une loi federale et par un arrete royal. En 1992, la Belgique a adoptc une loi
relative a la protection des donnees (") qui s'est largement inspiree de la loi franyaise. La loi
beIge est peu a peu entree en vigueur et elle est devenue pleinement effieace Ie 1" juin 1996.
La loi s'applique aux donnees a caractere personnel qui font ['objet d'un traitement
automatist ainsi qu'auxfichiers manuels organises a des fins de consultation. La loi cree des
droits el des obligations en rapport avec I'utilisation des donnees a caractere personnel, elle
delegue Ie pouvoir d'adopter des arretes royaux, elle instaure une procedure de declaration

e').
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La Belgique a ete redefinie comme un etat "federal" par un amendement a la constitution en 1994,
Modification a I. Con,.titution du 31 janvier 1994 (Moniteur beige du 12 feyrier 1994).
Constitution beIge, article 22. paragrapbe 2,
Lot du 8 d6cembre 1992 relative 8 la protection de la vie prlvee a tl egard des traltements de donnees a
caractere personnel.
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qui constitue une condition preaiable au Ir'.!itement des informations it caracrere personnel et
elle cree la Commission de la protection de la vie privee (ci-apres Ie « CPVP »), autoritc de
controle semi-independante ("). Les decisions de la Commission sont pubJiques, mIDs elles
n'ont pas ete publiees dans un recueil UJrique. Toutefois,
ia fin de j'annee 1997, ia
Commission a publie une serie de rapports annuels couvrant ses cinq premieres annees
d'existence. En outre, des mesures legales peuvent prevoir des dispositions sectorielles en
matiere de protection des donnees, telles celles qui sont relatives au credit Ii la consommation
("), aux ecoutes teJephoniques ("), au systeme de securite sociale ("), au registre national
("), aux dossiers concernant ies permis de conduire (").

a

1.3.2.

France

La France est une democratic constitutionnelle dont la tradition juridique est marquee par Ie
droit civiL Dans Ie cadre de la constitution de 1958, les lois sont promulguees par Ie
President de la Republique apres avoir ete conjointement adoptees par I'assemblee nationale
et Ie Senat C"'). En vertu de la Constitution de 1958, Ie Parlement a Ie pouvoir exclusif de
fixer les regles concernant des domaines particuliers ("), Les matieres autres que celles
reservees au domaine de la loi peuvent 6tre "'glementees par decret du gouvernement apres
consultation du Conseil d'Etat (42). Ce pouvoir reglementaire est accord': au premier ministre
qui dirige Ie gouvernement (41),

(d~bat sur

(")

Voir <i-apr1:s 2.2.1

e~)

Loi du 12juin 1991 relative au credit it la consommalion.
Loi du 30 juin 1994 relative a la protection de la vie privee contre ies ecoutes. la prise de connaissance
ell'enregistrement de communications et de telecommunications privees, M.B,. 24 janvier 1994~ p.
1542 et suivantes.

('0)

C'i)
ell)
e~

(40)
~l)

(")
(")

I"'independan<e" de la CPVP).

Loi du 15 janvier 1990 modifiant la loi relative a I'institution ct a I'organisation d'une Banquecarrefour de Ia securite sociale, M.B. 22 fevrier 1990" p. 3295 et suivantes.
Loi du 8 aoOt 1983 organisant un registre national des personnes physiques) M.B, 21 avri11984. p.
5247 elsuivantes,
Loi du 18 juinet 1990 modifiant Ia loi relative a 111 police de la circulation routiere, coordonnee Ie 16
mars 1968 et In loi du 21 juin 1985 reiative nux conditions techniques auxquelles dolvent repondre
tout vehicule de transport par terre, ses e'ements, masi que tes accessoires de securite. M.B. 8
novembr. 1990;p. 21184.t suivantes.
Voir Constitution du 4 oetobr. 1958, micles 10, 24, 34, 45.
Constitution du 4 oetobre 1958, article 34. paragraphe 2. Ccs domaines comprennent la protection
des droits civiques et les garanties fondamentales aceordees aux citoyens pour l'exercice des libertes
publiques. la nationalite, l'etat,. les succession~ la detenninatton des crimes et delits ainsi que les
peines qui leur sont appHcables. tes imp6ts. 1es regles et les procedures electorales.
ConstiMion du 4 Gctobr. 1958, article 37.
Constitution du 4 oetobre 1958, articl. 21.
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La Constitution frallyaise garantit Ie respect des droits de l'homme. Confonnement a ladite
Constitution, la loi fixe les regles concernaIJt les droits civiques et les garanties
fondamentales ru;cordees aux citoyens pour I'exercice des libertes publiques ("). En 1978, la
France a adopte l'une des premieres lois nationales pour reglementer Ie traitement
automatique des informations a caractere personnel ("). Plus r"cemment, dans Ie cadre d'une
affilire concernaIJt la videosurveillance, Ie Conseil constitutionnel ("') a declare que la
protection de la vie privee faisait partie de j'ensemble des libertes fondamentales garanties
par la Constitution ("). Par consequent, en France, seule la loi peut garantir la protection des
donnees.
La loi relative a la protection des donnees de 1978, toujours en vigueur, est une loi complete,
d'application generale qui offre un vaste eventail de protections aux citoyens. La loi
s'applique aux secteurs public et prive, et prevoit des obligations et des responsabilites it la
charge des personnes qui procedent au traitement d'infonnations it caractere personnel. La
loi prevoit des sanctions tant civiles que penales pour punir les infractions. La 10i a eM
I'origine de 13 creation d'une importante commission independante de regulation, la
Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertes (la CNIL) qui controle les
declarations de traitement des donnees tant dans Ie secteur public que dans Ie sccteur prive et
qui viellc sur Ie respect de la reglementation dans les secteurs public et prive. La CNIL
public un rapport annuel, ses deliberations et des recommandations.

1.3.3,

Allemagne

L'Allemagne est une republique federale compo see de seize Lander. En Allemagne, Ie
pouvoir legislatif peut etre exerce au niveau du Land ou au niveau federal (i! titre exelusif);
toutefois, dans certains cas, une legislation concurrente ou une loi cadre peut egalement
exister. Au niveau federal, Ie Bundestag -Ie par/ement federal· adopte les lois et les Lander
participent au processus legislatif a travers Ie Bundesrat.
En Allemagne, la protection des donnees a des origines constitutio!melles et legales. Dans sa
decision" Census» de 1983, Ie Tribunal constitutionnel allemand a identifie un (i droit a
l'autod6termination en matiere d'information )) base SUr les deux premiers articles de la Loi

('H)
(4S)

Constitution du 4octobre 1958, article 34, paragraphe 2.
La! 01' 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative a j'informatique, 'lUX fichiers et nux libertes,

(46)

Si cela. est requis) comme dans Ie cas de certaines lois organiques, au si une demande est wlte en ce
sens conformement aux procedures constitution nelles, Ie Consel! constitutionnel se prononce sur 13
cOfUititutionnalih~ des lois avant leur entree en vigueur. Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, article 61. Une
loi jugee inconstitutionneUe ne peut pas etre piornulguee et oe peut pas ctre appliquee, Id,
Decision 94-352 du Conseil Constltutionnel du J8 janvier 1995

('7)
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I

Ii

r

I
I

fondamentale (Grundgesetz) - la constitution allemande ("). CGS articles de la Loi
fondamentale font obligation a l'Etat de prendre des mesures positives pour proteger la
dignite humaine (article I") et le developpement de la personnalite humaine (article 2) (").
Le Tribunal cOllstitutiOlmel a estime que ces deux dispositions, qui constituent la base d'un
« droit de 1a persOlmalite », protegent la personne contre la collecte, Ie stockage, I'utilisation
et la transmission illimit!!s des donnees caractere personnel. La decision « Census » prevo it
egalement a 1a charge du Land l'obligation d'elaborer une legislation autorisant et
reglementant la collecte et Ie traitement des donnees Ii caractere personnel (so). Le droit Ii
I'autodetermination en matiere d'information fait obstacle au traitement des donnees Ii
caractere personnel qui aboutirait a I'exereiee d'un controlc ou d'une influence sur une
personne, capable de detruire I'autonomie de l'individu (").

a

Outre Ie droit Ii I'autodetermination en matiere d'information, la Loi fondamentale comporte
d'autres dispositions susceptibles de proteger In vie privee. Dans ce contexte, la plus
importante de ees dispositions est I'article 1 qui protege Ie caractere prive des
communications (52). En raison de I'article 10, en Allemagne, Ie debat actuel sur Ie cryptage
a en plus une dimension constitutionnelle.

°

lndependamment de ees elements constitutionnels, 13 protection des donnees en Allemagne
est assuree par des textes de loi importants tant au niveau du Land qu'au niveau federal. En
1970, l'assemblee legislative de la Hesse a adopt" la premiere loi relative Ii la protection des
donnees au niveau mondial (53). Les seize Lander allemands ont a present leurs propres lois
en matiere de protection des donnees. En 1977, Ie Bundestag -Ie parlement federal allemand
- a adopt': une loi federale sur la protection des donnees qui, depuis, a subi des modifications
("). Outre les nombreuses lois federales de synthese et les lois des Lander, de nombreux
textes sectoriels et sous-sectoriels relatifs it la protection des donnees ont "te adoptes en
AUemagne. Ces textes comprennent les dispositions relatives it la vie privee qui figurent

(")
(4i1)

65 Bundesverfassungsgericht I (1983).

eU)
(")

65 Bundesverfassungsgerichtentscheidungen l, 41-52,
Id.

ell

Article ! 01 paragraphe J er, Loi fondamentale: "Le secret de la correspondence, du courrier et des
telecommunications est inviolable." Article 10, paragraphe 2. addendum, "Des restrictions ne peuvent

e)
(~4)

Article 1<tr, paragraphe ler, Loi fondamentale: "La dignite de l'homme est inviolable. Toute autorite
de ['Etat a Ie devoir de [a respecter et de ia proteger. tI Article 2, paragraphe ler, Loi fondamentale:
"route personne a Ie droit de developper librement sa personna lite pour 8utant qu'cHe ne viole pas les
droits des autres OU n'enfreint aucune disposition de la constitution ou du code moraL)! Id.

6tre arr6tees que par lalo;,"

Depuls, cette loi a ete amendee. voir Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz., vom ll. November 1986 in der
Fassung des Gesetzes zur Anderung des Hessischen Datenschutzgesetzes '10m 21, Dezember 1988,
Le plus important de ces amendements a eM introdui[ en 1990. BDSG. '10m 20.Dezember 19901
BGBI. I S.2954 zuletzt geandert durch d.s Postneuordnunggesetz v. 14.9.1994, BGBI. I, S. 2325,
2385.
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dans Ie Code de la Stcurit'; sociale allemand, livre V, qui traitent des informations medicales
II caracterc personnel, et les dispositions qui figurent dans ce meme code, au livre X, qui
portent sur les informations liees ii la Securite sociale.
Enfin, des organismes de contra Ie de la protection des donnees on! ere crees en Allemagne
tant au niveau federal qu'au niveau des Lander. La 10i federale relative ii la protection des
donnees (BDSG) attribue au commissaire federal charge de la protection des donnees Ie role
de controler les organismes f6deraux (55). La loi allemande attribue parallelement Ie role de
controle les organismes des Lander aux commissaires des Lander charges de la protection
des donnees (50). Le commissaire federal charge de la protection des donnees a egalement
pour fonction de conseiller Ie gouvernement federal (Bundesregierung) et le Bundestag dans
Ie domaine de la protection des donnees ("). Enfin, Ie commissaire doil tenir un registre des
fichiers automatises du secteur public C'l.

La loi federale relative il. la protection des donnees charge les « Autorites de contrale» du
controle du secteur prive ('9). En vertu de cette loi, chaque gouvemement de Land doit
designer sa propre Auterite de controle. Les Lander ont parfois attribue ce role de
surveillance aux commissaircs des Lander charges de ia protection des donnees deja
design';s, lesquels, comme precedemment indique, ont egalement un pouvoir de controle a
l'egard des organismes relevant des Lander. D'autres Lander ont confi" ces [anctions a un
organisme public different. Comme les commissaires [ederaux et ceux des Lander, les
Autori!es de controle ont un pouvoir de surveillance (60). En outre, I' Autorite de controle
tient un registre des entites qui stockent des dOl1j1ees a caractere personnel a des fins
commerciaies (61). Enfin, en vertu de la loi federale relative la protection des donnees, les
societes du secteur priv,; qui emploient regulierement au moins cinq employes a plein temps
pour Ie traitement des donm!es a caractere personnel doivent designer un agent interne
charge de la protection des donnees (").

a

II existe en Allemagne une reglementation nouvelle et complete des services en ligne qui
figure dans Ie texte relatif aux services d'information et de communication (Informationsund Kommunikarionsdienste-Gesetz ("JuKDG") (OJ). Ce texte comprend trois nouvelles lois:

(")

e
6

)

(")
(;oJ

(")
(OC)

(")
(")
C'~)

BDSG. §§ 22-26.
Voir. par ex., Hessisches Datenscnutzgesetz., §§ 21-31.
BDSG, § 26.
BDSG. § 24.
BDSG, § 38.
BDSG, § 38.
BDSG, §(2).
BDSG, §§ 36-37.
Le pariement allemand a adopte ce texte ie 13 juin 1997 et II est entn~ en Yiglle~lr te Ie, aout 1997. On
peut Pobtenir it lladresse suivante: http://www.Hd.de.
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1) la loi relative aux teleservices, 2) la loi relative a la protection des donnees dans Ie cadre
des leleservices, et 3) la loi relative a la signature numerique. II comprend egalement des
amendements apportts a plusieurs textes, leis que Ie code penal et la loi relative au droit
d'auteur (").
L'IuKDG a gen<;\rnlement "te accue;1Ii comme un textc n'uss; sur In protection des donnees.
Le commissaire federal charge de la protection des donnees, M. Joachim Jacob, a salue cette
10i en affmnant qu' elle " ne [,xe pas la reglementation dans un cadre de statu quo, mais elle
encourage de maniere significative des developpements ulterienlS» ("'). Selon Hans-Ji.irgen
Garstka, Ie commissaire charge de 18 protection des donnees de Berlin, la promnlgation de ce
texte "ameliore cOllsiderablement la sitnation juridiqne de I'utilisateur particulier des
services multimedia » (").
L'IuKDG s'applique expressement anx services en iigne qui entrent dans Ie champ
d'app]ication de la definition des « teleservices)) figurant dans cette loi. La loi defmit les

(~4)

En adoptant P luKDG, I' Allemagne a ete une pionniere en matiere de regtementation des services en
ligne, Comme !'a declare JOrgen Rllttgers. Ie ;ninistre allemand de l'Education, de la Science, de la
Recherche et de In Technologie, l'luKDG "met en place les conditions prealables du passage d'une

societe industrlelle a une societe du savolL" Rede von Drluergen Ruetters MdB, 2. und 3. Lesung des
IUKDG
im
Deutschen
Bundestag
am
i 3.
Jun!
1997
in
Bonn,
http://www.lid.de/rahmenlrede 130697 ,l1tm\.

(("I)

(':.t,)

Comme Ie fait apparattre cette citation, J'une des

principales justifications de la reglementation des services en ligne est de nature eCQnomique.
L'luKDG precise que son objectlf "est de creer des conditions economiques uniformes pour les
diverses applications des services de communication et d'information electronique'l, luKDG, a.rticle
1er, paragraphe ler.
La notion de II conditions economiques uniformes" a ete expUcitee plus en detail par Ie Comite du
Bundestag pour l'Education. la Science. la Recherche, la Technologie et [,Evaluation des resultats de
la tecimo~ogie, Dans sa presentation de l'luKDG, ce Comite a scullgne qu'iI etait necessalre
"d>eliminer les obstacles au libre developpement des forces du march<: dans Ie secteur des nouveaux
services de communkatlon et d'information et de garantir ]'existence d'un cadre econornique
uniforme pour I'offre et I'utilisation de ces services", BeschluBempfehlung und Bericht des
Ausschusses fUr Blldt.:.ng, Wissenshaft, Forschung, Technologie und Technikfolgenabschlltzung (19.
Ausschufi), Ber)cht cler Abgeordneten Dr Mayer, Tauss. Kiper, Dr Laermann und Bierstadt 24 (19'17)
[ci-apres Ie rapport du ComiteJ, L1luKDG reg!emente les services en Hgne pour creer les conditions
preaiables necessaires au developpernent economique reussi de ce secteur.
L'luKDG contient egalement de puissantes dispositions sur 1a protection des donnees. Apres avoir
souligne les justifications economlques de rluKDG. Ie Comite du Bundestag a mis I'accent sur la
necessite d'a.dopter des mesures efficaces en matiere de protection des donnees. ld. La protection des
donnees dans Ie monde en ligne a ete considcree Comrne quctque chose d'absolumentessemiel pour
creer la confiance m!cessaire a {'utilisation etendue de ce media.
Berliner Datenschutz.beauftragter, Information zurn Dal.enschutz, Bereicn Recht 11,711.141.2 (l ~I aout
\991).
Berliner Datenscnutzbeauftrugter, information zum Datenschutz, Bereich Recht Ii, 71 L 14 1.2 (l>tf aoilt
1997).
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« teleservices)) comme etant « l'ensemble des services de communication et d'information
electronique qui sont conyus pour I'utilisation individuelle de donnees combinables telles
que des caracteres, des images ou des sons et qui sont bases sur la transmission par
telecommunication» ("). Comme cette definition l'indique dairement, ce texte ne concerne
pas les telecommunications proprement dites, lesquelles sont regies par d' autres lois, mais
une certaine utilisation des telecommunications, a savoir en vue de « I'utilisation
individuelle de donnees combinables » ("), Le gouvernernent federal a declare que Ie texte
reglementait « l'utilisation autunome el independante ( ... ) de donnees numerisees de
differentes formes de representations (par exemple, du texte, des graphiques, des langues,
des images, I'eneha'inement d'images, elc,) ("). De meme, lorsqu'ils onl presente Ie texte, les
membres du eomite legislatif responsable ant dee'.are qu'il reglementait <, des services
nouveaux dom l'utilisateur se sert de maniere individuelle en passant par les nouveaux
services d'information et de communication» (,'l.
La loi sur les t,'leservices ne s' applique cependam pas Ii ce que I' on nomme les « services
medias», Ces derniers sont reglementes par la Convention interLander relative aux services
medias qui est entree en vigueur Ie meme jour que !'luKDG ("). La Convention interLander
relative aux services medias est un traite fonde sur la competence des Lander dans Ie
domaine des medias de masse, Cette cOllvention canclue entre les Lander allemands
reglemente les nouveaux medias tels que les informations de In presse electronique, les

(")
(")
(")
(")

(")

IuKDG, alticle Ier, paragraphe 2, alinea I).

Id.
Drucksache 1317385 (page J 7),
Id, p. 25.
La 101 sur ies teh~services, qui constitue fa premiere partie de J'[uKDG. fournit egalement des
exemples precis des types de services auxquels eHe s'appliquc. Cette liste de services en ligne entrant
dans Ie champ d'application de la loi n'cst pas exhaustive, La loi sur les teleservices dispose que les

services concernes "'comprennent notamment" cinq groupes generaux;
Ill. services proposes dans Ie domaine de la communicatIOn individueBe (par ex., banque a distance,
echange de donnees).
"2, services proposes pour \'information et la communication a moins que !'accent soit mis sur
I'organisation editoriale pour que Je public se fasse une opinion (services de donnees fournissant des
renseignements sur 1a circulation, Ie temps, I'environnement et 1a bourse. \a diffusion d'informations
sur les biens etservices),
"3. services fournis5ant ['acces a Internet ou it d'autres reseaux,
"4. services permettant d'acceder a des jeux a distance,
"5. biens et services proposes et figurant dans des bases de donnees acccssibies par la voie
electronique offrant un acces interactlf et la possibilite d1une commande directe, U
Les services en ligne sont soumis a la Joi, quel que 501t leur mode d'acces ~ payant ou gratult.
Staatsvertrag Uber Mediendienste, Drucksache 12/1954 [ci-apres "Convention interUinder sur les
services med las"].
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textes televises, Ie teieshopping ou Ie choix des programmes de television payante e'l. Ala
difference de 1'IuKDG. la Convention interUnder relative aux services medias porte sur les
medias de masse electronique qui ne necessitent pas que l'utilisateur manipule et combine
!'information C'). La Convention imerLander relative aux services medias comporte
ega/ement des dispositions relatives II la protection des donnees qui tement volontairement
de suivre celles de 1'luKDG en vue de fournir un niveau uniforme de protection de la vie
privee independamment de la qualification de « teleservice " ou de ({ seryice media» (,).
Dans un domaine, celui des dispositions concernant des audits independants en matiere de
protection des donnees, la Conventio\! interUinder relative nux services medias contient une
mesure supplt!mentaire importante concernant Ie caractere prive des donnees qui va au-dela
de ce qui est prevu par I'IuKDG (").

1.3.4.

Royaume-Uni

Le Royaume-!jni est une monarchie constitutionnelle el une democratic pariementaire. Le
chef du gouyemement du pays est Ie premier ministre qui dirige Ie parti politique ayant la
majorite Ii la Chambre des communes. Le pouvoir politique est concentre entre les mains du
premier ministre et du gouvemement. Le premier ruinistre choisit les membres du
gouyememem parmi les membres de son parti politique au Parlement.
La protection des donnees au Royaume-!jni est reglementee par Ie Data Protection Act (loi
relative it la protection des donnees) de 1984 C'). Au Royaume-!jni, Ie contr61e de la
protection des donnees est mene a bien par l'intermediaire du Data Protection Registrar
(Emite chargee de la protection des donnees) qui a Ie pouvoir, grlice a la procedure de
. declaration et asa competence, de poursuivre les infractions it 1a Data Privacy Act ("). Grace
a la procedure de declaration, Ie Data Protection Registrar peut envoyer une notification de
mise en demeure ordonnant it une personne de prendre des mesures specifiques pour se
conformer au Data Privacy Act, et, notamment, aux principes de la protection des donnees
C'). Les pouvoirs du Registrar lui permeltent d'emettre un avis de radiation qui annule tout
ou partie de I'inscription au registre. Enfin, Ie Registrar petit emeltre un avis d'interdiction

C:\

Convention interLlinder sur les services medias, § 2. Les seiz.e Uinder allemands ont toujours lin
pouvoir de reglementatLon en ce qui concerne les medias traditionnels. POUT un debat sur ces ques~ions
de competence dans ie federaUsme allemand a l'ere d'lntemet; volr Ralf R.oeger. Internet tlnd

C1)

Convention interU!nder SliT les services medias, § 2(2).
Convention interUinder sur les services medias, §§ 12-i7.

Verfassungsrecht, 1997 Zeitscbrift fur Rechtspolitik 2OJ.
C+)
(")

C')
(")

(")

Convention interLander sur les services medias, § 17.
Data Protection Act 1984, adopte Ie 12juillet 1984.
Data Protection Act 1984, lle Partie, aline .. 4 a20.
Id. aline. 10.
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de transfert qui interdit Ie transfert de donnees Ii caracti:re personnel vcrS I'etranger ("). Si Ie
Registrar delivre I'un de ccs avis, ]'utilisateur des dOlmees peut exercer un recours devant
une juridiction independante, Ie Data Protection Tribunal (so).
Le Registrar peut egalement poursuivre les personnes ayam enfreint Ie Data Privacy Act. Si
Ie Registrar a des motifs suffisants pour suspecter I'existence d'un delit ou de la violation
d'un principe, il peut demander un mandaI de perquisition afin de pouvoir penetrer 01 fouiller
tous lieux ("). Des poursuites peuvent egalement etre engagees pour defaut de declaration
("). Au cours de ]'annee la plus recente pour laquelle on dispose de donnees, Ie Registrar a
obtenu vingt-deux oondamnations contre des utilisateurs de donnees qui n' etaient pas
declares (BJ). En 1996, Ie Data Protection Registrar a, pour la premiere fois, engage des
poursuites dans une affaire d' obtention et de vente illegales de donnees, lesqueHes ont abouti
au prononce d'une oondamnation et d'une amende contre la personne concernee qui "tait un
detective priv'; atemps partie I (").

1.4. Methode
La methode utilisee pour I'analyse comparative de ces pays sera conforme II I'approche
« fonctionnelle » ("). Dans Ie cadre de celte analyse, nous chercherolls a identitier dans Ie
droit national les n!ponses reglementaires Ii l'ensemble des questions identifiees au debut de
ce rappon. Ces questions portent sur la problematique n§glementaire des services en ligne.
Pour chaque pays, I'analyse comparative s'appuie sur des rapports publics emanant de
I'autorite nationale chargee de la protection des donnees, sur des decisions reglementaires
publiees, sur des entretiens avec des membres de la commission de protection des donnees
pertinente, ainsi que sur des contacts avec d' autres experts nationaux et sur differentes etudes
europeennes et intemationale, (") ..

("')

(")

Id .• lineas lOa 12.
ld, alineas 13 et 14, Le Dalo Protectionaf Tribunal est compose d'un president, d'un
de membres representant les

inren~ts

vice~pTesidcnt et
des utillsateurs de donnees et des personnes concernees. Id. 1fe

Panie, stinea 3. Le Tribunal peut renverSer 18 decision du Registrar et Ysubstituer sa propre decision,
td, Ile Partie, aHnca 14. Pour une discussion. voir Data Protection Registrar, The Guidelines Third

Series 10 (1994).
(")

Id. alinea 16 et annexe 4.
ld. aline. 19.
Data Protection Registrar, The Thirteenth Annual Report 45 (1997).

(")

News Release, http://www.open.goY.ukJdpr/news.htm

(")

Voir Paul Schwartz & Joel R, Reidenberg Data Privacy Law: A Study of U,S. Data Protection,

(")

(")

j

24~25

(Michie: 1996).
. (")

Joel Rcidenberg s'est consac:n! a Panalyse portant sur Ja Belgique et ta France, et Paul Schwartz s'est
consacre a 11analyse de l' Allemagne et du Royaume~Uni.
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I
Des lars que les reponses nationales aux problemes souleves par les services en ligne
semblen! dans l'ensemble simplement commencer Ii apparattre, cette etude, dans Ie cadre
d'une approche fonctionnelle, examine egalement d'autres regles existant en matiere de
protection des dOlmees qui peuvent fourn;r des orientations quant au trait.mem des services
en ligne, Par ailleurs, dans la meSUre au des regles specifiques de protection des donnees
pour les services en ligne sont en cours de developpement dans les pays eonsiden,s, I'analyse
du pays s'efforee d'.xaminer ees actions de reglementation emergentes. En I'absence
d'actions ou d'initiatives de reglementation speciliques, l'opinion des autorites chargees de
la protection des donnees, des responsables publics et d'autres experts ont egalement tte
exanlinees afin de presenter des conclusions sur les perspectives existant actuellement en ce
qui concerne Ie traitement des services en Iigne conformement aux regles de droit existantes.

2.

LES REPONSES JURI DIQUES EN EUROPE

Dans la presente section, nOUs procederons II une evaluation actuelle des reponses apportees
en Europe par la reglementlltion aux questions de protection des donnees posees par les
services en Iigne. Cette evaluation sem articulee autour d'une serie de questions
fondamentales et recurrentes relatives a I'application des principes de protection des donnees
aux services en iigne, Les deux premieres sous-sections traiteront des questions de
competence et de juridiction. Dans un premier temps, l'analyse considerera Ie champ
d'application materiel de la legislation relative a la protection des donnees pour ses le,ons en
matiere de competence sur les flux de donnees disparates lies aux tlombreux services en
Iigne, Par exemple, dans la mesure OU les activites des services en Iigne peuvent eviter
d'utiliser ou de creer des" donnees II caractere personnel» grace a l'anonymat, les regles
relatives a la protection des donnees peuvent etre entierement inapplicables.
Ensuite, I'examen des questions de juridiction portera sur l'applicabilite territoriale des
droits, des obligations et du controle en matiere de protection des donnees. Dans cette soussection, nous tenterons de determiner comment les entires chargees de 13 reglementation de
la protection des donnees nlagissent face aux activit"s simllllllnees entreprises sur Internet Ii
l' "tranger et localement. Ces reactions se manifesteront a travers des declarations de
traitement et des controles des aUlorit"s.
La troisieme sous-section analyse des questions liees a In transparence, telles que les
questions de la notification et du consentement, ainsi que la question du droit d'acees et de
rectification des donnees erronees qui appartient it la personne concemee. Dans cette section,
nous tenterons notamment de com prendre comment les quatre pays differents qui nous
occupent mettent en reuvre ees regles compte tenu de I'utilisation decentmlisee, diversifiee el
complexe de l'infonnation sur Internet.
La sous-section suivante portera sur l'etablissement de profils de comportement de
I'utilisateur et I'utilisation des donnees sensibles, Dans cette anaJyse, nous nous efforcerons
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de determiner comment les questions relatives it la finalite, au consentement et
conservation des dOlmees sont traitees dans ces quatre pays.

a

la

Pour finir, la derniere sous,section traitera des questions de securite. Compte tenu de
I'importance vitale dc la cryptographic pom Ie commerce electronique et du vigoureux debat
sur la possibilite d'acceder aux dOimees du reseau pour les autorites chargees de la silrete
d'Etat et de la repression de la criminalite, il est essentiel de proceder a I'analyse du cadre de
la protection des donnees sur ces questions.

a

2,1. Competence: champ d'application materiel des «donnees
caractere personnel» et des informations provenant des traces des
connexions

Question seuil de la competence legale, la reglementation de la protection des donnees ne
s'applique qu'au traitemont des « donnees ii caractere personnel». La Directive 951461CE
definit les « donnees it caractere personnel" comme etanl:
Toute Infonnation concernant une perSOlme physique identifiee ou identifiable
(( personne concernee»}; est reputee identifiable une personne qui peut etre
identifiee, directement ou indirecternent, notamrnent par reference it un nurnero
d'identification ou il un ou plusieurs elements specitiques, propres a son identite
physique, physiologique, psychique, economique, culturelle ou sociale (").
Pour ce qui concerne les services en ligne, repondre a la question de savoir si des
informations particulieres ont trait a une « personne identifiable)) ne sera certainement pas
simple. Ainsi, une adresse IP dynumigue est un numero de routage numerique uniquement
associe a une seance specifique sur Internet et a un ordinateur particulier utilise pour cette
seance. Un fournisseur de service Internet peut associer l'adresse numerique a un abonne
precis. Cependant, les sites qui sont visit!!s par I'utilisateur peuvent uniquement associer
r adresse nurnerique au fournisseur de service Internet. Ell I' absence d' autres informations
obtenues so it par divulgation de I'utilisateur (aB), soit par Ie fournisseur de service Internet, Ie
serveur visit':: par I'utilisateur ne peut pas identifier precisement I'utilisateuL En revanche,
une adresse IP fixe identifiera toujours Ie meme ordinateur particulier pour chaque seance
sur Internet et I'identite du proprietaire sera en general ala disposition de tous ("),

(")
(M)

(g,,)

Directive 95/46/CE, article 2, alinea a).
Cette divulgation peut cependant se faire sans que i'utilisateur Ie sache. Par exemp!e, une adresse
e·mail stockee dans le navigateuf de I'utilisateur peut etre lransrnise a Ull site vlsite.
Les inscriptions de nom de domaine et tes tables de routage peuvent etre utilisees com me un alllluuire
inverse pennettant d'identifier Ie proprietaire de l'ordio'3teur titulaire d'une adresse tP fixe.

25

Dans les considerants de la Directive 95f46fCE, il est precise qu' «iI convient de considerer
I'ensemble des moyens susceptibles d'etre raisonnablement mis en reuvre, soit par Ie
respons.ble du rraitement, soit par une autre personne pour identifier ladite personne» ("),
Dans lesdits considlirants, il est egalement indique que les regles de protection des donnees
ne s'appliquent pas" aux donnees rendues anonymes d'une maniere telle que la personne
concernee n'est plus identifiable» ("), Ces deux n\gles d'interpretation montrent que la
definition du champ d'application de I'expression « donnees a caractere personnel»
constitue une question essentielle pour Ie tra[tement des services en ligne. La Commission
europeenne estime ainsi que rendre les donnees anonymes peut etre un moyen de preserver Ie
respect de la vie privee dans Ie contexte du COmmerce elecrroniquc et les Blats membres
envisagent de leur cote la mise en place de" protecteurs d'identite » ("). Cependant, pour ce
qui concerne la n!glementalion de la protection des donnees, la methode consistant II rendre
les donnees anonymes ou Ii dissimuler la veritable identite de l'utilisateur peut faire l'objet
d'interpretations nalionales differenles et elle suppose done des obligations variables,
Outre la question seuil de sa definition, la juridiction territoriale de la loi nationale relative a
la protection des donnees sur les donnees generees par les traces des connexions souleve une
deuxieme question essentielle, La Directive 95/46!CE comporte une disposition de base en
matiere de choix de la legislation applicable ("). Cependant I'attribution de la responsabilite
concernant les donnees generees par les traces des connexions peut etre plus difficile A
determiner. Les donnees generees par les traces des connexions dans Ie cadre des activites en
ligne sont initialement trailees par un fournisseur d'acces Internet ou de service. Les bits et
les bytes sont alors partages par une myriade de parties qui participent aux transactions du
service en ligne. La localisation des activites de traitement concernees peut etre assez
variable. II s'ensuit que si plusieurs Btats membres estiment qu'i!s peuvent appliquer leur
legislation nationale a tout ou partie des donnees generees par les traces des connexions, cela
aura une repercussion signiticative sur Ie Jeveloppement des services en ligne,

(")
('11)
(4:l)

(")

Directive 951461CE, considerant 26,
Directive 95/46!CE~ considerallt 26.
Voir John Borking. Back (0 Anonymity-~ Privacy Enhancing Technologies in Proceedings of the 17th
International Conference of Data Protection Commissioners (Copenhagen: 1996)
Directive 951461CE, article 4,
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2.1.1.

I
I
I

[

I'

I

Belgique

La Belgique n'a aucune legislation sur la protection des donnees portant specifiquemem sur
les services en ligne, La loi generale sur la protection des dOlmees du 8 decembre 1992 (")
s'appliquera neanmoins aux informations utilisees dans Ie cadre des services en ligne, La
tendance de cette loi est contradictoire en cc qui concerne la couverture des informations a
caractere personnel par les regles de protection des donnees, En vertu de la loi g6nerale sur In
protection des donnees, les informations personnelles doivent repondre a deux criteres pour
entrer dans Ie champ d' application de la protection, En premier lieu, l'information doil avoir
un « caractere personnel » et concemer une « personne physique identifiee ou identifiable»
("), En second lieu, cette information doit etre integree dans un « fichier » defini comme un
ensemble de donnees Ii caracti"e personnel, constitue et conserve suivant une structure
logique pouvant permettre une consultation systematique ("), Cette notion de " fichier» fait
la distinction entre les informations conservees de maniere inoffensive et les informations a
caractere personnel soumises aux principes de protection des donnees ("), Les informations
qui ne sont conservees qn'i'! des fins de consultation occasionnelle ne sont pas susceptibles
d'etre protegees ("), Le traitement fortuit d'informations personnellement identifiables
n'enlre pas non plus dans Ie champ d'application de la loi (~, Les diverses dispositions
sectorielles en matiere de protection des donnees qui figurent dans d'autres lois, telles que la
loi relative au credit Ii la consomrnation (10,), ne contiennent pas de regles specifiques aux
services en ligne relativement Ii la definition des « informations a caractere personnel» ou au
traitement des donnees generees par les actions de souris,
Contrairement aux lois sur la protection des donnees d'autres pays, la loi beige contient une
serie de derogations Ii son application materielle, que des informations "a caractere
persOlmel» soientou non impliqu6es,· Ce's derogations ecartent en effet certains types

(~4)

(")

Loi cit) 8 decembre 1992 relative a ~a protection de la vie privee a I\~gard des traltements de donnees a
c'factere personnel, M,S" 18 mars J993, p, S801 a 5614 [ci.apres "Lol dv 8 decembfe 1992"].
Loi du 8 decembre J 992, article ler, § S, La C?V? observe que la definition tegale com porte trois
elements: 1) des donnees; 2) concernant une persanne pbysique; et 3) cette personne physique dolt
eIre identifiee ou identifiable, CPV?, Rapport d'activi'. 1992·1993, p, 24 (1997),

a caractere

CU)

Commission de la protection de la vie privee, Protection des donnees
Belgique; Quelle CommiSSIon? Pour quelie vie privee'? p, 2 (3 mai1993).

(")

Voir, par exemple, CPV?, Rapport d'activit. 1994·1995, p, 13 (1997); CPVP, Rapport d'activire
1996, p, 28-29 (1997),
Dans un arret recent, la Cour de Cassation a refuse d'appliquer la loi relative a la proteetion des
donnees a un dossier de candidature. Cour de Cassation au 16 mai 1997. Voir egalement CPVP,
Revue de Presse Septembre 1997. p. a (eitant Alain Heyrendt\ Un dossier de candidature n'est pas un
fleier, L. libre Belgique et publiant I'arrel),
Voir l'arrSt de la Cour d'appet d'Anvers. iere chambre, 27 septembre 1995, cite dans Ie rapport
d'.ctivit. pour 1996 de I. CPVP, p, 28-29 (1997)
Loi du 12 juin 1991 relative au credit a. la consommation.

(~6)

(0'1)
(IU(l)
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personnel en
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d'informations du domaine des informations II caractere personnel reglementees. La loi
relative it la protection des donnees ne s'applique 110tamment pas aux categories de donnees
suivantes:
•

celles qui sont exclusivement destilltles a un usage prive, familial ou domestique;

•

celles qui font J'objel d'une publicit.: en vertu d'une disposition legale ou
n!glementaire;

•

celles doni la personne a laquelle elles se rapportenl assure ou fail assurer la
publieit,;, pour autan! que Ie traitement respecte la linalite de cettc publicit";

•

celles traitoes conformement it la loi relative Ii la statistique publique (101).

\

L'exclusion des informations rendues publiques par la personne concernee sera
probablement impOltante dans Ie cadre des services en ligne. En effet, cette derogation ,;carte
certaines « donnees publiques » de la categorie des « informations it caractere personnel»
(10'). Bien que la derogation soit limitee par la lina!ite de l'objectif public Co'), Ie fait de
participer a des reseaux ouverts tels qu'lnternet debouche souvent sur la publication d'autres
informations Ii caractere personneL A titre d'exemple, l'affichage d'un message envoye a un
groupe de discussion associe publiquement I'identite de la personne au contenu du message
et au sujet traite par Ie groupe de discussion. Les services en ligne vonl ainsi deplacer Ie
debat sur Ie terrain de la linalite de la publication plutot que sur celui des aspects
identifiables de l'information, et ce afm de determiner si la loi est applicable aux donnees.

11 eSI difficile de savoir exactement dans quelle mesure la loi beJge reglemente Ie traitement
des informations cles liees aux services en ligne, telles qu'une adresse IP ou que des donnees
generees par les traces des connexions. Aucune indication claire ne resulte des dispositions
legales, des arretes royaux ou de la Commission de protection de la vie privee (<< CPVP))) en
ce qui concerne la nature identifiable des donnees liees aux services en ligne. Les regles
relatives a I'identification du numero appeJant foumiront en general une orientation utile
pour la determination du champ d'application des « informations a caractere personnel».
Toutefois, ces services viennent juste de faire leur apparition en Belgique. Pour Ie moment,
1a CPVP a choisi de ne pas publicr d'orientations offlcielJes relativement it !'identification de
l'iniatcur de PappeL Ainsi, dans Ie rapport alIDue1 de 1996, 1a CPVP tente de proposer

COl)
(102)

(I'll)

Lai du 8 de-cembre 1992, article 3 1 paragraphe 2.
CPVP, Recommandation nl) 02/93 du 7 septembre 1993 (appliquant 1a loi a Ia vente coml'nerdaie de
listes d'adresses fealisee par BELGACOM et constltuant une violation de In finalite de la publication
initiale de ces adresses.)
CPVP, Rapport d'actiYite 1994.1995, p, 48 (1997).
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I'annnymat camme principe de base des communicfi!'ans ti:lephoniques et elle observe que
toute personne doit pouvoir faire un appel sans communiquer son propre numero (104). Puis,
la CPVP indique simplement que ce probleme n'est actuellement train; par aucune
reglementalion. La CPVP est toutefois en discussion avec Belgacom, la compagnie nationale
du teJepl1:one, en vue d'elaborer des brochures expliquant Ie contenu des services mis it la
disposition des abolmes au telephone.
D'autre part, Ie champ d'application de la loi beIge semble meme englober Ie traitemenl des
donnees anonymes. Bien que la loi sur la protection des donnees exclue Ie trajtement des
informations iI caraetere personnel « rendues anonymes dans Ie but exclusif d'etablir et de
diffuser des statistiques anonymes» ('os), cette derogation coneeme uniquement les
dispositions de la loi relatives au droit d'information, d'acces et de rectitication (''"). La
derogation ne s' applique pas aux autres obligations prevue, par la loi sur la protection des
dOllllees telles que l'exigence d'une declaration (,07). Cela permet de pcnser que l'anonymat
ne suffira pas a ecarter completement Ie traHement de l' information du champ d' application
des principes de 1a protection des donnees, et la loi sur la protection des donnees pourra done
rcglementer ce qui est a un autre point de vue considere comme une donnee anonyme. Par
ailleurs, en vertu de la loi, I'objectif del' anonymat est fondamental aux fins de la derogation:
les dorm';es doivent avoir ete rendues anonymes dans Ie but de diffuser des statistiques.
Ainsi, une operation de paiement anonyme faite sur Internet n'aura pour objectif la diffusion
de statistiques et elle ne satisfera probablement done pas aux conditions de In derogation.
Cependant, la CPVP reconnait que la loi sur la protection des donnees ne doit pas
s'appliquer aux donnees anonymes COB). La CPVP a toutefois observe que des donnees ne
peuvent etre considerees comme veritablement anonymes II moins que Ie choix du critere
(par ex,emple, Ie lieu, l'age, etc.) empeche la personne chargee du traitement d'identitier la
personne concemee sans effort partieulier ('"'). La CPVP ne s'est pas particulierement
attardee sur la notion d' «effort particulier». Elle a cependant declare que pour determiner
l'existence d'un anonymat veritable, elle chercherait a savoir si la persorme chargee du
traitement peut disposer de toute autre information en provenance de sources externes ("0).
De celte fa,on, si nne information exteme cst disporuble et peut permettre d'aboutir Ii une reidentification de la personne concernee, la donnee ne peut etre consideree comme anonyme.
En consequence de cette interpretation stricte de i'anonymat, les traces electroniqtles laissees
it la suite de la visite des services en ligne peuvent les empecher d'etre structures de fa,on

("')
("')
(''')
(l1l1)

COB)

CPVP,Rapportd'.ctivite 1996,p.61 (1997).
Lai du 8 d.combre 1992, arlicle II.
Lai du 8 decembre 1992, anicle It.
Voir infra 2.2.2.
CPVP, Recommandation nil 0 tl96 du 23 septembre 1996 a propos de l'analyse de In consommation de

medicaments en Belgique basee sur des informations issues des prescriptions medicales, p, 5

C")
('w)

Id.
Id.
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suffisamment anonyme. Par exemple, une adresse IP permettra generalement de remonter
jusqu'it la personne concernee.
Contrairement it la portee limitee de la categorie des informations anonymes, Ia notion de
{( fichier}) peut conduire Ii eliminer d'importants traitements de donnees effectues dans Ie
cadre des services en ligne du champ d'application des principes de protection des donnees.
Corome precedemmen! observe dans cette etude, les informations relatives aux personnes
connectees en ligne sont fortement decentralisees et tres souples en Ce qui concerne la
structure de l'organisation du traitement de I'information. Ces caracteristiques techniques
vont it l' encontre de la definition de r information conservee pour une consultation
systematique suivant une structure logique; les bases de donnees dynamiques peuvent en fait
ne pas avoir de veritable «structure» et In consultation peut etre ad hoc plut6t que
systematique au sens de la loi. Par exemple, l'utilisation de l'un des nombreux moteurs de
recherche, tels que Lyeos, Hotbot au Excite. disponibles sur Ie World Wide Web entraine
une consultation ad hoe des informations conservees sur differents sites sans aucune
structure particulierement pertinente eu egard au critere de recherche, Par consequent:, 111
portee materielle de la 101 sur la protection des donnees est quelque peu ambigue en ce qui
concerne les services en ligne. Ce manque de clarte implique, par exemple, que les bases de
donnees dynamiques peuvent eehapper nux regies belges sur la protection des donnees.

2.1.2.

France

Le regime fran,ais de la loi relative it la protection des donnees ne comporte nl disposition
specifique Ii Internet, ni definition legale precisante expressement I'etendue de la categoric
des ({ donnees it caractere personnel » dans Ie cadre des services en ligne. Neanmoins, la loi
a vocation generale relative it la protection des donnees - Loi n° 78-17, du 6 janvier 1978,
d6finit Ie type de donnees susceptibles d'etre traitees comme des informations a carac1ere
personnel d'une fayon tres large. De leurs parts, la CNIL et Ie Conseil d'Etat (\1') ont rendu
des decisions importantes confirmant la nature extensible du champ d'application de cette
10i. On peut en conclure qu'un tres grand nombre d'activites de traitement d'informations
dans Ie cadre des services en ligne seront soumises aux droits et obligations de la loi
franyaise relative it la protection des donnees. En consequence, la loi fran,aise relative Ii la
protection des donnees peut s'appliquer a un ensemble d'informations circulant sur Internet
plus vaste que celui auquel peuvent s'appliquer d'autres legislations europeennes sur la
protection des donnees, notaroment la legislation britannique (''').

ell)
(Hl)

Le Conseil d'Etat est lajuridiction supreme de ]!ordre administratif en France. Les recours contre les
decisions de la CN1L peuvent ~tre introduits devant Ie Conseil d'Etat.
Voir infra 2.1-.3.
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Cependant, en meme temps, la tendance observee en ce qui concerne la protection des
donnees et les services en Iigne en France semble contraindre la voie a un retrecissement du
champ d'application de la loi tran.,:aise SUr la protection des donnees. La politique emergente
de la CNIL en ce qui concerne Internet s'efforce de promouvoir I'anonymat comme moyen
de protection de I'individu sur les informations personnelles Ie concernant. Cet anonymat
peut etre aussi utilise pour differencier les activites de commerce electronique mettant en jeu
des droits fondamentaux de celles qui n'entrent pas dans Ie champ d'application de la
protection des donnees.

I
!

La loi nO 78·17 qualifie une infOiroation de « nominative» si, d'une fayon au d'une autre,
elle pelroet directement ou indirectement d'identifier une personne physique ("'). Dans Ie
contexte des services en ligne, Ie fait qu'une information permette de remonter jusqu'" une
personne determinee peut permettre de dasser cette information dans la categorie des
informations ({ nominatives », meme 8i en l'occurrence l'entite qui traite I) information ne
connait pas ]' identite de la personne concern"e. Pour les informations qui permettent
d'identiller indirectement une personne, la loi franyaise ne distingue pas entre les
informations qui peuvent facilement eIre associees Ii nne persomle et les informations qui ne
peuvent etre assoeiees it une persomle qu'" l'aide de moyens extraordinaires ou avec la
cooperation de tiers. En revanche, la politique de la Directive 95/46/CE eherche a limiter Ie
champ d'application des informations « indirectement» identifiables a celles qui peuvent
raisonnablement etre associees a une personne identifiee (""). En effet, aux tennes des
dispositions legales fran,aises, si I'information peut etre associee a uue personne,
l'information sera consideree comme une donnee nominative; la loi sur la protection des
donnees s'appliquera 11 toute personne elfectuant Ie traitement de cette donnee indirectement
identifiable.
Les interpretations de la eNIL confirme la definition large et l'application extensible de la
loi fran9aise. Dans une publication qui resume ses dix premieres annees d'experience quant 11
la loi relative II la protection des donnees, la CNIL a expressemem declare qu'elle donnait
une interpretation tres large de la notion" d'informations nominatives» (,"). Ainsi, la CNIL
a meme indique que Ie numero de telephone et l'adresse du lieu de prise en charge indiques a
l'occasion d'une demande de taxi sont des informations indirectement nominatives, sans
chercher Ii savoir si Ie numero de telephone correspond au nom de la personne ayant

(Ill)

(''')
(IlS)

Los nG78-17 du 6janviel', 197&, article 4 «tsont reputees nominatives au sens de 18 presente loi les

informations qui permettent, sous quelque forme que ce sOlt, directement ou non, 1'identification des
personnes physiques auxquelles eiles s'appllqueno})
Directive 9S1461C8, considerant 26.
CN[L. Dix ans d'informatique et IIbertfs, p. 42 (1988).
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demande Ie taxi ou si I' adresse du lieu de prise en charge peut etre associee
donm;e ("'),

a une personne

Une serie de decisions de 1997 montro que 1a CNIL tend :\ reprendre cette philosophic
extensible pOUI' les services en ligne, En vertll de son pouvoir de controler les traitements de
donnees open!s dans Ie secteur public ("'), la CNIL a examine une serie de trois demandes
pn;sentees par des entites publiques qui demandaient l' autorisation de creer des sites web sur
Internet et des eonnexions Internet (""), Dans trois de Ces decisions, 1a CNIL a aborde la
question de la conservation d,es fichiers d'audit des utilisateurs neeessaire Ii des fins de
securite et elle a souligne que ces fichiers ne devaient eontenir que I'adresse IP de chaque
visiteur, Ie nom de domaine de ehaque visiteur, la rcquete page web consultee par Ie
visiteur - et la date et l'heure de la requete (' "), Bien que Ie foumisseur de serviee Internet du
visiteur puisse determiner l'identite de l'utilisateur particulier Ii panir de cette information,
les sites web eux-memes n'auront pas acces :\ cette information concernant I'identite,
Neanmoins, la CNIL a observe avec satisfaction que ees fichiers d'audit des utilisateurs
seralent effaces apres l'ecoulement de quinze jours (""), Lorsqu'eUe examine la finalit" des
fiehiers d'audit des utilisateurs et qu'elle approuve leur elimination apres une courte periodc
de temps, la CNIL traite implicitement la donnee consideree comme s'il s'agissait d'une

(IH.)

en)

(H$,)

eO)
J

("')

Voir deliberation nil 90-93 du 10 juillet 1990 portant adoption d'une recommandation concernant les
traitements automatlses mis en ceuvre par les societes de taxis. publiee tiU J.O. Infonnatiques et
Ubertes n° 1473 (1991). D'apres cette recommandmion, la CNJL semble considerer que Padresse du
lieu de prise en charge situee sur les Champs Elysees et le numero de telephone d'un restaurant sont
des informations nominatives pour la personne qui demande Ie taxi, n1eme 51 ni rune ni I'autre ne
peut etre associee a une personne determinee sans information complementaire.
Loi nO n;·17 du 6 janVier, 1978. article ]5 (aux termes duquel I'avis motive de 18 CNIL est exige
avant ta mise en reuvre de traitement5 automatises d'jnformations operes pour Ie secteur public).
Voir deliberation ni) 97~051 du 30 juin 1997 concernant une demande d'avis presente par la Mairie de
Paris relative a un traiternent d'informations nominatives mis en ceuvre dans Ie cadre du site Internet
de la Ville de Paris: deliberation nil 97~050 du 24 juin 1997 relative a Une demande d'avis presente par
France Teit:com concernant un traitement automatise d'informations nominatives denomme
«Minitelneb>; deliberation nQ 97-32 du 6 mai 1997 relative a In demande d'avis presentee par ie
premier ministre concernant un modele-type de traitements d'jnformations nominatives operes dans Ie
cadre d'un site Internet ministiSTiel: deliberation nil 97~009 du 4 fevrier 1997 relative a In demande
d'avis du Service d~information du Gouverneme!lt concernant le traitement d'jnformations
nomjoatives opere dans Ie cadre du site Internet du Premier Minlstre et du Gouvernement
Voir deliberation 0" 97-{}51 du 30 jutn 1997 COncernant une demande d'avis presentee par la Mairie
de Paris relative a UIj traitement d!informations nominatives mis en a:uvre dans Ie cadre du site
Internet de In Vine de Paris; deliberation n° 97~32 du 6 mai 1991 relative n In demande dJavis
presentee par Ie premier rninistre concernant un mod~le-type de traitements d'informations
nominatives Open!5 dans Ie cadre d'un site internet mlnisreriel; deliberation nl> 97-009 du 4 f6vrier
1997 relative a la demande d'avis du Service d'joformation du Gouvernement concernant Ie
traitement d'intbrmations nominatives opere dans Ie cadre du site Internet du Premier Minisu<e et du
Gouvernement.
ld.

infonnation nominative soumise a la limitation de la duree de conservation prevue par la loi
relative it la protection des donnees. Celle conclusion est dans ill logique de la qualification
d'informations it caractere personnel des informations foumies dans Ie cadre des reservations
telephoniques de trod. Dans I'ensemble, Ces decisions permettent de penser que la CNIL peut
considerer toute adresse IP, fixe au dynamique, et toute donnee resultant des traces des
cannexions, Camme constituant une information nominative pour les destinataires au les
detenteurs de cette infannation.
De meme, les representants de la CNIL estiment que les informations {( cookies» ('21) sont
des infonnations nominatives puisque les serveurs web installent ces informations sur les PC
des visiteurs afin d'identifier lesdits visiteurs lorsqu'ils reviennent sur Ie site. Bien que la
CNIL n'ai! pas rendu de decision portan! expressement sur les « cookies », I'autorisation
qu' elle a donnee aux sites web officiels ne leur donnen! pas Ie droit d' installer des
« cookies » sur les disques durs des visiteurs ("'). Les « cookies" ne permettent cependant
pas d'identifier un utilisateur particulier; la donnee correspond II I'utilisation d'un ordinateur
particuHer pluto! qu'a I'utilisation faite par une personne detenninee. En revanche, pour etre
capable d'identifier un utilisateur determine, I'information contenue dans Ie fichier doit etre
associee a une autre donnee telle qu'une inscription sur Ie site web (''').
Par ailleurs, la CNIL a clairement exprime son opinion sur I' anonymat, laquelle est
extr.!mement importante en ce qui concerne rapplication des principes de protection des
dOllnees au commerce electronique. Pour ce qui conceme les traces electroniques associees a
un groupe de personnes, les infonnations ne seront pas considerees comme anonymes si Ie
nombre des personnes dans Ie groupe est trop petit. La CNIL a ainsi rejete une proposition de
systeme intelligent dans Ie domaine du transport en partie au motif qu'il reposait sur la
collecte et Ie pistage de donnees correspondant a des numeros de plaques d'imrnatriculation
('''). Dans son avis, Ia CNIL a insist" sur Ie fait que les citoyens avaient Ie droit de se

(m)
("')

("')

('24)

Voir Ire partie, 1.3,2 (description complete des ((cookies»)
Voir deliberation nO 97·051 du 30 juin t997 concernant une demande d'avis presentee par la Mairie
de Paris relative a un traitement d'informations nominatives mis en lXuyre dans Ie cadre du site
[nternet de 1£1 Ville de Paris; deliberation n{t 97 ..32 du 6 mai 1997 relattve a la demande d1~wis
presentee par Ie premier ministre cOncernant un modele-type de traitements d'informadons
nominatives operes dans Ie cadre d'un site [nternet ministeriel: deliberation nO 97-009 du 4 fevrier

1997 relative a la demande d'avis du Service dtlnformation du Gouvernement concernant Ie
traitement d'jnformations nominatives opere dans Ie cadre du site lntemet du Premier Ministre et du
Gouvemement
[I s'agit d'une pratlque de plus en plus frequente sur Jes sites web. Voir Deuxieme Partie. etude du cas
du New York Times.
Deliberation nO 96*069 du 10 septembre 1996 relative it la demande d'avis portant creation it titre
experimental d'un traitement automatise d'infonnations nominatives ayant pour tinalite princlpale la
lecture automatique des plaques d'immatriculation des venicules en mouvement par la societe des

.utoroutes Poris-Rhin-Rh6ne (SAPR).
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deplacer de maniere anonyme sur les routes pubJiques. Cependant, les numeros des plaques
d'immatriculation ne sont qu'indirectement lies aux conducteurs; Ie numero de plaque
d'immatriculation identifie uniquement Ie propri"taire de la voiture et pas la personne qui
conduil r"eHement cette voiture. Le fait de traiter I" numero de plaque d'immatriculalion
comme une donnee Ii caractere personnel pour Ie veritable conducteur de la voiture signifie
que cette iniormation correspondant it un pelit groupe de personnes (Ies conducteurs
possibles d'une voiture determinee) ne peut etre traitee comme si elle etail anonyme, mais
doit etre consideree comme une information « nominative ».
De la meme fa, on, la CNIL a interprete I'etendue de la notion d'infonnation nominative it
des fins de recherche statistique. Dans ses premieres decisions, elle a consider'; que les
donnees issues du recensement etaient sutflSlllnment anonymes il un niveau d'agregation
superieur Ii. 5 000 personnes (,"). Plus n!cemment, In CNIL a autorise la diffusion de donnees
issues du recensement pour un projet de recherchc universitaire rassemblanl des informations
portant sur scalement i 50 personnes dans un groupe relativement homogene (,"). Cetle
approche montre qu'i1 est possible qu'a ravenir la CNIL traite differemment les adresses IP
dynamiques el les adresses IP fixes. Une adresse IP dynamique correspond beaucoup plus il
une agregation de donnees statistiques pour tout destinataire autre que Ie foumisseur de
service Internet des lors que I'adresse consider"e peut etre celle de n'importe lequel des
millions d'abonnes du foumisseur de service Internet. Une adresse IP dynamique noie
I'identite de l'abonne dans la masse de tous Ies abonnes du fuurnisseur de service.
Par contraste avec ces decisions, les avis de la CNIL sur I'identification de I'appelant laissent
supposer qu'en vertu de la loi fran,aisc relative a la protection des donnees toutes les
adresses IP peuven! etre traitees comme des infurmations nominatives. Dans un premier
temps, la CNIL a refuse d'autoriser France Telecom, la compagnie nationale du telephone,
de reveler taus Ics details des appels aux abonnes arm de proteger les informations

(m)

Vo;r CNIL, 16e Rapport d'act;vite, p. 378-382 (1996). L';nterdiction speciale de divulguer des

donnees issues du recensement a des niveaux d'agn!gation inferieurs a 5000 personnes a cependant
fait I'objet d'un recours devant 1e Conseil d'Etat pour vice de forme de la procedure administrative,
lequel a
juge bien fonde. Voir arret du Consoli d'etat du 26 Juillet, 1996; CNIL, 17e Rapport
d'activite, p" 33,-34 (1997). Une autre decision relative a [a cession de donnees issues du recensement
autorlse des agregations de donnees sous forme de tableaux comportant des rubriques determinces
pour des usages specifiques dans un cas au la reidentiflcation des persannes. bien que possible. est
interdite par une "licence d'usage", Deliberation n" 93~092 du 12 oeLobre 1993 portant avis sur la
demande presentee par PINSEE. relative a In diffusion des donnees agregees issues de I'exploitation
du recensement general de la population de 1990, dans CN1L, 14e Rapport d'act;v;t", p. 212-215
(1994), Dans des decisions anterieures prises dans Ie cadre d'enquetes epldemiologiques. l! a ete
consider€: que des agregations de donnees ne permettant pas I'identification de groupes de moins de 5
personnes seraient traitees comme des informations anunymes. VOir CNlL, Dix ans d'informatique et
liberto, p. 49 (198S).
CN1L, 17e Rapport d'ac.iv;te, p. 33-34 (1997).

"II,

(''')
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concernant les autres personnes vivant dans Ie foyer concerne (,"). Ulterieurement, la CNIL
a autarise la divulgation de ces informations a des fins uniquement liees au compte de
r abonne. Bien que ies donnees de facturation concernent r abonne, puisque ce dernier doit
payer ies communications, lesdites donnees de facturation n'indiquent pas implicitement qui
a passe I' appe!. Des informations supplementaires doivent otre obtenues par J' abo nne pour
faire indirectement Ie lien entre l'operation et une personne vivant dans Ie foyer concerne
susceptible d'avoir passe rappel telephonique. A maints "gards, l'information permettant
d'identifier l'auteur de !'appe! ressemb!e it une adresse IP dynamique. Un fournisseur de
service internet attribue un numero temporaire il son abonne et toute personne recevant ce
numoro, tels que les sites Web visites, saura uniquement que ce numero appartient au
foumisseur de service internet Seul Ie fournisseur de service Internet qui detient des
informations supplementaires peut faire Ie lien entre l' adresse et un abo nne.
Pour resumer, 1a loi fran,.ise reiative a ia protection des donnees et ia doctrine de 1a CNIL
ne permettent gwhe de faire de difference, au sein des flux d'informations sur internet, entre
ies informations anonymes qui n'entrent pas dans ie champ d'application des rogles de
protection des donnees et ies informations identifiables soumises 11 r ensemble des droits et
obligations. Dans io mesure au ies dOlmees resultant des traces des connexions permettent en
definitive de remanter jusqu'a une personne, chaque eiement d'une teUe donnee semble eire
une « information Ii caracti"e personnel» quelle qu'en soit la source. Les difficultes
pratiques et les elements d'incitation qui empechent concretement de remonter jusqu'a des
personnes determinees a partir des donnees resultant des traces des connexions apparaissent
comme sans importance.
Toutefois, !a France semble etre confront':e II une contradiction compte tenu de la definition
large de. !a notion d'information a caractere personnel et de ia tendance fran,aise recente a
encourager ies services en tigne anonymes. La CNIL semble defendre vigoureusement ia
solution de l'anonymat comme moyen susceptible d'etre utilise pour proteger les dormees
dans i' environnement du "'seau. Ainsi, la CNIL a. recemment critique un forum de
discussion sur Internet organise par les services financiers d'une entite, au motif qu'it ne

(ll1)

Dans un premier temps, la CNJL a nutorise 18 mention sur la facture de l'aOOmlt! des numeros
composes uniquement SI leurs quatre derniers chifTres etaient occultes afin de preset'Ver I'anonymat du
correspondant. DeHberation n° 82-.. 104 du 6 Juillet) 1982. Plus nkemment, la CNlL a annule
I'obligatkm dtocculter les'derniers ch!ffres pourvu que I'aboone demande l'integralite des numeros
eomposes et s'engagenl a n'utiHser ces informations qU'a Itt seule fin de maitriser leur consommation
telephonique. Deliberation n{l 9S"(}OS relative ala de-mande de modification de traitement presentt par
France Telecom concernant la facturation detaillee; CNIL, 16e Rapport d'aetivite. p. 402~403 (996).
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permettait pas aux utilisateurs d'amcher des messages de maniere anonyme (m). D'autre
part, la Directive 95/46/CE indique que les donnees rendues anonymes ne sont plus soumises
aux droits et obligations materielles qU'elle prevail (""). En tout etat de cause, l'anonymat
dans un environnement de reseau n'est pas necessairement absolu. Les fonctions permettant
de rendre les donnees anonymes ne sont pas toujours irreversibles. Dans une serie d'affaires
de 1994, la CNIL a observe que les ident;t';s co does des clients du paiement II la seance
constitua;ent des informations indirectement nominatives (,30). Ains;, l' operation qu; consiste
it renverser I'anonymat peut etre effectuee grace II des moyens extremement difficiles et
onereux tels que Ie cracking d'un algorithme generant de maniere aleatoire des
enregistrements d'informations. Plus recemment, la CNIL a aborde la question de
l'anonymat des transactions en ligne et a fait I'eloge d'une proposition de service de
paiement electronique qui empeche les commeryants de connaitre l'identite des personnes
qui achetent en ligne des produits et des services, en leur attribuant des codes ('''). Bien que
l'information concernant l'acheteur soit anonyme pour Ie commeryant, elle est
« nominative» pour Ie fournisseur du service de paiement. La CNIL n'a pas repondu a la
question de savoir si les commeryants pouvaient malgre tout traiter les intormations obtenues
aupres du service de paiement electronique comme si elles n'entraient pas dans Ie champ
d'application de la loi relative it 1a protection des donnees.
Dans la mesure ou une information concernant une personne semble tertiaire a une activite
de commerce electronique, it semble que la loi franyaise peut classer cette information en
dehors du champ d'application de la loi relative it la protection des donnees. Ainsi, dans une
decision anterieure, la CNIL a estime que Ie traitement par unc entreprise de donnees
comptables susceptibles de faire reference a des personnes ne eonstituait pas en soi un
traitement automatise d'informations nominatives (131). Plus recemment, Ie Consei! d'Etat a
estime que la loi relative it la protection des donnees ne pouvait servir Ii proteger des
personnalites susceptibles de faire I'objet de sondages d'opinion ("). II a declare que la
reference a des personnalites etait inherente a l'objectif du sondage - mesure de l'opillion
publique et qu'en consequence les resultats dudit sondage ne pouvaient pas etre consideres
comme des informations a caractere personnel relatives aux personnalites concemees.

C2l!)

(,19)

("'J
e:>l)

(''')

e

H)

CNIL, 17e Rapport d'uctivitc, p. 91 (\997)(declarant que 10. Caisse nationale de preyoyance aurai! dn
amenager son torum de discussion de sone a permettre tine participation anonyme au debut, meme 51
eUe reconnah que rien n'intcrdit a des utilisuteurs disposant de mayens techniques sophistiques
"d'emprunter Fidentite d'ull tiers pour intervenir sur le forum").
VoIr directive 95/46/CE, considerant 26.
Voir CNIL, 15. Rapport d',c!;"te, p. 62·63 (1995).
CNIL. 17e Rapport d'flctivite. p, 92-93 (1997){decrivant Ie systeme de paiement electronique de
KleJine).
CNJL, Dix ans d'informa!iquc ot IIbertos, p. 97 (1988).
Conseil d'etat, decision 1'1/:. 14&975 relative a III C1H~mbre Syndicflle Syntec Conseil du 9 juillet 1997.
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La CNIL a egalement indique que les pseudonymes pouvaient ne pas etre inclus dans la
categoric des informations a caractere personneL Cependant, des decisions ",centes semblent
contenir bon !lombre d'6lements contradictoires, Dans I'autorisation qu'elle a donnee pour
un site web de la mairie de Paris, la CNIL semble traiter toutes les adresses e-mail comme
des informations « nominatives» - que I' adresse e-mail utilise ou non un pseUdonyme ou un
re-mailer anonyme. L'autorisation de la CNIL tente d'encourager les communications avec
utilisation de pseudonymes et les communications anonymes avec la Mairie, mais elle ne fait
pas de distinction en ce qui concerne Ie traitement de ces communications par Ie site (''').
Dans un autre cas, la CNIL a autoris" France Telecom a mettre en place un service de
courrier electronique, Minitelnet, reliant Ie Minitel a Inlernet ('Jl). Dans eette autorisation,
toutes les adresses e-mail elaient considerees comme nominatives. Alors que ees decisions
portent, pour la plupart, sur des cas dans lesquels une adresse e-mail permet d'identifier une
personne, elles ne contiennent pas d'encouragement direct 11 I'utilisation d'une adresse email anonyme ou avec pseudonyme - les messages electroniques anonymes ou avec
pseudonyme continueront donc a etre consideres comme des infonnations nominatives.

2,1.3.

Allemagne

A I'ere d'Intemet, de nouveaux types d'informations sont generes el se pose la question de

savoir iesquelles parmi ces nouvelles donnees seronl considerees comme des donnees " a
earactere personnel" au sens de la loi allemande relative it la protection des donnees. La
notion d' « infonnation a caracterc personnel» a toujours etc determinante pour savoir 5i les
lois sur In protection des donnees etaient applicables, et c'est Ie cas de la legislation
allemande. Ainsi, la loi federale sur la protection des donnees (BDSG) vise a {{ proteger la
personne contre une restreinte dans ses droits de la personnalite decoulant de la manipulation
de donnees a caract;,re personnella concemant (personenbezogen Daten), » ('''). Le lexte sur
les services d'information et de communication (ll1formations- und Komm1.lnikationsdiensteGesetz, or "IuKDG") dispose qu'il <i ,'applique a la protection des donnees it caract"re
personnel ulilisees dans Ie cadre des tcleservices» ("'). Bien que l'IuKDG reprenne la
definition des « donnees a caractere personnel» qui figure dans la BDSG, illimite egalement
la portee de cette expression en prevoyanl une protection expresse pour les infonnations qui
peuvent ou non avoir un «caracterepersonnel»· en lout etat de cause. Ces informations

(1)4)

Deliberation nO 9T.051 du 30 juin 1997 concenmnt une demande d'avis presentee par lu Mairie de

(Il$)

de I. Ville de Paris.
Deliberation nl'l(j7-0SD du 24 juin 1997 relative

(''')
(m)

concernant un tmitement automatise d'informations nominatives denomme
BDSG,§I(I).
luKDG, article 2, § 1(1).

Paris reli\tive

aun traitemem d'informatlons nominatives mis en reuvre dans Ie cadre du slte Internet
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a une demande dlavis presentee par France Telecom
~{Minitelne[,})

comprennent des donnees d'uti!isation (Nulzungsdaten) et des infonnations sur les
pseudonymes. D'.utre part, 1'luKDG indique que ia premiere obligation d'un fournisseur de
tel"service est de rendre possible ['anonymat dans Ie cyberespace (m). C'est ulliquement
lorsque !'anonymat est impossible que des donnees acaractere personnel peuvent etre creees.
Bien que I']uKDG s'applique aux « dOlmees Ii caractere personnel», ce texte ne comporte
aucune definition desdites « donnees Ii caractere personnel». En raison des liens existant
entre !'!uKDG et ia loi fedemle sur la protection des donnees (BDSG), cette absence de
definition renvoie la question a la BDSG. L'IuKDG indique expressement que la BDSG
continue de s'appliquer au traitement des donnees a moins que des dispositions precises de
l'luKDG traite la situation en question ("'). Ainsi, l'IuKDG n'a pas abroge la BDSG, mais
s'y substitue uniquement dans la mesure oli le nouveau texte cantient des dispositions
expresses et applicables.
En raison de l'absence de definition de la notion de « donnees a earactere personnel » dans
l'IuKDG, on est oblige de consulter la BDSG afin de determiner Ie champ d'application de
cette notion de " donnee. a caractere personnel» et afin de savoir si les adresses IP font
partie de cette categorie. La notion de « donnees a caractere personnel» est fbndamentaie
pour la BDSG. COmIne eel a a de souJigne dans Un traite. la notion de « donnees a caracti:re
personnel » est la « notion la plus importante et la plus fn!quemrnent utilisee » par cette loi
("'''). A eet <'gard, Ie § 3 de la BDSG est la disposition pertinente, il dispose que I'expression
{( donnees a caraetere personnel» desigoe les informations (Angabe) relatives it la situation
personnelle ou materielle d'une personne identifiee ou identifiable' (personne
concernee) »)(''').
En droit allemand, les traites de droit ant tOlljours eu un rOle important dans l'interpretation
de la 101. II est done naturel de consulter les traites pour essayer de savoir ce que comprend
I'expression « donnees Ii caractere personnel », Scion Ie traite sur 1a protection des donnees
de Spiros Simitis e.a., une personne identifiable existe au sens du § 3 de la BDSG lorsque

(''')
C~')}

luKDG. article 2, § 4 (1).

iuKDG, article 2, § 1(2). Comme !'un des auteurs de 1'luKDG 11explique "Ia loi relative n !a
protection des dQnnees dans Ie cadre des teleservices tmite des conditions speciales necessalres au
traitement des donnees dans Ie cadre des teieservic!;:s, Ce n'est que lorsque Ia loi relative it Ja
protection des donne-es dans Ie cadre des teleservices contient une disposition speciale que ce texte
I'emporte sur la loi federale relative a la protection des donnees. Si la 10i relative a la protection des
donnees dans Ie cadre des teh!servlces ne contient aucune disposition applicable, la loi federale
relative it la protection des donnees s'applique" Stefan Engel-Flechsig, Die datenschutzrechtlichen
VOI'scbriften im neuen lnformations~ und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz, Recht der

C4D)

Datenverarbeitung 59, 61 (211997)
Ulrich Dammann, in Simitis et at. Kommentar zum SDSG, § 3, page 4.

(''')

BDSG. § 3(1).
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I,
l'information en question « est relative a certe personne et uniquement a cette
personne» (,"), Dans ce traite, Ulrich Dammann se sert des informations Ii caractere
personnel cryptees pour ilIustrer les cas d'informations identifiables et les cas d'informations
non identifiables ('n), Les parties qui reyoivem des informations crypttes, mais qui n'ont pas
aecies au' code necessaire au decryptage ne disposeront pas d' informations il caractere
personnel. Mais une fois que Ie code sera en leur possession, les donnees qui etaient
anonymes deviendront identifiables et deviendront done des donnees a caractere personnel.
Pour savoir si une information est ou non « identifiable », it convient done de determiner
« l'identifiabilite objective de la partie concerm;\e dans Ie cas d'espece» ('''),
Un autre traite allemand consacre it la protection des donnees lie « I'identifiabilite» aux
« connaissances, moyens et possibilites de I' organisme de traitement des donnees)) ('''), Cet
ouvrage fait reference il son « experience pratique» en ce qui concerne «cette sorte de
possibilite (d' identifiabilite) sur Iaquelle on peut compter avec un certain degr': de
probabilite» ('''), Meme lorsque I'utilisation d'informations supplementaires rend la
personne « identifiable », la donnee initiale en question ne devient une « donnee Ii caractere
personnel» au sens de la BDSG que lorsque les informations supplementaires sont
",eHernent disponibles et susceptibles d'etre utilisees pour rendre I'information identifiable,
Cette analyse est egalement corroboree par l'examen de Ja notion inverse de l'identifiabilite,
a savoir ['anonyma!. La BDSG, a son § 3 (.7), definit ['anonymisation (Anonymisieren)
comme « In modification de donnees a caractere personnel de telle sorte que des
informations particulieres concernant la situation personnelle ou materielle d'une personne
physique identifiee ou identifiable ne puissent plus lui etre attribuees il mains d'y consacrer
une quantite de temps, d'argent et d'efforts disproportionnee» ('41). Cette definition
corrobore ['idee que I' « identifiabilite)) depend de la probabilite que des efforts
f'disonnables puissent mener a des donnees Ii caracti"e personnel qui ne font reference qu'il
une seule personne,
Il ressort de celte analyse qu'en vertu de In legislation allemande: 1) lorsque l'utilisation
d'adresses IP et d'autres sortes d'informations (telles que des donnees resultant des traces
des connexions peut etre combinee avec d'autres donnees pour identifier une personne, et 2)
lorsque ces donnees sont susceptibles d'etre utilisees pour proceder Ii cette identification,

e

42

)

c,n}

(''')
('"

Spir~s Simitis. Ulrich Dammann et ai, Kommentar tum Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, §), 11.
Ulrich Dammann, tn Simitis e,a., Kornmentar zum BDSG~ § 3, 14.
Ict, p, 14 (Ie soul!gnage a ete 6iimine),

Peter Gola, Rudolf Schomerus, Hans·loachim Ordomann, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz § 3 (2,8, pg. QO)
(6e edition 1997),

(''')

Id,

(''')

BDSG, § 3(7),
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3) I'information initiale sera {( identifiable» et constituera done une "donnee il caraetere
personnel» au sens de 1']uKDG. L']uKDG soutient cette interpretation en prevoyant
expressement une protection pour les donnees d'utilisation (Nutzungsdalen), Ie, donnees
comptables (Abrechnungsdaten), ies donnees colltractuelles (Bestandsdaten), et meme pour
les . pseudonymes, AillSi, les donnees d'utilisation, qui sont definies comme etant des
informations qui pennettent il I'utilisateur de se servir des teleservices ('''), doivent etIe
effacees des que possible et ne doivent pas etre transmises il d'autres fournisseurs ou Ii des
tiers ('''). II y a egalement lieu de souligner que, comme cela sera commente plus loin,
l'IuKDG exige que Ie fournisseur de t~Heservices rende possible l'utilisation anonyme au a
l'aide d'un pseudonyme de ses services. II s'cnsuit qu'aux tcnnes de la legislation allemande
sur la protection des donnees, la premiere obligation d'un foumisseur est d'empecher que
des informations a caractere personnel soient generees ({ dans toute la mesure possible et
rmsonnable du point de vue technique» (,50).
L'!uKDG precise egalement que les adresses IP et les donnees resultant des traces des
connexions peuvent parfois etre considerees eomme des ({ fichiers » (Ill), En vertu de la loi
federale sur Ia protection des donnees, certaines exigences ne s'appliquent qu'aux
informations contenues dans des fichiers. De son cote, l'luKDG dispose que « sauf
disposition contraire de la presente loi, les dispositions pertinentes concernant la protection
des donnees a caractere personnel sont applicables meme si les donnees ne sont pas traitees
ou utilisees dans des fichiers » ('''), Cette disposition montre que les exigences de I'luKDG
en matiere de protection des donnees ne dependront pas du point de savoir si la colieete des
informations a earactere personnel remplit les conditions de la notion de « fiehiers »,
Abandonnant III question de savoir si Ies adresses IP sont considerees comme des donnees a
caract':re personnel en Allemagne, cette etude va maintenant s'interesser i; !'anonymisation
et aux pseudonymes, L'!uKDG comporte des dispositions fermes et expresses visant a rendre
possible I' anonymat dans Ie monde en ligne, Ce texte exige que les fournisseurs de service
« permettent ault utilisateurs d'utiliser et de payer de maniere anonyme les tel"services au
d'utiliser et de payer les services sous un pseudonyme dans toute la mesure possible et
raisonnable du point de vue technique » ('''), Il est egalement expressement prevu que les

(''')
(''')
C~O)

(''')
(''')
(''')

Id. article 2, § 6(1 )(1).
Id. article 2, §6(2) & (3).
Id., article 2, §4(1), Voir article 2, §3(4)({(Ul conception et Ie choix des mecanismes techniques'
devant etre utilises dans Ie cadre des teleservices dolvent avoir pour objet sait de ne collecter, de oe
traiter et de n'utiliser aucune donnee a caractere personnel, soit de ne cDllecter. de ne traiter et de

ntutiHser que Ie plus petit nombre possible de donnees)}).
Voir BDSG, § 3(2), § 14(1), § 20(2), § 27(1),
luKDG, article 2, §1(2).
luKDG, article 2, § 4.
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fournisseurs doivent informer Ies utilisateurs de ces possibilites (,54). Par aiIleurs, un
utilisateur a Ie droit d'aeceder non seulement aux donnees qui Ie concement conservees par
Ie foumisseur, mais egalement aux donnees conservees it propos de son pseudonyme (,").
Les pseudonymes jouent aussi un role impottant dans les dispositions de la loi consaerees
aux profils de comportement de l'utilisateur. L'luKDG limite gem!ralement les profils de
comportement de I'utilisateur aux cireonstances dans lesquelles les pseudonymes sont·
utilises. Ces profils anonymes ne sont pas lies a des donnees identifiables C"). Comme iI est
dit dans la loi " les profils extractibles sous des pseudonymes ne doivent pas etre combines
avec des donnees liees a la personne portant Ie pseudonyme» ('57). La question des profils de
comportement de I'utilisateur sera examinee plus en detail ci-dessous.
II est important de souligner I'existence d'une limitation importante a un certain type
d'utilisation des pseudonymes. Comme cela est dit dans la section ci-dessous consacree Ii la
cryptographic, la legiSlation allemande permet I'utilisation anonyme de signatures
numeriques publiquement certifiees (,58), mais cUe exige que rautorite de certification
connaisse I'identite de la personne. Dans cerlaines cireonstances, I'autorite de certification
doit partager celte information avec les autorites chargees de la surete d'Etat et de la
repression de la criminalite.
L'anonymat joue encore un role important en Ce qui conceme la limitation de I'utilisation
que les fournisseurs peuvent faire de donnees de connexion et de donnees eomptables. Le
fournisseur de service initial ne peut pas communiquer it d' autres fournisseurs dont les
services en ligne ant ete utilises des donnees alitres que des donnees comptables et « des
donnees d'utilisation anonymes aux fins de leurs etudes de marche)) (""). Outre cos
dispositions concernant I'anonymisation et les pseudonymes, en vertu de l'luKDG Ie
fournisseur est tenu de prendre des precautions techniques et organisationnelles afin de
s'assurer que « l'utilisateur est protege contre la prise de connaissance par des tiers du fait
qu'!1 utilise des teleservices» (,60). 11 s'agit de regles eXlremement strictes qui semblent
interdire Ie partage de dormees, teiles que les informations « http» relatives aux sites web
visites, avec des parties extemes.

("4)
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Id.

(''')
c~g)

ld.
Voir section 2.5.3.
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luKDG, article 2, § 6(3).
luKDG, article 2, § 4(2X3).

luKDG, article 2, § 7.
IuKDG, article 2, § 4(4).
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Un fournisseur allemand de service en ligne s'est deja conform': aux exigences de l'JuKDG,
T-Online est Ie service en ligne de Deutsche Telekom, qui est l'anelenne entreprise publique
allemande de services de teleconununications recemmen! privatis"e, Deutsche Telekom
attribue generalement des adresses e-mail uniquement composees de numeros, Elle permet
done ehaque abonne de T-Online de choisir son nom electronique et nomme I'adresse email qui en resulte {( e-mail Alias)) ("), En ayant eu Ie premier I'idee d'une adresse e-mail
composee de chiffres et en nommant toute transformation de ces chiffres en lettres « e-mail
Alias », T-Online met I'accent sur la liberte du client de choisir un pseudonyme,

a

i,,

2,1.4.

Royaume-Uni

Le regime britannique de protection des donnees ne comporte pas de dispositions legales
pro pres it Internet. Aucune loi ne precise expressement la portee des infonnations constituant
des «dOlmeeS a caract':re personnel» dans Ie cadre des services en ligne, La loi generale sur
la protection des donnees, Ie Data Protection Act de 1984, deiinit In « donnee caractiOte
personnel » comme etant " une donnee consistant en une information relative Ii une personne
vivante qui peut eire identifiee a partir de I'information (ou Ii partir de cette information et
d'autres informations en possession de I'utilisateur des donnees) (,,,)) ('''), Cene definition
indique clairement qu'une adresse IP sera consideree Gomme une donnee identifiable lorsque
des informations supplementaire. lui permeltant d'etre utili see afin d'idemilier l'utilisateur
des donnees, mais ce ne sera pas Ie cas lorsque des informations supplementaires ne seront
pas disponibles. Le Data Protection Registrar et Ie Home Office ont tous deux prcconise
cette interpretation de la loi,

a

Le Registrar a expressement aborde Ia question de savoir si une adresse e-mail constitue une
donnee II caractere personnel dans un document officiel intitule {( Data Protection and the
Internet ». Dans ce document, Ie Registrar observe que:
.
La reponse [a la question de savoir si une adresse IP est une donnee II caracrere
personnel] dependra d'un certain l10mbre d'elements : L'adresse est-elle attribuee II
une personne determinee? Quel est Ie contexte dans lequel elle est detenue?
ldentifie-t-elle une personne en raison de ses caracteristiques propres? Etc, Si
I' adresse peut etre rattachee a une personne identifiable soit en raison de ses
caraeteristiques propres, soit en raison de ses caracteristiques propres et d'aulres
informations en possession de I'utilisateur de la donnee, elle constitue une donnee
caractere personnel ('''),

a

Cm)

T-Online: Macht alles filr i.den so einfaeh 22 (5197),

('''')

Data Protection Act 1984, 1(3).

('\il)

brtp:/lwww.open.gov.ukldprfintemet.htm
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Selon cette interpretation, en vertu de la loi britannique sur la protection des donnees, une
adresse e-mail est une donnee a caractere personnel uniquement lorsqu'elle peut etre
rattachee a une personne identifiable.
Le Home Office a adopte une approche similaire dans un document relatif aux propositions
du gouvernement pour la mise en reuvre de la Directive 951461CE (,64), Dans ce textc public
en juillet 1997, Ie Home Office declare qu'il interprete rexpression « donnee a caractere
personnel » comme excluant les informations anonymes auxquelles il est peu probable que
les identif\cateurs puissont etre rattaches » ('''), Le Home Office a donne l'exemple suivant
« lorsqu'une personne detient des donnees qui sont anonymes pour elle et qu' elle ne detient
pas d'informations complementaires susceptibles de raider :\ identifier la personne
conccrnee, Ie simple fait que certe information existe ailleurs ne fait pas entrer la donnee
dans la categoric des donnees a caractere personnel au sens de la directive. II faut qu'il existe
une probabilite raisonnable que les deux elements d'information soient reunis» Coo).
Cette analyse est conforme a la legislation britannique sur la protection des donnees en ce
qui concerne les numeros de telephone ('''), En regie generale, au Royaume-Uni les numeros
de telephone sont consideres comme des infomlations a caractere personnel lorsqu'ils se
rattachent it un abonne particulier. Les numeros de telephone professionnels peuvent devenir
des informations a caracti"e personnel selon les circonstances. A titre d'exemple, lorsqu'un
lJumero de telephone est attribue it une personnt determinee, au lorsque des appels
telephoniques sont effeclUeS et attribues II une personne determinee, un numero de poste
deviendra un numero personnel.
Le Data Protecrion Act ne cite pas I'anonymat comme l'un de ses sept principes
fondamentaux en matiere de protection des donnees. L'anonymat se rattache cependant
clairement a plusieurs de ces principes; les deux principes qui sont peut-etre les plus
importants sont Ie principe de \( loyaute» et Ie principe en vertu duquel on ne doit collectet
que des informations a caractere persOfmel qui sont « adequates, pertinentes et non
excessives » ('6').
Le Data Protection Registrar a souligne I'importance de I'anonymat pour les services en
ligne. L'une des mentions les plus importantes faites II l' anonymat figure dans la reponse du

CO.)
(''')
('M)
(lto1)

(,6H)

Data Protection; The Government's Proposals (Juillet 1997). <http;!lwww.homeoffice,gov.uk/
damp l.htm>
Id,2.3.
Id,
Cette analyse est fondee sur une communication personnelle provenant d'un membre de l'equipe du
Data Protection Registrar.
Data Protection Act 19841anneXe J, Ire partie.
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Data Protection Registrar au « government.direct» qui est une initiative britannigue
importante en ce qui conceme !a prestation en ligne de services publics. Le livre vert
« governement.direct}) met raccent sur des strategies pour Ia prestation electronique de
services tels que {( la diffusion d'infol'mations, !a coJlecte d'impots et I'analyse de
statistiques, et la fourniture de biens et services » (""). {( government direct » tente d'utiliser
les technologies de l'information pour rapprocher les pouvoirs publics des personnes, pour
rendre les services publics plus accessibles et pour donner aux citoyens et aux entreprises un
plus grand controle sur leurs relations avec les pouvoirs publics (''').

Dans sa reponse Ii cette initiative, Ie Data Protection Registrar a souligne l'importance de
I'anonyma!. Il. a observe que « lorsque des services doivent etre livres electroniquement, les
fournisseurs de services au de prestations n'ont pas necessairement besoin de COlUla!tre a
tout moment I'identite precise d'une personne » ("'). II convient done de mettre au point une
technologie qui fournira aux personnes une methode sfire leur pennettant d' autoriser et
d'authentifier e!ectroniquernent des transactions et de « minimiser Ie besom d'identification
reelle ehaque fois que eela est possible» ('''). Cetle minimisation de I'identification des
utHisateurs sera rendue possible par des technologies pennettant d'ameliorer Ie respect de la
vie privee.
L'anonymat et l'utilisation de pseudonymes vont vraisemblablement jouer un role croissant
dans la protection des donnees au Royaume-Uni. Quant aux services en Iigne, Ie plus
probable est que I'anonymat et I'utilisation de pseudonymes seront consider';s comme des
elements cle des principes fondamentaux de la protection des donnees.

2.2. Juridiction territoriale: Notification des traitements et contro/e
par les autorites chargees de /a protection des donnees
La nature internationale des services en Iigne souleve une seconde serie de questions en ce
qui concerne l'etendue territoriale des regles de droit national relatives a ]a protection des
donnees. La Directive 95/46/CE enjoint a chaque Etat membre d'appliquer seS dispositions
nationales lorsque ; a) Ie traitement est effectue par un responsable du traitement des donnees
sur Ie territoire de rEta! membre, ce qui inclut les situations dans lesquelles un meme
responsable traite des donnees a caractere personnel dans plusieurs Etats membres, b) Ie droit
national s'applique en verla du droit public international meme si Ie responsable du

(169)
(I 'Xl)
en)

("')

<http://www.open.goy.uklcituigdirect/greenpaper/chapl.htm>
<http ;/1www.open.g{)v.uklcitu/gdlrectigreenpaper/fofeword.htm>
Response to Govemment.Direct Including a Paper on Privacy Enhancing Technology, Appendix 11,
13 Activities Report, 103.
Id.
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traitement n' est pas "tabli sur Ie tenitoire de cet Etat membre, au c) Ie responsable du
traitement est etabli en dehors du territoire de la Communaute, et recourt, Ii des fins de
traitement de I'information, Ii des moyens simes sur Ie territoire de ta Communaute (11l). En
eifet, de nombreuses legislations nationales peuvent s'appliquer nux services en ligne.
Les exigences concernant la notification aux autorites chargees de la protection des donnees
et Ie controle exerce par ces dernieres donnent un bon aperyu du champ d' application
territoriale de 1. reglementation sur la protection des donnees s'agissant des services en ligne
et elles funt utilement apparaitre un ensemble de questions susceptibles de se poser. La
Directive 951461CE exige qu 'une notification aux autorites chargees de la protection des
donnees de I'Btat membre soit effectuee avant la mise en reuvre du traitement de donnees il
caractere personnel ('74). Des lois actuellement en vigueur dans certains Btats membres
exigent deja que tout traHement de donnees a caractere nominatif SOil declare aupres de
l'autodte de controle nationale sauf au cas de derogation. Ainsi, au Royaume-Uni, Ie Data
Protection Registrar a resume les exigences de la It!gislation de son pays de la fayon suivante
({ chaque utilisateur de donnees qui detient des donnees a caraetere personnel doit etre
declare, a moins que I'ensemble des donnees ne soient couvertes par une derogation» (''').
Cependant, aveC Internet, toute information qui est en ligne peut etre transmise a tout
utilisateur d'!ntemet partout dans Ie monde. Les services en ligne et la navigation sur Ie Web
entrainen! sou vent la collecte d'informations par un serveur situe dans un autre pays que
celui de l'utilisateur. Par exemple, un utilisateur franyais d'!nternet peut avoir a remplir un
formulaire alors qu'il cherche des informations sur des produits sur Ie World Wide Web. Le
formulaire peut se treuver sur un serveur a Montreal, mms Ie se!Veur peut envoyer les
donnees it caractere personnel collectees aux fins de traitement a Francfort-sur-le-Main. II
s' ensuit que les differents sites et utilisateurs etrangers de donnees peuvent avoir l'obligation
de se declarer aupres d 'une au de plusieurs auto rites europ<!ennes chargees de la protection
des donnees. L'examen de I'obligation de cette notification est une fayon simple d'evaluer
I'applicabilite des regles de protection des donnees aux activires internationales il distance.
Les services en Iigne remeltent en question]' efficacite du controle des pratiques en matiere
de traitement des donnees exerce par les autorites chargees de celte protection. L'article 28
de la Directive 951461CE exige la creation par l'Etat membre d'une ou plusieurs autorites
independantes qui seront « chargees de surveiller I'application sur son tenitoire des
dispositions adoptees par les Btats membres». Par ailleurs, en vertu de ·Ia Directive
951461CE, ehaque autori!e nationale chargee de la protection des donnees doit etre vigilante
quant au traitement des donnees a l'exterieur d." frontieres nationales grace Ii ses

(m)

("')
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Directive 95/46/CE. article 4, Voir aussi id.! considerants 18-20.
Directive 95/46/CE, article la.
Data Protection Registrar, The Guidelines, p.6 (Third Series, Nov. 1994).
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dispositions relatives aux transferts de donnees internationaux, La mise en reuvre de cette
vigilance extraterritoriale sera loin d'etre facile, Un element de difficulte supplementaire
existe en Allemagne ou les commissaires charges de la protection des donnees au niveau
federal et au niveau des Lander onl differents types de pouvoirs de surveillance; la question
de savoir qui est responsab!e de la surveillance des services en ligne va alors se poser, Dans
cette sous-section, nous tenterons d'analyser la maniere selon laquelle Jes Etats membres
interpretent l'applicabilite de leurs legislations nationales aux activites sur Internet,

2.2.1,

I

II

Belgique

La Belgique exige Ie depot d'une declaration aupres de la CPVP avant la mise en ceuvre de
tout traitement automatise de donnees" caraetere persollllel ("'), Bien qu'aucune regie ne
soit eonsacree aux services en ligne, la loi generale relative a la protection des donnees
exigera la declaration des traitements relatifs a ees services, La declaration doit mentiollller :
a) la date de la declaration au la date de la loi, du decret, de I'ordonnallce ou de j'acte
reglementaire ayant autoris': la creation du traitement automatise; b) Ie nom et ['adresse du
maitre du fichier; c) Ie nom et [,adresse du gestiollllaire du traitement; d) Ie but poursuivi par
Ie trailement; e) les categories de donnees traitees, avec une description partieuliere de toutes
formes d'infonnations sensibles; f) les personnes adm!se, Ii obtenir les donnees a earactere
personnel; g) les garanties concernant les donnees a caraclere medical; h) les moyens par
lesquels les personnes concernees sont informees du traitement, Ie service aupres duquel
s'exercera Ie droit d'acces et les mesures prises pour faciliter l'exerclce de ee droit; i) la
duree maximum de conservation, d'utilisation et'de diffusion des donnees ('71), En ce qui
concerne Ie traitement des donnees effectu'; dans Ie secteur public, une loi au un arrete royal
doit autoriser Ie traitement des informations it caractere personnel avant Ie depot de la
declaration, Comme nombre de ses homologues dans d'autres pays, la CPVP a un role de
conseil t",s important dans Ie cadre de la preparation des lois et arretes ('n),
Cerie exigenee de declaration s'applique Ii tout « traitement automatise, meme 5i tout au
partie des operations est effectue it I' ';tranger, pourvu que ce traitement soil directement
accessible en Belgique par des moyens propres au traitement " ("') et done refiete un champ
d'applieation territorial extremement large de la loi beige sur la protection des donnees, En
effet, cette clause cree une regIe juridique materielle relative au choix de la loi applicable en
vertu de Jaquelle la legislation beige s'impose face au traitement des informations a caractere
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Loi au 8 decemore 1992, article 17, § ler,
Loi du 8 decembre 1992, article 17, § 3,
CI'VP, Rapport d'actiyite 1992-1993, p, 11·12 (1997),
Loi du 8 aeeembre 1992, article 3, § ler,
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personnel ('"'), Lorsqu'aucune intervention humaine n'est requise et que Ie traitement it
l'etranger est accessible en Belgique, In loi beige s'appliquera, En vertu de ce principe, si un
utilisateur d'informations it caJ~actere personnel se trouve en Belgique, Ie lieu actuel du
traitement est sans interet pour Ie choix de l'application de la loi beIge a I'utilisateur des
informations a caractere personnel et Ie traitement doit etre declare it la CPVP ("), La
proposition inverse peut egalement s'appliquer: si I'utilisateur des infonnations a caractere
personnel se trouve it l'exterieur de la Belgique, mais qu'i! parvient it acceder aux
inlbnnations en Belgique, les regles belges pourrom alors s'appliquer a I'utilisation des
informations it caractere personnel. Toutefois, dans cette situation ia loi est ambigue ('''),
D'apres la CPVP, la loi ne s'applique pas au trahement lion « directement accessible» a
l' extcrieur de la Belgique (,"). Les exemples officiels utilises en Ce qui concerne
l'accessibilite portent sur les flux d'informations entrant (c'est-iI-dire les dOlmees d6tenues it
l'exterieur du territoire beIge en vue d'etre utilisees en Belgique sous Ie contra Ie d'une
personne situee en Belgique), Cependant, la loi applique expressement les exigences de
notification a la collecte d'informations qui a lieu sur Ie territohe beige en vUe d'nn
traitement devant se derouler a I'cxterieur de la Belgique C") et la loi interdit la collecte sur
Ie territoire beige, aux fins d'un traitement it I'etranger, de donnees sensibles qui serait dans
d'autres circonstances limitee par la loi ("'), Si la loi beige s'applique pleinement a des
situations dans lesqueUes I'obtention de donnees sur Ie territoire beige suffit it rendre In
legislation beIge applicable au traitement, cette disposition particuliere relative a
l' exportation des donnees ne sera pas neeessaire pour les donnees sensibles,
En tout etat de cause, cette portee territoriale large aura probablement un impact significatif
sur les services en ligne. Chaque fois que des informations il caractere personnel se trouvant
sur des serveurs situes a l'exterieur du territoire beige sont utili sees en Belgique, plusieurs
lois s'appliqueront ill'activite en ligne, la loi du lieu ou Ie serveUr est situe ainsi que la loi
beIge, De la meme fayon, 81 I'information provient de Belgique, iI se peut que les services
etrangers soient encore soumis a la loi beige, Si ce n'est pas Ie cas, la difference quant a
l'application territoriale aura un effct dissuasif pour !,installation de services electroniques
en Belgique. Tout speciaiement, Ie fait pour un serveur, vers lequel convergent des donnees
en provenance du monde entier par Ie biais du remplissage de formulaires d'abonnement
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M~H. Boulanger, C. De Terwangne el 111. Leonard, La protection de la vie privee a !'egard des
!raitements de donnees caractere personnel·.. La Lei du 8 decembre 1992, Journal des Trihunaux, 15
mai 1993, p, 375,
CPVP, Rapport rl'activite 1994·1995, p, 17-18 (1997) (expliquW1t l'interpretation donne. par I.
Commission de la portee territoriale de ta legislation beIge).
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Lot du 8 decembre 1992, article 4. La CPVP est d'avis que cette obligation n'exlste que si
I'information est «accessible}) en Belgique. CPVP. Rapport d'activite 1994 .. 1995, p. t 8 (1997)
Loi du S rle.embre 1992, article 4, § 2,
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en ligne -, d'etre situe a I'exterieur du territoire beige pourra lui pennettre d'eviter les
restrictions prevues par la loi beige, Le traitement ne fera pas I'objet d'un « acces)) sur Ie
territoire belge, mais plus precis6ment la donnee sera obtenue sur Ie territoire beige,
LOrSque la loi beige s'applique, l'utilisateur au Ie ({ maitre du fiehier» doit etre present en
Belgique, soit en ayant un domicile legal en Belgique, soit en elisant domicile en Belgique,
soit, pour des tiers Ctrangers, en designant un representant beige (''"'), Toutefois, la qualit" de
maitre du fichier est Une notion vague en droit beige, L'article 6 de la loi relative a la
protection des donnees dMinit Ie « maitre du tichier» comme la personne physique ou
morale au l' association de fait « competente pour decider de In finalite du trahement oU des
categories de donnees devant y figurer») C"), D'apres la CPVP, Ie « maitre du tlchier» sera
la personne responsable en derni"re instance de la donnee ('''),
La Belgique a eu quelques difficultes pour tlxer un tarif adequat pour la declaration du
traitement. A present, les latifs sont progressits en fonction de I'importance du traitement des
donnees, laquelle est mesuree au regard du nombre de personnes concernees parle traitement
et de In modalit" de la declaration sur support papier au sous une fonne electronique (1&"),
Confonnement it la loi beige, un arrete royal peut exempter de I'obligation de declarer
certaines categories de traitements qui ne presentent manifestement pas de risque d'atleinte il
la vie privee (,"0), Cette disposition s'est inspiree de la loi franl'aise autorisant l'autorit"
chargee de la protection des dormees it accepter un enregistrement simplifie pour certains
types de traitement de donnees C9!), En Belgique, un large eventail d'activites ordinaires de
traitement de donnees ont ete exemptees de \' obligation de declaration, en particulier les
traitements portant sur:
L

I' administration des salaires;

2,

l'administration du personnel
donnees sensibles);
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Loi do 8 decembre 1992, article I, § 6,
Loi do 8 decembre 1992, article I, § 6,
CPVp, Rapport d'activit'; 1994- I995, p, 15-16 (t 997),
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Arr~te

(a I'exclusion des donnees relatives a la sante au des

royal n(l 12b1s du l6 mars 1996 modifiant I'arrete royal n° 12 du 7 mars relat~f a la contribution

it verser lors de la declaration des traitements de donnees a caractere personnel it la Commission de !a
protection de la vie privee, M.B., 15 mars 1996, p. 5801 etsuiv.
Loi do 8 decembre 1992, article 17, § 8,
Rapport ao Roi 50r I'Arrete Royal (n' 13) do 12 mars 1996, M,B" 15 mars 1996, p, 5802 (,oolignant
!'emprunt fait par ta legiSlation beIge a 1a loi franyaise). Pour une discussion sur la France, voir
section 2.2.2. ci~dessous,
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3.

la comptabili!e;

4.

I'administration des associes et des actionnaires;

5

la "estion des clients et des fournisseurs;

6

1a gestion des membres et des bienfaiteurs d'cntites sans but lucratif;

7.

donnees d'identification indispensables ala communication;

8.

enregistrements de visiteurs;

8.

dossiers d'eleves ou d'etudiants ;

10.

registres communaux;

II.

registres publics;

12.

securit" sociale;

13.

traitements effectues conformemem it des regles specifiques ("").

Cependant Ie traitement des informations

a caractere

personnel ne pourra beneficier de

l' exoneration de declaration que 5i un ensemble de conditions particulieres existent eu egard
au traitement: I) une finalite predetetrninee qui limite Ie type de donnee traitee; 2) des
restrictions concernant la source de conservation sont imposees; 3) des restrictions it
I'utilisation des donnees sont imposees; 4) la communication II des tiers de I'information est
interdite; et 5) une limitation de la duree de conservation des donnees existe COl). Si ees
conditions ne sont pas remplies, I'arrete royal n'exempte pas Ie traitement de I'obligation de
declaration imposee par la loi; ledit traitement pourra eIre autorise Ii condition que
I' obligation de declaration soit respectee ainsi que les autres principes relatifs a la protection
des donnees ftgurant dans la loi.
Plusieurs aspects ou fonctions des activites en ligne peuvent ainsi bem!ficier de I'exemption
de l'obligation de declaration. Toutefois, ces exemptions son! assez pn!cises par rapport aux

(1',11)

Arrete Royal (n° 13), du ]2 mars 1996 portant exemption conditioneHe de !'obligation de declaration

(''')

pour certaines categories de traitements automatists de donnees a caractcre personnel qui ne
presentent manifestement pas de risque d'atteinte a la vie privee. M,S., 15 mars 1996. p. 5816;
CPVP, Rapport d',cI;v;t. 1996, p. 48·49 (1997).
Id.
49

nombreuses activites Internet L'exemption concernant les « enregistrements de visiteurs))

ne s'appliquera;t probablement pas par exemple aux tichiers d'audit des utilisateurs tenus par
de nombreux sites web afin de tracer I'utilisation effeetuee. L'exemption ne coneerne que les
enregistrements de l'entree des visiteurs SUr des sites professionnels et elle ne peut couvrir
que certaines donnees concernant Ie visiteur: son nom, son adresse professionneUe,
I'identification de son employeur, I'identification du vehieule qu'il a utilise pour acceder au
site, la section et l'[dentit" de la personne visitee ainsi que la date et l'heure de la visite (,").
Bien que de nombreux paralleles existent entre ces donnees concernant des sites physiques et
les donnees relatives Ii des sites virtuels, seul un traitement siricterneni conforme a l'arrete
royal peut beneficier de I'exemption de declaration.
Pour ce qui conCerne les services en ligne, un ecart important semble exister entre les
exigences legales et les pratiques reeHes. Ainsi, malgre l' obligation de declaration, aucun des
plus grands operateurs de services en ligne en Belgique n'a declare Ie traitement de donnees
Ii caractere personnel a la CPVP ('''). Bien que la gestion comptable et leg donnees
d'identification indispensables a la communication it des lins de commutation soiem
exemptees de declaration, l'etablissement de proflls d'abonnes et la transmission a des tiers
de donnees relatives aux abonnes, comme la transmission d'adresses IP et d'int"ormations
concernant les navigateurs des abonnes ('''), ne seront pas couvertes par I'exemption.

En ce qui concerne ie controle, la loi beige relative 11 la protection des donnees a supprime la
Commission consultative de 1ft protection de la vie privee et a cree une nouvelle autorite de
contrOle semi-independante - la CPVP, Commission de protection de la vie privee ('''). En
outre, des lois particulieres peuvent creer un comite de conseii sectoriel tel que Ie Comite de
surveillance de la Banque-carrefour de la securite sociale (,'8). Bien que les mernbres de la
CPVP soient nommes afin de servir de « gardiens» independants, la CPVP elle-meme
depend du ministere de la Justice en termes de personnel et de budget ('''). Cette dependance
entarne Ie caractere entierement independant de la surveillance de la protection des donnees.
La transposition de la Directive 95/46/CE devrai! avoir des repercussions sur cette

C")

Arrete Royal (n' 13) du 12 mars 1996, article 9,

e9~)

Une recherche sur les registres de la Commission concernant Mictosoft Network (MSN). Skynet,
CompuServe. Datapak et Interpac effectuee Ie:; aoat 1991 n'a pas rev~le d'existence d'inscriplions.
eela fait generalement partie des informations de protocole <http> lransmises aux sites web a
distance.
Lui du 8 decembre 1992, article 23.
Voir loi du 15 janvier 1990 relative a:I'institution et a I'organisation d'une Banque·carrefour de In
securite sociale, chapitre VI, M.S., 22 fevrier 1990, p. 3295 et suiv,

c%)

(''')
(,9B)

("')

Id.; CPVP, Rapport d'activite 1996, p. sa (1997).
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l

.

structure (,00), cependant Ie texte revise de In proposition de loi beige ne comporte aucune
modification des dispositions institutionne!les (20').

.2.2.2.

France

La France exige que touttraitement automatise d'infonnations nominatives soit rendu public
et elle attribue Ie role d'autorite de controle ala CNIL. Le !raitement automatise de donnees
dans Ie secteur public ne peut pas avoir lieu sans une autorisation expresse de la lei ou un
acte reglementaire pris apres avis motive de la CNIL ('0'). Si I' avis de la CNIL est
defavorable, iJ ne peut etre passe outre que par un decrel pris sur avis conforme du Conseil
d'Etat (2"). Pour Ie secteur prive, la France exige que les traitements automatises
d'informations nominatives fassent, prealablement 11 leur mise en amvre, I' objet d'une
declaration aupres de la CNIL (204). La CNIL est tenue d'accepter toute declaration
remplissant formellement les conditions de divulgation requises ('os). En France, il n'existe
pas de disposition legale particuliere prevoyant des obligations de declaration specifiques
pour les services en ligne ou les activites sur Internet. Les obligations generales s'appliquent
aUK services en ligne et, pour ces services, Ie champ d'application territorial de la 10i semble
s' etendre au-dela des fromieres fran9aises.
Le pouvoir de controle appartient II la CNIL et aux personnes concernees. La CNIL est
chargee de veilIer au respect de la loi relative II la protection des donnees
et peut
soumettre des cas d'infractions au ministere public en vue de la mise en re.uvre de poursuites
('0'). La CNIL dispose touteteis d'un pouvoir de poursuite indirect Ii travers ses missions
d'enquete, des visites sur place et une procedure de notification ("'''). En tant que loi
({ d'ordre public», la loi relative it la protection des donnees prevoit des sanctions penales
app[icables en cas d'infraction aux conditions requises y compris la declaration. Cependant,
en vertu des principes gem!ralement applicables du code penal fraJ19ais, des sanctions ne

e')

(,00)
("')

e

(2

)

(,01)

ld .

.("')

Lai n' 78,17 au 6 janvier 1978. article 16.
Voir arr~t du Conse!! d'Etat du 6 janvier 1997 (voiding the implicit rejection by the CNIL of a
declar.ation of processing) publice dans CNIL, 17. Rapport d'activite. p. 414 (1997)
Loi n' 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 6.
Id., article I 1.
Loi 0'78-17 du 6janvier 1978, article 21.

(lOS)

i

CPVP, Rapport d'activite 1996, p. 58 (1997) qui cite I'avis n' 30/96 du 13 novembre 1996 concernant
PAvant-Projet de loi adaptant 1a loi du 8 decembre 1992 A ia Directive eUfOpeenne.
Voir pro)et de loi aduptant I. loi du 8 decembre 1992 relative ala protection de I. vie privee a I'egard
des ttaitements de donnees a caractere personnel it la Directive 95!46/CE d4 24 oetebre 1995 dl.!
Parlement europeen et du Conseil relative fJ. 1a protection des personnes physiques a j'egard du
traitement des donnees it caractere personnel et a la libre circulation de ces donnees
Loi n'"'7&-lS du 6janvier 1978, article IS.,

("")

(,01)
('08)
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peuvent etre imposees que si I' infraction est commise sur Ie territoire fran,uis ou si I'un des
actes contribuant a I' existence de !'infraction a eu lieu en France (209). Ce principe limitera
donc les pouvoirs de controle sur les services en ligne multinationaux aux activites se
deroulant en France. Ainsi, Ie pouvoir qu'a la CNIL d'obl;ger une partie II repondre a des
questions posees dans Ie cadre d'une enquete n'aura pas d'effet si la partie se trouve it
l' exterieur du territo;re franyais. Par aiHeW's, les personnes concernees peuvent egalement
« contrOler» Ie traitement des donnees dans la mesure ou la loi leur donne un droit d'acces
aux donnees les concernant mnsi qu'un droit de rectification (,10), La loi franyaise ne
distingue pas entre les residents et les non-residents pour ce droit de rectification.
En regie generale, les dispositions de la loi franyaise s'appliquent uniquement aux activites
de traitement effectuees en France. Cette limitation territoriale peut etre observee dans Ie
pOllvoir qu'a la CNIL de restreindre 13 circulation transfrontaliere des donnees si Ie
traitement ;;tranger est contraire aux principes fran,ais de protection des donnees ("1). Une
loi com;ue pour une application exrraterritoriale n'aurait pas besoin de bloquer les transferts
de donnees avec l'etranger, car it est probable qu'elle reglementerait directement un tel
traitement,
En outre, I'obligation de deciaration prevue par la It)i relative a la protection des donnees
permet de penser qu'il y a une expedition des donnees quand des informations sont
partiellement obtenues en France afin de faire l'objet de traitements ill'etranger, telles que
des donnees resultant des traces des connexions generees en France a partir de services en
ligne pour etre utilisees itl'exterieur du terriwire franyais ('''), Toutefois, plusieurs decisions
recentes indiquent que la France a I'intention d'appliquer les regles franyaises a toute
personne accedant Ii une donnee situee en France (m). Dans une discussion concernant
I'organisation de systemes de reservation aerienne, la CNIL a declare que les compagnies
utilisant des systemes internationaux de reservation aerienne devaient respecter la legislation
du territoire sur lequel les donnees sont collectees (,14), Conformement it cette opinion, tout

(W'l)

Nouveau Code Penal. article 113 2 «({La loi penule franyaise est applicable aux infractions commises
sur Ie territoire de la Republique. Uinfraction est reputee commise sur Ie territoire de la RepubHque
des lars qu~un de ses faits tonstltutlfs a eu lieu sur ce tcrritoire.})

(,"')

Lai n' 78-11 du 6 jaovier 1978, articles 34 et 36.
Loi nO 78~ 17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 24 (<da transmission entre Ie territoire fran~ais et l'etranger,
SOliS quelque forme que ce soit.. d'informations nominatives faJsant Ilobjet de traitements autoffiDtises
regis par i'article J6 ci~dessus [obligation de declaration] peut etre soumise a autorisation preatab~e

e

H)

M

(lIl)

(",) en vue d'assurer le respect des principes poses par la presente lQi.})),
Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, artk:le 19 ({da declaration doit preciser: ("') si le traitemem est
destine ;\ l'expedit(on d'informations nominatives entre Ie territoire frao9ais et I'ttrnnger, sous
'quelque forme que ee soit, y eampri$: ~orsqu'il est J'objet d'operatioos partieHement effeetw!es sur Ie
territoire franf(ais a partir d'operations anterieurement realisees hors de France,}1)
CN1L, 17e Rapport d'.clivite 1996. p. 106

("')

CN1L, l1e Rapport d'aet;vite 1996, p. 106

(m)
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site web collectant des infonnations nominatives sur des utilisateurs situes en France seront
soumis a l'obligation de declaration prevue par la loi [ram;aise comme condition preaiable II
la coUecte desdites informations, En particulier, si un utilisateur fran,ais a rempH un
formulaire sur un site .stranger qui etait utilise pour collecter des informations nominatives,
Ie site "tranger sera tellu des'declarer aupres de la CNIL avant d'accepter les informations
de [,utilisateur franyais, En effet, Ie fait d'acceder a des inlormations situees en France sera
assimile au traitement de ces infonnations en France; les obligations dde declaration seron!
rattachees au site de collecte ou au point d'entree des donnees ainsi qu'au site d'utilisation,
Par consequent, la question de savoir si differents acteurs doivent se declarer, eonionnement
a la loi relative a la protection des donnees, peut dependre de la nature des contacts avec Ie
forum frnnyais et pas uniquement du lieu ou se trouve I' acteur.
Pour Ie traitement des donnees soumis a ['obligation de declaration, la loi franyaise exige
I'indication de la personne qui, en France, controle Ie traitement, OU, en [,absence d'un
responsable dn traitement en France, la designation d'un representant legal en France (m),
Cetle obligation forcerait to ute personne accedant a des infonnations en ligne qui sont
conservees sur un serveur situe en France Ii designer un agent en France, La decision relative
aux systemes de reservation aerienne est interessante quant Ii la responsabilite des parties
dans Ie cadre d'un reseau decentralise, En vertu de celte decision, les soeletes de
commercialisation du systeme et les societes exploitant Ie systeme informatique de
reservation peuvent etre regardees comme responsables du traitement des donnees dans
chacun des pays au elles sont etablies ("6). Celle position a d'importantes implications pour
les navigateurs, les moteurs de recherche et les technologies simiJaires, Dans la mesure ou
ces technologies cn:ent des informations nominatives ou cherchent des informations
nominatives sur des sites Web franyais, elles pourraient etre sownises aux obligations de
declaration franyaises et aux obligations de la loi relative a la protection des donnees, Ainsi,
la tendance ilia definition d'un Open Profil Standard (OPS) et J'integration de celte nonne
dans Ie logicie! du navigateur permellrait au navigateur de conserver des infonnations
nominatives detaillees, On demanderait aux utilisateurs de fournir des inlormations
demographiques au navigateur pour de futures collectes automatiques effectuees par les s.ites
web, La conservation des infonnations et leur divulgation ulterieure par Ie logiciel
navigateur pourrait rendre Ie fabricant du logic;el responsable de certaines activiles de
traitement d'informations ('''), Par exemple, la maniere selon laqueUe Ie logicie! navigateur

e

J5 )

Cette obligation est liee aux mentIons qui doivent figurer dans ia declaration d'enregistrement Loi

nO

78·17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 19.

("')
em)

CNIL, 17e Rapport d'acllvit'; 1996, p. 106,
Meme SI c'est toujours l'utHlsateur qui entre les donnees dans Ie navigateur et qulil indique les
niveaux: de divulg?tion autorises pour les donnees qu'i! fournit, ie fabriquant controle les champs de
donnees. les formats et Ie traitement effectue par Ie logiciel (y compris !a securite), tous aspects qui
serom soumis aux dispositions de la loi relative a Is protection des donnees.
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integre l'OPS est significative. Un fabrican! qui exige que taus les champs de donnees soient
remplis avant d'installer Ie logiciel navigateur sur l'ordinateur personnel d'un utilisateur
violerait probablement les obligations relatives Ii la notification, au droit d'opposition et Ii la
pertinence prevues de la loi franyaise relative it la protection des donnees.
En outre, la loi franyai,e peut impliquer de multiples declarations pour une seule activite
commerciale en ligne. Cela est la consequence du fait que les donnees resultant des traces
des connexions transitent par de nombreuses organisations sur Internet et de I'interpretation
vraisemblablement large de la definition des informations nominatives de sorte qu'elles
comprennent les informations resultant des traces des connexions collectees par tout
intermediare el toul destinataire. Ainsi, un abonnement en ligne Ii un journal electronique tel
que Le Monde necessitera la declaration de I'abonnement et Ie traitement des donnees de la
navigation par Le Monde, Ie traitement des donnees de la navigation par Ie fournisseur de
service Internet, Ie traitement du paiement par l'intermediaire financier et tout etablissement
de proti! effectne par des tiers leis que DoubleClick.
La CNIL commence tout juste Ii s'interesser aux questions tenant Ii la declaration et au
respect de ce dernier par les fournisseurs de services Internet. En ]995, la CNIL a annonce
qu'une enquete etait en COUfS Sur plusieurs fournisseurs de services en ligne y compris MSN;
AOL et Club-Internet ('''). Cependant, II la presente date, les enquetes ne sont pas encore
terminees et faire des predictions quant a leur impact serait premature. Neannl0ins, il se peut
que la CNIL soit en train de considerer la possibilile de I'elaboratiol1 d'une procedure de
declaration simplifiee pour les sites Interne! (m). Cela pourrait alleger Ia longue procedure
d'applieation requise pour tout site Internet collectant des informations minimales telles que
des fichiers d'audit des utilisateurs ou des adresses IP.
La Ioi fran,aise relative a la protection des donnees pennel deja a la CNIL d'aceepter des
« normes simplitiees " pour des categories courantes de traitement qui ne menaeen! pas la
vie privee ou les libertes (220). Les traitements conformes a la norme simplifiee sont
autorisessans declaration prealable. Pour Ies sites a caractere public, Ia CNIL a deja donne
SOn autorisation a un projet d'arrete ministeriel qui autoriserait des ministeres II creer des
sites Internet conforme~ent it un modele-type contenant des types d'informations, une

("")
e!9}

Voir CNIL, 16. Rapport d'netivite, p. 86.
La CNIL s'est deja engagee dans cetle vote pour un nombre limite de sites. Internet du secteur public.
Voir deliberation nO 97~032 du 6 mal 1997 relative a Ie demande d'avis presentee par Ie premier
minist~e concernant un modele~type de traitements d'informations nominative open~s dans Ie cadre
d'un site Internet ministerieL

("')

Lo! nO 78-17 ou 6 j.Ilvier 1978, article 17. L~ CNIL a approuve 40 declarations simpliflces
d'enregistrement. CNIL. 17e Rapport d'.ctivit". p. 13.

54

finalite et une notification approuves ("l). Cependant, Ii I'heure actuelle, il n'existe pas de
norme simplifiee pour les services en ligne dans Ie seeteur prive. Un grand nombre de
categories actuelles de traitements faisant \'objet d'une nanne simplifiee presentent de
)'interet pour les services en ligne et Ie commerce electronique, telles que celles qui
concernent les donnees comptables et les donnees de facturation ('22), Ie traitement de
donnees relatives a la gestion de fichiers de clients em), les enregistrements de donnees
relatives aux paiements detenus par des etablissements bancaires (224), Ie traitement de listes
d'adresses utilisees pour envoyer des informations autres que des sollicitalions commerciales
("'). Cependant, il est peu probable que ces nonnes simplifiees s'appliquent a un grand
nombre de services en ligne. Pour etre conforme a la norme simplifiee, Ie Iraitement des
donnees dOlt strictement respecter les conditions prevues par In CNIL, y compris la finalite el
les types d'informations colleet"es. Or, les services en ligne collecteront en general des types
d'infonnations, te!!es que des adresses e-mail, des codes de cryptnge et des infomlations
relatives Ii des fichiers d'audit des utilisateurs, qui ne sont pas couvertes par I'autorisation des
normes simplifiees.
La France s'est egalement tout partieulierement interessee au controle du traitement des
donnees d6tenues dans Ie secteur public. Une serie de decisions concernant l'utilisation des
annuaires en ligne temoigne d'un souci particulier en ce qui concerne I'application
lerritoriale de la loi [ranyaise. La CNIL a invite les organismes publics it avertil' les
utilisaleurs d'!nternet que les services d'annuaires proposes sur leurs sites sont soumis aux
mesures de protection prevues par la loi fran~aise. Dans un cas, In CNIL a observe que les
operateurs du site concerne envisageaient de faire figurer !'avertissement en fran9ais et en
anglais aux cotes du texte de la loi apparaissant lui aussi dans les deux langues (''''). Le fait
que la CNIL approuve la presence d'un avertissement en anglais sur un site web fran"ais est
en soi extraordinaire, compte tenu de l'importance symbolique nationale de la langue en
France. Tout se passe comme si la France se servait du site central (host site) situe sur Ie

("')

Deliberation nO 97~032 du 6 mai 1997 relative a la demande d'avis presentee par Ie premier ministre
concernant Ull modele-type de traltements d'informations nominative open~s dans Je cadre d'un site

("')

Norme SlmpHfiee n<l 14. Deliberation nO 80~33 du 21 octobre 1980 cQncernant les traitements
automatises d'infonnations nominatives relatifs a la gestlon des fichiers de foumisseurs componant
des personnes physiques.
Noone Simplifiee n° 11, Deliberation n'" 80~21 du 24 juin 1980 concernant les traltements automatises
d'jnfonnations nominatives relatifs ala gestlon des fichiers de clients.
Norme Simplifiee n° 12, Deliberation n" 80~22 du 8: jUilIet \ 980 concernant les traitements
automatise.>:> d'informations nominatives relatifs a la tenue des comptes de ~a clientele et Ie traitement
des informations s'y rattachaot par les etablissements bancaires et assimiles.
Norme SimpUfiee n" 15, Deliberation n° 80~J2 du 21 octobre 1980 concernant les traitements
automatises d'informations nominatives relatifs BUX lisles d'adresses ayant pour objet I'envoi
d'infonnations_
Voir CNIL, 16e Rapport d'activite, p. 84-85 (1996).

Internet ministeriel.

("')

("')

(an)

(''')
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terriloire fi-am;ais comme d'un moyen de pression pour garantir I'application de normes
locales dans i'environnement internationaL

2.2.3.

Allemagne

Les services en ligne peuvent representer un d6fi difficile a relever eu egard a l'obligation de
declaration aupres d'une autorite chargee de la protection des donnees et soulever des
questions complexes quant II la capacite des membres de cette auto rite pour surveiller et
controler Ie traitement des donnees. Dans cette etude, nous debuterons I'analyse de ces
questions en Allemagne par une discussion portant sur i'approche decentralisee
traditionnelle de la h!gislation allemande du controle de la protection des donnees. En
Allemagne, les organismes charges du contrOie de la protection des donnees ont ell! crees
aux niveaux federal et des Ldnder.
Pour ce qui concerne Ie secteur public federal, la legislation f6derale relative a la protection
des donnees (BDSG) attribue un role de controle au Commissaire lederal charge de la
protection des donnees (217). Les legislations des Lander relatives II la protection des donnees
attribuent aux commissaires charges de la protection des donnees un role de controle
similaire sur les organismes a caraetere public des Lander. Quant au secteur prive, la BDSG
conlere un pouvoir de controle officiel sur les entites privees illadite « Autorill! de controle »
("'). Certains Ldnder ont confie ce rOle aux commissaires des Lander charges de la
protection des donnees, deja en place; d'autres Lander ont attribue ces lonctions II une
autorite pubJique differente. Enfin, en vertu de la BDSG, les societes du secteur prive
doivent nommer un agent interne charge de la protection des donnees si, dans ces soeletes,
cinq employes au moins sont responsables du traltement de donnees a caractere personnel
("'). Ces agents doivent veiller a l'utilisation adequate des projets impliquant Ie traitement
de donnees a caractere personnel (''').
Eu Allemagne, les commissaires charges de la proteetion des donnees dans Ie secteur public
et l' Autorite de controle dans Ie seeteur prive ont principalement un role de consei!. Bien que
les decisions juridiques contraignantes relatives au traitement des donnees rcleven! de la
competence d'autres eutites (les exceptions seront commentees plus loin), ces autorites
chargees de la protection des donnees peuvent engueter sur certains traitements de donnees.
Les commissaires charges de la protection des donnees au niveau federal et du Land peuvent
presenter pes plaintes officielles aupres des ministres responsables au niveau du

(m)

("')
("')
("')

BDSG.
BDSG.
BDSG,
BDSG.

§§ 22.26 .
§ 38.
§§ 36·37.
§ 37.
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gouvernement federal et des Lander. D'autre part, la BDSG, § 38(4} autorise l'Autorite de
contr61e ({ a penetrer dans les locaux de I'entite concernee pendant les hemes de bureau el it y
procecier it des controles et it des examens » ("'). Les autorites chargees de la protection des
donnees peuvent egalement faire appel aux medias et aux aS8emblees legislatives, Par
ailleurs, les autorites chargees de la protection des donnees ont I' obligation notamment
d'apporter leur aide II toute personne qui estime que Ie traitement de donnees a caractere
personnel!a concernant a entraine une atteinte a son droit au respect de la vie privee,
L' Allemagne ne confere pas aux autorites chargees de la protection des donnees Ie pouvoir
d'autoriser prealablement des collectes de donnees a caractere personnel. De plus, sauf dans
un ensemble limite de circonstances, les autorites char gees de la protection des donnees ne
peuvent ordonner a des organismes a caractere public ou prive qui traitent des informations
de prendre certaines meSUres au de mettre un terme Ii tel ou tel comportement. Ainsi, la
BDSG exige du Commissaire lederal charge de la protection des donnees qu'il presente des
plaintes aupres d'autres autorites s'il « Mcouvre l'existence d'une violation des dispositions
de cette loi ou d'autres dispositions relatives Ii la protection des dOlmees ou d'autres
irregularit.:s dans Ie traitemem ou l'utilisation de donnees a caractere personnel» C"). Les
commissaires charges de la protection des donnees om "galement un pouvoir simi!aire
(Beanstandungsrecht) e2JJ). Les Autorites de controle, qui sont nommees dans chaque Land
pour contrOler les emites privees, peuvent ordonner que des mesures soient prises
uniquement dans Ie but « de palier des lacunes techniques ou orgallisationnelles » (''').
La legislation aHemande exige toutefois que les entites qui effectuent Ie traitement de
donnees tiennent des registres concernant certaines banques de donnees, Par exemple, la
BDSG, § 18 exige que les entites a caractere public « tiennent un registre. des systemes de
traitement des donnees utilises» (,"). Ce registre est partage avec Ie Commissaire federal
charge de la protection des donnees et peut etre examine par quiconque. Comme l' a note
David Flaherty, « Ie registre permet de s'interroger SUr Ie deyeloppement bureallcratique de
I'administration pubJique en identifiant les raisons de I'existence et de l'utilisation de
certaines bases de donnees )} ("'),
Dans Ie secteur prive, l' Autorite de controle a egalement l' obligation de tenir un registre
pour certaines banques de donnees. Aux termes 'de la BDSG, ({ les entites qui procedent Ii la
conservation de donnees Ii caractere personnel a titre professionnel » doivent en informer les

("')
('")
(m
('H)

("')
(''')

BDSG, § 38(4).
BDSG, § 25,
VOir, par ex., Hessisches Datenschutzrecht, § 27.
BDSG, §38(S).
BDSG, § 18.
David Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies 60 (1989).
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autorites de contrOie competentes (m). L'enregistrement electronique ne semble pas encore
avoir sa place en Allemagne. Comme J'a observe Stefan Walz, Ie commissaire charge de la
protection des donnees de Breme, Ie registre est Ie "fondement et la [igne directrice
essentielle de mes activites de controle» (ns). Comme pnecedemment indique, ces actlviles
de cOntrOie se deroulent en verlu du pouvolr confer': par la BDSG, §38(4).
L'IuKDG reprend I"pproche allemande traditionnelle du controle. En premier lieu, ce tcxtc
n'impose pas d'obligation de declaration supplementaire. L'!uKDG dispose que « dans Ie
cadre de In loi, les teleservices ne sont pas soumis a une procedure d'antorisation au de
declaration» (m). Cette disposition signifie que I'obligation d'enregistrement prevue par la
BDSG s'appliquera. Dans la mesure au les services en ligne « procectent Ii la conservation de
domlees acaracti"e personnel il titre professionnel » (''"), ils seront tenus de s'inscrire aupres
de I' Antodt': de controle.
En matiere de controle, 1'luKDG adopre egalement une approche traditionnelle puisqu'elle
confere des pouvoirs aux Autorites de controle des Ltinder. L'luKDG habilite les Autoritcs
de controle it travers une reference croisee ii la BDSG, § 38. qui fixe les pouvoir. de ces
institutions. L'luKDG ctend ce pouvoir lorsqu'elle declare que « des .verifications peuvent
etre effectm!e. [par I' Autorite de controle] meme si rien ne pennet de supposer que les
. dispositions relatives it la protection des donnees ant ete violees i> ("'). Cette declaration fait
c!airement apparnitre que la competence de I' Autorit': de contrOle pour veiller au respeCI de
la protection des donnees dans Ie secteur prive existe bien independamment des cnquetes
fondees sur des soupyons de violations» (242).
L'!nKDG attribue egalement une responsabilite de surveillance au Commissaire federal
charge de la protection des donnees. Le Commissaire federal charge de la protection des
donnees doit (i surveilJer Ie developpement de la protection des donnees telle qu'appliquee a
la fourniture et a I'utilisation des teleservices .et ( ... ) faire mention des actions pertinentes a
cet effet dans Ie rapport d' activite qu'il doit presenter)) au Bundestag (,").
L'IuKDG n'impose pas d'obligation d'enregistrement et de declaration en plus de celie
prevue par la BDSG.1l resulle de cette approche que 1'luKDG n'aura pas de repercussion sur
les obligations d'enregistrement pour les traitements de donnees lies aux services en ligne.

(~').

(m)

BDSG, § 32.
Landesbeauftragter fur den Datellschutz. 19. Jahresbericht 47 (1997) (hereinafter cited as Bremen
Data Protection Commissioner, 19th Report],

("')

("'J
('''J
(''')

C''')

luKDG, article I, § 4.
Voir BDSG, § 32.
luKDG, article 2, § 8(2).
BDSG, § 38.
luKDG, artlcle 2, § 8(2).
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Toutefois la procedure de declaration pourrait etre grundement simplifiee si l' enregistrement
electronique en ligne etait possible en Allemagne. Cette possibilite ne semble pas faire
l'objet de discussion pour Ie moment.
Pour ce qui concerne Ie controle, ce sont les Autor!tes de controle des Lander et les
Commissaires ["cleraux charges de la protection des donnees qui joueront un role important.
En outre, l'IuKDG renforce la capacite des Aulor!tes de contrOle des Lander en indiquant
c1airement qu' elles sont en droit d'inspecter les locaux des fournisseurs de services en ligne
et de leur demander des informations.
Dans les premiers projets de l'luKDG, on avait egalement envisage la notion d'audit de la
protection des donnees (Datenschutz-Audit). Un audit de la protection des donnees aurait ete
mis en ceuvre par des experts independants engages par les fournisseurs de services en ligne.
II aurait constitue une aide pour I'agent interne charge de la protection des donnees et aurait
rendu'possible I'utilisation d'un ({ label de qualite relatif it la protection des donnees» pour
les services en ligne respectant les normes approuvees. Malheureusemem, I'IuKDG tel qu'i!
a ete adopte ne contient pas de dispositions portant SUr un audit de la protection des donnees
("'). Bien que l'IuDG ne prevoie pas de regles relatives a un audit de la protection des
donnees, une telle procedure peut etre mise en ",uvre de maniere volontaire ("').
Contrairement it l'IuKDG qui ne contient pas de dispositions prevoyant un audit de la
protection des donnees, la Convention interUinder relative aux services medias comporte
Une disposition expresse qui permet la realisation d'un audit de la protection des
donnees ("6).

(""j

Le Commissaire federal charge de la protection des donnees a fait valoir des objections contre cette de
dispositions concernant un audit de la protection des donnees, Dans· son rapport d!activite Ie plus
recent, Ie Dr Jacob a observe que
L'abschce d'un "label de qualite H que \'audit aurait permis de creer. fait obstacle ou rend plus difficlle
I'orientation qui est necessaire a une large acce"ptation au qui pennettra par-dessus tout ('entree it

("'j

grande ectu,Ue dans la societe de i'inforation. La RepubJique f6d6rale d'AHemagne renonce par IA ace
qui aurait ele un atout important A l1avenir dans fa competition internationale a savoir Ull atout
concernant 1a protection des donnees, un domaine dans lequel eHe a acqujs de !'experience.
Commissaire federal charge de la protection des donnees l 16e Rapport d'aetivite. p. 143.
Pour une discussion, voir Stefan Enge\MFlechsig. Die datenschutzrechtlichell Vorschriften in neuen
Informations~

und Kommunjkationsdienste~Gesetz.) Recht der Datenverarbeitung 59, 66~67 (Heft

2/1997).

(''')

Convention InterUtnder sur les services medias, § 17.
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2.2.4.

Royaume-Uni

Comme on I'a dejil indique plus haut dans ce rapport, Ie Data Protection Registrar a des
pouvoirs decisifs pendant la procedure d'enregistrement (mj, Conforrnement au Data
Protection Act, doit se faire enregistrer tout utilisateur de donnees qui detient des donnees iI
caractere personnel, sauf si toutes les donnees concernees sont couvertes par une derogation,
L'inscription doit contenir une description des donnees caracterc personnel ctetenues et
preciser les finalites pour lesquelles les donnees sont d6tenues ou utilisees, les sources aupres
desquelles I'utilisateur de donnees peut obtenir les inconnations constituant la donnee, et Jes
pays etrangers vcrs lesquels l'utilisateur des donnees peut les transferer (248),
.

a

Au cours des deux dernieres annees, un debat tres important s' est developpe sur la possibilite
d'une simplification de Ja procedure d'enregistrement. En consequence, la procedure
d'enregistrement a ete revue et rationalisee, 11 est maintenant possible d'effectuer
I'enregistrement en ligne en utiIisant des formulaires-type d'enregistrement, bases Sur la
nature de l'activite concernee. D'autre part, il est a present possible d'acceder en ligne au
registre public ('''). Environ 500 demandes d'enregistrement sont actuellement faites chaque
semaine ("0). D'autres changements sont envisages en CO qui cone erne i'enregisttement. Le
Home Secretary et Ie Data Registrar souhaitent remplacer Ie modele d'enregistrement actue!
par un nouveau systeme de «notification»). La procedure de notification a pour objet de
simplifier encore plus la procedure requise et de reduire au minimwn les renseignements' que
Ie responsable du traitement dolt fournir ("').
Au Royaume-Vni, il n'existe pas de disposition legale particuliere prevoyant des obligations
·yisant a l' enregistrement au Ii. 13 notification pour les sei-vices en ligne ou les activites
Internet. Le Data Registrar a toutefois elabore un document portant sur « la protection des
donnees et Internet" dans lequel it examine les questions relatives a I'enregistrement C''').

(!47)

(''')
("')
("')
(251)
(lS1)

Dans Ie cadre de la procedure d'enregistrement, Ie Data Protection Registrar peut delivrer un aVIs de
mise en demeure ordonnant a une personne enregistree de prendre certaines mesures pour se
conformer a fa legislation sur la protection des donnees ct, en particulier, aux principes de protection
des donnees. Le Registrw peut egalement emettre un avis de radiation qui eHmine du registre la
totalire Oli unc partie des elements de I'enregistrement et un avis d'jnterdiction de transfert qui interdit
Ie transfert de donnees a caractere personnel vers I'etranger. Si Ie Regisfrar prend de telles mesures
d1execution, l'utilisilteur des donnees a ia possibiHte d'introduire un recours devant le Data Protection
Tribunal. Voir Data Pr.aleelion Act 1984, Part 11. § 4·20,
Voir id § 6·9,
http://www.open.gov.ukldpriregister.htm
Data Protection Registr.r, Thirteenth Annual Report 5 (1997),
Home Omee, Data Protection: The Government's Proposals § 5,3; Paper 4, Data Protection Registrar)
Questions to Answer: Datn Protection and the EU Directive p. 33·46 (1996).
qata Protection and the Internet: Guidance on Registration, <http://www.open.gov.ukldpd
internet. htm>.
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Dans ce document, Ie Registrar explique qu'it estime que la plupar! des entreprises qui
envisagent d'utiliser Internet pour des activites actuellement n,alisees par d'autres moyens
sont probablement dejil enregistrees. Pour ces trai1ements de donnees, ['utilisation d'Internet
exigera une revision du contenu de ['enregistrement et ['adoption de decisions sur la question
de savoir si les circonstances de I'utilisation des donnees peuvent avoir change (253).
II existe une situation importante dans laquelle Internet modifie Ie cadre de [a diffusion
d'infonnation: lorsque des renseignements biographiques concernant Ie personnel d'une
entin: sont publies sur [e World Wide Web. Comme I'a declare Ie Registrar:
II existe des situations ( ... ) dans lesquelles Internet est utilise, par exemple, comme
moyen de pUblier des informations et augmente considerablement les possibilites
d'acces Ii I'information ( ... ).ll Be peut que ces informations aient de toute fayon ete
obtenues par ceux qui les recherchent d'une fayoo au d'une autre, mais ia publication
sur Ie web est bien differente de ia publication effecruee par des moyens plus
traditionneis ("4),
Lorsqu'il est fait un usage approfondi d'!nternet, Ie Registrar suggere que l'utilisateur des
donnees decrive librement l'utilisation qu'il fait d'!nternet dans I'enregistrement.
Lorsqu'Internet est utilisee pour acceder a des donnees a caractere personnel, un transfert
ulterieur des donnees esl facilement realisable. Si des donnees a caractere personnel sont
« largement accessible sur Internet», Ie Registrar suggere que la case « au niveau
,international» du formulaire d'enregistrement soit remplie au moyen d'une description libre,
Le Registrar recommande I'utilisation du texte suivant {( les donnees it caractere personnel
detenues Ii ceteffet peuvent etre um;smises sur Internet. Les transferts de donnees 11 caractere
personnel peuvent done potentiellement se produire vers tout pays,» ("'}.

11 semble que Ie Registrar ait Une approche prudente de la question de savoir si un site web
etranger doi! eire enregistre au Royaume-Uni au cas ou il collecte des donnees II caractere
personnel aU Royaume-UnL n fait observer:
Le simple fait, pour une personne qui ne controle pas Ie contenu et I'utilisation des
donnees d' acceder, II des donnees a caract!:re personnel sur Internet ne cree pas une
obligation d'enregistrement Toutefois Ie fait de telecharger et de garder une copie
des donnees pour un traitement ulterieur imp\ique l'existence d'un controle sur Ie
contenu des donnees et d'une utilisation de la copie, ct, II lUoins que les donnees

(m)

Id,

(''')

Id § 2.
Id.

(m)
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soient couvertes par une derogation, il est probable que cette action donne lieu Ii une
obligation d'enregistrement ("").
Ces propos peuven! signifier qu'une entteprise etrangere sera soumise a ['obligation
d'enregistrement si elle receuille ces informations. Neamnoins, il se peut que ces
declarations ne visent que les utilisateurs de donnees nationaux.
Le Home Office a r"cemment publi" ses commentaires sur la portee geographique du project
d'une nouvelle loi relative it la protection des donnees (m). Selon la proposition du Home
Office, une nouvelle loi britannique sur la protection des donnees devrait s'appliquer au
traitement effectue: I) par un responsab!e du traitement etabli uniquement au Royaume·Uni;
2) pour les activites de la succursale au Royaume-Uni d'un responsable du traitement etabli
dans plus d'un pays de [,Union europeenne; 3) par un responsable du traitement etabE it
l'exterieur du territoire du Royaumc-Uni, mais en un lieu OU la legislation du Royaume·Uni
est applicable; 4) par un responsable du traitement qui n'est pas etabli dans I'Union
europeenne rnais qui recourt 11 des moyens situes au Royaume·Uni. Dans ce qualrieme cas,
l'entite en questiou devrnit avoir I'obligation de designer un representant Camme responsable
du traitement au Royaume-Uni (158).
Cette proposition du Home Office souleve des questions importantes en ce qui concerne les
services en ligne, mais die lle defini! pas expressement les aCl1viti:s qui constitueront « Ie
recours a des moyens situes au Royaume-Uni n. Cette expression eSI sembi able a celie
utilis';" par la Directive 95/46/CE ("'). Deux autres sources peuvent etre examinees pour ce
qui concerne la question de I' enregistrement dans Ie monde en ligne. Le Data Protection Act
du Royanme·Uni dispose que <i il ne s'applique pas a un utilisateur de donnees eu egard II
des donnees delenues en dehors du territoire du Royaume-Uni» (260). Iei, I'element
fondamental est que la donnee doit etre consider';e comme « detenue» a l'endroit Oll
l'utilisateur des donnees exerce un controle sur ces demieres (,6'). Plus loin, Ie Data
Protection Act indique que Ie « contr61e des donnees» est Ie controle « du contenu et de

('''')

eS1)
("')
(25'»

[d. § 4,
Data Protection: ?111e Government's Proposais, 2.23. <littp:/lwww.homcoffice.gov.uk.dutap4.htm>.
[d.
Voir directive 95/46!CE du Parlement europcen et du Consei!, articie 4, pamgraphe It!, ulinea c)

("Chaque Etat membre applique les dispositions nationales qufjl arrete en venu de' in presente
directive aux traitements de donnees a caractere personnel lorsque: Ie responsable du traitemcnt n'est
pas etabli sur Ie territoire de la Communaute et recourt. a des fins de traitement de donnees a caractere
personnel, a des moyens, automatises ou non, situes sur Ie territoire dudtt Etat membre. sauf si ces
moyens ne soot utilises qu'a des fins de transit sur Ie territoire de la Communaute,"),
("")
("')

Data Protection Act 1985, § 39.
Id § 39(2)(a).
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l'utilisation des donnees collectees ("'). En raison de la nature internationale d'lnternet,
l'activite de traitement en ligne en Australie, a Hong-Kong au aux Etats-Unis peut egalement
impliquer des ordinateurs situes au Royaume-Uni. Il se peut que Ie « controle » du cuntenu
des donnees soit exerce depuis ulllieu situe a l'exterieur du territoire du Royaume-Uni. Dans
de tels cas, les sites "",b "trangers ne seront pas tenus de se faire enregistrer au RoyaumeUni et Us ne seront pas soumis a la legislation sur la protection des donnees du RoyaumeUni.
Le memorandum de consultation relatif it la directive sur la protection des donnees
(Consultation Paper on the Data Protection Directive) apporte quelques eclaircissements sur
In que,'lion de ['enregistrement (""). 11 est dit dans ce document que lorsqu'une donnee fait
l'objet d'un traitement it l'exte6eur dn teITitoire communautaire, la legislation nationale
applicable est « la legislation de l'Etat membrc dans Icquel sonl situes Ies moyens (par
L' exemple
exemple, un ordinateur) auxquels on a recours pour procMer au traitement})
suivapt est fourni dans ce memorandum ({ [un] responsable du trailement etabh, par exemple,
aux Etats-Unis, qui realise des operations en ayant recours it des moyens situes au RoyaumeUni, en France et en Allemagne serait soumis Ii ia I!'gislation nationale de chacun de ces
Etats membres au titre des operations de traitement specifiques ef'fectuees en ayant recours
aux moyens situes dans l'Etat membre dont il s'agit» ("'). lei encore la question de la portee
geographique de la loi britannique depend de la nature « des moyens auxquels on a reCoUrs»
au Royaume-Uni. Une operation Internet realisee par l'intermediaire d'un serveur situe aux
Etats-Unis peut faciJement permettre d'acceder aux donnees il caractere personnel
concernant une personne situee au Royaume-Uni - cette action impliquera necessairement Ie
« reeours » a des moyens simes II !'interieur et al' exterieur du territoire du Royaume-Uni.

e").

Entin, une observation generale sur I'enregistrement au Royaume-Uni s'impose: it semble
qu'U existe un assez grand nombre de difficultes quant au respect de cette obligation.
Comme precedemment indique, Ie Data Protection Registrar espere assister a une
augmentation du nombre d'enregistrements grace a l'enregistrement en ligne ct it 1a
rationalisation des conditions requises. D'autre part, les statistiques montrent que les
enregistrements sont en hausse et que Ie Data Protection Act est en tout etat de cause plutot
bien connu ('"'). Neanmoins, il est probable que Ie nombre actuel d'enregistrements est loin
d'approcher Ie nombre de taus ceux qui, au Royaume-Uni, procedent au traitement de

(,61)
e'tiJ)
eM)

("')
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Id § 1(2)(b).

Consultation Paper on the Be Data Protection Directive, ch. 2.22, <hnp:/lelj.warwick.ac.ukljilti
Consultlukdpldataprot.htm>.
Id. ch. 2.25.
Id. ch. 2.25.
Data Protection Registrar, 13e Rapport d'aclivil';, p. 29-34.
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donnees a caractere personnel ('''). En toute impartialite, cette observation est probablement
egalement valable pour les autres pays oil existe une obligation d'enregistrement ('"').

\

I

Dans la mesure ou il y a de plus en plus de traitements de donnees en ligne, il est probable
que Ie nombre d'entrcprises et de personnes soumises Ii I'obligation d'enregistrement
augmente considerablement. Le Registrar a declare Ii propos de l'informatique « ene se
repand partout, presque de maniere universelle, et eUe n'est pas Ulliquement utilisee par de
tres grandes entites d'une maniere extremement structuree, mais eHe est egalement utilisee
par des entreprises de toutes taiHes et par des millions de personnes » ("''). Malgre les efforts
actuels du Registrar pour simplifier les obligations d' enregistrement et pour mieux fillre
cannaltre Ie Data Protection Act, il n'est pas certain que l'obligation d'enregistrement sera
tres bien respectee dans I'environnement en Iigne. Ainsi, deux des plus importants journaux
en ligne du Royaume-Uni, Ie Times et I'Electronic Telegraph, coHectent des informations
personnelles sur leurs lecteurs en ligne dans Ie cadre d'une procedure d'inseription au service
qui est une condition pour pouvoir lire la version web desdits journaux (,70). Or, au 5
decembre 1997, aucun des deuxjoumaux ne s'es! fait enregistrer aupres'du Data Protection
Registrar.

2.3. Transparence
Comme indique pn!cedemment, la transparence est I'un des pnnclpes essent,els de Ja
legislation europeenne sur la protection des donnees ("'). Ce principe implique que Ie
traitement d'informations 11 caractere personnel soit structure de manieIe a erre ouvert et
comprehensible pour la personne concemee. De plus, Ie principe de transparence implique
que les personnes ment un droit d'acc"s et un droit de rectification a I'egard des informations
acaractere personnel conservees (,,").
Dans Ie contexte des services en ligne et d'lntemet, ce principe de la protection des donnees
est soumis a une tres forte pression. Dans la pratique actuelle, les participants aux services en
ligoe ne fournissent generalement pas de renseignements sur la fayoll dont ils utilisent les
donnees a cmaclcre personnel. Bien que de nombreux foumisseurs de service commencent a
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eo!.)
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(,70)
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En 1996-97,200364 utiHsnteurs de donnees sont enregistres au Royaume-UnL Be Rapport anouel,

p.21.
Voir, par exemp lej Landesbeauftragter fur den Datenscnutz, Preie Hansestadt Bremen,
J 9.lahresbericht (1997) (122 enregistrementi pour Ie Land de Bremo).
Questions to Answer, p. 4.
<http,/lwww.the-times.co.ukl;http,{lwww.telegraph.co.uk.>
Voirsupra § 1.2.2.·
Id.
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donner des explications a leurs abonnes sur ce point (213), beaucoup de sites web qui
collectent des infonnations acaractere personnel ne Ie font pas. Or, la transparence peut etre
techniquement realisee. D'ailieurs, comme nous l'avons note dans la premiere partie de cette
etude, il existe un site web qui permet meme aux interesses de tester ell temps reel les
informatiens qu'ull serveur peut collecter sur eux ('74).
De la meme, Ie droit d'aeces et Ie droit de rectification ne semblent pas etre proposes de
maniere generalc par les services en !igne. Or, camme la transparence, il est techniquement
possible de proposer ces droits dans l' environnement en ligne.

2.3.1.

Belgique

La loi beige exige que Ies personnes soient inform"es au moment OU des informations a
caractere personnel les concernant sont coliectees sl ces informations sont collectees
directement aupres d'elles (175). La personne concern,;e doit eire informee: de l'identite du
responsable du traitement, de la finalite pour laquelle les donnees rccueillies seront utilisees,
de la possibilite d'obtenir des renseignements complementaires dans la declaration faite ala
CPVP, de son droit d'acceder aux donnees it caractere personnel conservees la.concernant et
de son droit d'en demander In rectification (276). Si les donnees sont collectees de maniere
indirecte, les personnes concemees doivent etre informees au moment meme de la
conservation des informations (211). Cependant une information simultanee separee relative
aux collectes indirectes d'information8 it caractere personnel n'est pas exigee 81 une relation
contractuelle existe entre la personne concernee et Ie maltre du fichier ("'). L'information
n'est pas non plus exigee dans les cas suivants :
•

L'infomlation a deja ete delivn;e II la personne concemee, pour autant que les
finalites du traitement n'aient pas ete modifiees depuis la delivrance de cette
information;

•

Ie traitement porte exclusivement sur I'identification des perso!1l1es aupres desquelles
Ie maitre do fichier souhaite mener des operations de relations publiques ou avec
. Iesquelles il souhaite entretenir des relations sociales ou professionnelles, II condition

em
f14)
(m)

C-")
(m)
(m)

Voir, par exemple, Ire partie, § 104.3,1.5.2; Deuxieme Partie, etudes de cos.
Voir, parexemple, <http://www.anonymiser.com>.
Loi du 8 decembre 1992. article 4, § 1.
Loi du 8 decembre 1992, article 4.
Loi du 8 decembre 1992, article 9.
Loi du 8 decembre 1992, article 9.
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que les donnees d'identificatian soient communiquees directement au maitre
du flchier par la personne concern';e;
•

les donnees relatives a la personne concernee sont uniquement incorporees dans Ie
traitement au titre d'enregistrement secondaire de l'enregistrement principal d'une
autre personne physique, personne morale ou entite, it condition que l'enregistrement
secondaire ne soit pas traite ind6pendamment de l'enregistrement principal et que les
dOlmees qui y sont enregistrees ne soient pas utilisees a d'autres finalites que celles
pour lesquelles elles ant ele enregistrees;

•

Ie traitemenl comprend des donnees rendues publiques par la personne concern"e et iI
poursuil exclusivement la finalit" pour laquelle ces donnees ont ote rendues
pub/iques par la personne concern';e;

•

Ie traitement comprend des dOlmees donI une disposition legale ou reglementaire
organise la publicite el il poursuit exclusivement Ia finaiit': determinee sur la base de
cette pub licit" (m).

Lorsque I'obligation d'information existe, la loi beIge semble exiger des renseignements
assez precis sur la nature du traitement et, notamment, sur les fmalites dudit traitemen!.
Ainsi, un tribunal a estime qu'une banque informant scs clients que 1a banque « garantit que
les donnees it cara<:tere personnel ne seront utilisees qu' a des fins juridiques, notamment
pour la preparation et la signature de contrals dans Ie cadre de la foumiture de services
financiers et pour I' optimisation de Ia relation cntre la banque et Ie client» n' est pas une
information suffisante en ce qui concerne I'Ulilisation des donnees dans Ie cadre du
demarchage relalif a des produits d'assurance ("0). Le tribunal beige a estime que
I'information ne mentionnait correctement que des services purement bancaires tels que les
moyens de paiement, I' adresse du compte, les plans d' epargne, les investissements, les prets
et autres services de meme nature. Le tribunal a egalement justifie sa decision en faisant
valair que ce n'est que recemment que Ies activites d'assurance sont venues s'ajouter aux
services traditionnellement proposes par les banques ("'). Cette approche traduit une
interpretation stricte de la fmalite et eUe est importante pour les consequeoces de
I'information donnee par les services en ligne a leurs clients. Dans la mesure au les services
en ligne ont une nature dynamique, l'adaptation des utilisations des donnees echappera
vraisemblablemem a Ia portee de la finalite dont les personnes concernees om initialement

("')
(',,)
("')

Arrete royal (n' 15) du 15 mars 1996 modmant I'anel" royal n' 9 du 7 fevri.r )995, M.B., 15 mars
1996, p. 5830.
Tl'ib. Comm. Anvers, 7 juiliet 1994, reprinted in 199414 D.LT., pp. 52·53.
Id.
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etC inform';es. Par consequent, les services en Iigne peuvent frequemment eire tenus
d'actualiser I'information fournie aux personnes concernees.
En Belgique, Ie principe de transparence implique egalement un droit d'acc,:,s aux donnees a
caractere personnel detenues par Ie maitre du fichier (''') ainsi qU'ull droit de rectification
concernant les donnees inexactes ("'). Le maltre du fichier peut exiger qu'une personne paie
la samme de 100 FE (2,5 ecus) pour couvrir les frais administratifs afferents a la reponse it la
demande d'acces ('''), cependant, dans Ie cas d'une demande d'acces a des donnees relative
au credit iI la consommation, la consultation doit en regIe generale etre gratuite (Jil). Or, la
personne concernee peut eprauver des difficultes a exercer ces droits dans Ie cadre des
services en ligne. Pour toute transaction partiCuliere, l' entite qui a la qualite de {( maitre du
fichier» peut changer en fonction des flux de dmmees resultant des traces des connexions. Il
s'ensuit qu'une personne peut devoir entrer en contact avec plusieurs « maltresdu fichier»
pour avoir une idee claire des donnees la concernant qui sont en circulation.

2.3.2.

France

La loi franl'aise exige que les personnes soient informees de l'existence d'un traitement
autornatise d'inforrnations nominatives les concernant ('''). Cette obligation ne vaut que pour
ceux qui collectent des informations directement aupres des personnes concern,;es ("'). Celte
restriction concernant I'obligation d'informer est importante dans I'environnement du
roseau; de nombreux fournisseurs de services en Iigne ne collectent peut-etre pas des
informations a caract"re personnel directemcnt 'aupres des personnes concemees. Lorsque
I'obligation d'informer est ,applicable, la personne concernee doit eire inform"e: a) du
caractere obligatoire au facullatif des reponses; b) des consequences a leur egard d'un defaut
de reponse; c) des destinataires de I'inforrnation; d) de l'existence d'un droit d'acces et de
rectifleation ('''). Les personnes concernees ant Ie droit de s' opposer pour des raisons
legitimcs a ce que des informations nominatives la concernant fassent I' objet d'un traitement
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Loi du 8 decembre 1992, article 10.
Loi du 8 decembre 1992. article 12.
Arrete Royal if;)- 4 du 7 septembre fixant Ie montant, ies conditions et les modalil'es du paiement de la
redevance prealabie au maitre du ficnier lors de rexercice du droit de communication des donnees a
caractere personnel fonde sur ('article lOde la loi du & decembre 1992.
Voir Y. Poullet & A. Lefebvre. Vie privee et credit a ia consommation, proteger Ie consommateur ou
sa vie privee: un choix difflcile, in LE CREDIT A LA CONSOMMATION, p. 121 (G.-A. Dahl, Cd.,
1997)(citant Particle 70, § 2 de la loi sur Ie credit a la consommation et I'article lOde I'arr~te royal du
20 novembre 1992).
Loi n' 78·17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 27.
Voir, par exemple, CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertes, p. 16 (1988)
Loi n'78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 27.
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(sauf pour les traitements effectues conf1:mnement a un acte niglementaire) (m). Pour ce qui
concerne les donnees sensibles, les personnes concerm\es doivent donner leur accord ecrit
expres au traitement de ces informations ("'). Les personnes concernees ant egalement Ie
droit d'aceeder 11 toute information nominative detenue en vertu d'une declaration (l9I) ainsi
que -Ie droit d' exiger que soient reetifiees les informations la concernant qui SOn! inexactes,
incompletes, equivoques, perimees ou dont l'utilisation est interdite (m).
La CNIL a ete extremement vigilante quant a !'information et a I' accord dans Ie cadre du
traitement d'informations Ii caractere personnel et, en particulier, dans Ie cadre des services
en ligne. A l'occasion du dixieme almiversaire de la loi franyaise, un rapport de la CNIL
constatait que cette institution faisait une interpretation large du terme ({ collecte
d'infornlations a caractere personnel», y comp!'is dans des situations au !'information est
automatiquement gem!r':e dans Ie cadre d'une activit': ('93). Cette interpn!tation large vise a
eviter que soit elude le droit de la persorme d'etre informee de I'existence du traitement
d'informations a caractere personnella concernant. Plus !',;cemment, la CNIL a expressement
aborde la question de I'information fClUrnie aux persormes concernees quant aux donnees
figurant dans des annuaires accessibles Sur Internet (''') et elle a soigneusement examine la
question du traitement de donnees medicales sur Internet mn de s'assurer que les patients
re\Ooivent un formulaire de consentement expres au moment meme de la collecte des donnees
(''').
En ce qui concerne Ie caractere adequat du contenu des l'informations foumie aux individus,
la CNIL a insiste, dans ses decisions sur Internet, que I'information devait inclure la
« logique sous-tendant Ie traitement » e"), devait permettre aux utilisateurs de commitre la
finali!e des informations recueillies et les informer de ce que les transmissions SUr Internet
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Loi n' 78·17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 26.
Loi nn 78~ 17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 31. Bien que la loi ne prevoie aucune fonnalire pour te recueil
de )'accord, la CNll,., estime que Cette disposition impose Ie reeue!1 d'un accord ecrit. ce qui a f!te
confirme pur Ie Conseil d'Etat CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertes, p. 23.
ld., article 34.
Id., article 36.
CNIL, Dix !lOS d'jnformatique et des libertes, p. 17-18.
CN1L, 16e Rapport d'.ctivite, pp. 84·86 (1996); CNIL, 17c Rapport d'sctivit., 69-83 (1997).
Deliberation n' 96-062 du 9 juillct 1996; Deliberation n' 96-063 du 9 juillet 1996; CNIL, 17e Rapport
d'activite, p. 83-87 (1997).
CNIL, Voix, image et protectinn des donnees personnelles. 55 (1996), Bien que I. CNIL n'explique

pas In signification de I'expression ;'logique sous-tendant Ie traitemeot'\
realisee pour tirer dcs conclusions sur Ie;; intcresses.
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ce!le~ci

vise le type d'annlyse

offrent une securite mains grande que les autres formes de transmissions (m). En outre, la
CNIL a adopte une position ferme en ce qui concerne les informations tigurant dans les
annuaires. Elle eslime que les personnes concernees doivent tout particulierement etre
iuform':es de ce que ces informations scront placees Sur Internet et des risques particuliers
inherents it la diffusion des donnees acaractere personnel sur Internet ("').
En cc qui concerne Ie droit « d' opposition», qui est Ie droit appartenant aux personnes
concernees de s'opposer au traiternent, la CNIL distingue entre la divulgation d'informations
a caractere personnel sur Internet et les autres modes de diffusion (m). En consequence, la
CNiL a chercM a s'assurer que la divulgation par un canal tel qu'un annuaire telephonique
ne fait pas obstacle au droit de s'opposer Ii la diffusion sur Internet Coo). L'information
foumie doit generalement indiquer que les personnes concernees ont Ie droit de s'opposer au
traitement des donnees Ii caractere personnel.
Dans la mesure au I'obligation d'informer est limitee Ii la collecte d'infonnations a caractere
personnel effectuee directement aupres des personnes concernees, beaucoup de fournisseurs
de services en ligne peuvent echapper it I'obligation et ne sont pas tenus d'informer les
perSOIDles concernees. Les informations a caractere personnel peuvent egalement eire
recueillies indirectement aupnis des personnes concemees sur Internet, comme c'est Ie caS
des donnees pour fichiers d'audit des utilisateurs acquises par un site central (host sire)
aupres du foumisseur de service Internet de la personne concern';e. Dans ces cas, Ie
fournisseur de service Internet devrait avoir I'obligation d'informer les interesses du transfert
d'informations nominatives les concernant it des tiers, mais Ie destinataire n'uurait pas cette
obligation. La CNIL a egalement suggere que les fournisseurs de service Internet soient
charges d'informer les interesses de I'existence des traitements des donnees par des agents
intelligents lorsque ces derniers utilisent des proms d'informations nominatives COl).
Neanmoius, lorsqu'un destinataire a obtenu de maniere indirecte des infonnations a caractere
personnel, si ledit destinataire collecteensuite des informations directement aupres de la

('-'>7)

Voir, par exemple) deliberation nQ 97-0.51 du 30 ju[n 1997 concernant une demande d'avis presentee

(''')

par ia Mairie de Paris relative a un traitement d'informations nominatives mls en reuvre dans Ie cadre
du site Internet de In Ville de Paris; deliberation nO 97-032 du 6 mai 1997 relative a la demande d'avis
presentee par Ie premier mjnistre concernant un modele-type de traitements djjnformatlons
nominative operes dans ie cadre d'ufI'site Internet ministerieL
La CNIL a ains! approuve un modele-type de traitements d' infoonations acaractere personnel operes
dans Ie cadre de sHes Internet mlnisteriels et elle a insiste sur Ie contenu des renseignements a fournir
aux interesses, Voir deliberation n(l 97 032 du 6 mai 1997 relative a la demande d1avls presentee par
Je premier Olinistre concernant un modele-type de traitements d'informations nominative operes dans
Ie cadre d'un site Internet ministerieL
CNIL, 170 Rapport d'activite, p.n·73 (1997).
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Id.
CNIL, Voix, image el protcction dcs donnees, p. 56·57 (1996).
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personne concernee, par exemple en utilisant des « cookies» ou un questionnaire place sur ie
site, Hiui faudra respecter i'obligation legale d'informer la personne concernt'e. Or, Ie simple
fait qu'une alerte « cookies» apparaisse sur l'ecran it travers un navigateur Internet ou Ie fait
pour i'utiJisateur d'"tre implicitement conscient que des donnees sont collecteos lorsqu'il
remplit un questionnaire ne suffirait probablement pas II satisfaire Ie contenu des regles
applicables en matiere de notification; ainsi, en regie generale, ces mecanismes n'indiquent
pas Ie caractere obligatoire ou facultatif des reponses, la logique sous-tendant Ie traitement,
la finalite ou les risques accrus inherents a un environnement de ,,!seau ouvert.

J,

I

La transposition de la Directive 951461CE necessitera un rentorcement des obligations
d'information, car en vertu de celte directive, la personne concernee doit etre inlormee des
collectes indirectes d'infonnations Ii caractere personnel la concernant CO2 ). Dans Ie monde
en ligne, des moyens techniques peuvent facilement etre mis au point pour mettre en ceuvre
ces mesures d'information. Ainsi, de la meme qu'un petit icone apparalt sur certains
navigateurs pour indiquer que des protocoles de cryptage sont utilises ('OJ), un petit icone
pounait apparaitre pour indiquer i'existence d'un transtert d'informations Ii caractere
personneL La CNIL a fait quelques propositions experimentales en ce sens en faisant
observer, par exemple. qu'un ecran comportant un avertissement relatif aux droits
d'opposition et un lien sur lequel on peut cliquer pour manifester son opposition, etai! un
mecanisme approprie pour avertir la personne concern"e de l'existence d'une collecte
d'informations 11 caractere personnel et de la possibilite de la refuser (,").

a

Enfin, la loi fran,aise devra prevoir une serie de derogations I'obligation d'information
plus large que celle qui existe it I'heure actuelle afin de se conformer a la directive
europeenne ("5). La Directive 951461CE prevoit diverses exceptions qu'on ne retrouve pas
dans la loi fran,aise (par exemple, la surete de l'Etat, la defense, la securite publique, des
manquements a la deontologie dans Ie cas des professions n&glementees, un interet
economique ou financier important d'un Etat membre ou de [,Union europeenne) ('''). Ces
exceptions se reveleront probablement importantes pour les services en Iigne en raison de
l'omnipn!sence des questions de seeurite qui deviendront endemiques dans I'environnement
du roseau ouvert.

C"')

Voir directive 95146!CE, article 11; CN1L,

Vol"~

Image et Protection des donnees personnelies, p, 54

(1996).
(lQ))

(lti4)
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Netscape Navigator utilise une petite cle en bas du coin gauche de \'ecran de !'utiHsateur pour
indiquer l'utilisation en COurs de moyens de transmission securises.
Deliberation nP 97 .. 050 du 24 jutn 1997 relative a une demande d'avis presente par France Telecom
concernant un traitement autornatise d'infot'matlons nominatives denomme (~MjniteJnet.}}
La loi fran~aise ne prevatt d'exception que pour la coHecte des informations necessaires a la
constatation des infractions. Loi 0°78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 article 27, alinea 3.
Directive 9S/46fCE, article 13, § 1.
j
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2.3.3.

Allemagne

L'!uKDG vient s'ajouler aux dispositions de la BDSG ell ce qui concerne la transpar
t
. I' I
. d I" C
•
(307
,
enee e ,
en part,eu ler, a questlOn e lllLormattOn ). L luKDG met l'aceent sur !'importance de
!'information a divers cndroits. Son article 2, § 3(5) dispose ({ I'utilisateur doil etre informe
du type, de la portee, du lieu et des finalites de la collecte, du traitement et de I'utilisation
des donnees a earacrere personnel Ie concernant»). Cette regie fondamentale sur
!'infonnation est renforcee par des regles speciliques portant SUr les procedures
automatisees, telles que les cookies, gmce auxquelles des donnees Ii caractere personnel sont
collectees.
Les r"gles de l'IuKDG relatives aux cookies exigent Ii la [ois une infonnation ella possibilite
de renoncer II cetle infonnation. La loi dispose « en cas de traitement automatise qui permet
d'identifier ult.deurement l'utilisateur et qui prepare la colleete, le traitement au l'utilisation
de donnees Ii caractere personnel, l'utilisateur doit eIre informe avant Ie commencement de la
procedure» COB). Cette obligation ineombe aux ({ fournisseurs.) qui sont definis comme des
{( personnes physiques au morales au des associations de personnes qui fournissent des
teleservices au qui foumissent I'acees it l'utilisation de teleservices)} "'). l}obligation n'est
cependant applicable que dans les cas ou les cookies rendent possible ({ une identification
ulterieure de l'utilisateur » (,10). L'luKDG indique egalemerl! que la responsabilite de
l'informalion relative aux cookies incombera it la partie qui installe Ie cookie, done soit au
foumisseur de service Internet (ISP), soit au site web. Le site web fait partie de la categorie
des personnes" qui fournissent des teIeservices », les ISP appartiennent it la categorie des
personnes {{ qui foumissent l'ae,ces Ii I'utilisation de teleservices» ("I).
L 'utilisateur doit pouvoir acceder a tout moment aux informations relatives a ce " traitement
automatise)) (312). De plus, « l'utilisateur peut tenoncer it celte information» C"). Cependant,
Ie fait de renoncer Ii recevoir des informations sur Ie traitement automatise, camme par
exemple sur les cookies, n'est pas considerecomme equivalent II un accord donne afin de
pfnnettre la prestation de teleservices ou pour une utilisation ulterieure des donnees
collectees pour la prestation de teJeservices (,").

(lU1)

Voir BDSQ, § 19: "Sur sa dema~de, I' interesse doit i1ltre informe: 1) des donnees aearactere personnel
1e concernant, y compris leur source et leurs destinataires 1 et 2) de la finalite de In conservation",
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luKDO, article 2, §3(6).
luKDO, article 2, pel).
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luKDO, article 1, § 3.
IuKDO, article 2, § 3(5).
Id.
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Aux termes de 1'luKDG, les fournisseurs sont egalement tenus d'informer les utilisateurs
({ de toute reexpedition a un autre fournisseur » C"). Camme souligne preeedemment dans ce
rapport, 1'luKDG exige que I'utilisateur soit informe qu'il est possible « d'utiliser et de
payer de maniere anonyme des t':leservices au de les utiliser el de les payer en se servanl
d'un pseudonyme» (,16). En outre, l'ulilisateur doit etre informe de toute donnee conservee
sous son pseudonyme» ('11). En vertu de 1'luKDG, un utilisateur doit avoir gratuitement
ace"s aux « donnees conservees concernant sa personne ou son pseudonyme» (m).
L'luKDG place la question du consentement au cceur de ses principes visant a la protection
des donnees et veille soigneusement aux conditions dans lesquelles Ie consentement doil etre
donne. Le texte prevoit 18 possibilile de donner son consentement par la voie electromque.
Les dispositions de l'IuKDG sur Ie consentement indiquent la voie a suivre pour faire entrer
la protection des donnees dans Ie sieele it venir. Le fait de peffi1ettre l'obtention electronique
du consentement n!duit Ie cout afferent Ii I'obtention de I'accord pour les fournisseurs de
service en ligne. En meme temps, 1'luKDG s'efforce de faire en sorte que Ie consentement
soit double: I) veritablement eclaire et 2) veritablement volontaire.
Conformement it 1'luKDG, les dormees ne peuvent etre collectees et traitees que si la loi
permet celte action ou S1 I'utilisateur a donne son autorisation ('1"). I)'autre part, 1'luKDG
requiert I' obtention du consentement individuel pour certaines categories de traitements
supplementaires de « donneeS contractuelles », qui sont les donnees requises pour la
conclusion d'un contrat portant sur l'utilisation de teleservices (,20). L'luKDG dispose que
« Ie traitement et I' utilisation de donm:es contractuelles a des fins de conseil, de publicite,
d'etudes de march" on po.ur la conception de teleservices orientes vers la demande ne sont
autorises que si I'utilisateur a donne son consentement expres}) ("1). Celte disposition
impose une finalite stdete quant a I'utilisation ulterieure des infoffi1ations de base que les
tournisseurs de service doivent colleeter sur ehacun de leurs clients.
Le principe du consentement dans Ie cadre de la protection des donnees peut facHernent faire
I'objet de « faiblesses ». Ainsi, par Ie passe, 1. confianee dans Ie consentement donne au
traitement des informations aux Elats-Unis a montre que deux difficultes pouvaient se

(''')
(,")
("')

('''J

luKDG, § 4(3).
[uKDG. article 2, § 4.
luKDG, article 2, § 7.
luKDG, article 2, § 7.

La regie generale de la BDSG est ogalement que "I 'information dolt etre

fournie gratuitementl1 • BDSG, § 34.
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luKDG, arti,ie 2, § 3(1).
luKDG, article 2, § 5(2).
Id.
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poser ("'). En premier lieu, les personnes coneern';es peuvent ne pas avo;r d'autre
poss;bilile n!elle que de donner leur consentement lorsqu'on leur demande leur permission
avant de proeeder au traitement de donnees. D'autre part, les persannes concernees peuvent
ne pas etre capables de faire U/J choix eclain! si les informations relatives au traitement
envisage qui leur sont communiquees sont insuffisantes. L'luKDG tente de prevenir ces
deux possibilites de manquement a ses dispositions sur Ie consentement.
Quant iI I'absence de possibilite de faire un choix reel, en vertu de l'luKDG, l'acces aux
services en Iigne doit etre fourni independamment de I'octroi d'une autorisation pour des
traitements ulterieurs de donnees a caractere personneL La loi dispose que « Ie fournisseur ne
doit pas subordonner la prestation de teleservices au consentement de l'utilisateur pour Ie
traitement au l'utilisation des donnees Ie concernant a d'autres fins, si un autre moyen
d'acceder aces teleservices n'est pas mis a Ja disposition au raisunnablement mis a la
disposition de l'utilisateuf» ("'). De plus, l'utilisateur doit etre informe ({ de son droit de
retirer son consentement atout moment avec effet pour I'avenir" C"). La teneur de cette loi
garantit un acces satisfaisant aUx teleservices meme si un utilisateur ne donne pas son
consentcment pour une utilisation ulterieure des donnees II caractl"e personnel Ie concernant.
En ce qui concerne Ie danger qu'un consemement non eclaire soit donne, aux tennes de
l'luKDG, des calegories particulieres d'informations doivent etre partagees avec la personne
concernee dans Ie cadre de la procedure de consentement. La loi dispose que « I'utilisateur
doit etre informe du type, de la portee, du lieu et des finalites de la collecte, du traitement el
de I'utilisation des donnees it caractere personnel Ie concernant» C"). Ces dispositions
detaillees sont une garantie pour la procedure de consentement, dans la mesure ou enes
exigent que les utilisateurs reyoivent les categories d'informations qui sont susceptibles
d'etfe necessaires pour que les consommateurs de teleservices puissent prendre une decision
eclairee.
Un aut.re progres de la legislation relative it la protection des donnees est que l'IuKDG
permet expressement que eonsentement soit donne par la voie electronique. A SOn article 2, §
3(7), ce textc dispose que Ie consentement peut etre donne par lavoie electronique si
certaines conditions sont remplies. Scion les travaux preparatoires de l'IuKDG, cette
protection procedurale a cte prevue par ce textc en raison des risques particuliers inherents
aux consentements donnes par la voie electronique. Ces risques sont dus i\ I'absence de
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Ces problemes sont particulierement intenses dans Ie cadre du traitement des informations detenucs
par les services de sante. Voir Paul M. Schwartz & Joel R. Reideoberg, DATA PRIVACY LAW,
.167-71 (1996).
JuKDG, article 2, § 3(3).
luKDG, article 2, § 3(6).
luKDG, article 2, § 3(3).
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« materialisation (pas de fornmJaire ecrit)) et de « marques biometricaJes (pas de signature
apposee par la main de la personne concern';e » (''').
Par consequent, en vertu de J'luKDG, te consentement n'est valabJe que si \e fournisseur
garantit que Je consentement electronique est donne par une procedure adaptee au monde
numerique. Comme Ie dit la \0;;
Le consentement peut egalement laire I'objet d'une declaration eleclronique si Ie
foumisseur prend des mesures afin que
1. Ie consentement puisse etre donne par un aete non equivoque et reflt'chi de
I'utilisateur,
2. ce consentement ne puisse eire modifie sans que.cela soit detecte,
3. Ie createur puisse eire identifie,
4. Ie consentement soit enregislre et
5. l'utilisateur puisse obtenir Ii tout moment sur demande Ie texte du
eonsentement C").
L'une des conditions les plus importantes concernant Ie consentement electronique est que Ie
consentement ne peut eire donne que « par un acte non equivoque et retJechi de
I'utilisateur». Sur ce point, les travaux preparatoires de la loi indiquent " en ce sens, un
consentement est par exemple donne par une repetition confumee de la commande de
transfer! simultanement accompagnee sur l'ecran de visualisation par une declaration de
consentement apparaissant a tout !e mains sous forme d' extraits» ("'). Quant a l' exigence
selon laquelle Ie consentement ne peut eire modifie sans que cela puisse eIre delccte, Ii
l'occasion de !a presentation du projet d'luKDG, Ie gouvernement federa! a declare que
« des proeectes techniques adequats» doivent etre disponibles afin de faire la preuve de
l'autbenticite du consentement et de l'ident!t" de la personna I'ayant dOlme ('''),

La loi allemande protege non seulement Ie consentement, mais aussi les droits d'acces et de
rectification, L'!uKDG confere Ii l'utilisateur Ie droit « d'exammer gratuitement et Ii tout
moment les donnees Ii caractere personnel conservees concernant sa personne OU son
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pseudonyme chez Ie fournisseur)) (,){l), Elle dispose egalement que" I'information doit etre
dunnee electroniquement si I'utilisateur Ie demande » eJJ1 ),
L'luKDG elle-meme ne confere pas de droit de rectification concernant les donnees a
caractere'personneL Les exigences de Ia loi federale relative II la protection des donnees
interviendront pour combler cette lacune, La BDSG dispose que ({ Ies donnees it caractere
personnel doivent etre rectifiees si elles sont inexactes» (m),
Ces droits d'acces et de rectification ont une importance considerable dans Ie contexte en
ligne, Les personnes concernees scront en mesure de d6eouvrir les informations que les
fournisseurs ont conservee. sur elles, Elles seront egalement capables de faire rectifier ces
informations Iorsqu' elles ne seront pas exactes,
Enfin, il est possible de faire quelques conunentaires sur les pratiques qui ont actuellement
cours en Allemagne, Les droits prevus par l'luKDG en ce qui conceqe la transparence sont
impressionnants. Toutefois, il semble qu' en pratique les exigences de la loi ne soient pas
encore respectees. En examinant les sites web qui entrent dans la categorie legale de
« teieservices i), on observe certains manquements notables aux exigences legales
comment"es a la presente section.
Quelques exemples suffirant. Dans la categorie des « teleservices)i figurent les " biens et
services proposes et enumeres sur des bases de donnees electroniquement disponibles par un
scees interactif et la possibilite de passer des commandes» (m), Ainsi, certains sites Web
proposant des praduits it la vente sont clairement concermls par Ies exigences legales en
matiere de transparence, Cependant, une etude portant sur des sites web allemands revele
que les exigences de l'luKDG ne sont pas uniformement respectees. Ce phenomene peut ell
partie s'expliquer par Ie fait que la'loi n'est entree en vigueur que depms quelques mois
seulemen!.
Prenons comme premier exemple Un magazine allemand de premier plan Der Spiegel: n
propose un site web contenant de nouveaux articles et proposant la vente de nombreux biens
et services ('''). Sur ce site, sont vendus des disques compacts, des CD-Roms, des cassettesvideos, des livres ainsi que des billets pour des spectacles et des manifestations se deroulant
partout en Allemagne. Ces produits peuvent taus etre.commandes en ligne sur Ie site web du
Spiegel. Or, Ie site web de Der Spiegel ne foumit aucune indication quant 11 l'utilisation
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projetee des donnees it caractere personnel qui sont collectees dans Ie cadre des ventes de
biens realisees. Un autre sile web qui propose la vellte des biens et services est celui de
Kaufhof, un grand magasin allemand de premier plan (m), lei encore, Ie site web ne fournil
aucune information sur ses pratiques loyales applicables aux informations (si tallt est qu'il
en ait),
Pour finir, pre nons l'exemple de KaDeWe, Ie grand magasin a 1a mode de Berlin, qui vend
ses produits en Iigne sur Ie site web « my-world » ("'). Ce site fournit des informations en
ligne Sllr les meSures qu'il applique en matiere de securite. En particulier, Ie site web « myworld» utilise SSL, Ie Secure Socket Layer, qui est un procede de cryptage (m). Le site
{( my-world» utilise Ie SSL pour « vous garantir que les donnees caractere personnel vallS
concernant - telles que votre adresse ou votre numero de carte de credit - ne tomberont pas
entre les mains de personnes indelicates» (''').Cependant, ce site web ne fournit aucune
information sur d' autres pratiques loyales applicables aux informations.

a

2.3.4.

Royaume-Uni

En vertu de run des principes essentiels de la legislation britannique relative it la protection
des donnees, une personne a Ie droit « it intervalles de temps reguliers, et sans retard et f,ais
injustilies (. .. ), d'o$tre inform"e par tout utilisateur de donnees de co qu'il delieut des donnees
Ii caractere personnella concernant» ('''). L'information est un autre element du principe de
« loyaute» applicable a la protection des donnees. Pour savoir si une donnee it caractere
persqnnel a ete obtenue loyalement, il convient, selon la loi, de se demander « si la personne
aupres de laquelle celte information a
oblenue a ote abusee ou trompee quanl la tinalite
ou aux t1nalites pour lesquelles cette information va eIre detenue, utilisee ou divulguee»
(3"). Le droit a l'inforl1!ation a olle posterieurement developpe par des decisions du Data
Protection Tribunal. Trois decisions rendues par ce\te juridiction meritent d' etre citees.
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<http://www"kaufhof.de.~\Hfe.htmlParmi les nombreux p-rodults vend us sur son site web, on trouve
des souvenirs officiels du .Salon federal du Jardinage, y comptis des animaux en bois et des t1eurs en
bois que chacun _peut mettre dans son' jardin.
< http://www.kkauthof.de!cgilktestlhtm 11onl in e/bu ndesgarten> .
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En premier lieu, dans la decision Linguaphone de 1996 (,"), Ie Data Protection Tribunal a
jug'; que !'information fournie par l'utilisateur des donnees aux personnes concernees etait
insuffisant. Cette information n'avait pas une taille et un relief suffisants pour qu'on puisse
considerer que la personne a laquelle elle etait destinee avait ete correctement informee ("').
En seconcl lieu, dans une decision concernant l'utilisation par des entreprises assurant un
serYice public d'informations a caractere personnel dans leurs bases de donnees relatives 11
l'approvisionnement, it des fins autres que I'approvisionnement, Ie Data Protection Tribunal
a estime que ({ les interesses doivent etre inform':s de tOute finalite non evidente en vue de
laquelle les donnees les concernant peuvent etre utilisees au divulguees au moment ou Wle
relation s'etablit entre ces personnes et un utilisateur de donnees}) ("'). Si !'information doit
eire I'instrument de la loyaute dans Ie cadre de I'utilisation des donnees, elle doh etre foumie
au moment meme ou debute la relation impliquant une collecte de donnees.
Pour finir, dans sa decision Innovations (Mail Ordel) Ltd v. The Data Prorection Registrar,
Ie Data Protection Tribunal a souligne qu'iJ etait important que !'information soit donnec au
moment opportun (34'). Dans certains cas, la societe Innovations n'informait ses clients du
fait qu'elle louai! les !istes d'adresses en sa possession qu'au moment au elle accusait
reception de leurs commandos. Le Registrar a declare qu'il n'etait pas d'accord avec Ie
moment ou l'information etai! fournie, et Ie Tribunal a declare ({ nous en concluons que les
mots « obtenues de maniere loyale» qui figurent dans Ie premier principe de protection des
donnees renvoiellt au moment au les donnees sont obtenues et pas it un moment posterieur }}
(,"). Dans Ie cadre de la h!gislation britannique relative it la protection des donnees, Ie
moment durant lequel I'information est communiquee a la personne concernee est done un
element decisif pour savoir si l'information en question est conforme it l'obligationjuridique.
Ces decisions mettent I'accent sur Ie fait que !'information doit avoir une taille et un relief
suffisants, et qU'elle doit erre communiquee au moment au une donnee est transmise pour la
premiere fois 11 !'utilisateur des donnees. La mise en oeuvre de cette approche dans Ie monde
en ligne exigera Wl comportement particulier tant des fournisseurs de service Internet que
des sites web. D'apres l'interpretation de la notion d'information donnee par Ie Tribunal
dans les decisions precitees, Ies fournisseurs de service Internet seraient tenus de foumir une
information suffisante quant a la finalite pour laquelle iIs envisagent d'utiliser les donnees au
moment ou un contra! est conc1u pour la premiere fois avec la personne concernee. Pour ce
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I
qui concerne les sites web qui collectent et qui trahent des donnees Ii caractere personnel, ils
devraient eIre tenus de faumtr une information claire lorsqu'ils colleetent des donnees a
caractere personnel aupres de la personne qui visite leur site. Enfin, cette infonnation doit
etre suffisamment detaill<~e en raison de la complexit,; du traitemenl el du fait qu'[nternet
pennet d'avoir librement acees aux donnees.
Au Royaume-Uni, on considere que Ie consentement est un e!<;ment essentiel du principe de
" loyaut" ». Le Dala Proleclion ACI de 1984 dispose que les infonnations II caractere
personnel doivent etre obtenues et traitees d'une fayon « loyale et licite » e"). Au RoyaumeUni, en regie generale, il n'existe pas d'obligation formelle d'obtenir Ie consentement des
personnes concernees. En revanche, il existe une obligation d'informer la personne qui, dans
la mesure ou elle choisit d'utiliser les services de I'utilisateur des donnees, sempresumee
avoir consenti au traitement des donnees envisage. Cette n'gle generale relative au
consentement est soumise it certaines limitations. Tout d'abord, dans les cas au les personnes
concernees n'ont reellemen! pas d'autre solution que de fournir les infonnations les
concernant it un utilisateur de donnees determine, Ie Registrar a estime que « l' utilisateur des
donnees doit donner a la personne concernee la possibilite de s'opposer a des utilisations ou
des divulgations supplementalres d'informations allant au,delfi des finalites pour lesquelles
les informations ant ete fournies» ('n). Void un cas dans legue! il n'existe pas de veritable
choix: lorsqu'un fuurnisseur en situation de monopole fournit un service indispensable ("').
Le Dala Proleclion Registrar a egalemcnt etendu cette analyse aux foumisseurs en situation
de quasi monopole et it ceux qui ant une « position tres dominante sur Ie marche » ('''). Dans
les cas precites, les entites en question !!taient des entreprises assurant un service public ('so)
mais l'analyse peut etre ':tendue aux compagnies de telecommunications. Le Registrar a fait
valoir qu'il fallail considerer que les clients avaient limite la possibilite d'utiliser les donnees
Ii caractere personnel les concernant aux fins de fourniture et de facturation, en l'absence
d'un consentement expres donne pour d'autres finalit"s (HI).
En deuxieme lieu, Ie consentement doit etre obtenu dans certains cas pour des activites
commerciales impliquant des tiers. On est en presence de l'un des plus importallts de ces eas
lorsque «Ies utHisateurs de donnees ant decide de ne pas informer les sourees de leurs
infonnations de leur intention d'utillser des donnees a caraetere personnel dans Ie cadre de
hosl mailing ou de la location de listes d'adresses au moment oil Us obtiennent pour la
premiere fois des renseignements relatifs it la personne concernee, alors meme que e'etail
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Data Protection Act 1984~ amlexe 1, Ire partie, aiinea L
Dut. Protection Registr~r, Data Protection Guidance for Direct Marketers § 63, p. 22 (1995).
Data Protection Registrar. Thirteenth Annual Report, p. 27 (1997).
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leur intention.» (352). Une simple Iettre aux clients Ies informant de I'existence de I
.
. d I'
ff-' , .
.
a prallque
de IocatlOn
e 1stes ne su It pas a ,aIre presumer que toutes Ies personnes qui ' t
'f . I
.,
d
I
Jll
n on pas
mam este eur opposItion ant anne eur consentement ( ). Cette approche du consente e t
cree une obligation de choix positif Iorsque Ies utilisateurs de donnees decident de n;' ~s
infoffi1er . Ies personnes concernees de leur projet d'effectuer des mailings avec ~es
infoffi1ations Ii caractere personnel qu'iIs recueillent,
Entin, Ie Data Protection Registrar a indique que Ia nature du consentement, expres au
tacite, depend de I'analyse du contexte, Le consentement est avant tout lie Ii Ia notion
d'" obtention Ioyale » des infoffi1ations, et» "on ne peut savoir si un comportement est
loyal dans Un cas particulier qu'li Ia Iumiere des pratiques des entreprises et des attentes des
consommateurs » ("4). Comme ces pratiques et ces attentes changent, Ies regles relatives au
respect de I'obligation d'obtention Ioyale des infoffi1ations prevue par Ie Data Protection Act
continueront Ii evoluer.
Outre cette approche bien etablie de Ia notion de consentement, Ie Data Protection Registrar
du Royaume-Uni a effectue quelques commentaires specifiques sur Ie monde en ligne. II a
estime qu'iI etait necessaire que Ies utilisateurs des autoroutes de I'infoffi1ation " controlent
l'utilisation des donnees a caractere personnelles concernant et qu' ils effectuent un veritable
choix» ("'). II a en particulier souligne que Ies technologies peffi1ettant d'ameliorer Ie
respect de Ia vie privee constituaient un moyen prometteur pour r"pondre aux problemes
poses,
Le Data Protection Registrar du Royaume-Uni a fait une proposition importante pour Ie
monde en ligne, qui porte sur « des marqueurs de suppression dans les adresses Intemet »
(,56). Grace Ii I'utilisation de ce mecanisme, les personnes concemees pourraient indiquer
qu'elles refusent que « des donnees les concernant soient collectees ou que des e-mails Ii
caractere promotionnel non sollicites soient reyus apres avoir visite certains sites ou apres
avoir participe it des groupes de discussion» (,51). Un marqueur de suppression peffi1ettrait
aux personnes concemees de bloquer tout contact avec ceux qui peuvent utiliser Internet
pour collecter des donnees et leur envoyer par e-mail de la publicite qu'ils n'on! pas
demandee a recevoir (spamming),
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L'idee d'un marqueur de suppression d.e-mail met a profit la legislation britannique actuelle
sur Ia protection de 1a vie privee. Au Royaumc-Uni, :les services garantissant Ie respect des
preferences exprimees en matiere de confidentialit': des donnees existent pour Ie marketing
postal direct et pour Ie telemarketing direct (m). Ces services permettent aux consommateurs
d'indiquer qu'ils pn!ferent ne pas recevoir des communications commerciales directes qu'ils
n'ont pas demandees. D'autre pan, un service permeltant d'indiquer sa preference par
telecopie est a ['etude. Cn marqueur de suppression d'e-mail, comme I'a propose Ie Data
Protection Registrar, permettrait aux personnes concernees d'indiquer et de communiquer
directement leurs souhaits grace it leur adresse e-maiL Comme Ie Registrar I'a declare a
propos du souhail d'une personne de ne pas recevoir des e-mail non demandes, « il semble
n'y avoir sur Internet aucune raison pour isoler ce message de I'adresse elle-meme» ("'),
Celte proposition souleve une difficulte, En efTet, ene ne peut fonctionner sans une
infrastructure qui n'existe pas pour Ie moment. D'autre part, I'expression d'une preference
en matiere de confidentialite des donnees peut elle-meme soulever des problemes de
confidentialite des donnees. Ains!, a mains que d'autres garanties relatives a la protection de
I'information soient mises en place, les gestionnaires de marqueurs peuvent utiliser les
informations integrees dans la partie de l',adresse ou sont indiquees les preferences en
matiere de confidentialitc des dOlmees pour etablir un profil des interesses. Or, selon ses
propres termes, la proposition du Registrar "ne porte que sur la suppression des
informations, mais eUe ne porte pas sur leur obtenhon initiale » e"). De celte fa~on, une
sorte de meta-preference en matiere de confidentialite des donnees pourrait etre necessaire en
ce qui concerne I'utilisation Joyale, dans autre un cadre qu'lnternet, des marqueurs servant a
exprimer des preferences en matiere de confidentialit" des donnees.
Comment la legislation relative it la protection de la 'vie privee du Royaume-Uni peut-elle
r<!pondre aux questions posees par Ie consentement dans un environnement en ligne ? En
premier lieu, ['approche contextuelle du consentement dans Ja loi va probablement accentuer
la m!cessite d'exiger obligation un consentement expres s'il est impossible de proceder II un
veritable choix quant au service sous-jacent et 3i la personne concernee n'a re~u que des
informations insuffisantes au moment de la collecte des donnees, Cn exemple: la
transmission des donnees resultant des traces des connexions. Ainsi, Ie consentement expres
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Data Protection Guidance for Direct Marketers, p, 23-24 (1995),

Un "marqueur servant aexprimer des preferences en matiere de confidentialite des -do,nnties " pourrait
indiquer Ies preferences suivantes: 1) aucun message fie doit etre envoYI! a J'interesse, ou 2) une
communiculion emanam -du site web visite sera acceptee. aI'exclusion de cene emanant de toute autre
partie. Ces marqueurs pourraient egalement donner I<la liberte de prendre des decisions differentes
concernant des contacts differentsl>, Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Annexe 14, in UK Data
Protection Registrar, Thirteenth Annual Report. Ainsi, I'interesse pourrait exprimer une preference en
matiere de protection de Ja 'Vie privee
Id,
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a I'utilisation de donnees pourrait etre exige si, dans

une Zone geographique determinee, il
n'existe qu'un nombre limite de foumisseurs de service Internet.
De pins, des sites web qui au depart n'ont pas fourni suffisammem d'informations sur
I'utilisation qu'Hs envisagent de faire des donnees, pourraiem etre tenus d'obtenir Ie
consentemen! voluntaire des interesses pour d'autres finalites telle que Ie partage
d'informations avec des tiers. Enfin, il est probable que la legislation britamliqne en matiere
de protection des donnees cherche a utiliser les teclmologies pel"mettant d'ameliorer Ie
respect de la vie privee, lesquelles permettront aux interesses de donner leur COllsentement
d'une maniere rapide et peu onereuse.
La legislation britannique relative it Ia protection des donnees ne comporte aucune
disposition sectorielle concernant les droits d'acces et de rectification des donnees dans
I'environnement en ligne. Cependant, Ie Data Protection Act de 1984 antorise l'interesse a
acceder anx donnees a Cllractere personnel Ie concernant qui sont detenues par un utilisateur
de donnees, et « lorsque eela est opportun, de faire rectifier au effacer les donnees en
question» (361). En vertu de la legislation britannique relative a Ia protection des donnees, Jes
interesses ont Ie droit d'examiner toute donnee les concernant, sous reserveuniquement de
certaines exceptions C'.,). L'utilisateur des donnees doit en outre repondre immediatement
aux demandes d'acces ('''). La legislation britannique relative a la protection des donnees
permet de faire payer jusqu'a 10 livres sterling (15 ecus) ala personne concernee au titre de
l'exercice de son droit d'acces. Dans son projet de transposition de la Directive 95/46/CE, Ie
gouvernement a indique qu'il n'avait pas !'intention de modifier cette exigence de paiement
(,64).
Jusqu'a maintenant pen d'indications on! "te donnees quant a la fa,on dont ceS droits seront
appliques dans I' environnement en ligne. Le Data Protection Registrar a touteIois souligne
qu'un utilisateur de donnees doit faire son possible pour retrouver les donnees it caractere
personnel qu'il a conservees dans differents systemes afin de remplir son obligation de
respecter Ie droit d'acces. Le Registrar a fait observer:
'
Des difficultes peuvent surgir occasionnellement lorsque les donnees en question
sont conservees dans des systemes differents. Par exemple, Un specialiste en
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Data Proteclion Act 1984, Annexe.!, 1.7.
Voir Data Protection Act 1984, m.21: <'L'lnh!resse a Ie droit a) d'etre informe partoui utilisateur de
, donnees sur la question de savoir si les donnees detenues par ce demier comprennent des donnees a
caractere personnel le cQncernant; et b) d'obtenir aupres de tout utilisateur de donnees copie des
informations contenues dans les donnees acaractere persQnnel detenues par !edit utilisateur".
Data Protection Registrar, Homeworking and Computer Information, p. 24 (Juin 1997),
www.homeoffiee.gov.uk.d.tapS.htm.
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marketing qui est devenu un utilisateur de donnees dans la mesure au iJ se sert de
!istes d'adresses qui lui ont ete lonees, en plus d'une base de donnees clients
pr<,exislante, doit faire en sorte que ces deux series de donnees soient recherchees

(,6').
Des sites web qni collectent des donnees a caractere personnel et qui partagent ensuite ces
informations avec des sites web qui leur sont associes, peuvent avoir I'obligation de fournir
des droits d'acces et de rectification dont la portee va au·delit de leurs propres systemes de
donnees.
Pour ce qui concerne les droits d'acces et de rectification dans Ie monde en ligne, il est
egalement possible que se produisent des d6veloppements relatifs au mode d'acd:s aux
donnees. Le gouvernement a declare que toute nouvelle loi relative la protection des
donnees devrait profiter de la souplesse de la directive qui permet la communication
d'informations « sous une forme intelligible» ("'). Le gouvemement a particulierement
souligne la possibilile de « communications eleclroniques el autres moyens eventuels » (,67).
Le choix des moyens doit etre laisse II la discretion de la personne concernee qui « pourra
demander une copie imprimee des informations, laquelle devra necessairement etre foumie
sauf dans des cas Iimites OU une telle communication est deraisonnable ou implique un effort
.
disproportionne » (''').

a

Ces propos laissent entrevoir un regime de protection des donnees dans lequel l'interesse
pourra avoir ace!:s en ligne aux donnees Ie concernant. La legislation britannique relative Ii la
protection des donnees pourrait encourager les sites web et les fournisseurs de service
Internet Ii mettre au point des moyens techniques qui permettraient auX interesses d'acceder
en ligne aux informations conservees les concernant. Grace it cette approche du probleme,
une personne pourrait avoir acees aux informations Ii caractere personnel la concernant par
des moyens peu onereux. Cela serait tout Ii fait compatible avec I'interet manifeste par Ie
Data Pro/eelion Registrar pour les technologies permettant d'ameliorer Ie respect de la vie
privee (,69). A I'heure aClUelle, on ne salt pas comment Ie droit de I'utilisateur des dOlUleeS de
faire payer I'acces aux donnees sera interprete Ii une epoque au un tel acees peut etre mis a
disposition a un coilt tres faible et, en realite, sans I'intervention de qui que ce soit,
La legislation britannique ne contient aucune disposition expresse concernant les droils
d'acces er de rectification dans un environnement en Jigne. Cependant, J'actuelle loi
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britannique relative a la protection des donnees prevo it ces droits. L'etude de la signification
de tels droits dans un environnement en ligne n'en est qu'a ses balbutiements. Une
importante question devra etre resolue: celie de savoir comment sera payee la redevanee due
par rinteresse au titre de I' aeces aux donnees Ie concernant.

2.4.Profils des utilisateurs et I'utilisations des donnees sensibles

Les services en ligne s'appuient frequemment sur l'etablissement du profil des personnes
pour develop per des services personnalises et pour des activites de marketing. La methode
des profils souleve de nombreuses questions liees a la determination de la finalite de
[,utilisation des dOlmees telle qu'elle est exigee par la Directive 95/461CE (,10). Ainsi, grace
aux moteurs de recherche, les annuaires en ligne, les bases de donnees publiques en ligne et
les afflchages dc messages peuvcnt etre utilises a des fins diverses. Le rapprochement
habitue I d'une serie de donnees generees a partir de transactions effectuees en ligne avec
d'autres informations complementaires soulevent egalement une question de finalite. Par
ailleurs, J'enregistrement et ['utilisation de modeles de comportement soui<\vent d'autres
questions concernant Ie consentement, la conservation des donnees et l' elimination,
lesqueUes font egalement I'objet de dispositions dans la Directive 95/46/CE (''').
Le traitement que les Etats membres reservent a ces questions aura une "'percussion
fondarnentale sur la structure des services en ligne, De meme, Ie classement des personnes en
fonction de leur comportement fait entrer en jeu un autre principe fondamental de la
protection des dOlmees: Ie traitement particulier dont les donnees sensibles doivent faire
I' objet. Les profils elabores a partir des donnees peuvent frequemment se rapprocher des
categories de donnees sensibles qui sont soumises il des interdictions de traiiement
conformement it la Directive 95/461CE (l7l), Meme s'il est possible que des donnees il
caractere personnel isolees, obtenues dans Ie cadre d'activites de service en ligne, ne
constituent pas des « donnees sensibles)), Ie contexte de ceS informations, en particulier en
raison des' pratiques d'etablissernent de profils,peuvent faire entrer ces informations a
caractere personnel dans la categorie des (, donnees sensibles». Les reponses des Etats
membres aU)( questions soulevees par les donnees sensibles dans l'environnement en lignc
seront trios instructives pour I'analyse de l'harmonisation en profondeur des legislations
nationales.

("0)
(m)

("')

Directive 95146!CE, article 6, §l, alinea b).
Directive 951461CE, article 6, § I, alinea c), etarticle7.
Directive 951461CE, article S.
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2.4,1.

Belgique

La piece maitresse de la loi beige relative a la protection des donnees est la disposition legale
selon laquelle les donnees a caractere personnel ne peuvent etre traitees que pour une finalite
legitime et determinee et ne peuvent etre utilisees de maniere incompatible avec cette finalite
(m). La Belgique interpretc strictement la notion de finalite. Ainsi, dans une affaire judiciaire
importante. mais nOn publ;ee, la societe Mercedes a perdu un proces concernant une
violation de finalite au motif qu'elle avait utilise des informations relatives a
l'irrunatriculation d'un vehicule a des fins commerciales, Ii savoir pour proposer aux
proprietaires de Mercedes de faire entretenir leurs voitures dans des garages de la marque
Mercedes C"). Mercedes avait obtenu ces informations aupres du ministere des
Corrullunications et de l'Insfl'astructure par l'intermediaire de la F.E.B.l.A.C. (association
professionnelle des fabricants de voitures et de motocyclettes). La juridiction a observe que
la loi autorisant la divulgation des informations d6tenues par l'Etat sur les numeros
d'immatriculation des chassis de vehicules interdisait I'utilisation de documents
administratifq a des fins commercialcs et que, dans la mesure ou PEtat ne pouvait pas
deleguer sa mission de service public au secteur prive, il y avait lieu d'ecarter I'argument
avance par Mercedes scion lequelles communications destinees aux proprietaires de voitures
favorisaient la securite publique ("'). D'apres les commentateurs de celte affaire, la Caul' a
estime qu'il etait illegal pour un fabricant d'automobiles d'utiliser des informations relatives
au numero d'immatriculation des chassis de vehieules a des fins de dcmarchage
commercial (,").
Une loi sectorielle traite egalement des finalites du traitemcnt des informations i\ caractere
personnel liees iI des paiements en ligne. La loi relative au crectit a la consommation
interdirait de nombreuses activites d'etablissement de profils ('''). Cette loi sectorielle limite
Ie traitement des donnees a caractere personnel it la seule fin « d'apprecier la situation

(Hl)

("')

C. de Terwagne et y, Poutlet, Les armuaires IfUephoniques au carre/our des droi!sj Joumal des
Tribunaux, ler juin 1996) p. 425.432,
Chambre actions eass. Bl'uxelles, 20 mars i99~. Voir egaiement J.P. Buyle, L. Lanoy., Y. Poullet &
V. Willems, ehronique de 14 jurisprudence: L 'inform"t/que (1987·1994), Journal des tribunaux, 23
mars 1996 1 p, 235~236 (commentaire de 'I 'arret),

e7~)

Chambre actions cass, BruxeHes. 20 mars 199.5 (eiting Lai du 11 avril \994 relative ala pubHdte de
l'udministratioo) article 10.)

(no)
eli)

ld.

Une question Interessante se pose quant a Ja 1.01 applicable: la lui generaie relative a la protection des
donnees au la loi plus ancienne sur Ie credit a la consommation. Les commentateurs ont fait valoir que
les questions generales etai,ent regies par la iol du 8 decembre i992 et que les ql,lestions speciale:;:
relatives {lU secteur du credit etaient soumises it la loi du 12 juin 1991. Voir Y._P,oullet &- A, Lefebvre,
1!;e privee~et credit a la c:onsommalion, proteger {e consammateur au sa vie priv/:e: un choix difficile.
10 LE CREDIT A LA CONSOMMATION,l03, 105 (G .•A. Dabl, ed., 1997)
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financiere et la solvabilite du consommateur» ("'). Cette finalite restrcmte s'applique 11 tous
les contrats de credit conclus par des consommateurs em); les informations afferentes au
credit ne peuvent etre utilisees que pour l'octroi et la gestion du credit (,30). La loi limite
egalement les types de donnees susceptibles d'etre trait"es dans Ie cadre d'operations de
credit C'''): De meme, en yertu de la loi generale relative a la protection des donnees, les
donnees afferentes Ii uue operation de paiement ne peuvent pas etre utilisees a d'autres tins
que la realisation du paiement. Cela a "te confirm'; dims plusieurs affaires judiciaires dans
lesquelles les banques ont ete jugees coupable. d'avoir viole la finalite initiale en se servant
des releves de paiement pour proceder a l'etablissement du profil des clients et Ii un
demarchage commercial aupres de ceux-ci ("'). Dans la mesure au les transactions lices au
commerce eleclronique impliquent un credit a1a consommation, cette 10i sectorielle impose
d'importantes regles en matiere de tinalite aux calleetes de donnees afferentes aux
transactions realisees, des regles qui excluent l'application de la methode des profils it des
fins autres que Ie paiement.
La portee de la finalite sera une eontrainte importante pour Ie traitement des donnees a
caractere personnel generees par les services en ligne. Une interpretation stricte de la finalite,
la complexite et la f1uidite du traitement des donnees dans Ie cadre des activiti" en Iigne
donneront necessairement lieu a des decisions diverses sur la notion de tinatite et II une
tentative d'imposer des types d'utilisation limitee des donnees II earact';re personneL

En tout etat de cause, en vertu de la legislation beIge relative Ii la protection des donnees, les
donnees peuvent faire robjet d'une autre finalite avec Ie consentement de 1a personne
concernee, Dans certains cas, Ie c<.msentement doit etre donne de maniere explicite, Ainsi, la
publication d:almuaires concernant les fonctionnaires ne peut comporter que 1es adresses
professionnelles de ces personnes a moins que ces demieres ne consentent expressement Ii
!'insertion d'informations relatives 11 leur domicile personnel
De meme, la CPVP exige
Ie consentement expres de la personne concernee pour qu'i1 soit possible de faire figurer son

e").

e")

Loi du 12 juin 1991 relative au credit a la consommation, article 69.

("')
('"0)

ld., article 2.
Id., article p9; voir <galement, CPVP, Rapport d'aclivile 1992-1993, p. 68-72.

e

1H

)

Id.> artIcle 69. Ainsl, [a Commission s'est opposee au traitement des donnees relatives afa nationalite

d'une parsonne, CPVP, Rapport d'activit. 1992-1993, p. 77 (1997). L'arretl: royal comport.nt des

('")

()il)

mesures d'application relatives a la procedure de communication des donnees a 1a: Banque nationale
de Belgique a suivi cette opinion et a exclu la nationalii.C des types de donnees susce_ptibles de faire
l'objet d'un traitement dnns Ie cadre d'operations de credit ArrSte royal du 20 novembre 1992 reJatif
a.u traitement des donnees ii caractere personnel en matiere de credit a !a consommation.
Trib. comm. Bruxelles, 15 sept J 994, publle in 199414 D.LT., p. 45-50; Trib. Comn>, Anvers, 7 juillet
1994, publle in 199414 D,LT., p. 5J-55. Voir "galement J.P. Buyle, L. Lanoye, Y. Poullel, & V.
Willems. Chronlque de jurisprudence: L'informatique (19l:S7~t994), Journal des tribunaux. 23 mars
1996, p. 232.
CPVP, Avis n° 23194 du 13 juLilet 1994; CPVP, Rapport d'activite 1994-,1995, p. 27 (1997).
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nom et son adresse sur une lisle publicitaire C''') et pour l'etablissement de profils a partir de
la pratique des medecins en matiere de prescription ('''). Dans Ie cadre de son examen de
I'applicabilite de la loi relative it la protection des donnees aux infonnations figurant dans
J'annuaire tel<!phonique, la CPVP a sugger" que Belgacom, la compagnie nationale du
telephone, mette en ceuvre plusieurs niveaux de consentement explicite: i) consentement
donne pour toutes utilisations; ii) opposition aux utilisations commerciales de donnees a
caractere personnel ({( liste orange»); iii) opposition II toute diffusion des donnees a
caracterc personnel liste rouge») (,'"). La CPVP a indique que Belgacom devait informer
ses abonnes de l'existence de ces possibilites et de leurs droits decoulantde la loi relative il
la protection des donnees ('''). Dans Ie meme sens, les tribunaux ant declan'. qu'une societe
peut faire nn usage interne de donnees II caractere personnel depassant la portee de la finaHte
initiale de la collecte, Ii condition que les personnes concemees en soient infonnees et aient
la possibilite de s'y opposer (''').

«(

Dans Ie contexte des services en Hgne, un consentement d'opling.jn peut etre facilement
obtenu grAce it des moyens techniques. Les divers protocoles techniques tels que les alertes
« cookies» ou l'etiquetage et I'initiative de filtrage P3P au sein de W3C ('''') permet aux
utilisateurs de faire des choix explicites. Toutefois, une infonnation suffisante est toujours
necessaire pour que Ie consentement ait une veritable signification.
Neamnoins, pour Ie traitement des donnees sensibles, ia legislation beige exige generalement
Ie consentement prealable C·o). L'arrele royal relatif a la mise en ceuvTe de garanties pour Ie
traitement des donnees sensibles tente de suivre la Directive 95/46/CE en ce domaine. En
vertu de cet arrete royal, Ie consentement au traitement des donnees sensibles n'est valable
que s'i1 apparalt· qu'i! constitne {( une manifestation de volante libre, specifique et
informee» ("1). Cet arrete a modifie un texte anterieur relatif aux donnees sensibles qui
n'etait pas conforme au contenu de la Directive 95/46/CE. Toutefois, Ie nouvel arrete est fort
ambigu en ce qui concerne la fanne du consentement. Les decisions judiciaires anterieures

CM )
e$~)
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('"')
("B)
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Recommandation n"1195 du 18juillet 1995; CPVP, Rapport d'activite 1994·1995, pp. 29·30 (1997).
Recommandation nil 01196 du 23 septembre 1996 a propos de I'analyse de la consommation de
medicaments en Belgique basee sur des informations issues des prescriptions m&iicales, p. 6·7.
RecQOlmandation n° 02193 du 7 septembr. 1993; CPVP, Rapport d'activill! 1994·1995, p. 28 (1997).
Id.
Voir, par e.emple, Trib. comm. Bru.elles. 15 sept. 1994, publie in 1994/4 D.I.T.,'p. 45-50; Trib.
ComOl, Auvers, 7 juillet 1994, pubJie in 199414 D.I.T., p. 51-55.
Voir Joel R. Reidenberg, The Use of Technology to Assure Internet Privacy: Adapting Labels and
Filters for Data Protection. Lex Electronica 111:2, <www.lex..electronica,org/reidellbe.ntml>
(1997)(commentant [es initiatives P3P et W3C). Pour une autre discussion, voir (;:j-dessous § 3,3.
Arrfto royal (n° 14) du 22 rna! 1996, M.B., 30 rna! 1996, p. 14515 (rempla,ant I'arrete royal (n' 7) du
15 fevr!er 1995); CPVP, Rapport d'activite 1996, p.38 (1997).
Arrete royal (n° 14) du 22 mal 1996, arti,Ie I, alin" eJ, M.B., 30 mal 1996, p. 14515, 14532. Voir
egalement Rapport au Roi, M.B., 30 mal 1996, p. 14515, 14520.
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au changement d'arrete royal exigent que Ie consentement soit donne par Cedt (,"').
Cependant, Ie nouvel amSte royal garde Ie silence SUr cette question. Dans Ie' cadre des
services en ligne, cette ambigulte constitue manifestement un obstacle au consentement
electronique it la coliecte et au traitement des dormees sensibles.
En tant que corollaire importailt de la finalite des pratiques d'etablissement de profils, la
Belgique exige les entites qui collectent des donnees a caractere persormel reciuisen! au
minimum Ie volume de donnees traitees. L'article 5 de la 10i dispose que les dormees ne
dOlvent pas etre " excessives par rapport raux] finalites» du traitement (,"). La loi beige
dispose egalement que seules les donnees pertinentes eu egard aux finali!es du traitement
peuvent etre utilisees C''').
Enfin, la CPYP est egalement assez preoccupee par la duree de conservation des donnees it
caractere personnel. La loi beige interdit la conservation de dormees non pertinentes et
interdit en consequence la conservation au-dell, de la duree reguise par la finalite (395). Dans
un avis recent, la CPYP a critique un projet d'arrete royal relatif aux dormees Iiees au credit
en raison du caractere insuffisant de la limitation de la duree de conservation des donnees
positives liees au credit (396). II est probable que cet interet pour la conservation des donnees
aboutisse a la creation d'une obligation legale d'effacer rapidement les donnees conservees
dans Ie cadre des services en ligne.

2.4.2,

France

En vertu de la loi fran,aise, I'utilisation d'informations Ii caractere personnel est strictement
limitee aux finalites declarees au moment ou e11es ont ete coUectees (397). Cette obligation de
finalite est considen!e comme " omnipresent(e) dans Ie texte de la loi» ("'). Ce principe
acquiert une force particuJiere du fait des sanctions penales que sont susceptibles d'entralner

e")
(m)

e"4)
(M)

("')

C''')
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Arrete royal (n' 14) du 22 mal 1996, M.B., 30 mai 1996, p. 14515 (rempla,.nl ramIe royal (n' 7) du
15 fevrier 1995); CPVP, Rapport d'activite 19%, p. 38 (1997).
Loi du g decembre t 992 1 article.$
donnees (dolvent ~tre adequates. pertinentes et non excessives
par rapport aces finalites.»)
Lai au 8 decernbre 1992, article 5 (les donnees «doh'ent etre adequates. pertinentes et non excessives
par rapport a ces finalites.)~)
Loi du 8 deoetnbre 1992, article 16, §1, 4); article 17, §3, 10) qui exige que I. duree de conservation
des donnees sa it indiquee dans Ia declaration de traitement.
CPVP, Avis n' 10197 du 9 avril 1997.
Loi n' 78·\7 du 6 janvier 1978, ankle 19 (qui exige la mention de la finalite dans I. declaration) el
article 44 (qui prevoyait des SAnctions penales pour les utUisaHons d'infonnations nominatives
'incompatibles avec la finalhe dec1aree).
CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique el de libertes, p. 36·37 (1988).
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les utilisations secondaires d'infonnations il caractere personneL La loi dispose egalement
que {( I'appreciation sur un .comportement humain ne peut avoir pour fondement un
traitement automatise d'informations donnant une definition du profil au de la personnalite
de rinteresse » ('''). En effet, cette disposition s'oppose Ii. ce que la methode des profils
appliquee aux donnees soit I'unique fondement de I'adoption d'une decision ("'). Les profils
peuvent toutefois etre pris en compte aux cotes d'autres el<,ments, afin d'etre appreeies par
un decideur humain dans Ie cadre de I'adoption de decisions concernant des perSOIUles (40\).
Dans Ie cadre des services en ligne, les profils de comportement des utilisateurs a partir des
infonnations afferentes aux transactions peuvent egalement aboutir a la creation
d'informations sensible•. En vertu de la loi, iI est. interdit de metlre au de conserver en
memoire informatique des donnees nominatives qui, directement ou indirectement, font
appara1tre les origines raciales ou Ies opinions politiques, philosophiques au religieuses au
les appartenances syndicales (402). Si t' interesse donne expressement son accord dans un eerit
independamment du recueil des domlees, les informations sensibles peuvent ensuite faire
I'objet d'un traitement ('03). Cette exigence concernant Ie consentement est une eontrainte
importante pour les services en ligne car ils seront tenus d'obtenir un consentement
prealable, en dehors de la connexion en tigne, pour tout traitement aboutissant au Iraitement
de donnees sensible,.
Aux termes de In loi ii<an<;aise, les interesses ant Ie droit fondamental de s' opposer a ce que
des infonnations Ii. caractere personnel les concernant fassent I' objet d 'un traitement ("').
Pour des « raisons l<Sgitimes» Ies interesses peuvent exiger la suppression ou I'elimination
des infonnations a caractere personnel les concernant qui sont detenues par des tiers. '
Cependant, « PlnterSt public» peut battre en breche Ia legitimite des raisons de
I'interesse ('OJ).

("')
('"")

Voir n' 78·17 du 6 junvier 1978, article 2.
Voir CNIL, 140 Rapport d'activite, p. 59·64 ([994). Deliberation n' 93·032 du 6 avril 1993 relative

("')
(''')

CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique eJ libertes, p. 47-48 (1988).

au controle effectue Ie 2 octobre t 992 ala Caisse regionale doe credit agricoie de Dordogoe,

Loi nO 78~n du 6 janvier 1978, article )1. Les Egtises aU tes groupements a caractere religieux,
philosophique, politique ou syndical ne sont pas: cOllcernes par cette interdiction et peuvent tenir
registre de leurs memhres ou de leurs con"espondan.ts sous fonne automatisee, Id. En outre, pour -des
motifs d'jnter~t public, essentiellement la slirete de PEtat, it peut aussi etre fait exception Ii
rinterdtction Yisee pour certains traitemeots d'informations par decret en Conseil d'Etat. mais

(go,)

uniquement apres avis conforme ou sur proposition de la Commission.
Voir CNiL, Dix ans dl'informatique et libertes, p, 44 (1988)(mentionnant l'arret du Conseil d'Etat du
5 juin J 987); CNIL, 14e R'pport d'.clivi!', p. 40·42 (1994) (indigu.nt que les termes "accord expres"

doivent s'entendre d'un accord ecrit portant plus spedfiquement sur I'enregistrement de teHe ou telle
donnte consideree comme sensible.)
Lai n" 78·17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 26.
CNIL, l7e R.pportd'activite, p, 1l6·117 (1997).
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La duree de conservation des donnees est ega!ement soumise it des !imites precises prevues
par la Ioi fran9aise. Cette derniere interdit !a conservation d'informations nominatives audeli. de la duree necessaire pour satisfaire Ies objectifs de Ia collecte des infonnations (406).
La CNIL a toujours ete tres vigilante !orsqu'elle contrille la duree de conservation des
donnees ('01).
La loi relative aux teh:eommunications de 1996 ('.') peut egalement avoir une incidence Sur
Ie traitement des informations it caractere personnel Ii des fins d'Ctablissement de profils.
Scion Ia nouvelle loi, les operateurs de telecommunications dolvent respecter Ie secret de Ia
correspondance ("'). Cette disposition peut signifier eu'un fournisseur de service Internet tel
que Wanadoo, exploite par France Telecom, ne sera pas autorise Ii fournir a des tiers des
informations identifiables sur les activites en ligne des utilisateurs. En outre, la disposition
peut meme interdire I'utilisation des informations afferentes auX transactions it des fins
d' etablissement de profils.
Lorsque la CNIL exerce sa mission de controle sur les services en ligne, e1le attache une
attention toute particuliere au respect du principe de finalite.Pour ce qui concerne les
groupes de discussion sur Internet, Ia CNIL a indique que la finalit!! interdit d'utiliser des
informations recueillies dans un groupe de diseussion a d' autres fins que celles proposees par
ledit groupe de discussion. Le fait que Ies informations soient accessibles ne signifie pas
qu 'eiles peuvent &Ire utilisees pour « enrichir des bases de donnees conyues par exemple a
des fins commerciales» (""). Cela suggere que I'utilisation de moteurs de recherche externes
par rapport aux groupes de discussion, tels que <www.dejanews.com>. qui proposent des
fanctions d'etablissement de profils it partir des messages affiches pourrait violer Ie principe
de finalite. Pour les offres des services en Iigne, cela peut signifier qu'il faudrait que les
groupes de discussion frangais cachent leur existence aux moteurs dc' recherche, ou bien qu'i!
faudrait que les rnoteurs de reeherche supprime la recherche eoncernant les groupes de
discussion fran9ais afin d' eviter d' enfreindre Ie principe de finalite des affichages de
messages dans Ie cadre de ces groupes de discussion. A Phoore actuelle, rien n'indique que
de teiles mesures concernant l'infrastructure soient mises en reuvre ni meme envisagees.
Pour Ie commerce 6Iectronique, l't:tablissement de profils de comportement des
consommateurs est en passe de devenir un element clef de Ia strategie des entreprises. La
CNIL s'est interessee Ii l'etablissement de profils de comportement dans Ie secteur des

(''')
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Loi n' 78-11 du 6 janvier 1978, article 28.
CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertes, p. 31·32 (1988),
Loi n' 96·659 du 26 juillet de reglomentatlon des telecommunications.
Loi n' 96.659 du 26 juillet de reglementotion des ¢Itcommunications, article L. 32·11 alinea 5.
CNIL, 170 Rapport d'aetivii:t!. p. 92 (1997)(eommentaires sur Ie forum de discussion de In Caisse
natiomde de prevoyancc.)
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services financiers et ene a indique que l'etablissement de prolils de clients n'es! legitime
que dans Ie cadre de la mise au point d'une strategic commerciale et que la methode des
profils ne peut etre utilisee qu'i'I cette seule fin ("'). Dans Ie cadre de ['approbation du
systeme de paiement elcctronique Kieline pour Internet, I. CNIL • fait observer que les
rcleves de transactions electroniques pourraient constituer des elements extremement
precieux et que les utilismeurs devaient iltre informes de leur droit de s' opposer it la cession
par Kleline des informations 11 caractere personnel les concernant (411). La CNIL semble
egalement avoir utilise ses series de decisions relatives a la diffusion d'annuaires
elcctroniques sur Internet comme moyen d'aborder la question de la possibilite d'etablir des
profils a partir des traces laissees ill' occasion de la realisation de transactions electroniques.
La CNIL exige qu'un servour web precede a I'affiehage d'une page ccran bien visible
indiquant que les informations contenues dans les annuaires sont soumises aux droits et
obligations prevucs par 1a loi fran9aise et que Ia capture des informations de I'annuaire pour
enrichir des bases de donnees, en vue d'utilisations secondaires, et, en particulier, a des fins
commerciales, est illegale (m}. En meme temps, la CNIL reconnalt que la mise en reuvre du
principe de finalite sur Internet est loin d'etre claire; elle exige que les interesses dont Ie nom
figure dans les annuaires soient prealablement ave.ctis des risques aecrus inherents la
diffusion des donnees sur Internet ('14).

a

En etudiant Ie cas des annuaires diffuses sur Internet, la CNIL a indique que les donnees
accessibles pour Ie public en gem;!'al ne perdaient la qualite d'informations " nominatives»
et la protection y attachee (41S). En partieulier, la CNIL a sQuligne que Ie fait de consentir a la
diffusion d'informations dans un annuaire papier n'empechait pas de s'opposer ala diffusion
de ces memes informations en ligne sur Internet ou par CD· Rom ('!OJ. Les raisons de cette
distinction sont dues a la preoccupation de la CNIL quant aux risques concernant la tinalite
qui sont entralm!s par la possibilite d' acceder en ligne aux informations contenues dans les
annuaires, La CNIL exige que Ie site web procecte it l'affichage d'une page ':cran indiquant la
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CNIL,14e Rapport d'aetivite. p, 61 (1994).
CNIL, 170 Rapport d'activite, p. 93,

Deliberation n° 95~LH du 7 novembre. 1995 portant sur 1a demande d'avis presente par Ie Centre
national de caleul paralleie des sciences de la terre concernant un traitement automatist!
d'informations nominatives pour la publication d'un annuaire ~ur un feseau internatIonal ouvert . .
Deliberation nf,.> 96-065'du 6 juillet 1996 portant avis sur Ie projet de ded$ion presetlte pour Ie Centre
national de la recherche scientifique concernant un modele type de traitemetlt automatise
d'informations nominatives pour la publication d'annualres des unites propres ou mixtes sur un reseau
international ouvert. Deliberation n' 95·131 du 7 novembre 1995. CNIL, 17e Rapport d',etivite, p. 70
(1997); CNIL, 16e Rapport d'activite. p. 84-85 (1996).

- Voir supra.
Voir CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activite, p. 73 (1997)
CNIL, ne Rapport d'nctivi!e, p. 73 (1997).
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finalite des donnees avant !a diffusion de toute information (m). Par ailleurs, la CNIL a en
fait cree un regime perrnettant de s'opposer Ii toute utilisation secondaire de certaines
donnees publiques dans Ie cadre de la creation de sites Internet officiels. Les decisions
autorisent la diffusion sur Internet d'informations concernant des fonctionnaires et I'exercice
de leurs'fonctions publiques Ii condition que lesdits fonctionnaires aient ete prealablement
inform';s des utilisations illimitees dont ces donnees peuvent faire l'objet sur Internet et de
leur droit de s' opposer a10 diffusion des informations sur Internet.
II est probable que Ie rapport entre !'interdiction de la conservation de donnees sensibles
prevue par Ia loi franvaise (''') et les techniques d'etablissement de profils des utilisateurs
constitue une autre source de difficultes pour les services en ligne. En effet, dans la mesure
ou les profils fournissent des indications sur les « ma:urs » des interesses, qui sont revelees
par les caracteristiques des activites des interesses sur 1'Intemet au par les sites qu'ils visitent
habituellement, un tel etablissement de profil tombe sous Ie coup de I'interdiction de la
coUecte d'inforrnations sensibles. La CNIL semble admettre l'existence d'une exception Ii
cette interdiction lorsque la personne concern':e donne expresscment son accord ecrit
independamment du recueil des informations sensibles (41'). Compte tenu de I'importance
accordee par la CNIL au problemc du traitement des informations sensibles, il se peut qu'un
eonsentement donne en ligne au traitement de telles donnees ne soit pas suffisant. Dans la
mesure au un motel!l' de recherche, genere par exemple un profil reveIant des informations
({ sensibles », son utilisation serait illegale.
Les restrictions necessaires Ii l'etablissement de profils et Ii l'utilisation des donnees
sensibles posent un certain nombre de problemes pour les agents intelligents qui sont de plus
en plus necessaires au commerce electronique. Par exemple, Ie filtrage collaboratif et les
agents relationnels developpent necessairemcnt des profils de comportement de l'utilisateur
et peuvent les rapprocher des profils de tiers 'en vue de l'adoption d'une decision ou de la
realisation d'un choix automatique. Les services de diffusion d'informatlons tels que
PointCast peuvent ainsi personnaliser les informations en ligne foumies Ii un abonne en
fonction des profils d'abonnes ayant les memes gouts. Seules les informations interessant
des abonnes ayant les memes gouts seront communiqw!es Ii !'abonne concemi:. Dans une
certaine mesure, ces agents peuvent etre en infraction avec la disposition fondamentale de la
legislation franya!se selon laquelle aucune decision automatique ne doit etre prise a partir
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Deliberation n° 96·065 du 6 juillet 1996 portant avis sur Ie projet de decision presente pour Ie Centre
national de la recherche scieotiflque concernant un modele type de traitement automutise
d'informations nominatives pour 1a publication d'annuaires des unites propres ou mixtes Sur un reseau
international Duvert. DeHberation nO 95-131 du 7 novembre 1995, CNIL. 17e Rapport d1actlvite, p. 70
(1997). CN1L, 16e,Rapport d'nctivitl!, p. 84·85 (1996),
Loi n° 78·17 du 6 janvier 197.8, article 31.
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d'un profil de comportement. De meme, ces fonctions semblent etre contraires aux positions
relatives a l' etablissement de profils de comportements. Enlin, dans la mesure ou ces profils
mettent ajour des informations ({ sensibles", ils peuvent etre interdits.
Or, 1<;s problemes de reglementation poses par les agents intelligents sont encore aggraves
par leurs caract6ristiques techniques. Tous les agents ne prennent pas automatiquement des
decisions. Ainsi, un agent peut chereher Ie meilleur CD-Rom pour un client particulier, mais
n'execute pas reellement un ordre pour Ie compte de ce client. Si Ie CD-Rom se trouve etre
une compilation de la meilleure musique chretienne des annees 1990, I'agent traitera alors
une information sensible et se heurtera aux restrictions supplementaires exigeant I' obtention
du consentement prealable par ecrit.
De la meme mauiere, I'infrastructure emergente de la publicit6 sur Internet constitue un deli
pour les principes fran,ais. Les mecanismes decisionr.els concernant l'affichage de bannieres
publicitaires sur l'ecran de l'ordinateur d'une personne surfant sur Ie web, tel que
DoubleClick, dependent de I'etablissement d'un profil de l'utilisateur base sur les
informations contenues dans des fichiers des connexions des utilisateurs (log files) et sur les
{( cookies ». Pour autant que ces types d'informations semblent etre consideres comme des
informations nominatives par la CNIL, I'<,tablissement d'un profil qui conduit Ii une decision
automatique en ce qui concerne I'annonce publicitaire qui sera montree a l'utilisateur pose
un probleme potentie!. En effel, la loi fran,aise dispose qu'aucune «decision ( ... ) privee
impliquant une appreciation sur un comportement humain ne peut avoir pour fondement un
traitement automatise d'infonnations donnant une definition du profil ( ... ) de l'interesse»
('10). Cela est tout partieulierement problematique 5i Ies annonces publicitaires sont
selectionnees en fonction des preferences revelees par des informations sensibIe5.
Enfin, Ja CNIL a egalement insiste sur Ie fait que Ie droit d'opposition permet a l'abonne
titulaire d'une boite aux lettre5 electronique de refuser que ses nom, adresses et numeros de
telephone soient vendus (421). La CNIL a indiqu6 qu'elle etait tout particulierement
preoccupee par la possibilite que des tiers utilisent d'une fayon incompatible avec Ie principe
de finalite des adresses e-mail apres les avo!r obtenues lors de communications Internet ("").
En dehors du cadre des e-mail, la CNIL continue a insister sur Ie fait que les interesses ont
un droit effectif de demander a ce que les informations a caractere personnelles concernant
soient ecartees du processus de traitement. Dans les decisions qu'elle a rendues sur les
annuaires professionnels diffuses sur lntemct (m) et dans Ie cadre du contr6le des
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Loi n9 78.11 du 6 janvier 1918, article 2.
Deliberation n' 97·050 du 4 juin 1997 relative a une demand. d'av;s preSen!e par France Telcom
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mecanismes de paiement en ligne (424), la CNIL a constanunent souligne que les personnes
concernees devaient etre informees du traitement des informations Ii caractere personnel les
concernant et avoir un moyen de futre cesser ce traitement. D'autre part, ii est probable que
la CNIL exige un consentement (opl-in) plutot qu 'un consentement implicite (Opl-out) en ce
qui concerne la diffusion commerciale d'informattons relatives au profiL Ainsi, dans son
approbation recente d'un forum de discussion portant sur des services financiers, la CNIL a
note que I'inscription a la liste de diffusion d'un forum exige un choix en cochant une case
specitique figurant sur Ie site de la societe. ("').
La CNIL semble egalement tres vigilante par Ie probleme de la conservation des donnees.
Dans sa decision d'approbation du forum de discussion sur Internet d'une compagnie
d'assurance, ia CNIL a souligne que les messages ne seraient pas conserves plus de trois
mols ('''). De meme, dans son avis concernant des sites web officiels, la CNIL a insist;! sur
Ie fait que les ticrners des connexions des utilisateurs devalent etre effaces au bout de quinze
jours (42"'). II est probable que la courte duree de conservation autorisee se heurtera a la
len dance consistant it amasser des donnees provenant des transactions electroniques en vue
de les utiliser ulterieurement.

2.4.3.

Atlemagne

La BDSG ne contient aucun article reglementant expressement la question de la methode des
prafils. En revanche, 1'luKDG impose des limites strictes et expresses a l' etablissement de
profils a partir des donnees. Elle perme! la creation de profils de comportement de
l'utilisateur uniquement II II condition que des pseudonymes soient utilises» (m). D' autre
part, une fois que sont crees des profils susceptibles d'etre recuperes a I'aide de
pseudonymes, iI est expressement interdit de combiner ces donnees avec des donnees
relatives ala personne portant Ie pseudonyme en question (42').
Par ailleurs, aucUn article de la BDSG ne prevoit expressement de protection reuforcee pour
les donnees sensibles. Cependant, ses dispositions concernant I'autorisation de la
conservation et de la communication des donnees a caractere personnel couferen! une
protection renforcee it Cc type d'informations. Ainsi, Ie fait que I'interesse puisse faire valoir
« des interets legitimes» prioritaires par rapport aUl( « interets justifies du responsable du
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traitement des donnees» constitue un motif permettant d'empecher la conservation et la
communication des donnees (4"). Cette approche e'luUibree offre une protection renfore';e
pour les donnees sensibles it earaetere personnel ('ll), Comme la BDSG, I'luKDG ne prevoit
aucune protection specifique pour les informations sensibles, Cependant, dans la mesure ou
il garantit I'anonymat dans Ie cyberspace et ou il impose des limites strietes it la creation de
profils de comportement de l'utilisateur, co texte de loi aborde quelques-uns des problemes
les plus importants poses par les informations sensibles a caractere persolllleL
L'luKDG tient compte de Ia finalite dans la mesure oil elle restreint l'utilisation ulterieure
des donnees. Elle dispose que « Ie foumisseur ne peut utiliser les dOfileeS collectees pour Ie
fonctionnement de t"leservices ou pour d'autres finalites, que si eela est autorise par la
presente loi ou par une autre norme, ou si l'utilisateur a dorme son consentement» ("').
Camme on I'a deja indique dans cette etude, la loi s'efforce egalement de limiter les
possibilites d'eviter it celte disposition relative au consentement L'luKDG prevoit des
garanties visant it faire en sorte que Ie consentement est I) veritablement eclaire et 2)
veritablement volontaire. En vertu d'une autre disposition de 1'luKDG concernant la finalire,
({ les dOlllleeS it caractere personnel resultant de l'utilisation de plusieurs teleservices par un
meme utilisateuT)} doivent faire l'objet d'un traitement separe (433), La combinaison dc ces
donnees n'est autorisee que lorsqu'elle est « necessaire a des fins de comptabilite» ("').
L'une des idees les plus importantes de 1'luKDG est d'exiger que soit reduit au minimum Ie
volume de donnees a caractere personnel collectees a I'occasion de la foumiture et de
I'utilisation des services en Iigne. Le principe central de la loi en ce qui conceme la reduction
au minimum du volume de dormees collectees consiste a exiger que cette idee soit traduite
dans la conception de la technologic, L'luKDG dispose « la conception et Ie choix des
moyens techniques qui seront utilises par les teleservices, doivent avoir pour objectif la
collecte, Ie traitement et I'utilisation: soit d'aucune donnee it caractere personnel, soit d'un
volume de dOlllleeS Ie plus falble possible» (m).
Un autre moyen de garantir cette reduction au minimum du volume des donnees est d'exiger
que les donnees II caractere personnel soient effacees 11 intervalles fixes, Ainsi les donnees
resultant de I'utilisation doivent eIre effacees « des que possible, et au plus tard
immediatement apres la fin de chaque utilisation, it I'exception de celles qui constituent en
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meme temps des dOImees comptables)) ("'). En vertu de la loi, ies donnees comptabies
doivent etre effacees « des qu'elles ne sont plus necessaires i1 des fins de comptabilite » ("').
L'IuKDG s'efforce encore de garantir la minimisation de donnees a caractere personnel
utilisees dans Un traitement par un demier moyen qui consiste a limiter les informations
mentionnees sur les factures de services en ligne, La loi impose que « la facture afferente a
I'utilisation de teleservices ne doit pas reveier au fourcisseur l'heure, la duree, Ie type, Ie
contenu et la frequence de I'utilisation de tout teleservice particulier utilise, it moins que
I' abonne ne demande que de tels renseignements figurent sur les factures » ("').

2.4.4.

Royaume-Uni

La legislation britannique relative a !a protection des donnees exige que Ie traitement de
dOlmees ait une finalite et saumet la conservation des donnees it des restrictions. En ce qui
conceme la finalite, plusieurs des principes de protection des donnes soulignent I'importance
'de cct element des pratiques loyales applicables aux infonnations. Le deuxieme principe
prevoit que « les donnees it caracti'"e personnel doivent etre collectees pour une au plusieurs
finalites determinees et legitimes» C"'). Le troisieme principe protege egalement la finalire
puisqu'il dispose que « les donnees a caractere personnel collect"es pour une au plusieurs
finalites determinees ne doivent pas etre utilisees ou divulguees de maniere incompatible
avec la au les finalites precitees» (""). Une grande partie de I'interpretation donnee par Ie
Registrar de I'idee de final it" conceme la declaration. Arnsi, Ie Registrar a explique que
{( I'utilisation de donnees it caractere personnel pour toute finalite queUe qu'elle soit est
autorisee, et ne viole pas Ie principe [d'incompatibiliteJ, pour autant que I'utilisation desdites
donnees it c~ractere personnel pour la finalite prevue est decrile dans I'inscription au registre
correspondant Ii l'utllisateur des donnees» ("'). Toutefois, en vertu du principe de loyaute,
les interesses dolvent avoir connaissance de ces utilisations et divulgations supplementaires
avant qu'Hleur soit demande de fourcir des informations (''').
La loi britannique relative Ii la protection des donnees soume! egalement la conservation des
donnees it des limites. En vertu de I'un des principes de protection des donnees, les donnees
Ii caract"r. persol1j1el « ne doivent pas eire conservees plus longtemps que necessaire » C''').
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Conformement a ce meme pnnClpe, les donnees doivent etre effacees "au moment
opportun» ("'). Selon Ie Registrar, ce principe implique que « les utilisateurs de donnees
doivent mettre en place des procedures destinees a eliminer les donnees qui ne sont plus
utilisees» (m). Le Registrar a suggen! que les utilisateurs de donnees qui detiennent plus
qu'" un tres petit volume de donnees a caraetere personnel (. .. ) mettent en O!uvre une
politique systematique d' effacement des donnees» (,"). Cette elimination de donnees
pourrait se produire a la fin d'un cycle de vie standard des enregistrements d'un type
particulier ("').
La loi britannique relative a la protection des donnees ne contient aueune disposition
specifique sur la question de I'etablissement de profits de comportement de I'utilisateur, mais
ene y repond par Ie biais de ses principes applicables a la protection des donnees. Le principe
de la loyaute du traitement est d'une importance toute particuliere. Le Data Protection
Registrar a souligne que l'obligation d'obtenir les donnees de maniere loy ale impliquait que
des mesures soient prises pour que I'interesse prenne «co!1l1Jlissance des finalit.;s
supplementaires en vue desqueUes les informations sont detenues, ainsi que des ';venlUelles
utilisations et divulgations supplementaires, avant qu' il lui soit demande de fournir des
informations » ("'). 11 aborde essentiellement la question de l' etablissement de profils de
comportement de j'utilisateur par Ie biais de l' obligation de declaration. Cette approche est
reprise par Ie Code of Practice of the Internet Service Provider's Association (ISPA) ("").
L'ISPA prevoit que ses membres ant l'obligation de faire « tout leur possible pour garantir
que les services qui entrainent la collecte d'informations 11 caractere personnel ( ... ) indiquent
clairement 11 l'interesse la [malit" pour laquelle l'information est demandee» ("'). Aucune
disposition particulil~re de ce Code n'aborde Ja question de l'etabllssement de pro fils de
comportement de l'utilisateur.
II est de plus en plus difficile pour les interesses de savoir queI type d'etablissement de
profils de comportement de l'utilisateur est mis en (!Ouvre dans Ie monde en ligne.
L'application du principe de loyaute it l'etablissement de profils effectue par les fournisseurs
de services Internet au par les sites web est une question qui n'est pas ,n!solue pour Ie
moment.
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1

Le Data Protection Act pennet au ministre de completer par des dispositions
complementaires les principes relatifs a I. protection des donnees afin de mettre en place des
garanties supplementaires pour quatre categories de donnees sensibles. Ces categories
portent sur les infonnations relatives 1) a I'origine raciale, 2) aux opinions pOlitiques ou
religieuses ou auttes croyances, 3) a la sante physique ou mentale ou a la vie sexuelle, ou 4)
aux condarnnations penales de I'interesse ('''). Ce pouvoir n'a pas encore ete utilise par Ie
ministre qui n'a pris aucun aete reglementaire sur ee point.
Dans Ie cadre de la procedure de transposition de la directive europeenne, il est probable que
des mesures concernant la protection des informations sensibles seront expressemem
ajoutees au Data Protection Act ('51). Une proposition du Data Protection Registrar, qui
figure dans sa reponse au memorandum consultatif officie! ponant sur la directive, invite Ie
ministre Ii adopter un decret relatif aux donnees sensibles ("'). Le Registrar a indique que Ie
decret neerlandais sur les donnees sensibles pourrait servir de modele II un eventuel texte
britannique sur cette question (,54). Le Registrar a egalement preeonise la creation d'une
nouvelle categoric concernant les donnees sensibles dans Ie cadre de la declaration ("').
Bien qU'aucun texte de loi britannique n'aborde expressement la question de la minimisation
des donnees a caractere personnel sur Internet, Ie principe de reduction au minimum est bien
etabli dans 1a legislation britannique relative i\ la protection des donnees. En particulier, dans
Ie cadre de sa politique en faveur des technologies permertant d'ameliorer Ie respect de la vie
privee, Ie Data Protection Registrar a souligne !'importance de la reduction au minimum des
donnees disponibles. Comme il I'a dit dans ses commentaires sur un memorandum du
gouvernement concernant la fourniture de services publics, ({ le principe clef sous-jacent a
!'approche consist.nt elaborer des technologies permetlant d'ameliorer Ie respect de la vie
privee est que Ie volume d'informations a caractere personnel intervenant dans toute
transaction devrait etre reduit au minimum neeessaire a la realisation de la transaction
consideree» ('so). Cette proposition gouvemementale intitulee ({ govemment.direct» est,
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selon Ie Registrar, une occasion ideale de s'engager it concevoir une technologie qui
perrnettrait de collecter [a plus petite quantite possible de donnees it caractere personneL
Le rapport entre les technologies permettant d'ameliorer Ie respect de la vie privee et la
reduction au minimum des donnees disponibles exige de poser les bonnes questions alors
que la technologie est en cours de conception. Parmi celles-d, Ie Registrar a estime que la
suivante etait un element essentiel pour la conception de 1a teclmologie: « Ai-je vraiment
besoin de collecter des dOlmees it caractere personnel? » (451). Le Data Protection Registrar
recherche actuellement des systemes pilotes dans lesquels il pourrait promouvoir la
philosophie de [,amelioration du respect de la vie privee et les techniques permettant d'y
parvenir.

2.5. Securite

A [,heure

actuelle, ['une des questions les plus controversees s'agissant d']nternet et des
services en ligne est la recherche d'un equilibre entre la cryptographie et les problemes de
sfuete d'Etat et de la repression de la criminalite. D'une part, les services commerciaux et les
interesses ont besoin et tentent d'obtenir une amelioration de la seeurit. des communications
en utilisant differents types de cryptographic pour les transmissions en ligne de donnees 11
caractere personnel, en parliculier, dans Ie cadre des paiements electroniques ("'). La
Directive 95146!CE exige Ja mise en a:uvrc de « mesures techniques et d'organisation
appropriees pour proteger les donnees a caract!!re personnel contre la destruction accidente!!e
ou illicite, la perte accidentelle, [,alteration, la diffusion au I'acces non autorises ( ... )) ~''),
La Directive 95146/CE pn!voit egaiement que « ces mesures doivent assurer, (, .. ), un niveau
de sccurit" approprie au regard des risques pnisentes par Ie traitement et de la nature des
donnees it proteger}) compte tcnu de I'etat de I'art et des couts lies a leur mise en a:uvre (""),
D'autre pari, certaines aulorites cnargees de surete d'Etat et de la repression' de la criminalile
en Europe font valo!r que Ie cryptographie doit ~tre Iimitee de sorte que la police soit en
mesure d'acceder aux donnees en ligne necessaires pour combattre Ie crime organise. Un
Mbat, qui a vu Ie jour aux Btats-Unis au sujet de propositions concernant Jes tiers de
sequestre (key escrow) et les restrictions it I' exportation des systemes de cryptographie, a lite
repris partout en Europe. Ainsi, Ie ministre allemand de l'!nteneur a recemment presente sa
propre proposition relative aux tiers de sequestre (4&'). Certains commissaires allemands
charges de la protection des donnees contestent actuellement l'efficacite pretendue de cette
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proposition. La Commission europeenne a pris tres dairement position en faveur de la Eberte
des parties privees en matiere de eryptage de l'information (m).

.2.5.1.

Belgique

En vertu de ia 10i beige relative a la protection des donnees, Ie « maitre du fichi.r » est tenu
directement ot indirectement d'appliquer des mesures de seeurite suffisantes dans Ie cadre du
traitement des donnees a caractere personnel. Le « maitre du fichier» doit garantir la
protection des donnees Ii caractere personnel en veillant a ce que les personnes dont les
fonctions ne requierent pas l' acees a ces donnees n'y accedent pas et Ii ce que les personnes
qui ont acces it ces donnes ne puissent effectuer «des modifications, des ajouts, des
effacements, des lectures, des rapprochements au des interconnexions non prevus, non
autorises ou interdits» (4"). Le maitre du fichier doit egaiement «prendre les mcsures
techniques et organisationnelies requises pour proteger les fichiers contre la destruction
accidentelIe ou non autorisec, contre la perte accidentelle ainsi que contre la modification,
l' acces et tout autre traitement non autorise de donnecs a caractere personnel" ("'). Ces
mesures techniques doivent assurer un niveau de protection adequat compte tenu, d 'une part,
de retat de la technique en la matiere ot des !rais qu'entraine l'applicalion de ces mesures et,
d' autre part, de la nature des donnees a proteger ot des risques potentiels (OG'). Des normes
appropriees en matiere de securite peuvent egalement etre prevues par des arretes royaux
pour toutes ou certaines categories de traitement (466).
'Ces oxigences en matiere de s!!curite imposees par la loi relative il. la prolection des donnees
ont une iricidence importante sur les services en Iigne. Les services de commerce
electronique doivent prendre des mesures pour garantir l'integrite de la transmission. Bien
qu'il semble qu'aucune decision specifique n'ait encorc ele prise, on peut raisonnablement
penser que la reglementation beige relative a 1a protection des donnees imposera l'utilisation
de la cryptographie et certaines formes de signature numerique pour les transactions en ligne.
De meme, l' obligation imposee au « maitre du fichier» peut avoir des repercussions sur Ie
fonclionnement des moteurs de recherche. Pour ce qui concerne des donnees i\ caractere
personnel existant sur un site web, Ie ({ maitre du fichier » pourrail devoir adopter des
mcsures pour bloquer l' accils des moleurs de recherche si la personne qui lance la recherche

(~/)~)

Communication de'la Commission au Parlement europeen, au Conseil, au Comite ecooomique et
social et au Comite des Regions. Assurer la securite et 12 confiaoce dans la communication
electrooique: Vers un cadre eUfopeen pour les signatures numeriques et Ie chiffrement. COM (97) 503
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(7 octobre 1997).
Lui du 8 d~cembre 1992, article J6, § 1, 4).
Loi du 8 decembre 1992, artie Ie 1~, §3.
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(466)
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n' est pas autorisee a proceder au traitement, comme cela serait Ie cas si la personne lan~ant
la recherche cherchait a aller au,dela de la fmalit" pennettant de conserver les donnees Ii
caracrere personnel.
Contrairement a l'objectif de securite vise par la loi relative Ii la protection des donnees, la
loi sur les ecoutes telephoniques ("') supprime toutes veritables mcsures de securite. La
legislation beige impose aux operateurs de reseaux I'obligation de garantir que
['infrastructure technique pennet aux autorites chargees de la surete d'Etat et de la repression
de la criminalite d'acceder au contenu des telecommunications (46').
Du fait qu'eUe est favorable it des mesures de securite reniorcees, la CPVP a critique Ja
reglementation limilant la cryptographie. Dans un avis rendu sur des propositions de
modifications concernant la loi sur les ecoutes telephoniques et la correspondance, la CPVP
a indique que !'imposition d'un tiers de sequestrc "tait une mesure excessive et
disproportionnee eu egard aux besoins en matiere de securit" ("'). La CPVP est Plutot
favorable a I'approche preconisee par diverses enlites internationales, notamment l'OCDE et
I'Union europ6enne ('10). En particulier, la CPVP a contest" !a delegation du pouvoir
reglementaire par I'intermediaire des arretes royaux (m). En Belgique, des leaders tres
importants du sccleur de l'industrie sont "galement opposes a la figure de tiers de
sequestre (m).
Pour Ie moment, Ie gouvemement beige a accept" un assouplissement de la reglementation
de la cryptographic. Dans un projet de loi de mai 1997, Ie ministere des Communications et
de l'Infrastructure a aceepte de ne pas reglementer (,Ol) la cryptographie plutot que de la
sournettre i\ un tiers de sequestre. Toutefois, dans son expose des motifs, Ie ministre declare
que cette liberalisation "ne signifie pas que l'assemblee legislative a complelement
abandonne tout espoir d'avoir les moyens d'acceder it des messages de textes en clair it

{46~
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("')
(''')
(''')
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Loi du 30 juin 19,94 relative a1a protectIon de la vie privee contre les ecoutes, la prise de connaissance
et I'enregistrement de communications et de telecommunications privees,
Loi du 21 mars 1991 portant rMorme de certaines entreprise pubJiques economiques, article 70bis,
CPVP, Avis nO 09197 du 20 mars 1997, p.?
Id.
Id.
Voir, par exemple, BELlNFOSEC, Rapport soumis. I'approbation surles aspects juridiques de la
securite informatique•• La cryptographic en droit beige (Jolliet 1996).
Ministere des Communications et de I>Infrastructure, Avant-Projet de loi modUiant fa loi d)J 21 mars
1991 portant reforme de certa,ines entreprises publiques economiques afin d1adapter Ie cadre
regl{;mentaire auX obligations en matiere de Jibre concurrence et d'harmonisation sur Ie marche des
telecommunications d~c,oulant des decisions de l'Union europeenne, article 76 (27 mai
1997)(<<Vemploi de I. cryptographie est libre.»)
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l' avenir (".) Ie probleme sera de nouveau aborde plus tard en raison des evolutions
technoIogiques ou d'une utilisation abusive de la cryptographie. » (m).
La tension existant entre les efforts du gouvernement beige qui cherche a reglementer la
securite des donnees et les objections de la CPVP vom creer une certaine instabilite pour les
services en ligne.

2.5.2.

France

En France, il existe deux obligations legales importantes et potentiellement contradictoires
en matiere de securite des informations nominatives. La 10i relative a la protection des
donnees oblige toute personne effectuant le !raitement d'informations a caractere personnel
« a prendre toutes precautions utiles afin de preserver la securite des informations et
notamment d'empecher qu'elles ne soient deformees, endommagees ou communiquee, a des
tiers non autorises. » C")· r.: obligation de securite exige que Ie hardware et les logicieis
soient fiables et que ces logiciels soient capables de resister aux tentatives de trucage ("').
Dans Ie meme temps, la 101 de reglementation des teleconununieations ("') cree un cadre
nouveau pour l'utilisation de la cryptologie. Avant la nouvelle loi, toute activite de
cryptologie Ii des fins de seeurite de l'information etait soumise a une autorisation
gouvernementale. La nouvelle loi sur les tehkommunications prevoit que l'utilisation de
moyens de cryptologie est libre si son objet est d'authentifier ou d'assurer l'integrite des
messages (418). La cryptologie peut etre utilisee pour assurer l'integrite du contenu du
message transmis si les cles secretes ont ete deposees aupres d'une tierce partie de confiance
("'). La tierce partie de eonfianee doit etre agreee par PEtat (''''). Cependant, aucun arrete
ministeriel n'a encore precise les termes de l'agrement et rien n'indique que des agents
etrangers pourront exercer cette activit!:. Tout autre moyen au prestation de cryptologie est
soumise it autorisation du Premier ministre ("'). Cette reforme est destinee a creer a un
equilibre entre Ie fait que les utilisateurs ont besoin d' effeetuer des transactions securisees et
Ie fait que les interets de la defense nationale et de la securite publique requierent d'avoir
acces aux communications crypt':es. La nouvelle loi permet aux autorites chargees de la
smell! d'Etat et de Ja repression de la criminalite d'avoir acces aux cles secretes confiees aux
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ld" Expose des motifs, p. 51.
La; n' 78·17 du 6 janvier 1978, art;cle29.
CNIL, Dix ans d';nformatique et Iibertos, p. 49·50 (1988).
Lo! n' 96·659 du 26juillet 1996.
Lo; n' 96·659 du 26 juil\et 1996, article 17,

Id.
Id.
Id,
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tierces parties de cOllfianee agn;';es, En effet, la pretendue liberalisation de la cryptologie est
loin d' etre un encouragement il securiser Ie traitement des informations Ii caract"re personnel
tel que cela est envisage dans la loi relative a la protection des donnees.

I

La GNIL a mis l'accent il plusieurs reprises sur les mesures de seeutire destinees a garantir Ie
respect de la final it': des infornlations a caract':re personneL Cne serie de decisions prises
dans Ie cadre de I'information en matiere de sante et des dossiers des patients met en lumiere
les eliments de securite decisifs (,"j, Pour les sites Internet des ministeres, la CNIL a
nettement sou\igne I' existence d'un besoin fondamental de mecanismes de seeurite visant a
assurer l'integrite et la finalit" du traitement des donnees (m). La CNIL a egalement fait
observer que meme les infonnations figurant dans les annuaires installes sur les serveurs web
officiels doivent etre suffisamment·securisees afin de garantir I'impossibilite de tout autre
acces public aux informations a caractere personnel C'M), D'autre part, la CNIL a lnsiste sur
l'utilisation de la securite pour garantir I'integtite des informations it caractere personneL Par
exemple, Kleline, Ie service de paiement C1ectronique pour Internet, a fait I'objet d'une
appreciation favorable de la CNIL due en partie a l'accent mis par Kleline sur les
mecanismes de securite ("'). La CNIL a indique la consultation des autorit':s nationales
chargees de la securite constltuait une etape necessaire de I' exarnen des dispositions mises en
reuvre pour Ie traitement des donnees afin de garantir que des mecanismes de securite
juridique satisfaisants etaient cffectivement deploy';s (4"),
Toutefois, la portee des questions de securit" a change au cours des dernieres annees, En
1993, par exemple, la CNIL avah favorise l'utilisation de cartes a puce prepayees dans la
mesure ou elles permettaient d'effectuer des transactions de paiement anonymes en toute
securite et elle avait accepte I'introduction des cartes Ii puce dans Ie cadre des services
medicaux compte tcnu des mesures de securit" qui devaient garantir.l'acces limite aux
informations it caractere personnel conservees (487). En revanche, les services de
renseignements du ministere de l'Interieur ont estime que I'introduction en 1997 de la
Mobicarte - une carte de paiement pour les telephones mobiles - constituait un deli
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(4t1)

(484)

(''')
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Voir detiberation n° 97~032 du () mai L997 relative a la demande d'avis presentee par Ie premier
ministre concernant un modelc,.type de traitements d'inforrnations nominative o¢res dans le cadre
d'un site Internet ministerieL
Deliberation nil 96·065 du 6 juillet 1996 pOliant avis Sut' Ie projet de deCision prescote pour Ie Ce.ntre
national de la recherche scientifique concernant un modele type de traitement automatise
d'inforrnations nominatives pour [a publication d'nnnuatres des unites propres ou mixtes sur un roseau
intemationa! ouvert. Deliberation n' 95·131 du 7 novembre 1995. CN!L, 17< I\apport d'activite, p, 70
(1997), CN!L, 16e R.apport d'activi"!, p, 84·85 (1996),
CNll.. , !7e R.apport d'activile, p, 92·93 (1997).
Id.,.p, 92,
CNIL, 14e I\apport d'.ctivite, p, 72.73 (1994),
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fondamental et ils ont invite France Telecom II intcgrer dans cette carte une capacite de
pistage et d'identification des appelants ("'). Dans ce cas, la securite a plutot ete un moyen
d'identifier et de pister les individus qu'un moyen de creer l'anonymat.
11 est probable que la possibilite pour les autorites chargees de la suret'; d'Etat et de la
repression de la cdminalite d'acceder aux informations Ii caractere personnel va deven;r un
point de friction de plus en plus important. Les obligations de declaration prevues par la
legislation franyaise sont inapplicables dans des situations interessant la surete de l'Etat, la
defense et la sccudte publique ("'). De meme, les traitements de dOMees dans Ie secteur
public intcressant la suret" de l'Etat, la defense et la SeCUrile publique n'ont pas a etre reveles
par la publication des dispositions d'autorisation. Des regles procedurales specia!es
s'appliquent a !'exercice du droit d'acces de I'interesse aux informations a caractere
persoMelle concernant 5i Ie traitement interesse la surete de I'Etat, la defense et ia securite
publique ("'0).

2.S.3.

Allemagne

Pour ce qui concerne les services en ligne, l'IuKDG impose au fournisseur I'obligation de
proposer une securite. En vertu de ce texte, l'utilisateur doit etre protege contre Ia possibilitc
que des tiers apprerulent qu' il utilise des teleservices et les donnees a caractere personnel
habituellement genen!es a l'occnsion de I'acces aux teleservices doivent etre immediatement
effacees ("'). L'IuKDG a "galement cree un regime d'utilisation volontaire des signatures
numeriques (492) dont IlOUS parlerons plus loin.
Dans Ie cadre des dispositions concernant la seeurite en ligne, iI n'existe aetuellement en
Allemagne aucune restriction II l'utilisation de la cryptographie a l'interieur du pays et
aucune restriction a l'importation ou a l'exportation de logicie!s de cryptographie. II se peut
toutefois que cette situation viCIU1e 11 changer, car un vigoureux deb.t se deroule
actuellement quant a la necessite d'une 10i SUr la cryptographie (Kryptogesetz) qui en
Iimiterait la portee. Le ministre allemand de I'Interieur, les services de renseignements
allemands et certains membres de la eDU ont pris position en faveur de la limitation dela
. cryptographie. D'autres ministres aIlemands, des commissaires des L!inder charges de la
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La mobicarte de France Telecom ~pingie par Ie ministere de i>lnterieur. Agence France Presse, 27
mars 1997.
Loi n' 78· 17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 19.
Loi n' 78·17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 39.
\uKDG, article 2, §2(2) & (3).
iuKDG, article 3.
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protection des donnees et Ies industriels allemands ont vigoureusement pris position contre
toutes restrictions concernant la cryptographie ("'),
Les acteurs qui souha;tent que la cryptographie fasse l'objet de limitations ant fait valoir que
de telles mesures sont necessaires pour proteger les act; vites des autorites char gees de la
silrete d'Etat et de la repression de la criminalite. Comme il est dit dans un argument avance
par la CDU en faveur de la reglementation de la cryptographie « L'introduction d'un
cryptage largement repandu peut avoir pour r';sultat de rendre beaucoup plus difficile Ie
travail des autorit';s· responsables de la paursuite des infractions en transforrnant des
communications legalement control';es en des communications' impossibles Ii dechiffrer '.
Cela scrait un inconvenient pour Ie respect de la loi par les citoyens)} (""). Ce danger
potentiel pour la capacile des autorites chargees de la surete d'Etat et de I. repression de la
criminalit" a controler les communications est la raison politique la plus frequemment
avancee en faveur de la n!glementation de celle question ("').
Dans un expose de la position interne ayant les faveurs du gouvemement, que Der Spiegel a
decouvert, un groupe d'experts interministericl a preconis'; la creation d'une approche en
trois etapes du controle de la cryptographie ("'). En premier lieu, les personnes offrant des
produits et des services crypt"s scraient tenues de mettre leurs donnees Ii la disposition des
autorites publiques sous une forme non crypt';c. En co qui concerne les fournisseurs de
services de telecommunications, cette demande a deja ete satisfaite. Bien que la legislation
allemande n'imposc aUCune restriction a la cryptographie en soi, en vern] de la loi sur les
telecommunications, les fournisseurs de services de telecommunications doivent prendre des
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Plus pnecisement, certaines institutions pubUques ont insiste sur I'utilisation que les criminels et les
groupes extremistes pouvalent faire de la cryptographk Dans le demief rapport du Bureau de
protection de (a Constitution (AmI fur Verfassungschutz), cette institution a. par exemple. fait observer
que les groupes extremistes utilisaient de plus en plus tes nouveaux moyens de communication
electroniques, Amt fUr Verfassungschutz, Verfussungsschutzbericht 1996, Linksextremistisch'e
Bestrebungen I., 2.3. http://www.bundesregierung.rlelinlandiministerienlbmVvsber961linksj,hunl.

On a egalement decouvert que ces groupe:; extremJstes utHisaient des aigorithmes de cryptnge. en
particulier Ie "Pretty Gbod Privacy", pour chiffrer leurs communications. 'd. Panni les partisans les
plus fervent.~ de la mise en place de limitations aux iogiciels de eryptage. Oil trouve Ie Bureau de
protection de ta Constitution, II Agence federate du Renseignement (Bundesnachrichtdlenst) et Ie
ministre ,de j'lnterieur, Manfred Kanther.
(''')

. Lorenz Lorenz-Meyer, Pas Kreuz mit1ler KryptQgraphie, Spiegel Online Archiv-Pokument 311997
<http://www.spiegel.delspecial.heft2ikrypto.html>.
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mesures techniques afin de faire en sorte que leurs n!seaux puissent etre surveilles par les
autorites competentes (491). En second lieu, l'utilisation de systemes de cryptographic
exigerait I'autorisation du gouvemement. Cette utilisation serait liee a la possibilite que la
reconstitution des donnees cryptees puisse etre effectuee d'une maniere " courante et a un
cOllt raisonnable». Enrm, l'utilisation de proced':s de cryptographic non autorises scrait
interdite ('9&).
11 n'est pas du tout certain que celte proposition sera acceptee. De nombreuses voix se sont
clevees en Allemagne contre toute proposition de reglementation de la cryptographie (''').
Certaines de ces voix se sont elevees au sein meme du gouvemement federal. Ainsi, Ie
ministre federal de la Justice, Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, Ie ministre de la Technologie, Jiirgen
Riittgers el Ie ministre du Commerce, Gunter Rexrodt, ont fait part de leur scepticisme quant
aux limitations de la cryptographic. Ainsi, Ie 2 mai 1997, Ie Dr Rexrodt a publie un
communique de presse dans lequel il etait affirm': que Ie ministere federal du Commeree
avait joue un rOle actif au cours des dernieres annees en vue d'empecher Ie gouvemement
federal d'introduire toute me sure limitant la cryptographic ('"').
Les commissaires des Ltlnder charges de la protection des dOlmees ont egalement eu un role
tres actif dans ce Mba!. Le commissaire du Schleswig-Holstein a, par exemple, estime que
les outils de cryptographie n'etaient den moins qu'un « cadeau du cie! ». Dans son demier
rapport d'activite, Ie Dr Baumler, preconise l'utilisation de la cryptographie sans restrictions
comme moyen de proteger les communications et les transactions financieres sur les n;seaux
ouverlS. Dans ce rapport, il etait dit:
Reste a esperer que les decideurs se rendront compte que la cryptographie constitue
une chance unique pour la protection de la vie privee dans un environnement
problematique et technique. De plus, les experts affirment de fa<;on absolumenl
unanime qu'une interdiction ou une limitation de la cryptographie seralt inefficace. II
serait facile pour les personnes contre lesquelles elles auraient ete instaurees - it
savoir les membres d'organisations sophistiquees du crime organise - de contourner
ces restrictions ("').
.
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Telekommunikationsgesetz vom 25 Juli 1996, § 88.
Lorenz Lorenz Meyer. D,as Kreuz mit der Kr)'ptographie, Spiegel Online Archiv~Dokument 311997 <
hltp:llwww.spiegel.delspecial.heft2lkrypto.html>.
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<http://www.netlaw.de/newstick/krypto-Z.httn>.
Bundesministerium fur Wirtsch.ft, Rexrodt weiter strike gagen KryptographieverMt (2 mai 1997).
ht!p:llwww.bmwl.delpresseiI997/0S02prm.html.
19.Tnetigkeitsbericht, 2.3 (1996) (soulign. dans I'original).
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Tandis que la cryptographic constitue un pas en avant considerable dans Ie domaine de la
protection des donnees, toute tentative de la limiter est considen,e comme vouee it l' echec.
Le commissaire charge de la protection des donnees c.e la Hesse a poursuivi sur I'idee que la
cryptographic sera impossible II limiter. Dans son 25' rapport aunuel d'activite, ce
commissaire, Ie Dr Rainer Hamm, a plaid" en faveur d'un renollcement du gouvemement a
n!glementer la technologic du cryptage en raison des difficultes techniques existant quant it
la mise en ceuvre effective de limites a la cryptographie. Le Dr Hamm a estime que « toute
mesure de contr6le du gouvemement relative it l'introduction de proced':s de cryptage par Ie
transfert et la conservation des donnees sera vouee it I'echec» ('Ol). Et ce, en raison de
Ncteurs tels que la facilite avec laquelle cette reglementation peut w-e contournee, ains;
qu'en raison du fait qu'il est presque impossible de surveiller Ie eryptage et qu'on se heurte
Iii a d'autres interets publics et eeonomiques concernant la seeurite des dormees ("'). Le Dr
Hamm s'est egalement oppose aux propositions relatives it des tiers de sequestre qui, scion
lui, supposent des risques supph,mentaires pour la securite des des secretes (50'). D'autres
commissaires charges de la protection des donnees on! egalement souleve des objections a
l'encontre des limitations du cryptage sur Ie fondement de ces notions ('0'). Une autre
objection au cryptage fait valoir que les restrictions legales it cette technologic sont
inconstitutionnelles. Un expert de la protection des donnees a indique que les contrOles du
cryptage pourraient etre contraires Ii I'article 10 de la Loi fondamentale qui protege la
confidentialite des communications ('0'). II est probable qu 'une loi limitant Ie cryptage
puisse etre contraire It ce droit prevu par la Constitution sans qu'aucun effet positif n'en
decoule pour un autre interet protege par ladite constitution. En tant que teUes, les limites au
cryptage sont done reputees etre inconstitutionnelles en raison de leur inefficacite et de leur
caractere inadequat (so').
Entin, les industriels ~lIemands ant activement defendu l'utilisation ilIimitee du cryptage.
Ainsi, l'association allemande des fabricants de technologic de I'infonnation (Fachverband
lnfonnationstechnik) a declare que reglementer la cryptographie « aboutirait uniquement Ii la
creation de fomaHtes administratives et de frais considerables el diminuerait les possibilites
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Voir, par exemple, Berliner Datenschutzbeaufiragter Jahresbericht 1996, § 3.4 (1997),
<http://www.datenschutz-berlin.deljahresbe/96fte! 13 .hlm>.
Johann Bizer, Reehtliche Bedeutung der Kryptagraphie, 21 Datensehutz und Daten,leherung 203
(1997) .
ld, Vair egal.ment Norbert F. Paetzl, Ku.v...ts fuer E-mail, Spiegel On-Line.
<http://ww w.spiegel.delspeciaVheiWss03100.html> .
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d'exporter les produits allemands destines Ii garantir Ia seeurite » ('08). La Telesec, une
division de Deutsche Telekom, Ie fournisseur allemand de services de telecommunications
recemment privatise, s'est egalement opposee aux restrictions au cryptage (>09). Ce
mouvement d'oppositiou s'est egalement aceompagne d'un mouvement de resistance chez
Ies experts et dans la population en general (,'0).
Quant aux signatures numeriques, Ie legislateur allemand a prevu leur utilisation dans
l'IuKDO. Bien que ce texte prevoie une utilisation anonyme des signatures numeriques, Ia
loi relative a la signature numerique, qui fait partie de l'luKDO, permet egalement aux
autorites chargees de la surete d'Etat et de la repression de ]a criminalite de decouvrir Ies
noms des personnes qui utilisent ces des numeriques sous un pseUdonyme. Enfin, Ia loi
relative it la signature numerique comporte des dispositions sur la protection des donnees
dans Ie cadre de Ia collecte de donnees realisee par les autorites de certification elles-memes.
L'article 3 de 1'luKDG reglemente I'utilisation des signatures numeriques. Celle section du
texte, qui est appelee loi sur la signature numerique (Signaturgesetz), prevail les « conditioru;
dans Iesquelles Ies signatures numel'iques sont eonsiderees comme securisees et Ies
falsifications de signatures numeriques ou la manipulation de donnees signecs peuvent etre
facHement constatees )) (lIl). Le Iegislateur allemand a pris des dispositions dans ce domaine,
ce qui coru;titue un element d'encouragement pour Ie developpement des activites
commerciales sur Internet ("').
La loi sur Ia signature numerique de 1'luKDO prevoit une procedure d'autorisation it laqueJle
participent deux acteurs determinants: "I' autorhe competente» et « I' autorite de
certification ». En vertu de cette loi, Pautor;t" competente, un organisme public, donne des
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Fachverband Informationstechnik, Position zur Einfueh'rung des uGesetz.es zur digitaten Signatur" und
zur Regulierung von Verscbluessungsverfahren. http://www.telesec.de/fvit.htm.
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Void deux sites web sopbistiques qui traduisent Ie sentiment d'opposition genera! contre Ie cryptage

developpement des technologies de "information et de in communication ouvre de nouveaux horizons
aUX tra:nsferts de donnees et aux activites. economlques ", OesetzelltWurf der Bundesregierung~
Deutscher Bundestag, 13.Wahlperiode, DrucK.ache 1317385 (09. April 19.97) at 25.

Au lieu des normes g\obales de \a BDSG et de l'incertitude concernant leur application, une loi
sector1~l1e creerait une secUflte juridique pour ceS nouveaux transferts de donnees ces nouvelles
aetivites economiques, En outre1 en raispn des transferts de donnees personneUes de plus en plus
importnnts, y compris ceux concernant les donnees sensibles dans Ie secteur medical, Ie gouvernement
allemand a souligne qu'iI existait un Itbesoin urgent" de solutions numeriques destinees a proteger les
donnees contre d~s modifications non deteclees.
Id.
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autorisations d'attribuer des cl<~s publiques de signature aux autorites de certification. Cette
autor;te competente est identifiee par la loi afin d'etre « ramorit!! de regJementation des
services de telecommunications et des services postaux» (RegulierungsbehOrde) ($D). Cette
institution se trouve au sein du minislre du Commerce (Millisterium fUr Wirtschaft) (''').
Dans Ie cadre de ses fanctions d'octroi d'autorisalions pour distribuer des signatures
numeriques, I'autodte de reglementation (appetee "I'autorit" competente» dans 1']uKDG)
met a disposition les certificats numeriques qu'elle a delivres, afin qu'it soit possible a tout
moment de les verifier et de les obtenir sur des liaisons de telecommunications accessibles a
tous ("'). L'autorite de reglementationjoue egalement un role important dans Ie controle du
comportement des auto rites de certification, qui sont les organismes responsables de la
diffusion des signatures numeriques. L'autorite de rcglementation peut interdire l'utilisation
de composantes techniques inadequates et surveiller les activites d'une autoritc de
certification en visitant ses sites ('''). Celte disposition n'est soumise Ii aueune limite
territoriale, ce qui permet de penser qu'un organisme situe II I' exterieur du territoire allemand
cherehant a obtenir une autorisation de I'autontc de reglementation allemande serait
egalement soumis a cette disposition. D'autre part, la loi sur les signatures numeriques
contient des dispositions concernant les certifieats celivres par d'autres pays, ce qui peut
signifier que seules des entites allemandes peuvent certifier des cles en qualite d'aulorite de
certification (517). Enfin, l' autorite de reglementation peut "galement retirer des autorisations
i( en cas de non-respect des obligations» Meoulant de in loi sur la signature numedque (m).
Quant au rOle des autorites de certification, ces organismes sont charges de deHvrer les
certificats de cles aux parties qui souhailent apposer une signature nurnerique sur un
document ("'). En vertu de la loi sur les signatures numeriques, les certificats numeriques
doiven! contenir les informations suivanles : 1) Ie nom du proprietaire de la cle de signature
ou Ie pse\ldonyme distinetif attribue au proprietaire de la de; 2) la cle pubHque de signature
attribuee; 3) les noms des algorithmes avec lesquels la cle pubJique du proprietaire de la ele
de signature et la cle publique de l'autorit':: de certification peuvent eire utilisees; et 4) une
mention precisant si l'utilisation de la cl. de signature est limitee a des applications
specifiques du point de vue du type ou de la portee ("").

(51])

e
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("')
(m)
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(''')
(''")

luKDG. article 3, § 3. Cette partie renvoie a la io! sur Jes t~lecommunications, § 66,
Loi -sur les nHecornmunications, § 66.
luKDG, article 3, § 4.
luKDG, article 3, §§ 4·5.
luKDG, article 3, § 15.
luKDG, article 3, § 13(3).

\uKOG, article 3, § 4.
Id. article 3, § 5'7.
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La loi sur la signature numerique pennet iI l'autorite de certification de collecter des donnees
a caractere personnel dans certaines circonstanees. Ces donnees ne doivent etre collect"es
que 1) lorsque cette informati~n est necessaire aux fins d'une certification, et 2) direetement
aupres de !'interesse (HI). La coHecte de dOlmees aupres de tiers n'est autorisee qu'avec Ie
consentement de I'interesse (m).
ScIon la 10i sur les signatures numeriques, les certificats d6livres par d'autres pays pour une
signature numerique sont censes etre equivalents aux signatures numeriques delivr;,es en
vertu de ladite loi lorsque la signature nurm&rique etrangere est aussi sure qu'une signature
numerique allemande (m). Entin. il est expressement interdit aux autorites de certification de
conserver des des privees de signature - bien que ees mecanismes ne soient pas eux-memes
interdits par la legislation allemande C").
Comme l'indiquent les conditions auxquelles sont soumis les certificats numeriques, des
signatures'numeriques peuvent etre d6livrees a des personnes qui souhaitent les utiliser sous
un pseUdonyme. Rendre possible l'utilisation de signatures numeriques it I'aide d'un
pseudonyme permet a une personne de devenir internaute et de garder l' anonymat, ce qui
constitue une mesure importante de protection des donnees. Comme Ie commissaire federal
charge de la protection des donnees l'a observe dans son 16' rapport d'activite :
Grace a [Ia creation d'un pseudonymc] Ie volume des donnees a caractere personnel
qui est automatiquement cree sur une personne dans Ie. cadre de transactions
commereiales effectuees au moyen dc cormeetlon, telephoniq)les peut etre
serieusement reduit L' existence de profils de comportement de l'utilisateur, la
surveillance du comportement des consommateurs ainsi que la publicit,; direete
realisee par des societes seront par-Iii presque totalement <!vites ("').
L'attribution de signatures numeriques pUbliquement certifiees associees a un pseudonyme
est cependant subordonnee a la possibiIite pour les auto rites chargees de la surete d'Etat ct de
la repression de la criminalite d'acceder aux informations concernant Ja veritable identite du
titulaire du pseudonyme.

a la signature numerique comporte des regles qui permettent it une categorie
d'organismes publics d'obtenir des renseignements sur l'identite n!elle d'une personne
lorsque ees informations ont ell! caruoufi.!es par une signature numerique pUbliquement

La loi relative

("')
("')
("')
(''')
("')

luKDG, article 3(l2).
Id.
Jd. article 3, § 15(1).
ld. article 3, § 5(4).
147.

109

certifiee. Cette loi pennet d'oter son caractore anonyme au pseudonyme lburni aux
signatures numeriques pour un ensemble de finalites ddinies liees a['application de la loi:
I. poursuite des infractions Ii caractere penal ou administratif, en vue de prevenir un
danger mena9ant la securite publique ou ]'ordrc public ou pour I'exereiee
d'obligations legales par les autorites federales et des Under aUx fins de protection
de la Constitution, par les Services de renseignements f"deroux
(Bundesnachrichtendienst), Ie Service de contre espionnage militaire (Militaerischer
Abschinndienst) ou Ie Bureau des pratiques criminologiques (Zollkriminalamt) ("').

Toutes les demandes d'infonnations doivent etre presentees par ecrit et doivent ensuite
generalement etre communiquees au proprietaire de la cie de signature ("').
L'IuKDG contientegalement un autre article concernant l'acces des autorites chargees de la
surete d'Etat et de la repression de la criminalite aux donnees Ii earactere personnel. Elle
p,,!voit Ii son article 2, §6, une exception applicable aux autorites chargees de la suret" d'Etat
et de la repression de la criminalite, qui porte sur la protection relative aux dOllllees
d'utilisation et aUl< donnees comptables. eet article interdit tout d'abord la transmission de
ces donnees « II d'autres fournisseurs ou II des tiers», et dispose « eela n'affectera pas les
pouvoirs des autorites chargees de mener a bien des poursuites penales» C"). Le
Conunissaire federal charge de la protection des donnees a critique eet aspect de la loi,
estimant qu'il donnait un pouvoir disproportiolllle aux autorites chargees de la surete d'Etat
et de la repression de la eriminalite ("9).
Le reglement concernant la signature numerique (Verordnung zur digitalen Signatur) doit
apporter plus de precisions quant a l'utilisation des signatures numeriques. Le gouvemement
allemand a presente un projet de texte Ie 9 oetobre 1997 (''').

2.5.4;

Royaume-Uni

La sccurite des dOllllees est un element important de la protection des donnees au Royaum...
UnL En vertu du huitieme et demier principe relatif it la protection des donnees, la securite
desdites donnees doit etre assuree. Il dispose que « des mesures de s"curite suffisantes

("')
("')
("')
("')

e

JCi

)

luKDO, article 3, § 12(2).
Id.
Id, article 2, § 6.
Autori!6 federale de protection des donnees. 16e Rapport d'activit", p. )44.
Verordnung zur digitaJen Signatur in .cler P'assung des Beschlusses der Bundesreglerung yom

8.0ktober 199J <!lttp:/lwww.iid.delrahmentisigv.hlml>.
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doivent etre prises pour prevenir I'acces, la modification, la divulgatioll ou Ia destruction des
dOlmees it caractere personnel et les pertes accidemelles ou la destruction de donnees it
caractere personnel» ('"). D'apr';s Ie Registrar, « c'est l'utilisateur de I'ordinateur qui doit
etre principalement responsable de la creation et de la mise en (J:uvre des dispositions en
matiere de sccurile» ("'). Cette politique doit mettre en ceuvre tout ce qui est
raisonnablement possible pour garantir la securite. Le earacterc raisonnable des mesures de
seeurit" prises sera mesure au regard du « risque de danger pour les personnes concernees
implique par un manquement ala securite » (m).
II est probable que les risques concernant la seeurit!! des donnees augmenteront dans Ie
mande en ligne. Le Data Protection Registrar a commence uaborder cette question dans des
orientations sur (( Ie travail u domicile et les donnees informatiques» ("'). Ces orientations
portent sur Ie courrier electronique en particulier et sur Internet en general.
Le Registrar a declare que Ie courrier electronique est generalement susceptible d'etre
menace. Ces menaces sont dues a la nature d'Internet et des systemes de courrier
electronique:

En tant que forme de r';seau, Internet est fort peu sUr et n'est pas fiable it l'heure
d'apporter une protection aux donnees i\ caracti"e personnel. En outre, il est probable
que Ie fournisseur de service aura acces a la bolle aux lettres de meme que la
personne a laquelle eUe est assignee.
Cepehdant, en realite, les risques lies u['utilisation du courrier electronique pour des
messages de routine sans caractere sensible ne sont pas tres importants. Bien qu'il
soit possible que des personnes non autorist!es puissent acceder ala bolte aux lettres,
iJ est peu probable qu' elles attaquent les ordinateurs qui accedent it distance it la bolte
aux letlres. II ne faut que peu de temps pour acceder it la boite aux leUres et cela ne
laisse pas beaucoup de marge pour que se produise une interference ("').
Selon Ie Registrar, l'utilisation d'Internct avec des messages non cryptes peut elre
generalement compatible avec l'exigence de mesures de securite suffisantes.. Toutefois,
lorsque des informations sensibles it caractere personnel sont contenues dans des messages,
],utHisation d'Internet ne peut eIre adequate que 81 « une forme de cryptage appropriee» est
utilisee (''').

("')
(m)

("')
('H)

f")
("')

Data Prolection Acll984, Ire partie, annexe 1(8).
Dala Prolection Registrar, The Guidelines. p. 66 (3e Serie 1994).
Id. p. 68-69.
Data Protection RegiMrar, Homeworking and Computer Information, p. 25 (Juin 1997).
Id. at 28
Id.
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Quant it Internet en general, Ie Registrar a declare qu'il fallait que les entreprises prennent
des mesures gemirales de securite pour garantir ]'integrite des informations. A cet effet, il
faut installer des « firewalls» (pare-feu), surveiller les donnees a caractere personnel qui
sont inserees SUr un site web et obtenir Ie consentement eclaire de toutes les personnes dont
les donnees seront utilisees sur un site web ('''). Le Registrar a egalement mis en garde
contre Ia possibilite de vol des numeros de cartes de crooit sur Internet et il a suggere la mise
en ""uvre de « mesures de securite apprapr;"e, telles que Ie cryptage » (m).
Comme dans d'autres pays, un debat a actuellement lieu au Royaume-Uni en ce qui concerne
la reglementation de la cryptographie. Le ministere du Commerce et de l'industrie joue un
role fondamemal dans ce debat, et une bonne partie du debat toume autour d'un document
qu'i! a clabore sur la question et qui s'intitule « Octroi d'un agrement aul{ tiers de confiance
pour la foumiture de services de cryptage» (<< Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the
Provision of Encryption Services» ('''). Ce document plaide en faveur de I'octroi d'un
agrement officiel aUl{ tiers de contianee (TC) qui fourniron! des services de cryptographic.
En vertu du regime propose, Ie gouvemement doi! octroyer un agrement aux TCs «qui
foumiront des services de cryptographie a un large evenlail d' emites dans tous les
secteurs» ("0). Void ce qu'a declare Ie ministere du Commerce et de l'industrie it propos de
ce systeme d'agrement volontaire:
Le regime d'octroi d'un agniment visera II garantir que les entites qui souhaitent
devenir des rcs sont aptes Ii exercer les fonctions qui leur incombent. II visera 11
proteger les consommateurs ainsi qu'a preserver 1a capacilc des autorites chargees du
renseignement et de I'application de la loi 11 combattre les crimes graves el Ie
terrorisme en etablissant des proc6ciures permettant de leur reviHer les cles de
cryptage, dans Ie cadre de garanties simiiaires a celles qui existent deja pour la
captation justiii6e en vertu de Ia loi sur la captation des connnunications (Interception
of Communications Act) de 1985 ("').
Comme cette declaration l'indique clairement, Ie ministere du Commerce el de l'industrie
envisage de retenir a la fois la solution de I'octroi d'un agrement et la proposition
envisageant la figure du liers de sequestre.

("')

Id.

e")

ld.

(''')

Department of Trade and Indu!;)1ry, Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the PrQvision of Encryption
Services: Puhlic Consu ltarion Paper (Mar, (997) <http://dtilnlbl.dtl.gov.ukfpubs>.
Id, § 40.

("')

Id. § 17.
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Pour ce qui conceme I'octroi d'un agrement en general, 1.e ministere souhaite faire en sorte
que les entites qui ant recours aux services de TCs puissent leur fnire entieremem confiance.
L'ocrroi d'un agrement protegera les consommateurs, permettra l'interoperabilite de services
securises et permettra aux entreprises du Royaume-Uni de tirer profit d'un environnement de
commerce, electronique securise ("'), De plus, l'utilisation d'une TC sera lotalement
volontaire, Cornme Ie document I'indique « c'est Ie marche, et non Ie gouvemement, qui
decidera s'il souhaite avoir recours aux services d'une Te. Le gouvemement pense que les
avantages de ce systeme I' emporteront SUr toute autre consideration)) (''').
Bien que Ie recours a une TC soit volontaire, la TC ne doit, de son cote, pas avoir Ie choix
quant a sa participation a un systeme de tiers de sequestre. La delivrance d'un mandaI aux
autorites chargees de la suret" d'Etat et de la repression de la criminalite imposerait a une TC
de communiquer dans les delais prescrits les elements cryptographiques de la cle a un depot
central qui agirait pour Ie compte d'une institution publique, Le ministere du Commerce et
de I'industrie a present.; Ie role du depot central d'une maniere qui merite d'etre citee avec un
certain detail :

A des fins d'acces legal, un depot central pourra etre designe au cree par les autorites
du Royaume-Uni. Le but de In creation de ce depot central sera d'agir en tant que
point de contact unique pour I'interface entre une TC agreee et les autorit"s chargees
de la securite, du renseignement et de I'application de la loi qui ant obtenu un mandat
demandant Facces aux des de cryptage privees d'un client Le dep6t central sera
done charge de proceder it la signification du mandat (physiquement ou par des
moyens electroniques) a la Te et de diffuser la de de cryptage aux autorit"s
pertinentes ("'),
L'integralite du processus d'obtention des cles, a partir du moment OU Ie depot cenlral
signifie Ie mandat jusqu'a la remise des cles, ne doil en principe pas prendre plus d'une
heure ('45),
Le ministere du Commeree et de i'industrie a egalemom en tete un procede grace auquel des
TCs etrangeres partageront des eMs avec les autorites competentes du Royaume-Uni, Le
projet du gouvernement permettra aux TCs ';!rangeres d'etre choisies par des clients installes
au Royaume-Uni, Cependam, Ie ministere a declare «il sera done necessaire, (aux fins de
I'application de la loi) de passer des accords avec d'autres pays pout l'echange declt!s)} ("'),

(''') Id, § 42,
(,")
Id, § n
(''')
Id,§7S,
("'J
10, § 55,
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Ces accords doiven! etre fondes sur la notion de « double legalite n, ce qui signifle qu'une
demande d' acees devra remplir certains criteres uniformes dans chacun des deux pays
eoncernes. Le ministere a fait observer que « en vertu de cette legislation, les cles detenues
par des TCs agreees ne pourront pas ctre revelees aux autodtes cl'autres pays, it mains que
ces demandes soient confonnes it la legislation du Royaume-C ni et qu' elles soiem autorisees
par les autoritcs competentes du Royaume-Cni » ('''). Bnfin, Ie ministere du Commerce et de
l'industrie a declare qu'aucune obtention de des ne serait autorisee en ce qui concerne une
({ fonction d'integrite» (54'). Par celte expression, Ie ministere se retere a ['utilisation de la
cryptographie pour d'autres raisons que Ie codage d'informations, telles que la verification
de signatures numeriques.
Cette proposition ofl:1cielle s'est heurtee it des critiques d'intensite diverse, 11 commencer par
la reaction du Data Protection Registrar, dont les commentaires sont divises en des reponses
it deux questions de principe: 1) la reglementation du cryptage et des services de cryptage; et
2) les circonstances dans lesquelles les autorites chargees de la' sflretl! d'Etat et de la
repression de la criminalite doivent avoir acces aux donnees cryptees (54'). Pour ce qui
concerne la reglementation du cryptage, Ie Registrar « se rejouit des propositions visant a
octroyer un agrement aux Tes dans l'interet du public en general ( ... ) et it se ["licite tout
particulierement de ce que Ie recours aux services qui font l'objet de l'agrement sera
volontaire ("o). En partieulier, Ie Registrar a estime qu'iJ serait bon d'instaurer un regime
reglementaire pour les entites qui lournissent des services de cryptographie a autrui, afin de
garant!r que ces services "'pondent a certaines normes ("').
Quant II I'acces legitime aux donnees cryptees, Ie Data Protection Registrar reconna!t qu'il
existe des circonstances dans lesquelles les auto rites competentes doivent pouvoir acceder
aux infonnations. Iei, Ie Registrar cite Ia Convention europeenne de sauvegarde des droits
de 1'homme qui declare qu'il ne peut y avoir de limites au respect de la vie privee que « pour
autant que ( .. ,) (cela est) est necessaire it la securite nationale, it la sUrete publique, au bienetre economique du pays, it la defense de I'ordre et it la prevention des infractions penales, a
la protection de la sante au de 1a morale, au il la protection des droits et libertes d'autrui»)
("'). Cette restriction au respect de la vie privee est bien entendu potentiellement large et Ie

("41)
("')
(~49)

("")
(m)

(5Si)

Id. L'annexe B au rapport contient plus de details sur les aspects intematlonaux de la proposition du
gouvernement
Id. § 46.
Response of the Data Protection Registrar, Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of
Encryption Services (Mars 1997) < http://www.open.gov.ukldpr/ttpfina1.htm>.
Id. § 3.S(d)..
.
d. § 2,2,2 ("II y a lieu d'instituer un regime !'\!glementalre pour les entites qUI fournlssent des services
de cryptographie a autwl: iI faut fixer des normes relatives a -ces services et en faire assurer Ie
respectil ).
.
Convention europeenne de sauvegarge des droits de I'homme, article It
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Data Protection Registrar souligne que I' acces legitime a des codes de cryptage doit se
derouler confonnement a une procedure judiciaire C"). En outre, l' acces legitime doi! avoir
lieu dans Ie cadre d'un regime general de transparence eu egard aux implications dudit acces
legitime (,54). Camme Ie Registrar I'a declare:
Les utilisateurs de TCs agreees doivent savoir que I'eventualite que quelqu'un accede
legitimement a leurs des sans gu'ils en soient informes impUque gu'ils ne peuvent
pas supposer que Ie cryptage des donnees est absolument sur. Ils doivent ega1ement
savoir que des personnes etabUes a I'exterieur du Royaume-Uni peuvent se voir
accorder Ie droit d'accecter legitimement a ces donnees ("').
Le Data Protection Registrar estime que meme avec des tiers de sequestre Ie degre de risque
couru par la plupart des particuliers et des entreprise, sera acceptable (,;'). Enfin, Ie Registrar
souligne que la capacit" des autorites a crypter des donnees ne dolt pas les mettre en mesure
de se faire passer pour qui que ce soit (m). L'utilisation du cryptage a des fins
d'authentification ne devrait pas etre remise en cause par un regime d'acces a des codes de
cryptage.
Au Royaume-Uni, les milieux professionnels et les groupes de defense des libertes pubJiques
ont souleve des objections sedeuses contre Ie cryptage. Ains;, British Telecommunications
(131') s'oppose au texte du ministere du Commerce et de I'industrie dans Ia mesure au il
accorde une place trop faible aux ({ mecanismes de eonfiance» en comparaison avec son
insistance a (t s'assurer que Ie gouvemement peut intercepter Ies communications cryptees»
('58). BT expnme egalement sa preoccupation quant aux projets concernant des mandats
internationaux destines 11 obtenir la communication de cles. Cette entreprise craint qu'une
telle disposition favonse !'espionnage industrieL ScIon les propres tetmes employes par BT
« il est nCcessaire d'"tre prudent en ce domaine des lars que eela peut permettre a certains
pays de se servir des autorites chargees de la surete d'Etat et de la repression de la criminalite
et de la securite pour obtenir des informations pennettant a leurs entreprises « vedettes)}
d'obtenir un avantage competitif» ("'). Entin, BT souligne que les c1es de cryptage utilisees
ades fins d'authentification et de protection de l'integrite des donnees ne devraient pas etre

()}))

Response of the Data Protection Registrar. Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of
Encryption Services, § }.7 < http://www.open.govlukldpr/ttpfinal.htm>.
("')
Id. § 3.6.
(m)
Id. § 3.6.
(S6) Id. § 3.6.
(m)
Id. at § 3.8.
S
BT's Comments on the Public Consultation Paper I1Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the
)
Provision of Encryption Services" (Mal 1997). <http://www.bt.comlregulatelotherresplhmgothers
lencryptipnldoc.,htm>
(''')
Id. p. 61. <l!ttp:llwww.bl.comiregulaleiotherresplhmgothef1).encryptiolllresponse.h!l)l>
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communiquees aux autorit';, chargees de la sfuet" d'Etat et de ia repression de la criminalit,;
sans l'autorisation de leur proprietaire legitime ('60). La loi doit faire la distinction entre les
procedures d'acces aux cles qui sont utilisees pour proteger la confidentialite er les cles qui
sont utilisees a des fins d' authentification et de verification de l'integrite. des donnees (56').
D'autres porte-parole de l'industtie au Royaume-Uni ont manifest" ieur opposition au projet
de reglementation de la technologic dt! cryptage du gouvemement (,62).
Des organisations de defense des libertes publiques ont egalement souleve des objections
contre la proposition sur ie cryptage emanant du ministere du Commerce et de l'industrie. Le
Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties (UK) Group a proteste contre la figure des tiers de
sequestre en affirmant que cela creerait « un moyen technique de surveillance de masse sans
precedent » ('''). Ce groupe estime egalement que la conservation centralisee des cles
constituerait une cible de vol irresistible pour des intrus » (''').

3.

ANALYSE STRATEGIQUE

Dans la presente section, nous etudierons I'uniform!te des rcponses reglementaires actuelles
et envisagees des quatre Etats membres aux questions relatives it la protection des donnees
dans Ie cadre des services en ligne. Dans un premier temps, nous nous interesserons aux
divergences importantes qui existent entre les legislations des Etats membres pour ce qui
concerne les services en ligne. Cene analyse s'interessera egalement aux resultats potentiels
de la transposition de la Directive 95146/CE sur ces divergences, ainsi qu'aux resultats de la
transposition de la directive sectorielle, Directive 97/661CE (56'). Nous passerons ensuite en
revue les obstacles representes par les divergences subsistantes pour Ie marche interieur. A
cette occasion, nous identifierons Ie type d' obstacles reglementaires auxquels les services en
ligne vont se heurter et nous foumirons des exemples specifiques de services en ligne qui
sont confrontes II des obstacles reglementaires.
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(501)

("')
(51")
(50')

Id. Annexe. <http://www.bt.com/reguiate/otherresp/hmgothers.lencryptlon/annexa.htm;;.,
ld.

Voir. par exempJe. Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd response to the UK Government Consultation Paper,
<http:Hwww.cs,uc\'llc.uk1staff/I.BrownldtIlinteLhtm>~ pour un commentaire interessant de la
proposition britanni,que emanant d'un (':omite de l' American Bar Association, voir ABA Science &.
Technology Intormation Security Committee, Response to the Department of Trade and Industris
"Llcensing of Trust~d Third Parties for the Provision of Encryption Services tl (1997)
<h ttp;11dev.abanet. org/scitechleel isc/ukkeyr I. htm I> .
Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK), First Report on UK Encryption Policy p. 12 (30 rna; 1997)
<http://www.teed' .•elu~llawlpgs/yaman/ukdt;rep.h~n>
ld. p. 19.
Directive 971661CE du Parle",en! Europeen et du Con,eil du 15 decembre 1997 concernant Ie
traltement des donnees caractere,'personnet et lu proJe\;tion de 1a vie privee dans le secteur des
telecommunications, JO L 24 du 30 janvier 1998.[Ci-apre, I. directive RN1Sj.
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Pour finir, nous etudicrons les options politiques en matiere de prOlection des donnees tirees
des technologies d'infrastructure. Dans la discussion, des solutions techniques seront
envisagees pour repondre a de nombreuses questions relatives it la protection des donnees.
La presente section s'achevera par une analyse des options exislant pour une poJitique
regJementiire effective visant Ii proteger les infonnations ii caract,ore personnel dans un
environnement en ligne, Nous terminerons par la conclusion que l'elaboration d'une
infrastructure technique constitue une forme de decision de reglementation, Dans celte
conclusion, nous pn!senterons une serie d'instiuments politiques que les autorites char gees
de la protection des donnees pourraient utiliser pour participer a la prise de decisions
techniques determinantes et nous proposerons une solution de competence conforme aux
dispositions de' la Directive 951461CE sur les codes de conduite, qui pourrait servir a
renforcer la protection des donnees ii I' aide de nOrmes techniques.

3,1. Divergences existant dans la legislation des Etats membres et
Transposition de la Directive 951461CE et de la directive Directive

971661CE
Pour chacune des questions explorees ci-dessus, l'etude a filit apparaltre que les approches
des Etats membres en matiere de tmitemcnt des informations it caraclere personnel dans
]'environnement en ligne presentaient des points de convergence. Neanmoins, des
divergences existent entre ces Etats membres quant it J'intetpretation et a I'application des
principes de base de la protection des donnees. Ces divergences ont une importance
potentielle pour la structure elle developpement des services en ligne.

3.1.1,
Champ d'application materiel de la notion d, «informations
caractere personnel»

a

Bien qu'il existe dans chaque Etat membre des moyens de proteger les informations a
caraetere personnel, directement ou indirectement nominatives, i1 n'est pas rCpondu de
maniere unifonne a la question de savoir quand une information concerne une personne
« identifiable ». Ces differences ereent des ambigu:ites importantes en ce qui eoncerne
J'application des legislations relatives a la protection des donnees it des informations
essentielles auxqueUes on peut acceder en Iigne, telles que les adresses IP. AlIISi, au
Royaume-Uni, on proeede 11 une analyse du contexte qui detennine si oui ou non I'identite
de l'interesse peut etre etablie « a partir de eette donnee et d'autres intonnations en
possession de I'utilisateur des donnees» (50'). La h!gislation franyaise semble avoir une

("")

Data
Protection
Registrar ~
Data
Protection
and
<http;/lwww.open.gov.ukJdpriintemeLhtm;> (1997) (c'est nous qui ,oulignons),
1J7

the

Internet,

approche plus large de la notion de « perSOlme identifiable» ej considere la question de
savoir s'il est au non possible de remonter it partir de Indite information jusqu'a une
personne afin d'offrir une protection au cas ou des rapprochements seraient effectues (""). La
legislation beIge adopte meme une position inverse dans certains cas et elle n'accorde
aucune protection a de nombrcux lypes d' « informations a coractere personnel », qui sont
ailleurs protegees. telles que les donnees rendues pubJiques par la personne concerm,e ('''').
En revanche, ]' Allemagne dispose de regles qui figurent expressement dans 18 nouvelle loi
sur les services d'information et de communication, l'IuKDG. laquelle prevoil clalrement
une exigence d'interactions anonymes et effectuees sous un pseudonyme ('''). Ces regies
allemandes sectorielles appiiquent "galement certains droits en matiere de protection des
donnees, tel que Ie droit d'acces aux donnees conservees, aux informations protegees par un
pseudonyme ("0).
Ces ambiguItes rencontrees dans Ies legislations des Etats membres soulevent une question
importante pour la structure de la circulation des dOlmees. La complexite et ia souplesse de
la circulation des donnees pour les activites en ligne peuvent etre a l'ongine d'une quantite
considerabie de preoccupations et de problemes lies a la protection des donnees. Ces
preoccupations relatives a la protection des donnees pourraient devenir pius faciiement gerer
et minimiser si les informations etaient classe.s en donnees « identifiables» et « non
identifiables». L'accent mis dans les Etats membres sur les interacrions anonymes et
ciIectuees sous un pseudonyme traduit cette approche conceptuelle C"). En pratique, les
etudes de cas font egalement appara1tre que les accords commerciaux pour la collecte de
donnees et les types de donnees qui sont collectees en ligne varient de maniere importante et
peuvent Hre structures de sorte a eviter que des informations identifianles soient fournies it
un grand nombre de participants intermediaires em). Or, peu d'interactions seront vraiment
considen:es comme anonymes si la possibilite technique de remonter jusqu'a la personne
concernee it partir de cette information a pour effet de faire entrer toutes ces informations
dans la categorie juridique des informations concernant une personne ({ identifiable». Dans
cette mesure, "ies principes reJatifs a la protection des donnees s'appliqueront et devront faire
l'objet de developpements Ires detailles inctependamment de la maniere dont les reseaux
configurent la circulation des donnees.

("')

Voir 2.1.2

(56~)

Voir 2.1.1 La donner.: n'est pas couverte par Ja protection legale si 1a finalite de la diffusion publique
est respectee. Si c'est Ie (;.as. les garanties offertes par la loi, telles que l'informatiQn concernant
l'utilisati{m. les droits d'acces et de rectificatiQI1 ne seront pas applicables.

("")
("0)
("')
(m)

Yoir2.L3.
Voir 2.1.3.
Voir 2.1, 1,2.1.2,2.1.3,2.1.4.
Voir Deuxieme Partie.
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La transposition de la Directive 95/46/CE favorisera une plus grande convergence en ce qui
concerne Ie champ d'application des principes relatifs it la protection des donnees. I.:n
considerant de la directive euro¢enne dispose que pour determiner " 5i une personne est
identifiable, il convient de considerer I'ensemble des moyens susceptibles d'etre
raisonnal:ilement mis en reuvre, soit par Ie responsable du traitement, soit par une autre
perSOll!e, pour identifier ladite personne» (m). Co considerant dispose egalement que les
principes de la protection ne dcivent pas s'appliquer aux donnees anonymes ('''). Cependant,
I'appreciation de la directive europeenne basee sur Ie contexte autorise a la fois des
interpretations larges et ,;troites quant a la difficult.! d' identifIer ,,!ellement 1a personne a
laquelle des informations peuvent avoir trait uniquement de maniere indirecte. Les
consequences du traitemont des donnees sont importantes si un Etat membre juge que La
donnee en question est une « infoJ1llJltion a caractere personnel» et un autre non. La
legislation relative a la protection des donnees s'appliquera dans un Etat membre et pas dans
l'autre (m).
11 est probable que la transposition de la Directive 97i66/CE ne permettro pas de resoudre ce
probLeme. Bien que la Directive 97/66/CE ait vocation a s'appliquer dans tout Le secteur des
telecommunications ('''), ses dispositions sont redigees avec une precision qui met l'accent
sur la protection des donnees dans Ie cadre des communications par telephone et par fax. La
Directive 97/66/CE ne donne pas de definition des informations a caract.re personnel et elle
renvoie done Ii la directive cadre pour ce qui concerne Ie domaine des intormations
« identifiables » C"). La Directive 97/66/CE contient toutefois des restrictions particulieres
concernant les « donnees relatives au trafio ooncernant les abonnes et les utiJisateurs » ("') et
les informations relatives a !'identification de la ligne appelante ("'). Or, ees deux
dispositions semblent se referer aux appels te!ephoniques plutot qu'aux communications en
ligne, Ainsi, <i les donnees relatives au trafic» designent les informations traitees en vue
« d'etablir des communieations;; (c'est-ii-dire des appels) e'o) plutot que pour etablir des
« connexions» ou des « transmissions de donnees» ce qui aurail plus de sens dans
I'environnement en ligne. D'autre part, si les donnees relatives au trafic ont trait Ii un abOlme
ou a un utilisateur, des que l' appel est termine les donnees doivent etre effacees ou rendues
anonymes ("'), La Directive 97/66/CE ne comporte aucune indication sur ce qu'il faut

(m)

Directive 951461CE, c.on,idem"! 26.

('N)
("')
("')
(m)

Id.
Voir 3.2.2
Directive 971661CE, article 1, § I.
Voir directive 97/66/CE. article 1, § 2 [qui di.spose que (des dispositions de !a pre,sente directive
prt!cisent et completent In directive 95/46/CE aux fins enoncees au paragraphe L),]
Directive 97166ICE, article 6.
Id" article S.
Jd., article 6, § I.
Id.
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(51,)
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entendre par donnees « concernant" Ull abonne au un utilisateur. En tout etat de cause, la
Directive 97/66/CE ne precise pas les conditions dans lesquelles les informations sont
considerees Comme anonymes.
De la tneme fayon, en vertu de la disposition relative it I'identification de la Jigne appelante,
l'utilisateur appelant doit ponvoir « "liminer (",) I'indication de I'identification de la ligne
appelante, et ce, appel par appel » ('''), Cela 11'a aucun sens dans I'environnement en Iigne:
l'utilisation du web ne se fait pas « appel par appel » et I'elimination par un utilisateur de son
adresse IP empecherait presque toute communication sur Internet ('''), Par consequent, il est
peu probable que la transposition des dispositions de la Directive 97/66/CE perrnette de
resoudre les divergences concernant 1a portee des « informations a caractere personnel»,

3,1.2.

Juridiction territorielle de la notification et du contrale

L'analyse des obligations de la notification illustre bon nombre de traits communs aUK
legislations des Etats membres, mais elle fait egalement apparaitre des differences
significatives en co qui concerne la portee territoriale desdites legislations, Dans chacun des
Etats membres, toute perSOTUle qui effectue Ie traitement d'informations it caractere
personnel doit en ge"erai en informer une autori!e de controle eM), Cependant, certaines
aClivites peuvenl etre soit exemptees de I'obligation de declaration, comme c'est Ie cas en
Belgique, soit soumises it des procedures simptifiees, camme c'est Ie cas en France, Pour les
sites en ligne "trangers, la portee territoriale des legislations des Etats membres n'est pas
identique< En vertu de Ia legislation brilfllmique. actuelle, Ie lieu ou les d()nn~es sont
conservees determinera probablement l'applicabilite du Data Protection A>ct ('''), Ainsi, il est
peu probable que les sites web etrangers soient soumis a I'obligation de se declarer au
Royaume.Uni, En revanche, la France et la Belgique semblent se tenir pretes it considerer
que les sites web etrangers qui collectent des informations dans leurs pays respectifs sont
soumis ii la competence de leurs legislations respectives relatives II la protection des donnees
("')< En AlJemagne, la question de savoir si les sites web etrangers doivent se faire declarer
aupres de I'autorite de controle n'est pas encore resolue (,"j.

('In)
(5&1)

(''')
('"')
(50,)
(m)

[d.< article 8, § 1,
Dans I'envirormement en lign~. I'anonymat poursuivi par Ie b!ocage eLl peut eire realise en utilisant
un anonymiseur. Cependant, un 8nonymiseur transmet egalement tine adresse IP. rnais ee n'est pas
celie de l'utiHsateur final.
Voir 2,2,1,2,2,2,2.1.3,2,2.4,
Data Protection Act 1984, § ,39 (qui exclu! I'application de I' Act aux donnees detenue, II I'exterieur
du. Royaume·Vnl),
Voir 2,2.1, 2,2<2,
Voir BDSa, article 32; luKOO, article)(,
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Les formalites de la notification aupres des autoritc, nationales n!velent egalement bon
nombre de differences importantes. En premier lieu, les exigences concernant Ie contenu de
la notification a effectuer nupres des autorites nationalcs chargees de la protection des
donnees varient quelque peu selon les Etats membres. Ainsi, la France exige la declaration
de I'origin'; de toute donnee conservee (588), Ia Belgique ne Ie fait pas ("') et Ie Royaume-Uni
demande une description libre des services en ligne (""). En second lieu, les modalites de la
declaration ne sont pas les memes. En Belgique et au Royaume-Uni, les notifications par la
voie electronique sont autorisees, ce n'est Ie cas ni en France ni en Allemagne. Enfnt, les
tarifs de la notification illustrent les disparites existant entre les Etats membres. Ainsi, en
Belgique Ie tarif varie en fonetion du nombre de personnes concernees par Ie traitement et de
la modalite de l'enregistrement, tandis qu'au Royaume-Uni s'applique un tarif unique. Ces
di vergences peuvem avoir une repercussion sur la maniere dont les socictes organisent
l'architecture de leurs activites de teseau.
La Directive 95/46/CE vise II harmoniser I'application territoriale des legislations relatives Ii
la protection des donnees des differents Etats membres (m). En vertu des regles de la
directive europeenne concernant Ie choix de la loi applicable, chaque Eta! membre applique
sa legislation nationale lorsque:
a) Ie traiteruent est effectue dans Ie cadre des activites d'un etablissement du
responsable du traitement sur Ie territoire de l'Etat membre ( ... );
b) Ie responsable du traitement n'est pas etabli sur Ie territoire de l'Etat membre mais
en un lieu ou sa ioi nationale s'applique en vertu du droit international public;
c) Ie responsable du traitement n' est pas etabli sur Ie terri loire de la Communaute et
recourt, a des fins de traitement de. donnees a caractere personnel,"i; des moyens,
automatises ou non, situes sur Ie territoire dudit Etat membre, sauf si ces moyens ne
sont utilises qu'i! des fins de transit sur Ie territoire de la Communaute (592).
Pour Ie traitement de donnees au sein 'de l'Union europeenne, la Directive 95/46/CE
s'efforce d'aboutir it un choix exclusif en ce qui concerne la legislation applicable afin
d'eviter Ie chevauehement des regles de droit et de limiter la portee territoriale des
legislations relatives a la protection des donnees des Etats membres. Aux terme.s du
eonsiderant de la direetive pertinent II cet egard, il est dit: (' il est opportun de sQumettre les

("'J
("')

('''')
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Lui n' 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, article 19.
Lui du 8 decembre 1992, article 3.
Data Protection Registr.ar~ Data Protection and the lnternet: Guidance on Registration (1997),
<http://www,open,gov,uk/dpr/intemethtm>.
La directive 97/66/CE Ile c,onti,ent aucune <lisposition destinee a clarifier ou a completer l'impact de in
directive -generaje sur-les d_ivergencesterrltoJtales.
Directive 95/46/CB, article 4, 91.
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traitemems de donnees effectues par toute persollue operant SOliS l' autorite du respollsable du
traitement etabli dans Ull Etat membre a l'application de 1a legislation de eel Etat» (''').
Cependant, les considerants avertissent egalement que" dans les limites de cette marge de
man",uvre et conformement au droit communautaire, des disparites pourront se produire
dans la mise en ",Uvre de la directive» C"'). Dans l'environnement en ligne, la mise en
reuvre de cette disposition concernant Ie choix de la loi applicable ne sera certainement pas
simple ("').

!

En meme temps, en ce qui concerne Ie traitement de donnees a I'exterieur de l'Union
europeenne, la disposition de la Directive 95146!CE concernant Ie choix de la loi applicable
semble egalement approuver la portee plus large des legislations franyaise et beIge. On peut
supposer que toute information d'origine europeenne qui est transmise II \'exterieur de
I')jnion sera, en vertu de la derniere alinea de la disposition concernant Ie choix de la loi
applicable, soumise au droit materiel de l'Etat membre d'origine; Ie fait pour les
responsables du traitement de recourir « 11 des moyons» situes sur Ie territoire d'un Etat
membre pour traiter des informations, tels que tout type de materiel de transmission de
l'information, attribue competence a la legislation de cet Etat membre pour ce qui concerne
lesdites donnees. Toutefois, une ambigune des traductions ofticielles de la directive
europeenne a fait naitre une possibilite de divergence importante. Dans Ie texte franl'ms la
legislation de l'Etat membre s'applique au traitemcnt effectue dans des pays tiers Sl des
<i moyens » situes sur Ie territoire de [,Etat membre sont utilises (,"). Dans Ie texte anglais, la
meme disposition utilise ['expression «use of equipment» situe sur Ie territoire de j'Etat
membre (m). II n'est pas certain que «moyens» et « use of equipment); soient des termes
parfaitementequivalents ..
La transposition de la Directive 95!46!CE favorisera egalement I'existence d'une certaine
convergence en ce qui conceme Ie contenu des declarations aux autorites de controle. La
directive europeenne indique une serie de mentions qui constitue les informations minimales

e'jJ)

ld,. considerant 18.

("')

Id., co~siderant 9,
Voir ci~dessQus ],2.1, Ainsi\ en vertl,! de la disposition de Ja Directive 95146/CE relative au choix de la
legislation applicable, 11 est probable que de nombreux responsablcs du traHernent seronl "'etablis"
dans plus d 'un ~rat membre. Si un she we,b instaHe des cook.ies sur i' ordinateur d'un utHisateur, Ie site
web sera trcs vraisemblablement repute avoir un .Ietablissement" in oj'.! se trouve chaque utllisat~UL
Les considerants preci.sent que «I'etabHssement sur Ie territoire d'un Etat membre suppose t'exercice
effectif et reel d'une activite au moyen d)une instaHafion stable", Directive 95/46/CE, considernnt 19.
Les cookies utilisent I'ordinateor de j'utHisateur au moyen d)une Installation stable sur Ie lieu OU se
trouve I'utillsateur 'et constituent une activite rocUe et effectIve, De ill s;ortc, un serveur web situe dans
un Etat membre qui installe et recupere des cookies sur un pc situe dans un autre Etat membre doit
IStre considere com me disposant d'un "'etablissernentl ' dans te deuxieme Stat membre.
Directive 951461CE, article 4, § 1, e).
Id.

(S'i5)
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que doivent contenir les notifications adressees aux auto rites de contrOie ("&) et elle prevoit
certaines derogations au simplifications de la notification dans des circonstances
particulieres (''''). Les regies sectorielles qui figurent dans la Directive 971661CE ne preValent
pas de convergence supplementaire en ce qui conceme la notification du traitement dans Ie
• cadre de' services de telecommunications. Cette directive sectorieHe ne traite pas de la
question des declarations ("Oll), Or, pour les services en Iigne, les obligations supph,mentaires
en matiere de declaration imposees par un Etat membre, telles que la notification de la duree
de conservation des donnees et les moyens par lesquels les interesses sont informes du
trahement (60'), introduisent une charge potentiellement importante alors que des services en
ligne interactifs et sujets it des changements rapides sont fournis dans toute l'Union
europeenne. Une charge similaire existe lorsqu'un Etat membre decide de simplifier au de
dispenser de notification un traitement partieulier e\ qu'un autre Etat membre ne Ie fait pas
(602). Dans les deux cas, I'utilisateur des informations acaractere persOlmel sera soumis it des
exigences administratives differentes.
La Directive 95/46/CE garde Ie silence sur bon nombre de ces points de divergence
essentiels. Ainsi, la directive europeenne ne contient aucune disposition sur la modalit" de la
notification (presentation sur papier ou par la voie electronique) (""). C'est egalement Ie cas
de la Directive 97/66/CE sur ce point (""'). Pour les services en ligne operant exelusivement
sur Internet, Ie mode de notification aux autorites de controle, ct, notamment. Ie mode
d' actualisation des notifications, comporte de nombreuses implications pour les operations
internes, lesquelles sont susceptibles d' avoir un impact sur les taux de respect de cette
obligation par les services en ligne. En pratique, il semble que les autorites nationales
.envisagent d'adopter la solution de la notification electronique, qui est deja aecepte en
Belgique ej au Royaume-Uni. Or, jusqu'il. ce que I'ensemble des Etats membres ait autorise
les notifications electroniques, la divergence entre la presentation de la notification sur
papler ou par la voie electronique aura une incidence negative sur les services en ligne.
Enfin, la Directive 95/46/CE ne favorise pas la convergence en ce qui concerne la question
du tarif de la notification. Ancun grille de wifs n' appara1t dans la directive,
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ld" article 19, § 1.
Directive 95/46/CE, article 18, § 2.
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Voir directive 97166/CE.
Ces exigences quant au contenu existent par exemple dans la legislation beIge, mals pas dans In
directive europeenne-, Comparer 101 du 8 decembre 1992, article 17. § 3 et directive 9SJ4"6/CE, article
19, § I.
Par ex:empl~ la France a etabli une liste de declarations simplifiees slmilatre mnis non identique aux
normeS adoptees en Belgique.
Voir directive 95/461CE, article 18. § 1.
Voir dlrc,ctive 97/66/CE, La directive RNIS fie contiem nucune reference a In decJarotion des services
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3.1.3.

Transparence

Les Etats membres ont tous commence a aborder l'interpretation de regles nationales en
matiere de transparence des services en iigne, Dans cette etape prealable, de nombreuses
divergences d' opinions sont apparues et semblent avoir une importance particuliere pour les
services en ligne.
Bien que chaque Etat rnembre exige que les personnes concernees soient inform"es, la portee
de I' 0 bligation, sa forme et son contenu ne sont pas les memes. Quant it la portee de
l' obligation, une difference importante existe relativement a In responsabilite des collecteurs
de donnees, Ainsi, en France, il n'y a neu de pre ceder it une information que si la donm;e est
collectee directement nupres d'une personne ('.'). En Belgique, I'information doit se
produire a la fois en cas de collecte directe et indirecte de donnees it caractere personnel (""),
L' Allemagne ne distingue pas entre la collecte directe et indirecte de donnees; l'IuKDG
contient de rigoureuses dispositions relatives a !'information it foumir it I. personne
concemee, Ces differences enlre les legislations des Etats membres ont des repercussions
profondes sur les obligations des fournisseurs de services en ligne puisque, dans
I'environnement en ligne, les donnees a caractere personnel peuvent facilement eire
collectees de maniere indirecte plutot que directe. Par exemple, les donnees resultant des
traces des connexions collectees par un site web sur !'utilisation qu'un v:siteur fait dudi! site
sont en fait obtenues aupres du foumisseur de service Internet du visiteur et nOn directement
aupr!:s du visiteur du site.
Le mode d'information pose egalement bon nombre de questions. Bien que Ie contenu de
base de I'information exigee soit similaire dans les differents Etats membres, de nombreuses
differences apparaissent qui sont d'un grand interet pour les services en ligne. Par exemple,
I'information foumie conformement it la loi franyaise doit comporter, parmi ses mentions,
des renseignements relatifs Ii l'importance des donnees collectees, a savoir que I'interesse
doH etre informe du caractere obligatoire au faeultatif de la collecte d'une donnee
determinee et de l'identite de tout destinataire des donnees Ii caractere personnel collectees
("'7), En Belgique, des renseignements quelque peu differents doivent figurer dans
l'information fournie aux interesses, it savoir qu'elle doit comporter une mention relative a la
fillalite et it I'existenee du registre public des declarations de traitements (""), En Allemagne,
il est egalernent expressement obligatoire d'informer les interesses de I'utilis.ation de
« cooldes)) pendant les sessions Internet, de tout reacheminement de donnees a caractere

("")
("")
("")
("")

Voir2.3,2,
Voir 2,3.1.
Voir 2.3.2.
Voir 2.3.1.
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personnel et de l'existence de possibUites d'interactions anonymes (609). Dans
I' envirollnement en Ugne sujet a des changements rapides, il se peut que ceux qui collectent
des donnees Ii caractere personnel soient obliges de modifier frequemment les
renseignements contenus dans I'information fourllie sur ces points precis.
Pour ce qui concerne Ie consentement de l'interesse et Ie droit de s'opposer au traitement des
donnees, Ie Royaume-Uni envisage Ie consentement dans Ie cadre de la notion de « loyaute »
(b>U). Sur ce point, Ie Data Protection Registrar a plaide en faveur d'une analyse contextuelle
et d'un consentement expres dans cenains cas particuliers ('"). Alars que l'exercice d'une
option de refus (opt-out) a plutot les faveurs du droit au Royaume-Uni, il semble probable
que Ie Data Protection Registrar tende Ii exiger un consentement expres pour les services en
ligne ("'). L'Allemagne a pousse cette idee 'un peu plus loin et a mis au point des regles
precises sur Ie consentement en ce qui concem. les « cookies» et elle a egalement impose
un consent.ment expres ferme dans l'environnement en ligne (m). De son COle, la France a
auss; insiste sur d'options de refus concernant un certain nombre des services Internet (en
particulier, pour les annuaires et les affichages de messages) ("'). Cependant, en vertu de la
loi fran,aise, Ie traitement de donnees sensibles est soumis it I'obtention d'un consentement
prealable donne par ecrit ('"). En Allemagne, en revanche, il est expressement permis de
donner son consentement en ligne ('''). En raison de ces disparites, des exigences differentes
en matiere de consentement sont susceptibles de s'appliquer it un meme service en ligne dans
les divers Etats membres.
Quant a I'exerc;ce par les personnes concern':es de leur droit d'acces aUX informations il
caractere personnel, la forme de J'acees et sa portee presentent des differences notables dans
les divers Etats membres. Ainsi, en Allemagne, la 10i auto rise que les interesses puissont
acceder par la voie electronique aux informations a caract"re personnel les concernant. En
revanche, la Belgique ne semble pas s'etre ,engagee de maniere significative dans la vuie
permettant aux interesses d'acceder electroniquement aux donnees i\ caractere personnelles
concernant. De meme, la portee du droit d'acces peut fort blen evoluer avec des ditTerences
significatives scion les Etat membres. Enfin, il se peut qu'il existe au Royaume-Uni une
anlbigu'ite en ce qui concerne la pleine portee de l' obligation incombant au responsable du
traitement de fournir l'acc"s aux informations provenant du serveur web dudit responsable
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du traitement. Cette obligation peut egalement exister mihne si I'information n'est plus
presente sur ledit serveur (,n).
En outre, les tatifs que les interesses doivent payer pour acceder aux donnees ii caractere
personnelles concernant varien! En Allemagne, en vertu de la recente loi sur les t';leservices
I'accos aux informations en ligne doit etre propose gratuitement ("'). Dans les autres Etats
membres, il faut payer: 100 BEF (2, 5 ",cus) en Belgique et 10 livres sterling (15 ecus) au
Royaume-Uni. Cette difference peut avoir des repercussions sur la fa.yon dom un participant
aux services en ligne con.yoit l'architecture du systeme.
La transposition de la Directive 9S1461CE n'aura qu'un effet incomplet sur certaines de ces
divergences. Aux termes de la directive europeenne, certains renseignements doivent etre
foumis a la personne concernee, que les donnees aient ote collectees directement aupres de
cette personne ou indirectement ('''). Cette exigence d 'harmonisation resout une question
relative a la portee de l'obligation: les personnes cotlectant·des donnees a caractere personnel
. doiveIlt informer l'interesse que la collecte sait realisee directement aupres de lui au
indirectement. Toutefois, la directive europeenne II'enum"re que Ie cantenu minimal des
renseignements dont les Etat membres daivent exiger la presence dans l'information fournie
aux interessea (6"). Bien que ce minimum de renseignements semble combiner differentes
obligations existant dans les legislations nationales, la legislation de PEtat membre peut
imposer des elements suppl<,mentaires, camme l'exigence de la mention de I'existence du
registre public des declarations prevue par 1a loi beige.
Quant aux divergences cO.ncemant Ie consentement et l'opposition, Ia Directive 951461CE
contient certaines obligations qui ont trait a ces questions (621). Cepcndant, la directive ne
fournit aueun cntere ou aueune norme permettant de distinguer Ie consentement du
consentement implicite par une option de refus. Une seule exception sur ce. point concerne ie
droit de s'opposer a i'utilisation des infonnations it caractere persormei ii des fins de
prospection ("'). En effe!, cet!e disposition concernant la prospection permet au moins
d' exercer une option de refus.
La Directive 95/46/CE garde egalement Ie silence sur la question du consentemenl en ligne
et de I' opposition en ligne au traitement d'informations caractere personneL Bien que
l'environnement en Iigne augmente la facmt" et I'effioadt" des possibilites de
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Yair UK Data Protection Guidance for Direct Marketers, p. 37 (1995).
IuKDG. article 2, §7.
DirecIive 951461CE, articles 10 el 11.
Directive 951461CE, articles 10 etl1.
Directive 951461Cll, article 7 (consantamen'! at article 14 (opposition).
Directiva 951461CE, artIcle 14, b).
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consentements expres, Ie fait que les Etats membres puissent toujours avoir des regles
differentes sur la possibilite de donner son consentement et de manifester son opposition en
Iigne aura probablement un impact reel sur Ie coilt des services en ligne et sur la gestion de
ces services. Alors que la Directive 97!66!CE exige que I'interesse ait donne son
consentement au traitement de donnees relatives au trafic d'appels telephoniques ("3) et qu'il
dispose du droit de ne pas figurer dans un annuaire d'abonnes accessible en ligne ("'), elle
est tout aussi silencieuse que la Directive 95/46!CE sur la question des moyens permettant de
recueillir Ie consentement de l'interesse ou d'exercer Ie droit d'opposition.

Amesure que Ia Directive 95/46/CE sera transposee dans les Etats membres, il se peut qu'on
decouvre que Ies nouvelles lois de ces Etats ne resolvent pas toutes les questions qui se
posen! quant au mode d'exercice et 11 la portee des droits d'acces, La directive europeenne
dispose simplement que les Etats membres doivenl garantir it toute personne concemee un
droit d'acces contre 1e responsable du traitement ("'). La directive europeerme n'aborde pas
la question de savoir si un acees en ligne doit eire au pas autorise et elle ne fournit pas nOll
plus d'indications sur I'obligation jnridique du responsable dn traitement initial quant au
droit d'acces susceptible d'etre exerce contre des responsables d'un t,aitement ulterieur. La
meme observation vaut pour la Directive 97/66/CE. Les regles sectoriellcs ne disent rien sur
l'acces enligne et sur ['acees it travers des intermediaires it des infonnations trait';es par des
tiers.
Entin, la Directive 95/46/CE garde Ie silence snr la question du montant de la redevance
susceptible de devoir eIre payee par !'interesse pour acceder ,Ul( donnees Ie concernant. Bien
que Ie texte de la directive europeenne dispose que « les Etats membres garantissent It toute
personne coneernee Ie droit d'obtenir du responsable du traitement: c. ..) sans contrainte, It
des intervalles raisonnables et sans delais ou frais excessifs ( ... ») ('''), aucune indication
n' est fournie sur ce qni pourrait constitner des {( frais excessifs» (,,'). La transposition de la
directive europeenne n'aborde done pas celte question qui peut affeeter 1a mauiere dont la
circulation des donnees est strncturee et dont les informations peuvent etre conservees par les
services en tigne. De la meme fa90n, la Directive 97/66/CE ne 'comporte absolument aucune
indication sur le prix a payer par les personnes concernee, pour avoir acces aux donnees.
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3.1.4.
Profils de comportement de I'utilisateur et donnees
sensibles

!
1

I

I
I
f

Les approches nationales de la question de la protection des donnees telles qu' elles existent
deja et tclles qu'elles seront probablement appliquees aux services en ligne soulevent un
certain nombre de questions vitales pour Ie commerce electronique, Comme on l'a Vu dans
les etudes de cas (""), l'etablissement d'un prom de l'utilisateur joue un role economique
fondamental dans la canjoncture des activites en ligne. Or, les legislations relatives 11 la
protection des donnees sont incertaines face aux pratiques d' etablissement de protils de
comportement des utilisateurs des services en ligne. En France et en Belgique,
I'etablissement de profils de comportement de I'utilisateur est une question de finalite. Les
services en ligne doivent indiquer claircment I'existence d'activites impliquant Ja mise en
",uvre de Ja methode des profils. Au Royaume-Uni, I'etablissement de profils de
comportement de I'utilisateur est une question de loyaut", et Ie Data Protection Registrar n'.
pas enCore tranche la question de l'application du principe de Joyaute aux fournisseurs de
service et aux sites web. En revanche, en Allemagne, l' etablissement de profils de
comportement de I'utilisateur est soumis 11 des regles partieuJieres qui n' autorisem
l'etablissement de profils qu'it la condition que des pseudonymes soient utilises. Ces
exigences rencontrees dans les legislations actuelles des ftats membres soulevent des
questions ",rieuses en ce qui concerne la possibilite d'utiliser des moteurs de recherche et
des agents intelligents (""). Par exempJe, une recherche destinee a trouver des sites web et
les aHichages de messages creeront f",quemment un profil des interesses grace it Ia collecte
indirecte d'informations a caractere personnel. L'utilisateur du moteur de recherche agit
comme Ie responsable du traitement des donnees et sera tenu de se confanner a toutes les
dispositions applicablcs, des legislations relatives Ii la protection des dOllllees concernant
l'infonnation fournie it J'interesse et Ie consentement, bien qu'il soit possibJe que Je
chercheur ne decouvre pilS I'identite de la personne objet de l'etablissement du profil avant
que ledit profil soit elabore.
En outre, alors que les ftats membres exigent taus que seules les donnees pertinentes pour
les utilisations envisagees soient collectees, leurs exigences en co qui concerne cette
minimisation des donnees collectees sont quelque peu differentes. La France parvient a une
minimisation des donnees collectees par les limitations de finalite, Le Royaume-Uni a
recemment preconise des nonnes techniques pour parvenir a une minimisation de la collecte
des donnees. Pour sa part. I' Allemagne a recemment adopie ime disposition legale expresse
qui impose de maniere stricte une minimisation de la collecte des donnees. Avec ces points
de depart differents, l'interpretation du caractere pertinent de l'infonnation peut eire
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colhlboratil).
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differente pour un meme foumisseur de service en ligne dans l' ensemble des Etats membres:
Etat membre peut estimer qU'une information particuliere est pertinente pour la finalite
envisagee, tandis qu'un autre sera d'un avis contra;re.

Un

Une autr~ question importante liee a la methode des profils de comportement de l'utilisateur
se pose dans Ie cadre des interactions anonymes. En Allemagne, l'luKDG exige
expressement que les interactions en ligne soient anonymes dans la plus grande mesure
possible ('''). Cette nouvelle loi allemande applique egalement des regles de protection des
donnees particuJieres a des informations carnouflees par un pseudonyme (63'). Les autres
Etats membres semblent egalement encourager l'utilisation d'informations non identifiables.
Toutefois. a l'exterieur du territoire allemand, les informations veritablement anonymes
n'entreront probablement pas dans Ie champ d'application de la loi relative it la protection
des donnees ("'). De plus, en Belgique et en France, la large portee de la definition des
informations « identifiables » necessitera de plus en plus des decisions difficiles concernant
l'applicabilite de la legislation relative 11 1. protection des donnees. Le Royaume-Uni sera
egalement confront.; a des decisions interpretatives concernant les donnees disponibles en
ligne pour determiner si ces donnees sont « personnellement identifiables »; il semble
toutefois que Ie Royaume-Uni interprete cette expression de maniere plus etroite que la
Belgique et la France. Par consequent, il est probable que les differents Etats membres
auront des normes differentes en ce qui concerne l'anonymisation de I'information.
Quant au traitement et it I' etablissement de profils de comportement de I'utilisateur a partir
de donnees sensibles effectues par les services en ligne, les Etals membres ont aborde de
maniere un peu differente la forme que doit revetir Ie consentement it cet effet. L' Allemagne
a expressement auto rise Ie consentement electronique pourvu que certaines conditions
destinees it preserver la nature eclairee et volontaire dudit consentement solent rempties. Le
Royaume-Uni envisage l'adoption d'nn futur decret sur Ie consentement electronique. En
revanche, la France a une approche rigoureuse favorable au consentement par ecrit, tandis
que la Belgique ne semble pas avoir aborde cetle question.
La transposition de la Directive 951461CE ainsi que de la Directive 971661CE apportera un
peu plus de certitude quant a l'utilisation de la methode des profits et au traitement des
donnees sensibles dans :un environnement en tigne. La Directive 95146/CE contient des
dispositions specifiques sur la prospection C'''), mais elle ne couvre pas expressement
l' etablissement de profils de comportement de l'utilisateur au sens au la 10i allemande
prevoit expressement des £ogles concernant Ie traitement. De meme, la Directive 951461CE
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ne se prononce pas nettement sur les appreciations qui devront micessairement etre faites sur
la portee des informations" identifiables» ('''). Enfin, comme prec6demment indique, la
Directive 951461CE, ne tranche pas la question de la forme que dolt prendre Ie consentement
donne par les interesses a I'etablissement de profils de comportement ou au traitement de
donnees sensibles ("'). En revanche, la Directive 971661CE subordonne expressement
l'util"isation a des fins de commercialisation, des donnees de facturation concernant les
abonnes au consentement expres de I' abonne ("") et elle exige que les abonnes soient en
mesure d'indiquer dans les annuaires que les donnees les concernant ne peuvent pas etre
utili sees a des fins de prospection directe ("'). Pour les services en ligne, la restriction
concernant les donnees de facturation aura un effet d'harmonisation, mais eUe ne
s'appliquera pas II I'ensemble des infonnations resultant des traces des connexions, et la
disposition relative aux annuaires de la Directive 951461CE permettra d'harmonlser
I' elaboration des differents annualres dans les Etats membres.

3.1.5.

Securite

Corome on I'a vn precedemment, la reussite des initiatives en manere de commerce
electronique depend de la secmit': des informations ("'). Les legislations relatives a la
protection des donnees des BtalS membres et leurs interpretations sont en general favorables
Ii I'utilisation du cryptage pour proteger les informations a caraetere personnel. Cependant, il
existe de nombreuses r"gles juridiques qui s'opposent aux techniques qui pourraicnt etre
utillsees pour secunser les informations sur Internet. Dans les Etats membres, la question des
tiers de sequestre demeure ouvertc et sensible, La France, bien qu'ayant eu l'intention de
liberaliser ses regles de cryptologie en 1996, exigera que les tierces parties de contiance
obtiennent I'agrement du gouvernement (""). Les autontes fran~ajses n'ont toujours pas pris
de decret d'application fixant les criteres de I'agrement. En Allemagne, la cryptologie ne fait
I'objet d'aucune restriction, moos i! existe un systeme d'agn:ment volontaire pour les tierces
parties de confiance, ces entiU!s agreees seront tenues de reveler les cles de cryptage aux
auto rites chargees de la suret': d'Etat et de la repression de la criminalite en possession d'un
mandat (640). La Belgique et Ie Royaume-Uni envisagent tous deux des systemes de tiers de
sequestre. Au meme moment, en Belgique et en Allemagne, la Jegislation exige que les
operateurs de reseaux de telecommunications disposent de systemes « d'ecoutes prets il
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utiliser» pour l' acces des autorite, chargees de 1a suret" d'Etat et de Ia repression de 1a
criminalite (0. ').
La transposition de la Directive 95i46iCE et de la Directive 97166iCE ne n'glera
certainemenl pas Ie debat qui porte sur la cryptographie. La Directive 95146!CE, comme les
legislations des Elats membres, contient une disposition aux tennes de laquelle il est exige
que les Etats membres prevoient que Ie responsable du traitement " doit meltre en ceuvre les
mesures techniques et d'organisation appropriees pour proteger les donnees a caractere
personnel (... ) notamment lorsque Ie traitement comporte des transmissions de donnees dans
un reseau ( ... ) compte tenu de l'etat de l'art et des couts lies it leur mise en ceuvre» (,'''). La
Directive 97166/CE exige pareillement que:
Le prestataire d'un service de telecommunications accessible au public do;t prendre
les mesures d'ordre technique et organisationnel appropriees afin de garantir la
securit. de ses services ( ... ). Compte tenu des possibilites techniques les plus
recentes et du coOt de leur mise en ceuvre, ces mesures garantissent un degre de
securile adapte au risque existant (M').

I

Cependant, tant la Directive 95/46/CE que la Directive 97/66/CE contiennent des
derogations relatives au traitement de donnees it caractere personnel concernant la s"curit.!
publique et les « activites de l'Etal dans des domaines relevant du droit penal» ('''). Des lors
que la question centrale du debat sur la cryptographie concerne I'acees des autorit"s chargees
de la sfirete d'Etat et de la repression de la criminalit!! aux infonnations crypt"es,les
exigences imposees par la Directive 95/46/CE en ce qui concerne la s<lcudt", seront Iimitees
par Ia competence juridique de La Communaute pour agir dans des domaines touchant Ii Ia
sfirete de l'Etat et a l'application de la loi. Cette limitation vaut egalement pour la Directive
97/66/CE.

3.2. Obstacles au marche interieur

I

i
i

l

Les divergences qui existent entre les ttats membres en matiere de protection des donnees e(
que Ia transposition de la Directive 95/46!CE et de la Directive 97!66/CE ne resoudra
probablement pas pour l'environnement en ligne mettent en Inmiere une serie d'obstacles
importants pour Ie march" interieur europeen. Le choix de la legislation applicable souleve
en lui-meme bon nombre de questions pour Ie deveioppement des services en Iigne. T<mdis
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que la plupart des divergences semblenl eIre due Ii la « marge de manreuvre» que la
Directive 95/46/CE laisse aux Elats membres, les differences, legeres en apparence, existant
en matiere de protection des informations a caractere personnel peuvent avoir des
consequences importantes ou creer de fortes pressions sur les promoteurs de services en
ligne ainsi que sur les utilisateurs de ces services.

3.2.1.

Loi applicable

L'importance des divergences dans Ie traitement des informations Ii caractere personnel dans
Ie cadre des services en ligne sera influencee par Ie choix de la l<!gislation applicable. Si
plusieurs legislations relatives a la protection des donnees S'appliquent It la meme activite de
service en ligne, toute divergence entre ces 16gislations entrainera un conflit tenant aux droits
et obligations applicables en matiere de protection d~s donnees. Des activites autorisees sur
un territoire, telles que Ie traitement de fichiers d'audit des utilisateurs sans declaration,
peuvent etre interdites sur un autre. Dans un effort pour eviler ces obstacles, la Directive
951461CE lente d'exclure un chevauchement de la competence des Etats membres sur la
question de la protection des donnees. La Directive 95/46/CE contien! une disposition
consacree au choix de la i<!gislation applicable qui designe la legislation de l'Etat membre ou
est etabli Ie responsable du trailement ('''). La Directive 95146/CE dispose egalement que
« les Elats membres ne peuvent restreindre ni interdire la libre circulation des donnees Ii
caracti:re personnel entre Etats membres pour des raisons relatives Ii la protection assuree en
vertu du paragraphe I [ protection des libertes et droits fondamentaux des personnes
physiques, notamment de leur vie privee, Ii l'egard du traitement des donnees it caractere
personnel 1» ("'). La Cour de justice des Communautes europeennes a reconnu que Ie
contrl.lle du pays d' origine pOllvait avoir un caractere exclusif ("').
Neanmoins, les considerants de la directive reconnaissent expressement que « les Etats
membres disposeront d'une marge de manreuvre ( ... ) ret] dans les limites de cette marge de
manreuvre et eonformement au droit communautaire, des disparites pourront se produire
dans la mise en reuvre de la directive et que eela pourra avoir des incidences sur la
circulation des donnees tant Ii I'interieur d'un Elat membre que dans la Comrnunaute » (''').
En vertu de la disposition relative au choix de la legislation applicable contenue dans la
Directive 95/46/CE, Ie responsable du traitemen! est soumis Ii la legislation de chaque Elat
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membre au il est" etabli» (""). Comme il est explique dans les considerants, I'application
de la legislation d'un Etat membre suppose done" l'exereico effeetif et reel d'one activit" au
moyen d'une installation stable» ("'). Cette definition de « I'etablissement» permet de
penser que la collecte systematique d'informations sur Ie territoire d'un Etat membre au
moyen de serveurs ou d'autre materiel informatique situes sur Ie territoire dudit Etat membre
peut etre traitee comme correspondant a une situation d' « etablissement ». Aimi,
I'utilisation de "cookies" pourrait creer un etablissement Iii au est situe I'utilisateur puisque
l'interaction avec Ie disque dur de l'utilisateur est une installation stable situee a l'endroit ou
se trouve I'utilisateur, qui constitue, pour Ie responsable du traitement qui place les
"cookies," l'exercice effectif et reel d'une activite. En effet, on peut gent!ralement considerer
que les responsables du traitement qui operent dans l'environnement en ligne sont etablis
dans plusieurs Etats membrcs pour la meme activite en ligne. II s'ensuit que plusieurs
legislations sur la protection des donnees peuvent eire applicables it divers aspects d'un
service en tigue. La notification de I'installation de cookies doit ainsi respecter les exigences
existant it eet egard it I' endroit ou est situe I' utilisateur, tandis que Ie traitement mis en reuvre
par Ie serveur doit etre conforme aux exigences de la legislation de I'endroit OU Ie serveur est
situe.
La regle du choix uniforme de la h!gislation applicable imposee par la Directive 95146/CE
n'elimine cependant pas tous los chevauchements de competence territoriale possibles. En
vertu de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautes europeennes ("I), Ie
controle national de la protection des donnees ne s'oppose pas ce que Ie traitement des
infonnations caractere personnel fasse l'objet d'une reglementation lndependante ayant
d'autres finalites, telles que la protection des consommateurs ("'). Ainsi, en Allemagne, les
dispositions fondamentales relatives ala protection des donnees dans Ie cadre des services en
Iigne proviennent de la loi relative II la protection des donnees dans Ie cadre des tel<'services.
En tant que telles, ces dispositions pourraiem s'appliquer independamment des regles sur Ie
choix de 13 legislation applicable contenues dans la DireL'tive 951461CE.

a

a

Par ailleurs, la Directive 951461CE ne remplace pas les dispositions du droit penal (m). Dans
la mesure oilles Etals membres inscrivent dans leur droit penalles infractions aux regie" sur
la protection des donnees, ledit droit penal s'appliquera aux aetes comm;s sur Ie territoire de
l'Etat membre independamment des regles de la Directive 951461CE sur Ie choix de la
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Cel. ressort claireroellt des considerants. Voir directive 9S/46iCE, consideralll 71.
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legislation applicable, Ainsi, Ie code penal fran,ais considere comme un delit Ie ({ Ie fait de
collecter des donnees par un moyen frauduleux, deloyal au illicite, au de proceder it un
traitement d'informations nominatives concernant une personne physique malgre I'opposition
de cette personne, lorsque cette opposition est fondee sur des raisons legitimes» ("'), Le
droit penal fran,ais pr""ise egalement que Ie fait de conserver en memoire informatisee, sans
l'accord expres de l'interesse, des donnees nominatives qui, directement ou indirectement,
font apparaitre les origines raciales ou les opinions politiques, philosophiques ou religieuses
ou les appartenances syndicales ou les mreurs des personues constitue une infraction (655),
Pour ce qui concerne Ie march" interieur, les efforts visant il prevoir un choix exclusif de la
legislation applicable et Ie fait que des chevauchements de competences soient toujours
possibles sont autant d'incitations importantes pour les promoteurs de services en ligne A
essayer de contoumer specifiquement les regles applicables ala protection des donnees grace
it I'architecture de leurs infrastructures. L'environneIr.ent en ligne est soup Ie du point de vue
geographique. Une repartition des fonctions du responsable du traitement peut eire organisee
de sorte it tirer profit des differences dues a la « marge de manreuvre " des Etats membres,
Ainsi, un foumisseur franyais de services en ligne peut attribuer des adresses IP dynamiques
depuis des equipements situes au Royaume-Uni afin d'essayer d'eviter que la loi franyaise
relative it la protection des donnees s'applique aux destinataires de ces adresses ("'),

3.2.2.

Exemples precis

La legislation applicable et Jes divergences qu' elle renferme constituent des obstacles au
march<! interne dans trois types de cas particuliers, En premier lieu, les reponses
reglementaires aux questions soulevees par les services en ligne peuvent aboutir a
!'interdiction de celtains services dans certains Etats membres, mais pas dans tous. En
deu)(i<~me lieu, les regles relatives a la protection des donnees peuvent imposer des
difficultes supplementaires pour la prestation de services donnes dans certains Etats
membres, mais pas dans tous, Enfin, en raison de ces differences, la concurrence en matiere
de developpement des services en ligne dans les Etats membres peut etre faussee, Chacun de
ces types d' obstacles au marche interieur sera aborde dans cette section,

("')
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Code penal, .article 226-18,
Code penal, article 226-19.
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Voir infra 1.3.4.
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3.2.2(a)

Inlerdiclion de preslation des services

Comme cela a ete dit dans un precedent rapport (57), les transactions electroniques
augmentent rapidement grace it I'utilisation de sites web tant pour la diffusion
d'informations sur les produits que pour la realisation d'operations de ventes
Ces sites
courent Ie risque important de se heurter a des interdictions concernant la collecte des
donnees afferentes aux transactions dans certains Etats membres, et pas dans d'autres. Ains;,
les librairies en ligne se heurtent a des obstacles incontournable. Certains titres de livres
revelent toujours des donnees sensibles sur ceux qui les acheten!. En outre, les librairies en
ligne utiliseront habituellement un type de "panier de la menagere» et installeront des
« cookies}) sur Ie disque dur de l'acheteur independamment du lieu oli it est situe. Ces
« cookies" permettent au site web de ia librair;e de suivre la piste des achats de l' acheteur
aux fins de facturation.

e").

5i un utilisateur situe en France achetait des livres dans une librairie en ligne au RoyaumeUni teis que Catechisme de Nglise catholique, Devenir catho/ique meme si vous iiles, Elever
les enfants catholiques, les titres en eu.x-mcmes constitucraient des donnees sensibles. En
France, pour collecter de telles informations sensibles, Ie consentement ecrit de I'interesse
est necessaire tant aux teflnes de la loi relative a ia protection des donnees qu' aux termes du
code penal. Dans ce cas, Ie libraire est en infraction vis a vis de ia loi franl'aise en trailant la
transaction. Or, Ie libraire situe au Royaume-Uni ne d6couvrira Ie probleme qu'apres la
realisation de la transaction. Au Royaume-Uni, en revanche, la transaction est auterisee dans
la mesure au aueune exigence supplementaire n'a encore ete imposee en ce qui concerne Ie
traitement de donnees sensibles ('''). Des lors que les {( eookies » sont utilises par Ie libraire
en France, en vertu de la regie du choix de la legislation applicable contenue dans la
Directive 951461CE ('''), Ie Iibraire sera considere comme etabU en France pour ['application
de la 101 franyaise relative it la protection des donnees. Dans Ie meme temps, Ie libraire sera
un {( responsable du traitement )) soumis II la legislation britannique.
Un probleme similaire se pose pour Ie deve!oppement des services en ligne qui reposent
forlement sur les recette, publicitaires generees par les annonces publicitaires de tiers
installees sur les pages web par l'intennediaire d'entites telles que DoubleClick. En regie
generale, Ie site web conclut un contrat avec une agenee publicitaire qui, en retour, colleete
des informations aupres des eibles pour placer une annonce publicitaire pertinente sur J'ecran
de I' utilisateur. Pour au mains une agenee publicitaire, les informations tltilisees pour
proceder aux choix publicitaires impliquent une adresse IP et des tendanees reperees lars de

(h~")

Voir Rapport nO 1; Situation Giobale; Rapport n° 2: Etudes de cas

(li~li)

LaFNAC en France et Burton's au Royaume ..Uni sont deux de ces sltes.tres en vuc.
VO.ir2.4.4.
Voir directive 951461CE, article 4, § I.

(''')
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precedentes visites grace aux « cookies ». Toutefois, les donnees collectees ne comprennem
pas I'identite precise de l'utilisateur. Dans Ie cas du Hbraire, si un serveur britannique etait
utilise par I'agence de publicit;;, Ie service pourrait se heurter Ii de serieux obstacles scion Ie
pays europeen ou se trouvent les clients en Iigne. En vertu de la legislation sur la protection
des .donnees du Royaume-Uni ot de la doctrine prevalant dans ce pays, l'agence pourrait ne
pas etre soumise a la legislation sur la protection des donnees parce qu'il serait difficile
d'identifier la personne concernee i\ partir des informations traitees ('''). Cependant,
conform.oment aux theses qui prevalent en France et en Belgique, les informations afferentes
aux adresses IP combinees avec les donnees des « cookies" qui foumissent des indications
sur les tendances des precedentes visites pourraient probablement etre traileeS comme des
({ donnees a caractere personnel » (,6l). Par consequent, dans cos Etats membres, la eollecte
d'informations aupres des utilisateurs sur Ie territoire de ces Etats par I'agenee de publicit.:
sera interdite si les notifications requises n'ont pas .ote adressees aux .interesses et Ii l'autoritc
chargee de la protection des donnees (",').

Ie

D'autres exemples semblables pourraient etre trouves dans
cadre de l'utilisation de
moteurs de recherche ou de methodes destinees a reeolter des informations, Ainsi,
contrairement aux legislations relatives it la protection des donnees des autres Etats
membres, la loi allemande relative Ii la protection des donnees dans Ie cadre du
fonctionnement des teh,services interdit la creation de profils de comportement de
l'utilisateur sauf 5i dcs limitations strictes sont respectces, En regie gemlrale, la legislation
allemande exige que les protils de comportement de I'utilisateur soient camoufles par un
psendonyme (664). Des lors qu'on ne retreuve pas cette exigence dans les legislations des
trois autres Etats membres analysees dans la presente etude ni dans la Directive 95/46/CE, la
divergence fait peser une menace sur la legalite de l'utilisation de moteurs de recherche sur
Internet. A l'heure actuelle, les moteurs de recherche ne sont pas conyus pour ne creer que
des profils camoufles par un pseUdonyme.
3.2.2(b)

D/fficu/(es affectam fa prestation de services

En l'absence d'une restriction pure et simple affectant la prestation de certains services en
ligne, les divergences rencontrees dans les legislations relatives iJ. la protection des donnees
peuvent @tre al' origine de serieuses difficultes en ce qui concerne l' offre de services en Jigne
dans toute \'Union europ.enne. Ces difficultes peuvent it leur tour supposer des difficultes
pour Ie marcM interieur. Plusieurs exemp!es illustrent ces difficultes de base auxquelles se
heurtent les caracteristiques fondamentales des services en ligne. En Allemagne, les
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Y"jr U.3: 2.1.4.
Yoir2.1.1: 2.1.2.
Yoir 2.2,1; 2.2.2: 2,3.1: 2.3.2.
hiKDG, article 2, _ 4(4).
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fournisseurs de services en ligne doivent proposer aux utilisateurs diverses sortes d'options
concernant l'anonymat ou les pseudonymes ("'). D'autres BlaIS membres n'ont pas encore
impose d'exigences semblables. Par consequent, un fournisseur de service Internet doit soit
proposer les options allemandes dans to ute rUnion europeenne au offrir des services
diff6rents aux abonnes situes sur Ie territoire allemand.
Pour qu'un commerce elecrronique se developpe a travers I'Europe, les signatures
numeriques et In certification de ces signatures sont largement considerees comme des
elements necessaires. L' evolution de ces services dans les Etats membres se heurte
egalement it des difficultes concernant In protection des donnees. La loi allemande sur les
teleservices contient des dispositions sectorieHes sur les signatures numeriques et la collecte
d'informations personnelles Mes a In certification de la signature. Elle prevoit notamment
que des donnees peuvent uniquement etre collectees directement aupres des personnes
concern':es a moins qu'elles aient donne leur consentement a In colleete d'informations les
eoncernant aupres de tiers ("'). D'autres Etats mernbres n'ont pas impose d'exigences
comparables. Ainsi, I'utilisation de certificats de signature numerique en Allemagne sera
soumise a des dispositions particulieres en matiere de protection des donnees qui n' existent
dans aucun autre Etat membre.
3.2.2 (c)

Disrorsion de fa pres/alions de services

Meme si les divergences qui existent entre les Etat membres dans Ie domaine de la protection
des donnees ne conduisent pas a une interdiction pure et simple de la fournjture de services
en ligne au II des difficultes supplementaires pour ccux-cj, ces divergences peuvent
cependant representer des obstacles pour Ie marcM interieur. Ces divergences peuvent mener
it des distorsions de I' organisation structurelle des services en ligne. La technologie du
r"seau est extremement souple et permet aux fournisseurs de services de situer leurs activites
de traitement des informations sur divers territoires, ains! que de repartir les eomposantes de
leurs services pour une activite distincte de traitement, L'application des legislations
relatives a la protection des donnees des Etats membres Ii certains types de services peut
dondnciter les fournisseurs de serviees a situer au a resituer leurs activites en fonction de la
fn<;on dont Us souhaitent gerer la question de la protection des donnees.
Quelques exemples permettront d'illustrer facilement eet effet de distorsion. L'interpretation
Ia plus restrictive de Ia notion d'information relative a uno personne \( identifiable»
reneoutree au Royaume-Uni et en Allemagne (661) laisse penser que les fournisseurs de
service Internet seront incites a situer les serveurs qui attribuent les adresses IP dite
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Voir 2.3.3.
Voir 2.5.3.
VQ;r 2.1.3; 2.1.4

dynamiques dans ces Etats membres. Dans la mesure ou cos Etats membres ne traiteraient
pas les adresses IP dynamiques comme si elles "taient des « informations Ii caractere
personnel» pour ies destinataires web, Ie fournisseur de service Internet minimise
l'applicabHite de la legislation relative a la protection des donnees, quoiqu'en Allemagne In
loi >relative a la protection des donnees dans Ie cadre des t6leservices serait applicable. De
meme, Ie recueil d'adresses e-mail, auquel souhaitent proceder ies entreprises commerciales,
a toutes les chances de ne pas entrainer i'obligation de devoir respecter les exigences de In
legislation relative II ia protection des donnees dans des Etats membres tels que Ie Royaume·
Uni ou ces informations ne seront traitees comme des informations nominatives que si Ie
destinataire peut raisonnablement parvenir II identifier la personne concernee ("').
Du point de vue de l'utilisateur, ces distorsions sont particulierement troublantes. Dans un
envirormement en Iigne, il est frequent que l'utilisateur ne connaisse pas l'organisation de
l'infrastrueture, or eelle-ci peut avoh une in~idence fondamentale sur Ie degre de protection
des donnees pour les informations il caractere personnel concernant I'utilisateur. Cela est
particulierement vrai pour des utilisateurs situes dans des Etats membres tels que la France
ou la Belgique qui ant une interpretation de la protection des donnees beaucoup plus large
que les autres. Ces utilisateurs s'attendent legitimell1ent a beneficier d'un certain degre de
protection lorsqu'ils procedent a des echanges d'informations depuis leurs pays d'origine,
mais iis pcuvent etre surpris dc decouvrir que I'infrastructure situe Ie traitement dans Un Etat
membre dont les mesures de protection sont plus niduites. Ainsi, un utilisateur allemand qui
s'attend a ce que tout etablissernent de profil a partir des traces des eonnexions qu'i! a
effectuees sur un site soit realise par Ie foumisseur de service Internet en respectant son
anonymat peut deeouvrir avec surprise que Ie foumisseur de service Internet a situt! sur un
serveur britannique l'activite d'etablissement de profilsde comportement de l'utilisateur it
partir des traces des connexions eflectuees par l'utilisateur sur un site web, afin d't!viter
I' application de la loi allemande.

3.3. Solutions. techniques et politique de reglementation
Les divergences qui ressortent des legislations des BtalS membres et les obstacles au march<!
interne traduisent combien il est complexe et difficile d' appliquer des r"gles de protection
des donnees aux services en tigne. Deux series >d'optiQUS pour une politique de
n\glementation pourraient rt:'pondre II ces defis lances II la protection de la vie privee. La
premiere serie d' options depend des regles technologiques de mise en place de la protection
des donnees. Cette approchetechno1ogique offre 11 la fols des avantages et des inconvenients.
La seconde serie d'options envisage une polilique reglementaire effieace qui combinerai! un
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Voir 2.1.3; 2.1.4
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ensemble d'objectifs de politique juridique traditiOlmels et des instruments reglementaires
non traditionnels pour parvenir aune protection des donnees.

'3.3.1.

Solutions techniques

De memo que la technologic peut faire partie de la problematique de Ia protection des
donnees, l'infrastructure teclmoIogique peutegalement faire partie de la solution. Les regles
lechnologiques sont en passe de devenir une souree cle de la regulation dans
l'environnemenl du reseau (""). L'architecture d'intemel est dynamique et continuera 11
changer. Elle peut et doit etre clevelopp"e de fa~on II servir les objectifs de protection des
donnees.
Dans une certaine mesure, les solutions technologiques peuvent scrvir a minimis,:! tous les
confiits qui sonl susceptibles d'apparaltre du fait des divergences existant entre les
legislations des Etals membres. L'anonymat peut serYir a proteger les droits et les interets
des citoyens. Si Ie reseau peut etre structure de sorte a ce que I'anonymat puisse eire
maintenu pour certaines activites et pas pour d'autres, alors l'infrastructure aura un degre de
souplesse qui representera un moyen puissant de garantir la protection des donnees dans un
environnement en ligne complexe.
Autrement,les solutions technologiques pourraient etre utilisees pour aplanir les divergences
existant entre les legislations des Etats membres. Par exemple, les variations dans Ie contenu
de la declaration aux autorites de contrille et de la notification de l'utilisateur sont
susceptibles de faire l'objet d'un « courtage» automatis'; d'informations. En particulier, des
outils techniques tels que des agents intelligents pourraient iltre con~us pour rMuire a
I'essentiel la procedure de depot des declarations et Ia presentation de l'information aux
utilisateurs. Ces agents pourraient comparer les informations relatives aux pratiques d'un site
avec les mentions en vigeur par la legislation applicable, Des navigateurs pourraient aussi
envoyer un avertissement lorsque des informations Ii caractere personnel sont transmises, sur
Ie modele des alertes de securite qui apparaissent frequemment lorsqu'on accede a un
document {( non-code» ou lorsque I'on tente de precede; It une transmission « non-cO dee »
(670). De meme, une procedure automatique pourrait alleger les difficultes rencontrees lors
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Voir loel R. Reideoberg, Lex Informalica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through
TeChnology, 76 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 553 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in
Cyberspace, 45 EMORY LAW lOURNAL 869 (1996); loel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks
and Rule·Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 91) (1996); M. Sthan Kat,h,
Sofl;ware Worlds and the First Amendment: Virtual Doorkeepers In Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHICAGO
LEGAL FORUM 335.
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Netscape 3.0! Ilvertit du caractere peu sUr de certaines: activite.s QU de certains sites lorsqu'un
utiiisateur realise une.transactiPfl en Ugne.
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des declarations. Ainsi, si la declaration par voie electronique est autorisee, des programmes
au agents intelligents pourraient etre mis au point afin de permettre Ie fonctionncment d'un
systeme d'accomplissement des formalit"s en temps reel en ligne. II pourrait s'agir d'un
programme qui veriflerait Texistence d'une declaration si I'information est collectee au
transmise a des noms de domaines de l'interieur de I'Union europeenne. En l'absence de
declaration. Ie programme pourrait effectuer tout d'abord la presentation d'une declaration
electronique aupr"s de ['autorite de controle competente avant de proceder rcellement II la
collecte ou au traitement de toute information Ii caractere personnel originaire du domaine
europeen.
Au niveau eonceptuel, depuis bon nombre d'annees, les commISSIOns ehargees de la
protection des donnees en Europe ant encourage les technologies destinees a ameliorer la
protection de la vie privce (privacy enhancing technologies, PETS) car elles voient III une
solution poteniielle aux problemes poses par la protection des donnees. En general, la
solution offerle par les PETS est du type binaire: scit l'anonymat, soit I'identite. Dans
l'environnement en ligne, un anonymat total peut ne pas etre souhaitable dans certaines
circonstances, commc celles liees a une activit" criminelle lorsqu'il existe des raisons
legitimes d'identifier la per sonne concernee. Les technologies peuvent cependant etre
egalement considerees comme un moyen d' aborder differents problemes dans des contextes
differents (m). Une infrastructure peut etre com;ue pour garantir que seulcs les informations
pertincntes sont collectees, lorsque des informations "identifiees ou identifiables» sont
exigees, ou peut etre structuree pour interdire tout traitement ayant unc finalite differente des
finalites precisees au moment de la collecte (m) ..
Pour repondre a 18 pression qui a result" tant de l'adoption de la Directive 95/46/CE que des
auditions publiques qui se sont deroulees aux Elals-Unis devant Ie Congres et la Federal
Tmde Commission, les associations industrielles de lobbying vont de l'avant avec de
nombreuses normes techniques qui auront des repercussions sur la conception des services
en ligne. Or, du point de vue de la protection des donnees, les normes emergentes presentent
une grande faiblesse. Ainsi, 1'0pen Profiling Standard (<< OPS ») est une nonne technique
qui facilite la circulation des informations a caractere personnel entre les navigateur et l<,s
sites web (m). Telle qu'elle est con~ue, les utilisateurs inscriraient un profil de leurs
informations a caractere personnel dans des champs de donnees standardises sur leur
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Voir, par exemplet loel, R. Reidenberg, Lex. Informatica: The formulation of {nformation Policy
Rples through TeChnology, 76 TEJ\AS LAW REVIEW 553 (1998).
Par exemplc, !es Informations diffusees dans une enveloppe "securisee", telle qu'Utl cryPIO/Ope,
. empeche toute autre utilisation que celle tnitialemcnt envisagee par la personne qui a diffuse les
informations,
V~ir Netscape Communlcations Corporation SU,bmission Supptemental Comments V & VI! FTC
Consumer
Privacy
Hearings
(Juin
1997),
<http://www.ftc.gov/bep/privacy2lcomments2fnetscape.htm>.
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navigateur. Des cases specifiques peuvent etre cochees afin d' autoriser ou d' interdire tel ou
tel type d'utilisation, Le navigateur communiquera ensuite, dans la mesure autorisee par
l'utilisateur, les informations relatives au profil aux sites web visites par l'utilisateur. Bien
que celte solution soit attrayante par certains cotes, eUe presente egalement des
inconvenieilts importants. En premier lieu, Ia normalisation des champs de donnees destines
aux informations relatives au profil peUl considerablement ameliorer Ia comparaison des
donnees, En second lieu, la mise ell reuvre d'Ull OPS peut decourager I'anonymat de
protection dans la meSUre oil it est probable que ceux qui developpent les navigateurs
demanderont aux utilisateurs de creer des profils pour en faire un element de Ia configuration
initiale du navigateur.
Une autre initiative il souligner est mise en reuvre par Ie World Wide Web Consortium
(<< W3C»). W3C continue a travailler sur la norme ({ P3P » qui permettrait aux sites web et
aux utilisateurs de negocier des preferences de confidentiaHte pour les donnees collectees sur
Ie site web ("'). L'initiative est basee sur I'etiquetage PICS ot les technologies de filtrage
initialement mises au point pour resoudre Ie probleme de la pornographie sur Internet. Dans,
ces types d'initiatives d'etiquetage et de filtrage, les decisions prises en matiere de
conception impliqueront des choix politiques fondamentaux ("'), Comme ces exemples Ie
montrent, les decisions techniques, les architeetures et les normes peuvent etre elaborees en
vue d'encourager Ies objectifs de protection des donnees, mais ce nO sera pas
automatiquement Ie cas.
Les solutions techniques ne seront done pas la panacee et Ie developpement de la protection
des donnees ne peut s'arreter en raison de I'emergence de normes techniques impQrtantes.
Leur mise en ceuvre par les participants du reseau sera egaloment extremement importante.
Ainsi, bien que Netscape permette aux utilisateurs de Communicator 4.0 d'avoir un controle
sur les "cookies» plus important que cclui ·que leur offie Netscape 2,0, Ie deraut que
pn!sente Communicator est d'accepter tous les « cookies» installes par les sites web et de ne
pas infonner les utilisateurs de ees pratiques qui touchent it des informations les concernant
(6"). Lorsque Ies " cookies» sont traites comme des infonnations Ii caractere personnel,
I'installation de eeux-ei par defaut est contraire aux prineipes fondamentaux du droit
euro¢en relatif it Ia protection des donnees. De m8me, I'initiative P3P presente un interet
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Voir Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through
Technology, 76 TEXAS LA W REVIEW 553 (1998); Joel R, Reideoberg, The Use afTechnology to
A$$ure Infernet Privacy: Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection, LEX ELECTRONlCA,
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considerable pour la protection des donnees (611), rnais jusqu'il present, Ie processus de
developpernent a etO lent et n'en est pas encore au stade de la mise en application.

3.3.2.

Politiques rt3glementaires efficaces

En etudiant l'application des legislations relatives ala protection des donnees aux services en
ligne dans les Etats rnembres, la transposition des Directive 95/46/CE et 97166/CE
n' abordera pas complelement bon nombre de problemes fondamentaux souleves par Ie
champ d'application materiel des lois et la juridiction territoriale, la transparence, les profils
de comportement de I'utilisateur et la securite. Beaucoup des problemes nOn rt\solus resultent
du contexte specifique des services en tigne, it savoir la conception de !'infrastructure
existante et Ie developpement aclUel des applications liees au commerce electronique.
L'harmonisation juridique des principes de protection des donnees a un tel niveau de detail
dans un environnement dynamique sera une lourde tache. Face Ii une infrastructure en pleine
evolution, Ies considerations politiques seront importantes et la periode de temps necessaire
pour examiner les questions posees et pour parachever la procedure d' adoption d' une
nouvelle directive sera excessivement longue. Ainsi, la procedure d'adoption et de mise en
reuvre de la Directive 95146ICE a dure huit ans depuis la proposition initiale jU5qU'i1 lactate
de transposition dans les legislations nationales des Etats membres - une periode de temps
extraordinairement longue pour un environnement en Iigne qui change 5i rapidement.

I

En revanche, Ie Groupe de travail cree en vertu de la Directive 95146/CE (6") semble eire
bien situe pour examiner ces questions de divergence. Beaucoup de ces divergences sont
susceptibles d'etre rosolues par la voie d'un consensus sur I'interpretation des principes de
base. Ainsi, des orientations concernant l'anonymisation des informations a caractere
personnel pourraient etre elaborees par Ie Groupe de travail pour traiter les questions
relatives a la detlnition des informations "identifiables" et Ii la minimisation des donnees
collectees. Le Groupe de travail pourrait egalement etudier la question de l'uniformite du
contenu de I'information fouruie aux individus ot des declarations aux autarites de controle
aussi bien que I'uniformit" des mecanismes permettant de satisfaire it ces exigences par la
voie electronique (61,,).
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Voir, In.el R. Retdenberg, The Use of Technology 10 Assu,e Internet Privacy: Adapting Labels and
. Fillers
for
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Protection,
L.EX
ELECTRONICA,
Hl:2
<http://www.lex.
electronic •. erg/reiden be.htm I> (J 997).
Voir directive 95/46iCE, article 29.
En ce sens f1uniformite ,{h~signe \l.ne standardis_ution des descriptions et du typ~ d'information a
communiquer ct, dans ole ca,.dre des nptifications ou des _eoregistrements eleetroniques. une norme
teChnique s_p~cifiant les- champs de donnees et les Heux,
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Toutefois, les orientations politigues seules ne suffiront pas it garantir la protection des
donnees dans I'environnement du reseau (680), Les decisions techniques peuvent Hre a
l'origine de la creation de regles et eUes ont done des implications reglementaires
fondamentales pour les types d'informations it caractere personnel qui circulent sur Internet
et pour les'fayons dont ces informations sont traitees (6&1), L'infrastructure teclmigue pour les
flux des donnees en ligne peut etre l'instrument du succ"s de la mise en oeuvre des principes
de protection des donnees au peut les faire echouer, Dans Ie meme temps, les normes
relatives a la protection des donnees peuvent a leur tour Hre a I'origine d'amenagements
inattendus de I'infrastructure, Si l'AlJemagne exige gu'une information explicite soit fournic
a propos des {( cookies» et que la Belgique au Ie Royaume-Uni ne Ie font pas, les
fournisseurs de service peuvent tenter de situer leurs activites de traitement en Belgique au
au Royaurne.Uni,
Pour I'environnement en ligne, l'approche la plus puissante pour aboutir 11 une protection
loyales des donnees combinera les regles et les principes relatifs 11 la protection des donnees
ainsi que des infrastructures techniques permettant l'cxistence d'un respect Ie plus efficace et
Ie moins intrusif possible, Les services en ligne auront de plus en plus besoin de
differentiation technique et reglementaire, Quelques principes ele en matiere de conception
technique ant dejil .ote identifies par Ie Groupe de Berlin qui rassemblent les autorites
nationales de controle de la protection des donnees:
•

les donnees sensibles doivent etre cryplees

•

les technologies de J'information et des communications doivent permettre aux
utilisateurs de controler les donnees a caractere personnel qui les concement et de
faire connailre leur point de vue

•

il dolt eire possible d'acceder aux services en ligne de manlere anonyme

(Il~

Cette com,binaison de techniques est reconl1ue dans Ie projet de directive RNlS. Voir Common
Position (EC) n' 57196 adopted by the Council on 12 Septembol' 1996 with a view to .dopting
Directive 961 / Ee of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the processIng of
personal data lind the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector, in particular in the
integrated services digital network (RNIS) and in the public digital mobHe networks. Consiperant 7.
En outre, l'/nternationaJ Working Group 011 Data Protection in 1'elecommunicatinf1S a egalement
declare qu'''iI est imperatif dc<mettre au point des principes relatifs it I'elaboration des technolog,ies de
l'informatioo et des communications et du materiel et des logiciels multimedia~ pennertant a
l'utiHsateur Pflrticulier de controler ( ... ) les don(iees a caractere personnel ~e concernant", Qata
Pfot~ption ,a,nd Priva,cy ~mtQe lnternet: R.e.polt'and G.yidanct\(BerUn, 19'IlOV. 1.99,6.),
Voir Joel R. Reid~nherg, GQv~ming Netwprks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY LAW
JOURNAL91J (1996),

('BI)
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•

les methodes de cryptage sures doivent constituer une option legitime pour les
utilisateurs d'Internet

•

une certification avec" label de qualite " devrait eIre envisagee afin d'ameliorer la
transparence pour Ies utilisateurs ("').

Ces principes montrent que les choix el les decisions techniques pourraient reslreindre la
portee des questions auxquelles se heurte la reglementation. Par exemple, des lars que
l' aee,;s aux services en ligne est anonyme, la colleete et la conservation des traces de
transactions soulevent peu de questions si ce n' est aucune. Pour profiter au mieux de eet
effet de restriction de Ia portee des questions enlraine par les regles techniques, Ia protection
des donnees dolt avoir comme objectif Ie deveIoppement de technologies qui apportent des
possibililes des choix politiques dans differentes circonstances et une « marge de
manreuvre» parmi les Etats membres. Cependant, eet objectif de developpement de la
technologic doit aussi prendre en compte l'etablis~ement de regles imperatives pour la
circulation des informations; la technologie ne devrait pas offrir la possibilite de contourner
les regles d'ordre public, Cette approche nuancee, qui utilise les regles techniques pour
atteindre des objectifs de reglementation, offie aux autorites chargees de la protection des
donnees un ensemble d'inslnnnents importants pour atteindre des objectifs politiques (683).
Les outils principaux sont :
1)

la persuasion susceptible d'etre utilisee pour faire pression sur l'industrie afin qU'eIIe
mette au point des regles et des mecanismes techniques appropr;es (684);

2)

la participation des· autori!es cbargees de Ia protection des donnees au travail des
organisations de normalisation, pouvant favoriser l'emergence de mecanismes
destines it garantir les objectifs de la protection des donnees (685);

3)

Ie financement a travers des programmes, comme ESPRIT, qui peut serv;r Ii mettre
au point des technologies garantissant la protection des donnees (686);

International Working,Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, nata Protection and Privacy
on tne Internet: Report and Guidanee (Berlin, 19 novembre 1996).
(6I1l)
Voir Joel R, Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of information Policy Rules tnrough
Technology, 76 TEXAS LA W REVIEW p. 553,587·591 (1998).
(''')Id., p. 588-89.
(''')
Id., p. 589.
(612)

("")

Id.
144

I

l

4)

les achats du marche public ayont uue influence importante sur Ie de'veloppement des
marches prives et pouvant etre utilise!, comme un oulil concert'; pour encourager les
objectifu de protection des donnees (''');

5)

la Feglementation des comportements en imposant une responsabilite qui peut eIre
utili see camme une incitation indirecte pour :e developpement de regles techniques
destinees a gllIantir la protection des donnees dans des environnements de
reseaux ("');

6)

la reglementation des normes qui gllIantissent que certaines regles specifiques de
protection des donnees ne sont pas contoumees (6").

Cmnme ces outils Ie montrent, la Lex Informatica, ou des regles politiques emprunlant la
voie de la technologie, signifiera de plus en pius que les choix politiques seront effectu';es
dans Ie choix des protocoles et des normes. Ce phonomene est bien illustre par les projets
Internet d' etiquetage et de filtrage pour la protection des donnees. Les termes et les eriteres
utilises pour etiqueter les pratiques en matiere de protection des donnees traduisent des
jugements politiques (""'). En particulier, la traduction des principes de protection des
donnees dans des specifications techniques est Ie rellet de ehoix fondes sur un jugement
plutot que Ie reflet de termes dietees par des principes de protection des donnees. Par
ailleurs, Ia politisation des choix techniques sera un fait inevitable de la societe de
.
l'information.
Les autorites de reglementation de ia protection des donnees, a savoir la Commission
europeenne et les autorites nationales, devrant combiner l' ensemble des six instruments
cnumer':s plus haut si elles souhaitent qu'une politique reglementaire efficaee voie Ie jour.
Aucune approche unique ne fonctionnera correctement dans J' environnement en ligne. Ainsi,
la reglementation des comportements dans I'environnement en ligne necessitera toujours une
capacite technique adequate et l'adoption d'une norme ne devrait pas empecher les
developpements technologiques futurs.

CiS1 )
(f'U)

ld. Par ex~mple, tous les acbats publics de logiciels de navigation po,urraient edger que certaines
regles de protection des donnees soient mises en ceHvre par Ie navigateur,
Id,. p. 590. Alnsi. la loi fran~ajse sur les telecommunications fait encourir une responsabUite aux
fournisseurs de service s'ils ne proposent pas ,de mecanismes de mtrage a leurs abonnes.

(bS,)

ld.

(690)

Voir Joel R, Reidenberg, The Use of Technology to Assure internet Privacy: Adapting L_abels and
Fillers
for
Data
Profection,
LEX. ELECTRONIC A,
1ll:2
<http://w,"w.lex.

electronica.orglreidenbe.html> (1997).
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Pour rUnion europeenne, la Directive 951461CE offre deja un mecanisme important pour
aborder la protection des donnees a travers ces formes de regles technologiques. Beaucoup
de questions pourraient etre efficacement r':salues a travers les procedures existantes qui
concernent les codes de conduite ("'). La Directive 9S/461CE indique c1airement que les
Etats membres et la Commission:

.

doivent encourager les milieux professionnels concernes a elaborer des codes de
conduite en vue de favoriser, compte tenu des specificites du traitement de donnees
effectue dans certains sccteurs, la mise en reuvre de la pn5sentc directive dans Ie
respect des dispositions nationales prises pour son application (692).

\

Cette base juridique existante constitue Une voie importante pour la recherche d'lID
consensus entre les Etats membres en ce qui conceme les mecanismes techniques qui rendent
la protection des donnees possible Ii Une grande eehelle dans l'enviroMement en tigne. En
effet, les regles et les protocoles techniques qui determinent la circulation de I'information
sont des « codes de conduite}) a l'instar des lignes directrices elaborees par les milieux
professionnels (693). Toutefols, a la difference des codes de conduite traditionnels de
I'industrie, ces regie, et protocoles techniques ant une force d'application et de mise cn
oeuvre immediate; ils seront decisifs pour les flux des dOMees sur Ie roseau ('''). Des lars
qu'its qualifient les normes de systemes techniques de « codes de conduite)), la Commission
europeenne, Ie Groupe de travail et les autorites de controle nationales auront la competence
juridique d'intervenir activement sur des forums qui ne sont pas traditionnellement lies a la
protection des dOMees, comme l'Organisation internationale de normalisation ("''').

\

En sam me, pour garantir une protection des donnees qui tient compte de l' ensemble des
priocipes prevus par la Directive 95146/CE dans Ie contexte de 'i'enviroMement en ligne, les
autorites chargees de la protection des donnees de l'Union europeenne doivent exercer une
influence politique sur les decisions relatives a I'infrastructure technique affectant la nature et
les caracteristiques des flux des donnees, Des groupes tels que Ie W3C et les autres
organismes charges de la normalisation detiennent de plus en plus I'equivalent d'un pouvoir

("')
("')

Directive 9~146/CE, article 27.
Directive 95/46ICB, <onsiderant 61.

e"i)

Le profe.sseur Lessig dtsigne meme les obligations irnposees par Jes reglements et les lois integrees
dans les logiciels par Ie mot "code ". Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace. 45
EMORY LAW JOURNAL p. 669, 896(1996),

("")

Voir Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Inform.tion Policy Rules through
TeChnology, 76 TEXAS LAW RBVIBW p. 553. 572·573 (1998).
.

(b9S)

Voir Directive 95/46/CE. article 27(2) et 27(3). L'Qrganisation intemationale de norm,ali.sation
examine actueUement la propositio~ ca~_udienne d'-adoption d'une norme relatif a Ia c_onfidentiaUte
des "donnees similaire, a la noone ,c!inadien. Canadian Standards A$Sociatlon; Model Code for the
Protection ofperllo~al·ll1form'tion (1996).

\.46

L

de reglementation en matiere de politique de protection des donnees. Si Ia Commission
europeenne et Ie Groupe de travail souhaitent continuer 11 jouer un role reel dans Ie domaine
de la protection des donnees, il leur fauora acqw§rir une competence technique importante et
poursuivre leur reuvre de protection des donnees en utilisant un eventail d'instruments
politiques de reglementation allant au-delit de I'approche juridique traditionneJle de 1a
directive.

;.
i
i
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ANNEXE

.-

TABLEAU 1

LES SERVICES EN L1GNE ET LA PROTECTION DES DONNEES:
LES REPONSES DE LA REGLEMENTATION

!

Competence: Champ d'application materiel des «informations it caraclere personneb)
i

I Belgique

I
i

fDefinilion des
I informations cornme
! «identifiables»

i
i

France

Allemagne
i

,

I

Ii Large

Large

(ex,: .dresse IP dynamique
or adress•• -mail)

I Royaume-Uni
i

Contextuelle

' Contextuelle

i

!

Exclusions specifiques

Oui
i

Inclusions specifiques

i

I Non

(par exemple,
donnees publiques,
bases de donnees
diffusees ?)

Non

Non

Non

I

,

IOUi

Non

Oui

!

I

connexions des

(ex. donnees
anonymes!

(ex. fichiers de

!

utilisateurs~

donnees

cookies)

camouflees par un
pseudonyme)

Encourage(e)

Exige(e)

i

Anonymat!
Utilisation d'un
pseudonyme

Encourage(e)
i

i
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I,

Encourage(e)

TABLEAU 2

I
i

LES SERVICES EN LIONE ET LA PROTECDON DES DONNEES:
LES REPONSES DE LA REGLEMENTATlON
Competence: Champ d' application materiel des (<informations a caractere personneh>
Effet des directives

Directive 95/46/CE

Directive 97/99/CE

Convergence incomplete

Convergence incomplete

Definition des informations
, comme «identifIableSl)
(ex .•dresse IP dynamique ou
.dresse e.mail)

Exclusions specifiques

I

(donnees de fac!uration uniquement)

I Convergence limitee

Convergence incomplete

(ex. journalistes, foyers)

(ex. determination de I'origine d'un

: appel)

Inclusions speeifiques

Une certaine convergence

Pas d'effet

(c.a.d. «donnees relatives au Iratic»;
l'identificaiton du numero appellant)

Anonymatl
Utilisation d'Wl
pseUdonyme

Indirectement encQurage(e)

\51

Encourage(e)

TABLEAU 3

LES SERVICES EN LIGNE ET LA PROTECTION DES DONN1lES:
LES REPONSES DE LA REGLEMENTA1l0N
,

Juridiction territorielIe- Notificaiton et Controle
,

i

,
Belgique

France

Allemagne

I Royaume-Uni
!

,

Obligation de
Declaration
Declaration
Detaillee

Oui

Oui

Oui

Oui

Si Ie serveur est situe dans
l'Etat membre

Oui

Oui

Oui

Oui

Oui

Oui

Peu clair

Peu probable

Exemptions de declaration

Oui

Non

Non

Non

Declarations simplifiees

Non

Oui

Non

Oui

Non

Fixe

Si les informations des sites
web etrangers sont
accessibles II partir de I'Etat
membre
I

,

Depot de la declaration
Redevance

Variable

Depot electronique

Sur disquette

N/A

,

Pas encore

Pas encore

, Oui

I

TABLEAU 4

LES SERVICES EN LIGNE ET LA PROTECTION DES DONNEES:
LES REPONSES DE LA REGLEMENTATION
Juridiction temtorieIle: Notification et Controle

~__________________'I____E_ffi_e_t_d_eS_d_i_re_C_tiv_e_S______~I
!

Directive 95/46/CE

!

__________________~
Directive 97/66/CE

Obligation de declaration
Convergence incomplete

Pas d'effet

Convergence

Pas d'effet

Convergence incomplete

Pas d'effet

Une certaine convergence

Pas d'effet

Convergence

Pas d'effet

Declaration detaiIlee

,i

i
!

Si Ie serveur est sitne dans I'Etat
membre

i
i'

r

i Si les infonnations des sites web
; : .:trangers sont accessibllOS Ii
~ partir de FEtat membre
,
f, Exemptions de declaration

f

i Declarations simplifiees
"

I'~----------------------~------------------------r-------------------4

i Depot de la declaration

':
I
J;

1:1 Redevances

Pas d'effet

Pas d'effet

Pas d'effet

Pas d'effet

H:

Depot electronique

[

I

II
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TABLEAU 5

LES SERVICES EN LlGNE ET LA PROTECTION DES DONNEES:
LES REPONSES DE LA REGLEMENTAnON
Transparence

Belgique
, Information en cas de
i collecte directe

I France

i Oui

Allemagne

Oui

10Ui

' Royaume-Uni

10Ui

i
i

,

Infonnation en cas de'
collecte indirecte

i

,

Oui

; Non

i

Contenu de I'information
, fOUInie

Peut-etre

Oui
!

Detaille

I Detaille

D6taill"

Detaille

I

Information speciale pour
les services en Iigne

Finalites et
risques

I
I Cookies

--

Information explicite
SUI les finalites
; Reacheminement
supplementaires pour
Options Anonyma! , les donnees sensibles
I

Consentement special pour
: Internet

Non

Oui

Oui

I Non
i

i
Redevances de l'exereice
du droit d'aeees

.2.5 ceus

3,0 "cus
(seeteur public)

15 eeus

Non

4,5 eeus
(sceteur prive)
,

i
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TABLEAU 6

ET LA PROTECTION DES DONN ES:
I
LES SERVIeES> EN LONE
LES REPONSES DE LA REGLE:YlENTATION
Transparence
Effet des directives
i

Directive 95/46/CE

; Directive 97/66/CE

!

I
Information en cas de collecte
directe

Convergence

Convergence incomplete
(ex. donnees relatives au trafic)
i

Information en cas de collecte
indirecte

Contenu de !'information
fournie

Information speciale pour les
services en Iigne

Convergence

Pas d'effet

Convergence incomplete

Pas d'effet

i

,

I Convergence limit6c

Pas d'effet

i

. (ex. annualres en ligne)

Consenternent special pour
Internet

Redevances de l'exercice du
droit d'acces

: Pas d'effet

Pas d'effet

Pas d'effet

Pas d'effet

i
I
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I

TABLEAU?

I

~----<-~---

LES SERVICES EN LIGNE ET LA PROTECTION DES DONNEES:
LES REPONSES DE LA REGLEMENTA nON
Profils de comportement de l'utilisateur et donnees sensibles

I
I

,

i

Reglesectorielle
s de fmalite

!

Decisions
automatiques

Consentemenl
exige pour Ie
traitement en
ligne de
donnees
sensibles

;

i

I Royaume-Vni

I

I

France

Oui

Oui

Oui

Non

(ex~

(ex. mention de
la fmalite des
sites Internet)

(ex. ';tablissement de
profils en ligne avec
camouflage SOllS
pseudonyme)

(Mais, certaines limites
atravers les principes
de « loyaute » et de
consentement)

p~ ~"k'oo1
do
particuliere

i

I
i

-

Prealable, peut-etre
< par terit
i

I Allemagne

Belgique

profils pour
credit a la
consommation)

I

i

i

I
,

<-

I Pas de restriction

","mi'

I

Prealable, par
ecrit

particuliere

Pas de restriction
particuliere

Pas d'exigences
particulieres

Pas d' exigences
particulieres
'j

I
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TABLFAU8

LES SERVICES EN LIGNE ET LA PROTECTION DES DONNEES:
LES mONSES DE LA REGLElYfENTATlON
Profils de comportement de l'ulilisateur et donnees sensibles
Effel des directives

I Directive 97/661CE

I Directive 951461CE
!

Regles sectorieUes
de finalite

Decisions
automatiques

i

I
Autorisees

' Convergence

Convergence

. Pas d' effet
i

Consenlement
exige pour Ie
traitement en ligne
de donnees
sensibles

Pas d' effet particulier

Convergence

(en general des protections
speciales sont applicables)

(c.a.d. donnees de facturalion
de I' abonne)
i
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TABLEAU 9
r~-------------------------------------------------------------~-----~

LES SERVICES EN L1GNE ET LA PROTECTION DES DO.l>;'NEES:
LES REPONSES DE LA REGLEMENTATlON
Securite
,

,

Obligation de
foumir une securit!!
pour donnees des
services en ligne

i

I Belgique

I France

I Allemagne

:

I

I

Royaume-Uni

i

I

Qui

Oui

i

Oui

Oui

i

I

Cryptographie

I
Tiers de sequestre

\

Pas encore

Acces des autorites
chargees de la siltete
, d'Etat et de la
repression, de la
criminalite au
contenu des
communications
Envisage

I

I

i

, Rcglemcntation
des signatures
numeriques

I

' Pas encore

Volontaire

Pas encore

Sans restriction

Sans restriction

Autoris6e
i

En cours de
n!glementation

158

i Envisage
I

Envisage

TABLEAU 10

LES SERVICES EN LIGNE ET LA PROTECTION DES DONNEES:
LES REPONSES DE LA REGLEMENTATION
Securite
ElIet des directives

.

IDirective 97/66/CE

Directive 95/46/CE

!

Obligation de fournir
une securite pour
donnees des services
enligne

I

Convergence

Convergence

Reglementation des
signatures numeriques

Pas d'elIet

Pas d'elIet

Cryptographic

Encouragee

I Encouragee

Tiers de sequestre

Pas d'e!Iet

l

Convergence limitee
(c.ll.d. toute caracteristique
obligato ire autre que celles
exigees par les autorites
chargees de1a silret" d'Etat et de
la repression de lacriminalite ne
peut pas empecher la libre
circulation du materiel)

i
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